MARITAIN, GILSON, AND FABRO ON KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACT OF

BEING (ESSE)
Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2014.
Jacques Maritain,1 tienne Gilson,2 and Cornelio Fabro3 have all written on knowledge of
the act of being (esse).4 Jacques Maritain5 holds the position that we are able to have an intuition
of esse.6
tienne Gilson maintains that we do not strictly have a concept of esse, and that the act of
being (esse) is grasped in the second operation of the mind, that is, in judgment (principally in
judgments of existence, but also, as Wippel explains working on the studies of Gilson, in
judgments of attribution7).
Wippel writes, explaining the position of Gilson, that esse as used here signifies the
actual existence of a thing. It is this which is captured through judgment. The verb is as it
appears in propositions is sometimes predicated in its own right, as when we say: Sortes is. By
this we wish to indicate that Sortes is in reality, i.e., that he actually exists. As Gilson develops
this point, the verb is often appears in what we may describe as existential judgments, or
judgments of existence.8 But, Thomas continues, on other occasions the verb is is not
1

J. MARITAIN, Rflexions sur la nature blesse et sur lintuition de ltre, Revue Thomiste, 68 (1968), pp. 5-40.
. GILSON, Propos sur ltre et sa notion, in Studi tomistici (III): San Tommaso e il pensiero moderno, Rome,
1974, pp. 7-17.
3
C. FABRO, La nozione metafisica di partecipazione secondo S. Tommaso dAquino, S.E.I., Turin, 1963 ; C.
FABRO, Partecipazione e causalit secondo S. Tommaso dAquino, S.E.I., Turin, 1963; C. FABRO, Dallessere
allesistente, Morcelliana, Brescia, 1965 ; C. FABRO, The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse and the Ground of
Metaphysics, International Philosophical Quarterly, 6 (1966), pp. 389-487 ; C. FABRO, Notes pour la fondation
mtaphysique de ltre, Revue Thomiste, 66 (1966), pp. 214-237.
4
Studies on knowledge of the act of being (esse): B. J. MULLER-THYM, The To Be Which Signifies the Truth of
Propositions, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 16 (1941), pp. 230-254 ; R. J.
HENLE, Existentialism and the Judgment, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 21
(1946), pp. 40-52 ; R. W. SCHMIDT, The Evidence Surrounding Judgments of Existence, in An Etienne Gilson
Tribute, edited by C. J. ONeil, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1959, pp. 228-244 ; J. OWENS, Aquinas on Knowing Existence,
Review of Metaphysics, 29 (1976), pp. 670-690 ; F. WILHELMSEN, Existence and Esse, The New
Scholasticism, 50 (1976), pp. 20-45 ; M. PAOLINI PAOLETTI, Esse ut actus e giudizio desistenza: sulla
riflessione metafisica di . Gilson, Euntes Docete, 63.1 (2010), pp. 191-215 ; M. PAOLINI PAOLETTI,
Conoscere lessere: Fabro, Gilson e la conoscenza dellactus essendi, in Crisi e destino della filosofia: Studi su
Cornelio Fabro, edited by A. Acerbi, EDUSC, Rome, 2012, pp. 157-172.
5
Studies on the intuition of being in Maritain: J. P. HITTINGER, The Intuition of Being: Metaphysics or Poetry?, in
Jacques Maritain: The Man and His Metaphysics, edited by J. F. X. Knasas, American Maritain Association
(AMA), Notre Dame, IN, 1988, pp. 71-81 ; J. F. X. KNASAS, How Thomistic is the Intuition of Being? in Jacques
Maritain: The Man and His Metaphysics, edited by J. F. X. Knasas, American Maritain Association (AMA), Notre
Dame, IN, 1988, pp. 83-91 ; E. MORAWIEC, Intellectual Intuition in the General Metaphysics of Jacques Maritain,
Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Maim, 2013.
6
Cf. J. MARITAIN, Sept leons sur ltre, Paris, 1934, p. 52, 56, 66.
7
Cf. J. F. WIPPEL, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being, CUA
Press, Washington, D.C., 2000, p. 27.
8
See Being and Some Philosophers, pp. 200-201 as well as the citation and discussion of this text by Rgis as
reproduced by Gilson in the same source, pp. 218-220.
2

predicated in its own right as if it were the principal predicate, but only as joined to the principal
predicate in order to connect it with the subject of a proposition. So it is when we say: Sortes is
white. In this case the speaker does not intend to assert that Sortes actually exists, but rather to
attribute whiteness to him. As Gilson explains, such judgments may be described as judgments
of attribution.9
Because truth arises in the intellect from the fact that the intellect is conformed to
reality, it follows that in its second operation (judgment) the intellect cannot truthfully abstract
what is united in reality. For the intellect to abstract (that is, to distinguish or divide) in this
operation is for it to assert that there is a corresponding separation with respect to the things
very esse. For instance, if I am speaking of someone who is actually white and separate human
being from whiteness by saying this human being is not white, my judgment is false.10
In other words, Thomas is reminding us that truth in the strict sense arises at the level of
judgment. Any composition or division effected by the intellect through judgment must
correspond to a composition or division which obtains in reality if that judgment is to be true.
While this point appears to be evident enough in itself, it is important to keep it in mind in the
present discussion. If, as we are suggesting, Thomas holds that the intellects second operation
(judgment) is ordered to the esse of things and if this means their actual existence, one might
conclude that such is the case only in judgments of existence. Thomass text indicates that he
same holds for judgments of attribution such as Sortes is white. Even in such judgments there
must be some reference to reality, or, as Thomas has put it, to the very esse of the thing in
question. In fact, as Gilson has phrased it, in judgments of attribution is has correctly been
chosen to serve as a copula because all judgments of attribution are meant to say how a certain
thing actually is.11
While the first operation (of the intellect) grasps the quiddity of a thing, the second
(operation of the intellect) has to do with its esse. Because truth as such is grounded in esse
rather than in quiddity, truth and falsity properly speaking are found in this second intellectual
operation and in the sign of this same operation, that is, in the proposition.
It is through judgment that one grasps esse just as it is through judgment that truth,
properly speaking, is realized. Throughout this discussion, therefore, Thomas has contrasted esse
with nature or quiddity. And throughout this discussion, esse is said to be grasped by the
intellectual operation we know as judgment. Since esse is contrasted with quiddity in this
discussion, it seems clear that when it is so used it must signify actual existence. It is this which
is grasped through judgment rather than through the intellects first operation.12
Cornelio Fabro maintains, instead, that we only attain to existence (existentia) as result,
existence as fact of being, in the second operation of the mind which is judgment, whereas the
metaphysical principle of act of being (esse as actus essendi), the act of all acts and perfection of

For Gilson on judgments of attribution see Being and Some Philosophers, pp. 200, 190-191.
Cf. In V Metaphy., lect. 9, p. 239, nn. 895-896.
11
. GILSON, Being and Some Philosophers, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, 1952, p. 200.
12
J. F. WIPPEL, op. cit., pp. 25-28.
10

all perfections, is obtained by way of an intensive reflection13 of a metaphysical resolutioreductio.14

For Fabro, the authentic notion of Thomistic participation calls for distinguishing esse as
act not only from essence which is its potency, but also from existence which is the fact of being
and hence a result rather than a metaphysical principle.15 Fabro explains that existence
must be distinguished from the Aquinates esse as act not only from essence which is its
potency, but also from existence which is the fact of being and hence a result rather than a
metaphysical principle.16
Fabro writes: Knowledge of esse. Some modern authors hold that the Thomistic concept
of esse, as an act of being in the strict sense, is seized by the mind in the act of judgment or in the
synthesis of subject and predicate (F. Sladeckzek, K. Rahner, M. D. Roland-Gosselin, J. B.
Lotz). They do this because they do not distinguish between existentia as an empirical datum
(essentia in actu) and esse as a most intimate and profound constitutive principle: the first is
accessible to experience and expresses itself in the judgment, whereas the second reveals itself
only to the most advanced metaphysical reflection. Existentia, therefore, is affirmed either
through a judgment of perception that attains the present singulars or through demonstration by
means of a principle of causality or of similarity (per signum). Essence is known by abstracting
the universal from particulars, based on an induction that is a function of the cognitive power
influenced by the intellect and above all by the principle of contradiction; thus it expresses itself
through definition and through judgment in the formal order of nature considered in itself. The
activity that unveils esse in Thomistic metaphysics has a unique character and could be called a
resolutio that is proper to metaphysics. When St. Thomas attributes to simple apprehension the
knowledge of material essences through abstraction and assigns the ipsum esse rei to the second
act of the mind (In Boeth. De Trin. q. 5, a. 5), he is speaking of an esse that pertains to the
ontological, logical, and phenomenological orders, and not strictly of the esse that in God is His
essence and in creatures is a substantial act distinct from essence and the effect of God Himself.
Just as the apprehension of ens underlies the perception of reality, the apprehension of
esse as metaphysical act presupposes existential perception as much as intuition and abstraction,
and is located at the apex of their convergences. It is obtained, for St. Thomas, by recourse to
argumentation; this, however, is purely revelatory, bringing to light the originality of esse or
demonstrating the real distinction between esse and essence in creatures and their identity in
God. It is a dialectical kind of knowledge to the extent that esse as such is act and not content;
thus the apprehension of esse occurs by emergence, whereby the concept of act is approached
as a first principle and foundation, and so reveals the ultimate stage of agreement between
intellect and reality.17

13

Cf. C. FABRO, Nozione metafisica di partecipazione, Avvertenza, 3rd edition, S.E.I. Turin, 1963, p. viii.
Cf. C. FABRO, Dallessere allesistente, Morcelliana, Brescia, 1965, p. 66.
15
C. FABRO, The Intensive Hermeneutics of Thomistic Philosophy: The Notion of Participation, The Review of
Metaphysics, 27 (1974), pp. 470-471.
16
C. FABRO, op. cit., p. 470.
17
C. FABRO, Existence, 1967, p. 724.
14

Echoing Fabros gnoseology of our knowledge of the act of being (esse), Llano writes the
following concerning knowledge of esse: Esse does not appear to us in its pure state, but rather
as the act of a being, and we perceive it according to the mode in which the concrete being is
perceived, in dependence upon sense experience.
In the beginning, the act of being of things is known only in a superficial and confused
way. Somehow, it is grasped in this initial starting point; if it were not given to us in some way,
we could never get to know it explicitly. After a process of reduction in which we go from
what is founded to its foundation we get to know the esse ipsum as the radical act of a being.
The reduction of the diversity of the real to the (analogical) unity of being (esse), is
achieved by a dynamic reference to its foundation, which goes beyond logical unity based on
mere conceptual abstraction. This is not a process of intuition, nor of deduction, but an analytic
process of foundation. From the most superficial and variable acts we transcend to the most
profound and permanent acts. And thus, we reason from act to act (accidents, to substantial form,
to act of being), until we achieve being-as-act, the ultimate foundation of everything.18
Fabro explains that the metaphysical determination of esse as actus essendi in the sense
of act of all acts, is proper to Aquinas and constitutes the transcendental foundation of the
metaphysics of participation. This has been discovered by the strictly metaphysical method of
resolution or reduction (per resolutionem or per reductionem), as Aquinas often calls it, of
accidental predicamental acts to substantial form and of both accidental and substantial acts to
the more profound substantial act which is esse. It has also been discovered by the method of the
absolute reduction of the act of being by participation to the esse per essentiam.19
Jason Mitchell describes Fabros method and structure of metaphysical reflection the
resolutio an inductive analysis towards knowledge of the intensive notion of esse, as follows:
In general, Fabro uses the term resolutio to refer to the movement of reason in metaphysics
from ens to esse, from the initial notion of ens-esse to the intensive notion of esse. Fabro argues
that the intensive notion of esse is not obtained by abstraction or apprehended in an intuition.
Metaphysical resolutio does not consist in judgment, but rather in argumentation and dialectical
reflection. In involves demonstration, but is not limited to demonstration
Intitial notion of being. Metaphysical reflection presupposes an initial notion of ens
common to all. Fabro certainly has the merit of emphasizing the non-abstractive character of our
first notion and of arguing that this primum cognitum is best characterized as being obtained
through an apprehension. Ens is apprehended as a synthetic notion which implicitly includes
both essence and esse.
Phenomenological reflection. Phenomenological reflection on reality, substance and
causality provides the basis for subsequent philosophical distinctions. This reflection affirms the
unity of substance as both subject and essence; that the notion proper to causality is that of

18

A. LLANO, Gnoseology, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 2001, pp. 115-116.

C. FABRO, The Intensive Hermeneutics of Thomistic Philosophy: The Notion of Participation, The Review of
Metaphysics, 27 (1974), p. 486.

19

dependence, and that essence (obtained by abstraction) is irreducible to existence (affirmed in

judgment).
Philosophical reflection. Philosophical admiration urges us to address the problem of
movement, change and multiplicity. Accidental change and accidental multiplicity are explained
by means of the distinction between substance and accidents and between potency and act.
Substantial change is explained by the distinction between prime matter and substantial form.
The notion of univocal-predicamental, formal-notional participation is used to explain the
participation of an individual in a species and the species in a genus.
The beginning of metaphysical reflection. Metaphysical reflection proper begins when
the philosopher comes to an initial, metaphysical notion of ens-esse. According to Fabro, this
notion is obtained by surpassing the problem of movement and reflecting on the varying degrees
of perfection in the beings that surround us. In this way, the philosopher passes from the problem
of physical contrareity to that of metaphysical contrareity. In this way, Fabros proposal on the
constitution of the genus subiectum of metaphysics is very similar to J. Aertsens: the genus
subiectum of metaphysics is not constituted through a negative judgment on the separability or
materiality of being, but rather by means of a continual analysis of mobile being (Aertsen) or of
the principles of movement sub ratione entis (Fabro).
Metaphysics and the methodological notion of being. In the intermediate stage of
metaphysical reflection, which concerns the methodological-structural notion of ens-esse, two
important problems are affronted: the first concerns the argument for the real composition of
essence and esse in the created substance. In the solution to the first, the created substance is
seen to participate in actus essendi, which, in turn, is limited and determined by the form or
essence as potency-principle. In the solution to the second problem, the principles forma dat
esse and forma est causa essendi are interpreted to mean that the form exercises a formal
causality (determination, specification and limitation), and not an efficient causality (production
of act; reduction of potency to act) on actus essendi. Both problems that of the real
composition and that of forms causal influence on esse lead to that of transcendental causality.
The twofold passage to the intensive notion of being. Fabros twofold resolution is based
on the distinction he makes between formal resolution-reduction and real resolution-reduction:
the former concerns the creatures essence and the participation of pure perfections (vivere et
intelligere) in esse; the latter concerns the real, constitutive principles of created ens and the
foundation of the creatures participated actus essendi on Ipsum Esse Subsistens. Fabro bases the
distinction on St. Thomass commentary on Book Five of Dionysiuss De Divinis Nominibus,
lect. 1, n. 635. The first resolution culminates in a dialectical reflection on the relationship
between esse, vivere, and intelligere: Whatever participates in vivere first participates in esse
(esse appears as foundation); Something participates in intelligere to the degree that it
participates in esse(intensive notion of esse). In contrasting formal resolution with real
resolution, Fabro is not contrasting the irreal with the real, but rather isolating the
participations proper to the species, the genus and to the perfections vivere, and intelligere
from the participations proper to accidents, substance, matter, substantial form, essence and esse.
The former resolution ends in the formal, intensive notion of esse ipsum as formal plexus of all
perfections; the latter ends in the understanding of created, participated esse in its causal
5

relationship to Ipsum Esse Subsistens. Thus, it is in the final stage of metaphysical reflection that
the ultimate, analogical, intensive notion of esse is obtained.20

20

J. MITCHELL, Being and Participation: The Method and Structure of Metaphysical Reflection According to
Cornelio Fabro (summary article), Pontifical Athenaeum Regina Apostolorum, Rome, 2010, pp. 6-8.