Statcon Cases 3 Constitutional Construction

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 78059 August 31, 1987
ALFREDO M. DE LEON, ANGEL S. SALAMAT, MARIO C. STA. ANA, JOSE C. TOLENTINO,
ROGELIO J. DE LA ROSA and JOSE M. RESURRECCION, petitioners,
vs.
HON. BENJAMIN B. ESGUERRA, in his capacity as OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal,
HON. ROMEO C. DE LEON, in his capacity as OIC Mayor of the Municipality of Taytay, Rizal,
FLORENTINO G. MAGNO, REMIGIO M. TIGAS, RICARDO Z. LACANIENTA, TEODORO V.
MEDINA, ROSENDO S. PAZ, and TERESITA L. TOLENTINO, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
An original action for Prohibition instituted by petitioners seeking to enjoin respondents from
replacing them from their respective positions as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of
Barangay Dolores, Municipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal.
As required by the Court, respondents submitted their Comment on the Petition, and petitioner's their
Reply to respondents' Comment.
In the Barangay elections held on May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected
Barangay Captain and the other petitioners Angel S. Salamat, Mario C. Sta. Ana, Jose C. Tolentino,
Rogelio J. de la Rosa and Jose M. Resurreccion, as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores,
Taytay, Rizal under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act of
1982.
On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M, de Leon received a Memorandum antedated December
1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987
designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores, Taytay,
Rizal. The designation made by the OIC Governor was "by authority of the Minister of Local
Government."
Also on February 8, 1987, respondent OIC Governor signed a Memorandum, antedated December
1, 1986 designating respondents Remigio M. Tigas, Ricardo Z. Lacanienta Teodoro V. Medina,
Roberto S. Paz and Teresita L. Tolentino as members of the Barangay Council of the same
Barangay and Municipality.
That the Memoranda had been antedated is evidenced by the Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor,
the pertinent portions of which read:
xxx xxx xxx
That I am the OIC Governor of Rizal having been appointed as such on March 20,
1986;
That as being OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal and in the performance of my
duties thereof, I among others, have signed as I did sign the unnumbered
memorandum ordering the replacement of all the barangay officials of all the
barangay(s) in the Municipality of Taytay, Rizal;
That the above cited memorandum dated December 1, 1986 was signed by me
personally on February 8,1987;
That said memorandum was further deciminated (sic) to all concerned the following
day, February 9. 1987.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NONE.
Pasig, Metro Manila, March 23, 1987.
Before us now, petitioners pray that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared null
and void and that respondents be prohibited from taking over their positions of Barangay Captain
and Barangay Councilmen, respectively. Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the
Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office "shall be six (6) years which shall
commence on June 7, 1982 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall
have qualified," or up to June 7, 1988. It is also their position that with the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to designate
their successors.
On the other hand, respondents rely on Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution,
promulgated on March 25, 1986, which provided:
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973
Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or
executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their
successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from February
25,1986.
By reason of the foregoing provision, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and
appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of the
aforequoted provision and not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the
provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six (6) years
must be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with the aforequoted provision of the
Provisional Constitution.
Examining the said provision, there should be no question that petitioners, as elective officials under
the 1973 Constitution, may continue in office but should vacate their positions upon the occurrence
of any of the events mentioned. 1
Since the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution, there has been no proclamation or executive
order terminating the term of elective Barangay officials. Thus, the issue for resolution is whether or
not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the one-year
period which ended on February 25, 1987.
Considering the candid Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, we hold that February 8, 1977, should
be considered as the effective date of replacement and not December 1,1986 to which it was ante
dated, in keeping with the dictates of justice.
But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one-year deadline, the aforequoted provision
in the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII
of the 1987 Constitution reading.
SECTION 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all
previous Constitutions.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore, the
Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative,
respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof to designate
respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.
Petitioners must now be held to have acquired security of tenure specially considering that the
Barangay Election Act of 1982 declares it "a policy of the State to guarantee and promote the
autonomy of the barangays to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities. 2 Similarly, the 1987 Constitution ensures the autonomy of local governments and of
political subdivisions of which the barangays form a part, 3 and limits the President's power to "general
supervision" over local governments. 4 Relevantly, Section 8, Article X of the same 1987 Constitution
further provides in part:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years ...
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law, therefore, the term of office
of six (6) years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 5 should still govern.
Contrary to the stand of respondents, we find nothing inconsistent between the term of six (6) years
for elective Barangay officials and the 1987 Constitution, and the same should, therefore, be
considered as still operative, pursuant to Section 3, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, reading:
Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations letters of
instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent, with this Constitution
shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked.
WHEREFORE, (1) The Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Governor on February 8, 1987
designating respondents as the Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen, respectively, of
Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal, are both declared to be of no legal force and effect; and (2) the
Writ of Prohibition is granted enjoining respondents perpetually from proceeding with the
ouster/take-over of petitioners' positions subject of this Petition. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin and Cortes, JJ.,
concur.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, CJ., concurring:

The main issue resolved in the judgment at bar is whether the 1987 Constitution took effect
on February 2, 1987, the date that the plebiscite for its ratification was held or whether it took effect
on February 11, 1987, the date its ratification was proclaimed per Proclamation No. 58 of the
President of the Philippines, Corazon C. Aquino.
The Court's decision, with the lone dissent of Mr. Justice Sarmiento, holds that by virtue of the
provision of Article XVIII, Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution that it "shall take effect immediately
upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose," the 1987
Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987, the date of its ratification in the plebiscite held on that
same date.
The thrust of the dissent is that the Constitution should be deemed to "take effect on the date its
ratification shall have been ascertained and not at the time the people cast their votes to approve or
reject it." This view was actually proposed at the Constitutional Commission deliberations, but was
withdrawn by its proponent in the face of the "overwhelming" contrary view that the Constitution "will
be effective on the very day of the plebiscite."
The record of the proceedings and debates of the Constitutional Commission fully supports the
Court's judgment. It shows that the clear, unequivocal and express intent of the Constitutional
Conunission in unanimously approving (by thirty-five votes in favor and none against) the
aforequoted Section 27 of Transitory Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution was that "the act of
ratification is the act of voting by the people. So that is the date of the ratification" and that "the
canvass thereafter [of the votes] is merely the mathematical confirmation of what was done during
the date of the plebiscite and the proclamation of the President is merely the official confirmatory
declaration of an act which was actually done by the Filipino people in adopting the Constitution
when they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite."
The record of the deliberations and the voting is reproduced hereinbelow: 1
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, may we now put to a vote the original
formulation of the committee as indicated in Section 12, unless there are other
commissioners who would like to present amendments.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. May I propose the following amendments.
On line 2, delete the words "its ratification" and in lieu thereof insert the following-.
"THE PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT IT HAS BEEN RATIFIED." And
on the last line, after "constitutions," add the following: "AND THEIR
AMENDMENTS."
MR. MAAMBONG. Just a moment, Madam President. If Commissioner Davide is

going to propose an additional sentence, the committee would suggest that we take
up first his amendment to the first sentence as originally formulated. We are now
ready to comment on that proposed amendment.
The proposed amendment would be to delete the words "its ratification and in lieu
thereof insert the words "THE PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT IT HAS
BEEN RATIFIED." And the second amendment would be: After the word
"constitutions," add the words" AND THEIR AMENDMENTS,"
The committee accepts the first proposed amendment. However, we regret that we
cannot accept the second proposed amendment after the word "constitutions"
because the committee feels that when we talk of all previous Constitutions,
necessarily it includes "AND THEIR AMENDMENTS."
MR. DAVIDE. With that explanation, l will not insist on the second. But, Madam
President, may I request that I be allowed to read the second amendment so the
Commission would be able to appreciate the change in the first.
MR. MAAMBONG. Yes, Madam President, we can now do that.
MR. DAVIDE. The second sentence will read: "THE PROCLAMATION SHALL BE
MADE WITHIN FIVE DAYS FOLLOWING THE COMPLETION OF THE CANVASS
BY THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS OF THE RESULTS OF SUCH
PLEBISCITE."
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, after conferring with our chairman, the
committee feels that the second proposed amendment in the form of a new sentence
would not be exactly necessary and the committee feels that it would be too much for
us to impose a time frame on the President to make the proclamation. As we would
recall, Madam President, in the approved Article on the Executive, there is a
provision which says that the President shall make certain that all laws shall be
faithfully complied. When we approve this first sentence, and it says that there will be
a proclamation by the President that the Constitution has been ratified, the President
will naturally comply with the law in accordance with the provisions in the Article on
the Executive which we have cited. It would be too much to impose on the President
a time frame within which she will make that declaration. It would be assumed that
the President would immediately do that after the results shall have been canvassed
by the COMELEC.
Therefore, the committee regrets that it cannot accept the second sentence which
the Gentleman is proposing, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. I am prepared to withdraw the same on the assumption that there will
be an immediate proclamation of the results by the President.
MR. MAAMBONG. With that understanding, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. I will not insist on the second sentence.
FR. BERNAS. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Bernas is recognized.

FR. BERNAS. I would ask the committee to reconsider its acceptance of the
amendment which makes the effectivity of the new Constitution dependent upon the
proclamation of the President. The effectivity of the Constitution should commence
on the date of the ratification, not on the date of the proclamation of the President.
What is confusing, I think, is what happened in 1976 when the amendments of 1976
were ratified. In that particular case, the reason the amendments of 1976 were
effective upon the proclamation of the President was that the draft presented to the
people said that the amendment will be effective upon the proclamation made by the
President. I have a suspicion that was put in there precisely to give the President
some kind of leeway on whether to announce the ratification or not. Therefore, we
should not make this dependent on the action of the President since this will be a
manifestation of the act of the people to be done under the supervision of the
COMELECand it should be the COMELEC who should make the announcement
that, in fact, the votes show that the Constitution was ratified and there should be no
need to wait for any proclamation on the part of the President.
MR. MAAMBONG. Would the Gentleman answer a few clarificatory questions?
FR. BERNAS. Willingly, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. The Gentleman will agree that a date has to be fixed as to exactly
when the Constitution is supposed to be ratified.
FR. BERNAS. I would say that the ratification of the Constitution is on the date the
votes were supposed to have been cast.
MR. MAAMBONG. Let us go to the mechanics of the whole thing, Madam President.
We present the Constitution to a plebiscite, the people exercise their right to vote,
then the votes are canvassed by the Commission on Elections. If we delete the
suggested amendment which says: "THE PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT
THAT IT HAS BEEN RATIFIED," what would be, in clear terms, the date when the
Constitution is supposed to be ratified or not ratified, as the case may be?
FR. BERNAS. The date would be the casting of the ballots. if the President were to
say that the plebiscite would be held, for instance, on January 19, 1987, then the
date for the effectivity of the new Constitution would be January 19, 1987.
MR. MAAMBONG. In other words, it would not depend on the actual issuance of the
results by the Commission on Elections which will be doing the canvass? That is
immaterial Madam President
FR. BERNAS. It would not, Madam President, because "ratification" is the act of
saying "yes" is done when one casts his ballot.
MR. MAAMBONG. So it is the date of the plebiscite itself, Madam President?
FR. BERNAS. Yes, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. With that statement of Commissioner Bernas, we would like to

know from the proponent, Commissioner Davide, if he is insisting on his amendment.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I am insisting on the amendment because I cannot
subscribe to the view of Commissioner Bernas, that the date of the ratification is
reckoned from the date of the casting of the ballots. That cannot be the date of
reckoning because it is a plebiscite all over the country. We do not split the moment
of casting by each of the voters. Actually and technically speaking, it would be all
right if it would be upon the announcement of the results of the canvass conducted
by the COMELEC or the results of the plebiscite held all over the country. But it is
necessary that there be a body which will make the formal announcement of the
results of the plebiscite. So it is either the President or the COMELEC itself upon the
completion of the canvass of the results of the plebiscite, and I opted for the
President.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Nolledo is recognized.
MR. NOLLEDO. Thank you, Madam President. I beg to disagree with Commissioner
Davide. I support the stand of Commissioner Bernas because it is really the date of
the casting of the "yes" votes that is the date of the ratification of the Constitution The
announcement merely confirms the ratification even if the results are released two or
three days after. I think it is a fundamental principle in political law, even in civil law,
because an announcement is a mere confirmation The act of ratification is the act of
voting by the people. So that is the date of the ratification. If there should be any
need for presidential proclamation, that proclamation will merely confirm the act of
ratification.
Thank you, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Does Commissioner Regalado want to contribute?
MR. REGALADO. Madam President, I was precisely going to state the same support
for Commissioner Bernas, because the canvass thereafter is merely
the mathematical confirmation of what was done during the date of the plebiscite and
the proclamation of the President is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an
act which was actually done by the Filipino people in adopting the Constitution when
they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite.
MR. LERUM. Madam President, may I be recognized.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Lerum is recognized.
MR. LERUM. I am in favor of the Davide amendment because we have to fix a date
for the effectivity of the Constitution. Suppose the announcement is delayed by, say,
10 days or a month, what happens to the obligations and rights that accrue upon the
approval of the Constitution? So I think we must have a definite date. I am, therefore,
in favor of the Davide amendment.
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Maambong is recognized.
MR. MAAMBONG. With the theory of the Commissioner, would there be a necessity
for the Commission on Elections to declare the results of the canvass?
FR. BERNAS. There would be because it is the Commission on Elections which
makes the official announcement of the results.
MR. MAAMBONG. My next question which is the final one is: After the Commision
on Elections has declared the results of the canvass, will there be a necessity for the
President to make a proclamation of the results of the canvass as submitted by the
Commission on Elections?
FR. BERNAS. I would say there would be no necessity, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. In other words, the President may or may not make the
proclamation whether the Constitution has been ratified or not.
FR. BERNAS. I would say that the proclamation made by the President would be
immaterial because under the law, the administration of all election laws is under an
independent Commission on Elections. It is the Commission on Elections which
announces the results.
MR. MAAMBONG. But nevertheless, the President may make the proclamation.
FR. BERNAS. Yes, the President may. And if what he says contradicts what the
Commission on Elections says, it would have no effect. I would only add that when
we say that the date of effectivity is on the day of the casting of the votes, what we
mean is that the Constitution takes effect on every single minute and every single
second of that day, because the Civil Code says a day has 24 hours.So that even if
the votes are cast in the morning, the Constitution is really effective from the previous
midnight.
So that when we adopted the new rule on citizenship, the children of Filipino mothers
or anybody born on the date of effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, which is January
17, 1973, are natural-born citizens, no matter what time of day or night.
MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, safely say that whatever date is
the publication of the results of the canvass by the COMELEC retroacts to the date of
the plebiscite?
MR. MAAMBONG. I thank the Commissioner.
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.
MR. GUINGONA. Mention was made about the need for having a definite date. I
think it is precisely the proposal of Commissioner Bernas which speaks of the date
(of ratification that would have a definite date, because there would be no definite
date if we depend upon the canvassing by the COMELEC.
Thank you,
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Concepcion is recognized.
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Madam President.
Whoever makes the announcement as to the result of the plebiscite, be it the
COMELEC or the President, would announce that a majority of the votes cast on a
given date was in favor of the Constitution. And that is the date when the Constitution
takes effect, apart from the fact that the provision on the drafting or amendment of
the Constitution provides that a constitution becomes effective upon ratification by a
majority of the votes cast, although I would not say from the very beginning of the
date of election because as of that time it is impossible to determine whether there is
a majority. At the end of the day of election or plebiscite, the determination is made
as of that time-the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held on such and such a
date. So that is the time when the new Constitution will be considered ratified and,
therefore, effective.
THE PRESIDENT. May we now hear Vice-President Padilla.
MR. PADILLA. Madam President, I am against the proposed amendment of
Commissioner Davide and I support the view of Commissioner Bernas and the
others because the ratification of the Constitution is on the date the people, by a
majority vote, have cast their votes in favor of the Constitution. Even in civil law, if
there is a contract, say, between an agent and a third person and that contract is
confirmed or ratified by the principal, the validity does not begin on the date of
ratification but it retroacts from the date the contract was executed.
Therefore, the date of the Constitution as ratified should retroact to the date that the
people have cast their affirmative votes in favor of the Constitution.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Maambong is recognized
MR. MAAMBONG. We will now ask once more Commissioner Davide if he is
insisting on his amendment
MR. DAVIDE. In view of the explanation and overwhelming tyranny of the opinion
that it will be effective on the very day of the plebiscite, I am withdrawing my
amendment on the assumption that any of the following bodies the Office of the
President or the COMELEC will make the formal announcement of the results.
MR. RAMA. Madam President, we are now ready to vote on the original provision as
stated by the committee.
MR. MAAMBONG. The committee will read again the formulation indicated in the
original committee report as Section 12.
This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose and shall supersede all previous
Constitutions.
We ask for a vote, Madam President.
VOTING
THE PRESIDENT. As many as are in favor, please raise their hand. (Several
Members raised their hands.)
As many as are against, please raise their hand. (No Member raised his hand.)
The results show 35 votes in favor and none against; Section 12 is approved. 2
The Court next holds as a consequence of its declaration at bar that the Constitution took effect on
the date of its ratification in the plebiscite held on February 2, 1987, that: (1) the Provisional
Constitution promulgated on March 25, 1986 must be deemed to have been superseded by the 1987
Constitution on the same date February 2, 1987 and (2) by and after said date, February 2, 1987,
absent any saying clause to the contrary in the Transitory Article of the Constitution, respondent OIC
Governor could no longer exercise the power to replace petitioners in their positions as Barangay
Captain and Councilmen. Hence, the attempted replacement of petitioners by respondent OIC
Governor's designation on February 8, 1987 of their successors could no longer produce any legal
force and effect. While the Provisional Constitution provided for a one-year period expiring on March
25, 1987 within which the power of replacement could be exercised, this period was shortened by
the ratification and effectivity on February 2, 1987 of the Constitution. Had the intention of the
framers of the Constitution been otherwise, they would have so provided for in the Transitory Article,
as indeed they provided for multifarious transitory provisions in twenty six sections of Article XVIII,
e.g. extension of the six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President to noon of June
30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections, the continued exercise of legislative powers
by the incumbent President until the convening of the first Congress, etc.
A final note of clarification, as to the statement in the dissent that "the appointments of some seven
Court of Appeals Justices, 71 provincial fiscals and 55 city fiscals reported extended (by) the
President on February 2, 1987 . . . could be open to serious questions," in view of the provisions of
Sections 8 (1) and 9, Article VIII of the Constitution which require prior endorsement thereof by the
Judicial and Bar Council created under the Constitution. It should be stated for the record that the
reported date of the appointments, February 2, 1987, is incorrect. The official records of the Court
show that the appointments of the seven Court of Appeals Justices were transmitted to this Court on
February 1, 1987 and they were all appointed on or before January 31, 1987. 3(Similarly, the records
of the Department of Justice likewise show that the appointment papers of the last batch of provincial and
city fiscals signed by the President in completion of the reorganization of the prosecution service were
made on January 31, 1987 and transmitted to the Department on February 1, 1987.) It is also a matter of
record that since February 2, 1987, no appointments to the Judiciary have been extended by the
President, pending the constitution of the Judicial and Bar Council, indicating that the Chief Executive has
likewise considered February 2, 1987 as the effective date of the Constitution, as now expressly declared
by the Court.
CRUZ, J., concurring.
In her quiet and restrained manner, Justice Herrera is able to prove her point with more telling effect
than the tones of thunder. She has written another persuasive opinion, and I am delighted to concur.
I note that it in effect affirms my dissents in the De la Serna, Zamora, Duquing and Bayas cases,
where I submitted that the local OICs may no longer be summarily replaced, having acquired
security of tenure under the new Constitution. Our difference is that whereas I would make that right
commence on February 25, 1987, after the deadline set by the Freedom Constitution, Justice
Herrera would opt for February 2, 1987, when the new Constitution was ratified. I yield to that better
view and agree with her ponencia completely.
SARMIENTO, J., Dissenting.
With due respect to the majority I register this dissent.
While I agree that the one-year deadline prescribed by Section 2, Article III of the Provisional
Constitution with respect to the tenure of government functionaries, as follows:
25, 1986.
was cut short by the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, I entertain serious doubts whether or not
that cut-off period began on February 2, 1987, the date of the plebiscite held to approve the new
Charter. To my mind the 1987 constitution took effect on February 11, 1987, the date the same was
proclaimed ratified pursuant to Proclamation No. 58 of the President of the Philippines, and not
February 2, 1987, plebiscite day.
I rely, first and foremost, on the language of the 1987 Charter itself, thus:
Sec. 27. This Constitution shag take effect immediately upon its ratification by a
It is my reading of this provision that the Constitution takes effect on the date its ratification shall
have been ascertained, and not at the time the people cast their votes to approve or reject it. For it
cannot be logically said that Constitution was ratified during such a plebiscite, when the will of the
people as of that time, had not, and could not have been, vet determined.
Other than that, pragmatic considerations compel me to take the view.
I have no doubt that between February 2, and February 11, 1987 the government performed acts
that would have been valid under the Provisional Constitution but would otherwise have been void
under the 1987 Charter. I recall, in particular, the appointments of some seven Court of Appeals
Justices, 71 provincial fiscals, and 55 city fiscals the President reportedly extended on February 2,
1987. 1 Under Sections 8 (1) and 9, Article VIII, of the l987 Constitution, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 8. (I)A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary
of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex oficio Members, a

representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the
Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be
appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the
Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy, Such appointments need no
confirmation.
xxx xxx xxx
such appointments could be open to serious questions.
Since 1973, moreover, we have invariably reckoned the effectivity of the Constitution as well as the
amendments thereto from the date it is proclaimed ratified.
In Magtoto v. Manguera, 2 we held that the 1973 Constitution became in force and effect on January 17,
1973, the date Proclamation No. 1102, "Announcing the Ratification by the Filipino People of the
Constitution Proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention," was issued, although Mr. Justice, now
Chief Justice, Teehankee would push its effectivity date further to April 17, 1973, the date our decision
in Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 3 became final. And this was so notwithstanding Section 16, Article
XVII, of the 1973 Constitution, thus:
SEC. 16. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose and, except as herein
provided, shall supersede the Constitution of nineteen-hundred and thirty- five and all
amendments thereto.
On October 27, 1976, then President Marcos promulgated Proclamation no. 1595, proclaiming the
ratification of the 1976 amendments submitted in the plebiscite of October 16- 17, 1976. The
Proclamation states, inter alia, that.
By virtue-of the powers vested in me by law, I hereby proclaim all the amendments embodied in this
certificate as duly ratified by the Filipino people in the referendum- plebiscite held Oct. 16-17, 1976
and are therefore effective and in full force and effect as of this date.
It shall be noted that under Amendment No. 9 of the said 1976 amendments.
These amendments shall take effect after the incumbent President shall have
proclaimed that they have been ratified by a majority of the votes cast in the
referendum-plebiscite.
On April 1, 1980, the then Chief Executive issued Proclamation no. 1959, "Proclaiming the
Ratification by the Filipino People of the Amendments of Section 7, Article X of the Constitution"
(lengthening the terms of office of judges and justices). The Proclamation provides:
[t]he above-quoted amendment has been duly ratified by a majority of the votes cast
in the plebiscite held, together with the election for local officials, on January 30,
1980, and that said amendment is hereby declared to take effect immediately.
It shall be noted that under Resolution No. 21, dated December 18, 1979, the proposed amendment
shall take effect on the date the incumbent President/Prime Minister shall proclaim its ratification.
On April 7, 1981, Proclamation No. 2077 was issued "Proclaiming the Ratification in the Plebiscite of
April 7, 1981 of the Amendments to the Constitution Embodied in Batas Pambansa Blg. 122 and
Declaring Them Therefore Effective and in Full Force and Effect." The Proclamation, in declaring the
said amendments duly approved, further declared them "[e]ffective and in full force and in effect as
of the date of this Proclamation," It shall be noted, in this connection, that under Resolutions Nos. I
and 2 of the Batasang Pambansa, Third Regular Session, Sitting as a Constituent Assembly, which
parented these amendments, the same:
. . .shall become valid as part of the Constitution when approved by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite to be held pursuant to Section 2, Article XVI of the
Constitution.
On the other hand, Batas Pambansa Blg. 122, "An Act to Submit to the Filipino People, for
Ratification or Rejection, the Amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines, Proposed by the
Batasang Pambansa, Sitting as a Constituent Assembly, in its Resolutions Numbered Three, Two,
and One, and to Appropriate Funds Therefore," provides, as follows:
SEC. 7. The Commission on Elections, sitting en banc, shad canvass and proclaim
the result of the plebiscite using the certificates submitted to it, duly authenticated
and certified by the Board of Canvassers of each province or city.
We have, finally, Proclamation No. 2332, "Proclaiming the Ratification in the Plebiscite of January
27, 1984, of the Amendments to the Constitution Embodied in Batasang Pambansa Resolutions
Nos. 104, 105, 110, 111, 112 and 113." It states that the amendments:
....are therefore effective and in full force and effect as of the date of this
Proclamation.
It carries out Resolution no. 104 itself (as well as Resolutions Nos. 110 and 112 and Section 9,
Batas Blg. 643), which states, that:
The proposed amendments shall take effect on the date the President of the
Philippines shall proclaim that they have been ratified by a majority of the votes cast
in the plebiscite held for the purpose, but not later than three months from the
approval of the amendments.
albeit Resolutions Nos. 105, 111, and 113 provide, that:
These amendments shall be valid as a part of the Constitution when approved by a
majority of the votes cast in an election/plebiscite at which it is submitted to the
people for their ratification pursuant to Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution, as
amended.
That a Constitution or amendments thereto take effect upon proclamation of their ratification and not
at the time of the plebiscite is a view that is not peculiar to the Marcos era.
The Resolution of Both Houses (of Congress) in Joint Session on the March 11, 1947 plebiscite
called pursuant to Republic Act No. 73 and the Resolution of Both Houses (of Congress) adopted on
September 18, 1946, was adopted on April 9,1947. The April 9, 1947 Resolution makes no mention
of a retroactive application.
Accordingly, when the incumbent President (Mrs. Corazon C. Aquino) proclaimed on February 11,
1987, at Malacanang Palace:
... that the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines adopted by the
Constitutional Commission of 1986, including the Ordinance appended thereto, has
been duly ratified by the Filipino people and is therefore effective and in full force and
effect. 4
the 1987 Constitution, in point of fact, came into force and effect, I hold that it took effect at no other
time.
I submit that our ruling in Ponsica v. Ignalaga 5 in which we declared, in passing, that the new Charter
was ratified on February 2, 1987, does not in any way weaken this dissent. As I stated, the remark was
said in passing-we did not resolve the case on account of a categorical holding that the 1987 Constitution
came to life on February 2, 1987. In any event, if we did, I now call for its re-examination.
I am therefore of the opinion, consistent with the views expressed above, that the challenged
dismissals done on February 8, 1987 were valid, the 1987 Constitution not being then as yet in
force.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, CJ., concurring:
The main issue resolved in the judgment at bar is whether the 1987 Constitution took effect
on February 2, 1987, the date that the plebiscite for its ratification was held or whether it took effect
on February 11, 1987, the date its ratification was proclaimed per Proclamation No. 58 of the
President of the Philippines, Corazon C. Aquino.
The Court's decision, with the lone dissent of Mr. Justice Sarmiento, holds that by virtue of the
provision of Article XVIII, Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution that it "shall take effect immediately
upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose," the 1987
Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987, the date of its ratification in the plebiscite held on that
same date.
The thrust of the dissent is that the Constitution should be deemed to "take effect on the date its
ratification shall have been ascertained and not at the time the people cast their votes to approve or
reject it." This view was actually proposed at the Constitutional Commission deliberations, but was
withdrawn by its proponent in the face of the "overwhelming" contrary view that the Constitution "will
be effective on the very day of the plebiscite."
The record of the proceedings and debates of the Constitutional Commission fully supports the
Court's judgment. It shows that the clear, unequivocal and express intent of the Constitutional
Conunission in unanimously approving (by thirty-five votes in favor and none against) the
aforequoted Section 27 of Transitory Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution was that "the act of
ratification is the act of voting by the people. So that is the date of the ratification" and that "the
canvass thereafter [of the votes] is merely the mathematical confirmation of what was done during
the date of the plebiscite and the proclamation of the President is merely the official confirmatory
declaration of an act which was actually done by the Filipino people in adopting the Constitution
when they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite."
The record of the deliberations and the voting is reproduced hereinbelow: 1
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, may we now put to a vote the original
formulation of the committee as indicated in Section 12, unless there are other
commissioners who would like to present amendments.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. May I propose the following amendments.
On line 2, delete the words "its ratification" and in lieu thereof insert the following-.
"THE PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT IT HAS BEEN RATIFIED." And
on the last line, after "constitutions," add the following: "AND THEIR
AMENDMENTS."
MR. MAAMBONG. Just a moment, Madam President. If Commissioner Davide is
going to propose an additional sentence, the committee would suggest that we take
up first his amendment to the first sentence as originally formulated. We are now
ready to comment on that proposed amendment.
The proposed amendment would be to delete the words "its ratification and in lieu
thereof insert the words "THE PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT IT HAS
BEEN RATIFIED." And the second amendment would be: After the word
"constitutions," add the words" AND THEIR AMENDMENTS,"
The committee accepts the first proposed amendment. However, we regret that we
cannot accept the second proposed amendment after the word "constitutions"
because the committee feels that when we talk of all previous Constitutions,
necessarily it includes "AND THEIR AMENDMENTS."
MR. DAVIDE. With that explanation, l will not insist on the second. But, Madam
President, may I request that I be allowed to read the second amendment so the
Commission would be able to appreciate the change in the first.
MR. MAAMBONG. Yes, Madam President, we can now do that.
MR. DAVIDE. The second sentence will read: "THE PROCLAMATION SHALL BE
MADE WITHIN FIVE DAYS FOLLOWING THE COMPLETION OF THE CANVASS
BY THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS OF THE RESULTS OF SUCH
PLEBISCITE."
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, after conferring with our chairman, the
committee feels that the second proposed amendment in the form of a new sentence
would not be exactly necessary and the committee feels that it would be too much for
us to impose a time frame on the President to make the proclamation. As we would
recall, Madam President, in the approved Article on the Executive, there is a
provision which says that the President shall make certain that all laws shall be
faithfully complied. When we approve this first sentence, and it says that there will be
a proclamation by the President that the Constitution has been ratified, the President
will naturally comply with the law in accordance with the provisions in the Article on
the Executive which we have cited. It would be too much to impose on the President
a time frame within which she will make that declaration. It would be assumed that
the President would immediately do that after the results shall have been canvassed
by the COMELEC.
Therefore, the committee regrets that it cannot accept the second sentence which
the Gentleman is proposing, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. I am prepared to withdraw the same on the assumption that there will
be an immediate proclamation of the results by the President.
MR. MAAMBONG. With that understanding, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. I will not insist on the second sentence.
FR. BERNAS. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Bernas is recognized.
FR. BERNAS. I would ask the committee to reconsider its acceptance of the
amendment which makes the effectivity of the new Constitution dependent upon the
proclamation of the President. The effectivity of the Constitution should commence
on the date of the ratification, not on the date of the proclamation of the President.
What is confusing, I think, is what happened in 1976 when the amendments of 1976
were ratified. In that particular case, the reason the amendments of 1976 were
effective upon the proclamation of the President was that the draft presented to the
people said that the amendment will be effective upon the proclamation made by the
President. I have a suspicion that was put in there precisely to give the President
some kind of leeway on whether to announce the ratification or not. Therefore, we
should not make this dependent on the action of the President since this will be a
manifestation of the act of the people to be done under the supervision of the
COMELECand it should be the COMELEC who should make the announcement
that, in fact, the votes show that the Constitution was ratified and there should be no
need to wait for any proclamation on the part of the President.
MR. MAAMBONG. Would the Gentleman answer a few clarificatory questions?
FR. BERNAS. Willingly, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. The Gentleman will agree that a date has to be fixed as to exactly
when the Constitution is supposed to be ratified.
FR. BERNAS. I would say that the ratification of the Constitution is on the date the
votes were supposed to have been cast.
MR. MAAMBONG. Let us go to the mechanics of the whole thing, Madam President.
We present the Constitution to a plebiscite, the people exercise their right to vote,
then the votes are canvassed by the Commission on Elections. If we delete the
suggested amendment which says: "THE PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT
THAT IT HAS BEEN RATIFIED," what would be, in clear terms, the date when the
Constitution is supposed to be ratified or not ratified, as the case may be?
FR. BERNAS. The date would be the casting of the ballots. if the President were to
say that the plebiscite would be held, for instance, on January 19, 1987, then the
date for the effectivity of the new Constitution would be January 19, 1987.
MR. MAAMBONG. In other words, it would not depend on the actual issuance of the
results by the Commission on Elections which will be doing the canvass? That is
immaterial Madam President
FR. BERNAS. It would not, Madam President, because "ratification" is the act of
saying "yes" is done when one casts his ballot.
MR. MAAMBONG. So it is the date of the plebiscite itself, Madam President?
MR. MAAMBONG. With that statement of Commissioner Bernas, we would like to
know from the proponent, Commissioner Davide, if he is insisting on his amendment.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I am insisting on the amendment because I cannot
subscribe to the view of Commissioner Bernas, that the date of the ratification is
reckoned from the date of the casting of the ballots. That cannot be the date of
reckoning because it is a plebiscite all over the country. We do not split the moment
of casting by each of the voters. Actually and technically speaking, it would be all
right if it would be upon the announcement of the results of the canvass conducted
by the COMELEC or the results of the plebiscite held all over the country. But it is
necessary that there be a body which will make the formal announcement of the
results of the plebiscite. So it is either the President or the COMELEC itself upon the
completion of the canvass of the results of the plebiscite, and I opted for the
President.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Nolledo is recognized.
MR. NOLLEDO. Thank you, Madam President. I beg to disagree with Commissioner
Davide. I support the stand of Commissioner Bernas because it is really the date of
the casting of the "yes" votes that is the date of the ratification of the Constitution The
announcement merely confirms the ratification even if the results are released two or
three days after. I think it is a fundamental principle in political law, even in civil law,
because an announcement is a mere confirmation The act of ratification is the act of

voting by the people. So that is the date of the ratification. If there should be any
need for presidential proclamation, that proclamation will merely confirm the act of
ratification.
Thank you, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Does Commissioner Regalado want to contribute?
MR. REGALADO. Madam President, I was precisely going to state the same support
for Commissioner Bernas, because the canvass thereafter is merely
the mathematical confirmation of what was done during the date of the plebiscite and
the proclamation of the President is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an
act which was actually done by the Filipino people in adopting the Constitution when
they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite.
MR. LERUM. Madam President, may I be recognized.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Lerum is recognized.
MR. LERUM. I am in favor of the Davide amendment because we have to fix a date
for the effectivity of the Constitution. Suppose the announcement is delayed by, say,
10 days or a month, what happens to the obligations and rights that accrue upon the
approval of the Constitution? So I think we must have a definite date. I am, therefore,
in favor of the Davide amendment.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Maambong is recognized.
MR. MAAMBONG. With the theory of the Commissioner, would there be a necessity
for the Commission on Elections to declare the results of the canvass?
FR. BERNAS. There would be because it is the Commission on Elections which
makes the official announcement of the results.
MR. MAAMBONG. My next question which is the final one is: After the Commision
on Elections has declared the results of the canvass, will there be a necessity for the
President to make a proclamation of the results of the canvass as submitted by the
Commission on Elections?
FR. BERNAS. I would say there would be no necessity, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. In other words, the President may or may not make the
proclamation whether the Constitution has been ratified or not.
FR. BERNAS. I would say that the proclamation made by the President would be
immaterial because under the law, the administration of all election laws is under an
independent Commission on Elections. It is the Commission on Elections which
announces the results.
MR. MAAMBONG. But nevertheless, the President may make the proclamation.
FR. BERNAS. Yes, the President may. And if what he says contradicts what the
Commission on Elections says, it would have no effect. I would only add that when
we say that the date of effectivity is on the day of the casting of the votes, what we
mean is that the Constitution takes effect on every single minute and every single
second of that day, because the Civil Code says a day has 24 hours.
So that even if the votes are cast in the morning, the Constitution is really effective
from the previous midnight. So that when we adopted the new rule on citizenship, the
children of Filipino mothers or anybody born on the date of effectivity of the 1973
Constitution, which is January 17, 1973, are natural-born citizens, no matter what
time of day or night.
MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, safely say that whatever date is
the publication of the results of the canvass by the COMELEC retroacts to the date of
the plebiscite?
MR. MAAMBONG. I thank the Commissioner.
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.
MR. GUINGONA. Mention was made about the need for having a definite date. I
think it is precisely the proposal of Commissioner Bernas which speaks of the date
(of ratification that would have a definite date, because there would be no definite
date if we depend upon the canvassing by the COMELEC.
Thank you,
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Concepcion is recognized.
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Madam President.
Whoever makes the announcement as to the result of the plebiscite, be it the
COMELEC or the President, would announce that a majority of the votes cast on a
given date was in favor of the Constitution. And that is the date when the Constitution
takes effect, apart from the fact that the provision on the drafting or amendment of
the Constitution provides that a constitution becomes effective upon ratification by a
majority of the votes cast, although I would not say from the very beginning of the
date of election because as of that time it is impossible to determine whether there is
a majority. At the end of the day of election or plebiscite, the determination is made
as of that time-the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held on such and such a
date. So that is the time when the new Constitution will be considered ratified and,
therefore, effective.
THE PRESIDENT. May we now hear Vice-President Padilla.
MR. PADILLA. Madam President, I am against the proposed amendment of

Commissioner Davide and I support the view of Commissioner Bernas and the
others because the ratification of the Constitution is on the date the people, by a
majority vote, have cast their votes in favor of the Constitution. Even in civil law, if
there is a contract, say, between an agent and a third person and that contract is
confirmed or ratified by the principal, the validity does not begin on the date of
ratification but it retroacts from the date the contract was executed.
Therefore, the date of the Constitution as ratified should retroact to the date that the
people have cast their affirmative votes in favor of the Constitution.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Maambong is recognized
MR. MAAMBONG. We will now ask once more Commissioner Davide if he is
insisting on his amendment
MR. DAVIDE. In view of the explanation and overwhelming tyranny of the opinion
that it will be effective on the very day of the plebiscite, I am withdrawing my
amendment on the assumption that any of the following bodies the Office of the
President or the COMELEC will make the formal announcement of the results.
MR. RAMA. Madam President, we are now ready to vote on the original provision as
stated by the committee.
MR. MAAMBONG. The committee will read again the formulation indicated in the
original committee report as Section 12.
This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose and shall supersede all previous
Constitutions.
We ask for a vote, Madam President.
VOTING
THE PRESIDENT. As many as are in favor, please raise their hand. (Several
Members raised their hands.)
As many as are against, please raise their hand. (No Member raised his hand.)
The results show 35 votes in favor and none against; Section 12 is approved. 2
The Court next holds as a consequence of its declaration at bar that the Constitution took effect on
the date of its ratification in the plebiscite held on February 2, 1987, that: (1) the Provisional
Constitution promulgated on March 25, 1986 must be deemed to have been superseded by the 1987
Constitution on the same date February 2, 1987 and (2) by and after said date, February 2, 1987,
absent any saying clause to the contrary in the Transitory Article of the Constitution, respondent OIC
Governor could no longer exercise the power to replace petitioners in their positions as Barangay
Captain and Councilmen. Hence, the attempted replacement of petitioners by respondent OIC
Governor's designation on February 8, 1987 of their successors could no longer produce any legal
force and effect. While the Provisional Constitution provided for a one-year period expiring on March
25, 1987 within which the power of replacement could be exercised, this period was shortened by
the ratification and effectivity on February 2, 1987 of the Constitution. Had the intention of the
framers of the Constitution been otherwise, they would have so provided for in the Transitory Article,
as indeed they provided for multifarious transitory provisions in twenty six sections of Article XVIII,
e.g. extension of the six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President to noon of June
30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections, the continued exercise of legislative powers
by the incumbent President until the convening of the first Congress, etc.
A final note of clarification, as to the statement in the dissent that "the appointments of some seven
Court of Appeals Justices, 71 provincial fiscals and 55 city fiscals reported extended (by) the
President on February 2, 1987 . . . could be open to serious questions," in view of the provisions of
Sections 8 (1) and 9, Article VIII of the Constitution which require prior endorsement thereof by the
Judicial and Bar Council created under the Constitution. It should be stated for the record that the
reported date of the appointments, February 2, 1987, is incorrect. The official records of the Court
show that the appointments of the seven Court of Appeals Justices were transmitted to this Court on
February 1, 1987 and they were all appointed on or before January 31, 1987. 3(Similarly, the records
of the Department of Justice likewise show that the appointment papers of the last batch of provincial and
city fiscals signed by the President in completion of the reorganization of the prosecution service were
made on January 31, 1987 and transmitted to the Department on February 1, 1987.) It is also a matter of
record that since February 2, 1987, no appointments to the Judiciary have been extended by the
President, pending the constitution of the Judicial and Bar Council, indicating that the Chief Executive has
likewise considered February 2, 1987 as the effective date of the Constitution, as now expressly declared
by the Court.
CRUZ, J., concurring.

In her quiet and restrained manner, Justice Herrera is able to prove her point with more telling effect
than the tones of thunder. She has written another persuasive opinion, and I am delighted to concur.
I note that it in effect affirms my dissents in the De la Serna, Zamora, Duquing and Bayas cases,
where I submitted that the local OICs may no longer be summarily replaced, having acquired
security of tenure under the new Constitution. Our difference is that whereas I would make that right
commence on February 25, 1987, after the deadline set by the Freedom Constitution, Justice
Herrera would opt for February 2, 1987, when the new Constitution was ratified. I yield to that better
view and agree with her ponencia completely.
SARMIENTO, J., Dissenting.
With due respect to the majority I register this dissent.
While I agree that the one-year deadline prescribed by Section 2, Article III of the Provisional
Constitution with respect to the tenure of government functionaries, as follows:
25, 1986.
was cut short by the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, I entertain serious doubts whether or not
that cut-off period began on February 2, 1987, the date of the plebiscite held to approve the new
Charter. To my mind the 1987 constitution took effect on February 11, 1987, the date the same was
proclaimed ratified pursuant to Proclamation No. 58 of the President of the Philippines, and not
February 2, 1987, plebiscite day.
I rely, first and foremost, on the language of the 1987 Charter itself, thus:
Sec. 27. This Constitution shag take effect immediately upon its ratification by a
It is my reading of this provision that the Constitution takes effect on the date its ratification shall
have been ascertained, and not at the time the people cast their votes to approve or reject it. For it
cannot be logically said that Constitution was ratified during such a plebiscite, when the will of the
people as of that time, had not, and could not have been, vet determined.
Other than that, pragmatic considerations compel me to take the view.
I have no doubt that between February 2, and February 11, 1987 the government performed acts
that would have been valid under the Provisional Constitution but would otherwise have been void
under the 1987 Charter. I recall, in particular, the appointments of some seven Court of Appeals
Justices, 71 provincial fiscals, and 55 city fiscals the President reportedly extended on February 2,
1987. 1 Under Sections 8 (1) and 9, Article VIII, of the l987 Constitution, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 8. (I)A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary
of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex oficio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the
Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.
xxx xxx xxx
2Sec. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be
appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the
Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy, Such appointments need no
confirmation.
xxx xxx xxx
such appointments could be open to serious questions.
Since 1973, moreover, we have invariably reckoned the effectivity of the Constitution as well as the
amendments thereto from the date it is proclaimed ratified.
In Magtoto v. Manguera, 2 we held that the 1973 Constitution became in force and effect on January 17,
1973, the date Proclamation No. 1102, "Announcing the Ratification by the Filipino People of the
Constitution Proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention," was issued, although Mr. Justice, now
Chief Justice, Teehankee would push its effectivity date further to April 17, 1973, the date our decision
in Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 3 became final. And this was so notwithstanding Section 16, Article
XVII, of the 1973 Constitution, thus:
SEC. 16. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose and, except as herein
provided, shall supersede the Constitution of nineteen-hundred and thirty- five and all
amendments thereto.
On October 27, 1976, then President Marcos promulgated Proclamation no. 1595, proclaiming the
ratification of the 1976 amendments submitted in the plebiscite of October 16- 17, 1976. The
Proclamation states, inter alia, that.
By virtue-of the powers vested in me by law, I hereby proclaim all the amendments embodied in this
certificate as duly ratified by the Filipino people in the referendum plebiscite held Oct. 16-17, 1976
and are therefore effective and in full force and effect as of this date.
It shall be noted that under Amendment No. 9 of the said 1976 amendments.
These amendments shall take effect after the incumbent President shall have
proclaimed that they have been ratified by a majority of the votes cast in the
referendum-plebiscite.
On April 1, 1980, the then Chief Executive issued Proclamation no. 1959, "Proclaiming the
Ratification by the Filipino People of the Amendments of Section 7, Article X of the Constitution"
(lengthening the terms of office of judges and justices). The Proclamation provides:
[t]he above-quoted amendment has been duly ratified by a majority of the votes cast
in the plebiscite held, together with the election for local officials, on January 30,
1980, and that said amendment is hereby declared to take effect immediately.
It shall be noted that under Resolution No. 21, dated December 18, 1979, the proposed amendment
shall take effect on the date the incumbent President/Prime Minister shall proclaim its ratification.
On April 7, 1981, Proclamation No. 2077 was issued "Proclaiming the Ratification in the Plebiscite of
April 7, 1981 of the Amendments to the Constitution Embodied in Batas Pambansa Blg. 122 and
Declaring Them Therefore Effective and in Full Force and Effect." The Proclamation, in declaring the
said amendments duly approved, further declared them "[e]ffective and in full force and in effect as
of the date of this Proclamation," It shall be noted, in this connection, that under Resolutions Nos. I
and 2 of the Batasang Pambansa, Third Regular Session, Sitting as a Constituent Assembly, which
parented these amendments, the same:
... shall become valid as part of the Constitution when approved by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite to be held pursuant to Section 2, Article XVI of the
Constitution.
On the other hand, Batas Pambansa Blg. 122, "An Act to Submit to the Filipino People, for
Ratification or Rejection, the Amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines, Proposed by the
Batasang Pambansa, Sitting as a Constituent Assembly, in its Resolutions Numbered Three, Two,
and One, and to Appropriate Funds Therefore," provides, as follows:
SEC. 7. The Commission on Elections, sitting en banc, shad canvass and proclaim
the result of the plebiscite using the certificates submitted to it, duly authenticated
and certified by the Board of Canvassers of each province or city.
We have, finally, Proclamation No. 2332, "Proclaiming the Ratification in the Plebiscite of January
27, 1984, of the Amendments to the Constitution Embodied in Batasang Pambansa Resolutions
Nos. 104, 105, 110, 111, 112 and 113." It states that the amendments:
....are therefore effective and in full force and effect as of the date of this
Proclamation.
It carries out Resolution no. 104 itself (as well as Resolutions Nos. 110 and 112 and Section 9,
Batas Blg. 643), which states, that:
The proposed amendments shall take effect on the date the President of the
Philippines shall proclaim that they have been ratified by a majority of the votes cast
in the plebiscite held for the purpose, but not later than three months from the
approval of the amendments.
albeit Resolutions Nos. 105, 111, and 113 provide, that:
These amendments shall be valid as a part of the Constitution when approved by a majority of the
votes cast in an election/plebiscite at which it is submitted to the people for their ratification pursuant
to Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution, as amended.
That a Constitution or amendments thereto take effect upon proclamation of their ratification and not
at the time of the plebiscite is a view that is not peculiar to the Marcos era.
The Resolution of Both Houses (of Congress) in Joint Session on the March 11, 1947 plebiscite
called pursuant to Republic Act No. 73 and the Resolution of Both Houses (of Congress) adopted on
September 18, 1946, was adopted on April 9,1947. The April 9, 1947 Resolution makes no mention
of a retroactive application. Accordingly, when the incumbent President (Mrs. Corazon C. Aquino)
proclaimed on February 11, 1987, at Malacanang Palace:
... that the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines adopted by the
Constitutional Commission of 1986, including the Ordinance appended thereto, has
been duly ratified by the Filipino people and is therefore effective and in full force and
effect. 4
the 1987 Constitution, in point of fact, came into force and effect, I hold that it took effect at no other
time.
I submit that our ruling in Ponsica v. Ignalaga 5 in which we declared, in passing, that the new Charter
was ratified on February 2, 1987, does not in any way weaken this dissent. As I stated, the remark was
said in passing-we did not resolve the case on account of a categorical holding that the 1987 Constitution
came to life on February 2, 1987. In any event, if we did, I now call for its re-examination.
I am therefore of the opinion, consistent with the views expressed above, that the challenged
dismissals done on February 8, 1987 were valid, the 1987 Constitution not being then as yet in
force.
Footnotes
1 Topacio, Jr. vs. Pimentel G.R. No. 73770, April 10, 1986.
2 Section 2, BP Blg. 222.

3 Article 11, Section 25 and Article X, Sections 1, 2, 14, among others.
4 Article X, Section 4.
5 Section 3, BP Blg. 222.
Teehankee, C.J., concurring:
1 Volume Five, Record of the Constitutional Commission Proceedings and Debates,
pages 620-623; emphasis supplied.
2 The entire draft Constitution was approved on October 12, 1986 forty forty-five
votes in favor and two against.
3 The seven Court of Appeals Justices referred to are Justices Alfredo L. Benipayo,
Minerva G. Reyes, Magdangal B. Elma, Cecilio PE, Jesus Elbinias, Nicolas Lapena
Jr. and Justo P. Torres, Jr., and their appointments bear various dates from January
9, 1987 to January 31, 1987.
Sarmiento, J., dissenting:
1 Manila Bulletin, Feb. 3, 1987, p. 1, cols. 6-7 Philippine Daily Inquirer, Feb. 3,1987,
p. 1, cot 1; Malaya, Feb. 3, 1987, p. 1, col. 1.
2 Nos. 3720102 March 3, 1975, 63 SCRA 4 (1975).
3 Nos. L-36142, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 30 (1973).
4 Proclamation No. 58 (1987).
5 G.R. No. 72301.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 78780
July 23, 1987
DAVID G. NITAFAN, WENCESLAO M. POLO, and MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO, JR., petitioners,

vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE FINANCIAL OFFICER, SUPREME COURT
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila,
seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and
the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from
their salaries.
In a nutshell, they submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial
officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that "(d)uring their continuance in office, their salary
shall not be decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned in
and by said Constitution."
It may be pointed out that, early on, the Court had dealt with the matter administratively in response
to representations that the Court direct its Finance Officer to discontinue the withholding of taxes
from salaries of members of the Bench. Thus, on June 4, 1987, the Court en banc had reaffirmed
the Chief Justice's directive as follows:
RE: Question of exemption from income taxation. The Court REAFFIRMED the Chief
Justice's previous and standing directive to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office of this
Court to continue with the deduction of the withholding taxes from the salaries of the Justices
of the Supreme Court as well as from the salaries of all other members of the judiciary.
That should have resolved the question. However, with the filing of this petition, the Court has
deemed it best to settle the legal issue raised through this judicial pronouncement. As will be shown
hereinafter, the clear intent of the Constitutional Commission was to delete the proposed express
grant of exemption from payment of income tax to members of the Judiciary, so as to "give
substance to equality among the three branches of Government" in the words of Commissioner
Rigos. In the course of the deliberations, it was further expressly made clear, specially with regard to
Commissioner Joaquin F. Bernas' accepted amendment to the amendment of Commissioner Rigos,
that the salaries of members of the Judiciary would be subject to the general income tax applied to
all taxpayers.
This intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the Constitution as
approved and ratified in February, 1987 (infra, pp. 7-8). Although the intent may have been obscured
by the failure to include in the General Provisions a proscription against exemption of any public
officer or employee, including constitutional officers, from payment of income tax, the Court since
then has authorized the continuation of the deduction of the withholding tax from the salaries of the
members of the Supreme Court, as well as from the salaries of all other members of the Judiciary.
The Court hereby makes of record that it had then discarded the ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer and
Endencia vs. David, infra, that declared the salaries of members of the Judiciary exempt from
payment of the income tax and considered such payment as a diminution of their salaries during
their continuance in office. The Court hereby reiterates that the salaries of Justices and Judges are
properly subject to a general income tax law applicable to all income earners and that the payment
of such income tax by Justices and Judges does not fall within the constitutional protection against
decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office.
A comparison of the Constitutional provisions involved is called for. The 1935 Constitution provided:
... (The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts) shall receive such
compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance
in office ... 1 (Emphasis supplied).
Under the 1973 Constitution, the same provision read:
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme court, and of
judges of inferior courts shall be fixed by law, which shall not be decreased during their
continuance in office. ... 2 (Emphasis ours).
And in respect of income tax exemption, another provision in the same 1973 Constitution specifically
stipulated:
No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including
constitutional officers, shall be exempt from payment of income tax. 3
The provision in the 1987 Constitution, which petitioners rely on, reads:
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of
judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary
shall not be decreased. 4(Emphasis supplied).
The 1987 Constitution does not contain a provision similar to Section 6, Article XV of the 1973
Constitution, for which reason, petitioners claim that the intent of the framers is to revert to the
original concept of "non-diminution "of salaries of judicial officers.
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to Section 10, Article VIII, negate
such contention.
The draft proposal of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution read:
Section 13. The salary of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court
and of judges of the lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office,
their salary shall not be diminished nor subjected to income tax. Until the National Assembly
shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice shall receive an annual salary of _____________
and each Associate Justice ______________ pesos. 5 (Emphasis ours)
During the debates on the draft Article (Committee Report No. 18), two Commissioners presented
their objections to the provision on tax exemption, thus:
MS. AQUINO. Finally, on the matter of exemption from tax of the salary of justices, does this
not violate the principle of the uniformity of taxation and the principle of equal protection of
the law? After all, tax is levied not on the salary but on the combined income, such that when
the judge receives a salary and it is comingled with the other income, we tax the income, not
the salary. Why do we have to give special privileges to the salary of justices?
MR. CONCEPCION. It is the independence of the judiciary. We prohibit the increase or
decrease of their salary during their term. This is an indirect way of decreasing their salary
and affecting the independence of the judges.
MS. AQUINO. I appreciate that to be in the nature of a clause to respect tenure, but the
special privilege on taxation might, in effect, be a violation of the principle of uniformity in
taxation and the equal protection clause. 6
xxx
xxx
xxx
MR. OPLE. x x x
Of course, we share deeply the concern expressed by the sponsor, Commissioner Roberto
Concepcion, for whom we have the highest respect, to surround the Supreme Court and the
judicial system as a whole with the whole armor of defense against the executive and
legislative invasion of their independence. But in so doing, some of the citizens outside,
especially the humble government employees, might say that in trying to erect a bastion of
justice, we might end up with the fortress of privileges, an island of extra territoriality under
the Republic of the Philippines, because a good number of powers and rights accorded to
the Judiciary here may not be enjoyed in the remotest degree by other employees of the
government.
An example is the exception from income tax, which is a kind of economic immunity, which
is, of course, denied to the entire executive department and the legislative. 7
And during the period of amendments on the draft Article, on July 14, 1986, Commissioner Cirilo A.
Rigos proposed that the term "diminished" be changed to "decreased" and that the words "nor
subjected to income tax" be deleted so as to "give substance to equality among the three branches
in the government.
Commissioner Florenz D. Regalado, on behalf of the Committee on the Judiciary, defended the
original draft and referred to the ruling of this Court in Perfecto vs. Meer 8 that "the independence of
the judges is of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries."
Commissioner Rigos then moved that the matter be put to a vote. Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas
stood up "in support of an amendment to the amendment with the request for a modification of the
amendment," as follows:
FR. BERNAS. Yes. I am going to propose an amendment to the amendment saying that it is
not enough to drop the phrase "shall not be subjected to income tax," because if that is all
that the Gentleman will do, then he will just fall back on the decision in Perfecto vs. Meer and
in Dencia vs. David [should be Endencia and Jugo vs. David, etc., 93 Phil. 696[ which
excludes them from income tax, but rather I would propose that the statement will read:
"During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be diminished BUT MAY BE
SUBJECT TO GENERAL INCOME TAX."IN support of this position, I would say that the
argument seems to be that the justice and judges should not be subjected to income tax
because they already gave up the income from their practice. That is true also of Cabinet
members and all other employees. And I know right now, for instance, there are many
people who have accepted employment in the government involving a reduction of income
and yet are still subject to income tax. So, they are not the only citizens whose income is
reduced by accepting service in government.
Commissioner Rigos accepted the proposed amendment to the amendment. Commissioner Rustico
F. de los Reyes, Jr. then moved for a suspension of the session. Upon resumption, Commissioner
Bernas announced:
During the suspension, we came to an understanding with the original proponent,
Commissioner Rigos, that his amendment on page 6,. line 4 would read: "During their
continuance in office, their salary shall not be DECREASED."But this is on the understanding
that there will be a provision in the Constitution similar to Section 6 of Article XV, the General
Provisions of the 1973 Constitution, which says:
No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including
constitutional officers, shall be exempt from payment of income tax.
So, we put a period (.) after "DECREASED" on the understanding that the salary of justices
is subject to tax.
When queried about the specific Article in the General Provisions on non-exemption from tax of
salaries of public officers, Commissioner Bernas replied:
FR BERNAS. Yes, I do not know if such an article will be found in the General Provisions.
But at any rate, when we put a period (.) after "DECREASED," it is on the understanding that
the doctrine in Perfecto vs. Meer and Dencia vs. David will not apply anymore.
The amendment to the original draft, as discussed and understood, was finally approved without
objection.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bengzon). The understanding, therefore, is that there will
be a provision under the Article on General Provisions. Could Commissioner Rosario Braid
kindly take note that the salaries of officials of the government including constitutional
officers shall not be exempt from income tax? The amendment proposed herein and
accepted by the Committee now reads as follows: "During their continuance in office, their
salary shall not be DECREASED"; and the phrase "nor subjected to income tax" is deleted.9
The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in
question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers
of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary
taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of
constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting
it should be given effect.10 The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and
thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of
the Constitution.11 it may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were
guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.12
1avv phi 1
Besides, construing Section 10, Articles VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, which, for clarity, is again
reproduced hereunder:
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of
judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary
shall not be decreased. (Emphasis supplied).
it is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of compensation
of Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they are receiving at the time of
enactment, or if lower, it would be applicable only to those appointed after its approval. It would be a
strained construction to read into the provision an exemption from taxation in the light of the
discussion in the Constitutional Commission.
With the foregoing interpretation, and as stated heretofore, the ruling that "the imposition of income
tax upon the salary of judges is a dimunition thereof, and so violates the Constitution" in Perfecto vs.
Meer,13 as affirmed inEndencia vs. David 14 must be declared discarded. The framers of the
fundamental law, as the alter ego of the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the
meaning and import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they have adopted
Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the discussions and
deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of the
cost of maintaining the government and should share the burden of general income taxation
equitably.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for Prohibition is hereby dismissed.
Teehankee, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Yap, J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1
Section 9,Articie VIII.
Section 10, Article X.
Section 6, Article XV, General Provisions.
Section 10, Article VIII.
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 433.
Record of the Constitutional Commission, p. 460.
Ibid., at page 467,
85 Phil. 552 (1950).
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 506.
10
Gold Creek Mining Co. vs. Rodriguez, 66 Phil. 259 (1938).
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration, No. L-21064, February 18, 1970,
31 SCRA 413.
11
12
Tanada, Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, Fourth Ed., Vol. 1, p. 21.
13
85 Phil. 552 (1950).
14
93 Phil. 696 (1953).

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-38969-70 February 9, 1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FELICIANO MUOZ, alias "Tony", et al., accused, MARVIN MILLORA, TOMAS TAYABA, alias
"Tamy Tayaba" and JOSE MISLANG, defendants-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Manuel B. Millora for appellant Marvin Millora.
Abelardo P. Fermin for appellant Jose Mislang.
Aquilino D. Baniqued for appellant Tomas Tayaba.
CRUZ, J.:
Of the four persons convicted in this case, one has not appealed and thus impliedly accepted his
sentence. The others have questioned their conviction and insist that they are innocent. The
prosecution did not think so, and neither does the Solicitor General now. The brief for the appellee
would affirm the finding of guilt and in fact even increase the penalty.
The prosecution presented a bizarre case of arbitrary condemnation and instant punishment meted
out by what appear to be the members of a private army. Eleven persons, most of them bodyguards
of the town mayor, went out in a jeep at the behest of one of them who had complained of having
been victimized by cattle rustlers. Having found their supposed quarry, they proceeded to execute
each one of them in cold blood without further ado and without mercy. One was shot in the mouth
and died instantly as his son and daughter looked on in horror. The second was forced to lie down
on the ground and then shot twice, also in the head, before his terrified wife and son. The third, who
was only sixteen years old, was kicked in the head until he bled before he too had his brains blown
out. To all appearances, the unfortunate victims were only innocent farmers and not the dangerous
criminals they were pronounced to be.
Bizarre but true, as the trial court agreed.
Of the eleven persons who were charged with murder in three separate informations, the four who
stood trial were found guilty. 1 The other seven have yet to be identified and tried. The sentence of
Feliciano Muoz, who did not appeal, has long become final and executory and is now being
served. 2 We deal here only with the appeals of the other convicts, namely, Marvin Millora, Tomas
Tayaba, and Jose Mislang, who all ask for a reversal.
The killings occurred in the morning of June 30, 1972, in Balite Sur, San Carlos City, Pangasinan. 3
As established by the prosecution, Feliciano Muoz, Marvin Millora, Tomas Tayaba, Jose Mislang,
and the other seven unidentified men went to the house of Mauro Bulatao and asked for the address
of his son Arsenic. All four of them went inside while the rest surrounded the house. All eleven men
were armed. Mauro, who was then bathing his horse, was called by the accused. As he approached
and while under his house, he was met by Millora who simply shot him at arm's length with a "long
firearm," hitting him in the mouth and killing him as he fell. At that precise time, Muoz, Tayaba and
Mislang were standing by Millora, evidently giving him armed support. None of them made any move
to restrain or dissuade him. 4
After killing Mauro, the four accused dragged out of the house his sixteen year old son, Aquilino, and
knocked him down. Muoz kicked him several times in the head as he lay on the ground while the
others looked on in silent approval or at least without objection. They then took the bleeding man
with them to look for their third target, Alejandro Bulatao. 5
In Alejandro's house, the group forced his wife, Juana to go with them and direct them to her
husband. They found him tending to their cows with his son Pedro. Muoz ordered Alejandro and his
wife to lie down and then, even as Pedro pleaded for his father's life, shot Alejandro twice in the
head, killing him instantly. Millora, Tayaba and Mislang, along with their companions, merely stood
by as the brutal act was committed. Juana watched her husband's death in terror and the 12-year
old boy made a desperate run for his life as one of the accused fired at him and missed. 6
The second victim having been murdered as the first, the accused then vented their violence on
Aquilino, whom Muoz again brutally kicked as the others looked on. Aquilino was entirely
defenseless. Finally, Muoz ended the boy's agony and shot him to death, hitting him in the head
and body. Muoz and Minora then picked up all the empty shells and fled with the rest of their
companions, leaving the terrified Juana with the two grisly corpses. 7
The above events were narrated at the trial by Melecia Bulatao, 8 Mauro's daughter and Aquilino's
sister; Jose Bulatao, 9 Mauro's son and Aquilino's brother; Juana Bulatao, 10 Alejandro's wife; and Pedro
Bulatao, 11 their son. Their testimony was corroborated by Dr. Juanita de Vera, 12 who performed the
autopsy on the three victims.
Melecia and Jose testified on the killing of their father by Marvin Minora as the other accused stood
by and the mauling of their brother Aquilino before he was dragged away by the group. The trial
court especially noted the straightforward account given by Jose, who positively identified Minora as
the killer and described the participation of the others, including the savage kicking of his brother by
Muoz. 13 Melecia earlier pointed to Mislang as the one who had shot her father but changed her mind
later on cross-examination and named Millora as the actual killer. She explained her turn-about by
confessing that she had earlier agreed to exonerate Minora in exchange for the sum of P3,000.00
promised by his father although she actually did not receive the money. 14 For her part, Juana related how
she was threatened with death unless she accompanied the accused to where her husband was. She
narrated in detail how Alejandro was killed before her very eyes and how Aquilino was later kicked and
then also shot to death, also by Muoz, while the other accused stood by. 15 Her testimony was
corroborated by Pedro, her son, whom the accused had also thought of killing because he was "talkative"
and indeed was shot at when he successfully escaped after his father's murder. 16
The defense makes much of the fact that it was only months after the killings that it occurred to
these witnesses to denounce the accused and suggests that this delay should impugn their
credibility. As correctly pointed out by the trial judge, however, these witnesses were naturally
deterred from doing so for fear that they would meet the same fate that befell their relatives. These
were humble barrio folk whose timidity did not allow them to report their grievances beyond the
barrio officials they knew, more so since the higher authorities appeared to be indifferent and gave
no attention, much less encouragement, to their complaints.
It is true that there were several inconsistencies in the testimony of these witnesses as painstakingly
pointed out by the appellants, 17 but these are minor flaws that do not detract from the essential
truthfulness of their accounts of the ruthless killings.
18
The brutality of the murders and the veracity of the testimony of the said witnesses are emphasized
by the medical reports 19 of the injuries sustained by the victims, as follows:
Mauro Bulatao:
1. Thru and thru gunshot wound with point of entrance at the upper lip left side
around 1 cm. in diameter and with the exit at the middle of the back of the head
around 1-1/2 cm. in diameter.
2. Gunshot wound at the lower lip left side of the mouth.
Alejandro Bulatao:
1. Lacerated gunshot wound at the left eye with the whole eye practically lacerated.
2. Lacerated gunshot wound of the right eye and the forehead practically opened
with the brain tissue outside.
Aquiline Bulatao:
1. Thru and thru gunshot wound with point of entrance at the upper right jaw bone
around 1- 1/2 cm. in diameter and with the exit at the middle of the back of the head
around 2 cm. in diameter.
2. Gunshot wound at the upper left shoulder out the middle of the left clavicle around
1- 1/2 inches in diameter.
The three appellants invoked individual defenses which the trial court correctly rejected as false and
unbelievable. All claimed the Bulataos were killed as a result of an exchange of gunfire with a rather
hazy group and each claimed he was not involved in the shoot-out.
Testifying for Millora on the alleged encounter between the Bulataos and their adversaries,
Victoriano Bacani said that the latter included Tayaba, Mislang and five others who fled from the
scene in a jeep. 20 Graciano Muoz, corroborating Bacani, said he himself saw seven men in a jeep
coming from the sound of the gunfire after he had paid Mauro P400.00 to redeem his stolen
carabao. 21 Another witness for Millora, Orlando de los Santos, testified to having seen the encounter
between the Bulataos and the other group and declared that the former were armed with carbines and
Garand rifles. 22
The trial court rejected Bacani's testimony because he appeared hesitant and suspicious on the
stand and did not give the impression that he was telling the truth. 23 Moreover, it took him all of one
year to report the alleged shooting encounter, which he also did not mention that same afternoon when
he visited Mauro's family to condole with them. 24 It is also not believable that the group would flee
because they had no more bullets when their supposed three adversaries were already dead in the field.
The alleged redemption made by Muoz was described by the trial court as preposterous, especially
since no shred of evidence had been presented to show that Mauro was a cattle rustler, let alone his 16
year old son. 25 As for De los Santos, no firearms were discovered beside the dead bodies of the
Bulataos, including Mauro, who was found not in the supposed battleground but under his house, as
testified to by Dr. De Vera. 26
Millora's own defense was that he was in Dagupan City at the time of the killings, having gone there
in the evening of June 29, 1972. He claimed he had stayed there overnight with a female companion
after drinking beer with Atty. Antonio Resngit returning to San Carlos City only between 8 and 9
o'clock the following morning or June 30, 1972.27 The lawyer corroborated him, 28 but he cannot be
more credible than Mauro's own children, Jose and Melecia, who positively identified Millora as the
person who actually shot their father in the face and killed him instantly. Such a traumatic experience
could not have been forgotten by these witnesses who saw their father murdered without warning or
mercy nor could their memory of the heartless killer have been easily wiped out from their minds.
It is stressed that Juana Bulatao and her son Pedro also categorically declared that Millora was with
the group that she took to the field where her husband and Aquilino were killed by Muoz. 29
Tayaba and Mislang offered a common defense, also of alibi. Both claimed that Mislang having
complained of cattle rustlers, a group of policemen, including Tayaba, stayed in the former's house
the whole night of June 29, 1972, leaving only at 8 o'clock the following morning of June 30, 1972,
after Mislang had served them breakfast.30 Significantly, however, barrio Bacnar where Mislang's house
was located, is only two kilometers from Balite Sur. 31Moreover, the trial court doubted the testimony given
by Sgt. Lomibao, who corroborated them and spoke of having heard the gunfire narrated by Millora's
witnesses. The decision noted that Lomibao was mysteriously absent when the police chief and Dr. de
Vera went to the scene of the crime at 9 o'clock that morning to investigate the killings. In fact, it
expressed the suspicion that Lomibao and Patrolman Liwanag, who also testified for the accused, might
have been among the seven unidentified persons who were with Muoz and the three appellants herein
when the Bulataos were murdered. 32
All told, we affirm the findings of the trial judge, who had the opportunity to observe the witnesses at
the trial and assess their credibility. As we said in a previous case:
We see no reason to reverse the factual findings of the trial judge, who had the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and to assess their credibility.
The written record will not show that nuance of tone or voice, the meaningful contrast
between the hesitant pause and the prompt reply, and the expression or color or tilt
of face that will affirm the truth or expose the fabrication. All these subtle factors
could be considered by the trial judge in weighing the conflicting declarations before
him, and we do not find that he has erred. 33
We agree that the three appellants, together with Muoz and their seven other companions,
participated in the killings of the three Bulataos in the manner described by the witnesses for the
prosecution. The defenses of the herein appellants should be, as they properly were, rejected as
undeserving of belief in the light of the more convincing and telling evidence submitted by the
government.
However, we do not accept the different degrees of participation assigned by the court a quo to each
of the appellants in each of the three offenses imputed to them. In Criminal Case No. 0176, Millora
was found guilty as principal and Muoz and the other two herein appellants only as accomplices,
and in Criminal Case Nos. 0177 and 0178, Muoz was found guilty as principal and the herein
appellants only as accomplices. 34 In support of this finding, the trial court said that there was no
evidence of conspiracy to justify holding each of the accused equally liable for the three murders.
We hold that there was. Indeed, it is clear that from the very start, when the eleven men went out to
look for the suspected cattle rustlers, there was already an agreement among them to ferret out and
punish the Bulataos whom they had condemned beforehand. They knew whom they were looking
for. They knew where to look for them. They sought each of them with drawn and ready weapons.
When they reached Mauro Bulatao's house, four of them went inside while the rest deployed
themselves in strategic positions. When Millora shot Mauro, the appellants and the others stood by
with guns at the ready. Nobody moved to dissuade or stop him. Together they dragged Aquilino from
the house and the rest watched while Muoz kicked him in the head while helpless on the ground.
Together, they took him with them and then forced Juana Bulatao to lead them to her husband. The
rest stood by with their weapons as Muoz shot Alejandro in the head. No one interceded to stop
him from also killing Aquilino. There is no question that the group moved in concert, pursuing a
common design previously agreed upon, that made each of them part of a conspiracy. 35 As such,
each of them is liable in equal degree with the others for each of the three killings. Each member of the
conspiracy to commit the crime of murder is guilty as a co-principal, regardless of who actually pulled the
trigger that killed the three victims. It is settled that in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all. 36
Each of the three killings constituted the crime of murder, qualified by alevosia. There was treachery
because every one of the three victims was completely helpless and defenseless when shot and
killed by the accused with no risk to themselves. Mauro was completely taken by surprise when he
was shot in the face. Alejandro was lying down when he was shot in the head. Aquilino was seated
when he was shot in the head and shoulders. None of the three victims had a chance to resist.
The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code was reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death, but this was modified by Article III, Section 19(l) of the 1987 Constitution
providing as follows:
Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
inflicted Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty
already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
Conformably, the Court has since February 2, 1987 not imposed the death penalty whenever it was
called for under the said article but instead reduced the same to reclusion perpetua as mandated by
the above provision. The maximum period of the penalty was thus in effect lowered to the medium,
the same period applied, as before, where the offense was not attended by any modifying
circumstance, with the minimum period, i. e., reclusion temporal maximum, being still applicable in
all other cases. The three-grade scheme of the original penalty, including death, was thus
maintained except that the maximum period was not imposed because of the constitutional
prohibition.
In People v. Gavarra 37 Justice Pedro L. Yap declared for the Court that "in view of the abolition of the
death penalty under Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the penalty that may be imposed for
murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua" thereby eliminating death as
the original maximum period. Later, without categorically saying so, the Court, through Justice Ameurfina
Melencio-Herrera in People v. Masangkay 38 and through Justice Andres R. Narvasa in People v.
Atencio 39 divided the modified penalty into three new periods, the limits of which were specified by
Justice Edgardo L. Paras in People v. Intino, 40 as follows: the lower half of reclusion temporal maximum
as the minimum; the upper half of reclusion temporal maximum as the medium; and reclusion
perpetua as the maximum.
The Court has reconsidered the above cases and, after extended discussion, come to the
conclusion that the doctrine announced therein does not reflect the intention of the framers as
embodied in Article III, Section 19(l) of the Constitution. This conclusion is not unanimous, to be
sure. Indeed, there is much to be said of the opposite view, which was in fact shared by many of
those now voting for its reversal. The majority of the Court, however, is of the belief that the original
interpretation should be restored as the more acceptable reading of the constitutional provision in
question.
The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution abolished the death penalty and
thereby limited the penalty for murder to the remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium.
These should now be divided into three new periods in keeping with the three-grade scheme
intended by the legislature. Those who disagree feel that Article III, Section 19(l) merely prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty and has not, by reducing it to reclusion perpetua, also
correspondingly reduced the remaining penalties. These should be maintained intact.
A reading of Section 19(l) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing therein which
expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that the death
penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress
hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The
language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough. And it is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics
that if the language under consideration is plain, it is neither necessary nor permissible to resort to
extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional convention, for its interpretation. 41
At that, the Court finds that such resort, even if made, would not be of much assistance either in the
case at bar. Accepting arguendo that it was the intention of the framers to abolish the death penalty,
we are still not convinced from the debates in the Constitutional Commission that there was also a
requirement to adjust the two remaining periods by dividing them into three shorter periods. This is
not a necessary consequence of the provision as worded. The following exchange cited by those in
favor of Masangkay is at best thought-provoking but not decisive of the question:
FR. BERNAS: The effect is the abolition of the death penalty from
those statutes-only the death penalty. The statute is not abolished,
but the penalty is abolished.
MR. MAAMBONG: That is what I am worried about, because the
statutes, especially in the General Criminal Law, which is the Revised
Penal Code, do not necessarily punish directly with death.
Sometimes it has a range of reclusion temporal to death or reclusion
perpetua to death. And what would be the effect on the judges, for
example, if the range is reclusion temporal to death and he can no
longer impose the death penalty? He will have difficulty in computing
the degrees.
Could the committee enlighten us on how the judge will look at the
specific situation.
FR. BERNAS: I grant that the judges will have difficulty, but I suppose
that the judges will be equal to their tasks. The only thing is, if there is
a range, the range cannot go as far as death (Record, CONCOM,
July 18, 1986, Vol. I, 749).
FR. BERNAS: Certainly, the penalties lower than death remain.
MR. REGALADO: That would be reclusion perpetua. But the range of
the penalty for murder consists of three periods. The maximum period
of reclusion temporal under the present status is the minimum period
for the penalty for murder. The medium period isreclusion perpetua.
The maximum period is death. If we now remove the death penalty,

we will, therefore, have a range of penalty of 17 years, 4 months and
1 day to 20 years of reclusion temporal up to reclusion perpetua. You
cannot divide reclusion perpetua into two. While it has a duration of
30 years, it is an indivisible penalty. Where do we get the medium
period now until such time that Congress gets around to
accommodate this amendment?
FR. BERNAS: As I said, this is a matter which lawyers can argue with
judges about. All we are saying is, the judges cannot impose the
death penalty (Record, CONCOM July 18, 1986, Vol. I, p. 750).
So there we have it "this is a matter which lawyers can argue with judges about." Assuming that
Commissioner Bernas's answer reflected the consensus of the body, we are still not persuaded that
it was the intention of the framers to lower not only the maximum period but also the other periods of
the original penalty. That is not necessarily inferable from his statement that "the judges will be equal
to their task," especially so since he also said and we think with more definiteness-that "all we are
saying is that the judges cannot impose the death penalty" (Emphasis supplied). We understand this
to mean that they were not saying more.
The question as we see it is not whether the framers intended to abolish the death penalty or merely
to prevent its imposition. Whatever the intention was, what we should determine is whether or not
they also meant to require a corresponding modification in the other periods as a result of the
prohibition against the death penalty.
It is definite that such a requirement, if there really was one, is not at all expressed in Article III,
Section 19(l) of the Constitution or indicated therein by at least clear and unmistakable implication. It
would have been so easy, assuming such intention, to state it categorically and plainly, leaving no
doubt as to its meaning. One searches in vain for such a statement, express or even implied. The
writer of this opinion makes the personal observation that this might be still another instance where
the framers meant one thing and said another-or strangely, considering their loquacity elsewhere
did not say enough.
The original ruling as applied in the Gavarra, Masangkay, Atencio and Intino cases represented the
unanimous thinking of the Court as it was then constituted. All but two members 42 at that time still sit
on the Court today. If we have seen fit to take a second look at the doctrine on which we were all agreed
before, it is not because of a change in the composition of this body. It is virtually the same Court that is
changing its mind after reflecting on the question again in the light of new perspectives. And well it might,
and can, for the tenets it lays down are not immutable. The decisions of this Court are not petrified rules
grown rigid once pronounced but vital, growing things subject to change as all life is. While we are told
that the trodden path is best, this should not prevent us from opening a fresh trial or exploring the other
side or testing a new idea in a spirit of continuing inquiry.
Accordingly, with the hope that "as judges, (we) will be equal to (our) tasks," whatever that means,
we hereby reverse the current doctrine providing for three new periods for the penalty for murder as
reduced by the Constitution. Instead, we return to our original interpretation and hold that Article III,
Section 19(l) does not change the periods of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code except only insofar as it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and reduces it
to reclusion perpetua. The range of the medium and minimum penalties remains unchanged.
The Court relies that this interpretation may lead to certain inequities that would not have arisen
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code before its modification. Thus, a person originally
subject to the death penalty and another who committed the murder without the attendance of any
modifying circumstance will now be both punishable with the same medium period although the
former is concededly more guilty than the latter. True enough. But that is the will not of this Court but
of the Constitution. That is a question of wisdom, not construction. Of some relevance perhaps is the
parable in the Bible of the workman who was paid the stipulated daily wage of one penny although
he had worked longer than others hired later in the day also paid the same amount. When he
complained because he felt unjustly treated by the householder, the latter replied: "Friend, I do you
no wrong. Did you not agree with me for a penny?'
The problem in any event is addressed not to this Court but to the Congress. Penalties are
prescribed by statute and are essentially and exclusively legislative. As judges, we can only interpret
and apply them and have no authority to modify them or revise their range as determined exclusively
by the legislature. We should not encroach on this prerogative of the lawmaking body.
Coming back to the case at bar, we find that there being no generic aggravating or mitigating
circumstance attending the commission of the offenses, the applicable sentence is the medium
period of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code which, conformably to the
new doctrine here adopted and announced, is still reclusion perpetua. This is the penalty we impose
on all the accused-appellants for each of the three murders they have committed in conspiracy with
the others. The award of civil indemnity for the heirs of each of the victims is affirmed but the amount
thereof is hereby increased to P30,000.00 in line with the present policy.
It remains to observe that the crimes inflicted upon the humble farmers would have remained
unpunished were it not for the vigilance of certain responsible officials, especially the police and the
prosecuting officer, who took up the cudgels for the victims' families. The courage and
conscientiousness they displayed are still the most potent weapons against those who, in their
arrogance, believe that they can flout the law and frustrate justice because they have the protection
of powerful patrons.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is MODIFIED and all the accused-appellants are hereby
declared guilty as principals in Criminal Case Nos. 0176, 0177 and 0178. Each of them is sentenced
to suffer three (3) penalties ofreclusion perpetua, and to pay solidarily to the heirs of their victims civil
indemnity in the sum of P30,000.00 for each of the deceased, or a total indemnity of P90,000.00,
with costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ.,
concur.
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring and dissenting:

Concurrence is expressed in so far as conviction of the appellants is concerned.
Dissent is registered, however, as to the penalty imposed which, in our view, should adhere to that
provided in the Gavarra, followed by Masangkay, Atencio and Intino cases, which is more reflective
of the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution.
Simply put, the question is: did Section 19(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, abolish the death
penalty or not? The pertinent portion thereof provides:
... Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it.
xxx xxx xxx
The majority pronouncement is that said provision did not abolish the death penalty but only
provided for its non-imposition. Our reading, however, is that when the Constitution states that the
death penalty shall not be imposed, it can only mean that capital punishment is now deemed nonexistent in our penal statutes.
It is because of the imperfection ("awkward" as termed by the majority) of the language used, and its
susceptibility to two conflicting interpretations, contrary to the majority opinion that the text is plain,
that resort must be had to judicial construction.
It is elementary in statutory construction that it is the intent of the statute that must be given effect.
The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines the construction thereof, and the Court looks
less to its words and more to its context, subject matter, consequence and effects (Manila Race
Horse Trainers Association vs. de la Puente, 88 Phil. 60). A statute must be read according to its
spirit and intent, and where legislative intent apparently conflicts with the letter of the law, the former
prevails over the latter (Tanada vs. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051). This intent must be ascertained from
the words of the statutory provision itself. However, in a situation such as in the case at bar, where
the intent does not decisively appear in the text of the provision as it admits of more than one
construction, reliance may be made on extrinsic aids such as the records of the deliberations of the
body that framed the law in order to clearly ascertain that intent.
The records of the Constitutional Commission (CONCOM) leave no doubt as to the intention of that
body to abolish the death penalty. Thus, Fr. Bernas spoke of the constitutional abolition of the death
penalty in his speech sponsoring the provision:
My recollection on this is that there was a division in the Committee not on whether
the death penalty should be abolished or not, but rather on whether the abolition
should be done by the Constitution-in which case it cannot be restored by the
legislature-left to the legislature. The majority voted for the constitutional abolition of
the death penalty. And the reason is that capital punishment is inhuman for the
convict and his family who are traumatized by the waiting, even if it is never carried
out. There is no evidence that the death penalty deterred deadly criminals, hence, life
should not be destroyed just in the hope that other lives might be saved. Assuming
mastery over the life of another man is just to presumptuous for any man. The fact
that the death penalty as an institution has been there from time immemorial should
not deter us from reviewing it. Human life is mare valuable than an institution
intended precisely to service human life. So, basically, this is the summary of the
reason which were presented in support of the constitutional abolition of the death
penalty (Record, CONCOM, July 17, 1986, Vol. 1, p. 676). (Emphasis supplied)
Expounding on this abolition, Fr. Bernas also stated: "Rather than wait for legislative discretion to
abolish the death penalty, the Commission went ahead to abolish it but left the matter open for
Congress to revive capital punishment at its discretion for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes." "By a show of hands, the abolition of the death penalty was approved, 19 to 18. On motion
of Commissioner Rodrigo, nominal voting was called and the outcome was still for abolition, 22 to
17" (Bernas, Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. 1, pp. 442443).
Another member of the CONCOM, Mr. Florenz Regalado, now a member of this Court, spoke for the
retention of the death penalty, arguing that the law has provided numerous procedural and
substantive safeguards that must be observed before the death penalty could be carried out. Among
the safeguards are the requirements that evidence still be presented to justify the imposition of the
death penalty although the accused has pleaded guilty, and the automatic review of such death
penalty when imposed by Trial Courts. Commissioner Regalado also mentioned the fact that the
Supreme Court has modified the death sentences imposed by Trial Courts in many instances.
According to him, this only shows that the imposition of capital punishment goes through all the
stages of screening and processing to avoid the possibility of error (Record, CONCOM, July 18,
1986, Vol. 1, pp. 745-746).
In response, Fr. Bernas said that the numerous safeguards that must be observed before the death
penalty could be carried out precisely show the tremendous reluctance of Philippine society to
impose the death penalty, which reluctance must be translated into a constitutional prohibition. To
quote him:
FR. BERNAS: The reluctance is so grave that so many obstacles are put up against
the execution of the death penalty and judges agonize whether they have to impose
a death penalty or not. Legislators have made it more difficult for the death penalty to
be imposed. Thus, the total abolition of the death penalty by the Constitution
facilitates everything for the judges and for the legislators. it removes the agonizing
process of having to decide whether the death penalty should be imposed by them or
not. (Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. 1, p. 746) (Emphasis supplied)
It is thus clear that when Fr. Bernas sponsored the provision regarding the non-imposition of the
death penalty, what he had in mind was the total abolition and removal from the statute books of the
death penalty. This became the intent of the framers of the Constitution when they approved the
provision and made it a part of the Bill of Rights.
The following interpellation during the CONCOM deliberations sheds further light:
MR. MAAMBONG: Just one clarificatory question. On the assumption
that this proposed amendment will be granted, what would happen to
the laws which presently punish certain penal omens by death,
because those laws may have to be repealed later by the National
Assembly? But as of this moment, there are so many penal offenses
which are punishable by death. What would be the effect of the grant
of these amendments?
those statutes-only the death penalty. The statute is not
abolished, but the penalty is abolished. (Record, CONCOM, July 18,
1986, Vol. 1, pp. 748-749) (Emphasis supplied)
It is true that Article III, Section 19(l) also grants Congress the power to provide for the death penalty
in cases involving heinous crimes. Congress was given this power precisely because it is only the
law-making body which can legislate back into existence something that has been eliminated from
our penal laws. Thus, the Constitution, while abolishing capital punishment, also left to Congress the
power to restore it in certain cases. It is clear, however, that unless and until Congress enacts the
necessary legislation, the death penalty remains non-existent in our statute books. Again, the
deliberations in the CONCOM prove this point:
FR. BERNAS: The sense of this proposal is that upon the ratification
of this Constitution, the legislature, if it wants to reimpose the death
penalty, must repeat the act. In other words, the penalty disappears
and there is need of a new act of the legislature to put it back.
MR. MAAMBONG: Could we put it more simply, Madam President?
Could we say that once this amendment is accepted, all penal
offenses punishable by death will no longer carry the death penalty?
FR. BERNAS: That is correct (Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol.
I, p. 749). (Emphasis supplied)
The following exchange on the floor when the CONCOM was deliberating on the provision giving the
Legislature the power to provide for the death penalty in cases involving heinous crimes shows the
understanding among the framers of what the consequences would be when the legislature does not
pass a law reimposing death penalty for certain heinous crimes:
MR. DE CASTRO: What happens if the National Assembly does not
pass any law concerning death penalty such as on heinous crimes?
MR. MONSOD: Then there is no death penalty.
MIL DE CASTRO: That is the effect of the amendment?
MR. MONSOD: Yes (Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. I, pp.
747-748) (Emphasis supplied)
To say that the wordings "neither shall death penalty be imposed," do not provide for the abolition of
the death penalty, but only provides for its non-imposition is to adopt a rather literal and restrictive
construction that goes against the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution. The literal import or
meaning of a statute must yield to its apparent intent, purpose or spirit. Intent is the spirit which gives
rise to legislative enactment. It must be enforced when ascertained although it may not be consistent
with the strict letter of the statute. The language of the Constitution "should be read in a sense most
obvious to the common understanding at the time of its adoption" (Eisner v. Macomber, 15, 6 Ed
421, 424). The intention of the legislature and its purpose or object, being the fundamental inquiry in
judicial construction, control the literal interpretation of the particular language of a statute and a
language capable of more than one meaning is to be taken in such a sense as to harmonize with the
intention and object and effectuate the purpose of the enactment (US vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128).
Coming now to the penalty for Murder-the majority reverses the Decisions of this Court in People vs.
Gavarra (L-37673, October 30, 1987, en banc, 155 SCRA 327), People vs. Masangkay (L-73461,
October 27, 1987, 155 SCRA 113), People vs. Atencio (L-67721, December 10, 1987, 156 SCRA
242) and People v. Intino (L-69934, September 26, 1988) with respect to the imposable penalty for
Murder in the absence of modifying circumstances. Those cases held that with the constitutional ban
on capital punishment, the penalty for Murder now becomesreclusion temporal maximum
to reclusion perpetua. Applying the provisions of the Revised Penal Code (Article 61 [3]), the
medium period would be the higher half of reclusion temporal maximum or 18 years, 8 months and 1
day to 20 years, and the minimum period is the lower half of reclusion temporal maximum, or 17
years, 4 months and 1 day to 18 years and 8 months. The maximum period is, of course, reclusion
perpetua because of the prohibition regarding the death penalty.
The foregoing is but in faithful adherence to the graduated three-period scheme in the Revised
Penal Code whereby if an aggravating circumstance attends the commission of the crime, the
imposable penalty is the maximum period; if a mitigating circumstance, the minimum period; and in
the absence of any modifying circumstance, the medium period.
The majority assails the foregoing interpretation, however, in that the requirement of the modification
of the penalty is not at all expressed in the Constitutional provision in question nor indicated therein
by at least clear and unmistakable implication. However, to require the inclusion of such an
additional provision would have made for more prolixity to a document that already is. That detail
was best left to the Courts as indicated by the discussions on the floor.
Indeed, when the abolition of the death penalty was being discussed on the floor of the CONCOM,
the issue of the proper penalty for Murder, specifically with regard to its medium period, was raised.
The following interpellation, also repeated in the majority opinion, tackled that issue:
longer impose the death penalty? He will have difficulty in commuting
the degrees.
specific situation.
July 18, 1986, Vol. I, p. 749).
xxx xxx xxx
FR. BERNAS: Certainly, the penalties lower than death remain.
for the penalty for murder. The medium period is reclusion perpetua.

1 day to 20 years ' of reclusion temporal up to reclusion perpetua.
You cannot divide reclusion perpetua into two. While it has a duration
of 30 years, it is an indivisible penalty. Where do we get the medium
death penalty (Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. 1, p. 750)
The fact that the medium period of the penalty for Murder was at all discussed not only bolsters the
holding in the Gavarra and related cases that the death penalty had been abolished, and that the
penalty for Murder was consequentially to be reduced to two periods, but also shows a keen
awareness that "difficulty" would be encountered by the Courts by reason thereof The Supreme
Court had proven itself "equal to the task" by resolving that "difficulty in the cited cases. If it were, as
the majority says, that "they (the proponents) were not saying more," wherein would the "difficulty"
lie? It would have been an easy matter for the proponents to have simply answered that the medium
period was to be maintained at reclusion perpetua since anyway, as the majority concludes, the
death penalty had not been abolished.
If, as opined by the majority, reclusion perpetua is retained as the penalty for Murder even in the
absence of aggravating and modifying circumstances, while imposed also as the new maximum
penalty for the crime, then, the presence or absence of modifying circumstances will no longer lead
to the imposition of a higher or lesser penalty depending on the attendant circumstances, as the
Penal Code has prescribed. The distinction is erased between Murder committed with a generic
aggravating circumstance and Murder carried out with neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance. In both cases, the same penalty is imposable. As a consequence, the reason of the
law in creating penalties divided into periods and in providing for various modifying circumstances
with different effects, that is, the need to penalized more severely a Murder attended by an
aggravating circumstance than a Murder with neither aggravating nor modifying circumstance, is
rendered nugatory. Certainly, the CONCOM, in banning the imposition of capital punishment, could
not have also intended to discard the underlying reason of the Penal Code in imposing three-periods
for the penalty for Murder, i.e., to punish the offense in different degrees of severity depending on
the offender's employment of aggravating or mitigating circumstance, or the lack thereof. To say that
this is "the will of the Constitution" is inaccurate for the matter was clearly left to the Courts which
were expected to be "equal to the tasks."
In keeping with that expectation, this Court held that the modified penalty for Murder, or, reclusion
temporal, maximum, to reclusion perpetua, must retain the three-period scheme. In the application of
the new penalty, a medium period, less severe than the maximum penalty, must be provided for so
that the original intention of the law to penalize Murder in different degrees of severity depending on
the attendant circumstances, remains in effect. That was the basis for the ruling in the Masangkay
and the related that the majority is now abandoning. In those cases, the Court did not prescribe a
penalty, a function admittedly legislative. It merely effectuated the Constitutional ban on capital
punishment and harmonized it with the basic tenets underlying our Penal Code.
Narvasa, Paras, Sarmineto, Cortes and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions

xxx xxx xxx
provided for its non- imposition. Our reading, however, is that when the Constitution states that the
1986, Vol. 1, pp. 745-746).
quote him:
the degrees.
specific situation.
July 18, 1986, Vol. I, p. 749).
xxx xxx xxx

Separate Opinions
xxx xxx xxx
provided for its non- imposition. Our reading, however, is that when the Constitution states that the
1986, Vol. 1, pp. 745-746).
quote him:

the degrees.
specific situation.
July 18, 1986, Vol. I, p. 749).
xxx xxx xxx
Footnotes
1 Decision was penned by Judge Himerio B. Garcia, Circuit Criminal Court, Third
Judicial District, Dagupan City, Rollo, pp. 2858.
2 Consolidated Brief for the Appellee, p. 5, Rollo, p. 296.
3 Rollo, p. 28.
4 TSNS, May 16, 1973, pp. .40-45; May 23, 1973, pp. 181-189.
5 Ibid., pp. 45-48; Id., pp. 190-194.
6 TSNs, May 18, 1973, pp. 124-128; May 24, 1973 pp. 231- 236, 258-259.
7 Ibid., pp. 128-13 1; Id., p. 236.
8 TSNs May 16, 1973, pp. 39-71; May 17,1973, pp. 76-104.
9 TSN May 23,1973, pp. 180-221.
10 TSN, May 24, 1973, pp. 230-269.
11 TSNs May 18, 1973, pp. 119-146; May 23, 1973, pp. 151-178.
12 TSN., May 16, 1973, pp. 7-39.
13 Decision, Rollo, pp. 38-39. T.S.N.,
14 May 17, 1973, pp. 102-103.
15 TSN., May 24, 1973, pp. 230-236.
16 TSN May 18, 197 3, pp. 124-132.
17 Brief for accused-appellant Marvin Millora, Rollo, pp. 243-254; Brief for accusedappellant Tomas Tayaba, pp. 15- 33; Rollo, p. 193; Brief for accused-appellant Jose
Mislang, pp. 8-10, Rollo, p. 212.
18 People v. Abigan, 144 SCRA 130; People v. Bautista, 142 SCRA 649; People v.
Valentino, 141 SCRA 397; People v. Arbois, 138 SCRA 24; People v. Pacabes, 137
SCRA 158. '9 Exh. 'A,' Records of Crim. Case No. III-0176, p. 88;
19 Exh. "A," Records of Crim. Case No. 111- 1077, p. 43; Exh. "A,' Records of Crim.
Case No. III-0178, p. 40.
20 TSN., June 11, 1973, pp. 351-353.
21 TSN., July 25, 1973, pp. 388-394.
22 Ibid., pp. 427-432.
23 Decision, Rollo, p. 43.
24 Ibid.
25 Id., pp. 43-44.
26 Id., p. 43; T.S.N., May 16, 1973, pp. 23-24.
27 TSN, December 20, 1973, pp. 473-478.
28 Ibid., pp. 502-505.
29 TSNs' May 24, 1973, pp. 231-233, 236; May 18, 1973, pp. 126- 127, 131,
30 TSN, January 30, 1974, pp. 627-631; January 31, 1974, pp. 672-678.
31 TSN, January 29, 1974, p. 597.
32 Decision, Rollo, pp. 47-50.
33 People v. Guardo, et al., G.R. No. L-42965, December 3, 1987.
34 Decision, Rollo, pp. 55-58.
35 Consolidated Brief for the Appellee, pp. 4546, Rollo, p. 296.
36 People v. Punzalan, 153 SCRA 1; People v. Liza, 152 SCRA 318; People v.
Serante, 152 SCRA 510; People v. Rojas, 147 SCRA 169; People v. Loren, 130
SCRA 311.
37 155 SCRA 327.
38 155 SCRA 113.
39 156 SCRA 242.
40 L-69934, September 26, 1988.
41 16 C.J.S. 67-68.
42 Chief Justice Teehankee and Chief Justice Yap.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 93054 : December 4, 1990.]
192 SCRA 100
Cordillera Regional Assembly Member ALEXANDER P. ORDILLO, (Banaue), Ifugao
Provincial Board Member CORAZON MONTINIG, (Mayoyao), Former Vice-Mayor
MARTIN UDAN (Banaue), Municipal Councilors MARTIN GANO, (Lagawe), and
TEODORO HEWE, (Hingyon), Barangay Councilman PEDRO W. DULAG (Lamut);
Aguinaldo residents SANDY B. CHANGIWAN, and DONATO TIMAGO; Lamut resident
REY ANTONIO; Kiangan residents ORLANDO PUGUON, and REYNAND DULDULAO;
Lagawe residents TOMAS KIMAYONG, GREGORIO DANGO, GEORGE B. BAYWONG,
and VICENTE LUNAG; Hingyon residents PABLO M. DULNUAN and CONSTANCIO
GANO; Mayoyao residents PEDRO M. BAOANG, LEONARDO IGADNA, and MAXIMO
IGADNA; and Banaue residents PUMA-A CULHI, LATAYON BUTTIG, MIGUEL
PUMELBAN, ANDRES ORDILLO, FEDERICO MARIANO, SANDY BINOMNGA, GABRIEL
LIMMANG, ROMEO TONGALI, RUBEN BAHATAN, MHOMDY GABRIEL, and NADRES
GHAMANG, Petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; The Honorable
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, Secretary of Justice; Hon. CATALINO MACARAIG, Executive
Secretary; The Cabinet Officer for Regional Development; Hon. GUILLERMO
CARAGUE, Secretary of Budget and Management; and Hon. ROSALINA S. CAJUCOM,
OIC, National Treasurer, Respondents.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The question raised in this petition is whether or not the province of Ifugao, being the only
province which voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can,
alone, legally and validly constitute such Region.
The antecedent facts that gave rise to this petition are as follows:
On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao,
Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite held pursuant
to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region."
The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results of the plebiscite showed that the
creation of the Region was approved by a majority of 5,889 votes in only the Ifugao Province
and was overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and city
above-mentioned.
Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990, issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that
the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of the votes
cast only in the province of Ifugao. On the same date, the Secretary of Justice issued a
memorandum for the President reiterating the COMELEC resolution and provided:
". . . [A]nd considering the proviso in Sec. 13(A) that only the provinces and city voting
favorably shall be included in the CAR, the province of Ifugao being the only province which
voted favorably then, alone, legally and validly constitutes the CAR." (Rollo, p. 7)
As a result of this, on March 8, 1990, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6861 setting the
elections in the Cordillera Autonomous Region of Ifugao on the first Monday of March 1991.
: na d
Even before the issuance of the COMELEC resolution, the Executive Secretary on February 5,
1990 issued a Memorandum granting authority to wind up the affairs of the Cordillera
Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly created under Executive Order No. 220.
On March 9, 1990, the petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the non-ratification
of the Organic Act for the Region. The COMELEC merely noted said petition.
On March 30, 1990, the President issued Administrative Order No. 160 declaring among
others that the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly and all the offices
created under Executive Order No. 220 were abolished in view of the ratification of the Organic
Act.
- nad
The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one
province as the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be
composed of more than one constituent unit.
The petitioners, then, pray that the Court: (1) declare null and void COMELEC resolution No.
2259, the memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, the memorandum of the Executive
Secretary, Administrative Order No. 160, and Republic Act No. 6861 and prohibit and restrain
the respondents from implementing the same and spending public funds for the purpose and
(2) declare Executive Order No. 220 constituting the Cordillera Executive Board and the
Cordillera Regional Assembly and other offices to be still in force and effect until another
organic law for the Autonomous Region shall have been enacted by Congress and the same
is duly ratified by the voters in the constituent units. We treat the Comments of the
respondents as an answer and decide the case.
This petition is meritorious.
The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution that:
"Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in
the Cordillera consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution
and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines." (Emphasis Supplied)
The keywords provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that "region"
is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. The term "region" used in its ordinary
sense means two or more provinces. This is supported by the fact that the thirteen (13)
regions into which the Philippines is divided for administrative purposes are groupings of
contiguous provinces. (Integrated Reorganization Plan (1972), which was made as part of the
law of the land by P.D. No. 1; P.D. No. 742) Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of
a region, it must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas. It joins
other units because of their common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic
and social structures and other relevant characteristics. The Constitutional requirements are
not present in this case.
- nad
The well-established rule in statutory construction that the language of the Constitution, as
much as possible should be understood in the sense it has in common use and that the words
used in constitutional provisions are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed, must then, be applied in this case. (See Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA
757, 770, [1988]; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413, 422423 [1970]).
Aside from the 1987 Constitution, a reading of the provisions of Republic Act No. 6766
strengthens the petitioner's position that the Region cannot be constituted from only one
province.
Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of the Statute provide that the Cordillera Autonomous Region is
to be administered by the Cordillera government consisting of the Regional Government and
local government units. It further provides that:
"SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions necessary
for the proper governance and development of all provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangay or ili within the Autonomous Region . . ."
From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province
may constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be faced with the absurd
situation of having two sets of officials, a set of provincial officials and another set of regional
officials exercising their executive and legislative powers over exactly the same small area.
Article V, Sections 1 and 4 of Republic Act 6766 vest the legislative power in the Cordillera
Assembly whose members shall be elected from regional assembly districts apportioned
among provinces and the cities composing the Autonomous Region.
chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry
If we follow the respondent's position, the members of such Cordillera Assembly shall then
be elected only from the province of Ifugao creating an awkward predicament of having two
legislative bodies the Cordillera Assembly and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan exercising
their legislative powers over the province of Ifugao. And since Ifugao is one of the smallest
provinces in the Philippines, population-wise, it would have too many government officials for
so few people.
:-cralaw
Article XII, Section 10 of the law creates a Regional Planning and Development Board
composed of the Cordillera Governor, all the provincial governors and city mayors or their
representatives, two members of the Cordillera Assembly, and members representing the
private sector. The Board has a counterpart in the provincial level called the Provincial
Planning and Development Coordinator. The Board's functions (Article XII, Section 10, par.
2, Republic Act No. 6766) are almost similar to those of the Provincial Coordinator's (Title
Four, Chapter 3, Article 10, Section 220 (4), Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 Local Government
Code). If it takes only one person in the provincial level to perform such functions while on
the other hand it takes an entire Board to perform almost the same tasks in the regional level,
it could only mean that a larger area must be covered at the regional level. The respondent's
theory of the Autonomous Region being made up of a single province must, therefore, fail.
Article XXI, Section 13 (B) (c) alloting the huge amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00)
to the Regional Government for its initial organizational requirements cannot be construed as
funding only a lone and small province.
These sections of Republic Act No. 6766 show that a one province Cordillera Autonomous
Region was never contemplated by the law creating it.
The province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of the total population of the areas enumerated
in Article I, Section 2 (b) of Republic Act No. 6766 which include Benguet, Mountain Province,
Abra, Kalinga-Apayao and Baguio City. It has the second smallest number of inhabitants from
among the provinces and city above mentioned. The Cordillera population is distributed in
round figures as follows: Abra, 185,000; Benguet, 486,000; Ifugao, 149,000; KalingaApayao, 214,000; Mountain Province, 116,000; and Baguio City, 183,000; Total population
of these five provinces and one city; 1,332,000 according to the 1990 Census (Manila
Standard, September 30, 1990, p. 14).
There are other provisions of Republic Act No. 6766 which are either violated or which cannot
be complied with. Section 16 of Article V calls for a Regional Commission on Appointments
with the Speaker as Chairman and are (6) members coming from different provinces and
cities in the Region. Under the respondents' view, the Commission would have a Chairman
and only one member. It would never have a quorum. Section 3 of Article VI calls for cabinet
members, as far as practicable, to come from various provinces and cities of the Region.
Section 1 of Article VII creates a system of tribal courts for the various indigenous cultural
communities of the Region. Section 9 of Article XV requires the development of a common
regional language based upon the various languages and dialects in the region which regional
language in turn is expected to enrich the national language.
The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region is infused
with provisions which rule against the sole province of Ifugao constituting the Region.
:-cra law
To contemplate the situation envisioned by the respondent would not only violate the letter
and intent of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 but would also be impractical and
illogical.
Our decision in Abbas, et al. v. COMELEC, (G.R. No. 89651, November 10, 1969), is not
applicable in the case at bar contrary to the view of the Secretary of Justice.
The Abbas case laid down the rate on the meaning of majority in the phrase "by majority of
the votes cast by the constituent units called for the purpose" found in the Constitution, Article
X, Section 18. It stated:
x x x
". . . [I]t is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is simple majority of
votes approving the Organic Act in individual constituent units and not a double
majority of the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in the individual
constituent units."
This was the pronouncement applied by the Secretary of Justice in arriving at his conclusion
stated in his Memorandum for the President that:
x x x
". . . [i]t is believed that the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR) as
mandated by R.A. No. 6766 became effective upon its approval by the majority of the
votes cast in the province of Ifugao. And considering the proviso in Section 13 (a) that
only the provinces and city voting favorably shall be included in the CAR, the province
of Ifugao being the only province which voted favorably can, alone, legally and
validly constitute the CAR." (Rollo. p. 40).
The plebiscites mandated by the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 for the Cordillera and
Republic Act No. 6734 for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao determine (1)
whether there shall be an autonomous region in the Cordillera and in Muslim Mindanao and
(2) which provinces and cities, among those enumerated in the two Republic Acts, shall
comprise said Autonomous Regions. (See III, Record of the Constitutional Commission, 487492 [1986]).
The Abbas case established the rule to follow on which provinces and cities shall comprise the
autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao which is, consequently, the same rule to follow with
regard to the autonomous region in the Cordillera. However, there is nothing in the Abbas
decision which deals with the issue on whether an autonomous region, in either Muslim
Mindanao or Cordillera could exist despite the fact that only one province or one city is to
constitute it.
chanroble s virtual law l ibra ry
Stated in another way, the issue in this case is whether the sole province of Ifugao can validly
and legally constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region. The issue is not whether the
province of Ifugao is to be included in the Cordillera Autonomous Region. It is the first issue
which the Court answers in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Resolution No. 2259 of the Commission on
Elections, insofar as it upholds the creation of an autonomous region, the February 14, 1990
memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, the February 5, 1990 memorandum of the Executive
Secretary, Administrative Order No. 160, and Republic Act No. 6861 are declared null and
void while Executive Order No. 220 is declared to be still in force and effect until properly
repealed or amended.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 91636 April 23, 1992

PETER JOHN D. CALDERON, petitioner,
vs.
BARTOLOME CARALE, in his capacity as Chairman of the National Labor Relations
Commission, EDNA BONTO PEREZ, LOURDES C. JAVIER, ERNESTO G. LADRIDO III, MUSIB
M. BUAT, DOMINGO H. ZAPANTA, VICENTE S.E. VELOSO III, IRENEO B. BERNARDO,
IRENEA E. CENIZA, LEON G. GONZAGA, JR., ROMEO B. PUTONG, ROGELIO I. RAYALA,
RUSTICO L. DIOKNO, BERNABE S. BATUHAN and OSCAR N. ABELLA, in their capacity as
Commissioners of the National Labor Relations Commission, and GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in
his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
Controversy is focused anew on Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution which provides:
Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of
other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective
only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress. 1
The power of the Commission on Appointments (CA for brevity) to confirm appointments, contained
in the aforequoted paragraph 1 of Sec. 16, Art. VII, was first construed in Sarmiento III vs. Mison 2 as
follows:
. . . it is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a

bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the
consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. As a matter of fact, as
already pointed out, while the 1935 Constitution includes "heads of bureaus" among
those officers whose appointments need the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand, deliberately excluded the
position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent

(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
. . . Consequently, we rule that the President of the Philippines acted within her
constitutional authority and power in appointing respondent Salvador Mison,
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, without submitting his nomination to the
Commission on Appointments for confirmation. . . .
. . . In the 1987 Constitution, however, as already pointed out, the clear and
expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential appointments from
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, except appointments to offices
expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII. Consequently, there
was no reason to use in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII the word "alone"
after the word "President" in providing that Congress may by law vest the
appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the
heads of departments, because the power to appoint officers whom he (the
president) may be authorized by law to appoint is already vested in the President,
without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, in the second
sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article VII." (emphasis supplied)
Next came Mary Concepcion Bautista v. Salonga, 3 this time involving the appointment of the Chairman
of the Commission on Human Rights. Adhering to the doctrine in Mison, the Court explained:
. . . Since the position of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is not

among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987
Constitution, appointments to which are to be made with the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments, it follows that the appointment by the President of the
Chairman of the CHR is to be made without the review or participation of the
Commission on Appointments. To be more precise, the appointment of the Chairman
and Members of the Commission on Human Rights is not specifically provided for in
the Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, whose
appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution in the president with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments. The president appoints the Chairman
and Members of The Commission on Human Rights pursuant to the second
sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, that is, without the confirmation of the Commission
on Appointments because they are among the officers of government "whom he (the
President) may be authorized by law to appoint." And Section 2(c), Executive Order
No. 163, 5 May 1987, authorizes the President to appoint the Chairman and
Members of the Commission on Human Rights.
Consistent with its rulings in Mison and Bautista, in Teresita Quintos Deles, et al. v. The Commission
on Constitutional Commissions, et al., 4 the power of confirmation of the Commission on Appointments
over appointments by the President of sectoral representatives in Congress was upheld because:
. . . Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5,

Art. VI may be filled by appointment by the President by express provision of Section
7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is indubitable that sectoral representatives to the
House of Representatives are among the "other officers whose appointments are
vested in the President in this Constitution," referred to in the first sentence of
Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
From the three (3) cases above-mentioned, these doctrines are deducible:
1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential appointees
mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers whose
appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution itself in the president (like sectoral
representatives to Congress and members of the constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil Service
and Election).
2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be authorized by
law to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights). Also, as
observed in Mison, when Congress creates inferior offices but omits to provide for appointment
thereto, or provides in an unconstitutional manner for such appointments, the officers are considered
as among those whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law.
Sometime in March 1989, RA 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law), amending the Labor Code (PD 442) was
approved. It provides in Section 13 thereof as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners shall
all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. Appointments to any vacancy shall come from the nominees of the
sector which nominated the predecessor. The Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor
Arbiters shall also be appointed by the President, upon recommendation of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment, and shall be subject to the Civil Service Law,
rules and regulations. 5
Pursuant to said law (RA 6715), President Aquino appointed the Chairman and Commissioners of
the NLRC representing the public, workers and employers sectors. The appointments stated that the
appointees may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the office. After said
appointments, then Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon issued Administrative Order No. 161, series of
1989, designating the places of assignment of the newly appointed commissioners.
This petition for prohibition questions the constitutionality and legality of the permanent appointments
extended by the President of the Philippines to the respondents Chairman and Members of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), without submitting the same to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation pursuant to Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by said RA 6715.
Petitioner insists on a mandatory compliance with RA 6715 which has in its favor the presumption of
validity. RA 6715 is not, according to petitioner, an encroachment on the appointing power of the
executive contained in Section 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of other officers appointed by the President
additional to those mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution.
Petitioner claims that the Mison and Bautista rulings are not decisive of the issue in this case for in
the case at bar, the President issued permanent appointments to the respondents without submitting
them to the CA for confirmation despite passage of a law (RA 6715) which requires the confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments of such appointments.
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that RA 6715 which amended the Labor
Code transgressesSection 16, Article VII by expanding the confirmation powers of the Commission
on Appointments without constitutional basis. Mison and Bautista laid the issue to rest, says the
Solicitor General, with the following exposition:
As interpreted by this Honorable Court in the Mison case, confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments is required exclusively for the heads of executive
departments, ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in the President by the Constitution, such as the members of the various
Constitutional Commissions. With respect to the other officers whose appointments
are not otherwise provided for by the law and to those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint, no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is
required.
Had it been the intention to allow Congress to expand the list of officers whose
appointments must be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the
Constitution would have said so by adding the phrase "and other officers required by
law" at the end of the first sentence, or the phrase, "with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments" at the end of the second sentence. Evidently, our
Constitution has significantly omitted to provide for such additions.
The original text of Section 16 of Article VII of the present Constitution as embodied
in Resolution No. 517 of the Constitutional Commission reads as follows:
"The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the
executive departments and bureaus, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of
captain or commander, and all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for by law,
and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The
Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers in the
President alone, in the courts or in the heads of the department."
Three points should be noted regarding sub-section 3 of Section 10 of Article VII of
the 1935 Constitution and in the original text of Section 16 of Article VII of the present
Constitution as proposed in Resolution No. 517.
First, in both of them, the appointments of heads of bureaus were required to be
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
Second, in both of them, the appointments of other officers, "whose appointments
are not otherwise provided for by law to appoint" are expressly made subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. However, in the final version of
Resolution No. 517, as embodied in Section 16 of Article VII of the present
Constitution, the appointment of the above mentioned officers (heads of bureaus;
other officers whose appointments are not provided for by law; and those whom he
may be authorized by law to appoint) are excluded from the list of those officers
whose appointments are to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. This
amendment, reflected in Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution, clearly shows
the intent of the framers to exclude such appointments from the requirement of
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Third, under the 1935 Constitution the word "nominate" qualifies the entire
Subsection 3 of Section 10 of Article VII thereof.
Respondent reiterates that if confirmation is required, the three (3) stage process of
nomination, confirmation and appointment operates. This is only true of the first
group enumerated in Section 16, but the word nominate does not any more appear in
the 2nd and 3rd sentences. Therefore, the president's appointment pursuant to the
2nd and 3rd sentences needs no confirmation. 6
The only issue to be resolved by the Court in the present case is whether or not Congress may, by
law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of appointments extended by the
president to government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec.
16, Art. VII of the Constitution whose appointments require confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
To resolve the issue, we go back to Mison where the Court stated:
. . . there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four
(4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer from time to time, are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the president may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may
by law vest in the President alone. 7
Mison also opined:
In the course of the debates on the text of Section 16, there were two (2) major
changes proposed and approved by the Commission. These were (1) the exclusion
of the appointments of heads of bureaus from the requirement of confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments; and (2) the exclusion of appointments made under
the second sentence of the section from the same requirement. . . .
The second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII refers to all other officers of the government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law and those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint.
Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the second sentence of Section 16,
Article VII of the Constitution, more specifically under the "third groups" of appointees referred to
in Mison, i.e. those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. Undeniably, the
Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among the officers mentioned in the first sentence of
Section 16, Article VII whose appointments requires confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of the appointments of respondents Chairman and Members of the National Labor
Relations Commission, it is unconstitutional because:
1) it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution by adding thereto
appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and
2) it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, by imposing
the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments on appointments which are otherwise
entrusted only with the President.
Deciding on what laws to pass is a legislative prerogative. Determining their constitutionality is a
judicial function. The Court respects the laudable intention of the legislature. Regretfully, however,
the constitutional infirmity of Sec. 13 of RA 6715 amending Art. 215 of the Labor Code, insofar as it
requires confirmation of the Commission on Appointments over appointments of the Chairman and
Member of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is, as we see it, beyond redemption if
we are to render fealty to the mandate of the Constitution in Sec. 16, Art. VII thereof.
Supreme Court decisions applying or interpreting the Constitution shall form part of the legal system
of the Philippines. 8 No doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en
banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc. 9
. . . The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law
as of the date that law was originally passed, since this Court's construction merely
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed
intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a
restatement of the legal maxim "legis interpretado legis vim obtinent" the
interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law.10
The rulings in Mison, Bautista and Quintos-Deles have interpreted Art. VII, Sec. 16 consistently in
one manner. Can legislation expand a constitutional provision after the Supreme Court has
interpreted it?
In Endencia and Jugo vs. David, 11 the Court held:
By legislative fiat as enunciated in Section 13, Republic Act No. 590, Congress says
that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation. This is a
clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase "which
shall not be diminished during their continuance in office," found in Section 9, Article
VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers.
xxx xxx xxx
The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any
declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law was before its
passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A
legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of
its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be
usurping a judicial function in defining a term. (11 Am. Jur., 914,
emphasis supplied).
The legislature cannot, upon passing law which violates a

constitutional provision, validate it so as to prevent an attack thereon
in the courts, by a declaration that it shall be so construed as not to
violate the constitutional inhibition. (11 Am., Jur., 919, emphasis
supplied).
We have already said that the Legislature under our form of government is assigned
the task and the power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is
more true with regard to the interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which is
not within the sphere of the Legislative department. If the Legislature may declare
what a law means, or what a specific portion of the Constitution means, especially
after the courts have in actual case ascertained its meaning by interpretation and
applied it in a decision, this would surely cause confusion and instability in judicial
processes and court decisions. Under such a system, a final court determination of a
case based on a judicial interpretation of the law or of the Constitution may be
undermined or even annulled by a subsequent and different interpretation of the law
or of the Constitution by the Legislative department that would be neither wise nor
desirable, being clearly violative of the fundamental principles of our constitutional
system of government, particularly those governing the separation of
powers. 14(Emphasis supplied)
Congress, of course, must interpret the Constitution, must estimate the scope of its constitutional
powers when it sets out to enact legislation and it must take into account the relevant constitutional
prohibitions. 15
. . . The Constitution did not change with public opinion.
It is not only the same words, but the same in meaning . . . and as long as it it speaks
not only in the same words, but with the same meaning and intent with which it spoke
when it came from the hands of its framers, and was voted and adopted by the
people . . . 16
The function of the Court in passing upon an act of Congress is to "lay the article of the Constitution
which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares
with the former" and to "announce its considered judgment upon the question." 17
It can not be overlooked that Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution was deliberately, not
unconsciously, intended by the framers of the 1987 Constitution to be a departure from the system
embodied in the 1935 Constitution where the Commission on Appointments exercised the power of
confirmation over almost all presidential appointments, leading to many cases of abuse of such
power of confirmation. Subsection 3, Section 10, Art. VII of the 1935 Constitution provided:
3. The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and bureaus,
officers of the Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the
rank of captain or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint; . . .
The deliberate limitation on the power of confirmation of the Commission on Appointments over
presidential appointments, embodied in Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, has undoubtedly
evoked the displeasure and disapproval of members of Congress. The solution to the apparent
problem, if indeed a problem, is not judicial or legislative but constitutional. A future constitutional
convention or Congress sitting as a constituent (constitutional) assembly may then consider either a
return to the 1935 Constitutional provisions or the adoption of a hybrid system between the 1935 and
1987 constitutional provisions. Until then, it is the duty of the Court to apply the 1987 Constitution in
accordance with what it says and not in accordance with how the legislature or the executive would
want it interpreted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by RA 6715
insofar as it requires the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments of appointments of the
Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is hereby declared
unconstitutional and of no legal force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado,
Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., concurring:

When the issues in this petition were first raised in Sarmiento III v. Mison (156 SCRA 549 [1987]), I
joined Justice Cruz in a dissent because I felt that the interpretation of Section 16, Article VII by the
majority of the Court results in absurd or irrational consequences. The framers could not have
intended what the majority ruled to be the meaning of the provision. When the question was again
raised in Bautista v. Salonga (172 SCRA 160 [1989]), I reiterated my dissent and urged a reexamination of the doctrine stated in Sarmiento v. Mison.
The issue is again before us. Even as I continue to believe that the majority was wrong in
the Sarmiento andBautista cases, I think it is time to finally accept the majority opinion as the Court's
ruling on the matter and one which everybody should respect. There will be no end to litigation if,
everytime a high government official is appointed without confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, another petition is filed with this Court.
I, therefore, VOTE with the majority to DISMISS the PETITION.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I dissent on the basis of my dissent in Sarmiento v. Mison, which I believe should be re-examined
instead of being automatically re-affirmed simply because of its original adoption. I do not believe we
should persist in error on the ground merely of adherence to judicial precedent, however unsound.
Separate Opinion
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
When the issues in this petition were first raised in Sarmiento III v. Mison (156 SCRA 549 [1987]), I
joined Justice Cruz in a dissent because I felt that the interpretation of Section 16, Article VII by the
majority of the Court results in absurd or irrational consequences. The framers could not have
intended what the majority ruled to be the meaning of the provision. When the question was again
raised in Bautista v. Salonga (172 SCRA 160 [1989]), I reiterated my dissent and urged a reexamination of the doctrine stated in Sarmiento v. Mison.
The issue is again before us. Even as I continue to believe that the majority was wrong in
the Sarmiento andBautista cases, I think it is time to finally accept the majority opinion as the Court's
ruling on the matter and one which everybody should respect. There will be no end to litigation if,
everytime a high government official is appointed without confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, another petition is filed with this Court.
I, therefore, VOTE with the majority to DISMISS the PETITION.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I dissent on the basis of my dissent in Sarmiento v. Mison, which I believe should be re-examined
instead of being automatically re-affirmed simply because of its original adoption. I do not believe we
should persist in error on the ground merely of adherence to judicial precedent, however unsound.
Footnotes
1 Sec. 16, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution.
2 G.R. No. 79974, 17 December 1987, 156 SCRA 549.
3 G.R. No. 86439, 13 April 1989, 172 SCRA 160.
4 G.R. No. 83216, 4 September 1989, 177 SCRA 259, 260.
5 Rollo, pp. 10-11.
6 Memorandum for respondents, Rollo, p. 8.
7 Supra at pp. 553-554.
10 Art. 8, New Civil Code of the Philippines.
11 Art. VII, Sec. 4(3), 1987 Constitution.
12 People vs. Jabinal, G.R. No. L-30061, 27 February 1974, 55 SCRA 607.
13 G.R. Nos. L-6355-56, 31 August 1953, 93 Phil. 699.
14 Ibid., pp. 701-702.
15 Swisher, Carl Brent. The Supreme Court in Modern Role, NYU Press, Inc., 1958,
pp. 34-35.
16 Ibid., former Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott vs. Sandford, 19 Howard 393, 407
(1857), p. 147.
17 Ibid., Justice Roberts in United States vs. Butler, 297 U.S. I, 62-63 (1936), p. 170.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003]
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner, NAGMAMALASAKIT NA

MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO,
INC.,
ITS
OFFICERS
AND
MEMBERS,
petitioner-inintervention, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE
GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents, JAIME N. SORIANO,
respondent-in-Intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL,
respondent-in-intervention.
[G.R. No. 160262. November 10, 2003]
SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA

RAZON-ABAD, petitioners, ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL
AND
PETE
QUIRINO
QUADRA,
petitioners-inintervention, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING
SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT,
SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents, JAIME
N. SORIANO,respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q.
PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
[G.R. No. 160263. November 10, 2003]
ARTURO
M.
DE
CASTRO
AND
SOLEDAD
M.
CAGAMPANG, petitioners, WORLD WAR II VETERANS
LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,petitioners-inintervention, vs. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS
CAPACITY
AS
SPEAKER
OF
THE
HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES,
respondents,
JAIME
N.
SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q.
[G.R. No. 160277. November 10, 2003]
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, WORLD WAR II VETERANS

LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-inintervention, vs. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GILBERT TEODORO, JR.,
FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA IV, HENRY
LANOT, KIM BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO LIBANAN,
EMMYLOU TALIO-SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN
GATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ,
ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL
DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAON, JR., CECILIA CARREONJALOSJOS, AGAPITO AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR.,
GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS LACSON,
MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR,
WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL DE
GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO,
FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANO RUFINO
BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO
PARAS, JOSE SOLIS, RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES,
AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO MACIAS, ARTHUR PINGOY, JR.,
FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO ESTRELLA III, ELIAS
BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO BONDOC,
GENEROSO TULAGAN, PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAEL DUAVIT,
JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI LAPUS, CARLOS COJUANGCO,
GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS ESCUDERRO, RENE VELARDE,

CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES, DIDAGEN DILANGALEN,
ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO, DARLENE ANTONIOCUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLF PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA,
GREGORIO IPONG, GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO,
CELIA
LAYUS,
JUAN
MIGUEL
ZUBIRI,
BENASING
MACARAMBON, JR., JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK COJUANGCO,
MAURICIO
DOMOGAN,
RONALDO
ZAMORA,
ANGELO
MONTILLA, ROSELLER BARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA
NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN CHIPECO, JR., AND
RUY
ELIAS
LOPEZ,
respondents,
JAIME
N.
PIMENTEL,respondent-in-intervention.
[G.R. No. 160292. November 10, 2003]
HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA

PAPA, NAPOLEON C. REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO
C.
LIGON,
JOAN
P.
SERRANO
AND
GARY
S.
MALLARI, petitioners, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES
OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. HON.
SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P.
NAZARENO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES,
respondents,
JAIME
N.
[G.R. No. 160295. November 10, 2003]
SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M.

GONZALES,
petitioners, WORLD WAR II VETERANS
LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-inintervention, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH
THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER,
SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE

GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM
B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON,respondents, JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-inintervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-inintervention.
[G.R. No. 160310. November 10, 2003]
LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN

MATIBAG, RAMON MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO
MALASAGA, EDUARDO SARMIENTO, EDGARDO NAOE,
LEONARDO GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO MENDIOLA,
MARIO TOREJA, GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A. LOYOLA,
WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE TOQUILLO, KATE ANN VITAL,
ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICO PABLES, JR., JAIME
BOAQUINA, LITA A. AQUINO, MILA P. GABITO, JANETTE
ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG, DR.
BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE, WILLIE
RIVERO, DANTE DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO
BUENAVISTA, EMILY SENERIS, ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA,
SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH
LEANDRO LOYOLA, ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMON SIBULO,
MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U. SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND
NOEL ISORENA, MAU RESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, AND
EDILBERTO GALLOR, petitioners, WORLD WAR II VETERANS
LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-inintervention, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER JOSE C. DE VENECIA, JR.,
THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON. SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIX FUENTEBELLA, ET
AL., respondents.
[G.R. No. 160318. November 10, 2003]
PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,

vs. HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AND ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE
SENATE, respondents.
[G.R. No. 160342. November 10, 2003]
ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF

THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND
ENGR. MAXIMO N. MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A
TAXPAYER
AND
MEMBER
OF
THE
ENGINEERING
PROFESSION,
petitioners,
vs.
THE
HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83 HONORABLE
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE LED BY HON. REPRESENTATIVE
WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
[G.R. No. 160343. November 10, 2003]
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE

OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING
SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT,
SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents.
[G.R. No. 160360. November 10, 2003]
CLARO
B.
FLORES,
petitioner,
vs.
THE
HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATE
PRESIDENT, respondents.
[G.R. No. 160365. November 10, 2003]
U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C.

PADERANGA, DANILO V. ORTIZ, GLORIA C. ESTENZO-RAMOS,
LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V. DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON,
ROLANDO P. NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R.
DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B. CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G.
AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF
OTHER
CITIZENS
OF
THE
REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,petitioners,
vs.
THE
HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN
DRILON, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES FELIX FUENTEBELLA AND
GILBERTO
TEODORO,
BY
THEMSELVES
AND
AS
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUP OF MORE THAN 80 HOUSE
REPRESENTATIVES
WHO
SIGNED
AND
FILED
THE
IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST SUPREME COURT CHIEF
JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. respondents.
[G.R. No. 160370. November 10, 2003]
FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE

PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE SPEAKER OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 160376. November 10, 2003]
NILO
A. MALANYAON, petitioner, vs. HON. FELIX WILLIAM

FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN REPRESENTATION
OF THE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT
AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. AND THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G.
DE VENECIA, respondents.
[G.R. No. 160392. November 10, 2003]
VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEA, petitioners, vs. THE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G.
DE VENECIA, AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
THROUGH
SENATE
PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN
DRILON, respondents.
[G.R. No. 160397. November 10, 2003]
IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF

JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U.
VALLEJOS, JR.,petitioner.
[G.R. No. 160403. November 10, 2003]
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR PRESIDING
OFFICER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE
GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM
B. FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH
SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
[G.R. No. 160405. November 10, 2003]
DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY

CHAPTER, MANUEL M. MONZON, PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU
PROVINCE, VICTOR A. MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARD
MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN OF THE COLLEG EOF LAW,
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCAITION OF
CEBU, INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY ATTY. MANUEL
LEGASPI, CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF
THE PHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED BY

RODERIC R. POCA, MANDAUE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION,
[MANLAW],
REPRESENTED
BY
FELIPE
VELASQUEZ,
FEDERACION INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS [FIDA],
REPRESENTED BY THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS G. CO,
PRESIENT OF CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY
AND CEBU LADY LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.],
MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND BERNARDITO FLORIDO, PAST
PRESIDENT
CEBU
CHAMBER
OF
COMMERCE
AND
INTEGRATED
BAR
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
CEBU
CHAPTER, petitioners, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AS HOUSE
SPEAKER AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATOR
FRANKLIN DRILON, AS SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how passionate
and seemingly irreconcilable it may appear to be, over the determination by the
independent branches of government of the nature, scope and extent of their respective
constitutional powers where the Constitution itself provides for the means and bases for
its resolution.
Our nations history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at times
turbulent, dynamics of the relationship among these co-equal branches. This Court is
confronted with one such today involving the legislature and the judiciary which has drawn
legal luminaries to chart antipodal courses and not a few of our countrymen to vent
cacophonous sentiments thereon.
There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present
controversy subject of the instant petitions whether the filing of the second impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives
falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution, and whether the resolution
thereof is a political question has resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps even more truth to
the view that it was brought upon by a political crisis of conscience.
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to
address all the issues which this controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally
pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of
resolving it is neither necessary nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and protection
of the public interest lie in adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever
mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the
legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for

absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power
assigned to it by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been
carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three
branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality.
Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government, intended
as they are to insure that governmental power is wielded only for the good of the people,
mandate a relationship of interdependence and coordination among these branches
where the delicate functions of enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws are harmonized
to achieve a unity of governance, guided only by what is in the greater interest and wellbeing of the people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.
Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XI
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court,
the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be
removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of
public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment.
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power
to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House
of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member
thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee,
after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the
House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within
ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary
either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the
Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be
recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least
one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment.
When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the
President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall
preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of
two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from
office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines,
but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial,
and punishment according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out
the purpose of this section. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the
12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on November 28,
2001, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules[1] approved by the
11th Congress. The relevant distinctions between these two Congresses House
Impeachment Rules are shown in the following tabulation:
11TH CONGRESS RULES

RULE II
INITIATING IMPEACHMENT
12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES

RULE V
BAR AGAINST INITIATION
OF IMPEACHMENT
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST
THE SAME OFFICIAL
Section 2. Mode of Initiating

Impeachment. Impeachment
shall be initiated only by a
verified
complaint
for
impeachment filed by any
Member of the House of
Representatives or by any
citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any Member
thereof or by a verified
complaint or resolution of
impeachment filed by at least
one-third (1/3) of all the
Members of the House.
Section 16. Impeachment

Proceedings Deemed
Initiated. In cases where a
Member of the House files
a verified complaint of
impeachment or a citizen
files a verified complaint
that is endorsed by a
Member of the House
through a resolution of
endorsement against an
impeachable
officer,impeachment
proceedings against such
official aredeemed
initiated on the day the
Committee on Justice finds
that the verified complaint
and/or resolution against
such official,as the case
may be, is sufficient in
substance, or on the date
the House votes to
overturn or affirm the
finding of the said
Committee that the
verified complaint and/or
resolution, as the case may
be, is not sufficient in
substance.
In cases where a verified
complaint or a resolution of
impeachment is filed or
endorsed, as the case may
be, by at least one-third
(1/3) of the Members of the
House,impeachment
proceedings are deemed
initiated at the time of the
filing of such verified
complaint or resolution of
impeachment with the
Secretary General.
RULE V
BAR AGAINST
IMPEACHMENT
Section 14. Scope of Bar. No

impeachment proceedings shall
be initiated against the same
official more than once within
the period of one (1) year.
Section 17. Bar Against

Initiation Of Impeachment
Proceedings. Within a period of
one (1) year from the date
impeachment proceedings are
deemed initiated as provided in
Section 16 hereof, no
impeachment proceedings, as
such, can be initiated against the
same official. (Italics in the
original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, [2] sponsored
by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice
to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development
Fund (JDF).[3]
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment
complaint[4] (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and
seven Associate Justices[5] of this Court for culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal
of the public trust and other high crimes.[6] The complaint was endorsed by
Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang
Dilangalen,[7] and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003 [8] in
accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of
the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by
any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members,
shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral,
together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment
complaint was sufficient in form,[9] but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for
being insufficient in substance.[10] To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet
been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI
of the Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint
or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it,
the second impeachment complaint[11] was filed with the Secretary General of the
House[12] by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix
William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by abovementioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by
a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the
Members of the House of Representatives.[13]
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most
of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution
that [n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year.
In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a
duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all available legal
remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raised in his petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of transcendental importance, and that he
himself was a victim of the capricious and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the 12th Congress,[14] posits that his right to bring
an impeachment complaint against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been violated
due to the capricious and arbitrary changes in the House Impeachment Rules adopted
and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of Representatives and prays that (1)
Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be declared
unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of mandamus directing respondents House of
Representatives et. al. to comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the
Constitution, to return the second impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the records
of the House of Representatives, and to promulgate rules which are consistent with the
Constitution; and (3) this Court permanently enjoin respondent House of Representatives
from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and
taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case are of transcendental importance, pray, in
their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ perpetually prohibiting
respondent House of Representatives from filing any Articles of Impeachment against the
Chief Justice with the Senate; and for the issuance of a writ perpetually prohibiting
respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of
Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that the Senate has accepted the
same, from proceeding with the impeachment trial.
In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang, as
citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
alleging that their petition for Prohibition involves public interest as it involves the use of
public funds necessary to conduct the impeachment trial on the second impeachment
complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining Congress from
conducting further proceedings on said second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has
recognized that he has locus standi to bring petitions of this nature in the cases of Chavez
v. PCGG[15] andChavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation,[16] prays in
his petition for Injunction that the second impeachment complaint be declared
unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and
members of the legal profession, pray in their petition for Prohibition for an order
prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from drafting, adopting, approving and
transmitting to the Senate the second impeachment complaint, and respondents De
Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and Deputy
Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of the House of Representatives,
they have a legal interest in ensuring that only constitutional impeachment proceedings
are initiated, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment
complaint and any act proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they have a
right to be protected against all forms of senseless spending of taxpayers money and that
they have an obligation to protect the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity
of the Judiciary, allege in their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is instituted as
a class suit and pray that (1) the House Resolution endorsing the second impeachment
complaint as well as all issuances emanating therefrom be declared null and void; and
(2) this Court enjoin the Senate and the Senate President from taking cognizance of,
hearing, trying and deciding the second impeachment complaint, and issue a writ of
prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and agents to desist from conducting
any proceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are
citizens and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a
member of the Philippine Bar, both allege in their petition, which does not state what its
nature is, that the filing of the second impeachment complaint involves paramount public
interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules and the
second impeachment complaint/Articles of Impeachment be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a member
of the Philippine Bar Association and of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in their petition for the issuance
of a Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction to enjoin the House of
Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is
mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility to uphold the Constitution, prays in
its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V and Sections
5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional and
that the House of Representatives be permanently enjoined from proceeding with the
second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition that the House Impeachment Rules be declared
unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al., in their
petition for Prohibition and Injunction which they claim is a class suit filed in behalf of all
citizens, citingOposa v. Factoran[17] which was filed in behalf of succeeding generations of
Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a writ prohibiting respondents House of Representatives
and the Senate from conducting further proceedings on the second impeachment
complaint and that this Court declare as unconstitutional the second impeachment
complaint and the acts of respondent House of Representatives in interfering with the
fiscal matters of the Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino, alleging
that the issues in his petition for Prohibition are of national and transcendental
significance and that as an official of the Philippine Judicial Academy, he has a direct and
substantial interest in the unhampered operation of the Supreme Court and its officials in
discharging their duties in accordance with the Constitution, prays for the issuance of a
writ prohibiting the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate from receiving the same or giving the
impeachment complaint due course.
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his petition
for Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time they filed the second
impeachment complaint, were absolutely without any legal power to do so, as they acted
without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of Impeachment assail the alleged abuse of
powers of the Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF).
In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L. Hofilea,
alleging that as professors of law they have an abiding interest in the subject matter of
their petition forCertiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a constitutional issue which they
are trying to inculcate in the minds of their students, pray that the House of
Representatives be enjoined from endorsing and the Senate from trying the Articles of
Impeachment and that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging
his locus standi, but alleging that the second impeachment complaint is founded on the
issue of whether or not the Judicial Development Fund (JDF) was spent in accordance
with law and that the House of Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in the
examination and audit thereof, prays in his petition To Declare Complaint Null and Void
for Lack of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction that the second impeachment complaint be
declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the issues
raised in the filing of the second impeachment complaint involve matters of
transcendental importance, prays in its petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the
second impeachment complaint and all proceedings arising therefrom be declared null
and void; (2) respondent House of Representatives be prohibited from transmitting the
Articles of Impeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent Senate be prohibited from
accepting the Articles of Impeachment and from conducting any proceedings thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens and
taxpayers, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment
complaint as well as the resolution of endorsement and impeachment by the respondent
House of Representatives be declared null and void and (2) respondents Senate and
Senate President Franklin Drilon be prohibited from accepting any Articles of
Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that they have accepted the same,
that they be prohibited from proceeding with the impeachment trial.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the first
three of the eighteen which were filed before this Court,[18] prayed for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the House of
Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment arising from the second
impeachment complaint to the Senate. Petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261
likewise prayed for the declaration of the November 28, 2001 House Impeachment Rules
as null and void for being unconstitutional.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295, which
were filed on October 28, 2003, sought similar relief. In addition, petition bearing docket
number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House Resolution No. 260 (calling for a legislative
inquiry into the administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on the
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a direct violation of the constitutional
principle of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, a
motion was put forth that the second impeachment complaint be formally transmitted to
the Senate, but it was not carried because the House of Representatives adjourned for
lack of quorum,[19] and as reflected above, to date, the Articles of Impeachment have yet
to be forwarded to the Senate.
Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction which were filed on or before October 28, 2003, Justices Puno
and Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but the Court rejected their offer. Justice
Panganiban inhibited himself, but the Court directed him to participate.
Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution of
October 28, 2003, resolved to (a) consolidate the petitions; (b) require respondent House
of Representatives and the Senate, as well as the Solicitor General, to comment on the
petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral
arguments on November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d) appointed distinguished legal
experts as amici curiae.[20] In addition, this Court called on petitioners and respondents to
maintain the status quo, enjoining all the parties and others acting for and in their behalf
to refrain from committing acts that would render the petitions moot.
Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through
Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-respondents, by way of special
appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to
hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, which is an independent
and co-equal branch of government under the Constitution, from the performance of its
constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases. On even date, Senator
Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene (Ex Abudante
Cautela)[21] and Comment, praying that the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that
the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court to try
and decide impeachment cases, including the one where the Chief Justice is the
respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the
Constitution.[22]
Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved to (a)
consolidate them with the earlier consolidated petitions; (b) require respondents to file
their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; and (c) include them for oral
arguments on November 5, 2003.
On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President
Franklin M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned, the petitions
are plainly premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as of the time of the
filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it since (1) its constitutional
duty to constitute itself as an impeachment court commences only upon its receipt of the
Articles of Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the principal issues raised by the
petitions pertain exclusively to the proceedings in the House of Representatives.
On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a Petition for Leave to Intervene in
G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, and 160295, questioning the status
quo Resolution issued by this Court on October 28, 2003 on the ground that it would
unnecessarily put Congress and this Court in a constitutional deadlock and praying for
the dismissal of all the petitions as the matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial
determination.
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra filed
in G.R. No. 160262 a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit the Herein
Incorporated Petition in Intervention.
On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention in G.R. No. 160261. On
November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. also filed
a Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263,
160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310.
The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentels Comment and
Attorneys Macalintal and Quadras Petition in Intervention were admitted.
On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the
arguments of petitioners, intervenors Senator Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal, and
Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in an Advisory issued
by this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked; who can
invoke it; on what issues and at what time; and whether it should be exercised by this
Court at this time.
In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:
a) locus standi of petitioners;
b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);
c) political question/justiciability;
d) Houses exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment;
e) Senates sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;
f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-vis Section
3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution; and
g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising from
the instant petitions as well as the myriad arguments and opinions presented for and
against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted and determined them to
be as follows: (1) the threshold and novel issue of whether or not the power of judicial
review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not the
essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been fulfilled;
and (3) the substantive issues yet remaining. These matters shall now be discussed
in seriatim.
Judicial Review
As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial
review to determine the validity of the second impeachment complaint.
This Courts power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the
government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government. (Emphasis supplied)
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice
Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral Commission[23] after the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose provisions, unlike the present Constitution, did
not contain the present provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power
includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed:
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the

Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of
conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be
called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several
departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and
perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through
their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their
sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to
operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances,
and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said
instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions
and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and
limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not
provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage,
the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good
government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions
embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In
the United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their
constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of
its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular
acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this
moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2
of article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine
the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided
for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the
judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act
of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it
by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is
involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of
judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is
limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of
argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the
very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and
barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as
its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is
presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the
determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of
the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the government. (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
[24]
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this moderating power to determine the proper
allocation of powers of the different branches of government and to direct the course of
government along constitutional channels is inherent in all courts[25] as a necessary
consequence of the judicial power itself, which is the power of the court to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. [26]
Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not explicitly
conferred upon the courts by its Constitution, such power has been set at rest by popular
acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. To be sure, it was in the
1803 leading case of Marbury v. Madison[27] that the power of judicial review was first
articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be

the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws
of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the
constitution, have that rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms
and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions,
that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other
departments, are bound by that instrument. (Italics in the original; emphasis
supplied)
[28]
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the 1935
Constitution, the power of judicial review was exercised by our courts to invalidate
constitutionally infirm acts.[29] And as pointed out by noted political law professor and
former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,[30] the executive and legislative
branches of our government in fact effectively acknowledged this power of judicial review
in Article 7 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or nonobservance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the
former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when
they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,[31] judicial review is indeed an integral
component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the
corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of
government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people
for which it serves.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of

government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our
Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters
within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow
from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the
Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each
other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and
balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to
determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if
violative of the Constitution. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
[32]
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, x x

x judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of
powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of
government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and
control between them.[33] To him, [j]udicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of
participation or instrument of intervention of the judiciary in that balancing operation. [34]
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion
by any branch or instrumentalities of government, the afore-quoted Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the first time into its history, into block letter law the
so-called expanded certiorari jurisdiction of this Court, the nature of and rationale for
which are mirrored in the following excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its proponent,
former Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:
xxx
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience
during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the
role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the
circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then had
no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political
questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning
particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the
release of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of
martial law failed because the government set up the defense of political
question. And the Supreme Court said: Well, since it is political, we have no authority
to pass upon it. The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper
solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment
upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations
thereof during the martial law regime. x x x
xxx
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and
offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the
judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power
but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts
cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that
such matters constitute a political question. (Italics in the original; emphasis and
[35]
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must
necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of
constitutional construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must
be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,[36] this Court, speaking through Chief
Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We
do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that
the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective
sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to
them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyers document, it being
essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the peoples
consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense
they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be
construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based
on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are
the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum. (Emphasis and
[37]
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution
should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. And so did this Court
apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary[38] in this wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the

provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a
Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption,
and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be
examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances
under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason
which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision
and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the
whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that
purpose. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied supplied)
[39]
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue[40] where, speaking through

Madame Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:
x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental

principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the
organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task
in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the
purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may
also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided
mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
[41]
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a

whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon,[42] this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran
declared:
x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated

a provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without
considering that it could also affect others.When they adopted subsection 2, they
permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of
its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other
provisions of that great document. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
[43]
Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,[44] this Court affirmed that:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of

the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but
that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into
view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the
instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and
interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and
one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable
construction, the two can be made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor
of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may
make the words idle and nugatory. (Emphasis supplied)
[45]
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids
is available. In still the same case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this
Court expounded:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of

the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the
resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as
said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the
meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing
the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but
they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less
of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the
force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what
appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on
how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's
understanding thereof. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
[46]
It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and

jurisprudential application of the power of judicial review that respondents Speaker De
Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument that the
Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial review.
Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that
impeachment is a political action which cannot assume a judicial character. Hence, any
question, issue or incident arising at any stage of the impeachment proceeding is beyond
the reach of judicial review.[47]
For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senates sole power to
try impeachment cases[48] (1) entirely excludes the application of judicial review over it;
and (2) necessarily includes the Senates power to determine constitutional questions
relative to impeachment proceedings.[49]
In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings are
outside the scope of judicial review, respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and
intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily on American authorities, principally the majority
opinion in the case of Nixon v. United States.[50] Thus, they contend that the exercise of
judicial review over impeachment proceedings is inappropriate since it runs counter to the
framers decision to allocate to different fora the powers to try impeachments and to try
crimes; it disturbs the system of checks and balances, under which impeachment is the
only legislative check on the judiciary; and it would create a lack of finality and difficulty in
fashioning relief.[51] Respondents likewise point to deliberations on the US Constitution to
show the intent to isolate judicial power of review in cases of impeachment.
Respondents and intervenors reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American
Constitution and American authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition that
the Senates sole power to try and decide impeachment cases, as provided for under Art.
XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
all issues pertaining to impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusion of the power
of judicial review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor
can it reasonably support the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate
the inherently judicial power to determine constitutional questions incident to

impeachment proceedings.
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution,
are of dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and
have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned.
As held in the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC,[52] [i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this
Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly
applicable because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and
needs.[53] Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the
United States, their paths of development have long since diverged. In the colorful words
of Father Bernas, [w]e have cut the umbilical cord.
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and
that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is
only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that
granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in
the Constitution, is not just a power but also aduty, and it was given an expanded
definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
government branch or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine
Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment
proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the
House of Representatives without limitation,[54] our Constitution, though vesting in the
House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, [55] provides
for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4)
and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to
impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines
their finality and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus,
they call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that whenever
possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively,
recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness and pride.[56]
But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the abovementioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not intend
to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided
for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,[57] judicially discoverable
standards for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power
of judicial review.
The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez[58] and Alejandrino v. Quezon,[59] cited by respondents
in support of the argument that the impeachment power is beyond the scope of judicial
review, are not in point. These cases concern the denial of petitions for writs
of mandamus to compel the legislature to perform non-ministerial acts, and do not
concern the exercise of the power of judicial review.
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial
review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,[60] this Court ruled
that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate
or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the
exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Tanada v. Angara,[61] in seeking to nullify
an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held
that the petition raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative
branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right
but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. InBondoc v. Pineda,[62] this Court
declared null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the
nomination, and rescinding the election, of a congressman as a member of the House
Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,[63] it held that the resolution of whether the House
representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional
representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the
Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,[64] it held that the act of the
House of Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on
Appointments is subject to judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,[65] it held that although
under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does
not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of
Congress. InAngara v. Electoral Commission,[66] it ruled that confirmation by the National
Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether his election is contested,
is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the
privileges of a member of the National Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of
judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and
balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and one section is not to
be allowed to defeat another.[67] Both are integral components of the calibrated system of
independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act
beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
Essential Requisites for Judicial Review

As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts power of judicial
review, like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several
limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (2) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge; he must have
a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota of the case.
x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and
limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any
attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to
sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner,
the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to
legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the
Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through
their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government. (Italics in the original)
[68]
Standing
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result
of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is
whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.[69]
Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that
petitioners do not have standing since only the Chief Justice has sustained and will
sustain direct personal injury.Amicus curiae former Justice Minister and Solicitor General
Estelito Mendoza similarly contends.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing
since this Court had, in the past, accorded standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned
citizens, legislators in cases involving paramount public interest[70] and transcendental
importance,[71] and that procedural matters are subordinate to the need to determine
whether or not the other branches of the government have kept themselves within the
limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given
to them.[72] Amicus curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of the
same opinion, citing transcendental importance and the well-entrenched rule exception
that, when the real party in interest is unable to vindicate his rights by seeking the same
remedies, as in the case of the Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot himself
invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts will grant petitioners standing.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule
on standing, for the former is a concept of civil procedure[73] while the latter has
constitutional underpinnings.[74] In view of the arguments set forth regarding standing, it
behooves the Court to reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato[75] to clarify what is
meant by locus standi and to distinguish it from real party-in-interest.
The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has been noted
by authorities thus: It is important to note . . . that standing because of its
constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very different from questions

relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to
sue. Although all three requirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain
parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a partial consideration of
the merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the
judiciary in certain areas.
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are
brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or
by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually
sue in the public interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have
alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
xxx
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he is the party
who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails
of the suit. (Citations omitted)
[76]
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged
unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, none of the petitioners before us
asserts a violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice. On the contrary, they
invariably invoke the vindication of their own rights as taxpayers; members of
Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit; and members of the bar and of the legal
profession which were supposedly violated by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the
House of Representatives.
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when
specific requirements have been met have been given standing by this Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of
a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or
any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers
thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or
is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is
about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act
complained of.[77] In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, [78] the
mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds
are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose,
or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law.[79] Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he
must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure
of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a
general interest common to all members of the public.[80]
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit
should be entertained.[81] This Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given
their allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of
Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the
expenditure of public funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action
which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator.[82] Indeed, a member of the
House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers
and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.[83]
While an association has legal personality to represent its members,[84] especially when it
is composed of substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital interests,[85] the
mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal
profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, although undoubtedly
true, does not suffice to clothe it with standing. Its interest is too general. It is shared by
other groups and the whole citizenry. However, a reading of the petitions shows that it
has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of
their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. [86] It, therefore, behooves this Court
to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issues presented by it.
In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons
intervening must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned [87] to
enable the court to deal properly with all interests involved in the suit,[88] for a judgment in
a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is, under the res
judicata principle, binding on all members of the class whether or not they were before
the court.[89] Where it clearly appears that not all interests can be sufficiently represented
as shown by the divergent issues raised in the numerous petitions before this Court, G.R.
No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Since petitioners additionally allege standing as
citizens and taxpayers, however, their petition will stand.
The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground of
transcendental importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397, is mum
on his standing.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following
instructive determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the
case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory
prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3)
the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions
being raised.[90] Applying these determinants, this Court is satisfied that the issues raised
herein are indeed of transcendental importance.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus
standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental
significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the
public.[91] Such liberality does not, however, mean that the requirement that a party should
have an interest in the matter is totally eliminated. A party must, at the very least, still
plead the existence of such interest, it not being one of which courts can take judicial
notice. In petitioner Vallejos case, he failed to allege any interest in the case. He does not
thus have standing.
With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court
requires an intervenor to possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the
court or of an officer thereof. While intervention is not a matter of right, it may be permitted
by the courts when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law
authorizing intervention.[92]
In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadras case, they
seek to join petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262. Since, save for one
additional issue, they raise the same issues and the same standing, and no objection on
the part of petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has been interposed, this Court as earlier stated,
granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et. al.
sought to join petitioner Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking their right as citizens to
intervene, alleging that they will suffer if this insidious scheme of the minority members of
the House of Representatives is successful, this Court found the requisites for
intervention had been complied with.
Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263,
160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310 were of transcendental importance, World War II
Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a Petition-in-Intervention with Leave
to Intervene to raise the additional issue of whether or not the second impeachment
complaint against the Chief Justice is valid and based on any of the grounds prescribed
by the Constitution.
Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino,
Inc., et al. and World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal
interest in the matter in litigation the respective motions to intervene were hereby granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited
purpose of making of record and arguing a point of view that differs with Senate President
Drilons. He alleges that submitting to this Courts jurisdiction as the Senate President does
will undermine the independence of the Senate which will sit as an impeachment court
once the Articles of Impeachment are transmitted to it from the House of Representatives.
Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a legal interest in the matter in litigation, he being a
member of Congress against which the herein petitions are directed. For this reason, and
to fully ventilate all substantial issues relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to
Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier stated, allowed to argue.
Lastly, as to Jaime N. Sorianos motion to intervene, the same must be denied for,
while he asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing requirement for
bringing taxpayers suits as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec,[93] to wit:
x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public

moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is
being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protection against
abuses of legislative power, or that there is a misapplication of such funds by
respondent COMELEC, or that public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds
through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. (Citations omitted)
[94]
In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the act of
petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of public funds or in public money being
deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere interest as a member of the Bar
does not suffice to clothe him with standing.
Ripeness and Prematurity

In Tan v. Macapagal,[95] this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a
case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something had by then
been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the
picture.[96] Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if and when the
latter is challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the second
impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance with the House
Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the constitutionality of which is
questioned. The questioned acts having been carried out, i.e., the second impeachment
complaint had been filed with the House of Representatives and the 2001 Rules have
already been already promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged
unconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed before suit, as Tan v.
Macapagal holds, has been complied with.
Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions are
premature. Amicus curiae former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga opines that there
may be no urgent need for this Court to render a decision at this time, it being the final
arbiter on questions of constitutionality anyway. He thus recommends that all remedies
in the House and Senate should first be exhausted.
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law who
suggests to this Court to take judicial notice of on-going attempts to encourage signatories
to the second impeachment complaint to withdraw their signatures and opines that the
House Impeachment Rules provide for an opportunity for members to raise constitutional
questions themselves when the Articles of Impeachment are presented on a motion to
transmit to the same to the Senate. The dean maintains that even assuming that the
Articles are transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice can raise the issue of their
constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.
The deans position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the Representatives
of their signatures would not, by itself, cure the House Impeachment Rules of their
constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the
questioned second impeachment complaint since it would only place it under the ambit
of Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI of the Constitution[97] and, therefore, petitioners would
continue to suffer their injuries.
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or both
Houses of Congress before coming to this Court is shown by the fact that, as previously
discussed, neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate is clothed with the power
to rule with definitiveness on the issue of constitutionality, whether concerning
impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as said power is exclusively vested in the
judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot
be sought from a body which is bereft of power to grant it.
Justiciability
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,[98] Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion defined
the term political question, viz:
[T]he term political question connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris
Secundum, it refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure. (Italics in the original)
[99]
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any rhyme
or reason, this Court vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance of cases which involved
political questions. In some cases, this Court hid behind the cover of the political question
doctrine and refused to exercise its power of judicial review.[100] In other cases, however,
despite the seeming political nature of the therein issues involved, this Court assumed
jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies.[101] Even in the landmark 1988 case of Javellana v.
Executive Secretary[102] which raised the issue of whether the 1973 Constitution was
ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted the political question doctrine and took
cognizance thereof. Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a political question, it
being a question decided by the people in their sovereign capacity.
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to refuse
to take jurisdiction over certain cases during the Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice
Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify this Courts power
of judicial review and its application on issues involving political questions, viz:
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.

I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the usual
comment that the judiciary is the weakest among the three major branches of the
service. Since the legislature holds the purse and the executive the sword, the
judiciary has nothing with which to enforce its decisions or commands except the
power of reason and appeal to conscience which, after all, reflects the will of God, and
is the most powerful of all other powers without exception. x x x And so, with the
bodys indulgence, I will proceed to read the provisions drafted by the Committee on
the Judiciary.
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience
during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but
the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by
the circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then
had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political
questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning
particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the
release of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and
effect of martial law failed because the government set up the defense of political
question. And the Supreme Court said: Well, since it is political, we have no
authority to pass upon it. The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a
proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request an
encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further
violations thereof during the martial law regime. I am sure the members of the Bar
are familiar with this situation. But for the benefit of the Members of the Commission
who are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I will start with a decision of the Supreme
Court in 1973 on the case of Javellana vs. the Secretary of Justice, if I am not
mistaken. Martial law was announced on September 22, although the proclamation
was dated September 21. The obvious reason for the delay in its publication was that
the administration had apprehended and detained prominent newsmen on September
21. So that when martial law was announced on September 22, the media hardly
published anything about it. In fact, the media could not publish any story not only
because our main writers were already incarcerated, but also because those who
succeeded them in their jobs were under mortal threat of being the object of wrath of
the ruling party. The 1971 Constitutional Convention had begun on June 1, 1971 and
by September 21 or 22 had not finished the Constitution; it had barely agreed in the
fundamentals of the Constitution. I forgot to say that upon the proclamation of martial
law, some delegates to that 1971 Constitutional Convention, dozens of them, were
picked up. One of them was our very own colleague, Commissioner Calderon. So, the
unfinished draft of the Constitution was taken over by representatives of
Malacaang. In 17 days, they finished what the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention had been unable to accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of the 1973
Constitution was presented to the President around December 1, 1972, whereupon the
President issued a decree calling a plebiscite which suspended the operation of some
provisions in the martial law decree which prohibited discussions, much less public
discussions of certain matters of public concern. The purpose was presumably to
allow a free discussion on the draft of the Constitution on which a plebiscite was to be
held sometime in January 1973. If I may use a word famous by our colleague,
Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum, however, the draft of the Constitution
was analyzed and criticized with such a telling effect that Malacaang felt the danger of
its approval. So, the President suspended indefinitely the holding of the plebiscite and
announced that he would consult the people in a referendum to be held from January
10 to January 15. But the questions to be submitted in the referendum were not
announced until the eve of its scheduled beginning, under the supposed supervision
not of the Commission on Elections, but of what was then designated as citizens
assemblies or barangays. Thus the barangays came into existence. The questions to be
propounded were released with proposed answers thereto, suggesting that it was
unnecessary to hold a plebiscite because the answers given in the referendum should
be regarded as the votes cast in the plebiscite. Thereupon, a motion was filed with the
Supreme Court praying that the holding of the referendum be suspended. When the
motion was being heard before the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice delivered to
the Court a proclamation of the President declaring that the new Constitution was
already in force because the overwhelming majority of the votes cast in the
referendum favored the Constitution. Immediately after the departure of the Minister
of Justice, I proceeded to the session room where the case was being heard. I then
informed the Court and the parties the presidential proclamation declaring that the
1973 Constitution had been ratified by the people and is now in force.
A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential proclamation null
and void. The main defense put up by the government was that the issue was a
political question and that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.
xxx
The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to January 15, the
vast majority ratified the draft of the Constitution. Note that all members of the
Supreme Court were residents of Manila, but none of them had been notified of any
referendum in their respective places of residence, much less did they participate in
the alleged referendum. None of them saw any referendum proceeding.
In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a majority of the
members of the Court felt that there had been no referendum.
Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a big difference
between a referendum and a plebiscite. But another group of justices upheld the
defense that the issue was a political question.Whereupon, they dismissed the
case. This is not the only major case in which the plea of political question was
set up. There have been a number of other cases in the past.
x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because the issue was
clearly justiciable.
xxx
x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its functions, it faced
the following questions: What is judicial power? What is a political question?
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual
controversies involving conflicts of rights which are demandable and
enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced by a
judiciary party. In a decided case, a husband complained that his wife was unwilling
to perform her duties as a wife. The Court said: We can tell your wife what her duties
as such are and that she is bound to comply with them, but we cannot force her
physically to discharge her main marital duty to her husband. There are some rights
guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that to enforce them by actual compulsion
would be highly derogatory to human dignity.
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable or enforceable . . .
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical questions. In a
presidential system of government, the Supreme Court has, also another
important function. The powers of government are generally considered divided
into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is
supreme within its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of that
supremacy power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in
courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and
offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the
judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power
but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts
cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that
such matters constitute a political question.
I have made these extended remarks to the end that the Commissioners may have an
initial food for thought on the subject of the judiciary. (Italics in the original;
emphasis supplied)
[103]
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice Concepcion

further clarified the concept of judicial power, thus:
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term judicial power but judicial
power is not vested in the Supreme Court alone but also in other lower courts as
may be created by law.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?
MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to identify
political questions with jurisdictional questions. But there is a difference.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression judicial power?
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases but
where there is a question as to whether the government had authority or had
abused its authority to the extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction,
that is not a political question. Therefore, the court has the duty to decide.
xxx
FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided by the
Supreme Court according to the new numerical need for votes.
On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with the political
question doctrine?
MR. CONCEPCION. No.
FR. BERNAS. It is not.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of discretion,
amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. . .
FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended to do
away with the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.
When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define what is judicial
power. But the Gentleman will notice it says, judicial power includes and the
reason being that the definition that we might make may not cover all possible
areas.
FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems arising from the
political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly political
questions are beyond the pale of judicial power. (Emphasis supplied)
[104]
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be
abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief
Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not
intended to do away with truly political questions. From this clarification it is gathered that
there are two species of political questions: (1) truly political questions and (2) those which
are not truly political questions.
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the
doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section
1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political
in nature.
As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP College of
Law, this Court has in fact in a number of cases taken jurisdiction over questions which
are not truly political following the effectivity of the present Constitution.
In Marcos v. Manglapus,[105] this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene
Cortes, held:
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens
the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions,
would have normally left to the political departments to decide. x x x
[106]
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,[107] through Justice Teodoro Padilla,

this Court declared:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform
under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case, (t)he political question
doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival
claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to
this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution,
although said provision by no means does away with the applicability of the
principle in appropriate cases. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
[108]
And in Daza v. Singson,[109] speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and
decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before
us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under
the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even
the political question. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
[110]
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable political
questions and non-justiciable political questions, however. Identification of these two
species of political questions may be problematic. There has been no clear standard. The
American case of Baker v. Carr[111] attempts to provide some:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a courts undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches
of government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on one question. (Underscoring supplied)
[112]
Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;
(2) the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; and (3)
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion. These standards are not separate and distinct concepts but are
interrelated to each in that the presence of one strengthens the conclusion that the others
are also present.
The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of
judicial review is radically different from our current concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution provides our courts with far less discretion in determining whether they
should pass upon a constitutional issue.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable
political question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally
imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then
our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the
government properly acted within such limits. This Court shall thus now apply this
standard to the present controversy.
These petitions raise five substantial issues:
I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid
impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section
3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial
Development Fund is an unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally
mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the
12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI
of the Constitution.
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article
XI of the Constitution.
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which
this Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue would require
this Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a

determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound
discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.[113]
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for
impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude
a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission shows that the framers could find no better way to approximate the
boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by alluding to both
positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut definition or even
a standard therefor.[114] Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable
political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article
VIII.
Lis Mota
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality
of a governmental act should be avoided whenever possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto
v. Commission on Elections,[115] this Court held:
x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional

question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is
raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some
other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be
adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case
arises in which a decision upon such question will be unavoidable. [Emphasis
and underscoring supplied]
[116]
The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian

Reform,[117] where this Court invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No. 6657 for
being confiscatory and violative of due process, to wit:
It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a
constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial
inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or
controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination,
the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party,
and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the
case itself. [Emphasis supplied]
[118]
Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly
unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidity of
the second impeachment complaint, collectively raise several constitutional issues upon
which the outcome of this controversy could possibly be made to rest. In determining
whether one, some or all of the remaining substantial issues should be passed upon, this
Court is guided by the related cannon of adjudication that the court should not form a rule
of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is applied.[119]
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among other
reasons, the second impeachment complaint is invalid since it directly resulted from a
Resolution[120] calling for a legislative inquiry into the JDF, which Resolution and legislative
inquiry petitioners claim to likewise be unconstitutional for being: (a) a violation of the
rules and jurisprudence on investigations in aid of legislation; (b) an open breach of the
doctrine of separation of powers; (c) a violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal
autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault on the independence of the judiciary. [121]
Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.s claims, it is the studied
opinion of this Court that the issue of the constitutionality of the said Resolution and
resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed from the issue of the validity of the second
impeachment complaint. Moreover, the resolution of said issue would, in the Courts
opinion, require it to form a rule of constitutional law touching on the separate and distinct
matter of legislative inquiries in general, which would thus be broader than is required by
the facts of these consolidated cases. This opinion is further strengthened by the fact that
said petitioners have raised other grounds in support of their petition which would not be
adversely affected by the Courts ruling.
En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative inquiries
has already been enunciated by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon
Commttee,[122] viz:
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not,
therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted
provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be in
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure and that the
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. It
follows then that the right rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected,
including the right to due process and the right not be compelled to testify against
ones self.
[123]
In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra,
while joining the original petition of petitioners Candelaria, et. al., introduce the new
argument that since the second impeachment complaint was verified and filed only by
Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella, the same does not
fall under the provisions of Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at

least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles
of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives signed
a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy the requisites for
the application of the afore-mentioned section in that the verified complaint or resolution
of impeachment was not filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House. With
the exception of Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella, the signatories to said
Resolution are alleged to have verified the same merely as a Resolution of Endorsement.
Intervenors point to the Verification of the Resolution of Endorsement which states that:
We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of the

abovementioned Complaint of Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix William B.
Fuentebella x x x
[124]
Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution requires
in order for said second impeachment complaint to automatically become the Articles of
Impeachment and for trial in the Senate to begin forthwith, is that the verified complaint
be filed, not merely endorsed, by at least one-third of the Members of the House of
Representatives. Not having complied with this requirement, they concede that the
second impeachment complaint should have been calendared and referred to the House
Committee on Justice under Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution, viz:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of
the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by
any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members,
shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral,
together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
Intervenors foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that for
Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution to apply, there should be 76 or more
representatives who signed and verified the second impeachment complaint
as complainants, signed and verified the signatories to a resolution of
impeachment. Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the members of the House of
Representatives as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment contemplated by the

Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being necessary only from at least one
Member whenever a citizen files a verified impeachment complaint.
While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra, does
indeed limit the scope of the constitutional issues to the provisions on impeachment, more
compelling considerations militate against its adoption as the lis mota or crux of the
present controversy. Chief among this is the fact that only Attorneys Macalintal and
Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have raised this issue as a ground for
invalidating the second impeachment complaint. Thus, to adopt this additional ground as
the basis for deciding the instant consolidated petitions would not only render for naught
the efforts of the original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the efforts presented by the
other petitioners as well.
Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the
determination of the instant cases is made easier by the fact that said intervenors
Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the petition of Candelaria, et. al., adopting the latters
arguments and issues as their own. Consequently, they are not unduly prejudiced by this
Courts decision.
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as they are,
constitute the very lis mota of the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of
Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12 th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and
(2) whether, as a result thereof, the second impeachment complaint is barred under
Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Judicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the
Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases
of impeachment.Again, this Court reiterates that the power of judicial review includes the
power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.
On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that [t]here is a
moral compulsion for the Court to not assume jurisdiction over the impeachment because
all the Members thereof are subject to impeachment.[125] But this argument is very much
like saying the Legislature has a moral compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses
because Members of the House of Representatives are subject to them.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this
Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor
can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the controversy may
be referred.[126] Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII,
Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution.More than being clothed with authority thus, this Court is
duty-bound to take cognizance of the instant petitions.[127] In the august words of amicus
curiae Father Bernas, jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not
be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty.
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of
government cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge because no other office
has the authority to do so.[128] On the occasion that this Court had been an interested party
to the controversy before it, it has acted upon the matter not with officiousness but in the
discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and fairness. [129] After
all, by [his] appointment to the office, the public has laid on [a member of the judiciary]
their confidence that [he] is mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied
contentions. For this reason, they expect [him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to render
justice, to be unafraid to displease any person, interest or power and to be equipped with
a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations lurking in [his] office. [130]
The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had already been
settled in the case of Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal.[131] In that case, the petitioners
filed with the respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or
Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET Case
No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them were interested parties to said case as
respondents therein. This would have reduced the Tribunals membership to only its three
Justices-Members whose disqualification was not sought, leaving them to decide the
matter. This Court held:
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator
sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the
same objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if
sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty
that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if
shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration that the Tribunal be not prevented
from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of
which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by
no less than the fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the
Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that
would involve all Senatorselect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment
thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992 elections
when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet
the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations or
for the substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may
be sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and hopes of
vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the Tribunal.
Justices and Senators, singly and collectively.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral

Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before
said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain
from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal
interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment.
What we are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral
Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and
that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the
power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,[132] it was held that:
Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of

them, is nothing short of pro tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as
established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his
judicial power. And if that judge is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise
the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court, the
deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial
power of the court itself. It affects the very heart of judicial independence. The
proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Court no
alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the
participation of its entire membership of Justices. (Italics in the original)
[133]
Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it
exercises its power of judicial review.
In Demetria v. Alba,[134] this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the seven
pillars of limitations of the power of judicial review, enunciated by US Supreme Court
Justice Brandeis inAshwander v. TVA[135] as follows:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, nonadversary proceeding, declining because to decide such questions is legitimate only in
the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital
controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly
suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the
constitutionality of the legislative act.
2. The Court will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the
necessity of deciding it. . . . It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a
constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.
3. The Court will not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by
the precise facts to which it is to be applied.
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented
by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be
disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be
decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a
question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter.
Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a question under
the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because the judgment can be
sustained on an independent state ground.
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who
fails to show that he is injured by its operation. Among the many applications of this
rule, none is more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one who lacks a
personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in
the performance of his official duty will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes,
the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to have the
Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the
challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not entertained although made by the
Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one
who has availed himself of its benefits.
7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a
serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will
first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the
question may be avoided (citations omitted).
The foregoing pillars of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander v.
TVA from different decisions of the United States Supreme Court, can be encapsulated
into the following categories:
1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of the
case
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the
statute
5. that the parties are not in estoppel
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.
As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the
exercise of judicial review:
1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power

2. the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge; he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.[136]
Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial restraint
the possibility that judicial review of impeachments might also lead to embarrassing
conflicts between the Congress and the [J]udiciary. They stress the need to avoid the
appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial hearings, and the scenario
that it would be confusing and humiliating and risk serious political instability at home and
abroad if the judiciary countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an impeachable
official.[137] Intervenor Soriano echoes this argument by alleging that failure of this Court to
enforce its Resolution against Congress would result in the diminution of its judicial
authority and erode public confidence and faith in the judiciary.
Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by the
Solicitor General, the possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason
for this Court to refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachment cases. Justices
cannot abandon their constitutional duties just because their action may start, if not
precipitate, a crisis.
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act.
x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive act is not

regarded as settled until the Supreme Court has passed upon the constitutionality of
the act involved, the judgment has not only juridical effects but also political
consequences. Those political consequences may follow even where the Court fails to
grant the petitioners prayer to nullify an act for lack of the necessary number of
votes. Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one way or the other, itself constitutes a
decision for the respondent and validation, or at least quasi-validation, follows.
[138]
Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary[139] where this Court was split and in the end
there were not enough votes either to grant the petitions, or to sustain respondents
claims,[140] the pre-existing constitutional order was disrupted which paved the way for the
establishment of the martial law regime.
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the coordinate
branches of the government would behave in a lawless manner and not do their duty
under the law to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Yet there is no
reason to believe that any of the branches of government will behave in a precipitate
manner and risk social upheaval, violence, chaos and anarchy by encouraging disrespect
for the fundamental law of the land.
Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by the
doctrine in People v. Veneracion, to wit:[141]
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If [public
officers], under the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam
unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise the
duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of
men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its
authority. Under this system, [public officers] are guided by the Rule of Law, and
ought to protect and enforce it without fear or favor, resist encroachments by
governments, political parties, or even the interference of their own personal beliefs.
[142]
Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure

for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that
Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3
(5) of Article XI of our present Constitution, contending that the term initiate does not
mean to file; that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the House of Representatives, as a
collective body, which has the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment; that
initiate could not possibly mean to file because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of
the Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified
complaint for impeachment by any member of the House of Representatives; or (2) by
any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all
the members of the House. Respondent House of Representatives concludes that the
one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same
officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of
Representatives, acting as the collectivebody, has yet to act on it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term
initiate. Resort to statutory construction is, therefore, in order.
That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution, Commissioner
Florenz Regalado, who eventually became an Associate Justice of this Court, agreed on
the meaning of initiate as to file, as proffered and explained by Constitutional
Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional Commission proceedings, which he
(Commissioner Regalado) as amicus curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the
instant petitions held on November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of initiating
included the act of taking initial action on the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed
the word initiate as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to
file the complaint and take initial action on it.
Initiate of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin,
to commence, or set going. As Websters Third New International Dictionary of the English
Language concisely puts it, it means to perform or facilitate the first action, which jibes
with Justice Regalados position, and that of Father Bernas, who elucidated during the
oral arguments of the instant petitions on November 5, 2003 in this wise:
Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a comlexus of acts

consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end. The end is the transmittal of the
articles of impeachment to the Senate. The middle consists of those deliberative
moments leading to the formulation of the articles of impeachment. The beginning or
the initiation is the filing of the complaint and its referral to the Committee on Justice.
Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by Representatives
Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that impeachment is deemed initiated when the
Justice Committee votes in favor of impeachment or when the House reverses a
contrary vote of the Committee. Note that the Rule does not say impeachment
proceedings are initiated but rather are deemed initiated. The language is recognition
that initiation happened earlier, but by legal fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to
a time after actual initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into the
intent of the law. Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution can be
pried from its records:
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the procedure and the
substantive provisions on impeachment, I understand there have been many proposals
and, I think, these would need some time for Committee action.
However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee a resolution
on impeachment proceedings, copies of which have been furnished the Members of
this body. This is borne out of my experience as a member of the Committee on
Justice, Human Rights and Good Government which took charge of the last
impeachment resolution filed before the First Batasang Pambansa. For the
information of the Committee, the resolution covers several steps in the
impeachment proceedings starting with initiation, action of the Speaker
committee action, calendaring of report, voting on the report, transmittal
referral to the Senate, trial and judgment by the Senate.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of
the approval of the amendment submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just
make of record my thinking that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of
Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that
the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. And what is actually done on
the floor is that the committee resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment
is the one approved by the body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it
appears that the initiation starts on the floor. If we only have time, I could cite
examples in the case of the impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon
wherein the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the
resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was the body who
approved the resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It only approves or
disapproves the resolution. So, on that score, probably the Committee on Style could
help in rearranging these words because we have to be very technical about this. I
have been bringing with me The Rules of the House of Representatives of the U.S.
Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on the case of Richard
Nixon are with me. I have submitted my proposal, but the Committee has already
decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of
Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is only in
keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules of the House of Representatives of the
United States regarding impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this provision, that
on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete the words which read: to
initiate impeachment proceedings and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the
word resolution the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter i in
impeachment and replace the word by with OF, so that the whole section will now
read: A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary
either to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the
Committee or to override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be
recorded.
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of
Representatives of the United States is concerned, really starts from the filing of the
verified complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries with it the Articles
of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words Articles of Impeachment are
mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a verified compliant of onethird of all the Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam President, that
my amendment will not vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the
uniform procedure of the House of Representatives of the United States
Congress. Thank you, Madam President.

udnerscoring supplied)
[143]
(Italics in the original; emphasis and
This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and accepted

by the Committee on the Accountability of Public Officers.[144]
It is thus clear that the framers intended initiation to start with the filing of the
complaint. In his amicus curiae brief, Commissioner Maambong explained that the
obvious reason in deleting the phrase to initiate impeachment proceedings as
contained in the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it
understood once and for all that the initiation of impeachment proceedings starts
with the filing of the complaint, and the vote of one-third of the House in a resolution
of impeachment does not initiate the impeachment proceedingswhich was already
initiated by the filing of a verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article
XI of the Constitution.[145]
Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is
Father Bernas, who was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the
word initiate as used in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both adding, however, that
the filing must be accompanied by an action to set the complaint moving.
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the word
initiate, appearing in the constitutional provision on impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate
all cases of impeachment.
xxx
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year, (Emphasis supplied)
refers to two objects, impeachment case and impeachment proceeding.
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is to
initiate. The object in the first sentence is impeachment case. The object in the second
sentence is impeachment proceeding. Following the principle of reddendo singuala
sinuilis, the term cases must be distinguished from the term proceedings. An
impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Abovequoted first provision provides that the House, by a vote of one-third of all its members,
can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House has exclusive power to
initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a decision is
made to initiate a case in the Senate, a proceeding must be followed to arrive at a
conclusion. A proceeding must be initiated. To initiate, which comes from the Latin
word initium, means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It has
a beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the House and
consists of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member
of the House of Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the

House of the Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper
Committee which may either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution
of the Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to
the House for further processing; and (4) there is the processing of the same complaint
by the House of Representatives which either affirms a favorable resolution of the
Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If
at least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are
prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the House initiates an
impeachment case. It is at this point that an impeachable public official is successfully
impeached. That is, he or she is successfully charged with an impeachment case before
the Senate as impeachment court.
Father Bernas further explains: The impeachment proceeding is not initiated when
the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the House
proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the
impeachment proceeding initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed
on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The
action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or
beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed
and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which
triggers the series of steps that follow.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary
meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that A vote of at least onethird of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to initiate impeachment
proceedings, this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of
the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint
does.[146] Thus the line was deleted and is not found in the present Constitution.
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, No impeachment proceeding
shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year, it
means that no second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee
on Justice for action. By his explanation, this interpretation is founded on the common
understanding of the meaning of to initiate which means to begin. He reminds that the
Constitution is ratified by the people, both ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand
it; and that ordinary people read ordinary meaning into ordinary words and not abstruse
meaning, they ratify words as they understand it and not as sophisticated lawyers confuse
it.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate
impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says The House of Representatives
shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment, This is a misreading
of said provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating
impeachment cases with impeachment proceeding.
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two
former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term to initiate refers
to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress taking initial action of
said complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or
endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by
the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the
Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes
clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment
complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment
proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on
Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once
the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the
verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or
endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified
complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the
House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the
term initiate a meaning different meaning from filing and referral.
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court could not use
contemporaneous construction as an aid in the interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI,
citing Vera v. Avelino[147] wherein this Court stated that their personal opinions (referring to
Justices who were delegates to the Constitution Convention) on the matter at issue
expressed during this Courts our deliberations stand on a different footing from the
properly recorded utterances of debates and proceedings. Further citing said case, he
states that this Court likened the former members of the Constitutional Convention to
actors who are so absorbed in their emotional roles that intelligent spectators may know
more about the real meaning because of the latters balanced perspectives and
disinterestedness. [148]
Justice Gutierrezs statements have no application in the present petitions. There are
at present only two members of this Court who participated in the 1986 Constitutional
Commission Chief Justice Davide and Justice Adolf Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has
not taken part in these proceedings for obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court has not
simply relied on the personal opinions now given by members of the Constitutional
Commission, but has examined the records of the deliberations and proceedings thereof.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI,
it is clear and unequivocal that it and only it has the power to make and interpret its rules
governing impeachment. Its argument is premised on the assumption that Congress
has absolute power to promulgate its rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced.
Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that The Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section. Clearly, its power to
promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section. Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the
Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3
of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules, viz:
Section 3. (1) x x x
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House
of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member
thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee,
after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the
House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to
either affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the
Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be
recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least
one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental
law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary
implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need
of referendum.
In Osmea v. Pendatun,[149] this Court held that it is within the province of either House
of Congress to interpret its rules and that it was the best judge of what constituted
disorderly behavior of its members. However, in Paceta v. Secretary of the Commission
on Appointments,[150] Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for this
Court and quoting Justice Brandeis inUnited States v. Smith,[151] declared that where the
construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than members of the Legislature,
the question becomes judicial in nature. In Arroyo v. De Venecia,[152] quoting United States
v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,[153] Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held that
while the Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings, it may
not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and further
that there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. It is only within these
limitations that all matters of method are open to the determination of the Legislature. In
the same case of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his Concurring and
Dissenting Opinion, was even more emphatic as he stressed that in the Philippine setting
there is even more reason for courts to inquire into the validity of the Rules of
Congress, viz:
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are nonjusticiable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of
power if we assume jurisdiction over he case at bar. Even in the United States, the
principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the
interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by
legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as a window to
view the issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first
defined the boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review congressional rules. It
held:
xxx
The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may determine the
rules of its proceedings. It appears that in pursuance of this authority the House had,
prior to that day, passed this as one of its rules:
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the names of
members sufficient to make a quorum in the hall of the House who do not vote shall
be noted by the clerk and recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker with the
names of the members voting, and be counted and announced in determining the
presence of a quorum to do business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question, therefore, is
as to the validity of this rule, and not what methods the Speaker may of his own
motion resort to for determining the presence of a quorum, nor what matters the
Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon the journal. Neither do the
advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters
for judicial consideration.With the courts the question is only one of power. The
Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not
by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there
should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceedings
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within
these limitationsall matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and
it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more
accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different
one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is
not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to
be exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond
the challenge of any other body or tribunal.
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of
congressional rules, i.e, whether they are constitutional. Rule XV was examined
by the Court and it was found to satisfy the test:(1) that it did not ignore any
constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its method
had a reasonable relationship with the result sought to be attained. By examining
Rule XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere
invocation of the principle of separation of powers.
[154]
xxx
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to

categorically reject the political question defense when its interposition will cover
up abuse of power. For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution
was intentionally cobbled to empower courts x x x to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. This
power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It
was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state
constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormous power to our courts in view
of our experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state power were
shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question
doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the
CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis--vis the
Executive and the Legislative departments of government.
[155]
xxx
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a mere
power which it can decline to exercise. Precisely to deter this disinclination, the
Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike down any act of a branch or
instrumentality of government or any of its officials done with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the
Constitution has elongated the checking powers of this Court against the other
branches of government despite their more democratic character, the President and
the legislators being elected by the people.
[156]
xxx
The provision defining judicial power as including the duty of the courts of justice. . .
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional Commission
to upgrade the powers of this court vis--vis the other branches of government. This
provision was dictated by our experience under martial law which taught us that a
stronger and more independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in government. x x
x
xxx
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of government
committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new Constitution transformed this
Court from passivity to activism. This transformation, dictated by our distinct
experience as nation, is not merely evolutionary but revolutionary. Under the 1935
and the 1973 Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional violations by
initially determining what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift
in stress this Court is mandated to approach constitutional violations not by finding
out what it should not do but what it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn
duty by not resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new
constitutional provision as the case at bar once more calls us to define the parameters
of our power to review violations of the rules of the House. We will not be true to
our trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if we refuse to exercise
this new power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding
timidity to unsheathe the judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened other
branches of government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of our
courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel
provision stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its
interpretation should not be depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign
jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own history should
provide us the light and not the experience of foreigners. (Italics in the original
emphasis and underscoring supplied)
[157]
Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant petitions. Here,
the third parties alleging the violation of private rights and the Constitution are involved.
Neither may respondent House of Representatives rely on Nixon v. US[158] as basis for
arguing that this Court may not decide on the constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of
the House Impeachment Rules. As already observed, the U.S. Federal Constitution
simply provides that the House of Representatives shall have the sole power of
impeachment. It adds nothing more. It gives no clue whatsoever as to how this sole power
is to be exercised. No limitation whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme Court

concluded that there was a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of a
constitutional power to the House of Representatives. This reasoning does not hold with
regard to impeachment power of the Philippine House of Representatives since our
Constitution, as earlier enumerated, furnishes several provisions articulating how that
exclusive power is to be exercised.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules
which state that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding
by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is
sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the
Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in
substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House
of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3
of the members of the House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they
give the term initiate a meaning different from filing.
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon,
the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint
has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former
President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate
justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice
on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto
C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23,
2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
Conclusion
If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a
phenomenon that takes the center stage of our individual and collective consciousness
as a people with our characteristic flair for human drama, conflict or tragedy. Of course
this is not to demean the seriousness of the controversy over the Davide
impeachment. For many of us, the past two weeks have proven to be an exasperating,
mentally and emotionally exhausting experience. Both sides have fought bitterly a
dialectical struggle to articulate what they respectively believe to be the correct position
or view on the issues involved. Passions had ran high as demonstrators, whether for or
against the impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to the streets armed with their familiar
slogans and chants to air their voice on the matter. Various sectors of society - from the
business, retired military, to the academe and denominations of faith offered suggestions
for a return to a state of normalcy in the official relations of the governmental branches
affected to obviate any perceived resulting instability upon areas of national life.
Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment had
been constituted, this Court was specifically asked, told, urged and argued to take no
action of any kind and form with respect to the prosecution by the House of
Representatives of the impeachment complaint against the subject respondent public
official. When the present petitions were knocking so to speak at the doorsteps of this
Court, the same clamor for non-interference was made through what are now the
arguments of lack of jurisdiction, non-justiciability, and judicial self-restraint aimed at
halting the Court from any move that may have a bearing on the impeachment
proceedings.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of
the constitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide
is concerned. To reiterate what has been already explained, the Court found the existence
in full of all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and
duty of judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction
or interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an
issue of a genuine constitutional material which only this Court can properly and
competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers
under our system of government. Face-to-face thus with a matter or problem that squarely
falls under the Courts jurisdiction, no other course of action can be had but for it to pass
upon that problem head on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the process of
impeachment has effectively set up a regime of judicial supremacy, is patently without
basis in fact and in law.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the
merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the
Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond
this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn
justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business
of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the
government. Rather, the raison detre of the judiciary is to complement the discharge by
the executive and legislative of their own powers to bring about ultimately the beneficent
effects of having founded and ordered our society upon the rule of law.
It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality of the
impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice, the members of this Court have
actually closed ranks to protect a brethren. That the members interests in ruling on said
issue is as much at stake as is that of the Chief Justice. Nothing could be farther from the
truth.
The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has long held
and been entrusted with the judicial power to resolve conflicting legal rights regardless of
the personalities involved in the suits or actions. This Court has dispensed justice over
the course of time, unaffected by whomsoever stood to benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid
by whatever imputations or speculations could be made to it, so long as it rendered
judgment according to the law and the facts. Why can it not now be trusted to wield judicial
power in these petitions just because it is the highest ranking magistrate who is involved
when it is an incontrovertible fact that the fundamental issue is not him but the validity of
a government branchs official act as tested by the limits set by the Constitution? Of
course, there are rules on the inhibition of any member of the judiciary from taking part in
a case in specified instances. But to disqualify this entire institution now from the suit at
bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely incapable of impartiality when one of its
members is a party to a case, which is simply a non sequitur.
No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system
which recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential to the laws moral
authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and obedience to its
commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch or instrumentality that is most
zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality other than the Supreme Court which
has discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its application to numerous
cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence.The Chief Justice
is not above the law and neither is any other member of this Court. But just because he
is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than anybody else. The
law is solicitous of every individuals rights irrespective of his station in life.
The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to test once
again by this impeachment case against Chief Justice Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this
Court has resorted to no other than the Constitution in search for a solution to what many
feared would ripen to a crisis in government. But though it is indeed immensely a blessing
for this Court to have found answers in our bedrock of legal principles, it is equally
important that it went through this crucible of a democratic process, if only to discover that
it can resolve differences without the use of force and aggression upon each other.
WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on
November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary
General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph
5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., no part.
Bellosillo, J., see separate opinion.
Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Vitug, J., please see separate opinion (concurring).
Panganiban, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., see separate concurring opinion.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., see separate and concurring opinion
Quisumbing, J., concurring separate opinion received.
Carpio, J., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., concur in the majority opinion and in the separate opinion of
Justice Vitug.
Corona, J., will write a separate concurring opinion.
Azcuna, J., concur in the separate opinion.
Tinga, J., concur. Please see separate opinion.
[1]
Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 180-182; Annex H.
[2]
Per Special Appearance with Manifestation of House Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. (Rollo, G.R. No.
160261 at 325-363) the pertinent House Resolution is HR No. 260, but no copy of the same was
submitted before this Court.
[3]
Id. at 329. Created through PD No. 1949 (July 18, 1984), the JDF was established to help ensure and
guarantee the independence of the Judiciary as mandated by the Constitution and public policy
and required by the impartial administration of justice by creating a special fund to augment the
allowances of the members and personnel of the Judiciary and to finance the acquisition,
maintenance and repair of office equipment and facilities.
[4]
Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 120-139; Annex E.
[5]
The initial complaint impleaded only Justices Artemio V. Panganiban, Josue N. Bellosillo, Reynato S.
Puno, Antonio T. Carpio and Renato C. Corona, and was later amended to include Justices Jose
C. Vitug, and Leonardo A. Quisumbing.
[6]
Supra note 4 at 123-124.
[7]
Rollo, G.R. No. 160403 at 48-53; Annex A.
[8]
http://www.congress.gov.ph/search/bills/hist_show.php?bill_no=RPT9999
[9]
Rollo, G.R. No. 160262 at 8.
[10]
Rollo, G.R. No. 160295 at 11.
[11]
Rollo, G.R. No. 160262 at 43-84; Annex B.
[12]
Supra note 2.
[13]
A perusal of the attachments submitted by the various petitioners reveals the following signatories to the
second impeachment complaint and the accompanying Resolution/Endorsement. 1. Gilbert
Teodoro, Jr., NPC, Tarlac (principal complainant) 2. Felix Fuentebella, NPC, Camarines Sur
(second principal complainant) 3. Julio Ledesma, IV, NPC, Negros Occidental 4. Henry Lanot,
NPC, Lone District of Pasig City 5. Kim Bernardo-Lokin, Party List-CIBAC 6. Marcelino Libanan,
NPC, Lone District of Eastern Samar, (Chairman, House Committee on Justice) 7. Emmylou TalinoSantos, Independent, 1st District, North Cotobato 8. Douglas RA. Cagas, NPC, 1st District, Davao
del Sur 9. Sherwin Gatchalian, NPC, 1st District, Valenzuela City 10. Luis Bersamin, Jr., PDSPPPC, Lone District of Abra 11. Nerissa Soon-Ruiz Alayon, 6th District, Cebu 12. Ernesto Nieva,
Lakas, 1stDistrict, Manila 13. Edgar R. Erice, Lakas, 2nd District, Kalookan City 14. Ismael Mathay
III, Independent, 2nd District, Quezon City 15. Samuel Dangwa, Reporma, Lone District of
Benguet 16. Alfredo Maraon, Jr., NPC, 2ndDistrict, Negros Occidental 17. Cecilia Jalosjos-Carreon,
Reporma, 1st District, Zamboanga del Norte 18. Agapito A. Aquino, LDP, 2nd District, Makati City 19.
Fausto L. Seachon, Jr., NPC, 3rd District, Masbate 20. Georgilu Yumul-Hermida, Pwersa ng Masa,
4th District, Quezon 21. Jose Carlos Lacson, Lakas, 3rd District, Negros Occidental 22. Manuel C.
Ortega, NPC, 1st District, La Union 23. Uliran Joaquin, NPC, 1st District, Laguna 24. Soraya C.
Jaafar, Lakas, Lone District of Tawi-Tawi 25. Wilhelmino Sy-Alvarado, Lakas, 1st District,
Bulacan 26. Claude P. Bautista, NPC, 2nd District, Davao Del Sur 27. Del De Guzman, Lakas, Lone
District of Marikina City 28. Zeneida Cruz-Ducut, NPC, 2nd District, Pampanga 29. Augusto Baculio,
Independent-LDP, 2nd District, Misamis Oriental 30. Faustino Dy III, NPC-Lakas, 3rd District,
Isabela 31. Agusto Boboy Syjuco, Lakas, 2ndDistrict, Iloilo 32. Rozzano Rufino B. Biazon, LDP,
Lone District of Muntinlupa City 33. Leovigildo B. Banaag, NPC-Lakas, 1st District, Agusan del
Norte 34. Eric Singson, LP, 2nd District, Ilocos Sur 35. Jacinto Paras, Lakas, 1st District, Negros
Oriental 36. Jose Solis, Independent, 2nd District, Sorsogon 37. Renato B. Magtubo, Party ListPartido ng Manggagawa 38. Herminio G. Teves, Lakas, 3rd District, Negros Oriental 39. Amado T.
Espino, Jr., Lakas, 2nd District, Pangasinan 40. Emilio Macias, NPC, 2nd District, Negros Oriental 41.
Arthur Y. Pingoy, Jr., NPC, 2nd District, South Cotobato 42. Francis Nepomuceno, NPC, 1st District,
Pampanga 43. Conrado M. Estrella III, NPC, 6th District, Pangasinan 44. Elias Bulut, Jr., NPC, Lone
District of Apayao 45. Jurdin Jesus M. Romualdo, NPC, Lone District of Camiguin 46. Juan Pablo
Bondoc, NPC, 4th District, Pampanga 47. Generoso DC. Tulagan, NPC, 3rd District, Pangasinan 48.
Perpetuo Ylagan, Lakas, Lone District of Romblon 49. Michael Duavit, NPC, 1st District, Rizal 50.
Joseph Ace H. Durano, NPC, 5th District, Cebu 51. Jesli Lapus, NPC, 3rd District, Tarlac 52. Carlos
Q. Cojuangco, NPC, 4th District, Negros Occidental 53. Georgidi B. Aggabao, NPC, 4th District,
Santiago, Isabela 54. Francis Escudero, NPC, 1st District, Sorsogon 55. Rene M. Velarde, Party
List-Buhay 56. Celso L. Lobregat, LDP, Lone District of Zamboanga City 57. Alipio Cirilo V.
Badelles, NPC, 1st District, Lanao del Norte 58. Didagen P. Dilangalen, Pwersa ng Masa, Lone
District of Maguindanao 59. Abraham B. Mitra, LDP, 2nd District, Palawan 60. Joseph Santiago,
NPC, Lone District of Catanduanes 61. Darlene Antonino-Custodio, NPC, 1st District of South
Cotobato & General Santos City 62. Aleta C. Suarez, LP, 3rdDistrict, Quezon 63. Rodolfo G. Plaza,
NPC, Lone District of Agusan del Sur 64. JV Bautista, Party List-Sanlakas 65. Gregorio Ipong,
NPC, 2nd District, North Cotabato 66. Gilbert C. Remulla, LDP, 2 nd District, Cavite 67. Rolex T.
Suplico, LDP, 5th District, Iloilo 68. Celia Layus, NPC, Cagayan 69. Juan Miguel Zubiri, Lakas,
3rd District, Bukidnon 70. Benasing Macarambon Jr,. NPC, 2nd District, Lanao del Sur 71. Josefina
Joson, NPC, Lone District of Nueva Ecija 72. Mark Cojuangco, NPC, 5th District, Pangasinan 73.
Mauricio Domogan, Lakas, Lone District of Baguio City 74. Ronaldo B. Zamora, Pwersa ng Masa,
Lone District of San Juan 75. Angelo O. Montilla, NPC, Lone District of Sultan Kudarat 76. Roseller
L. Barinaga, NPC, 2nd District, Zamboanga del Norte 77. Jesnar R. Falcon, NPC, 2nd District,
Surigao del Sur 78. Ruy Elias Lopez, NPC, 3rd District, Davao City.
[14]
Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 5. Petitioner had previously filed two separate impeachment complaints before
the House of Representatives against Ombudsman Aniano Desierto.
[15]
299 SCRA 744 (1998). In Chavez v. PCGG, petitioner Chavez argued that as a taxpayer and a citizen,
he had the legal personality to file a petition demanding that the PCGG make public any and all
negotiations and agreements pertaining to the PCGGs task of recovering the Marcoses ill-gotten
wealth. Petitioner Chavez further argued that the matter of recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses is an issue of transcendental importance to the public. The Supreme Court, citing Taada
v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985), Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530 (1987)
and Albano v. Reyes, 175 SCRA 264 (1989) ruled that petitioner had standing. The Court, however,
went on to elaborate that in any event, the question on the standing of petitioner Chavez was
rendered moot by the intervention of the Jopsons who are among the legitimate claimants to the
Marcos wealth.
[16]
384 SCRA 152 (2002). In Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation, wherein the
petition sought to compel the Public Estates Authority (PEA) to disclose all facts on its then ongoing negotiations with Amari Coastal Development Corporation to reclaim portions of Manila Bay,
the Supreme Court said that petitioner Chavez had the standing to bring a taxpayers suit because
the petition sought to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties.
[17]
224 SCRA 792 (1993).
[18]
Subsequent petitions were filed before this Court seeking similar relief. Other than the petitions, this
Court also received Motions for Intervention from among others, Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., and
Special Appearances by House Speaker Jose C. de Venecia, Jr., and Senate President Franklin
Drilon.
[19]
Supra note 2 at 10.
[20]
Justice Florenz D. Regalado, Former Constitutional Commissioners Justice Regalado E. Maambong and
Father Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Former Minister of Justice and
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Deans Pacifico Agabin and Raul C. Pangalangan, and
Former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga,.
[21]
Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 275-292.
[22]
Id. at 292.
[23]
63 Phil 139 (1936).
[24]
Id. at 157-159.
[25]
Vide Alejandrino v. Quezon, 46 Phil 83 (1924); Taada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil 1051 (1957); Ynot v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 659, 665 (1987).
[26]
CONST., art. VIII, sec. 1.
[27]
5 US 137 (1803).
[28]
Id. at 180.
[29]
In In re Prautch, 1 Phil 132 (1902), this Court held that a statute allowing for imprisonment for nonpayment of a debt was invalid. In Casanovas v. Hord, 8 Phil 125 (1907), this Court invalidated a
statute imposing a tax on mining claims on the ground that a government grant stipulating that the
payment of certain taxes by the grantee would be in lieu of other taxes was a contractual obligation
which could not be impaired by subsequent legislation. InConcepcion v. Paredes, 42 Phil 599
(1921), Section 148 (2) of the Administrative Code, as amended, which provided that judges of the
first instance with the same salaries would, by lot, exchange judicial districts every five years, was
declared invalid for being a usurpation of the power of appointment vested in the Governor General.
In McDaniel v. Apacible, 42 Phil 749 (1922), Act No. 2932, in so far as it declares open to lease
lands containing petroleum which have been validly located and held, was declared invalid for being
a depravation of property without due process of law. In U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil 1 (1922), Act
No. 2868, in so far as it authorized the Governor-General to fix the price of rice by proclamation
and to make the sale of rice in violation of such a proclamation a crime, was declared an invalid
delegation of legislative power.
[30]
VICENTE V. MENDOZA, SHARING THE PASSION AND ACTION OF OUR TIME 62-53 (2003).
[31]
Supra note 23.
[32]
Id. at 156-157.
[33]
Florentino P. Feliciano, The Application of Law: Some Recurring Aspects Of The Process Of Judicial
Review And Decision Making, 37 AMJJUR 17, 24 (1992).
[34]
Ibid.
[35]
I RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 434-436 (1986).
[36]
31 SCRA 413 (1970)
[37]
Id. at 422-423; Vide Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757, 770 (1988); Luz Farms v. Secretary of the
Department of Agrarian Reform, 192 SCRA 51 (1990); Ordillo v. Commission on Elections, 192
SCRA 100 (1990).
[38]
194 SCRA 317 (1991).
[39]
Id. at 325 citing Maxwell v. Dow, 176 US 581.
[40]
152 SCRA 284 (1987).
[41]
Id. at 291 citing Gold Creek Mining v. Rodriguez, 66 Phil 259 (1938), J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc v. Land
Tenure Administration, supra note 36, and I TAADA AND FERNANDO, CONSTITUTION OF THE
PHILIPPINES 21 (Fourth Ed.).
[42]
82 Phil 771 (1949).
[43]
Id. at 775.
[44]
Supra note 38.
[45]
Id. at 330-331.
[46]
Id. at 337-338 citing 16 CJS 2.31; Commonwealth v. Ralph, 111 Pa. 365, 3 Atl. 220 and Household
Finance Corporation v. Shaffner, 203, SW 2d, 734, 356 Mo. 808.
[47]
Supra note 2.
[48]
Citing Section 3 (6), Article VIII of the Constitution provides:
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that
purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on
trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be
convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
[49]
Supra note 21.
[50]
506 U.S. 224 (1993).
[51]
Supra note 2 at 349-350 citing Gerhardt, Michael J. The Federal Impeachment Process: A Constitutional
and Historical Analysis, 1996, p. 119.
[52]
227 SCRA 100 (1993).
[53]
Id. at 112.
[54]
US Constititon. Section 2. x x x The House of Representatives shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.
[55]
1987 Constitution, Article XI, Section 3 (1). The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power
to initiate all cases of impeachment.
[56]
Supra note 2 at 355 citing AGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY, 1984, pp. 112-113.
[57]
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
[58]
141 SCRA 263 (1986).
[59]
Supra note 25.
[60]
298 SCRA 756 (1998).
[61]
272 SCRA 18 (1997).
[62]
201 SCRA 792 (1991).
[63]
187 SCRA 377 (1990).
[64]
180 SCRA 496 (1989).
[65]
Supra note 25.
[66]
Supra note 23.
[67]
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, supra note 38 at 330-331.
[68]
Id. at 158-159.
[69]
IBP v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000) citing Joya v. PCGG, 225 SCRA 568 (1993); House International
Building Tenants Association, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 703 (1987); Baker
v. Carr, supra note 57.
[70]
Citing Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 250 SCRA 130 (1995).
[71]
Citing Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 281 SCRA 330 (1997).
[72]
Citing Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, 163 SCRA 371, 378 (1988).
[73]
Rule 3, Section 2. Parties in interest. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise
authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest.
[74]
JG Summit Holdings, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 345 SCRA 143, 152 (2000).
[75]
246 SCRA 540 (1995).
[76]
Id. at 562-564.
[77]
Agan v. PIATCO, G.R. No. 155001, May 5, 2003 citing BAYAN v. Zamora, 342 SCRA 449, 562-563
(2000) and Baker v. Carr, supra note 57; Vide Gonzales v. Narvasa,, 337 SCRA 733
(2000); TELEBAP v. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 337 (1998).
[78]
Chavez v. PCGG, supra note 15.
[79]
Del Mar v. PAGCOR 346 SCRA 485, 501 (2000) citing Kilosbayan, Inc., et.al. v. Morato, supra note
70; Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392 (1980); Sanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333
(1976); Philconsa v. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 (1966); Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil
331 (1960); Vide Gonzales v. Narvasa, supra note 77; Pelaez v. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569
(1965); Philconsa v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 (1965); Iloilo Palay & Corn Planters Association v.
Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377 (1965).
[80]
BAYAN v. Zamora, supra note 77 citing Bugnay v. Laron, 176 SCRA 240, 251-252 (1989); Vide Del Mar
v. PAGCOR, supra note 79; Gonzales v. Narvasa, supra note 77; TELEBAP v.
COMELEC, supra note 77; Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, supra note 70; Joya v. PCGG, supra note
69; Dumlao v. COMELEC, supra note 79; Sanidad v. COMELEC, supra note 79; Philconsa v.
Mathay, supra note 79; Pelaez v. Auditor General, supra note 79; Philconsa v.
Gimenez, supra note 79; Iloilo Palay & Corn Planters Association v. Feliciano, supra note
79; Pascual v. Sec. of Public Works, supra note 79.
[81]
Gonzales v. Narvasa, supra note 77 citing Dumlao v. COMELEC, supra note 79; Sanidad v.
COMELEC, supra note 79; Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677 (1972).
[82]
Tatad v. Garcia, Jr., 243 SCRA 436 (1995); Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, supra note 70 at 140-141 citing
Philconsa v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 (1994); Guingona v. PCGG, 207 SCRA 659
(1992); Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 (1990); Tolentino v. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702
(1971).
[83]
Del Mar v. PAGCOR, supra note 79 at 502-503 citing Philconsa v. Mathay, supra note 79.
[84]
Chinese Flour Importers Association v. Price Stabilization Board, 89 Phil 439, 461 (1951) citing Gallego
et al. vs. Kapisanan Timbulan ng mga Manggagawa, 46 Off. Gaz, 4245.
[85]
Philippine Constitution Association v. Gimenez, supra note 79 citing Gonzales v. Hechanova, 118 Phil.
1065 (1963); Pascual v. Secretary, supra note 79.
[86]
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000).
[87]
MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines, G.R. No. 135306, January 28,
2003, citing Industrial Generating Co. v. Jenkins 410 SW 2d 658; Los Angeles County Winans, 109
P 640; Weberpals v. Jenny, 133 NE 62.
[88]
Mathay v. Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, 58 SCRA 559, 570-571 (1974), citing Moore's Federal
Practice 2d ed., Vol. III, pages 3423-3424; 4 Federal Rules Service, pages 454-455; Johnson, et
al., vs. Riverland Levee Dist., et al., 117 2d 711, 715; Borlasa v. Polistico, 47 Phil. 345, 348 (1925).
[89]
MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines, supra note 87, dissenting opinion
of Justice Carpio; Bulig-bulig Kita Kamag-Anak Assoc. v. Sulpicio Lines, 173 SCRA 514, 514-515
(1989); Re: Request of the Heirs of the Passengers of Doa Paz, 159 SCRA 623, 627
(1988) citing Moore, Federal Practice, 2d ed., Vol. 3B, 23-257, 23-258; Board of Optometry v. Colet,
260 SCRA 88 (1996), citing Section 12, Rule 3, Rules of Court; Mathay v. Consolidated Bank and
Trust Co., supra note 88; Oposa v. Factoran, supra note 17.
[90]
Kilosbayan v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994).
[91]
Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, supra note 70 citing Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, supra note
38; Philconsa v. Gimnez, supra note 79; Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association v. Feliciano,
supra note 79; Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 (1949); vide Tatad v. Secretary of the Department
of Energy, 281 SCRA 330 (1997); Santiago v. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106 (1997); KMU v. Garcia,
Jr., 239 SCRA 386 (1994); Joya v. PCGG, 225 SCRA 368 (1993); Carpio v. Executive
Secretary, 206 SCRA 290 (1992); Osmea v. COMELEC, 199 SCRA 750 (1991); Basco v.
PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52 (1991); Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221 (1991); Daza v. Singson,
supra note 64; Dumlao v. COMELEC, supra note 79.
[92]
Firestone Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 522, 531 (1999) citing Gibson vs. Revilla, 92
SCRA 219; Magsaysay-Labrador v. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 266, 271 (1989).
[93]
Supra note 79.
[94]
Id. at 403.
[95]
Supra note 81.
[96]
Id. at 681.
[97]
SECTION 3. x x x
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or
by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included
in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three
session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members,
shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable
resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution.
The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
[98]
Supra note 25.
[99]
Id. at 1067.
[100]
Vide Barcelon v. Baker, 5 Phil. 87 (1905); Montenegro v. Castaeda, 91 Phil. 882 (1952); De la Llana v.
COMELEC, 80 SCRA 525 (1977).
[101]
Vide Avelino v. Cuenco, 83 Phil. 17 (1949); Macias v. COMELEC, 3 SCRA 1 (1961); Cunanan v. Tan, Jr.,
5 SCRA 1 (1962); Gonzales v. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774 (1967); Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448
(1971); Tolentino v. COMELEC, supra note 82.
[102]
50 SCRA 30 (1973).
[103]
RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTION COMMISSION, Vol. 1, July 10, 1986 at 434-436.
[104]
Id. at 439-443.
[105]
177 SCRA 668 (1989).
[106]
Id. at 695.
[107]
203 SCRA 767 (1991).
[108]
Id. at 776 citing Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452, 463 (1990).
[109]
Supra note 64.
[110]
Id. at 501.
[111]
Supra note 57.
[112]
Id at 217
[113]
2 RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION at 286.
[114]
Id. at 278, 316, 272, 283-284, 286.
[115]
76 Phil 516 (1946).
[116]
Id. at 522.
[117]
Supra note 37.
[118]
Id. at 58 citing Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
175 SCRA 343 (1989).
[119]
Vide concurring opinion of Justice Vicente Mendoza in Estrada v.Desierto, 353 SCRA 452, 550
(2001); Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208, 210-211 (1987) citing Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288
(1936).
[120]
As adverted to earlier, neither a copy the Resolution nor a record of the hearings conducted by the
House Committee on Justice pursuant to said Resolution was submitted to the Court by any of the
parties.
[121]
Rollo, G.R. No. 160310 at 38.
[122]
Supra note 107.
[123]
Id. at 777 (citations omitted).
[124]
Rollo, G.R. No. 160262 at 73.
[125]
Supra note 2 at 342.
[126]
Perfecto v. Meer, 85 Phil 552, 553 (1950).
[127]
Estrada v. Desierto, 356 SCRA 108, 155-156 (2001); Vide Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, 166
SCRA 651 (1988); Vargas v. Rilloraza, et al., 80 Phil. 297, 315-316 (1948); Planas v. COMELEC,
49 SCRA 105 (1973), concurring opinion of J. Concepcion.
[128]
Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703, 705 (1993).
[129]
Ibid.
[130]
Ramirez v. Corpuz-Macandog, 144 SCRA 462, 477 (1986).
[131]
Supra note 127.
[132]
Estrada v. Desierto, supra note 127.
[133]
Id. at 155-156 citing Abbas, et al. v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, supra note 127; Vargas v. Rilloraza, et
al., supra note 127.
[134]
[135]
Supra note 119.
[136]
Board of Optometry v. Colet, 260 SCRA 88, 103 (1996); Joya v. PCGG, supra note 69 at 575; Macasiano
v. National Housing Authority, 224 SCRA 236, 242 (1993); Santos III v. Northwestern Airlines, 210
SCRA 256, 261-262 (1992), National Economic Protectionism Association v. Ongpin, 171 SCRA
657, 665 (1989).
[137]
[138]
[139]
Supra note 102.
[140]
Supra note 33.
[141]
249 SCRA 244, 251 (1995).
[142]
Id. at 251.
[143]
2 RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION at 342-416.
[144]
Id. at 416.
[145]
Commissioner Maambongs Amicus Curiae Brief at 15.
[146]
2 RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION at 375-376, 416
[147]
77 Phil. 192 (1946).
[148]
Justice Hugo Guiterrezs Amicus Curiae Brief at 7.
[149]
109 Phil. 863 (1960).
[150]
40 SCRA 58, 68 (1971).
[151]
286 U.S. 6, 33 (1932).
[152]
277 SCRA 268, 286 (1997).
[153]
144 U.S. 1 (1862).
[154]
[155]
Id at 311.
[156]
Id. at 313.
[157]
[158]
Supra note 50.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 122156. February 3, 1997]
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE

INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION,
COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall
give preference to qualified Filipinos,[1] is invoked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of
the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic Manila
Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision is not self-executing but
requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the
51% shares form part of the national economy and patrimony covered by the protective
mantle of the Constitution.
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under
Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30%
to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or
the eventual strategic partner, is to provide management expertise and/or an international
marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and
performance of the Manila Hotel.[2] In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two
(2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation,
which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and
Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for
the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent GSIS state -
I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC 1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by October
23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995) or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to
purchase the Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer the Block of Shares to the
other Qualified Bidders:
a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the GSIS/MHC the
Management Contract, International Marketing/Reservation System Contract or other
type of contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for the Manila
Hotel x x x x
b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with
GSIS x x x x
K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner after the
following conditions are met:
a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than October 23,
1995 (reset to November 3, 1995); and
b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee on Privatization)/
OGCC (Office of the Government Corporate Counsel) are obtained.
[3]
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner

and the execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS
dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong
Berhad.[4] In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a managers check
issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33,000,000.00) as Bid Security
to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad x x x x[5] which
respondent GSIS refused to accept.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded
the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by
respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court
on prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the
Malaysian firm.
On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En Banc after it
was referred to it by the First Division. The case was then set for oral arguments with
former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici
curiae.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution
and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has
practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine
heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed
in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the
full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of
the national patrimony.[6]Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC
carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent
GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent
GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national
economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly
covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987
Constitution, applies.[7]
It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national
patrimony and its business also unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner
should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding
rules mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of
Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted
bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of
price per share.[8]
Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the
1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a selfexecuting provision and requires implementing legislation(s) x x x x Thus, for the said
provision to operate, there must be existing laws to lay down conditions under which
business may be done.[9]
Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under
the term national patrimony which only refers to lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and
exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987
Constitution. According to respondents, while petitioner speaks of the guests who have
slept in the hotel and the events that have transpired therein which make the hotel historic,
these alone do not make the hotel fall under the patrimony of the nation. What is more,
the mandate of the Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which
possesses a personality of its own separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State.
Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the
constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51%
of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which
the building stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC cannot be considered part
of the national patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition of the shares of the MHC is really
contrary to the Constitution, petitioner should have questioned it right from the beginning
and not after it had lost in the bidding.
Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the bidding rules which
provides that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares,
GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids
provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price
per share, is misplaced.Respondents postulate that the privilege of submitting a matching
bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot
be awarded the Block of Shares.Thus the submission by petitioner of a matching bid is
premature since Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded the block of shares and
the condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not
yet taken place.
Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should fail
since respondent GSIS did not exercise its discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner,
and if ever it did abuse its discretion it was not so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Similarly,
the petition for mandamus should fail as petitioner has no clear legal right to what it
demands and respondents do not have an imperative duty to perform the act required of
them by petitioner.
We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance
and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except
by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and
paramount law of the nation.[10] It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of
government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers and duties, and
establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The fundamental
conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform
and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority
administered.[11] Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract
violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the
legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private
purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution
is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in
every statute and contract.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and
principles. Their provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the
purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of government providing for the
different departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental
and inalienable rights of citizens.[12] A provision which lays down a general principle, such
as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of
which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a
constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and
the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by
an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the
subject is referred to the legislature for action.[13]
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted
upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws
intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory
enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like
that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions
of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to
ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.[14] This can be
cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that -
x x x x in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather

than non-self-executing x x x x Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions
of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give
the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These
provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could
make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing
statute.
[15]
Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is
clearly not self-executing, as they quote from discussions on the floor of the 1986
Constitutional Commission MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this question as the Chairman of the
Committee on Style. If the wording of PREFERENCE is given to QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS, can it be understood as a preference to qualified Filipinos vis-avis Filipinos who are not qualified. So, why do we not make it clear? To qualified
Filipinos as against aliens?
THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the
word QUALIFIED?
MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS as against
whom? As against aliens or over aliens ?
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is understood. We use the word
QUALIFIED because the existing laws or prospective laws will always lay down
conditions under which business may be done. For example, qualifications on
capital, qualifications on the setting up of other financial structures, et
cetera (underscoring supplied by respondents).
MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes.[16]
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to
make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly,
the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional
provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details
may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional
provisions.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to
facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation
of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a
convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof,
or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that
legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a selfexecuting constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the
absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for
a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not
intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution
does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be
in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it
more available.[17] Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the
subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.
Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par.,
of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section
which undoubtedly are not self-executing.[18] The argument is flawed. If the first and third
paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to
encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the
first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over
foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori,
by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its
language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the
grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-selfexecuting in another.[19]
Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain constitutional provisions are
merely statements of principles and policies, which are basically not self-executing and
only placed in the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially
enforceable rights - are simply not in point. Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming
Corporation[20] speaks of constitutional provisions on personal dignity, [21] the sanctity of
family life,[22] the vital role of the youth in nation-building,[23] the promotion of social
justice,[24] and the values of education.[25]Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance[26] refers to
constitutional provisions on social justice and human rights[27] and on
education.[28] Lastly, Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato[29] cites provisions on the promotion of
general welfare,[30] the sanctity of family life,[31] the vital role of the youth in nationbuilding[32] and the promotion of total human liberation and development. [33] A reading of
these provisions indeed clearly shows that they are not judicially enforceable
constitutional rights but merely guidelines for legislation. The very terms of the provisions
manifest that they are only principles upon which legislations must be based. Res ipsa
loquitur.
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference
to qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when
our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action
may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation
on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such
constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance,
and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a
remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission[34] explains -
The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers
not only to our rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our
race. It also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore,
we should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and other natural
resources but also the mental ability or faculty of our people.
We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to
heritage.[35] When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the
natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the
term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark - a living testimonial of Philippine
heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it
immediately evolved to be truly Filipino. Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since
then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine
history. It was called the Cultural Center of the 1930s. It was the site of the festivities
during the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest
House of the Philippine Government it plays host to dignitaries and official visitors who
are accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality.[36]
The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel: The Heart
and Memory of a City.[37] During World War II the hotel was converted by the Japanese
Military Administration into a military headquarters. When the American forces returned
to recapture Manila the hotel was selected by the Japanese together with Intramuros as
the two (2) places for their final stand. Thereafter, in the 1950s and 1960s, the hotel
became the center of political activities, playing host to almost every political
convention. In 1970 the hotel reopened after a renovation and reaped numerous
international recognitions, an acknowledgment of the Filipino talent and ingenuity. In 1986
the hotel was the site of a failed coup d etat where an aspirant for vice-president was
proclaimed President of the Philippine Republic.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs
and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public
interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and
nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and
patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the
constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone
who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In
this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on
which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents claim that
the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of
the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which
the building stands.[38]
The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in our
Constitution also includes corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos. This
is very clear from the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. I would like to introduce an amendment to the Nolledo amendment. And
the amendment would consist in substituting the words QUALIFIED FILIPINOS with
the following: CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES OR CORPORATIONS OR
ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE CAPITAL OR CONTROLLING STOCK IS WHOLLY
OWNED BY SUCH CITIZENS.
xxxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, apparently the proponent is agreeable, but we have
to raise a question. Suppose it is a corporation that is 80-percent Filipino, do we not
give it preference?
MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo amendment would refer to an individual Filipino. What about
a corporation wholly owned by Filipino citizens?
MR. MONSOD. At least 60 percent, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. Is that the intention?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting it if we say that the preference
should only be 100-percent Filipino.
MR. DAVIDE. I want to get that meaning clear because QUALIFIED FILIPINOS may
refer only to individuals and not to juridical personalities or entities.
MR. MONSOD. We agree, Madam President.[39]
xxxx
MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote, may I request that the amendment be read again.
MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment will read: IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES
AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS. And the word Filipinos here, as intended by the proponents, will include
not only individual Filipinos but also Filipino-controlled entities or entities fullycontrolled by Filipinos.[40]
The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would like to request Commissioner Nolledo to please
restate his amendment so that I can ask a question.
MR. NOLLEDO. IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS
COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL
GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS.
MR. FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterprise is qualified and a
Filipino enterprise is also qualified, will the Filipino enterprise still be given a
preference?
MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.
MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the Filipino enterprise,
will the Filipino still be preferred?
MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is yes.
MR. FOZ. Thank you.[41]
Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner Nolledo

continues
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead of MUST, it will be SHALL - THE STATE
SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. This embodies the socalled Filipino First policy.That means that Filipinos should be given preference in
the grant of concessions, privileges and rights covering the national patrimony.[42]
The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional Commission regarding

the subject provision was still further clarified by Commissioner Nolledo[43] -
Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the Pro-Filipino bias in all economic

concerns. It is better known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy x x x x This provision
was never found in previous Constitutions x x x x
The term qualified Filipinos simply means that preference shall be given to those
citizens who can make a viable contribution to the common good, because of credible
competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and
preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or
inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would be counterproductive and
inimical to the common good.
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to
be made between a qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter shall be
chosen over the former.
Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered by
respondent GSIS and selected as one of the qualified bidders. It was pre-qualified by
respondent GSIS in accordance with its own guidelines so that the sole inference here is
that petitioner has been found to be possessed of proven management expertise in the
hotel industry, or it has significant equity ownership in another hotel company, or it has
an overall management and marketing proficiency to successfully operate the Manila
Hotel.[44]
The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by arguing that
the subject provision is not self-executory and requires implementing legislation is quite
disturbing. The attempt to violate a clear constitutional provision - by the government itself
- is only too distressing. To adopt such a line of reasoning is to renounce the duty to
ensure faithfulness to the Constitution. For, even some of the provisions of the
Constitution which evidently need implementing legislation have juridical life of their own
and can be the source of a judicial remedy. We cannot simply afford the government a
defense that arises out of the failure to enact further enabling, implementing or guiding
legislation. In fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on constitutional
government is apt -
The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement laws, including the
Constitution, even before Congress acts - provided that there are discoverable legal
standards for executive action. When the executive acts, it must be guided by its own
understanding of the constitutional command and of applicable laws. The
responsibility for reading and understanding the Constitution and the laws is not the
sole prerogative of Congress. If it were, the executive would have to ask Congress, or
perhaps the Court, for an interpretation every time the executive is confronted by a
constitutional command. That is not how constitutional government operates.
[45]
Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to the State,
not to respondent GSIS which by itself possesses a separate and distinct personality. This
argument again is at best specious. It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could
only be carried out with the prior approval of the State acting through respondent
Committee on Privatization. As correctly pointed out by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this
fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a state action. In
constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are
considered state action covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is
a public function; (2) when the government is so significantly involved with the private
actor as to make the government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government
has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in
selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories
of state action. Without doubt therefore the transaction, although entered into by
respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the
constitutional command.[46]
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to
the government as elements of the State. After all, government is composed of three (3)
divisions of power - legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional
mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of
government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is
addressed among others to the Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a
government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet
the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only
be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary
contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of
the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest
bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning
bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under
obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee
respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions
of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional
provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent
GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic
principle in constitutional law that all laws and contracts must conform with the
fundamental law of the land. Those which violate the Constitution lose their reason for
being.
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the Highest
Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified
Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing
to match the highest bid in terms of price per share.[47] Certainly, the constitutional mandate
itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder
notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot
conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding
concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the
Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino
matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we
are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987
Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the
bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it
would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign
investors. But the Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always
open to public scrutiny. These are given factors which investors must consider when
venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do
business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to
know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.
The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the
sale to Renong Berhad since petitioner was well aware from the beginning that a foreigner
could participate in the bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike
were invited to the bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no Filipino
qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match the highest bid tendered by the foreign
entity. In the case before us, while petitioner was already preferred at the inception of the
bidding because of the constitutional mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid
offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have the right or personality then to compel
respondent GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the bid of the
foreign firm and the apparent disregard by respondent GSIS of petitioners matching bid
did the latter have a cause of action.
Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard unless
perhaps the award has been finally made. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to
foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to
insist that government be treated as any other ordinary market player, and bound by its
mistakes or gross errors of judgment, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino
people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus we would rather
remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the government
develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and
parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad
pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to
petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and
documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and
procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute
the corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the
latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the
1987 Constitution not merely to be used as a guideline for future legislation but primarily
to be enforced; so must it be enforced. This Court as the ultimate guardian of the
Constitution will never shun, under any reasonable circumstance, the duty of upholding
the majesty of the Constitution which it is tasked to defend. It is worth emphasizing that it
is not the intention of this Court to impede and diminish, much less undermine, the influx
of foreign investments. Far from it, the Court encourages and welcomes more business
opportunities but avowedly sanctions the preference for Filipinos whenever such
preference is ordained by the Constitution. The position of the Court on this matter could
have not been more appropriately articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa -
As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function to substitute its
judgment for that of the legislature or the executive about the wisdom and feasibility
of legislation economic in nature, the Supreme Court has not been spared criticism for
decisions perceived as obstacles to economic progress and development x x x x in
connection with a temporary injunction issued by the Courts First Division against the
sale of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its partner, certain statements were
published in a major daily to the effect that that injunction again demonstrates that the
Philippine legal system can be a major obstacle to doing business here.
Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no business of the Court to
intervene in contracts of the kind referred to or set itself up as the judge of whether
they are viable or attainable, it is its bounden duty to make sure that they do not
violate the Constitution or the laws, or are not adopted or implemented with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It will never shirk that
duty, no matter how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed criticism.
[48]
Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability and
preventing further losses, regardless of the character of the asset, should not take
precedence over non-material values. A commercial, nay even a budgetary, objective
should not be pursued at the expense of national pride and dignity. For the Constitution
enshrines higher and nobler non-material values. Indeed, the Court will always defer to
the Constitution in the proper governance of a free society; after all, there is nothing
so sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial review when the
Constitution is involved.[49]
Nationalism is inherent in the very concept of the Philippines being a democratic and
republican state, with sovereignty residing in the Filipino people and from whom all
government authority emanates. In nationalism, the happiness and welfare of the people
must be the goal. The nation-state can have no higher purpose. Any interpretation of any
constitutional provision must adhere to such basic concept. Protection of foreign
investments, while laudible, is merely a policy. It cannot override the demands of
nationalism.[50]
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be
sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. We are not talking about an
ordinary piece of property in a commercial district. We are talking about a historic relic
that has hosted many of the most important events in the short history of the Philippines
as a nation. We are talking about a hotel where heads of states would prefer to be housed
as a strong manifestation of their desire to cloak the dignity of the highest state function
to their official visits to the Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has played and continues
to play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history
and culture. In this sense, it has become truly a reflection of the Filipino soul - a place
with a history of grandeur; a most historical setting that has played a part in the shaping
of a country.[51]
This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of
respondents to sell the historical landmark - this Grand Old Dame of hotels in Asia - to a
total stranger. For, indeed, the conveyance of this epic exponent of the Filipino psyche to
alien hands cannot be less than mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner viewed, a
veritable alienation of a nations soul for some pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask:
What advantage, which cannot be equally drawn from a qualified Filipino, can be gained
by the Filipinos if Manila Hotel - and all that it stands for - is sold to a non-Filipino? How
much of national pride will vanish if the nations cultural heritage is entrusted to a foreign
entity? On the other hand, how much dignity will be preserved and realized if the national
patrimony is safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-meaning Filipino? This
is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine
Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the
duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and protect the
sanctity of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,
MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF
THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from
selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to
ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to

purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per
share and thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the
sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be
necessary for the purpose.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Kapunan, Francisco, and Hermosisima, Jr.,
JJ, concur.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), and Melo, J., joins J. Puno in his dissent.
Padilla, J., see concurring opinion.
Vitug, J., see separate concurring opinion
Mendoza, J., see concurring opinion
Torres, J., with separate opinion
Puno, J., see dissent.
Panganiban J., with separate dissenting opinion.
[1]
[2]
See Sec. 10, par. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.

Par. I. Introduction and Highlights, Guidelines and Procedures: Second Prequalifications and Public
Bidding of the MHC Privatization; Annex A, Consolidated Reply to Comments of
Respondents; Rollo, p.142.
[3]
Par. V. Guidelines for the Public Bidding, Id., pp. 153-154.
[4]
Annex A, Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with Temporary Restraining Order; Rollo, pp.13-14.
[5]
Annex B, Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with Temporary Restraining Order; Id., p.15.
[6]
Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with Temporary Restraining Order, pp. 5-6; Id., pp.6-7.
[7]
Consolidated Reply to Comments of Respondents, p. 17; Id., p.133.
[8]
Par. V. J. 1,Guidelines for Public Bidding, Guidelines and Procedures: Second Prequalifications and
Public Bidding of the MHC Privatization, Annex A, Consolidated Reply to Comments of
Respondents; Id., p. 154.
[9]
Respondents Joint Comment with Urgent Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order, p.9; Rollo, p. 44.
[10]
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 138 (1803).
[11]
11 Am Jur. 606.
[12]
16 Am Jur. 2d 281.
[13]
Id., p. 282.
[14]
See Note 12.
[15]
Cruz, Isagani A., Constitutional Law, 1993 ed., pp. 8-10.
[16]
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 3, 22 August 1986, p. 608.
[17]
16 Am Jur 2d 283-284.
Sec. 10, first par., reads: The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning
agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage
as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will
encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
[18]
Sec. 10, third par., reads: The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within
its national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.
[19]
State ex rel. Miller v. OMalley, 342 Mo 641, 117 SW2d 319.
[20]
G.R. No. 91649, 14 May 1991, 197 SCRA 52.
[21]
Sec. 11, Art. II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies), provides that [t]he State values the dignity
of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.
[22]
Sec. 12, Art. II, provides that [t]he State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the
mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents
in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive
the support of the government.
[23]
Sec. 13, Art. II, provides that [t]he State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall
promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall
inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and
civic affairs.
Sec. 1, Art. XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights), provides that [t]he Congress shall give highest priority
to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce
social, economic and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and
political power for the common good.
[24]
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property and its
increments.
Sec. 2, Art. XIII, provides that [t]he promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create
economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.
Sec. 2, Art. XIV (Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports), provides that [t]he State
shall:
[25]
(1) Establish, maintain, and support a complete, adequate, and integrated system of education relevant to
the needs of the people and society;
(2) Establish and maintain a system of free public education in the elementary and high school
levels. Without limiting the natural right of parents to rear their children, elementary education is compulsory
for all children of school age;
(3) Establish and maintain a system of scholarship grants, student loan programs, subsidies, and other
incentives which shall be available to deserving students in both public and private schools, especially to
the underprivileged;
(4) Encourage non-formal, informal, and indigenous learning, independent, and out-of-school study
programs particularly those that respond to community needs; and
(5) Provide adult citizens, the disabled, and out-of-school youth with training in civics, vocational efficiency,
and other skills.
[26]
G.R. No. 115455, 25 August 1994, 235 SCRA 630.
[27]
See Note 25.
[28]
Sec. 1, Art. XIV, provides that [t]he State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality
education at all levels of education and shall take appropriate steps to make such education
accessible to all.
[29]
G.R. No. 118910, 17 July 1995.
[30]
Sec. 5, Art. II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies), provides that [t]he maintenance of peace and
order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are
essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
[31]
See Note 23.
[32]
See Note 24.
[33]
Sec. 17, Art. II, provides that [t]he State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts,
culture, and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote
total human liberation and development.
[34]
Nolledo, Jose N., The New Constitution of the Philippines Annotated, 1990 ed., p. 72.
[35]
Websters Third New International Dictionary, 1986 ed., p. 1656.
[36]
The guest list of the Manila Hotel includes Gen. Douglas MacArthur, the Duke of Windsor, President
Richard Nixon of U.S.A., Emperor Akihito of Japan, President Dwight Eisenhower of U.S.A,
President Nguyen Van Thieu of Vietnam, President Park Chung Hee of Korea, Prime Minister
Richard Holt of Australia, Prime Minister Keith Holyoake of New Zealand, President Lyndon
Johnson of U.S.A., President Jose Lopez Portillo of Mexico, Princess Margaret of England, Prime
Minister Malcolm Fraser of Australia, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone of Japan, Prime Minister
Pierre Elliot Trudeau of Canada, President Raul Alfonsin of Argentina, President Felipe Gonzalez
of Spain, Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita of Japan, Prime Minister Hussain Muhammad Ershad
of Bangladesh, Prime Minister Bob Hawke of Australia, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone of
Japan, Premier Li Peng of China, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah of Brunei, President Ramaswami
Venkataraman of India, Prime Minister Go Chok Tong of Singapore, Prime Minister Enrique Silva
Cimma of Chile, Princess Chulaborn and Mahacharri Sirindhorn of Thailand, Prime Minister
Tomiichi Murayama of Japan, Sultan Azlan Shah and Raja Permaisuri Agong of Malaysia,
President Kim Young Sam of Korea, Princess Infanta Elena of Spain, President William Clinton of
U.S.A., Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia, King Juan Carlos I and Queen Sofia of
Spain, President Carlos Saul Menem of Argentina, Prime Ministers Chatichai Choonhavan and
Prem Tinsulanonda of Thailand, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan, President Vaclav Havel
of Czech Republic, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf of U.S.A., President Ernesto Perez Balladares of
Panama, Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius of Lithuania, President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani of
Iran, President Askar Akayev of Kyrgyztan, President Ong Teng Cheong of Singapore, President
Frei Ruiz Tagle of Chile, President Le Duc Anh of Vietnam, and Prime Minister Julius Chan of
Papua New Guinea, see Memorandum for Petitioner, pp. 16-19.
[37]
Authored by Beth Day Romulo.
[38]
See Note 9, pp.15-16; Rollo, pp. 50-51.
[39]
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 3, 22 August 1986, p. 607.
[40]
Id., p. 612.
[41]
Id., p. 616.
[42]
Id., p. 606.
[43]
Nolledo, J.N., The New Constitution of the Philippines Annotated, 1990 ed., pp.930-931.
[44]
Bidders were required to have at least one of the these qualifications to be able to participate in the
bidding process; see Note 2.
[45]
Memorandum of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., p.6.
[46]
Id., pp. 3-4.
[47]
See Note 8.
[48]
Keynote Address at the ASEAN Regional Symposium on Enforcement of Industrial Property Rights held
23 October 1995 at New World Hotel, Makati City.
[49]
Speech of Senior Associate Justice Teodoro R. Padilla at the Induction of Officers and Directors of the
PHILCONSA for 1996 held 16 January 1996 at the Sky-Top, Hotel Intercontinental, Makati City.
[50]
Memorandum of Authorities submitted by former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, p.5.
[51]
8 March 1996 issue of Philippine Daily Inquirer, p. B13.

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Republic of the Philippines

TEEHANKEE, CJ., concurring:

MR. MAAMBONG. Just a moment, Madam President. If Commissioner Davide is

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Bernas is recognized.

MR. MAAMBONG. With that statement of Commissioner Bernas, we would like to

MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President.

CRUZ, J., concurring.

of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex oficio Members, a

because an announcement is a mere confirmation The act of ratification is the act of

MR. PADILLA. Madam President, I am against the proposed amendment of

CRUZ, J., concurring.

2 Section 2, BP Blg. 222.

Republic of the Philippines

July 23, 1987

DAVID G. NITAFAN, WENCESLAO M. POLO, and MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO, JR., petitioners,

Section 9,Articie VIII.

Section 10, Article X.

Section 6, Article XV, General Provisions.

Section 10, Article VIII.

Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 433.

Record of the Constitutional Commission, p. 460.

Ibid., at page 467,

85 Phil. 552 (1950).

Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 506.

Gold Creek Mining Co. vs. Rodriguez, 66 Phil. 259 (1938).

Tanada, Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, Fourth Ed., Vol. 1, p. 21.

85 Phil. 552 (1950).

93 Phil. 696 (1953).

Republic of the Philippines

The maximum period is death. If we now remove the death penalty,

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring and dissenting:

we will, therefore, have a range of penalty of 17 years, 4 months and

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring and dissenting:

xxx xxx xxx

MR. MAAMBONG: Just one clarificatory question. On the assumption

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 91636 April 23, 1992

. . . it is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a

position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent

. . . Since the position of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is not

. . . Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5,

The legislature cannot, upon passing law which violates a

GUTIERREZ, JR., concurring:

[G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003]

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner, NAGMAMALASAKIT NA

[G.R. No. 160262. November 10, 2003]

SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA

[G.R. No. 160263. November 10, 2003]

[G.R. No. 160277. November 10, 2003]

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, WORLD WAR II VETERANS

GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS ESCUDERRO, RENE VELARDE,

[G.R. No. 160292. November 10, 2003]

HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA

[G.R. No. 160295. November 10, 2003]

SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M.

SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE

[G.R. No. 160310. November 10, 2003]

LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN

[G.R. No. 160318. November 10, 2003]

PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,

[G.R. No. 160342. November 10, 2003]

ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF

[G.R. No. 160343. November 10, 2003]

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE