Hard and Soft Law in International Governance

Author(s): Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal

Reviewed work(s):
Source: International Organization, Vol. 54, No. 3, Legalization and World Politics (Summer,
2000), pp. 421-456
Published by: The MIT Press
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Hard and SoftLaw

in InternationalGovernance
Kenneth
W.AbbottandDuncanSnidal

arelegalizedto an impressive
Contemporary
international
relations
extent,
yetinternationallegalization
displaysgreatvariety.
A fewinternational
institutions
andissueareasapproachthetheoretical
law is
idealofhardlegalization,
butmostinternational
"soft"in distinctive
ways.Herewe explorethereasonsforthewidespread
legalizainthedegreesandformsof
tionofinternational
governance
andforthisgreatvariety
1Wearguethatinternational
legalization.
actorschoosetoordertheirrelations
through
international
law and designtreatiesand otherlegal arrangements
to solve specific
actorschoose
substantive
andpoliticalproblems.
We further
arguethatinternational
softerformsof legalizedgovernance
whenthoseformsoffersuperiorinstitutional
solutions.We analyzethebenefits
and costsof different
typesof legalizationand
thecircumstances
thatlead actorsto selectspecific
suggesthypotheses
regarding
forms.We do notpurport
to developa fulltheoryof law. Nonetheless,
examining
ofinternational
thesepoliticalchoicesinthespareinstitutional
context
relations
may
toa better
contribute
understanding
oftheuses oflaw moregenerally.
ofhardlegalization.
We beginbyexamining
theadvantages
The termhardlaw as
usedinthisspecialissuerefers
thatareprecise(orcan
tolegallybindingobligations
be madeprecisethrough
ortheissuanceofdetailedregulations)
andthat
adjudication
forinterpreting
thelaw.2Although
hardlaw is
delegateauthority
andimplementing
notthetypicalinternational
a close lookat thisinstitutional
form
legalarrangement,
thebenefits
andcostsof all typesoflegalizaprovidesa baselineforunderstanding

Forhelpful
comments
intheconferences
as we developedthisarticle,we thankparticipants
leadingup
tothisspecialissue;ourdiscussant
attheProgram
on InternaAlexander
Thompsonandotherparticipants
at the
tionalPolitics,Economics,and Security
Workshop
at theUniversity
of Chicago;and participants
"half-baked
lunch"discussionat Northwestern
Law School.We also thanktheeditorsofthis
University
specialissue,especiallyJudith
Goldsteinand RobertKeohane,and theeditorsand refereesof InternationalOrganization
forvaluablecomments.
1. Wehaveprofited
fromtheinsights
inKeohane,Moravcsik,
andSlaughter
1997,whichwas prepared
in connectionwiththisproject.

2. For an extensivediscussionof thesethreedimensions,

whichguidethearticlesin thisissue,see
Abbott,
Keohane,Moravcsik,
Slaughter,
andSnidal,thisissue.
International
Organization
54, 3, Summer2000,pp.421-456
? 2000byThe10 Foundation
andtheMassachusetts
Institute
ofTechnology

422 International
Organization
tion.By usinghardlaw to ordertheirrelations,
international
actorsreducetransactionscosts,strengthen
thecredibility
of theircommitments,
expandtheiravailable
andresolveproblemsofincomplete
politicalstrategies,
contracting.
Doingso,however,also entailssignificant
costs:hardlaw restricts
actors'behaviorandeventheir
sovereignty.

Whilewe emphasizethebenefits
andcostsoflegalization
froma rational
perspectivefocusedon interests,
law simultaneously
engagesnormative
considerations.
In
additionto requiring
commitment
to a background
set of legal norms3 including
in established
engagement
legalprocessesanddiscourse-legalization
providesactorswitha meansto instantiate
normative
values.Legalizationhas effectthrough
normative
and processesas well as self-interested
standards
calculation,and both
interests
and valuesareconstraints
on thesuccessof law.We considerlaw as both
and "covenant"to capturethesedistinict
"contract"
butnotincompatible
characteristics.Indeed,we rejectvigorously
theinsistenceof manyinternational
relations
thatonetypeofunderstanding
is antithetical
specialists
totheother.4
The realmof "softlaw" beginsoncelegalalfangements
areweakenedalongone
or moreof thedimensions
of obligation,
precision,and delegation.This softening
can occurin varyingdegreesalongeach dimensionand in different
combinations
termsoftlaw todistinguish
thisbroadclass
acrossdimensions.
We use theshorthand
ofdeviations
fromhardlaw and,attheotherextreme,
frompurelypoliticalarrangementsinwhichlegalization
is largelyabsent.Butbearinmindthatsoftlaw comesin
thechoicebetweenhardlaw andsoftlaw is nota binaryone.
manyvarieties:
Softlaw has beenwidelycriticized
andevendismissedas a factorin international
affairs.
Realists,of course,focuson theabsenceof an independent
judiciarywith
law is soft andis
supporting
enforcement
powersto concludethatall international
therefore
Butsomeinternational
onlywindowdressing.5
lawyersdismisssoftinternationallaw froma morenormative
perspective.
ProsperWeil,forexample,argues
thatincreasing
use of softlaw "mightdestabilizethewholeinternational
normative
thatcan no longerserveitspurpose."6Others
systemandturnit intoan instrument
moresatisfactory
justifysoftlaw onlyas an interim
steptowardharderandtherefore
law includessecInternational
legalsystemhas developedoverseveralcenturies.
3. The international
andapplied,as wellas instituhowprimary
rulesareto be made,interpreted,
ondarynormsprescribing
whichbothkindsof rulesare implemented.
The background
legal systemshapesmany
tionsthrough
actor.
ithelpsdefinetheverynotionofan international
international
interactions-indeed,
andnormadifferences
betweeninterest-based
paradigmatic
4. To be sure,theremaybe irreconcilable
by
however,
eitherapproachcanbe improved
On theground,
tiveapproaches
atthelevelofgrandtheory.
One can profitably
adaptation.
thearguments
madebytheother,withappropriate
carefully
incorporating
employbotha hammerand a wrenchwithoutdeclaringone tool betterforall problemsand without
arethebetter
handymen.
Thisis especiallytruewhenanalyzing
orplumbers
resolving
whether
carpenters
combinesbothtrades.
law,whichinherently
law at all.
thattheyrarelydiscussinternational
is so deeplyheldamongneorealists
5. Thisperspective
law but
obeyedinternational
Classicalrealistssuchas Hans Morgenthau
recognizedthatstatesgenerally
A
issuesofinternational
affairs.
tomeanthatlaw didnotcoverthesignificant
tookthelackofenforcement
by Downs and his colleagues,who critiquemuchinternational
modernrepriseof thisthemeis offered
ofagreements
whatstateswouldhavedoneon theirownandso do
forconsisting
thatreflect
cooperation
notchangebehavior.
Downs,Rocke,andBarsoom1996.
6. Weil1983,423.

HardandSoftLaw 423
legalization.
The implication
is thatsoftlaw law that"fallsshort"on one ormore
ofthethreedimensions
oflegalization is a failure.
We argue,in contrast,
thatinternational
actorsoftendeliberately
choose softer
formsof legalizationas superiorinstitutional
To be sure,softlaw is
arrangements.
sometimes
butoftenitis preferable
designedas a waystationto harderlegalization,
ofhardlaw,avoidssomeof
on itsownterms.Softlaw offers
manyoftheadvantages
thecostsof hardlaw,and has certainindependent
advantagesof itsown.7Imporbecauseone or moreof theelementsof legalizationcan be relaxed,softer
tantly,
legalizationis ofteneasierto achievethanhardlegalization.
This is especiallytrue
andwhentheissuesat
whentheactorsare statesthatarejealous of theirautonomy
handchallengestatesovereignty.
Softlegalizationalso providescertainbenefits
not
moreeffective
availableunderhardlegalization.It offers
waysto deal withuncertainty,
especiallywhenitinitiates
processesthatallow actorsto learnabouttheimovertime.8In addition,
softlaw facilitates
andthus
pactofagreements
compromise,
beneficial
betweenactorswithdifferent
interests
and values,
mutually
cooperation,
different
timehorizonsanddiscountrates,anddifferent
degreesofpower.
The specificformsof softlaw chosenreflecttheparticular
problemsactorsare
in general,different
formsof
to solve.Whileouranalysisfocuseson softness
trying
in different
circumstances.
We
softness
maybe moreacceptableormoreefficacious
suggesta numberof variables includingtransactions
costs,uncertainty,
implicaand powerdifferentials
ofpreferences,
tionsfornationalsovereignty,
divergence
ofobligation,
thatinfluence
whichformsof softlaw,whichcombinations
precision
anddelegation,
arelikelytobe selectedin specificcircumstances.
This articleis largelyan exercisein comparative
statics;we ask whyparticular
situational
features
lead actorsto adoptspecificinstitutional
at given
arrangements
inthesensethatitinitiates
a
pointsintime.Softlaw is frequently
dynamic,
however,
processand a discoursethatmayinvolvelearningandotherchangesovertime.We
in our analysisby examininghow actors(imperincorporate
theseconsiderations
softlaw commitments.
fectly)evaluatethedynamicconsequencesofcurrent
For ease of exposition,and because statesare essentialactorsin international
we frameourinitialdiscussionsintermsofstatesandtheproblems
legalization,
they
face.We recognize,however,thatfirms,
activistorganizations,
and othernonstate
levelsare increasingly
at boththedomesticand international
groupsoperating
key
andof softlaw in particular.
ofinternational
actorsin thedevelopment
legalization,
accountsof therole of
In the finalsectionof thearticlewe comparealternative
formsoflegalization.
nonstate
actorstoexaminewhysuchgroupspressfordifferent
interests
andvaluesofnonstate
actorsalso adds
The needtodeal withthecompeting
softlaw strategies.
tothereasonsstateshaveforpursuing
We employa rangeof examples,includingsome elaboratedby otherarticlesin
ofinternational
thewidevariety
thisissue,toillustrate
legalarrangements.
Although
see Lipson1991.
andcostsofinformal
agreements,
7. Fora relateddiscussionofthebenefits
workon howstatesstructure
treaties
toenablemutuallearning.
8. Wedrawon Koremenos'sinsightful
Koremenos1999.

424 International
Organization
theseexamplesdo notprovidea trueempirical
testofourarguments,
theydo provide
evidencefortheirplausibility.
To characterize
ourexampleseconomically
alongthe
hardlaw/soft
law continuum,
we use thenotationtO,P,D1.
The elementsof each
triplet
referto thelevelofobligation,
precision,
anddelegation,
respectively.
Variationsalongeach dimensionare indicatedby capitallettersforhighlevels (forexample,0), smalllettersformoderatelevels (forexample,o), and dashesforlow
levels(-). Thust0,P,DIindicatesan arrangement
thatis highlylegalizedon all three
dimensions
andtherefore
constitutes
"hardlaw"; {o,P,-1
indicatesan issuethathas a
moderate
leveloflegalobligationcoupledwithhighprecisionbutverylimiteddelegation; and 10,-,-I indicatesan issue withhigh legal obligationbut verylow preci-

sionandverylimited
delegation.
Although
thistripartite
categorization
remainssomewhatcoarse,it suggeststhecontinuous
thatare
ofhardnessand softness
gradations
blurred
whenthehardlaw/soft
law distinction
is incorrectly
takenas binary.9

Contractsand Covenants:RationalesforHard Law

Introduction
"Contracts"and "covenants"referto twodistinct
underthoughnotincompatible
of international
Statesenterinto"contracts"
to further
interstandings
agreements.
In internanormative
commitments.
ests;theyenterinto"covenants"to manifest
tional legal scholarship,interest-and norm-basedagreementsare essentially
butinternational
interchangeable;10
relations
scholarship
(likeotheranalysesoflaw1")
oftenseeksto distinguish
betweenthem:contracts
andcovenantscorrespond
to the
andconstructivist
rationalist
on international
perspectives,
respectively,
institutions,
12
ifnotmutually
exclusive.
approachesthatareusuallyseenas contrasting,
In thestereotypical
actors(usuallystates)as
view,rationalists
(1) see therelevant
motivated
as "conlargelyby materialinterests;
(2) viewinternational
agreements
tracts"createdtoresolveproblemsofcoordination,
ordomesticpolicollaboration,
orothermatecontracts
as operating
incentives
tics;and(3) understand
bychanging
rialfeatures
ofinteractions,
suchas iteration,
ortheinfluence
reciprocity,
information,
9. Becauseourexamplesareillustrative,
we do notdevelopformalized
codingcriteria.
Notethata dash
(-) indicatesa low level of a property,
notits absence.Low delegation,
forexample,wouldincludean
international
consultative
bodythatfacilitates
politicalbargaining
amongmemberstates.Wherean internationalinstitution
handlesmoreextensiveadministrative
functions-suchas substantial
information
and nonbinding
arbitration-wewouldcode delegationas d. Finally,wherean
gathering,
monitoring,
institution
includesstrongadjudicativecapacityor independent
administrative
power,we wouldcode
A
of obligationand precisionpose similarproblemsand possibilities.
delegationas D. The dimensions
morefine-grained
is containedinAbbottet al., thisissue;andAbbottand
discussionofthesedimensions
Snidal1997.TheeightrowsofTable 1 inAbbottetal.,whichreflect
onlyhighandlow valuesofthethree
ofcapitalletters
anddashesin ournotation
elements
oflegalization,
correspond
to combinations
(thatis,
o0,PD},1O,,D| ... 10,-,V-, -1).

10. Some agreements

withstrongnormative
contentare entitled"covenants,"mostnotablythecovButthisusageis notwidespread.
enantson civilandpoliticalandon economic,social,andcultural
rights.
Manyhumanrights
agreements,
forexample,aresimplyentitled
"treaty"or "convention."
11. Tyler1990.
12. Katzenstein,
Keohane,andKrasner1998.

HardandSoftLaw 425
of particular
Constructivist
or normative
interest
groups,or through
enforcement.13
scholars,on theotherhand,(1) focuson nonstateand intragovernmental
actors,14
as thesourceofinternational
oftenmotivated
bymoralorsocialconcerns,
norms;(2)
sharednormsandunderviewinternational
agreements
as "covenants"embodying
and (3) understand
standings;
covenantsas operating
through
persuasion,
imitation,
tomodify
ofappropriate
andinternalization
intersubjective
understandings
behavior,
interests,
andevenidentities.15
In studying
is clearlymisplaced.
international
legalization,
thissharpbifurcation
In itsoriginsandoperation,
law is bothan interest-based
anda normative
enterprise:
1. Statesandotheractorslookto law to achievetheirendswhether
theyarepurorvalues.In fact,thesegoalsarenormally
suinginterests
deeplyintertwined.
Businessgroupsandstatesseekingrulestoprotect
intellectual
for
property,
tonormsofproperty
andfairness
as wellas selfexample,arecommitted
interest;
nongovernmental
organizations
(NGOs) andstatessupporting
rules
topromote
areconcerned
withsecurity
andtradeas wellas pardemocracy
ticipatory
values.
2. Actorsutilizebothnormative
andinterest-based
to createlegalarstrategies
BusinessgroupsandWestern
statessupporting
liberaleconomic
rangements.
rulesappealtonormsofindividual
choiceas wellas economicinterests;
humanrights
rulescitematerial
NGOs andgovernments
benseekingstrong
efits andmobilizeeconomicleverage alongwithhumanitaijan
values.16
Mostintemational
aresimultaneously
contract
andcovenant.
agreements
3. Legal rulesandinstitutions
incentives
and
operatebothbychangingmaterial
ofbehavior,
andidentities.
In particustandards
bymodifying
understandings,
andinstitutions
thatfacilitate
enforcement
as well
lar,theyinvokedoctrines
as socialnormsofobediencetolaw.Concernedactorsstrivetobringall these
effects
tobear,through
fromlitigation
andsanctionsto
techniques
ranging
17
normative
persuasion,
appeals,andshaming.
In theremainder
ofthissectionwe explorewhystatesseektoordertheirrelations
hardlaw: institutional
through
arrangements
generallycharacterized
as {O,P,DIor
legalrulesand institutions
by
10,p,D1.18Since statesmostoftencreateinternational
andagreement,19
negotiation
we employcontracting
theory
toorganizeouranalysis,
13. MartinandSimmons1998.
14. In thistheyfollowmodernliberaltheorists.
Moravcsik1997.
15. See Finnemore1996; Keck and Sikkink1998. Recentyearshave witnessedsome convergence.
Rationalists
increasingly
recognizethatinterests
requireexplanationand thatinstitutions
do muchto
shapethem.Keohane1988. Constructivists
stressthatnormentrepreneurs
pursuetheirgoals rationally,
even strategically,
seekingto modifythe utilityfunctions
of othersto accordwithpreferred
norms.
Finnemore
andSikkink1998.
16. Klotz1995.
17. See Klotz1995;KeckandSikkink1998;andKoh 1996.
thefirst
18. As notedearlier,
andsecondsectionsofthisarticlefocuson statesandthethirdsectionon
nonstateactors.Even in thefirstand secondsections,however,somearguments
turnon actionsby and
effects
on nonstate
actors,oftenindomesticpolitics.
19. Our emphasis,then,is on treaties,
especiallymultilateral
regulatory
treaties.
Chayesand Chayes
1995.Customary
elementoftheinternational
law is also an important
legalsystem,
butwe do notaddress

426 International
Organization
incorporating
normative
considerations
as wellas theinterest-based
factors
thatdominatethecontracting
literature.
CredibleCommitments
The difficulty
stateshave in crediblycommitting
themselves
to future
behavioris
feature
ofinternational
widelyviewedas a characteristic
"anarchy"andan impediIn contracting
menttowelfare-enhancing
cooperation.
theory,
crediblecommitments
are crucialwhenone partyto an agreement
mustcarryout its side of thebargain
beforeotherpartiesare requiredto perform,
or moregenerally
whensomeparties
mustmakerelation-specific
investments
in relianceon future
performance
by others.20In gametheory,
similarly,
crediblecommitments
are essentialwhenever
some
partiesto a strategic
interaction
demand"assurance"fromothers,as in situations
modeledby gamessuchas Assurance,Chicken,or Prisoners'Dilemmaand when
partiesseektoensurethattheyarriveatthesamecoordination
point.
Otherassuranceissuesappearwhenone beginsto disaggregate
thestate.Forone
canbe politicalas wellas material:
investments
a government
thing,
relation-specific
forhumanrightspledges,for
economicor politicalconcessionsin return
offering
domesticpoliticalcostsif theotherpartyreneged;it would
example,wouldsuffer
therefore
demandcredibleassurances.The government
makingthosepledgesmight
also wishtoenhancecredibility
forinternal
purposes:tobinditssuccessorsin office
or otherbranchesof government,
or to strengthen
itscitizens'incentives
to adjust
theirpracticesandattitudes.
Legal commitments
can speakto privatepartiesabroadas well as at home.As
Frederick
Abbottnotesin thisissue,theMexicangovernment
soughtto legalizethe
NorthAmerican
FreeTradeAgreement
of
(NAFTA)inparttoincreasethecredibility
itsincreasingly
liberaleconomicpoliciesin theeyesofforeign
investors.
Reversing
longstanding
nationalpolicy,it even acceptedsignificant
international
delegation,
fromNAFTAcountries
totakedisputestobindingarbitration.
allowinginvestors
In domesticsocieties,legal commitments
are crediblebecauseaggrievedparties
Even "hard"international
canenforce
them,withthepowerofthestateifnecessary.
international
law fallsshortofthisstandard:
toestablish
regimesdo notevenattempt
enforceable
Yetitis erroneous
toconclude
legalobligations
centrally
againststates.21
is therefore
thatthe"formallegal status"of international
agreements
meaningless.
is oneoftheprincipal
methods
Legalization
bywhichstatescanincreasethecredibilityoftheircommitments.22
here.Ourimpression,
is thatmuchcustomary
law todayis theresultofconscious
itsystematically
though,
thanthegradualaccretion
of statepractice.To theextent
politicalactionbystatesandotheractors,rather
muchofouranalysiswillalso applytocustom.
thisis correct,
20. Williamson1989.
21. Keohane1984,88-89.
22. A moreextremewayto addresscommitment
problems,
analogousto themerger
of firmsin busiis to integrate
ness relationships
thatraiseassuranceproblems,
separatesovereignties
intoa singlepocanbe partialas wellas complete,
liticalunit,suchas a federalstate.Integration
as theEU illustrates.
Even
fullintegration,
though,cannotsolve commitment
and othercontracting
problemsamongthemanypowithinandacrosssocieties.
litical,economic,andotherinterests

HardandSoftLaw 427
One way legalizationenhancescredibility
is by constraining
self-serving
autointerpretation.
Precisionof individualcommitments,
coherencebetweenindividual
commitments
and broaderlegal principles,
and acceptedmodesof legal discourse
andargument
all helplimitsuchopportunistic
behavior.
Granting
interpretive
authorityto courtsor otherlegal institutions
further
constrains
auto-interpretation.23
Anotherway legalizationenhancescredibility
is by increasing
thecostsof reneging.
Regimescholarsarguethatagreements
are strengthened
whentheyare linkedto a
broaderregime:violating
an agreement
thatis partofa regimeentailsdisproportionate costs,becausethereputational
costsof renegingapplythroughout
theregime.
Legal commitments
benefit
fromsimilareffects,
buttheyinvolveintemational
law as
a wholeinadditiontoanyspecificregime.
Whena commitment
is castas hardlaw,thereputational
effects
ofa violationcan
be generalized
toall agreements
subjecttointernational
law,thatis, tomostinternationalagreements.24
Thereare fewalternatives
to legalizationwhenstateswishto
identify
undertakings
as reliablecommitments.
Alternatives
likebondingandescrow
aremuchmorecostly.In addition,
international
law providestheveryfoundations
of
ofsovereignty,
territorial
nonintervenstatehood:
principles
recognition,
competence,
tion,and so on. Violationsweakenthe international
legal systemand are selfatleastovertime.
defeating,
Moreconcretely,
enhances(albeitmodestly)
thecapacityforenforcelegalization
and applied
ment.First,hardlegalcommitments,
1O,PDIor 10,p,DI,areinterpreted
like thoseassociatedwiththeEuropeanUnion
by arbitralor judicial institutions,
(EU), theEuropeanhumanrightsregimeor theWorldTradeOrganization
(WTO).
Becauselegalreview
(Softercommitments
maybe invokedinpoliticalinstitutions.)
allows allegationsand defensesto be testedunderacceptedstandardsand procecostsifa violationis found.TheEU maycurrently
be
dures,itincreasesreputational
costsas a resultoftherepeatednegativelegalrulings
suchaggravated
experiencing
overEuropeanrestrictions
on imports
bodiesinlitigation
byWTO disputesettlement
a legitimate
of hormone-treated
beef(forwhichtheEU was unableto demonstrate
andbananas.
scientific
justification)
fixesconsequencesforlegalviolations.In
Second,thelaw of stateresponsibility
likesomelegalizedregimes(suchas theWTO), itauthorizes
particular,
proportional
whereotherremediesare unavailable.This legitimizes
retalia"countermeasures"
tionand clarifiesits intent,
reducingthecosts and risksof self-help.
Third,even
instiinternational
law can drawon someformsofcentralized
enforcement,
through
financial
institutions.
tutions
liketheUN Security
Councilandtheinternational
arisebecauseinternational
costsoflegalviolations
Otherinterest-based
legalcommitments
oftenbecomepartof domesticlaw.As JohnK. Setearpointsout,forexevenobservers
In practice,
however,
23. Deconstructionists,
ofcourse,wouldcontestthesestatements.
Koskenniemi
1999.
ofthisbentsee law as constraining
interpretation.
the
24. Keohaneobservesthatstatescan reducetheforceof reputational
effectsby distinguishing
otheragreements.
Keohane1995.In thenineteenth
circumstances
of a violationfromthosesurrounding
itstreaties
with"savage" Indiantribes,
which
century,
theUnitedStatessoughtin thiswayto distinguish
Theeffort
devotedtomakingthisdistincitfrequently
violated,fromagreements
withEuropeancountries.
effects
wouldotherwise
havespreadacrossall legalagreements.
tion,however,
suggeststhatreputational

428 International
Organization
ample,Congresshas providedthatviolationsof theWhalingConvention
and the
on International
Convention
Tradein Endangered
Species(CITES) constitute
violationsofU.S. law,carrying
criminal
penalties.25
EllenL. LutzandKathryn
Sikkinkin
theirarticleinthisissuefurther
describehowinternational
rulescondemning
torture
andotheratrocities
havebeencharacterized
as customary
international
law and appliedbyU.S. courts.26
Wheninternational
commitments
areincorporated
intodomestic law,thelevel of delegationassociatedwiththemrisesdramatically
(thoughit
evokesweakerconcernfornationalsovereignty):
thecommitments
can nowbe appliedbywell-established
systemsofcourtsand administrative
agencies;privateactorscan ofteninitiatelegalproceedings;
and lawyershaveincentives
to invokethe
rules.Whensupranational
bodiesliketheEuropeanCourtofJustice
(ECJ)havealso
been grantedlegal authority,
theycan nurture
withtheirdomestic
"partnerships"
counterparts,
strengthening
bothinstitutions.27
Domesticated
commitments
can moreeasilybe enforced
againstprivatepersons
andtheirassets.A striking
againstGeneralPinochet,
exampleis therecentlitigation
whichwas initiated
international
bya Spanishmagistrate
conventions
banenforcing
and otheratrocities
thathad becomepartof Spanishlaw.Although
the
ningtorture
formostof
BritishHouseofLordsruledthatPinochetcouldnotbe heldresponsible
afterthe
thechargesagainsthim,it did hold himanswerableforacts committed
intoBritishlaw.
torture
convention
hadbeenincorporated
mobilizelegallyoriented
interest
andadvocacygroups,such
Legal commitments
as theorganizedbar,andlegitimize
theirparticipation
in domesticdecisionmaking.
withinforeignofficesand other
Theyalso expandtherole of legal bureaucracies
government
agencies.Finally,so long as domesticactorsunderstand
legal agreementstobe seriousundertakings,
theirplansandactionsinreliance
theywillmodify
on suchcommitments,
theaudiencecostsofviolations.
increasing
channels.VioLegalizationalso increasesthecostsofviolationthrough
normative
lationof a legal commitment
entailsreputational
to all
costs-again generalizable
distasteforbreaking
law reinlegalcommitments-that
reflect
thelaw.International
forcesthiseffectthrough
its strongemphasison compliance(pacta suntservanda
and theprincipleof good faith).28
To theextentthatstates(or certainstates)see
themselves
as membersof an international
societystructured
by international
law,
effectsmaybe even broader.29
Law observanceis even morehighly
reputational
tojustifyinternational
valuedin mostdomesticsocieties;efforts
violationsthuscreatecognitive
dissonanceandincreasedomesticaudiencecosts.
In Thomas
Legal obligations
arewidelyperceivedas havingparticular
legitimacy.
Franck'swords,legitimacy
createsan independent
"compliancepull."30 Individuals,
25. Setear1999.
26. LutzandSikkink,
thisissue.
27. See BurleyandMattli1993;andHelferandSlaughter1997.
28. The ruleofpacta sutntseivandad is to someextentweakenedby exceptionsand defenses,
notably
thebroadchange-of-circumstances
defenseknownas rebussic stanttibus.Yet thesedoctrines
introduce
neededflexibility;
whentheyarefoundinapplicable,
thenormative
forceofthebasicruleis enhanced.
29. See Wight1977;Bull 1977;Hurrell1993;andBuzan 1993.
30. Franck1990.

HardandSoftLaw 429
rulesso thattheadvantages
government
agencies,andotherorganizations
internalize
and disadvantages
of complianceneed notbe recalculatedeach timetheyare intocertainsubstanvoked.Franckarguesthatthelegitimacy
ofrulesvariesaccording
tivequalities-determinacy
andcoherence,
amongotherproperties-andtheproceonthesedimensions:
duresbywhichtheywereapproved.
Legal rulesareoftenstrong
and adoptedthrough
formalized
and often
relatively
precise,internally
consistent,
elaborateprocedures.
justification
andpersuaLegalizationentailsa specificformofdiscourse,
requiring
in
sion termsofapplicablerulesandpertinent
factorssuchas
facts,andemphasizing
argutext,precedents,
analogies,and practice.Legal discourselargelydisqualifies
The natureofthisdiscourseaffords
mentsbasedsolelyon interests
andpreferences.
is delegatedto adjudicative
legal professionals
a prominent
role.Whenauthority
can be highlyformalized.
Even without
strongdelegation,
institutions,
proceedings
will
however,
thisdiscourseimposessomeconstraint
on stateaction:governments
and oftenbeyond,if theyact
incurreputational
costswithinthelegal community,
without
a defensible
tojustifytheirconductin
positionorwithout
reasonableefforts
legalterms.
Certainhypotheses
theindependent
variablesthatlead statestouse hard
regarding
law can be distilledfromthisanalysis.First,statesshoulduse hardlegal commitaregreatbutthepotenmentsas assurancedeviceswhenthebenefits
ofcooperation
tialforopportunism
anditscostsarehigh.Theseconditions
aremostlikelyin "consuchas tradeorinvestment
thatincludereciprocal
commitments
tracts,"
agreements,
andnonsimultaneous
Buttheymayalso appearin "covenants" such
performance.
as environmental
or laboragreementswhenviolationswouldimposesignificant
in coordination
externalities
on others.Opportunism
is less significant
situations,
whereagreements
arelargelyself-enforcing.31
coordination
stanIndeed,international
inwhichprivate
dardsareoftenvoluntary,
andarecreatedthrough
institutions
t-,P,dl,
actorshave a significant
is
legalization,
role.Opportunism,
and thusinternational
in
few
also less significant settings
wherenationalactionshave
external
effects.32
of commitSecond,statesshoulduse hardlegalizationto increasethecredibility
mentswhennoncompliance
to detect,as in mostarmscontrolsituations.
is difficult
oftenincludecentralized
ordecentralized
monitoring
provisions
Legal arrangements
Evenapartfromthese,however,
comas an aspectofdelegation.
legalcommitments
pensatein partforthereducedlikelihoodof detectionby increasingthecosts of
detected
violations.
"clubs" of sinThird,statesshouldfindhardlaw of specialvaluewhenforming
functions
as an ex
cerelycommitted
states,liketheEU andNATO.Herelegalization
costson violaante sorting
device:becausehardlegalcommitments
imposegreater
to makethemidentifies
one as havinga low propensity
to defect.
tors,a willingness
in loosergroupings
hardlegalizationis less significant
like theAsiaConversely,
ofmovingthegrouptoa new
31. Coordination
agreements
maynotbe self-enforcing
whenthebenefits
equilibrium
arehigh.In thesesituations,
especiallywhenthegainsto certainpartiesarelargeenoughto
makesuchattempts
feasible,hardlaw maybe usefulas an assurancedevice.
32. AbbottandSnidal2000.

430 International
Organization
PacificEconomicCooperationforum(APEC), describedby Miles Kahlerin this
issue,thatarenotpursuing
deepcooperation
andthusdo notrequireexanteevidence
ofa sincerecommitment
frommembers.33
Fourth,lookingwithinthestate,executiveofficialsshouldlook to hardinternationallaw to commitotherdomesticagencies(especiallylegislatures)
or political
when
those
officials
make
international
groups
are able to
agreements
withlittle
interference
orcontrol,
andwhentheirpreferences
differ
significantly
fromthoseof
competing
powercenters.In thisperspective,
domesticpoliticsand constitutional
law aresignificant
explanatory
variables.
Finally,as a secondary
hypothesis,
legal commitments
shouldbe morecredible
whenmadebystateswithparticular
characteristics.
inother
Externally,
participation
international
legal regimesshouldenhancecredibility:
it exposesstatesto greater
costsand makesthemmorevulnerable
reputational
to countermeasures.
Internally,
domestic
institutions
and.
traditions
should
enhance
strong
legal
credibility.
Manyof
thespecialcostsofviolating
legalcommitments
stemfromthesecharacteristics.
Costs
ReducingTransactions
costsof subsequent
On balance,at least,hardlegalizationreducesthetransactions
interactions.34
Twotypesofinteractions
oneis the"manageareespeciallyrelevant:
rial"processof applyingand elaborating
agreedrules;theotheris themoreadversarialprocessofenforcing
commitments.
The roleofinternational
regimesinreducing transactionscosts especially the costs of negotiatingsupplementary
has not,however,
Thatliterature
disagreementshas beenextensively
analyzed.35
fromotherinstitutional
tinguished
legalization
forms.36
Considertheneedto "manage"theapplication
andevolution
ofagreements.
With
all agreements,
eventhosethatarequiteprecise,provisions
mustbe intervirtually
andelaboratedto resolveambiguities
and
preted,appliedto specificfactsituations,
addressnew and relatedissues.Delegationto courtsand otherlegal institutions
is
one important
way statesaddresstheseproblems;we discussdelegationlaterin
connection
withincomplete
is weak-forexample,
contracts.
Evenwheredelegation
andelaboration
{O,p,dlor {O,p,-1 legalizationfacilitates
interpretation,
application,
clearboundson disputeresolutionand negotiation.
Substanby settingrelatively
tively,legalizationimpliesthatproposalsforresolvingdisputesand fornewor exwithexistingnorms.Theyshouldbe compatible
pandedrulesmustbe integrated
withsettledrulesifpossible,so thatbargainsneednotbe reopened.In anycase they
shouldbe compatiblewiththebasic principles
of therelevantregime,so thatlegal
coherenceis maintained.
hardlaw constrains
ofdisputesettlement
thetechniques
andnegotiaProcedurally,
tion.Even whendelegationis relatively
low,legalization
impliesthatmostdisputes
33. Kahler,thisissue.
34. As discussedlater,the costs of reachinga fullylegalizedagreement
are oftenrelatively
high,
leadingactorstoadoptsofter
formsoflegalization.
35. Keohane1984.
36. CompareAbbottandSnidal1998.

HardandSoftLaw 431
andquestionsofinterpretation
shouldbe addressedthrough
specializedprocedures,
modesof discourse.
operatedprimarily
by legal professionals
usingprofessional
Evenwhendirectly
negotiated
solutionsarepermitted,
theexistenceoflegalinstitutionsmeansthatstateswillbargain"in theshadow"of anticipated
legal decisions.
coercivebehavioris generally
Whenlegalrulesareineffect,
unauthorized
moreover,
seenas illegitimate.
It is no coincidencethatlegalizationin theWTO was explicitly
tiedtoa requirement
thatmemberstatesresolvetheirtradedisputesthrough
thenew
determinations
andresponses-a
disputesettlement
procedures,
notthrough
unilateral
provisionaimeddirectly
at thecoercivetacticsof theUnitedStatesunderSection
ofcourse;theprinciples
discussed
301. Evenhardinternational
law is notfoolproof,
on the
heremaybe ignoredin practice,especiallybypowerful
states.Nonetheless,
wholelegalization
remainsan effective
devicefororganizing
ongoinginteractions.
The previoussectionexamConsidernexttheneedto "enforce"commitments.
oftheirowncommitments.
inedhowlegalization
helpsstatesincreasethecredibility
But legalization
is also significant
of thestates(and otheracfromtheperspective
ofteninthefaceofstrong
fromothers,
tors)thathaveworkedtoobtaincommitments
resistance.
Wereferto suchpartiesas "demandeurs."
Whenever
thereareincentives
will seekwaysto
fornoncompliance
withinternational
demandeurs
commitments,
orrespondtoviolations
forestall
byothers.
As discussedearlier,
hardlegalization
offers
a richassortment
ofinternational
and
for
domesticinstitutions
andreputational
andprocedures
andnormative
arguments
actorsin thisposition.Comparedto alternatives
likefrequent
renegotiation,
persuasion,or coercion,itmaterially
reducesthecostsofenforcement.
Otherthingsbeing
inparticular
equal,assuming
thatthesubstance
ofanagreement
is acceptable,
demandeursshouldpreferhardlegalization,especiallyin theformJO,P,D1.7
Of course,
otherthings
beingequal,statesthatresistagreement
ordesiregreater
flexibility
should
resisthardlegalization,or at least strivefor(O,p,D]commitments,
forthesevery
reasons.The compromises
and tradeoffs
thatresultare discussedin thefollowing
section.
in theprevioussubsection
Manyofthehypotheses
can be reformulated
fromthe
demandeur's
perspective.
Demandeursshouldseek hardlegalization(1) whenthe
likelihoodof opportunism
and itscostsare high,and noncompliance
is difficult
to
detect;(2) whentheywishto limitparticipation
to thosestrongly
committed
to an
agreement;
and(3) whenexecutiveofficials
inotherstateshavepreferences
compatiblewiththoseofthedemandeurs,
butothereliteswithinthosestateshavedivergent
preferences.
Finally,demandeurs
shouldplace greatest
relianceon commitments
by
statesthatparticipate
in
and
have
actively legal regimes
stronglegal institutions,
professions,
andtraditions.
ModifyingPolitical Strategies

As proponents
of legal processtheorymakeclear,hardlegalizationallows states
as theyworkto extendand
(and otheractors)to pursuedifferent
politicalstrategies
37. We considerlaterthespecificformsoflegalization
andweakstates.
preferred
bypowerful

432 Intemational
Organization
enforce(ortoweakenorescape)international
agreements.38
Indeed,thosestrategies
are oftenunavoidable.Both demandeurs
and resistersmaybe as concernedwith
thesetacticalattributes
as withthestrategic
issuesofcredibility
andenforceability.
As defined
in thisissue,hardlaw includesspecializedlegalinstitutions.
Regimes
or
that
offer
thespeoftheformO,PD} and(O,p,D]includejudicial arbitral
organs
to
cializedproceduresand techniquesof litigation
as a supplement
or alternative
moreovertly
foraddressing
politicaltechniques
disputes,
questionsofinterpretation,
as in (O,p,d}regimes,are
and instancesof noncompliance.
Nonjudicialinstitutions,
to interpret
issueregulations
orrecommenoftenauthorized
governing
instruments,
and thelike.These foracombinethepolitics
dations,draftproposedconventions,
andrhetoric
oflaw withordinary
politics.
In some,forexample,
Legal institutions
oftenrequireevenmoresubtlestrategies.
Criminal
statesmaynoteveninitiateproceedings.
Thus,althoughtheIntemational
and
TribunalfortheFormerYugoslavia(ICTY) is a valuabletoolof humanitarian
interest-based
politics,decisionstoprosecute
(ornottoprosecute)
aremadebyICTY
officials.
NA+O governments
(andprivategroups)musttherefore
pursuesuchtactics
as lobbyingfortheappointment
of acceptableICTY officials,
gathering
evidence,
tobringcases-as theUnitedStatesdidinpressingforthe
encouraging
prosecutors
of SlobodanMilosevic-and arranging
forthearrestofpotential
defenindictment
ofprosecution
topressure
theSerbiangovernment.
dants,whileusingthethreat
law
Hardlegalcommitments
intotheinternal
aresometimes
incorporated
directly
ofparticipating
states;evenmorefrequently
international
agreements
requirestates
to enactimplementing
legislation,
andsometimes
toestablishparticular
implementing institutions.
Domesticlitigation
thenbecomespartof theinternational
toolkit.
Theremay,however,be jurisdictional
obstaclesto litigation
by stateclaimants.In
thosesituations,
statesmustengageinthesubtleprocessofidentifying,
encouraging,
and supporting
privatelitigants
who will advancetheirinterests.39
Recentscholarthatsupranational
shipanalyzesthestrategies
judgespursuetoencourageactionsby
law.40National
privatelitigants
andnationalcourtsthatwillstrengthen
international
followparallelstrategies.
KarenAlter'sarticleinthisissue
governments
presumably
exploresthecomplexstrategies
pursuedbythisrangeofpublicandprivateactorsin
thehighlylegalizedinstitutions
oftheEU.41
We hypothesize
broadlythatstateswill be morelikelyto seekhardlegalization
itoffers
areadvantageous
tothem.Mundaneissuessuch
whenthepoliticalstrategies
as theavailability
of resourcesand trainedpersonnelcan be quitesignificant:
the
UnitedStatesandotheradvancedindustrial
nationswithlargelegal staffs
shouldbe
moreamenableto legalizationthancountrieswithfew trainedspecialists.States
38. Koh 1997.
39. This reversestheprocessassociatedwithmoretraditional
institutions
liketheIran-U.S.Claims
Tribunal,whereprivateactorsencouragegovernments
to initiateproceedings
and providesupportand
encouragement
togovernment
litigators.
40. See BurleyandMattli1993;HelferandSlaughter
1997;Alter1998b;Garrett,
Kelemen,andSchulz
1998;andMattliandSlaughter1998b.
41. Alter,thisissue.

HardandSoftLaw 433
shouldalso favorhardlegalizationwhentheycanbe confident
thatagreements
will
tracktheirpreferences,
forlegal procedures
will allow themto implement
those
preferences
efficiently
and at low politicalcost.This suggeststhatpowerfulstates
have a significant
and oftenoverlookedstakein hardlegalization.
And statesthat
seektominimize
politicalconflict
inrelations
withotherstatesorinparticular
issueareasshouldfavorhardlegalization,
forit sublimates
suchconflict
intolegal argument.
Handling Problems of IncompleteContracting

to constrain
Statessometimes
to writedetailedagreements
attempt
auto-interpretaButthoughprecisionhas
tion,reducetransactions
costs,andincreaseenforceability.
greatvalue,italso has severalproblems.
Itmaybe wasteful,
forcing
statestoplanfor
highlyunlikely
events;itmaybe counterproductive,
introducing
opaqueandinconsistent
itmaylead to undesirable
anditmayprevent
provisions;
rigidity;
agreement
altogether.
In any case, writingcompletecontracts
is extremely
difficult.42
The principalthatasymmetlic
information
makesitimposdemonstrates
agentliterature
typically
iftheagentis risk-averse.
Yeteventhisliterature
sibleto writean optimalcontract
assumesthatone could in principlewritea contractcompletewithrespectto all
andthepervastatesoftheworld.In fact,givenboundedrationality
possiblefuture
sive uncertainty
that
in whichstatesoperate,theycan neverconstruct
agreements
This probleminvitesopportunistic
anticipate
everycontingency.
behaviorand discouragesbothrelation-specific
investments
andvalue-enhancing
agreements.
Delegationis oftenthebestway to deal withincomplete
contracting
problems.
Regimesof theform(O,p,D]are clearlydesignedwiththispurposein mind:they
utilizeadministrative
and judicial institutions
to interpret
and extendbroadlegal
The TreatyofRome,forexample,authorizes
theECJ and theEuropean
principles.
toelaborateandapplygeneralprinciples
ofcominstitutions
Community's
legislative
ofcompetition,"
petition
law,suchas "concerted
practices"and "distortion
through
individual
casesandgeneralregulations.
EvenfO,P,DI
regimesgrantsignificant
powers to administrative
bodies.Althoughmanyproviorgansandjudicialor arbitral
on HumanRights,
forexample,arequitedetailed,
sionsoftheEuropeanConvention
theEuropeanCourtof HumanRightsmuststillapplygeneralstandards-suchas
and"respectfor... privateandfamily
anddegrading
treatment"
life"-in
"inhuman
whentheconvention
was drafted.
situations
thatcouldnothavebeenanticipated
forfilling
Softerregimesoftenincludenonjudicial
outincomplete
conprocedures
tracts,
thoughthesenormally
requirestateconsent.Hardlegalregimes,in contrast,
tojudicialor arbitral
bodiesbutrequirethemto follow
grantgreater
independence
andtoactonlyon specificdisputesandrequests.Thiscombiagreeduponprinciples
nationof attributes,
rulesand expectations
of intemaalongwiththebackground
42. Incomplete
is negotiated
contracting
problemsarisewhenanyagreement
underconditions
of incompleteorasymmetric
Fora recentoverview,
information,
risk,anduncertainty.
see Hart1995.

434 International
Organization
tionallaw,simultaneously
constrains
and legitimates
delegatedauthority.
One can
thatstateswill grantsuchauthority
hypothesize
whentheanticipated
gainsfrom
cooperation
are largeand thereis reasonableconsensuson generalprinciples,
but
specificapplications
aredifficult
toanticipate.

The AdvantagesofSoftLegalization
Hardlaw facilitates
international
interactions
in themanywaysalreadydiscussed,
butit has significant
costsand limitations.
In thissection,we explorehow softer
formsoflegalization
providealternative
andoftenmoredesirablemeanstomanage
manyinteractions
byproviding
someof thebenefits
of hardlaw at lowercost.We
emphasizebothrationalist
concerns,
suchas contracting
costs,and thespecialrole
softlegalrulesandinstitutions
playinpromoting
learning
andnormative
processes.
ContractingCosts

A majoradvantageof softerformsof legalizationis theirlowercontracting

costs.
Hardlegalization
reducesthepost-agreement
comcostsofmanaging
andenforcing
butadoptionof a highlylegalizedagreement
entailssignificant
contractmitments,
ingcosts.43
Anyagreement
entailssomenegotiating
learncosts-comingtogether,
ingabouttheissue,bargaining,
andso forth-especially
whenissuesareunfamiliar
or complex.But thesecostsare greaterforlegalizedagreements.
Statesnormally
exercisespecialcarein negotiating
sincethecostsof
anddrafting
legalagreements,
violationare higher.Legal specialistsmustbe consulted;bureaucratic
reviewsare
oftenlengthy.
Different
acrossstatescomplicatetheexercise.Aplegal traditions
provaland ratification
processes,typicallyinvolvinglegislativeauthorization,
are
morecomplexthanforpurelypoliticalagreements.
Two examplessuggesttheimpactof contracting
costson formsof legalization.
LaFirst,thecostsandrisksofnationalratification
led theInternational
procedures
borOrganization
itshistory,
(ILO) to modifyitslegalizationstrategy.44
Throughout
theILO has actedprimarily
In recentdecades,howbyadoptingdraftconventions.
at a low anddeclining
ILO conventions
rate.Believever,stateshavebeenratifying
was damaging
theprestige
ingthatthisphenomenon
oftheorganization,
twosuccessivedirectors-general
calledfortheILO toemphasizenonlegally
binding
instruments,
suchas recommendations
andcodesofconduct,attheexpenseofbindingtreaties
in
reorderto reducethecostsof nationalratification.
Althoughlaborrepresentatives
sistedthischange,theILO hasbeguntoadoptsomenewrulesin softer
legalform.
costswereusedas a delayingtacticinthenegotiations
thatled
Second,contracting
tothe1997Organization
forEconomicCooperation
andDevelopment
(OECD) con43. Theregimesliterature
does notalwaysdistinguish
betweenthecostsoftransacting
regimes
within

and the costs of creatingregimes. In early work,regimes are seen as the legacy of hegemony,so thattheir

creation
is notdirectly
addressed.
44. Maupain1998.

HardandSoftLaw 435
businesstransactions.
In those
ventionrestricting
foreignbriberyin intemational
theUnitedStateshopedtoreducethecommercial
created
disadvantage
discussions,
PracticesActby supporting
a legallybindingtreaty,
{O,P,d},
by itsForeignCorrupt
all OECD members
to adoptequivalentregulatory
limits.As negotiations
requiring
anyactionontheissuecameout
proceeded,
however,
theverystatesthathadresisted
in favorofa bindingtreaty!
Thesenationshopedtouse thehighcontracting
costsof
a
toimpedeagreement.
The UnitedStatesresponded
bysupporting
hardlegalization
Thetwosideseventually
comprononlegally
bindingOECD recommendation,
I-,P,d}.
and agreeingto adopta
misedby settinga shortdeadlinefortreatynegotiations
ifthedeadlinewas notmet.
recommendation
ofinternational
The costsofhardlegalizationaremagnified
bythecircumstances
tolimititthrough
arereluctant
politics.States,jealous oftheirsovereignautonomy,
concernsintensify
thedistributional
issuesthataclegalizedcommitments.
Security
or involvinggreater
companyanyagreement,
especiallyones of greatermagnitude
is oftennot
areoftenmultilateral.
The scopeofbargaining
uncertainty.
Negotiations
are ill defined(forexample,is free
sincetheissues themselves
clearlydelimited,
ofthe
tradeinmagazinesan economicissueora cultural
one?).Finally,thethinness
context(including
thelow prevailing
leveloflegalization)
international
institutional
does littletolowerthecostsofagreement.
thesecostsas well. For example,statescan dampen
Softlegalizationmitigates
concernsby optingforescape clauses,{o,P,dl;imprecise
and distributional
security
thatallowthemtomaintain
or "political"formsofdelegation
commitments,
{O,p,d};
Theseinstitutional
devicesprofuture
controlifadversecircumstances
arise,{O,p,-1.
whileproviding
tectstatesovereignty
and reducethecostsand risksof agreement
statesan
oflegalization.
softlegalization
offers
someoftheadvantages
Furthermore,
In manycases such
to leam abouttheconsequencesoftheiragreement.
opportunity
learningprocesseswill lowertheperceivedcosts of subsequentmovesto harder
legalization.
theseadvantages.45
The international
nuclearregimeillustrates
AlthoughfundaaresetoutintheNuclearNon-Proliferation
mentalnonproliferation
Treaty
obligations
and otherlegallybindingagreements,
{O,Fd},manysensitiveissues-such as the
ofnuclearmaterials-areregulated
predominantly
through
recommendaprotection
tionsfromtheInternational
AtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA), |-,P,d}.Recommendationsdeal withtechnicalmatters,
suchas inventory
controlandtransportation,
at a
level of detailthatwouldbe intractable
They also address
in treatynegotiations.
of nationalregulatory
agencies
issuesof domesticpolicy,suchas theorganization
and thesupervision
of privateactors,thatstatesmightregardas too sensitivefor
Whena highlevelofconsensusformsaroundan IAEA recommentreaty
regulation.
itsprovisionsintoa bindingtreaty-asocdation,memberstatesmayincorporate
of spentnuclearfuelandradioactive
wastecurTedwithruleson themanagement
buteventhesetreaties
mustusuallybe supplemented
ontechnical
byrecommendations
issues.
45. Keliman1998.

436 International
Organization
The international
traderegimealso illustrates
theadvantagesofsoftlaw in costly
Theproposedcharter
contracting
environments.
oftheInternational
TradeOrganizationcontemplated
ontherightofwithlegallybindingcommitments
withconstraints
drawaland significant
institutionalization,
it also covereda wide rangeof
1O,P,dI;
economicissues.Such an instrument
was verydifficult
to negotiateand draft;its
institutional
strength
also provokedpoliticalresistancewithintheUnitedStates.46
Becauseoftheseproblems,
theparticipating
statesadoptedthe1947GeneralAgreementonTariffs
andTrade(GATT) as a low-cost,interim
framework
fortariff
reductions.Comparedto thedraftcharter
of theInternational
TradeOrganization,
GATT
1947 was relatively
soft:it was adoptedonly "provisionally,"
includeda lenient
withdrawal
clause,and createdonlyskeletalinstitutions,
(o,p,-}. Overtime,GATT
developedintotheWTO as stateslearnedtheadvantagesof harderlegalizationin
governing
international
trade.But thehistory
of theregime-fromitsearliestdays
theNovember1999ministerial
through
meeting-demonstrates
clearlythatachievingharderlegalization
is a sensitive
andprotracted
process.
In sum,we arguethatstatesfacetradeoffs
in choosinglevelsoflegalization.
Hard
agreements
reducethecostsofoperating
withina legalframework-by
strengthening commitments,
reducingtransactions
costs,and thelike-but theyare hardto
reach.Softagreements
cannotyieldall thesebenefits,
buttheylowerthecostsof
of
achieving(some) legalizationin the firstplace. Choices along thiscontinuum
determine
tradeoffs
the"hardness"oflegalization,
bothinitially
andovertime.
In general,we hypothesize
thatsofter
formsoflegalization
willbe moreattractive
to statesas contracting
costsincrease.Thisproposition
shouldbe truebothforrelaofactorsandrigortivelymechanicalcosts-such as thosecreatedbylargenumbers
ous nationalratification
procedures-andformoreintensely
politicalcostslikethose
innegotiations
withpotentially
In theremainprevailing
strong
distributional
effects.
derofthissection,we explorethehardlaw/soft
law tradeoff
in termsof severalkey
independent
variables,eachofwhichincreasesthecostsofinternational
agreement.
These variablesincludesovereignty
costs,uncertainty,
divergence
amongnational
in timehorizonsanddiscountrates,andpowerdifferentials
preferences,
differences
amongmajoractors.
Costs
Sovereignty
The natureofsovereignty
costs. Acceptinga bindinglegalobligation,
especially
to a supranational
whenit entailsdelegating
authority
body,is costlyto states.The
costsinvolvedcanrangefromsimpledifferences
in outcomeon particular
issues,to
tomorefundamental
encroachlossofauthority
overdecisionmakinginanissue-area,
is
Whilewe recognizethattheconceptof "sovereignty"
mentson statesovereignty.
we use "sovereignty
costs"as a coveringtermforall
broadandhighlycontested,47
46. Diebold1952.
domnestic
sovereignty
(theorganization
47. Krasneroffers
fourmeaningsorcategoriesofsovereignty:
andcontrolwithinthestate),initerdepenidenice
sovereignty
(theabilitytocontrolflowsacross
ofauthority
thestatusof a politicalentity
in theinternational
borders),international
legal sovereignty
(establishing

HardandSoftLaw 437
threecategoriesof coststo emphasizethehighstakesstatesoftenfacein accepting
international
agreements.
The potential
forinferior
outcomes,loss of authority,
and
of sovereignty
diminution
makes statesreluctantto accept hardlegalizationespeciallywhenitincludessignificant
levelsofdelegation.
costsarerelatively
Sovereignty
low whenstatessimplymakeinternational
legal
commitments
thatlimittheirbehaviorin particular
circumstances.
Statestypically
acceptthesecostsin orderto achievebettercollectiveoutcomes-as illustrated
by
solutionsto Prisoners'
Dilemmaandcollectiveactionproblems
thatlimitindividual
choices.Suchagreements
areundoubtedly
exercisesoflegalsovereignty.
Nevertheless,eventheymaylimittheabilityof statestoregulatetheirborders(forexample,
themtoallowgoods,capital,orpeopletopassfreely)andtoimplement
byrequiring
important
domestic
onlabor,safety,
policies(as whenfreetradeimpinges
orenvironmentalregulations),
thusencroaching
on otheraspectsofsovereignty.
Greatersovereignty
costsemergewhenstatesacceptexternalauthority
oversignificant
decisions.International
orexplicitly
agreements
mayimplicitly
insertinternationalactors(whoareneither
electednorotherwise
subjectto domesticscrutiny)
intonationaldecisionprocedures.
Thesearrangements
maylimittheabilityofstates
to governwholeclassesofissues-such as socialsubsidiesor industrial
policy-or
requirestatestochangedomesticlawsorgovernance
structures.
Theirsignificance
is
reflected
inEuropeanconcerns
overthe"democratic
deficit"
andcomplaints
ofAmerican activistsregarding
the "facelessbureaucrats"
in theWTO. Nevertheless,
the
impactofsucharrangements
is tempered
fromintemabystates'abilitytowithdraw
tionalagreements-although
processesof enmeshment
may makeit increasingly
costlyforthemtodo so.
costsareattheirhighest
wheninternational
Sovereignty
arrangements
impingeon
therelations
betweena stateanditscitizensor territory,
thetraditional
hallmarks
of
Of course,ordinary
restrictions
on domesticpoliciescan
(Westphalian)
sovereignty.
havesucheffects
incontemporary
welfarestates,buttheseareheightened
andgeneralizedwhen,forexample,aninternational
humanrights
a state's
regimecircumscribes
theUnitedStateshas correctly
abilityto regulateitscitizens.Similarly,
been concernedthatan International
CriminalCourtmightclaimjurisdiction
overU.S. soldiersparticipating
in international
or otherforeignendeavpeacekeepingactivities
ors.Agreements
suchas theLaw oftheSea Convention
bothredefine
national
terlitory
(forexample,by delineating
overa territorial
jurisdiction
sea, exclusiveeconomic
system),and Westphaliani
sovereignty
(preventing
externalactorsfrominfluencing
or determining
domesticauthority
structures).
Krasner1999.Thesecategoriesoverlapanddo notcovaryin anynecessary
pattern.
Krasnerarguesthatsovereignty
has neverbeenimmutable,
hastendedtobe
although
legalsovereignty
morerespected
thanWestphalian
orothertypesofsovereignty.
Indeed,somelegalpuristssee sovereignty
as a fundamental
andinviolablelegalconceptrelating
tostatesupremacy
inmakingandwithdrawing
from
international
treaties.
Butrecentlegaltheorists
arguethatsucha viewis untenable
givenongoingdevelopmentsin international
legalization;theyconcludethat"it is timeto slowlyease thetermout of polite
languagein international
relations,
surelyin law." See Henkinet al. 1993,19. We skirttheseconceptual
debates,focusinginsteadon thefactthatstatesoftenperceiveinternational
legalizationas infringing
on
theirsovereignty,
broadlyconstrued.

438 International
Organization
zone, and continental
shelf)and limitthecapacityof statesto restrict
itsuse (for
example,by establishing
rightsof innocentpassage). Here,too, individualstates
retainthecapacityto withdraw,
but doingso may actuallydiminishtheir(legal)
sovereignty,
risking
loss ofrecognition
as members
in good standing
oftheinternationalcommunity.
Legalizationcan lead to further,
oftenunanticipated
sovereignty
costsovertime.
Even ifrulesare written
preciselyto narrowtheirrange,or softened
by including
escape clauses or limiting
delegation,statescannotanticipateor limitall of their
possibleeffects.
Delegationprovidesthegreatestsourceof unanticipated
costs.As
sovereignty
CharlesLindblompointsout,a grantof "authority
alwaysbecomesto a degree
uncontrollable."48
The bestexampleis theECJ.As KarenAlterdescribesin this
issue,ECJrulingstransformed
thepreliminary
rulingprocedure
ofArticle177 ofthe
Treatyof Romefroma checkon supranational
powerintoa devicethrough
which
privatelitigants
can challengenationalpoliciesas inconsistent
withEuropeanlaw.
whileFranceandCanadahaveconsistently
Similarly,
soughttominimize
theimpact
ofexpanding
tradelegalization
on theirautonomous
cultural
policies,theyhaveneverthelessseen thatautonomyslowlytrimmed
back by decisionsin theWTO and
NAFTA. Even nonjudicialorganizations
like theIMF or WorldBank exerttheir
in waysthatgo beyondtheinitialintentions
or anticipations
of the
independence
states.49
contracting
The delegation
oflegalauthority
toindependent
domesticcourtsandagenciescan
createsimilarunexpectedconsequences.However,statesgenerallyfeeltheyhave
ultimate
controloverdomesticcourts-theyappointthejudgesand controlthejusticedepartments
thatbringcriminal
ingeneral,
actions-andso theyfind,
thatdomeshas lowersovereignty
ticdelegation
costs.
Even themostpowerful
statesrecognizethatlegalizationwillcircumscribe
their
U.S. opposition
toautonomous
autonomy.
international
whether
theEninstitutions,
in theLaw of theSea Convention,
theInternational
CriminalCourt,or the
terprise
UN moregenerally,
reflectsthe special concernthatdelegationraises.50Even in
is paramount,
theUnitedStatesresisted
NAFTA,whereitspoliticalinfluence
delegatto supranational
bodiesforinterstate
ingauthority
disputesettlement
disputes;only
forreviewing
andcountervailing
theChapter19 procedure
antidumping
dutyrulings
createssignificant
delegatedauthority.
Congressalso explicitlyprovidedthatthe
wouldnotbe self-executing
in domesticlaw,limiting
agreement
delegationto naMorerecently,
concernthathighlylegalizedWTO disputesettlement
tionalcourts.51
led Coninstitutions
mightexpandthemeaningof theUruguayRoundagreements
48. Lindblom1977,24.
49. AbbottandSnidal1998.
viewthatsuchdevelopments
arean inevitable
of
partofthedevelopment
50. Shapirotakestheextreme
pull in
anylegal system.Shapiro1981. Our viewis thattheadvantagesof legalizationexerta powerful
thisdirection
butthatsovereignty
costsprovidesignificant
resistance;
we shouldexpecta mixedlevelof
international
legalizationaccordingto thecharacteristics
of issuesand states,at leastin theforeseeable
future.
51. F.Abbott,thisissue.

HardandSoftLaw 439
ofWTO membership,
gressto provideforan earlyreviewof thecostsandbenefits
procedureforwithtiedto a fast-track
includingtheresultsof legal proceedings,
of theUnitedStatesand
Conversely,
thewillingness
drawalfromtheorganization.
indicatesthattheirbeninstitutions
othercountries
to subscribeto moreconstrained
costs-at leastup toa point.
efitsoutweigh
theirsovereignty
whencompeting
domestic
costsis morecomplicated
The notionof sovereignty
Cerofinternational
legalization.
affect
thedevelopment
andtransnational
interests
costsfrominternational
taindomesticgroupsmayperceivenegativesovereignty
thatprovidethemwithmorefavorableoutcomesthannationalpolicy.
agreements
coalitionsthatprefertheirstates'tradepoliciesto be
Examplesincludefree-trade
and
rather
legislatures,
boundbyWTO rulings
thanopentothevagariesofindividual
accord
environmental
groupsthatbelievetheycan gainmorefroman international
a government
thatanticithanfromdomesticpolitics.For similarreasons,although
to limititscontroloveran issue,a governpatesstayingin powermaybe reluctant
internamayseek to bindits successorsthrough
mentless certainof its longevity
We discusssuchdomesticvariationsin thefollowing
tionallegal commitments.52
section.
costsmayalso be negativeforexternal
reasons,as whereparticipaSovereignty
enhancesa state'sinternational
anddomesticpositionininternational
arrangements
have been codifiedin a varietyof legal instrution.53Key aspectsof sovereignty
ontheRightsandDutiesofStates,
the1933Montevideo
Convention
ments,
including
andtheUN GeneralAssemblyDeclarationon Principles
Article2 oftheUN Charter,
of International
Law Concerning
FriendlyRelationsAmongStates.Regionallegal
ofAmericanStates(OAS) providemuch-needed
liketheOrganization
arrangements
theindepenforstatesovereignty.
promotes
ChapterIV oftheOAS Charter
support
ofpowerdifferentials
and
denceandsovereign
equalityofmemberstatesregardless
ofnonintervention.
through
principles
protects
internal
sovereignty
exception,
positivesovercostsare an important
Althoughnegativesovereignty
case forinternational
legaliza(andmoredifficult)
eigntycostsarethemorestandard
theclassiclegal modelwithcentralized
tion.Hardlegalization-especially
judicial
in thecourseofresolving
institutions
thetermsofagreements
capableofamplifying
betweenthe
costs.Thus statesface tradeoffs
disputes-imposeshighsovereignty
andsovereignty
benefits
costsofdifferent
formsoflegalization.
Statescan limitsovereignty
coststhrough
thatare nonbinding
or
arrangements
ordo notdelegateextensive
themselves
powers.Mostoften,statesprotect
imprecise
as in theCouncilof
by adoptingless preciserulesand weakerlegal institutions,
Convention
fortheProtection
of NationalMinorities,
Europe'sframework
1O,p,dI.
protocol
Theyfrequently
providethatmemberstatesmustadhereto a specialtreaty
beforea courtor quasi-judicialbody can assertjurisdiction
overthem,as in the
52. Colombattoand Macey offera relatedviewin arguingthatgovernmental
agenciesseek internationallegalizationin orderto protect
theiradministrative
positionsat a costto domesticgroups.ColombattoandMacey 1996.
53. In Krasner'sterminology,
theseconstitute
international
legalandWestphalian
sovereignty,
respectively.

440 International
Organization
disputemust
inter-American
humanrightssystem,
or thatall partiesto a particular
Stillweakerformsof delegation-suchas
consentbeforethecase can be litigated.
theconsultation
arrangements
characteristic
of armscontrolagreements,
10,P,-}withpoliticalmechalimitsovereignty
costsevenmore,couplinglegal obligations
ofmeans-none
a variety
nismsofcontrolanddefense.Thussoftlegalization
offers
costs.
ofthemperfect-bywhichstatescan limitsovereignty
BeginThe international
money-laundering
regimeprovidesa good example.54
tocontroltheinternational
launderninginthe1980s,theUnitedStatesled an effort
moneylaundering
ingofcriminal
profits.
Manynationsresisted
efforts
tocriminalize
ortorequiregreater
offinancial
fearing
interference
withlegitiscrutiny
transactions,
betweenprudenmatebusinessdealingsandwiththedivisionofdomesticauthority
tialregulators
andprosecutors.
To addresstheseconcerns,
in 1989theOECD created
theFinancialActionTaskForceoffinancial
The taskforcehas issuedpolicy
experts.
recommendations,
administers
a systemof peerreview,and can evenimposemild
sanctions.Its guidelinesare notas tightly
as hardlegal commitments
constraining
and are moredifficult
to "enforce."Yettheyprovidea commonbasis fordomestic
nationaldifferences),
guide
implementation
(withenoughflexibility
toaccommodate
andcreateexpectations
thatviolationswillbringpoliticalcosts.Taskforce
behavior,
in nationaldecisionsby international
actorsand
guidelineslegitimize
participation
and NGOs. Theyinvokea formof legal disby concerneddomesticbureaucracies
thetask
ofinternational
law.In itsdecadeof operation,
courseand someprinciples
forcehas fostereda significant
aroundtheprinciplescondegreeof convergence
tainedin itsguidelines.
As thisexampledemonstrates,
softlaw providesa meansto lessensovereignty
arrangements
alonga more
costsby expandingtherangeof availableinstitutional
extensiveand finelydifferentiated
tradeoffcurve. How states evaluate these
theirpreferences
fordifferent
formsoflegalizationtradeoffs-and
thusdetermine
andthecircumstances
ofparticular
issue-areas.
dependson theirowncharacteristics
on nationalautonomy
and
costsand issue type. Viewingconstraints
Sovereignty
thatstateswill prefer
as coststhatvaryacrossissues,we hypothesize
sovereignty
formsof legalizationin different
different
issue-areas.At one extreme,
sovereignty
costsare especiallyhighin areas relatedto nationalsecurity.
Adversaries
are exrisksof agreement
forthestandardreasonsadtremely
sensitiveto unanticipated
threats
vancedbyrealists,
relative
including
gains.Evenalliesfacingcommonexternal
itis unsurarereluctant
to surrender
overtheirsecurity
affairs.
Therefore
autonomy
allianceever,delegationis
prisingthateven in NATO, themostinstitutionalized
have laggedbehindotherinstitumoderate,
arrangements
{O,p,dj,or thatsecurity
likeSALT
intheEU. Similarly,
tionaldevelopments
bilateral
armscontrol
agreements
canbe veryprecisein specifying
missilenumbers
andtypesandareunquestionably
butareonlyminimally
institutionalized,
?,PI-1.
legallybinding

54. Simmons2000a.

HardandSoftLaw 441
costsand henceof
Politicaleconomyissuesdisplaya widerangeof sovereignty
on whichstateinterests
areclosely
lie technicalmatters
legalization.
Atone extreme
costs
Heresovereignty
transportation
orfoodstandards.
aligned,suchas international
is correspondingly
high.One even
arelow andtheincidenceoflegalizedagreements
to organizations
in whichprivate
sees a significant
level of delegation-including
Organization
forStandardization
actorsplaymajorroles,suchas theInternational
makesithardto
costsare low and technicalcomplexity
(ISO)-where sovereignty
authority.
Politicaleconomy
adaptagreements
rapidlywithoutsome coordinating
and security-related
exportconissues like investment
policy,moneylaundering,
trols,however,remainsensitiveand have notbeen legalizedto nearlythe same
butincreasextent.Similarly,
taxpolicy,whichlies at thecoreofall statefunctions
is characterized
by manybilateraltreaties
coordination,
inglyrequiresinternational
butdisplayslittleoverallinstitutionalization.
but
costsaresignificant
Tradeissuesrangebetweentheseextremes-sovereignty
Thisis
oflegalizedagreements.
arefrequently
bytheperceivedbenefits
outweighed
of interest
due partlyto lesserconflicts
amongstatesand partlyto strongdomestic
frombeneficiaries
evenon a givenissue,sovoflegalization.
Consequently,
support
costscan varyacrossstatesand overtime.For example,thesovereignty
ereignty
aretypically
forless-developed
stateswhere
costsofagricultural
greater
agreements
thesectoris largerandpolitically
central;theyhave graduallydecreasedin OECD
countries
ofagriculture.
alongwiththerelativeimportance
such as theEU, occur
arrangements,
Finally,themosthighlyinstitutionalized
toreducing
orwherea longprocess
wherethereis a strong
commitment
sovereignty,
of legalizedcooperation
has led to institutionalization
evenagainststateresistance.
is againinstructive.
In manyrespects,the
The historyof tradeinstitutionalization
thantheproposedInternational
WTO todayis a stronger
institution
TradeOrganization.Continuedsuccessin expanding
tradeunderGATTchangeddomesticpolitical
balancesand loweredthecostsof further
legalization.Moreover,states"learned"
can proas
a
thatharderlegalization(such
mechanism)
stronger
disputesettlement
thedangersof
duce greaterbenefits;
theymayalso have beenreassuredregarding
oftheWTO
enmeshment.
disputesoverthefuture
Nevertheless,
vigorouscontinuing
reflect
states'continued
warinessofsacrificing
autonomy.
Uncertainty

issuesarenewand complex.The underlying

problemsmaynot
Manyinternational
all possibleconsequencesofa legalso statescannotanticipate
be wellunderstood,
to a
One wayto deal withsuchproblemsis to delegateauthority
ized arrangement.
interto
or
a
court
international
central
organization) implement,
party(forexample,
as circumstances
unfold.This approachavoids the
pret,and adapttheagreement
butittypiorofhavingto (re)negotiate
costsofhavingno agreement,
continuously,
costs.Softlegalization
providesa numhighsovereignty
callyentailsunacceptably
fordealingwithuncertainty.
alternatives
berofmoreattractive

442 International
Organization
First,statescan reducetheprecisionof theircommitments:
{O,p,dj.Of course,if
theydo notknowtherelevantcontingencies,
theycannotachievetheprecisionof
hardlaw evenif theywishto do so, exceptas to better-understood
aspectsof the
problem.Thusan armscontrolagreement
can preciselycontrolknowntechnologies
andcanevenlimitresearch
intotechnologies
whoseresultscanreasonably
be anticipated(suchas testingantiballistic
missilesystems).But it cannotgoverntechnologies whosemilitary
impactcannotbe foreseen.And blanketlimitations
on all research with potentialmilitaryimplicationswould unacceptablyimpair the
ofbeneficial
civiliantechnologies.
development
Butuncertainty
makesprecisionless desirableas wellas less attainable.
The classic distinction
betweenriskand uncertainty
is significant
here.55
Whenriskis the
central
concern-that
theoutcomeofan agreement
but
is,whenactorscannotpredict
knowtheprobability
distribution
of possibleoutcomes,conditionalon agreement
terms-preciseagreements
offera wayto manageand optimizerisk-sharing.56
But
whencircumstances
arefundamentally
uncertain-that
is,wheneventherangeand/or
ofpossibleoutcomesis unknown-amorepreciseagreement
distribution
maynotbe
ifactorsare "ambiguity-averse,"57
to leave
desirable.In particular,
theywillprefer
rather
thanfacethepossibility
ofbeingcaughtin unfavorable
agreements
imprecise
Unfamiliar
environmental
conditions
likeglobalwarming
commitments.
providegood
illustrations:
because the nature,the severity,
even the veryexistenceof these
theimprethreats-aswellas thecostsofresponding
tothem-arehighlyuncertain,
cise commitments
foundin environmental
"framework"
agreements
maybe theoptimalresponse.
A secondwaytodealwithuncertainty
is through
thatareprecisebut
arrangements
notlegallybinding,suchas Agenda21, theForestPrinciples,
and otherhortatory
andDevelopment,
instruments
adoptedat the1992Rio Conference
on Environment
to
of
in
These
allow
states
see
the
rules
and to gain their
impact
practice
{-,P,-J.
therulesmight
whileretaining
to avoidanyunpleasant
benefits,
flexibility
surprises
of obligahold.Sometimesprecisionis actuallyused to limitthebindingcharacter
drawnexceptionsor escape clauses.These also protectthe
tions,as withcarefully
turnsouttohavehiddencostsorunforeseen
partiesincase theagreement
contingencies,so thatstatesarenotlockedintocommitments
theyregret.
of agreements,
Third,althoughstrongdelegationcan aggravatetheuncertainty
moderate
bodieswhere
delegation-typically
involving
politicalandadministrative
55. See Knight1921;andEllsberg1963.
provisionsso thatstatescan
might,forexample,containrenegotiation
56. Morepreciseagreements
modifytheagreement
as eventsunfold.See Koremenos1999. This case forgreaterprecisionassumes
of
bindingagreements.
Finally,optimization
risk-averse
states;riskseekerswouldgambleon imprecise,
in
exemplified
by asymmetries
of information
whenit is constrained
theagreement
willbe second-best
standard
models.
principal-agent
aversionmeansthatactorspreferknownoutcomes(includingthestatusquo) to un57. Ambiguity
probknownones.Whenactorsknowthepossibleoutcomesbutdo notknowwhichof twoalternative
ambiguity
aversionas assumingthatan actleads
abilitydistributions
governsthem,Ellsbergcharacterizes
to theminimum
possibleexpectedoutcome.Ellsberg1963. In thiscase, agentspreferincompleteto
evenatzerocontracting
costs.See Mukerji1998.
completecontracts

HardandSoftLaw 443
statesretainsignificant
control-providesanotherway to manageuncertainty.
UN
adspecializedagenciesandotherinternational
organizations,
playrestricted
{-,p,dl,
ministrative
rolesacrossa wide varietyof issues,and a smallnumberof (mainly
financial)
organizations
havemoresignificant
autonomy.58
Theseorganizations
have
thecapacitytoprovideinformation
(andthusreduceuncertainty)
andsomecapacity
to modifyand adaptrulesor to initiatestandards.59
In general,however,eventhis
levelofdelegationappearsonlyin areaswithlow sovereignty
costs,suchas technical coordination.
Morefundamental
elaboration
ofarrangements
is typically
accomareprecise
plishedthrough
directpoliticalprocesses.Thusarmscontrolagreements
and bindingbut limitdelegationto forumsthatpromotepoliticalbargaining,
not
independent
third-party
decisionmaking,
{0,P,-j.
forindividual
Vieweddynamically,
thesefoimsofsoftlegalization
offer
strategies
andcollectivelearning.60
Considerthecase wherestatesarelegallyboundbutin an
imprecise
way,as undertheoriginalViennaOzoneConvention,
{O,p,-j.Theseobligationsoffer
flexibility
andprotection
forstatestoworkoutproblems
overtimethrough
rather
thanconstrained
negotiations
shapedbynormative
guidelines,
bypreciserules.
Hortatory
rules,forexample,{-,p,dj,
similarly
providegeneralstandards
againstwhich
over
behaviorcanbe assessedandsupport
learning
processesthatreduceuncertainty
time.Some emergingarrangements
on therightsof womenand childrenfitthis
thatareprecisebutnonbinding,
liketheHelsinkiFinalAct,I-,P,dl,
model.Agreements
and reviewsessionswhere
oftenincludeinstitutional
devicessuchas conferences
statescan potentially
as theyresolveuncertainties
about
deepentheircommitments
theissue.
Indeed,moderatedelegation-including
international
organizations
thatprovide
fordecentralized
andcapacitiesforcollecting
informasupport
bargaining,
expertise,
thanadjudicativeprocedures
tion-may be moreappropriate
(domesticor international)foradaptingrulesas circumstances
arebetterunderstood.
Examplesinclude
thenumerous
international
withpriagenciesthatrecommend
(oftenin conjunction
on a rangeofissues,including
transvateactors)international
standards
technology,
andhealth.Although
notbinding,
theirrecommendations
portation,
provideprecise
andcompelling
coordination
pointstowhichstatesandprivateactorsusuallyadhere.
In othercases,consultative
committees
orformalinternational
organizations
maybe
to makerulesmorepreciseas learningoccurs.Effective
institutions
of
empowered
thatstatesmaybe reluctant
thissortrequirea certainautonomy
to grantovertruly
issues.
important
Thelearning
hereareillustrated
processesdescribed
bythejointFood andAgricultureOrganization-UN
Environment
Program(FAO-UNEP) regimerequiring
prior
consentto international
ofhazardouschemicalsandpesticides.61
informed
transfers
58. AbbottandSnidal1998.
59. Gold 1983.
see Morrow1994;andKoremenos1999.Fora moreconstruc60. Fora rationalapproachtolearning,
as acquiring
information
andlearning
tivistapproach,
see Finnemore
1996.Ourviewis thatbothlearning
as changing
oridentity
arerelevant
(andcompatible)
aspectsoflegalization.
preferences
61. Mekouar1998.

444 International
Organization
The FAO adopteda "code of conduct"on thedistribution
and use of pesticidesin
1985; UNEP adopted"guidelines"on theexchangeof information
on internationally tradedchemicalsin 1987. Because of continuedconcernoverexportsof rethe
stricted
substancesto developingcountries,
thetwo organizations
coordinated
amendment
oftheirrespective
softlaw instruments
in 1989toadd a requirement
for
anda propriorinformed
consentforinternational
transfers
ofhazardoussubstances
cedureforhandlingconsents.Thisprocedure
was managedbytheFAO andUNEP.
Bothorganizations
sponsoredextensiveconsultations
withexpertgroupsfromgovand industry
ernment
andprovidedtechnicalassistance.The consentsystem,
then,
involvedlow obligation,
relatively
highprecision,
andmoderate,
largelyadministrativeand technical,delegation,{-,P,dl.At the 1992 Rio conference,
atsupporters
temptedto "harden"theconsentsystemthrough
a bindingtreaty,
butthiseffort
to administer
theexistingsystem,
failed.The FAO and UNEP continued
however,
and a fewyearslaterthememberstatesof bothorganizations
authorized
formal
treaty
negotiations.
The convention
approvedin September1998 trackedtheFAOUNEP systemalmostexactly,
{O,P,dl.
In thissectionwe havearguedthatsoftlegalization
providesa rationaladaptation
to uncertainty.
It allowsstatesto capturethe"easy" gainstheycan recognizewith
oruncertainties
incomplete
knowledge,
without
allowingdifferences
aboutthesituationtoimpedecompletion
ofthebargain.Softlegalization
further
providesa frameas circumstances
workwithinwhichstatescan adapttheirarrangement
changeand
can pursue"harder"gainsthrough
further
negotiation.
Softlaw avoidsthesovercostsassociatedwithcentralized
orotherstrong
andis
eignty
adjudication
delegation
in lightofnewinformation.
less costlythanrepeatedrenegotiation
Ourdiscussionalso suggestshypotheses
as towhendifferent
formsoflegalization
of
are mostlikelyto be used. Considerthefourpossiblehigh/low
combinations
and sovereignty
variablesin our
uncertainty
costs,two of themajorindependent
analysis.Wherebothvariablesare low, stateswill be inclinedtowardhardlegal
toefficiently
costs
arrangements
managetheirinteractions,
{O,P,DI.Whensovereignty
are highand uncertainty
is low,stateswillbe reluctant
to delegatebutwillremain
ifsovereignty
costs
opentopreciseand/or
bindingarrangements,
{O,P,-1.Conversely,
are low anduncertainty
is high,stateswillbe willingto acceptbindingobligations
and at leastmoderatedelegationbutwillresistpreciserules,{O,p,dl.Finally,when
bothuncertainty
costsarehigh,legalizationwillfocuson thestateandsovereignty
mentofflexible
orhortatory
thatareneither
obligations
precisenorhighlyinstitutionIn all thesecases, legalizationprovidesa framework
within
alized,{o,p,-] or {-,p,-].
whichstatescan workto resolvetheiruncertainty,
makingharderlegalizationmore
attractive.
SoftLaw as a ToolofCompromise
Compromiseat a pointin time. Softlaw can ease bargaining
problemsamong
stateseven as it opensup opportunities
forachievingmutually
compropreferred
mises.Negotiating
states
a hard,highlyelaborated
agreement
amongheterogeneous
is a costlyand protracted
process.It is oftenmorepracticalto negotiatea softer

HardandSoftLaw 445
thatestablishesgeneralgoals butwithless precisionand perhapswith
agreement
limiteddelegation.
allowsstatestoadapttheircommitments
totheirparticular
situaSoftlegalization
tionsratherthantrying
to accommodate
divergent
nationalcircumstances
withina
helpingstatesdeal with
singletext.Thisprovidesforflexibility
in implementation,
of
thedomesticpoliticalandeconomicconsequences an agreement
andthusincreassoftlaw shouldbe attracingtheefficiency
withwhichitis carriedout.Accordingly,
amongthepreferences
andcapacities
tivein proportion
to thedegreeof divergence
one
moves
frombilateral
ofstates,a condition
thatincreasesalmostautomatically
as
through
regionaltomultilateral
negotiations.
is especiallyimportant
orone stickyproblemthreatFlexibility
whenuncertainty
ens to upseta larger"packagedeal." Ratherthanhold up theoverallagreement,
statescan incorporate
or impreciseprovisionsto deal withthedifficult
hortatory
issues,allowingthemtoproceedwiththerestofthebargain.The laborandenvironon thispoint.
mentalsideagreements
toNAFTAaresuggestive
stateswithdifferent
Softness
also accommodates
degreesofreadinessforlegalization.Those whoseinstitutions,
laws,and personnelpermitthemto carryouthard
commitments
can enteragreements
of thatkind;thosewhoseweaknessesin these
them
from
hardlegal commitments
can acceptsofter
areas prevent
implementing
or
formsof agreement,
reservations,
phase-inperiods.
perhapsthrough
exceptions,
transitional
Many treatiesmakesuch specialprovisionsfordevelopingcountries,
to
suchan arrangement
economies,andothercategoriesofstates.Statesmayprefer
eithera softer
withlimitedmembership.
agreement
amongall ora harderagreement
Overtime,ifthesoftarrangements
aresuccessful
andwithout
adverseconsequences,
theinitially
reluctant
statesmayacceptharderlegalization.
The 1996Wassenaar
onexportsofconventional
Arrangement
fornationalcontrols
theuse ofsoftlegalization
tofacilitate
illustrates
weaponsanddual-usetechnologies
forMultilatWassenaaris a successortotheCoordinating
Committee
compromise.62
eralExportControls,theinformal
institution
whichtheWestcoordinated
through
controls
on exportstotheSovietbloc.TheUnitedStatespressedfora newinstitution
toaddresspost-ColdWarsecurity
liketerrorism,
regionalconflicts,
andarms
threats
toagreement:
nearly
buildupsbyroguenationslikeIraq.Butitfacedseveralbarriers
twiceas manynationswouldhave to takepart;the"commonenemy"of theCold
Warno longerexisted;theparticipating
nationshad verydifferent
attitudes
toward
and
the
of
controls
countries conflicts; economiccosts export
wouldfall
particular
some
more
stateswere
technically
preparedthan
unevenlyacrosscountries;and
otherstooperatea sophisticated
control
system.
export
Thenonbinding
overcamethesebarriers
substanbyincorporating
"arrangement"
inall threeelements
tialflexibility
oflegalization,
The
core
of
the
{-,p,
arrangement
-1.
on pastexportsofagreeduponproducts
is theexchangeofinformation
tobuyersin
markets.
This
information
alerts
members
to
suspicious
acquisition
agreedtarget
commercial
The
and
focuses
undercutting.
arrangepatterns
peerpressureagainst
62. Dursht1997.

446 International
Organization
mentoperatesby consensus,and membercountries
implement
itsrequirements
in
domesticlaw. The UnitedStatesyieldedon a numberof issues,suchas priorapitobtainedinclusionofbothconventional
provalofexportsales.In return,
however,
armsanddual-usegoods,specificlistsofcontrolled
items,designation
ofsomespecifictarget
thatallowsittorespondin serious
nations,anda degreeoftransparency
cases.
Theseadvantagesof flexibility
do notcomewithout
cost.Softlaw compromises
makeit harderto determine
whethera stateis livingup to its commitments
and
therefore
to shirk.Theyalso weakentheabilityofgovernments
createopportunities
to committhemselves
to policiesby invokingfirminternational
commitments
and
therefore
makeit easierfordomesticgroups,includingotherbranchesof government,toundotheagreement.
Again,statesfacea tradeoff
betweentheadvantages
of
inachievingagreement
in ensuring
flexibility
anditsdisadvantages
performance.
combinations
Statescan designdifferent
elementsofan agreement
withdifferent
ofhardness
thistradeoff
tofine-tune
on different
issues.Alternative
formsofdelegationcan be usedto limitthetendencies
to shirk.In somecases,international
reportbe
whether
states
ing requirements
may sufficient
to determine
are meetingtheir
commitments.
for
domestic
doElsewhere,
requirements
implementation,
including
or NGOs to enforcethe
mesticlegalization,
mayempowerprivateactorslikefirms
agreement.
commitstatestocharCompromiseovertime. Becauseevensoftlegalagreements
acteristic
softlaw providesa way of achieving
formsof discourseand procedure,
overtime.Considera patientstate(low discountrate)thatis seekinga
compromise
concessionbutis unwilling
to offer
enoughimmediately
(forexample,in linkageto
otherissues)to inducean impatient
stateto offertheconcession.The patientstate
be willingto makea (smaller)current
fora soft
maynevertheless
payoffin return
thathas someprospect
theimpatient
legalagreement
ofenmeshing
stateina process
thatwilldelivertheconcessiondowntheroad.Insofaras statesfinditprogressively
themselves
fromlegalprocesses,softlaw helpsremedythecomcostlyto extricate
mitment
relations.
problemthatloomslargeininternational
The
The Helsinkiprocessis a dramaticillustration
of thisformof compromise.
SovietUnion(theimpatient
needto stabilizemilitary
and
party)had an immediate
withWestern
politicalrelations
EuropeandtheUnitedStatesso thateconomicrelationscoulddevelopmorerapidly.
TheWest(themorepatient
party)wasnotprepared
to recognizeSovietdominancein Easternand CentralEuropeon a legallybinding
basis,butit was willingto do so in less preciseand explicitly
nonlegallybinding
that
terms-ifin return
theSovietswouldaccepta softhumanrightsframework
biteoverthelongerterm.
turned
outtohavean unexpectedly
significant
The Sovietssurelyunderestimated
thelong-run
effectsof BasketIII, buttheir
tenaciousbargaining
efforts
toobscuretheprovisions
with"noninterven(including
tion"terminology)
showsthattheytooktheseconcessionsveryseriously.63
Thusthe
63. Maresca1985.U.S. negotiators
andtheAmerican
publicalso underestimated
thelong-term
significanceofthesearrangements.

HardandSoftLaw 447
thatdeSovietleadershipaddresseditspressingproblemswithsoftcommitments
of theSovietregimeto
ferredthecoststo its successors.The subsequent
inability
orinternationally,
illustrates
containtheBasketIII arrangements,
eitherdomestically
thesubtlestrength
ofsoftlaw overtime.
processesoflearning,
do not
The longer-term
consequencesofsoftlaw,including
meanthatlegal agreements
have an inevitablelifecyclefromsoftertowardharder
legalization.Hard law is probablymorelikelyto evolvefromsoftlaw thanfrom
But thisdoes notimplythatall soft
(utopian)plansto createhardlaw full-blown.
or thathardlegalizationis the
legalizationis a way stationto hard(er)legalization,
notedearliermayneverbe resolvedin
optimalform.The contracting
difficulties
someissue-areas;here,theattainablesoftlegalizationwillbe superiorto hardlaw
movement
towardgreater
legalthatcannotbe achieved.In thesecases,continuing
izationis neither
inevitable
nornecessarily
desirable.
The Helsinkiexperienceand the "backlash"againstECJ activismdescribedby
on theevolution
ofsoftlaw: statesmay
Alterinthisissuesuggesta further
limitation
effects
learnfromexperience
thatevensoftformsoflegalizationcan havepowerful
thislesson,theywillbe morealerttothepossibilities
overtime.As statesinternalize
of enmeshment
in othernegotiations.
It wouldnotbe surandevolutionary
growth
forexample,iftheHelsinkiexperience
China'sposition
prising,
werestillinforming
on (evensoft)humanrightscommitments.
statesmaybe forcedto accept
Impatient
softlegalizationin orderto obtaincurrent
buttheymaydemanda higher
payoffs,
price.

facilitates
comCompromisebetweentheweakand thestrong. Softlegalization
legal view is thatlaw
promisebetweenweak and powerfulstates.The traditional
international
relations
view
operatesas a shieldfortheweak,whereasthetraditional
is thatlaw acts as an instrument
of thepowerful.These seeminglycontradictory
viewscan be reconciledbyunderstanding
how (soft)law helpsbothtypesof states
achievetheirdiffering
goals.
Whatevertheirviewson softlaw,traditional
agreethat
legal scholarsgenerally
aidsweakstates.Weil,a severecriticofsoftlaw,writesthat"itis [hard]
legalization
law withitsrigorthatcomesbetweentheweak and themighty
to protectand deliver."64
MichaelReisman,morefavorabletowardsoftlaw,agreesthatlaw advanto
Theseviewsechoanalysesofconstitutionalism
as a movement
tagestheweak.65
oflaws,notofmen(or states),in ordertoconstrain
thepowercreatea government
fromgeneralprinciples
ofnonintervenful.66Attheinternational
level,rulesranging
tiontoagreements
liketheNuclearNon-Proliferation
Treatycanbe seenas bounding
thestruggle
forpower.
To
statesoftenseekhardlegalization.
Forjustthesereasons,smallanddependent
theextent
itis effective,
andreducesuncertainty
hardlaw offers
bydemarprotection
64. Weil 1983,442.
65. Reisman1988,377.
66. Lindblom1977.

448 International
Organization
catingthelikelybehaviorofpowerful
states.LutzandSikkinkargueinthisissuethat
LatinAmericanstateshave longseeninternational
law as providing
themwithexactlythistypeof protection
fromtheUnitedStates.67
Since theyhave less direct
controlovertheirown fates,smallstatesalso incurlowersovereignty
costsfrom
hardlegalization.
Indeedhardlaw mayentailnegativesovereignty
costs,enhancing
Africansupinternational
standing
andoffering
at leastformalequality.Widespread
whichmakelittlesenseon ethnic,
portforpostcolonial
boundaries,
political,orecoto
nomicgrounds,
providesa striking
illustration
ofthevalueoflegalarrangements
weakstates.
In contrast,
manyinternational
relations
scholars(andsomecriticallegalscholars)
holdthemoreskepticalview thatinternational
law is whollybeholdento internationalpower.Powerfulstateshave greatercontroloverinternational
outcomes,are
lessinneedofprotection,
andfacehighersovereignty
costs.Theyhaveless needfor
andmorereasontoresistit,eventhoughtheiradherence
is crucialtoits
legalization
success.
Forthesereasons,realistssee international
law largelyas epiphenomenal,
merely
also treatpower(forexample,
reflecting
thedistribution
of power.Institutionalists
as a primary
sourceof
hegemonyand/ora capacityfordecentralized
retaliation)
orderandrulesin theinternational
system.Unlikerealists,
however,
theyarguethat
of
institutions
have real effects,
resulting
in a disjuncture
betweenthedistribution
in thesystem.
powerandbenefits
These perspectives
can to someextentbe reconciledby understanding
legalization,especiallysoftlegalization,as furthering
thegoals of bothclasses of states.
Mostimportantly,
legallybindingandrelatively
preciserulesallowstrong
andweak
statestoregularize
theirasymmetric
relations.
overtexercise
Becausethecontinual,
of poweris costly,powerfulstatesgain by embodying
theiradvantagein settled
in bargaining,
rules.Because weakerstatesareat a constant
disadvantage
theybenefitfromthecertainty
and credibility
of legalizedcommitments.
The resultis not
unlikean insurance
toa stronwherea weakerpartygladlypaysa premium
contract,
ger one in returnforthe latterbearing,or in thiscase reducing,certainrisks.
In addition,both sides benefitby reducingthe transactions
costs of continual
bargaining.
Of course,stronger
stateshave disproportionate
influence
overthesubstanceof
statescannotsimplydictatetheoutagreeduponrules.Buteventhemostpowerful
come of everynegotiation
because of thehighcosts of coercion.Instead,strong
statesmusttypically
makethesubstantive
contentof legalizedarrangements
(just)
attractive
at an acceptablecost.Reduced
enoughto encouragebroadparticipation
costsnormally
bargaining
provideampleroomforsuchconcessions.
Powerful
statesaremostconcerned
withdelegation,
themajorsourceofunanticicosts.As a result,
formsoflegalization
thatinvolvelimiteddelegapatedsovereignty
between
tion,forexample,{O,p,-] or{O,p,dl,
providethecrucialbasisforcooperation
theweakand thestrong.Lowerlevelsof delegationprevent
intrusions
unexpected
67. LutzandSikkink,
thisissue.

HardandSoftLaw 449
intothesovereignpreservesof powerfulcountries
whileallowingthemsignificant
influence
overdecisionmaking.Delegationtoadministrative
thanjudibodiesrather
cial organsallowspowerful
statesto retaincontroloverongoingissuemanagement.
The structure
and decision-making
rulesof thosebodies,includingformalvoting
meansofbalancingmembers'
procedures,
providefurther
interests.68
Softlegalizationprovidesotherimportant
groundsforcooperationas well. We
describedearlierhow legalizationhelps statessolve commitment
problems.This
pointbecomesrelevantwhenpowerfulstateswantsmallstatesto takeactionsthat
wouldleave themvulnerable.
in suchcases
Powerfulstatescan inducecooperation
of legallybindingrulesandprocedures,
by agreeingto operatewithina framework
themselvesfromopportunistic
crediblyconstraining
behavior;withlow levels of
delegation,
though,
theycan maintain
predominant
influence
overdecisionmaking.
Forexample,theUnitedStatesranitsGulfWaroperation
through
theUN Security
becausethishelpedit to
Council,{O,p,dj,eventhoughdoingso was burdensome,
fromweakerstates,including
mobilizevaluablesupport
bases in SaudiArabiaand
financing
fromJapan.InvolvingtheSecurityCouncilalso allowedthesupporting
statestomonitor
andinfluence
thescopeofU.S. activities,
theU.S.
notwithstanding
veto.69

of weak
Finally,even withoutan externalcommitment
problem,governments
statesmayfindit domestically
costlyto be perceivedas followingthedictatesof a
ina legalizedway,anddelegatstate.Organizing
international
powerful
arrangements
to international
thesecosts
ingmodestsupervisory
authority
agencies,can mitigate
without
withtheoutcomesdesiredbythepowerful
state.We have
undulyinterfering
elsewheredescribed
theroleofformal
organizations
as vehiclesforthis
intemational
typeof "laundering."70
Two examplesillustrate
how softnessfacilitates
and
bargainsbetweenstronger
weakerstates.TheLaw oftheSea Convention
of
expandedtheteiTitorial
sovereignty
littoralstates,gave less developedcountries
a rolein theexploitation
of ocean resuchrights
as military
states.Obligation
sources,andprotected
passageforpowerful
and precisionare highin mostpartsof theagreement,
butdelegationis limited68. Wherepoweris veryasymmetric,
dominant
statesmayprefer
bilateralbargaining.
ThusDoremus
findsthattheUnitedStatespursuedlegalizedarrangements
through
thepatentregimeforbiotechnology
wherebargaining
powerwas relatively
equal amongstates,usedthemorepoliticalmechanism
ofbilateral
reciprocity
forsemiconductors
wheretheUnitedStateswas mostpowerful,
anduseditsunilateral
power
to enforcethecopyright
regimeforsoftware
whereitspoweradvantagewas moderate.Doremus1996.
Doremusalso arguesthatlegalizationwillbe morelikelyduringstagesoftheproductcyclein whichno
country
has a strong
market
advantage.
oftheEasternblocduringtheCold Warprovidesanother
69. The legalization
intriguing
example.The
SovietUnionwas coercivelypreponderant
withinits sphereof influence
throughout
theperiod,butit
as morebalancedrelations.Beginningin the
learnedearlyon thatrule by stickwas not as efficient
theCouncilforMutualEconomicAssistance(CMEA) froman instrument
of
mid-1950s,it transformed
unilateral
controlintoan arrangement
thatoffered
EasternEuropeanstatesthecarrotof subsidizedand
securesuppliesof fueland rawmaterialsin exchangeforacquiescenceto Sovietcontrol.See Marreese
1986.The level of legalizationin theCMEA was low,Io,p,-},and theSovietUnioncouldreadilyhave
reverted
toa coercivestrategy,
as itdidinCzechoslovakiain 1968.Still,theCMEA promoted
continuing
cooperation
amongtheEasternbloc states.
70. AbbottandSnidal1998.

450 International
Organization
ithashandledveryfewdisputesalthough
theconvention
createsa specialtribunal
oftheEnterprise
andtheoperation
remainstobe workedoutinpractice.
an explicitbargain:weakerstates
The NuclearNon-Proliferation
Treatyreflected
acceptedtheexistingnuclearoligopoly;powerfulstatesagreedto pursueweapons
restraints
and technology
transfer.
Obligationwas high,thoughlimitedby escape
clausesandthetwenty-five-year
renegotiation
clause.Precisionwas highin limiting
thetransfer
ofmilitary
butlowerwithregardstocommercial
technology,
technology
transfers.
Delegationto theIAEA has beenlargelycontrolled
by themajorpowers
(whomonopolizethenecessary
expertise).
An understanding
ofsoftlegalization
helpsreconciletheseemingly
contradictory
viewsof theeffectof law. Viewedas a process,legalizationis a formof political
wherepowerful
statesare advantaged.
bargaining
However,theefficiency
gainsof
forthepowerful-cynically,
an efficient
meanstoextract
benlegalization
providing
efitsfromtheweak-dependontheiroffering
theweaksufficiently
terms
satisfactory
to inducetheirparticipation.
Viewedas an outcome,legalizationappearsless politiof legal principlesand
cal, sinceevenpowerfulstatesmustaccepttheconstraints
Yetpowerful
stateshavethe
discourseto takeadvantageoflegalizedarrangements.
on thesubstantive
associatedwith
greatest
influence
legalrules,andtheinstitutions
to ensurethema leading
(soft)international
legalizationarefrequently
constructed
voice.

The Role ofPrivateActors

In manyissue-areas,fromtradeand investment
to humanrightsand theenvironment,individuals
andprivategroupsaretheactorsmostresponsible
fornewinternain favorof thestatusquo. A
tionalagreements-andforresisting
new agreements
of researchhas documented
thegrowingrole of nonstateactors,including
flurry
traditional
interest
based on causal knowledgeand
groups,epistemiccommunities
International
professional
disciplines,71
andNGOs committed
tonormative
values.72
conferences
andorganizations
havebecomemoreaccessibletoprivategroups,allowingthemtoactinternationally
as wellas domestically.
Transnational
advocacycoalitionshaveemerged
Atthe
withthescopeofinternational
issuesandfora.73
congruent
sametime,individual
unitshaveincreasingly
governmental
engagedintransnational
rulemaking.
Thesetrends
thesystematic
ofinternational
haveinspired
reformulation
relations
froma "liberal"perspective74
toissuesofinternatheory
anditsapplication
tionallaw.75
The samedevelopments
lead us to considertheroleofnonstate
actorsin internaOurdiscussionthusfar,whilefocusedon states,hasbeenconsistionallegalization.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Haas 1992.
See Slaughter
1997a;Risse-Kappen1995a;andRaustiala1997.
KeckandSikkink1998.
Moravcsik1997.
Slaughter
1997band 1995a,b.

HardandSoftLaw 451
balancesofdomestic
tentwiththeliberalassumption
thatgovernment
actionsreflect
amonggovernmental
interests;
muchof thatdiscussionalso appliesto agreements
examinewhynonstate
actorspursuedifunits.In thissection,though,
we explicitly
formsof legalization.We considerthreetheoretical
a pluralist
perspectives:
ferent
nationalpreferences
accountin whichinteractions
amongprivategroupsdetermine
officials
and international
outcomes;a publicchoiceaccountin whichgovernment
napursueprivaterewards;and a statistaccountin which(partially)autonomous
tionalgovernments
interact
withprivateactors.
Pluralist Interactions

InAndrewMoravcsik'spureliberalaccount,individuals
within
andgroupsoperating
actorsininternational
politics.76
They"orga(andacross)statesarethefundamental
and values.National
nize exchangeand collectiveaction"to further
theirinterests
unitary
governments
merelyratify
theseprivatebargains,
actinginternationally-as
orthrough
theresulting
nationalpreferences.
entities
individual
units-toimplement
Thisviewimpliesthatvariations
indomesticpoliticswillproducenationalpreferences thatdivergemorewidelythanrationalist
modelsnormallyassume.For exon
thenegotiations
almostcertainly
characterized
ample,widedomesticvariations
Agenda21, {-,P-j, and theframework
Convention
on NationalMinorities,
1O,p,-1.
increasetransaction
and bargaining
probDivergent
preferences
costs,uncertainty,
lems,makingsoftlegalization
evenmorevaluable.
viewinginternational
Fundamentally,
however,Moravcsik'saccountis pluralist,
andgroups.
outcomes
as resulting
frominteractions
individuals
directly
amongprivate
Theseinteractions
betweendemandeur
groups
canbe understood
as politicalbargains
ornormative
to
andresister
groupsworking
seekingnewredistributive
arrangements
blockorweakenthem.
As withstates,privatedemandeurs
willnormally
pressforhardlaw,otherthings
enforcebeingequal,to raisethecostsofviolationforotherpartiesandto facilitate
mentagainstresister
groupsand governments,
includingtheirown.Thusbusiness
firms
favoreda
groupsin Mexicofavoreda legalizedNAFTAandhightechnology
onTrade-Related
Property
Rights
legalizedWTO Agreement
AspectsofIntellectual
in theILO resistedproposalsto emphasize
(TRIPs), whileworkerrepresentatives
recommendations
overbindingconventions.
Activist
legalgroupsseekinternational
izationtogainleverageindomestic
E. KeckandKathryn
politics,a processMargaret
Sikkinkcall the"boomerang
effect."77
Here,too,thedemandforhardlaw shouldbe
arehighandcomplianceis difficult
especiallystrongwhentherisksofopportunism
tomonitor.
Hardlegalization
also providesnewstrategies
fornonstate
actors.First,as Robert
0. Keohane,AndrewMoravcsik,andAnne-Marie
discussin thisissue,a
Slaughter
are opento private
growingnumberof international
disputesettlement
institutions
76. Moravcsik1997.
77. KeckandSikkink1998,12-13.

452 International
Organization
claimants,
substantially
altering
politicaldynamics.78
Second,wheninternational
leintonationallaw,privateactorscan invokethemin nagal rulesare incorporated
tionalcourtsandagencies.Multinational
firms,
advocacycoalitions,
andothertransat leastiftheyhavesufficient
nationalgroupsarebestsuitedtopursuethisstrategy,
resources.
evenwhenprivatelitigation
Finally,legalrulespresentnew strategies
is
to espousetheirlegal
restricted.
Privategroupscan,forexample,urgegovernments
investors
havelongdone;theWTO AppellateBodyhas recently
claims,as foreign
thatdisputesettlement
determined
panelscan acceptfriend-of-the-court
briefsfrom
NGOs.
Whenresister
groupsare able to bluntor deferdemandsforinternational
action,
a primeinstrument
softlegalization
offers
ofcompromise,
interjustas in interstate
actions.In thesesituations
demandeurs
willseektheparticular
formsoflegalization
theyarebestequippedtoutilize,whereasresister
groups,bythesamelogic,oppose
thoseelements
thatwouldbe mostcostlyforthem.Ifdemandeurs
arewellsituated
to
conductnationallitigation,
forexample,theymightdemandbindingand precise
directapplicability
intodomesticlegalsystems)
norms(tofacilitate
orincorporation
butbe willingto yield on international
delegation,fO,P,-I7

Activistdemandeurs
on precisenormative
stateappearto place a highpriority
often
ments,yieldingon otherelementswhennecessary,
{-,P,-}.This compromise
appearstosuittheneedsofbusinessandotherresister
groupsas well,sinceitavoids
Atthe1992Rio conference,
concretelegalenforcement.
forexample,afterbusiness
interests
blockedlegallybinding
onvariousissues,environmental
agreements
groups
turned
theirefforts
toobtaining
likethe
buthighlyelaborated
documents
nonbinding
Rio Declaration,
Agenda21, andtheForestPrinciples.
Instruments
like theseare valuabletoolsforactivists.Althoughtheycannotbe
invokedas law,theysupporta similarnormative
discourse.A majortechniqueof
activistcampaignsis to exposegapsbetweeninternational
commitments
andactual
conduct.80
butsoftundergovernment
Legal obligations
mightbe morecompelling,
committakingscan fuel "accountability
politics"if theycontainclearnormative
ments.Instruments
liketheBeijingDeclarationandtheHelsinkiFinalActalso give
to issuesandinitiate
legitimacy
politicalprocessesthatmaylead to harderlaw over
time.
PublicChoice
In thepublicchoice account,government
officialshave powerto affectpolitical
outcomesand actto further
theirownprivateredistributive
interests.
In effect,
offi-

of supranational
judges
78. Participation
by privateactorsis also crucialto thepoliticalstrategies
andthebodiesoflaw theyadminister.
seekingto enhancethestrength
andscopeoftheirowninstitutions
HelferandSlaughter1997.
79. The supporters
ofTRIPs didnothavetomakethischoice:theyobtainedbothdomesticimplemenWTO disputesettlement
system.
tationanddelegation
tothestrengthened
80. Keck andSikkink1998,24-25.

HardandSoftLaw 453
cialsbecomeanother
class ofprivateactornegotiating
politicalbargains.
As a result,
thisperspective
is explicitly
includedinMoravcsik'sformulation.
Froma publicchoiceperspective,
officials
pursueformsoflegalization
thatmaximizetheiropportunities
forreelection,
campaigncontributions,
bribes,orotherpersonalbenefits.
a highlylegalizedagreement
likeTRIPs
Thus,officials
mightsupport
as a wayof makingcrediblecommitments
for
to influential
privateactorsin return
electoralsupport.
Yet softlaw will oftenbe appealingin thepublicchoicecontext,especiallyto
officials.
Forone thing,softlegalizationallowsofficials
to supplypresgovernment
entbenefits
toprivatedemandeurs
whileretaining
thepossibility
ofextracting
future
rents.Legallybindingrulesare relatively
inflexible;
strongdelegationintroduces
additional
Precisebutnonbinding
actorswhomaybehaveunpredictably.
normative
commitments,
maybe theoptimalsolution.
I-,P,dl,
Softlegalization
also enablesrent-seeking
officials
tominimize
politicallossesin
thefaceofstrong
privatedistributional
conflicts.
In domesticpolitics,officials
facing
suchconflicts
resisttakingsides,hopingnotto alienateeithergroupofconstituents;
of
theyuse suchexpedients
as callingforfurther
study,
supporting
vaguestatements
orpassingthebucktoadministrative
principle,
agencies.Weakobligation,
precision,
anddelegation
aretheinternational
oftheseactions.
counterparts
such
formsofsoftlaw arecreatedin "transgovernmental"
Significant
institutions,
ofSecuas theBasle Committee
ofcentralbankersortheIntemational
Organization
ritiesCommissions.
Participants
do notrepresent
statesas such,butrather
individual
81 Publicchoicetheory
concerned
agencieswithinthe"state."
suggeststhatofficials
withadvancingtheirinfluence
toreinforce
theirpositions
canusetheseorganizations
orjustifynewregulations
athome.82
Participating
agenciesmaybe forcedtorelyon
softlaw becausetheylackauthority
Informal
toenterbindingtreaties.
arrangements
mayalso avoidexecutiveorlegislativeapprovalandpublicscrutiny.
Less cynically,
softlaw is wellsuitedtotheloose coordination
theseassociations
normally
pursue.
Statism
In a statistaccount-contrary
to thepurepublicchoiceview-governments
retain
to
and
accommodations
whichtheyexercise influence restrict
(some) autonomy,
are determined
amongprivateactors.Government
preferences
by factorssuchas
nationalself-preservation
andindependence,
relations
withotherstates,thenatureof
andprevailing
individualissue-areas,
ideas andnorms,as wellas domesticpolitics.
A simplestatist
actas "transmission
belts"
modelmightassumethatgovernments
forprivatebargainson mostissuesbutintervene
whenthosebargainswouldimpair
softlegalizationallowsgovernments
to renationalautonomy.
In thesesituations,
would
to
demands
while
costs.
One
spond private
limiting
sovereignty
expectgovandtolimitdelegaernments
inthesesettings
toavoidlegallybindingcommitments
2000.
81. See Zaring1998;andSlaughter
82. Colombatto
andMacey 1996.

454 International
Organization
tiontocompeting
centersofpower.Again,precisebutnonbinding
normswithweak
delegation,
would
be
a
frequent
outcome.
-1,
I-,P,
Here,too,theRio andBeijingconferences
areperfect
illustrations.
Although
environmental
and women'sgroupsare increasingly
influential,
at leastin manycountries,itis extremely
unlikely
thattheUnitedStatesorvirtually
anyothergovernment
wouldhaveacceptedtheinnovative
and expansiveRio andBeijingdeclarations
as
legallybindingobligations.
Yet in softlaw form,withsovereignty
costsas well as
economicandsocialcostslimited,
theywereadoptedbyalmosteverynationin the
world.
A morecomplexstatist
modelmightcreditstateswitha broaderrangeofindepenas aninstrument
ofaccommodentpreferences.
Softlegalization
wouldthenfunction
dationbetweenthestateandprivateactors,as well as amongprivateactors.When
theUnitedStateswas considering
of NAFTA,forexample,laborand
ratification
otherconstituencies
demandedlegallybindingruleson laborrights.The Clinton
administration
wishedto respond,
butit was also aware-quite apartfromcounterto interference
in its internal
vailingbusinesspressures-ofMexico's sensitivity
affairs.
Consequently,
theadministration
addressedlaborrightsin a side agreement
thatwas legallybinding,quiteprecisein termsof theparties'obligationto enforce
nationallaborlaws,and withmoderatedelegation,
In addressing
theconfO,P,dl.83
tentofnationallaborlaws,though,
U.S. negotiators
acceptedmarkedly
vaguerules
andweakerdelegation,
[-,p,d).
Statesandprivateactorsmightalso havedivergent
discountrates.At thetimeof
theHelsinkiconference,
activist
forprogress
groupswereimpatient
onhumanrights,
butWestern
weremorepatient.
The UnitedStatesalso hopedto retain
govemments
on humanrightsso thatit couldpursuetradeand security
issues.In the
flexibility
declaration.
end,U.S. negotiators
accepteda nonbinding
use different
oflegalizaGivenindependent
forms
preferences,
governments
might
tionoffensively
as wellas defensively.
Theycould,forexample,use bindingagreementsto forestall
demandsof moderately
domesticgroups.Alternatively,
powerful
orimprecise
tointroduce
theycoulduse nonbinding
agreements
potentially
unpopularnewrulestodomestic
audiences."Framework"
liketheViennaOzone
agreements
Convention
andtheWTO servicesagreement
changepoliticaldiscourseandcreate
forprivateactorstoadjust,butleavecostlyregulation
forthefuture.
incentives

Conclusion
Wehaveanalyzedthespectrum
ofinternational
fromsoftinformal
legalization
agreementsthrough
intermediate
blendsof obligation,
precision,and delegationto hard
law does notapproachstereoevenhardinternational
legalarrangements.
Although
international
oflaw basedon advanceddomesticlegalsystems,
typicalconceptions
83. The parallelagreement
on environmental
includedan innovative
protection
provisionallowing
privatepartiestoinitiate
reviewsofcompliance.

HardandSoftLaw 455
legalizationnevertheless
represents
a distinctive
formof institutionalization.
Ultimately,
we canonlyunderstand
theinclination
ofactorstocasttheirrelations
inlegal
andthevariety
ofwaysin whichtheydo so,intermsofthevaluethoseinstituform,
tionalformsprovideforthem.Put plainly,international
legalizationis a diverse
phenomenon
becauseit helpsa diverseuniverseof statesand otheractorsresolve
diverseproblems.
Legalizationreflects
a seriesof tradeoffs.
Statesare typically
tornbetweenthe
ofhardlegalization-forexample,mitigating
benefits
commitment
and incomplete
contracting
problems-andthesovereignty
costsit entails.For theirpart,private
actorsgenerallyseek hardlegal arrangements
thatreflecttheirparticular
interests
andvalues,butthesedemandsoftenconflict
withthoseofotherprivateactorsor of
In settings
likethese,softlegalization
governments.
helpsbalancecompeting
considerations,
offering
techniquesforcompromise
amongstates,amongprivateactors,
andbetweenstatesand privateactors.In addition,softlaw helpsactorshandlethe
exigenciesofuncertainty
andaccommodate
powerdifferentials.
Our analysisnecessarily
combinestherationalincentives
associatedwith"contracts"andthenormative
considerations
associatedwith"covenants."Legalization
is a strategy
through
whichactorspursuetheirinterests
andvalues;italso suppliesa
and identities.
thatshapeactors'behavior,
bodyof normsandprocedures
interests,
Thus,thoughwe premiseour analysison thenotionof actorsrationally
pursuing
goals,we arguethattheydo so knowingthatlegalization
embedsthemin a partially
theirbehaviorand maymodify
autonomous
processand discoursethatconstrains
important
understandings.
The warinesswithwhichstatesregardtheprospectof
enmeshment
in suchnormative
tothepoweroflegalizationprocessesis testimony
softandhard.
Moregenerally,
themanyformsoflegalizationremindus thatinternational
politicsandinternational
law arenotalternative
Alrealms,butaredeeplyintertwined.
in general-is to settlekeyissuesso that
thoughone goal oflaw-as ofinstitutions
actorscanregularize
theirinteractions,
thecreation
anddevelopment
oflegalarrangementsis highlypolitical.This is especiallytruein theinternational
sphere,where
mostlegalregimesarerelatively
newand undeveloped.
Politicspermeates
internationallaw andlimitsitsautonomy.
international
FromtheprinConversely,
politicsis rootedin legalconsiderations.
thatdefinemodernnation-states,
therulesof diplociplesof sovereignty
through
theirinteractions,
to thespecificregimes
macy,war,and commercethatstructure
and normative
the
theycreate,legalizedagreements
processesguideand constrain
behaviorof states.Without
thisfoundation
in law,neither
statesnoranalystscould
makesenseofinternational
interactions.
Thedeepconnection
oflaw andpoliticsis mostapparent
intheareaofdelegation.
to independent
Statesalmostneverdelegateauthority
courtsofgeneralandmandalikethoseofadvanceddomesticlegalsystems-although
morecontoryjurisdiction
strained
and is supplemented
in many
judicialdelegationappearsto be increasing
casesbytheparticipation
ofnationalcourts.Moretypically,
eveninconnection
with
bindinglegal commitments,
theydelegateauthority
onlyto international
organiza-

456 International
Organization
tionsorotheradministrative
bodiessubjecttodirectandindirect
controls.
Thischoice
of venuelimitstheextentto whichinteractions
can be governedby purelylegal
procedures
anddiscourse.
In forecasting
thefuture
ofinternational
legalization,
we subscribeto thetheories
ofneither
andespePollyannanorChickenLittle.To be sure,thetwentieth
century
ciallytheperiodfollowing
WorldWarII witnesseda remarkable
expansionofinterButinlargepartthatgrowth
nationallegalization.
instimerelyallowedinternational
tutions
tocatchup withthedramatic
changesin globalization
(nee interdependence)
thathad overtaken
theinherited
framework.
It does notfollowthatintemational
legalizationwill continueat thesame rate,or thatthe apparenttendencytoward
(somewhat)harderlegalization
willcontinue.
Indeed,a centralpartofourargument
is thatstatesandnonstate
softlegalactorscan achievemanyoftheirgoalsthrough
izationthatis moreeasilyattained
orevenpreferable.
In thislight,we arguevigorously
againstthosewhodiscount
international
legalizationbecauseitis so oftensoft.Softlaw is valuableon itsown,notjustas a steppingstoneto hardlaw. Softlaw providesa basis forefficient
international
"contracts,"
and ithelpscreatenormative
"covenants"and discoursesthatcan reshapeintemationalpolitics.International
legalizationin all itsformsmustbe consideredone of
relations.
themostsignificant
institutional
features
ofinternational