FIPS PUB 202

FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS

PUBLICATION

SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and

Extendable-Output Functions

CATEGORY: COMPUTER SECURITY

SUBCATEGORY: CRYPTOGRAPHY

Information Technology Laboratory

National Institute of Standards and Technology
Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8900
This publication is available free of charge from:
http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.202
August 2015

U.S. Department of Commerce

Penny Pritzker, Secretary
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Willie May, Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology and Director

FOREWORD
The Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication Series of the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is the official series of publications relating
to standards and guidelines adopted and promulgated under the provisions of the Federal
Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002.
Comments concerning FIPS publications are welcomed and should be addressed to the
Director, Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and
Technology, 100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8900, Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8900.
Charles H. Romine, Director
Information Technology Laboratory

ii

Abstract
This Standard specifies the Secure Hash Algorithm-3 (SHA-3) family of functions on
binary data. Each of the SHA-3 functions is based on an instance of the KECCAK
algorithm that NIST selected as the winner of the SHA-3 Cryptographic Hash Algorithm
Competition. This Standard also specifies the KECCAK-p family of mathematical
permutations, including the permutation that underlies KECCAK, in order to facilitate the
development of additional permutation-based cryptographic functions.
The SHA-3 family consists of four cryptographic hash functions, called SHA3-224,
SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512, and two extendable-output functions (XOFs),
called SHAKE128 and SHAKE256.
Hash functions are components for many important information security applications,
including 1) the generation and verification of digital signatures, 2) key derivation, and 3)
pseudorandom bit generation. The hash functions specified in this Standard supplement
the SHA-1 hash function and the SHA-2 family of hash functions that are specified in
FIPS 180-4, the Secure Hash Standard.
Extendable-output functions are different from hash functions, but it is possible to use
them in similar ways, with the flexibility to be adapted directly to the requirements of
individual applications, subject to additional security considerations.

Key words: computer security, cryptography, extendable-output function, Federal

Information Processing Standard, hash algorithm, hash function, information security,
KECCAK, message digest, permutation, SHA-3, sponge construction, sponge function,
XOF.

iii

Federal Information
Processing Standards Publication 202
August 2015
Announcing the

SHA-3 STANDARD: PERMUTATION-BASED HASH

AND EXTENDABLE OUTPUT FUNCTIONS
Federal Information Processing Standards Publications (FIPS PUBS) are issued by the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) after approval by the Secretary of Commerce
pursuant to Section 5131 of the Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996
(Public Law 104-106), and the Computer Security Act of 1987 (Public Law 100-235).
1. Name of Standard: SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output
Functions (FIPS PUB 202).
2. Category of Standard: Computer Security Standard, Cryptography.
3. Explanation: This Standard (FIPS 202) specifies the Secure Hash Algorithm-3 (SHA-3)
family of functions on binary data. Each of the SHA-3 functions is based on an instance of the
KECCAK algorithm that NIST selected as the winner of the SHA-3 Cryptographic Hash
Algorithm Competition. This Standard also specifies the KECCAK-p family of mathematical
permutations, including the permutation that underlies KECCAK, which can serve as the main
components of additional cryptographic functions that may be specified in the future.
The SHA-3 family consists of four cryptographic hash functions and two extendable-output
functions (XOFs). The cryptographic hash functions are called SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3384, and SHA3-512; and the XOFs are called SHAKE128 and SHAKE256.
For hash functions, the input is called the message, and the output is called the (message) digest
or the hash value. The length of the message can vary; the length of the digest is fixed. A
cryptographic hash function is a hash function that is designed to provide special properties,
including collision resistance and preimage resistance, that are important for many applications
in information security. For example, a cryptographic hash function increases the security and
efficiency of a digital signature scheme when the digest is digitally signed instead of the message
itself. In this context, the collision resistance of the hash function provides assurance that the
original message could not have been altered to a different message with the same hash value,
and hence, the same signature. Other applications of cryptographic hash functions include
pseudorandom bit generation, message authentication codes, and key derivation functions.

iv

The four SHA-3 hash functions specified in this Standard supplement the hash functions that are
specified in FIPS 180-4 [1]: SHA-1 and the SHA-2 family. Together, both Standards provide
resilience against future advances in hash function analysis, because they rely on fundamentally
different design principles. In addition to design diversity, the hash functions in this Standard
provide some complementary implementation and performance characteristics to those in FIPS
180-4.
For XOFs, the length of the output can be chosen to meet the requirements of individual
applications. The XOFs can be specialized to hash functions, subject to additional security
considerations, or used in a variety of other applications. The approved uses of XOFs will be
specified in NIST Special Publications.
The KECCAK-p permutations were designed to be suitable as the main components for a variety
of cryptographic functions, including keyed functions for authentication and/or encryption. The
six SHA-3 functions can be considered as modes of operation (modes) of the KECCAKp[1600,24] permutation. In the future, additional modes of this permutation or other KECCAK-p
permutations may be specified and approved in FIPS publications or in NIST Special
Publications.
4. Approving Authority: Secretary of Commerce.
5. Maintenance Agency: U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST), Information Technology Laboratory (ITL).
6. Applicability: This Standard is applicable to all Federal departments and agencies for the
protection of sensitive unclassified information that is not subject to Title 10 United States Code
Section 2315 (10 USC 2315) and that is not within a national security system as defined in Title
40 United States Code Section 11103(a)(1) (40 USC 11103(a)(1)). Either this Standard or
Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 180 must be implemented wherever a secure
hash algorithm is required for Federal applications, including as a component within other
cryptographic algorithms and protocols. This Standard may be adopted and used by non-Federal
Government organizations.
7. Specifications: Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 202, SHA-3 Standard:
Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions (affixed).
8. Implementations: Federal departments and agencies shall only use implementations of the
KECCAK-p permutations within FIPS-approved or NIST-recommended modes of operation, such
as the SHA-3 functions that are specified in this Standard. The SHA-3 functions may be
implemented in software, firmware, hardware or any combination thereof. Only implementations
of these functions that are validated by the Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program will be
considered as complying with this Standard. Information about the validation program can be
obtained at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/index.html.

9. Implementation Schedule: This Standard is effective immediately. Applications or

extensions of this Standard that depend upon the release of new or revised NIST Special
Publications are effective upon final publication of the supporting Special Publications.
10. Patents: Implementations of the SHA-3 functions in this Standard may be covered by U.S. or
foreign patents.
11. Export Control: Certain cryptographic devices and technical data regarding them are
subject to Federal export controls. Exports of cryptographic modules implementing this Standard
and technical data regarding them must comply with these Federal regulations and be licensed by
the Bureau of Export Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce. Information about
export regulations is available at: http://www.bis.doc.gov/index.htm.
12. Qualifications: Although this Standard specifies mathematical functions that are suitable
components for information security applications, conformance to this Standard does not assure
that a particular implementation is secure. The responsible authority in each agency or
department shall assure that an overall implementation provides an acceptable level of security.
This Standard will be reviewed every five years in order to assess its adequacy.
13. Waiver Procedure: The Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) does not
allow for waivers to a FIPS that is made mandatory by the Secretary of Commerce.
14. Where to Obtain Copies of the Standard: This publication is available electronically at
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/. Other computer security publications issued by NIST are
available at the same web site.

vi

Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 202

Specifications for the

SHA-3 STANDARD: PERMUTATION-BASED

HASH AND EXTENDABLE-OUTPUT FUNCTIONS
1

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................1

GLOSSARY ..........................................................................................................................................................2
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4

TERMS AND ACRONYMS ....................................................................................................................2

ALGORITHM PARAMETERS AND OTHER VARIABLES ..........................................................................4
BASIC OPERATIONS AND FUNCTIONS .................................................................................................5
SPECIFIED FUNCTIONS .......................................................................................................................6

KECCAK-P PERMUTATIONS..........................................................................................................................7
3.1

3.2

3.3
3.4

STATE ................................................................................................................................................7
3.1.1 Parts of the State Array ........................................................................................................8
3.1.2 Converting Strings to State Arrays .......................................................................................9
3.1.3 Converting State Arrays to Strings ..................................................................................... 10
3.1.4 Labeling Convention for the State Array ............................................................................ 11
STEP MAPPINGS ............................................................................................................................... 11
3.2.1 Specification of ................................................................................................................ 11
3.2.2 Specification of ................................................................................................................ 12
3.2.3 Specification of ................................................................................................................ 14
3.2.4 Specification of ................................................................................................................ 15
3.2.5 Specification of ................................................................................................................. 15
KECCAK-p[b, nr] .............................................................................................................................. 16
COMPARISON WITH KECCAK-f ......................................................................................................... 17

SPONGE CONSTRUCTION ............................................................................................................................ 17

KECCAK ............................................................................................................................................................. 19
5.1
5.2

SPECIFICATION OF pad10*1 ............................................................................................................. 19

SPECIFICATION OF KECCAK[c] ......................................................................................................... 20

SHA-3 FUNCTION SPECIFICATIONS .......................................................................................................... 20

6.1
6.2
6.3

SHA-3 HASH FUNCTIONS ................................................................................................................ 20

SHA-3 EXTENDABLE-OUTPUT FUNCTIONS ..................................................................................... 20
ALTERNATE DEFINITIONS OF SHA-3 EXTENDABLE-OUTPUT FUNCTIONS ....................................... 21

CONFORMANCE .............................................................................................................................................. 21

SECURITY ......................................................................................................................................................... 23
A.1
A.2

SUMMARY........................................................................................................................................ 23
ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATION FOR EXTENDABLE-OUTPUT FUNCTIONS .......................................... 24

EXAMPLES........................................................................................................................................................ 25
B.1
B.2

CONVERSION FUNCTIONS ................................................................................................................ 26

HEXADECIMAL FORM OF PADDING BITS .......................................................................................... 27

OBJECT IDENTIFIERS ................................................................................................................................... 28

REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................................... 28

vii

Figures
Figure 1:
Figure 2:
Figure 3:
Figure 4:
Figure 5:
Figure 6:
Figure 7:

Parts of the state array, organized by dimension [8] ...................................................... 8

The x, y, and z coordinates for the diagrams of the step mappings .............................. 11
Illustration of applied to a single bit [8] .................................................................... 12
Illustration of for b = 200 [8] ..................................................................................... 13
Illustration of applied to a single slice [8] ................................................................. 14
Illustration of applied to a single row [8] .................................................................. 15
The sponge construction: Z = SPONGE[f, pad, r](N, d) [4] ............................................ 18
Tables

Table 1:
Table 2:
Table 3:
Table 4:
Table 5:
Table 6:

KECCAK-p permutation widths and related quantities ..................................................... 7

Offsets of [8] ............................................................................................................... 13
Input block sizes for HMAC.......................................................................................... 22
Security strengths of the SHA-1, SHA-2, and SHA-3 functions ................................... 23
Illustration of h2b .......................................................................................................... 27
Hexadecimal Form of SHA-3 Padding for Byte-Aligned Messages ............................. 28

viii

1 INTRODUCTION
This Standard specifies a new family of functions that supplement SHA-1 and the SHA-2 family
of hash functions specified in FIPS 180-4 [1]. This family, called SHA-3 (Secure Hash
Algorithm-3), is based on KECCAK [2]the algorithm1 that NIST selected as the winner of the
public SHA-3 Cryptographic Hash Algorithm Competition [3]. The SHA-3 family consists of
four cryptographic hash functions and two extendable-output functions. These six functions
share the structure that is described in [4], namely, the sponge construction; functions with this
structure are called sponge functions.
A hash function is a function on binary data (i.e., bit strings) for which the length of the output is
fixed.2 The input to a hash function is called the message, and the output is called the (message)
digest or hash value. The digest often serves as a condensed representation of the message. The
four SHA-3 hash functions are named SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512; in
each case, the suffix after the dash indicates the fixed length of the digest, e.g., SHA3-256
produces 256-bit digests. The SHA-2 functions, i.e., SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 SHA-512,
SHA-512/224, and SHA-512/256, offer the same set of digest lengths. Thus, the SHA-3 hash
functions can be implemented as alternatives to the SHA-2 functions, or vice versa.
An extendable-output function (XOF) is a function on bit strings (also called messages) in which
the output can be extended to any desired length. The two SHA-3 XOFs are named SHAKE128
and SHAKE256.3 The suffixes 128 and 256 indicate the security strengths that these two
functions can generally4 support, in contrast to the suffixes for the hash functions, which indicate
the digest lengths. SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are the first XOFs that NIST has standardized.
The six SHA-3 functions are designed to provide special properties, such as resistance to
collision, preimage, and second preimage attacks. The level of resistance to these three types of
attacks is summarized in Sec. A.1. Cryptographic hash functions are fundamental components in
a variety of information security applications, such as digital signature generation and
verification, key derivation, and pseudorandom bit generation.
The digest lengths in FIPS-approved hash functions are 160, 224, 256, 384, and 512 bits. When
an application requires a cryptographic hash function with a non-standard digest length, an XOF
is a natural alternative to constructions that involve multiple invocations of a hash function
and/or truncation of the output bits. However, XOFs are subject to the additional security
consideration that is described in Sec. A.2.
Each of the six SHA-3 functions employs the same underlying permutation as the main
component in the sponge construction. In effect, the SHA-3 functions are modes of operation

More precisely, the competition called for four hash functions, and KECCAK is a larger family of functions.
For many hash functions, there is a (very large) bound on the length of the input data.
3
The name SHAKE was proposed in [5] to combine the term Secure Hash Algorithm with KECCAK.
4
An exception is when the output length is sufficiently small; see the discussion in Sec. A.1.
2

(modes) of the permutation. In this Standard, the permutation is specified as an instance of a

family of permutations, called KECCAK-p, in order to provide the flexibility to modify its size
and security parameters in the development of any additional modes in future documents.
The four SHA-3 hash functions differ slightly from the instances of KECCAK that were proposed
for the SHA-3 competition [3]. In particular, a two-bit suffix is appended to the messages, in
order to distinguish the SHA-3 hash functions from the SHA-3 XOFs, and to facilitate the
development of new variants of the SHA-3 functions that can be dedicated to individual
application domains.
The two SHA-3 XOFs are also specified in a manner that allows for the development of
dedicated variants. Moreover, the SHA-3 XOFs are compatible with the Sakura coding scheme
[6] for tree hashing [7], in order to support the development of parallelizable variants of the
XOFs, to be specified in a separate document.
Most of the notation and terminology in this Standard is consistent with the specification of
KECCAK in [8].

2 GLOSSARY
2.1 Terms and Acronyms
bit

A binary digit: 0 or 1. In this Standard, bits are indicated in the Courier

New font.

byte

A sequence of eight bits.

capacity

In the sponge construction, the width of the underlying function minus the
rate.

column

For a state array, a sub-array of five bits with constant x and z coordinates.

digest

The output of a cryptographic hash function. Also called the hash value.

domain separation

For a function, a partitioning of the inputs to different application domains

so that no input is assigned to more than one domain.

extendable-output
function (XOF)

A function on bit strings in which the output can be extended to any

desired length.

FIPS

Federal Information Processing Standard.

FISMA

Federal Information Security Management Act.

hash function

A function on bit strings in which the length of the output is fixed. The
output often serves as a condensed representation of the input.
2

hash value

See digest.

HMAC

Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code.

KDF

Key derivation function.

KECCAK

The family of all sponge functions with a KECCAK-f permutation as the

underlying function and multi-rate padding as the padding rule. KECCAK
was originally specified in [8].

lane

For a state array of a KECCAK-p permutation with width b, a sub-array of

b/25 bits with constant x and y coordinates.

message

A bit string of any length that is the input to a SHA-3 function.

multi-rate padding

The padding rule pad10*1, whose output is a 1, followed by a (possibly

empty) string of 0s, followed by a 1.

NIST

National Institute of Standards and Technology.

plane

For a state array of a KECCAK-p permutation with width b, a sub-array of

b/5 bits with a constant y coordinate.

rate

In the sponge construction, the number of input bits processed or output

bits generated per invocation of the underlying function.

round

The sequence of step mappings that is iterated in the calculation of a

KECCAK-p permutation.

round constant

For each round of a KECCAK-p permutation, a lane value that is

determined by the round index. The round constant is the second input to
the step mapping.

round index

The value of the integer index for the rounds of a KECCAK-p permutation.

row

For a state array, a sub-array of five bits with constant y and z coordinates.

SHA-3

Secure Hash Algorithm-3.

SHAKE

Secure Hash Algorithm KECCAK.

sheet

For a state array of a KECCAK-p permutation with width b, a sub-array of

b/5 bits with a constant x coordinate.

slice

For a state array, a sub-array of 25 bits with a constant z coordinate.

sponge construction The method originally specified in [4] for defining a function from the
following: 1) an underlying function on bit strings of a fixed length, 2) a
padding rule, and 3) a rate. Both the input and the output of the resulting
function are bit strings that can be arbitrarily long.
sponge function

A function that is defined according to the sponge construction, possibly

specialized to a fixed output length.

state

An array of bits that is repeatedly updated within a computational

procedure. For a KECCAK-p permutation, the state is represented either as
a three-dimensional array or as a bit string.

state array

For a KECCAK-p permutation, a 5-by-5-by-w array of bits that represents

the state. The indices for the x, y, and z coordinates range from 0 to 4, 0 to
4, and 0 to w-1, respectively.

step mapping

One of the five components of a round of a KECCAK-p permutation: , ,

, , or .

string

For a nonnegative integer m, a sequence of m symbols.

width

In the sponge construction, the fixed length of the inputs and the outputs
of the underlying function.

XOF

See extendable-output function.

XOR

The Boolean Exclusive-OR operation, denoted by the symbol .

2.2 Algorithm Parameters and Other Variables

A

A state array.

A[x, y, z]

For a state array A, the bit that corresponds to the triple (x, y, z).

The width of a KECCAK-p permutation in bits.

The capacity of a sponge function.

The length of the digest of a hash function or the requested length of the
output of an XOF, in bits.

The generic underlying function for the sponge construction.

ir

The round index for a KECCAK-p permutation.

The input string to RawSHAKE128 or RawSHAKE256.

For a KECCAK-p permutation, the binary logarithm of the lane size, i.e.,
log2(w).

Lane (i, j)

For a state array A, a string of all the bits of the lane whose x and y
coordinates are i and j.

The input string to a SHA-3 hash or XOF function.

The input string to SPONGE[f, pad, r] or KECCAK[c].

nr

The number of rounds for a KECCAK-p permutation.

pad

The generic padding rule for the sponge construction.

Plane (j)

For a state array A, a string of all the bits of the plane whose y coordinate
is j.

The rate of a sponge function.

RC

For a round of a KECCAK-p permutation, the round constant.

The lane size of a KECCAK-p permutation in bits, i.e., b/25.

2.3 Basic Operations and Functions

0s

For a positive integer s, 0s is the string that consists of s consecutive 0s. If

s = 0, then 0s is the empty string.

len(X)

For a bit string X, len(X) is the length of X in bits.

X[i]

For a string X and an integer i such that 0 i < len(X), X[i] is the bit of X
with index i. Bit strings are depicted with indices increasing from left to
right, so that X[0] appears at the left, followed by X[1], etc. For example,
if X = 101000, then X[2] = 1.

Truncs (X)

For a positive integer s and a string X, Truncs (X) is the string comprised of
bits X[0] to X[s 1]. For example, Trunc2(10100) = 10.

XY

For strings X and Y of equal bit length, X Y is the string that results from
applying the Boolean exclusive-OR operation to X and Y at each bit
position. For example, 1100 1010 = 0110.

X || Y

For strings X and Y, X || Y is the concatenation of X and Y. For example,

11001 || 010 = 11001010.

m/n

For integers m and n, m/n is the quotient, i.e., m divided by n.

5

m mod n

For integers m and n, m mod n is the integer r for which 0 r < n and mr
is a multiple of n. For example, 11 mod 5 = 1, and 11 mod 5 = 4.

For a real number x, x is the least integer that is not strictly less than x.
For example, 3.2 = 4, 3.2 = 3, and 6 = 6.

log2(x)

For a positive real number x, log2(x) is the real number y such that 2y = x.

min(x, y)

For real numbers x and y, min(x, y) is the minimum of x and y. For

example, min(9, 33) = 9.

2.4 Specified Functions

The following higher-level functions are specified in this Standard:
, , , ,

The five step mappings that comprise a round.

KECCAK[c]

The KECCAK instance with KECCAK-f [1600] as the underlying permutation

and capacity c.

KECCAK-f [b]

The family of seven permutations originally specified in [8] as the

underlying function for KECCAK. The set of values for the width b of the
permutations is {25, 50, 100, 200, 400, 800, 1600}.

KECCAK-p[b, nr]

The generalization of the KECCAK-f [b] permutations that is defined in this

Standard by converting the number of rounds nr to an input parameter.

pad10*1

The multi-rate padding rule for KECCAK, originally specified in [8].

RawSHAKE128

An intermediate function in the alternate definition of SHAKE128.

RawSHAKE256

An intermediate function in the alternate definition of SHAKE256.

rc

The function that generates the variable bits of the round constants.

Rnd

The round function of a KECCAK-p permutation.

SHA3-224

The SHA-3 hash function that produces 224-bit digests.

SHA3-256

The SHA-3 hash function that produces 256-bit digests.

SHA3-384

The SHA-3 hash function that produces 384-bit digests.

SHA3-512

The SHA-3 hash function that produces 512-bit digests.

SHAKE128

The SHA-3 XOF that generally supports 128 bits of security strength, if

the output is sufficiently long; see Sec. A.1.

SHAKE256

The SHA-3 XOF that generally supports 256 bits of security strength, if
the output is sufficiently long; see Sec. A.1.

SPONGE[f, pad, r]

The sponge function in which the underlying function is f, the padding

rule is pad, and the rate is r.

3 KECCAK-p PERMUTATIONS
In this section, the KECCAK-p permutations are specified, with two parameters: 1) the fixed
length of the strings that are permuted, called the width of the permutation, and 2) the number of
iterations of an internal transformation, called a round. The width is denoted by b, and the
number of rounds is denoted by nr. The KECCAK-p permutation with nr rounds and width b is
denoted by KECCAK-p[b, nr]; the permutation is defined for any b in {25, 50, 100, 200, 400, 800,
1600} and any positive integer nr.
A round of a KECCAK-p permutation, denoted by Rnd, consists of a sequence of five
transformations, which are called the step mappings. The permutation is specified in terms of an
array of values for b bits that is repeatedly updated, called the state; the state is initially set to the
input values of the permutation.
The notation and terminology for the state are described in Sec. 3.1. The step mappings are
specified in Sec. 3.2. The KECCAK-p permutations, including the round function Rnd, are
specified in Sec. 3.3. The relationship of the KECCAK-p permutations to the KECCAK-f
permutations that were defined for KECCAK in [8] is described in Sec. 3.4.

3.1 State
The state for the KECCAK-p[b, nr] permutation is comprised of b bits. The specifications in this
Standard contain two other quantities related to b: b/25 and log2(b/25), denoted by w and l,
respectively. The seven possible values for these variables that are defined for the KECCAK-p
permutations are given in the columns of Table 1 below.
b
w
l

25
1
0

50
2
1

100
4
2

200
8
3

400
16
4

800
32
5

1600
64
6

Table 1: KECCAK-p permutation widths and related quantities

It is convenient to represent the input and output states of the permutation as b-bit strings, and to
represent the input and output states of the step mappings as 5-by-5-by-w arrays of bits. If S
denotes a string that represents the state, then its bits are indexed from 0 to b1, so that
S = S[0] || S[1] || || S[b-2] || S[b-1].

If A denotes a 5-by-5-by-w array of bits that represents the state, then its indices are the integer
triples (x, y, z) for which 0 x < 5, 0 y < 5, and 0 z < w. The bit that corresponds to (x, y, z) is
denoted by A[x, y, z]. A state array is a representation of the state by a three-dimensional array
that is indexed in this manner.
3.1.1 Parts of the State Array

Figure 1: Parts of the state array, organized by dimension [8]

The state array for a KECCAK-p permutation, and its lower-dimensional sub-arrays, are illustrated
in Figure 1 above for the case b = 200, so that w = 8. The two-dimensional sub-arrays are called
sheets, planes, and slices, and the single-dimensional sub-arrays are called rows, columns, and
lanes. The algebraic definitions of these sub-arrays are given in the Glossary, in Sec. 2.1.
3.1.2 Converting Strings to State Arrays
Let S denote a string of b bits that represents the state for the KECCAK-p[b, nr] permutation. The
corresponding state array, denoted by A, is defined as follows:
For all triples (x, y, z) such that 0 x < 5, 0 y < 5, and 0 z < w,
A[x, y, z] = S [w(5y + x) + z].
For example, if b= 1600, so that w= 64, then
A[0, 0, 0] = S [0]
A[0, 0, 1] = S [1]
A[0, 0, 2] = S [2]

A[0, 0, 61] = S [61]

A[0, 0, 62] = S [62]
A[0, 0, 63] = S [63]

A[1, 0, 0] = S [64]
A[1, 0, 1] = S [65]
A[1, 0, 2] = S [66]

A[1, 0, 61] = S [125]

A[1, 0, 62] = S [126]
A[1, 0, 63] = S [127]

A[0, 1, 0] = S [320]
A[0, 1, 1] = S [321]
A[0, 1, 2] = S [322]

A[0, 1, 61] = S [381]

A[0, 1, 62] = S [382]
A[0, 1, 63] = S [383]

A[1, 1, 0] = S [384]
A[1, 1, 1] = S [385]
A[1, 1, 2] = S [386]

A[1, 1, 61] = S [445]

A[1, 1, 62] = S [446]
A[1, 1, 63] = S [447]

A[4, 1, 0] = S [576]
A[4, 1, 1] = S [577]
A[4, 1, 2] = S [578]

A[4, 1, 61] = S [637]

A[4, 1, 62] = S [638]
A[4, 1, 63] = S [639]

A[0, 2, 0] = S [640]
A[0, 2, 1] = S [641]
A[0, 2, 2] = S [642]

A[0, 2, 61] = S [701]

A[0, 2, 62] = S [702]
A[0, 2, 63] = S [703]

A[1, 2, 0] = S [704]
A[1, 2, 1] = S [705]
A[1, 2, 2] = S [706]

A[1, 2, 61] = S [765]

A[1, 2, 62] = S [766]
A[1, 2, 63] = S [767]

A[4, 2, 0] = S [896]
A[4, 2, 1] = S [897]
A[4, 2, 2] = S [898]

A[4, 2, 61] = S [957]

A[4, 2, 62] = S [958]
A[4, 2, 63] = S [959]

A[4, 0, 0] = S [256]
A[4, 0, 1] = S [257]
A[4, 0, 2] = S [258]

A[4, 0, 61] = S [317]

A[4, 0, 62] = S [318]
A[4, 0, 63] = S [319]

and

and

etc.

3.1.3 Converting State Arrays to Strings

Let A denote a state array. The corresponding string representation, denoted by S, can be
constructed from the lanes and planes of A, as follows:
For each pair of integers (i, j) such that 0 i < 5 and 0 j < 5, define the string Lane (i, j) by
Lane (i, j) = A[i, j, 0] || A[i, j, 1] || A[i, j, 2] || || A[i, j, w-2] || A[i, j, w-1].
For example, if b = 1600, so that w = 64, then
Lane (0, 0) = A[0, 0, 0] || A[0, 0, 1] || A[0, 0, 2] || || A[0, 0, 62] || A[0, 0, 63]
Lane (1, 0) = A[1, 0, 0] || A[1, 0, 1] || A[1, 0, 2] || || A[1, 0, 62] || A[1, 0, 63]
Lane (2, 0) = A[2, 0, 0] || A[2, 0, 1] || A[2, 0, 2] || || A[2, 0, 62] || A[2, 0, 63]
etc.
For each integer j such that 0 j < 5, define the string Plane (j) by
Plane (j) = Lane (0, j) || Lane (1, j) || Lane (2, j) || Lane (3, j) || Lane (4, j).
Then
S = Plane (0) || Plane (1) || Plane (2) || Plane (3) || Plane (4).
For example, if b = 1600, so that w = 64, then
S=

A[0, 0, 0] || A[0, 0, 1] || A[0, 0, 2] || || A[0, 0, 62] || A[0, 0, 63]

|| A[1, 0, 0] || A[1, 0, 1] || A[1, 0, 2] || || A[1, 0, 62] || A[1, 0, 63]
|| A[2, 0, 0] || A[2, 0, 1] || A[2, 0, 2] || || A[2, 0, 62] || A[2, 0, 63]
|| A[3, 0, 0] || A[3, 0, 1] || A[3, 0, 2] || || A[3, 0, 62] || A[3, 0, 63]
|| A[4, 0, 0] || A[4, 0, 1] || A[4, 0, 2] || || A[4, 0, 62] || A[4, 0, 63]
|| A[0, 1, 0] || A[0, 1, 1] || A[0, 1, 2] || || A[0, 1, 62] || A[0, 1, 63]
|| A[1, 1, 0] || A[1, 1, 1] || A[1, 1, 2] || || A[1, 1, 62] || A[1, 1, 63]
|| A[2, 1, 0] || A[2, 1, 1] || A[2, 1, 2] || || A[2, 1, 62] || A[2, 1, 63]
|| A[3, 1, 0] || A[3, 1, 1] || A[3, 1, 2] || || A[3, 1, 62] || A[3, 1, 63]
|| A[4, 1, 0] || A[4, 1, 1] || A[4, 1, 2] || || A[4, 1, 62] || A[4, 1, 63]

|| A[0, 4, 0] || A[0, 4, 1] || A[0, 4, 2] || || A[0, 4, 62] || A[0, 4, 63]

|| A[1, 4, 0] || A[1, 4, 1] || A[1, 4, 2] || || A[1, 4, 62] || A[1, 4, 63]
|| A[2, 4, 0] || A[2, 4, 1] || A[2, 4, 2] || || A[2, 4, 62] || A[2, 4, 63]
|| A[3, 4, 0] || A[3, 4, 1] || A[3, 4, 2] || || A[3, 4, 62] || A[3, 4, 63]
|| A[4, 4, 0] || A[4, 4, 1] || A[4, 4, 2] || || A[4, 4, 62] || A[4, 4, 63] .

10

3.1.4 Labeling Convention for the State Array

0
y

1
w

2
1
0
4
3
3 4 0 1 2
x

Figure 2: The x, y, and z coordinates for the diagrams of the step mappings
In the diagrams of the state that accompany the specifications of the step mappings, the lane that
corresponds to the coordinates (x, y) = (0, 0) is depicted at the center of the slices. The complete
labeling of the x, y, and z coordinates for those diagrams is shown in Figure 2 above.

3.2 Step Mappings

The five step mappings that comprise a round of KECCAK-p[b, nr] are denoted by , , , , and .
Specifications for these functions are given in Secs. 3.2.1-3.2.5.
The algorithm for each step mapping takes a state array, denoted by A, as an input and returns an
updated state array, denoted by A, as the output. The size of the state is a parameter that is
omitted from the notation, because b is always specified when the step mappings are invoked.
The mapping ir has a second input: an integer called the round index, denoted by ir, which is
defined within Algorithm 7 for KECCAK-p[b, nr], in Sec. 3.3. The other step mappings do not
depend on the round index.
3.2.1 Specification of
Algorithm 1: (A)
Input:
state array A.
Output:
state array A.
11

Steps:
1. For all pairs (x, z) such that 0 x < 5 and 0 z < w, let
C[x, z] = A[x, 0, z] A[x, 1, z] A[x, 2, z] A[x, 3, z] A[x, 4, z].
2. For all pairs (x, z) such that 0 x < 5 and 0 z < w let
D[x, z] = C[(x1) mod 5, z] C[(x+1) mod 5, (z 1) mod w].
3. For all triples (x, y, z) such that 0 x < 5, 0 y < 5, and 0 z < w, let
A[x, y, z] = A[x, y, z] D[x, z].
The effect of is to XOR each bit in the state with the parities of two columns in the array. In
particular, for the bit A[x0, y0, z0], the x-coordinate of one of the columns is (x0 1) mod 5, with
the same z-coordinate, z0, while the x-coordinate of the other column is (x0 + 1) mod 5, with zcoordinate (z0 1) mod w.
In the illustration of the step mapping in Figure 3 below, the summation symbol, , indicates
the parity, i.e., the XOR sum of all the bits in the column.

Figure 3: Illustration of applied to a single bit [8]

3.2.2 Specification of
Algorithm 2: (A)
Input:
state array A.
Output:
state array A.
Steps:
1. For all z such that 0 z < w, let A [0, 0, z] = A[0, 0, z].
2. Let (x, y) = (1, 0).

12

3. For t from 0 to 23:

a. for all z such that 0 z < w, let A[x, y, z] = A[x, y, (z (t + 1)(t + 2)/2) mod w];
b. let (x, y) = (y, (2x + 3y) mod 5).
4. Return A.
The effect of is to rotate the bits of each lane by a length, called the offset, which depends on
the fixed x and y coordinates of the lane. Equivalently, for each bit in the lane, the z coordinate is
modified by adding the offset, modulo the lane size.

y=2
y=1
y=0
y=4
y=3

x=3 x=4 x=0 x=1 x=2

153 231
3
10
171
55
276
36
300
6
28
91
0
1
190
120
78
210
66
253
21
136 105
45
15
Table 2: Offsets of [8]

The offsets for each lane that result from the computation in Step 3a in Algorithm 2 are listed in
Table 2 above.
An illustration of for the case w = 8 is given in Figure 4 below. The labeling convention for the
x and y coordinates in Figure 4 is given explicitly in Figure 2, corresponding to the rows and
columns in Table 2. For example, the lane A[0, 0] is depicted in the middle of the middle sheet,
and the lane A[2, 3] is depicted at the bottom of the right-most sheet.

Figure 4: Illustration of for b = 200 [8]

For each lane in Figure 4, the black dot indicates the bit whose z coordinate is 0, and the shaded
cube indicates the position of that bit after the execution of . The other bits of the lane shift by
the same offset, and the shift is circular. For example, the offset for the lane A[1, 0] is 1, so the
last bit, whose z coordinate is 7 for this example, shifts to the front position, whose z coordinate

13

is 0. Consequently, the offsets may be reduced modulo the lane size; e.g., the lane for A[3, 2], at
the top of the left-most sheet, has an offset of 153 mod 8 for this example, i.e., the offset is 1 bit.
3.2.3 Specification of
Algorithm 3: (A)
Input:
state array A.
Output:
state array A.
Steps:
1. For all triples (x, y, z) such that 0 x < 5, 0 y < 5, and 0 z < w, let
A[x, y, z]= A[(x + 3y) mod 5, x, z].
2. Return A.
The effect of is to rearrange the positions of the lanes, as illustrated for any slice in Figure 5
below. The convention for the labeling of the coordinates is depicted in Figure 2 above; for
example, the bit with coordinates x = y = 0 is depicted at the center of the slice.

Figure 5: Illustration of applied to a single slice [8]

14

3.2.4 Specification of
Algorithm 4: (A)
Input:
state array A.
Output:
state array A.
Steps:
1. For all triples (x, y, z) such that 0 x < 5, 0 y < 5, and 0 z < w, let
A [x, y, z] = A[x, y, z] ((A[(x+1) mod 5, y, z] 1) A[(x+2) mod 5, y, z]).
2. Return A.
The dot in the right side of the assignment for Step 1 indicates integer multiplication, which in
this case is equivalent to the intended Boolean AND operation.
The effect of is to XOR each bit with a non-linear function of two other bits in its row, as
illustrated in Figure 6 below.

Figure 6: Illustration of applied to a single row [8]

3.2.5 Specification of
The mapping is parameterized by the round index, ir, whose values are specified in Step 2 of
Algorithm 7 for computing KECCAK-p[b, nr], in Sec. 3.3. Within the specification of in
Algorithm 6 below, this parameter determines l + 1 bits of a lane value called the round constant,
denoted by RC. Each of these l + 1 bits is generated by a function that is based on a linear
feedback shift register. This function, denoted by rc, is specified in Algorithm 5.

15

Algorithm 5: rc(t)
Input:
integer t.
Output:
bit rc(t).
Steps:
1. If t mod 255 = 0, return 1.
2. Let R = 10000000.
3. For i from 1 to t mod 255, let:
a. R = 0 || R;
b. R[0] = R[0] R[8];
c. R[4] = R[4] R[8];
d. R[5] = R[5] R[8];
e. R[6] = R[6] R[8];
f. R =Trunc8[R].
4. Return R[0].
Algorithm 6: (A, ir)
Input:
state array A;
round index ir.
Output:
state array A.
Steps:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

For all triples (x, y, z) such that 0 x < 5, 0 y < 5, and 0 z < w, let A[x, y, z] = A[x, y, z].
Let RC = 0w.
For j from 0 to l, let RC[2j 1] = rc(j + 7ir).
For all z such that 0 z < w, let A [0, 0, z] = A [0, 0, z] RC[z].
Return A.

The effect of is to modify some of the bits of Lane (0, 0) in a manner that depends on the round
index ir. The other 24 lanes are not affected by .

3.3 KECCAK-p[b, nr]

Given a state array A and a round index ir, the round function Rnd is the transformation that
results from applying the step mappings , , , , and , in that order, i.e.,:
Rnd(A, ir) = (((((A)))), ir).

16

The KECCAK-p[b, nr] permutation consists of nr iterations of Rnd, as specified in Algorithm 7.

Algorithm 7: KECCAK-p[b, nr](S)
Input:
string S of length b;
number of rounds nr.
Output:
string S of length b.
Steps:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Convert S into a state array, A, as described in Sec. 3.1.2.

For ir from 12 + 2l nr to 12 + 2l 1, let A = Rnd(A, ir).
Convert A into a string S of length b, as described in Sec. 3.1.3.
Return S.

3.4 Comparison with KECCAK-f

The KECCAK-f family of permutations, originally defined in [8], is the specialization of the
KECCAK-p family to the case that nr = 12 + 2l :
KECCAK-f [b] = KECCAK-p[b, 12 + 2l].
Consequently, the KECCAK-p[1600, 24] permutation, which underlies the six SHA-3 functions, is
equivalent to KECCAK-f [1600].
The rounds of KECCAK-f [b] are indexed from 0 to 11 + 2l . A result of the indexing within Step 2
of Algorithm 7 is that the rounds of KECCAK-p[b, nr] match the last rounds of KECCAK-f [b], or
vice versa. For example, KECCAK-p[1600, 19] is equivalent to the last nineteen rounds of
KECCAK-f [1600]. Similarly, KECCAK-f [1600] is equivalent to the last twenty-four rounds of
KECCAK-p[1600, 30]; in this case, the preceding rounds for KECCAK-p[1600, 30] are indexed by
the integers from 6 to 1.

4 SPONGE CONSTRUCTION
The sponge construction [4] is a framework for specifying functions on binary data with arbitrary
output length. The construction employs the following three components:

An underlying function on fixed-length strings, denoted by f,

A parameter called the rate, denoted by r, and
A padding rule, denoted by pad.

The function that the construction produces from these components is called a sponge function,
denoted by SPONGE[f, pad, r]. A sponge function takes two inputs: a bit string, denoted by N, and

17

the bit length, denoted by d, of the output string, SPONGE[f, pad, r](N, d). The analogy to a sponge
is that an arbitrary number of input bits are absorbed into the state of the function, after which
an arbitrary number of output bits are squeezed out of its state.
The sponge construction is illustrated in Figure 7 below, adapted from [4].

Figure 7: The sponge construction: Z = SPONGE[f, pad, r](N, d) [4]

The function f maps strings of a single, fixed length, denoted by b, to strings of the same length.
As in Sec. 3, b is called the width of f. The SHA-3 functions, specified in Sec. 6 are instances of
the sponge construction in which the underlying function f is invertible, i.e., a permutation,
although the sponge construction does not require f to be invertible.
The rate r is a positive integer that is strictly less than the width b. The capacity, denoted by c, is
the positive integer br. Thus, r + c = b.
The padding rule, pad, is a function that produces padding, i.e., a string with an appropriate
length to append to another string. In general, given a positive integer x and a non-negative
integer m, the output pad(x, m) is a string with the property that m + len(pad(x, m)) is a positive
multiple of x. Within the sponge construction, x = r and m = len(N), so that the padded input
string can be partitioned into a sequence of r-bit strings. Algorithm 9 in Sec. 5.1 specifies the
padding rule for the KECCAK functions and, hence, the SHA-3 functions.
Given these three components, f, pad, and r, as described above, the SPONGE[f, pad, r] function
on (N, d) is specified by Algorithm 8. The width b is determined by the choice of f.
Algorithm 8: SPONGE[f, pad, r](N, d)
Input:
string N,
nonnegative integer d.

18

Output:
string Z such that len(Z) = d.
Steps:
1. Let P = N || pad(r, len(N)).
2. Let n = len(P)/r.
3. Let c = b r.
4. Let P0, , Pn-1 be the unique sequence of strings of length r such that P = P0 || || Pn1.
5. Let S = 0b.
6. For i from 0 to n1, let S = f (S (Pi || 0c)).
7. Let Z be the empty string.
8. Let Z = Z || Trunc r (S).
9. If d |Z|, then return Trunc d (Z); else continue.
10. Let S = f(S), and continue with Step 8.
Note that the input d determines the number of bits that Algorithm 8 returns, but it does not
affect their values. In principle, the output can be regarded as an infinite string, whose
computation, in practice, is halted after the desired number of output bits is produced.

5 KECCAK
KECCAK is a family of sponge functions, originally defined in [8]. The padding rule for KECCAK,
called multi-rate padding, is specified in Sec. 5.1. The parameters and the underlying
permutations for KECCAK are described in Sec. 5.2, and a smaller family of KECCAK functions,
KECCAK[c], is specified explicitly, which will suffice to define the SHA-3 functions in Sec. 6.

5.1 Specification of pad10*1

Algorithm 9: pad10*1(x, m)
Input:
positive integer x;
non-negative integer m.
Output:
string P such that m + len(P) is a positive multiple of x.
Steps:
1. Let j = ( m 2) mod x.
2. Return P = 1 || 0j || 1.
Thus, the asterisk in pad10*1 indicates that the 0 bit is either omitted or repeated as
necessary in order to produce an output string of the desired length.

19

5.2 Specification of KECCAK[c]

KECCAK is the family of sponge functions with the KECCAK-p[b, 12 + 2l] permutation (defined in
Sec 3.3) as the underlying function and with pad10*1 (defined in Sec. 5.1) as the padding rule.
The family is parameterized by any choices of the rate r and the capacity c such that r + c is in
{25, 50, 100, 200, 400, 800, 1600}, i.e., one of the seven values for b in Table 1.
When restricted to the case b = 1600, the KECCAK family is denoted by KECCAK[c]; in this case r
is determined by the choice of c. In particular,
KECCAK[c] = SPONGE[KECCAK-p[1600, 24], pad10*1, 1600 c].
Thus, given an input bit string N and an output length d,
KECCAK[c] (N, d) = SPONGE[KECCAK-p[1600, 24], pad10*1, 1600 c] (N, d).

6 SHA-3 FUNCTION SPECIFICATIONS

In Sec. 6.1, the four SHA-3 hash functions are defined, and in Sec. 6.2, the two SHA-3 XOFs are
defined. In Sec. 6.3, an alternate definition of each SHA-3 XOF is given in terms of an
intermediate function.

6.1 SHA-3 Hash Functions

Given a message M, the four SHA-3 hash functions are defined from the KECCAK[c] function
specified in Sec. 5.2 by appending a two-bit suffix to M and by specifying the length of the
output, as follows:
SHA3-224(M) = KECCAK[448] (M || 01, 224);
SHA3-256(M) = KECCAK[512] (M || 01, 256);
SHA3-384(M) = KECCAK[768] (M || 01, 384);
SHA3-512(M) = KECCAK[1024] (M || 01, 512).
In each case, the capacity is double the digest length, i.e., c = 2d, and the resulting input N to
KECCAK[c] is the message with the suffix appended, i.e, N = M || 01. The suffix supports domain
separation; i.e., it distinguishes the inputs to KECCAK[c] arising from the SHA-3 hash functions
from the inputs arising from the SHA-3 XOFs defined in Sec. 6.2, as well as other domains that
may be defined in the future.

6.2 SHA-3 Extendable-Output Functions

Given a message M, the two SHA-3 XOFs, SHAKE128 and SHAKE256, are defined from the
KECCAK[c] function specified in Sec. 5.2 by appending a four-bit suffix to M, for any output
length d:
20

SHAKE128(M, d) = KECCAK[256] (M || 1111, d),

SHAKE256(M, d) = KECCAK[512] (M || 1111, d).
The purposes of the additional bits, 1111, are discussed in Sec. 6.3.

6.3 Alternate Definitions of SHA-3 Extendable-Output Functions

Two additional sponge functions, called RawSHAKE128 and RawSHAKE256, are defined as
the following instances of KECCAK[c], where the input string is denoted by J, and the output
length denoted by d:
RawSHAKE128(J, d) = KECCAK[256] (J || 11, d),
RawSHAKE256(J, d) = KECCAK[512] (J || 11, d).
These functions enable alternate definitions of SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 that are equivalent
to the definitions in Sec. 6.2. In particular,
SHAKE128(M, d) = RawSHAKE128 (M || 11, d),
SHAKE256(M, d) = RawSHAKE256 (M || 11, d).
The following input N to KECCAK[c] results from the padding of these inputs M and J:
N = J || 11 = M || 11 || 11.
The bolded suffix (i.e., 11) supports domain separation: it distinguishes the inputs to KECCAK[c]
that arise from RawSHAKE128 and RawSHAKE256 from the inputs arising from the SHA-3
hash functions defined in Sec. 6.1, as well as other domains that may be defined in the future.
The italicized suffix (i.e., 11) provides compatibility for RawSHAKE128 and RawSHAKE256
with the Sakura coding scheme [6]. This scheme will facilitate the future development of tree
hashing [7] variants, in which parallel processing can be applied to compute and update digests
of long messages more efficiently.
Note that, within the execution of KECCAK[c], additional bits are appended to N as specified by
the multi-rate padding rule.

7 Conformance
Implementations of the KECCAK-p[1600, 24] permutation and the six SHA-3 modes of this
permutationSHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512, SHAKE128, and SHAKE256
may be tested for conformance to this Standard under the auspices of the Cryptographic
Algorithm Validation Program [9].

21

SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512 are approved cryptographic hash functions.
One of the approved uses of cryptographic hash functions occurs within the Keyed-Hash
Message Authentication Code (HMAC). The input block size in bytes, denoted by B in the
HMAC specification [10], is given in Table 3 below for the SHA-3 hash functions5:

Hash Function
Block Size (bytes)

SHA3-224
144

SHA3-256
136

SHA3-384
104

SHA3-512
72

Table 3: Input block sizes for HMAC

SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are approved XOFs, whose approved uses will be specified in
NIST Special Publications. Although some of those uses may overlap with the uses of approved
hash functions, the XOFs are not approved as hash functions, due to the property that is
discussed in Sec. A.2.
The KECCAK-p[1600, 24] permutation is approved for use in the context of its approved modes of
operation, such as the SHA-3 functions. Similarly, the other intermediate functions that are
defined in this Standarde.g., KECCAK[c], RawSHAKE128, and RawSHAKE256are
approved in the context of an approved mode of operation of the underlying KECCAK-p
permutation.
The KECCAK-p[1600, 24] permutation may become approved for other uses, and other KECCAK-p
permutations may also become approved if any modes of operation for them are developed and
approved within a FIPS Publication or a NIST Special Publication.
The SHA-3 functions are defined on messages of any bit length, including the empty string. A
conforming implementation of a SHA-3 function may restrict the set of supported bit lengths for
messages. Similarly, a conforming implementation of a SHA-3 XOF may restrict the set of
supported values for the output length. In both cases, any such restrictions may affect
interoperability with other implementations.
For every computational procedure that is specified in this Standard, a conforming
implementation may replace the given set of steps with any mathematically equivalent set of
steps. In other words, different procedures that produce the correct output for every input are
permitted.

In general, the input block size (in bits) of a sponge function is its rate.

22

A Security
The detailed analysis of the security properties of KECCAK in [8] applies to the SHA-3 family of
hash and extendable output functions. The SHA-3 family also inherits security properties from
the sponge construction; these properties are analyzed in detail in [4].
Applications of hash functions often require collision resistance, preimage resistance, and/or
second preimage resistance; these properties are summarized for the SHA-3 family of hash
functions and XOFs in Sec. A.1. XOFs differ from hash functions in the generation of closely
related outputs; this important security consideration is discussed in Sec. A.2.

A.1 Summary
As of the publication of this Standard, the security strengths of the SHA-3 functions are
summarized in Table 4. The SHA-1 and SHA-2 functions are included for comparison,
duplicating some of the discussion in [11], which will be updated as necessary with the latest
security information.

Security Strengths in Bits

Output
Size

Collision

Preimage

2nd Preimage

SHA-1

160

< 80

160

160 L (M)

SHA-224

224

112

224

min(224, 256 L (M))

SHA-512/224

224

112

224

224

SHA-256

256

128

256

256 L (M)

SHA-512/256

256

128

256

256

SHA-384

384

192

384

384

SHA-512

512

256

512

512 L (M)

SHA3-224

224

112

224

224

SHA3-256

256

128

256

256

SHA3-384

384

192

384

384

SHA3-512

512

256

512

512

SHAKE128

min(d/2, 128)

min(d, 128)

min(d, 128)

SHAKE256

min(d/2, 256)

min(d, 256)

min(d, 256)

Function

Table 4: Security strengths of the SHA-1, SHA-2, and SHA-3 functions

23

For the security strength against second preimage attacks on a message M, the function L(M) is
defined as log2(len(M)/B), where B is the block length of the function in bits, i.e., B = 512 for
SHA-1, SHA-224, and SHA-256, and B = 1024 for SHA-512.
The four SHA-3 hash functions are alternatives to the SHA-2 functions, and they are designed to
provide resistance against collision, preimage, and second preimage attacks that equals or
exceeds the resistance that the corresponding SHA-2 functions provide. The SHA-3 functions are
also designed to resist other attacks, such as length-extension attacks, that would be resisted by a
random function of the same output length, in general providing the same security strength as a
random function, up to the output length.
The two SHA-3 XOFs are designed to resist collision, preimage, and second-preimage attacks,
and other attacks that would be resisted by a random function of the requested output length, up
to the security strength of 128 bits for SHAKE128, and 256 bits for SHAKE256. A random
function whose output length is d bits cannot provide more than d/2 bits of security against
collision attacks and d bits of security against preimage and second preimage attacks, so
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 will provide less than 128 and 256 bits of security, respectively,
when d is sufficiently small, as described in Table 4. For example, if d = 224, then SHAKE128
and SHAKE256 provide 112 bits of collision resistance; however, they provide different levels
of preimage resistance: 128 bits for SHAKE128 and 224 bits for SHAKE256.
If d > r + c/2, then SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 provide more than 128 and 256 bits of preimage
resistance, respectively; moreover, if d > 1600, a preimage probably does not exist.

A.2 Additional Consideration for Extendable-Output Functions

An XOF is a powerful new kind of cryptographic primitive that offers the flexibility to produce
outputs with any desired length. Technically, it is possible to use an XOF as a hash function by
selecting a fixed output length. However, XOFs have the potential for generating related
outputsa property that designers of security applications/protocols/systems may not expect of
hash functions. This property is important to consider in the development of applications of
XOFs.
By design, the output length for an XOF does not affect the bits that it produces, which means
that the output length is not a necessary input to the function. Conceptually, the output can be an
infinite string, and the application/protocol/system that invokes the function simply computes the
desired number of initial bits of that string. Consequently, when two different output lengths are
chosen for a common message, the two outputs are closely related: the longer output is an
extension of the shorter output. For example, given any positive integers d and e, and any
message M, Truncd(SHAKE128(M, d+e)) is identical to SHAKE128(M, d). The same property
holds for SHAKE256.
No two distinct SHA-3 functions would be expected to ever exhibit this property in practice. For
example, for a randomly chosen message M, SHA3-256(M) will almost certainly not be an
extension of SHA3-224(M), or of SHAKE128(M, 224), even though the three functions have

24

almost identical structure. The same statement applies to previously approved hash functions,
including the truncated versions of SHA-512 in FIPS 180-4 (e.g., SHA-512/256).
However, existing mechanisms for constructing functions with arbitrary output lengthby
concatenating and/or truncating digests from hash functionsgenerally do exhibit this property.
The possibility of closely related outputs can affect the security of the
application/protocol/system that invokes an XOF. For example, a nave (and non-approved) way
for two parties to agree to derive a 112-bit Triple DES key from a message designated as
keymaterial would be to compute SHAKE128(keymaterial, keylength), where keylength is 112.
However, if an attacker is able to induce one of the parties to use a different value for keylength,
say 168 bits, but the same value for keymaterial, then the two parties will end up with the
following keys:
SHAKE128(keymaterial, 112) = fg
SHAKE128(keymaterial, 168) = fgh,
where the bolded letters of the digest represent 56-bit strings, e.g., the parts of a Triple DES key.
Because of the structure of Triple DES, these keys are vulnerable to attack.
In practice, the use of an XOF as a key derivation function (KDF) could preclude the possibility
of related outputs, by incorporating the length and/or type of the derived key into the message
input to the KDF. In that case, a disagreement or misunderstanding between two users of the
KDF about the type or length of the key they are deriving would almost certainly not lead to
related outputs.
Where extended digests are problematic, a more general solution is domain separation, by which
different instances of the XOFs could be created and tailored to different purposes, independent
of the number of output bits. All of the SHA-3 functions are designed to allow variants for new,
separate domains that NIST may develop in the future.

B Examples
Examples of the five step mappings and of the six SHA-3 functions are available at the examples
page at NISTs Computer Security Resource Center web site: http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST
/toolkit/examples.html.
The bit strings for these examples are represented as hexadecimal strings, i.e., sequences of the
sixteen hexadecimal digits: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, A, B, C, D, E, and F, where A is the digit
for ten, B is the digit for eleven, etc.
The convention for interpreting hexadecimal strings as bit strings for the inputs and outputs of
the SHA-3 examples is different from the convention for other functions on the examples page.
The conversion functions between hexadecimal strings and SHA-3 bit strings are specified in
Sec. B.1. For byte-aligned messages, the hexadecimal forms of the padding for the SHA-3
functions are described in Sec. B.2.
25

Specific hexadecimal strings in these sections are written in the Courier New font, preceded
by the marker 0x.

B.1 Conversion Functions

The conversion function from hexadecimal strings to the SHA-3 strings that they represent,
denoted h2b, is specified in Algorithm 10. The function is defined on hexadecimal strings with
an even number of digits.
Algorithm 10: h2b(H, n).
Input:
hexadecimal string H consisting of 2m digits for some positive integer m;
positive integer n such that n 8m.
Output:
bit string S, such that len(S) = n.
Steps:
1.
2.

3.
4.

For each integer i such that 0 i < 2m-1, let Hi be the ith hexadecimal digit in H:
H = H0 H1 H2 H3 H2m-2 H2m-1.
For each integer i such that 0 i < m:
a. Let hi = 16 H2i +H2i+1.
b. Let bi0 bi1 bi2 bi3 bi4 bi5 bi6 bi7 be the unique sequence of bits such that
hi = bi7 27 + bi6 26 + bi5 25 + bi4 24 + bi3 23 + bi2 22 + bi1 21 + bi0 20.
For each pair of integers (i, j) such that 0 i < m and 0 j < 8, let T [8i + j] = bij.
Return S = Truncn(T).

In Step 1, the indices are defined for the hexadecimal digits. In Step 2a, each pair of hexadecimal
digits is converted to the (base 10) integer between 0 and 255 that the pair represents in base 16.
In Step 2b, each integer from Step 2a is converted to its binary representation as a byte. In Step
3, the bytes are combined into a single string, and the result is truncated to the desired number of
bits in Step 4.
For example, if H = 0x A3 2E and n = 14, then the intermediate values that are defined in Steps 1
and 2 of Algorithm 10 are indicated in Table 5 below:
H0 = A
H1 = 3
h0 = 16 10 + 3 = 163 =
1 27+0 26+1 25+0 24+0 23+0 22+1 21+
1 20
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
b07 b06 b05 b04 b03 b02 b01 b00

H2 = 2
H3 = E
h1 = 16 2 + 14 = 46 =
0 27+0 26+1 25+0 24+1 23+1 22+1 21+
0 20
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
b17 b16 b15 b14 b13 b12 b11 b10

26

Table 5: Illustration of h2b

Thus, T = b00 b01 b02 b03 b04 b05 b06 b07 b10 b11 b12 b13 b14 b15 b16 b17 = 1100 0101 0111 0100, and
S = Trunc14(T ) = 1100 0101 0111 01, as described in Steps 3 and 4.
If the length n of the output string S is not specified explicitly as an input, then h2b(H) is defined
to be h2b(H, 8m), i.e., n is given the maximum possible value.
The conversion function from SHA-3 bit strings to the hexadecimal strings that represent them,
denoted b2h, is specified in Algorithm 11.
Algorithm 11: b2h(S).
Input:
bit string S consisting of n bits for a positive integer n.
Output:
hexadecimal string H consisting of 2n /8 digits.
Steps:
1.
2.
3.
4.

5.

Let n = len(S).
Let T = S || 0-n mod 8 and m = n/8.
For each pair of integers (i, j) such that 0 i < m and 0 j < 8, let bij = T [8i + j].
For each integer i such that 0 i < m:
a. Let hi = bi7 27 + bi6 26 + bi5 25 + bi4 24 + bi3 23 + bi2 22 + bi1 21 + bi0 20.
b. Let H2i and H2i +1 be the hexadecimal digits such that hi = 16 H2i + H2i+1.
Return H = H0 H1 H2 H3 H2m-2 H2m-1.

The formal bit-reordering function that was specified in [12]for the KECCAK submission to the
SHA-3 competitiongives equivalent conversions when the message is byte-aligned, i.e., when
n is a multiple of 8.

B.2 Hexadecimal Form of Padding Bits

For the SHA-3 functions, either a two- or four-bit suffix is appended to the message M to
produce the input string N to KECCAK[c], and additional bits are appended as part of the multirate padding rule.
For most applications, the message is byte-aligned, i.e., len(M) = 8m for a nonnegative integer m.
In this case, the total number of bytes, denoted by q, that are appended to the message is
determined as follows by m and the rate r:
q = (r/8) (m mod (r/8)).

27

The value of q determines the hexadecimal form of these bytes in this case according to the
conversion functions specified in Sec. B.1. The padded messages that result are summarized in
Table 6:
Type of SHA-3 Function Number of Padding Bytes

Padded Message

Hash

q=1

M || 0x86

Hash

q=2

M || 0x0680

Hash

q>2

M || 0x06 || 0x00 || 0x80

XOF

q=1

M || 0x9F

XOF

q=2

M || 0x1F80

XOF

q>2

M || 0x1F || 0x00 || 0x80

Table 6: Hexadecimal form of SHA-3 padding for byte-aligned messages

In Table 6, the notation 0x00 indicates the string that consists of q 2 zero bytes.

C Object Identifiers
Object identifiers (OIDs) for SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512, SHAKE128, and
SHAKE256 are posted at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/csor/algorithms.html.

D References
[1]

Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-4, Secure Hash Standard

(SHS), Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and
Technology, March 2012, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-4/fips-180-4.pdf.

[2]

G. Bertoni, J. Daemen, M. Peeters, and G. Van Assche, The KECCAK SHA-3 submission,
Version 3, January 2011, http://keccak.noekeon.org/Keccak-submission-3.pdf.

[3]

The SHA-3 Cryptographic Hash Algorithm Competition, November 2007-October 2012,

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/sha-3/index.html.

[4]

G. Bertoni, J. Daemen, M. Peeters, and G. Van Assche, Cryptographic sponge functions,

January 2011, http://sponge.noekeon.org/CSF-0.1.pdf.

[5]

Ethan Heilman to hash-forum@nist.gov, October

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/email_list.html.
28

5,

2012,

Hash

Forum,

[6]

G. Bertoni, J. Daemen, M. Peeters, and G. Van Assche, SAKURA: a flexible coding for tree
hashing, http://keccak.noekeon.org/Sakura.pdf.

[7]

R. C. Merkle, A digital signature based on a conventional encryption function, Advances

in Cryptology - CRYPTO '87, A Conference on the Theory Applications of
Cryptographic Techniques, Santa Barbara, California, USA, 1987, 369-378.

[8]

G. Bertoni, J. Daemen, M. Peeters, and G. Van Assche, The KECCAK reference, Version
3.0, January 2011, http://keccak.noekeon.org/Keccak-reference-3.0.pdf.

[9]

NIST Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP), http://csrc.nist.gov

/groups/STM/cavp/index.html.

[10]

Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 198-1, The Keyed-Hash Message

Authentication Code (HMAC), Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of
Standards and Technology, July 2008, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198-1/
FIPS-198-1_final.pdf.

[11]

NIST Special Publication 800-107 Revision 1: Recommendation for Using Approved

Hash Algorithms, August 2012, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-107-rev1/
sp800-107-rev1.pdf.

[12]

G. Bertoni, J. Daemen, M. Peeters, G. Van Assche, and R. Van Keer, KECCAK

implementation
overview,
January
2011,
http://keccak.noekeon.org/Keccakimplementation-3.0.pdf.

29