The Eight Refutations

Controverted Point: That the person is known in the sense of a real

and ultimate fact.

The First Refutation

The Fivefold Affirmative Presentation
1.1.1Theravdin: Is the person known in the sense of a real and
ultimate fact?
Puggalavdin: Yes.
Theravdin: Is the person known in the same way as a real and
ultimate fact is known?
Puggalavdin: No, that cannot truly be said.
Theravdin: Acknowledge your refutation: (i) If the person be known in
the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then indeed, good sir, you should
also say, the person is known in the same way as any other real and
ultimate fact is known.
(ii) That which you say here is wrong, namely, (1) that we ought to say,
the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, but (2)
we ought not to say, the person is known in the same way as any other
real and ultimate fact is known.
(Suffering) If the latter statement (2) cannot be admitted, then indeed
the former statement (1) should not be admitted.
(iv) In affirming the former statement (1), while (v) denying the latter
(2), you are wrong.
The Fourfold Rejoinder
1.1.2Puggalavdin: Is the person not known in the sense of a real and
ultimate fact?
Theravdin: No, it is not known.
Puggalavdin: Is it unknown in the same way as any real and ultimate
fact is known?
Theravdin: No, that cannot truly be said.
Puggalavdin: Acknowledge the rejoinder: (i) If the person be not
known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then indeed, good sir,

you should also say: not known in the same way as any real and
ultimate fact is known.
(ii) That which you say here is wrong, namely, that (1) we ought to say
the person is not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, and
(2) we ought not to say: not known in the same way as any real and
ultimate fact is known.
If the latter statement (2) cannot be admitted, then indeed the former
statement (1) should not be admitted either.
In affirming (2), while denying (1), you are wrong.
The Fourfold Refutation
1.1.3Puggalavdin (continues): But if you imagine we ought to affirm
that (1) the person is not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact,
but we ought not also to affirm that (2) the person is not known in the
same way as any real and ultimate fact is known, then you, who have
actually assented to the very proposition contained in that negative
question, must certainly be refuted in the following manner: let us then
refute you, for you are well refuted!
(i) If (1) the person is not known in the sense of a real and ultimate
fact, then indeed, good sir, you should have said as well that (2) the
person is not known in the same way as any real and ultimate fact is
known.
(ii) What you affirm is false, namely, that the former statement (1)
should be affirmed, but that the latter (2) should not be affirmed.
If the latter statement (2) is not to be affirmed, then neither truly can
the former (1) be affirmed.
That which you say here(1) should be affirmed, but not (2); this
statement of yours is wrong.
The Fourfold Application
1.1.4 Puggalavdin (continues): If this be a faulty refutation, look at the
parallel procedure in your own argument (Kv1.1.1). Thus, according to
us (1) was true (the person is known, etc.); but (2) was not true (
known in the same way, etc.). Now we, who admitted these
propositions, do not consider ourselves to have been refuted. You say
you have refuted us; anyway we are not well refuted. Your argument
ran that if we affirmed (1), we must also affirm (2); that if we did not
admit the truth of (2), neither could we admit the truth of (1); that we
were wrong in assenting to (1), while denying (2).
The Fourfold Conclusion

1.1.5Puggalavdin (continues): No (I repeat), we are not to be refuted

thus, (i) namely, that my proposition compels me to assent to your
known in the same way, etc.; (ii) your pronouncement that my
proposition (1) coupled with my rejection (2) is wrong; (Suffering) that if
I reject (2), I must also reject (1); (iv) that I must affirm both or none.
This refutation of yours is badly done. I maintain, on the other hand,
that my rejoinder was well done, and that my sequel to the argument
was well done.
The Second Refutation
The Fivefold Adverse Controversy
1.1.6Puggalavdin: Is the person not known in the sense of a real and
ultimate fact?
Theravdin: No, it is not known continue as in Kv1.1.1, reversing the
speakers, and substituting not known for known:
The Fourfold Rejoinder
1.1.7 Theravdin: Is the person known in the sense of a real and
ultimate fact?
Puggalavdin: Yes continue as in Kv1.1.2, reversing the speakers,
and substituting known for not known.:
The Fourfold Refutation
1.1.8Theravdin: But if you imagine we ought to affirm that the
person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, but that we
ought not to affirm as well that the person is known in the same way as
any other real and ultimate fact is known, etc continue as in Kv1.1.3,
reversing the speakers, and substituting known for not known: .
The Fourfold Application
1.1.9Theravdin (continues): If this be a faulty refutation, look at the
parallel procedure in your own argument (Kv1.1.6). Thus, according to
us (a) was true (a person is not known, etc.); but (b) was not true (
not known in the same way, etc.). Now we, who admitted these
propositions, do not consider ourselves to have been refuted, etc.
The Fourfold Conclusion
1.1.10Theravdin (continues): No, I repeat, we are not to be refuted as
you claim to have refuted us wherefore your refutation was suffering
done, etc.

The Third Refutation

1.1.11Theravdin: Is the person known in the sense of a real and
ultimate fact?
Puggalavdin: It is.
Theravdin: Is the person known everywhere in that sense?
Puggalavdin: No, that cannot truly be said.
Theravdin: Acknowledge the refutation: If the person be known in the
sense of a real and ultimate fact, then indeed, good sir, you ought to
admit that the person is known in that sense everywhere. You are
wrong to admit the one proposition (A) and deny the other (C). If (C) is
false, (A) is also false.
The Fourth Refutation.
1.1.12Theravdin: Is the person known in the sense of a real and
ultimate fact?
Puggalavdin: It is.
Theravdin: Is the person known always in that sense?
Puggalavdin: No, that cannot truly be said continue as above,
substituting always for everywhere: .
The Fifth Refutation
1.1.13Theravdin: Is the person known as in Kv1.1.11: in
everything in the sense of a real and ultimate fact? continue as in
Kv1.1.11, substituting in everything for everywhere : .
The Sixth Refutation
1.1.14 Puggalavdin: Is the person not known otherwise as in
Kv1.1.11: everywhere in that sense? substituting not known for
known: .
The Seventh Refutation
1.1.15Puggalavdin: Is the person not known always in that sense?

The Eighth Refutation

1.1.16Puggalavdin: Is the person not known in everything in that
sense?

Comparative Inquiry
Comparison with other Realities, simply treated.
1.1.17Theravdin: Is the person known in the sense of a real and
ultimate fact, and is material quality also known in the sense of a real
and ultimate fact?
Puggalavdin: Yes.
Theravdin: Is material quality one thing and the person another?
Puggalavdin: No, that cannot truly be said.
Theravdin: Acknowledge the refutation: If the person and material
quality be each known in the sense of real and ultimate facts, then
indeed, good sir, you should also have admitted that they are distinct
things. You are wrong to admit the former proposition and not the latter.
If the latter cannot be admitted, neither should the former be affirmed.
To say that the person and material quality are both known in the sense
of real and ultimate facts, but that they are not mutually distinct things,
is false.
The same argument is then repeated, substituting for matter the other
aggregates, the twelve sense-bases, the eighteen elements and the
twenty two faculties