THIRD DIVISION

NOEL B. BACCAY,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 173138

Present:

- versus -

CARPIO
MORALES, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.
Promulgated:

MARIBEL C. BACCAY and

REPUBLIC OF
December 1, 2010
THEPHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, assails the Decision[1] dated August 26, 2005 and
Resolution[2]dated June 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
74581. The CA reversed the February 5, 2002 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 38, which declared the marriage of petitioner Noel B.
Baccay (Noel) and Maribel Calderon-Baccay (Maribel) void on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 36[4] of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The undisputed factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
Noel and Maribel were schoolmates at the Mapua Institute of Technology
where both took up Electronics and Communications Engineering. Sometime in
1990, they were introduced by a mutual friend and became close to one another.
Noel courted Maribel, but it was only after years of continuous pursuit that Maribel

accepted Noels proposal and the two became sweethearts. Noel considered Maribel
as the snobbish and hard-to-get type, which traits he found attractive.[5]
Noels family was aware of their relationship for he used to bring Maribel to
their house. Noel observed that Maribel was inordinately shy when around his family
so to bring her closer to them, he always invited Maribel to attend family gatherings
and other festive occasions like birthdays, Christmas, and fiesta celebrations.
Maribel, however, would try to avoid Noels invitations and whenever she attended
those occasions with Noels family, he observed that Maribel was invariably aloof or
snobbish. Not once did she try to get close to any of his family members. Noel would
talk to Maribel about her attitude towards his family and she would promise to
change, but she never did.
Around 1997, Noel decided to break up with Maribel because he was already
involved with another woman. He tried to break up with Maribel, but Maribel
refused and offered to accept Noels relationship with the other woman so long as
they would not sever their ties. To give Maribel some time to get over their
relationship, they still continued to see each other albeit on a friendly basis.
Despite their efforts to keep their meetings strictly friendly, however, Noel
and Maribel had several romantic moments together. Noel took these episodes of
sexual contact casually since Maribel never demanded anything from him except his
company. Then, sometime in November 1998, Maribel informed Noel that she was
pregnant with his child. Upon advice of his mother, Noel grudgingly agreed to marry
Maribel. Noel and Maribel were immediately wed on November 23, 1998 before
Judge Gregorio Dayrit, the Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City.
After the marriage ceremony, Noel and Maribel agreed to live with Noels
family in their house at Rosal, Pag-asa, Quezon City. During all the time she lived
with Noels family, Maribel remained aloof and did not go out of her way to endear
herself to them. She would just come and go from the house as she pleased. Maribel
never contributed to the familys coffer leaving Noel to shoulder all expenses for their
support. Also, she refused to have any sexual contact with Noel.

Surprisingly, despite Maribels claim of being pregnant, Noel never observed

any symptoms of pregnancy in her. He asked Maribels office mates whether she
manifested any signs of pregnancy and they confirmed that she showed no such
signs. Then, sometime in January 1999, Maribel did not go home for a day, and when
she came home she announced to Noel and his family that she had a miscarriage and
was confined at the Chinese General Hospital where her sister worked as a nurse.
Noel confronted her about her alleged miscarriage sometime in February
1999. The discussion escalated into an intense quarrel which woke up the whole
household. Noels mother tried to intervene but Maribel shouted Putang ina nyo, wag
kayo makialam at her. Because of this, Noels mother asked them to leave her house.
Around 2:30 a.m., Maribel called her parents and asked them to pick her up. Maribel
left Noels house and did not come back anymore. Noel tried to communicate with
Maribel but when he went to see her at her house nobody wanted to talk to him and
she rejected his phone calls.[6]
On September 11, 2000 or after less than two years of marriage, Noel filed a
petition[7] for declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC of Manila. Despite
summons, Maribel did not participate in the proceedings. The trial proceeded after
the public prosecutor manifested that no collusion existed between the parties.
Despite a directive from the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) also did
not submit a certification manifesting its agreement or opposition to the case.[8]
On February 5, 2002, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Noel. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of the
parties hereto celebrated on November 23, 1998 at the sala of Judge
Gregorio Dayrit of the Metropolitan Trial Court in Quezon City as NULL
and VOID.
The Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Chief of the
National Statistics Office are hereby directed to record and enter this
decree into the marriage records of the parties in their respective marriage
registers.

The absolute community property of the parties is hereby dissolved

and, henceforth, they shall be governed by the property regime of
complete separation of property.
With costs against respondent.
SO ORDERED.[9]

The RTC found that Maribel failed to perform the essential marital obligations
of marriage, and such failure was due to a personality disorder called Narcissistic
Personality Disorder characterized by juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability
as determined by a clinical psychologist. The RTC cited the findings of Nedy L.
Tayag, a clinical psychologist presented as witness by Noel, that Maribel was a very
insecure person. She entered into the marriage not because of emotional desire for
marriage but to prove something, and her attitude was exploitative particularly in
terms of financial rewards. She was emotionally immature, and viewed marriage as
a piece of paper and that she can easily get rid of her husband without any
provocation.[10]
On appeal by the OSG, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 38 declaring as null and void the
marriage between petitioner-appellee and respondent is hereby
REVERSED. Accordingly, the instant Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[11]

The appellate court held that Noel failed to establish that Maribels supposed
Narcissistic Personality Disorder was the psychological incapacity contemplated by
law and that it was permanent and incurable. Maribels attitudes were merely mild
peculiarities in character or signs of ill-will and refusal or neglect to perform marital
obligations which did not amount to psychological incapacity, said the appellate
court. The CA noted that Maribel may have failed or refused to perform her marital
obligations but such did not indicate incapacity. The CA stressed that the law
requires nothing short of mental illness sufficient to render a person incapable of
knowing the essential marital obligations.[12]

The CA further held that Maribels refusal to have sexual intercourse with Noel
did not constitute a ground to find her psychologically incapacitated under Article
36 of theFamily Code. As Noel admitted, he had numerous sexual relations with
Maribel before their marriage. Maribel therefore cannot be said to be incapacitated
to perform this particular obligation and that such incapacity existed at the time of
marriage.[13]
Incidentally, the CA held that the OSG erred in saying that what Noel should
have filed was an action to annul the marriage under Article 45 (3)[14] of the Family
Code. According to the CA, Article 45 (3) involving consent to marriage vitiated by
fraud is limited to the instances enumerated under Article 46[15] of the Family Code.
Maribels misrepresentation that she was pregnant to induce Noel to marry her was not
the fraud contemplated under Article 45 (3) as it was not among the instances
enumerated under Article 46.[16]
On June 13, 2006, the CA denied Noels motion for reconsideration. It held
that Maribels personality disorder is not the psychological incapacity contemplated
by law. Her refusal to perform the essential marital obligations may be attributed
merely to her stubborn refusal to do so. Also, the manifestations of the Narcissistic
Personality Disorder had no connection with Maribels failure to perform her marital
obligations. Noel having failed to prove Maribels alleged psychological incapacity,
any doubts should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.[17]
Hence, the present petition raising the following assignment of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE
CASE OF CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT
FIND APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT CASE.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE
RESPONDENT IS NOT SUFFERING FROM NARCISSISTIC
PERSONALITY DISORDER; AND THAT HER FAILURE TO
PERFORM HER ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS DOES
NOT CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.[18]

The issue to be resolved is whether the marriage between the parties is null
and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner Noel contends that the CA failed to consider Maribels refusal to
procreate as psychological incapacity. Insofar as he was concerned, the last time he
had sexual intercourse with Maribel was before the marriage when she was drunk.
They never had any sexual intimacy during their marriage. Noel claims that if a
spouse senselessly and constantly refuses to perform his or her marital obligations,
Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity rather
than to stubborn refusal. He insists that the CA should not have considered the premarital sexual encounters between him and Maribel in finding that the latter was not
psychologically incapacitated to procreate through marital sexual cooperation. He
argues that making love for procreation and consummation of the marriage for the
start of family life is different from plain, simple and casual sex. He further stresses
that Maribel railroaded him into marrying her by seducing him and later claiming
that she was pregnant with his child. But after their marriage, Maribel refused to
consummate their marriage as she would not be sexually intimate with him.[19]
Noel further claims that there were other indicia of Maribels psychological
incapacity and that she consistently exhibited several traits typical of a person
suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder before and during their marriage. He
points out that Maribel would only mingle with a few individuals and never with Noels
family even if they lived under one (1) roof. Maribel was also arrogant and haughty.
She was rude and disrespectful to his mother and was also interpersonally exploitative
as shown by her misrepresentation of pregnancy to force Noel to marry her. After
marriage, Maribel never showed respect and love to Noel and his family. She
displayed indifference to his emotional and sexual needs, but before the marriage she
would display unfounded jealousy when Noel was visited by his friends. This same
jealousy motivated her to deceive him into marrying her.
Lastly, he points out that Maribels psychological incapacity was proven to be
permanent and incurable with the root cause existing before the marriage. The
psychologist testified that persons suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder
were unmotivated to participate in therapy session and would reject any form of
psychological help rendering their condition long lasting if not incurable. Such
persons would not admit that their behavioral manifestations connote pathology or

abnormality. The psychologist added that Maribels psychological incapacity was

deeply rooted within her adaptive system since early childhood and manifested
during adult life. Maribel was closely attached to her parents and mingled with only
a few close individuals. Her close attachment to her parents and their over-protection
of her turned her into a self-centered, self-absorbed individual who was insensitive
to the needs of others. She developed the tendency not to accept rejection or
failure.[20]
On the other hand, the OSG maintains that Maribels refusal to have sexual
intercourse with Noel did not constitute psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code as her traits were merely mild peculiarities in her character or signs
of ill-will and refusal or neglect to perform her marital obligations. The psychologist
even admitted that Maribel was capable of entering into marriage except that it would
be difficult for her to sustain one. Also, it was established that Noel and Maribel had
sexual relations prior to their marriage. The OSG further pointed out that the
psychologist was vague as to how Maribels refusal to have sexual intercourse with
Noel constituted Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
The petition lacks merit.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

The Court held in Santos v. Court of Appeals[21] that the phrase psychological
incapacity is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article 68[22] of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most
serious of cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

In Republic of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals,[23] the Court laid down the
guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, based on
Article 36 of theFamily Code, to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution
and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our
laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the
foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family
and marriage are to be protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and
the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms
may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties,
or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so
as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
ofejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of
the celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness
was existing when the parties exchanged their I dos. The manifestation of
the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or

even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but
may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her
own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as
well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated
in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling
or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x.
xxxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall
be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which
will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court
such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095. (Emphasis ours.)

In this case, the totality of evidence presented by Noel was not sufficient to
sustain a finding that Maribel was psychologically incapacitated. Noels evidence
merely established that Maribel refused to have sexual intercourse with him after their
marriage, and that she left him after their quarrel when he confronted her about her
alleged miscarriage. He failed to prove the root cause of the alleged psychological
incapacity and establish the requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability. As correctly observed by the CA, the report of the psychologist, who
concluded that Maribel was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder traceable
to her experiences during childhood, did not establish how the personality disorder
incapacitated Maribel from validly assuming the essential obligations of the
marriage. Indeed, the same psychologist even testified that Maribel was capable of
entering into a marriage except that it would be difficult for her to sustain one.[24] Mere
difficulty, it must be stressed, is not the incapacity contemplated by law.
The Court emphasizes that the burden falls upon petitioner, not just to prove
that private respondent suffers from a psychological disorder, but also that such
psychological disorder renders her truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage.[25] Psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal,
or a neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. An unsatisfactory
marriage is not a null and void marriage. As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos:[26]
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with
a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor
manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting
a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave
and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. x x x.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74581 is AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

ENRIQUE
AGRAVIADOR yALUNAN,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 170729

Present:
CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.

versus -

Promulgated:
December 8, 2010
ERLINDA AMPAROAGRAVIADOR and REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. -- x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
BRION, J.:

Enrique Agraviador y Alunan (petitioner) challenges through his petition for review
on certiorari[1] the decision dated May 31, 2005[2] and the resolution dated December
6, 2005[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 75207.The challenged
decision reversed the resolution[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 276,
Muntinlupa City, declaring the marriage of the petitioner and Erlinda AmparoAgraviador (respondent) null and void on the ground of the latters psychological

incapacity. The assailed resolution, on the other hand, denied the petitioners motion
for reconsideration.
Antecedent Facts
The petitioner first met the respondent in 1971 at a beerhouse where the latter
worked. The petitioner, at that time, was a 24-year old security guard of the Bureau
of Customs, while the respondent was a 17-year old waitress. Their meeting led to a
courtship, and they eventually became sweethearts. They often spent nights together
at the respondents rented room, and soon entered into a common-law relationship.
On May 23, 1973, the petitioner and the respondent contracted marriage in a
ceremony officiated by Reverend Juanito Reyes at a church in Tondo, Manila. The
petitioners family was apprehensive about this marriage because of the nature of the
respondents work and because she came from a broken family. Out of their union,
the petitioner and the respondent begot four (4) children, namely: Erisque,
Emmanuel, Evelyn, and Eymarey.
On March 1, 2001, the petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with the respondent, under Article 36 of the
Family Code, as amended.[5] The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-081. He
alleged that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the
essential obligations of marriage as she was carefree and irresponsible, and refused
to do household chores like cleaning and cooking; stayed away from their house for
long periods of time; had an affair with a lesbian; did not take care of their sick child;
consulted a witch doctor in order to bring him bad fate; and refused to use the family
name Agraviador in her activities.
The petitioner likewise claimed that the respondent refused to have sex with
him since 1993 because she became very close to a male tenant in their house. In
fact, he discovered their love notes to each other, and caught them inside his room
several times.
The respondent moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the root cause
of her psychological incapacity was not medically identified and alleged in the
petition.[6]The RTC denied this motion in its order dated July 2, 2001.[7]

In her answer,[8] the respondent denied that she engaged in extramarital affairs
and maintained that it was the petitioner who refused to have sex with her. She
claimed that the petitioner wanted to have their marriage annulled because he wanted
to marry their former household helper, Gilda Camarin. She added that she was the
one who took care of their son at the hospital before he died.
The RTC ordered the city prosecutor and/or the Solicitor General to
investigate if collusion existed between the parties.[9] The RTC, in its Order
of November 20, 2001, allowed the petitioner to present his evidence ex
parte.[10] The petitioner, thus, presented testimonial and documentary evidence to
substantiate his claims.
In his testimony, the petitioner confirmed what he stated in his petition, i.e.,
that the respondent was carefree, irresponsible, immature, and whimsical; stubbornly
did what she wanted; did not stay long in the conjugal dwelling; refused to do
household chores; refused to take care of him and their children; and consulted a
witch doctor in order to bring bad luck upon him.
The petitioner further confirmed that the respondent abandoned their sick
child, which led to the latters death. The petitioner further stated that the respondent
became very close to a male border of their house; he discovered their love notes to
each other, and caught them inside his room several times.
The petitioner declared that he filed the petition for nullity because the
respondent refused to change; he loves his children and does not want their children
to be affected by their mothers conduct. He intimated that he might remarry if it
would benefit their children.
Aside from his testimony, the petitioner also presented a certified true copy
of their marriage contract (Exh. B)[11] and the psychiatric evaluation report (Exh.
A)[12] of Dr. Juan Cirilo L. Patac.
In his Psychiatric Evaluation Report, Dr. Patac made the following findings:
REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the information gathered from Enrique, his son and their
helper, the psychological report and the mental status examination,
Enrique is found to be psychologically capable to fulfill the
essential obligations of marriage. He coped with Erlindas selfish
and irresponsible behavior as he dutifully performed what she
failed to do for the family. He patiently tried to understand her and
exerted every effort to make her realize the harm caused by her
neglect to the family. Throughout their marriage, he provided
emotional and material support for the family. He engaged in other
business endeavors aside from his employment as he maintained to
be financially productive.
The same data revealed that Erlinda failed to fulfill the essential
obligations of marriage. She manifested inflexible maladaptive
behavior even at the time before their marriage. She is known to be
stubborn and uncaring who did things her way without regard to the
feelings of others. She is an irresponsible individual who selfishly
ignored and neglected her role as daughter to her parents as wife to
Enrique and mother to their children. Before the marriage at a
young age of 17, Erlinda defied her parents as she lived alone,
rented a room for herself and allowed Enrique to sleep with her.
She did not care about the needs of Enrique before and after
marriage and she maintained to be so with her children. She
abandoned and relegated her duty to her family to their helper. She
never stayed long in their house despite pleadings from her children
and Enrique. Her irresponsible, uncaring behavior even led to the
death of one of their children. Likewise, she does not show concern
and ignores a daughter who is presently manifesting behavioral
problem. She kept secrets as she never allowed her husband and
children know where she stays when shes not at work. She falsified
documents as she hid her marital status when she used her maiden
surname in her present employment. She is having illicit affairs and
is reported to be presently having an affair with a lesbian. Her desire
to bring bad fate and death to Enrique through her consultation with
a mangkukulam point out her lack of care, love, and respect to
Enrique.
Erlindas lack of motivation and insight greatly affected her capacity
to render love, respect and support to her family.

The above data shows that Erlinda is suffering from a Personality

Disorder (Mixed Personality Disorder). She has been having this
disorder since her adolescence. There is no definite treatment for
this disorder. She is deemed psychologically incapacitated to
perform the obligations of marriage.
In fairness to Erlinda, she is recommended to undergo the same
examination as Enrique underwent.[13]

The RTC Ruling

The RTC nullified the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent in its
decision of April 26, 2002. It saw merit in the petitioners testimony and Dr. Patacs
psychiatric evaluation report, and concluded that:
Without contradiction the recitation by Petitioner and the findings
of the doctor show that Respondent is indeed suffering from Mixed
Personality Disorder that render her incapable of complying with her
marital obligations. Respondents refusal to commit herself to the
marriage, her tendencies to avoid a close relationship with Petitioner,
preferring to be with her lover and finally abandoning their home for a
lesbian, a disregard of social norm, show that she was never prepared for
marital commitment in the first place. This incapacity is deeply rooted
from her family upbringing with no hope for a cure. Therefore, for the
good of society and of the parties themselves, it is best that this marriage
between ENRIQUE AGRAVIADOR Y ALUNAN and ERLINDA
AMPARO AGRAVIADOR be annulled as if it never took place at all.
The Civil Registrar of the City of Manila and the General Civil Registrar,
National Census and Statistics Office, East Avenue, Quezon City, are
hereby requested to make the necessary correction of the civil record of
the marriage between the parties and on their respective civil status.
The children ERISQUE AGRAVIADOR, EMMANUEL
AGRAVIADOR, EVELYN AGRAVIADOR and EYMAREY
AGRAVIADOR will however remain as their legitimate children.
It is SO ORDERED.[14]

The CA Decision
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA, in its decision[15] dated May 31, 2005,
reversed and set aside the RTC resolution, and dismissed the petition.
The CA held that Dr. Patacs psychiatric evaluation report failed to establish that the
respondents personality disorder was serious, grave and permanent; it likewise did
not mention the root cause of her incapacity. The CA further ruled that Dr. Patac had
no basis in concluding that the respondents disorder had no definite treatment
because he did not subject her to a mental assessment.
The CA added that the psychiatric remarks in the Report were nothing but a
showcase of respondents character flaws and liabilities. There was no proof of a
natal or supervening factor that effectively incapacitated the respondent from
accepting and complying with the essential obligations of marriage. If at all, these
character flaws may only give rise to a legal separation suit.
The petitioner moved to reconsider this decision, but the CA denied his
motion in its resolution of December 6, 2005.[16]
The Petition and Issues
The petitioner now comes to us via the present petition to challenge and seek the
reversal of the CA ruling, based on the following arguments:
I.

THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY [HIM] WAS MORE

THAN
SUBSTANTIAL
TO
ESTABLISH
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE
RESPONDENT[;]

II.

THE GUIDELINES SET FORTH IN REPUBLIC V.

MOLINA [HAD BEEN] SATISIFIED[;]

III.

THE ADMISSIBILITY XXX OF THE PSYCHIATRIC

EVALUATION REPORT XXX STILL STANDS FOR
NOT HAVING BEEN CONTESTED XXX BY THE
STATE AND/THE RESPONDENT[; and]

IV.

THE DEGREE OF PROOF REQUIRED IN CIVIL CASES

HAD BEEN SATISIFIED[.]

The issue in this case essentially boils down to whether there is basis to nullify the
petitioners marriage to the respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity to
comply with the essential marital obligations.

The Courts Ruling

We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit, and hold that no sufficient basis
exists to annul the marriage, pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code and its related
jurisprudence.
The totality of evidence presented
failed to establish the respondents
psychological incapacity
The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the
Family Code which provides that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." It introduced the concept
of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage, although this concept
eludes exact definition.
The initial common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the Family Code was that it did not involve a species of vice of consent. Justices
Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision committee that
drafted the Code, conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary
consent to a marriage but was, nonetheless, incapable of fulfilling such rights and
obligations. Dr. Arturo Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his
commentaries on the Family Code that this psychological incapacity to comply with
the essential marital obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage.[17]

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[18] the Court first declared that psychological

incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c)
incurability. It should refer to "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."[19] It
must be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage.
We laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic v. Court of Appeals[20] (the Molina case)
where we said:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This
is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation
of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting
it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and
the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent
that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although
no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness

and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be

given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their I do's. The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant
to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife
as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents
and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling
or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall
be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which
will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court

such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated
under Canon 1095.

These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements we established in Santos. A later

case, Marcos v. Marcos,[21] further clarified that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to
introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the
totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.
A later case, Ngo Te v. Yu-Te,[22] declared that it may have been inappropriate for
the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases
of psychological incapacity. We stated that instead of serving as a
guideline, Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket, forcing all cases
involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it, which is not only
contrary to the intention of the law but unrealistic as well because, with respect to
psychological incapacity, no case can be considered as on "all fours" with
another. Ngo Te, therefore, put into question the applicability of time-tested
guidelines set forth in Molina.
Ting v. Velez-Ting[23] and the fairly recent case of Suazo v. Suazo[24] squarely met the
issue and laid to rest any question regarding the applicability of Molina. In these
cases, we clarified that Ngo Te did not abandon Molina; far from abandoning
Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements. We also
explained in Suazo that NgoTe merely stands for a more flexible approach in
considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological
incapacity.
Under these established guidelines, we find the totality of the petitioners
evidence insufficient to prove the respondents psychological incapacity.

a. Petitioners court testimony

For clarity, we reproduce the pertinent portions of the petitioners testimony
that essentially confirmed what the petition alleged:
Q: Out of your marriage with the said respondent, were you blessed
with children, and how many?
A: Yes, sir, we were blessed with four (4), two (2) boys and two (2)
girls.
Q: Where are they now?
A: All grown up with the exception of one who died of pneumonia
due to the neglect and fault of my said wife who abandone[d]
him at the time of his illness.
Q: Is that the reason why you file[d] the instant petition, Mr.
Witness?
A: It is only one of the several reasons, Sir.
Q: Can you cite these reasons, you mentioned?
A: She appears to be carefree, irresponsible, immature,
whimsical and used to impose what she wanted to get, she
refused to do household chores, like cooking, caring for
the husband and children, used to stay from the conjugal
dwelling, initially for weeks, then for months and lately
fully abandoned the family house and stay with a lesbian.
[sic]
At first, I discovered a love note while being so secretive and
used to be very close to a male renter in the ground floor
of their house and caught them several times alone in his
room, thus explaining the reason why she refused to have
sex since 1993, up to and until the present time.
Lately, we discovered that she used to consult a
cult mangkukulam to bring bad fate against the family
and death for me.

Q: By the way did you give her the chance to change?

A: I gave her but she refused to reform.
xxxx
Q: Can you not give a last chance for you to save your marriage?
A: I think I cannot since she does not accept her fault and she does
not want to change for the sake of our family.[25]

These exchanges during trial significantly constituted the totality of the

petitioners testimony on the respondents supposed psychological or mental malady.
We glean from these exchanges the petitioners theory that the respondents
psychological incapacity is premised on her refusal or unwillingness to perform
certain marital obligations, and a number of unpleasant personality traits such as
immaturity, irresponsibility, and unfaithfulness.
These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of psychological incapacity
that the law requires, and should be distinguished from the difficulty, if not outright
refusal or neglect, in the performance of some marital obligations that characterize
some marriages.[26] The intent of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders existing
at the time of the marriage clearly demonstrating an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage.[27] The psychological illness that
must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so
grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities
of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.[28]
In the present case, the petitioners testimony failed to establish that the
respondents condition is a manifestation of a disordered personality rooted on some
incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition that makes her completely
unable to discharge the essential marital obligations. If at all, the petitioner merely
showed that the respondent had some personality defects that showed their
manifestation during the marriage; his testimony sorely lacked details necessary to
establish that the respondents defects existed at the inception of the marriage. In
addition, the petitioner failed to discuss the gravity of the respondents condition;

neither did he mention that the respondents malady wasincurable, or if it were

otherwise, the cure would be beyond the respondents means to undertake. The
petitioners declarations that the respondent does not accept her fault, does not want
to change, and refused to reform are insufficient to establish a psychological or
mental defect that is serious, grave, or incurable as contemplated by Article 36 of
the Family Code.
In a similar case, Bier v. Bier,[29] we ruled that it was not enough that the
respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying
with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of
a natal or supervening disabling factor an adverse integral element in the
respondent's personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying
with his essential marital obligations had to be shown.
b. Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report
The Court finds that Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report fell short in
proving that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital duties. We emphasize that Dr. Patac did not personally evaluate and
examine the respondent; he, in fact, recommended at the end of his Report for the
respondent to undergo the same examination [that the petitioner] underwent. [30] Dr.
Patac relied only on the information fed by the petitioner, the parties
second child, Emmanuel, and household helper. Sarah. Largely, the doctor relied on
the information provided by the petitioner. Thus, while his Report can be used as a
fair gauge to assess the petitioners own psychological condition (as he was, in fact,
declared by Dr. Patac to be psychologically capable to fulfill the essential obligations
of marriage), the same statement cannot be made with respect to the respondents
condition. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and
comprehensiveness of the examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be
suffering from a psychological disorder.[31]
We do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated is mandatory. We have confirmed in Marcos v.
Marcos that the person sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated must be
personally examined by a psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at such
declaration.[32] If a psychological disorder can be proven by independent means, no

reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted and given credit.[33] No
such independent evidence appears on record, however, to have been gathered in
this case.
In his Report, Dr. Patac attempted to establish the juridical antecedence of
the respondents condition by stating that the respondent manifested inflexible
maladaptive behavior before marriage, pointing out how the respondent behaved
before the marriage the respondent defied her parents and lived alone; rented a room
for herself; and allowed the petitioner to sleep with her. These perceived behavioral
flaws, to our mind, are insufficient to establish that the incapacity was rooted in the
history of the respondent antedating the marriage. Dr. Patac failed to elucidate on
the circumstances that led the respondent to act the way she did, for example, why
she defied her parents and decided to live alone; why she neglected her obligations
as a daughter; and why she often slept with the petitioner. This is an area where
independent evidence, such as information from a person intimately related to the
respondent, could prove useful. As earlier stated, no such independent evidence was
gathered in this case. In the absence of such evidence, it is not surprising why the
Psychiatric Report Evaluation failed to explain how and why the respondents socalled inflexible maladaptive behavior was already present at the time of the
marriage.
Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise failed to prove
the gravity or seriousness of the respondents condition. He simply made an
enumeration of the respondents purported behavioral defects (as related to him by
third persons), and on this basis characterized the respondent to be suffering from
mixed personality disorder. In the Background History portion of his Psychiatric
Evaluation Report, Dr. Patac mentioned that the respondent employed one of her
siblings to do the household chores; did not help in augmenting the familys earnings;
belittled the petitioners income; continued her studies despite the petitioners
disapproval; seldom stayed at home; became close to a male
border; had an affair with a lesbian; did not disclose the actual date of her departure
to
Taiwan;
threatened
to
poison
the
petitioner
and
their
children; neglected and ignoredtheir children; used her maiden name at work; and
consulted a witch doctor to bring bad fate to the petitioner. Except for the isolated
and
unfounded
statement
that
Erlindas
lack
of
motivation and insight greatly affected her capacity to render love,

respect and support to the family,[34] there was no other statement regarding the
degree of severity of the respondents condition, why and to what extent the disorder
is
grave,
and
how
it
incapacitated
her
to
comply
with the duties required in marriage. There was likewise no showing of a
supervening disabling factor or debilitating psychological condition that effectively
incapacitated the respondent from complying with the essential marital
obligations. At any rate, the personality flaws mentioned above, even if true, could
only amount to insensitivity, sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity, and
irresponsibility, which do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Interestingly, Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report highlighted only the
respondents negative behavioral traits without balancing them with her other
qualities. The allegations of infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity, as well as the
claim that the respondent refused to engage in sexual intercourse since 1993, of
course, came from the petitioner, but these claims were not proven. Even
assuming ex gratia argumenti that these accusations were true, the Psychiatric
Evaluation Report did not indicate that unfaithfulness or promiscuousness were traits
that antedated or existed at the time of marriage. Likewise, the accusation that the
respondent abandoned her sick child which eventually led to the latters death appears
to be an exaggerated claim in the absence of any specifics and corroboration. On the
other hand, the petitioners own questionable traits his flirtatious nature before
marriage and his admission that he inflicted physical harm on the respondent every
time he got jealous were not pursued. From this perspective, the Psychiatric
Evaluation Report appears to be no more than a one-sided diagnosis against the
respondent that we cannot consider a reliable basis to conclusively establish the root
cause and the degree of seriousness of her condition.
The Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise failed to adequately explain how
Dr. Patac came to the conclusion that the respondents personality disorder had no
definite treatment. It did not discuss the concept of mixed personality disorder, i.e.,
its classification, cause, symptoms, and cure, and failed to show how and to what
extent the respondent exhibited this disorder in order to create a necessary inference
that the respondents condition had no definite treatment or is incurable. A glaring
deficiency, to our mind, is the Psychiatric Evaluation Reports failure to support its
findings and conclusions with any factual basis. It simply enumerated the

respondents perceived behavioral defects, and then associated these traits with
mixed personality disorder. We find it unfortunate that Dr. Patac himself was not
called on the witness stand to expound on the findings and conclusions he made in
his Psychiatric Evaluation Report. It would have aided petitioners cause had he
called Dr. Patac to testify.
Admittedly, the standards used by the Court in assessing the sufficiency
of psychological evaluation reports may be deemed very strict, but these are proper, in view
of the principle that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage and
the indissolubility of the marital vinculum.[35] Marriage, an inviolable institution
protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties, especially
where the prices of evidence presented are grossly deficient to show the juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability of the condition of the party alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated to assume and perform the essential marital duties.
The petitioners marriage to the respondent may have failed and appears to be
without hope of reconciliation The remedy, however, is not always to have it declared
void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. We stress that Article 36 of the
Family Code contemplates downright incapacity or inability to assume and fulfill the basic
marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the
part
of
the
errant
spouse.
It
is
not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
grounds for divorce manifest themselves. The State, fortunately or unfortunately,
has not seen it fit to decree that divorce should be available in this country. Neither
should an Article 36 declaration of nullity be equated with legal separation, in which
the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence,
moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, sexual
infidelity, abandonment, and the like.[36] Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a
situation where the parties or one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological
illness existing at the time the marriage was celebrated, was incapacitated to fulfill the
obligations of marital life (and thus could not then have validly entered into a marriage), then
we are compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we DENY the petition
and AFFIRM the Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated May

31, 2005 andDecember 6, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 75207. Costs

against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 185595

January 9, 2013

MA. CARMINIA C. CALDERON represented by her Attorney-In-Fact, Marycris V.

Baldevia, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE ANTONIO F. ROXAS and COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the Decision1 dated September
9, 2008 and Resolution2 dated December 15, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
85384. The CA affirmed the Orders dated March 7, 2005 and May 4, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Paraaque City, Branch 260 in Civil Case No. 97-0608.
Petitioner Ma. Carminia C. Calderon and private respondent Jose Antonio F. Roxas, were married
on December 4, 1985 and their union produced four children. On January 16, 1998, petitioner filed
an Amended Complaint3 for the declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
On May 19, 1998, the trial court issued an Order4 granting petitioners application for support
pendente lite. Said order states in part:
Accordingly, the defendant is hereby ordered to contribute to the support of the above-named
minors, (aside from 50% of their school tuition fees which the defendant has agreed to defray, plus
expenses for books and other school supplies), the sum of P42,292.50 per month, effective May 1,
1998, as his share in the monthly support of the children, until further orders from this Court. The first
monthly contribution, i.e., for the month of May 1998, shall be given by the defendant to the plaintiff
within five (5) days from receipt of a copy of this Order. The succeeding monthly contributions of
P42,292.50 shall be directly given by the defendant to the plaintiff without need of any demand,
within the first five (5) days of each month beginning June 1998. All expenses for books and other
school supplies shall be shouldered by the plaintiff and the defendant, share and share alike. Finally,
it is understood that any claim for support-in-arrears prior to May 1, 1998, may be taken up later in
the course of the proceedings proper.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.5
The aforesaid order and subsequent orders for support pendente lite were the subject of G.R. No.
139337 entitled "Ma. Carminia C. Roxas v. Court of Appeals and Jose Antonio F. Roxas" decided by
this Court on August 15, 2001.6 The Decision in said case declared that "the proceedings and orders
issued by the trial court in the application for support pendente lite (and the main complaint for
annulment of marriage) in the re-filed case, that is, in Civil Case No. 97-0608 were not rendered null

and void by the omission of a statement in the certificate of non-forum shopping regarding the prior
filing and dismissal without prejudice of Civil Case No. 97-0523 which involves the same parties."
The assailed orders for support pendente lite were thus reinstated and the trial court resumed
hearing the main case.
On motion of petitioners counsel, the trial court issued an Order dated October 11, 2002 directing
private respondent to give support in the amount of P42,292.50 per month starting April 1, 1999
pursuant to the May 19, 1998 Order.7
On February 11, 2003, private respondent filed a Motion to Reduce Support citing, among other
grounds, that the P42,292.50 monthly support for the children as fixed by the court was even higher
than his then P20,800.00 monthly salary as city councilor.8
After hearing, the trial court issued an Order9 dated March 7, 2005 granting the motion to reduce
support and denying petitioners motion for spousal support, increase of the childrens monthly
support pendente lite and support-in-arrears. The trial court considered the following circumstances
well-supported by documentary and testimonial evidence: (1) the spouses eldest child, Jose
Antonio, Jr. is a Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman and is already earning a monthly salary; (2) all
the children stay with private respondent on weekends in their house in Pasay City; (3) private
respondent has no source of income except his salary and benefits as City Councilor; (4) the
voluminous documents consisting of official receipts in payment of various billings including school
tuition fees, private tutorials and purchases of childrens school supplies, personal checks issued by
private respondent, as well as his own testimony in court, all of which substantiated his claim that he
is fulfilling his obligation of supporting his minor children during the pendency of the action; (5) there
is no proof presented by petitioner that she is not gainfully employed, the spouses being both
medical doctors; (6) the unrebutted allegation of private respondent that petitioner is already in the
United States; and (7) the alleged arrearages of private respondent was not substantiated by
petitioner with any evidence while private respondent had duly complied with his obligation as
ordered by the court through his overpayments in other aspects such as the childrens school tuition
fees, real estate taxes and other necessities.
Petitioners motion for partial reconsideration of the March 7, 2005 Order was denied on May 4,
2005.10
On May 16, 2005, the trial court rendered its Decision11 in Civil Case No. 97-0608 decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring (sic):
1. Declaring null and void the marriage between plaintiff Ma.Carmina C. Roxas and defendant Jose
Antonio Roxas solemnized on December 4, 1985 at San Agustin Convent, in Manila. The Local Civil
Registrar of Manila is hereby ordered to cancel the marriage contract of the parties as appearing in
the Registry of Marriage as the same is void;
2. Awarding the custody of the parties minor children Maria Antoinette Roxas, Julian Roxas and
Richard Roxas to their mother herein petitioner, with the respondent hereby given his visitorial and
or custodial rights at [sic] the express conformity of petitioner.
3. Ordering the respondent Jose Antonio Roxas to provide support to the children in the amount of
P30,000.00 a month, which support shall be given directly to petitioner whenever the children are in
her custody, otherwise, if the children are in the provisional custody of respondent, said amount of
support shall be recorded properly as the amounts are being spent. For that purpose the respondent
shall then render a periodic report to petitioner and to the Court to show compliance and for

monitoring. In addition, the respondent is ordered to support the proper schooling of the children
providing for the payment of the tuition fees and other school fees and charges including
transportation expenses and allowances needed by the children for their studies.
4. Dissolving the community property or conjugal partnership property of the parties as the case may
be, in accordance with law.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General, the Office of the City
Prosecutor, Paranaque City, and the City Civil Registrar of Paranaque City and Manila.
SO ORDERED.12
On June 14, 2005, petitioner through counsel filed a Notice of Appeal from the Orders dated March
7, 2005 and May 4, 2005.
In her appeal brief, petitioner emphasized that she is not appealing the Decision dated May 16, 2005
which had become final as no appeal therefrom had been brought by the parties or the City
Prosecutor or the Solicitor General. Petitioner pointed out that her appeal is "from the RTC Order
dated March 7, 2005, issued prior to the rendition of the decision in the main case", as well as the
May 4, 2005 Order denying her motion for partial reconsideration.13
By Decision dated September 9, 2008, the CA dismissed the appeal on the ground that granting the
appeal would disturb the RTC Decision of May 16, 2005 which had long become final and executory.
The CA further noted that petitioner failed to avail of the proper remedy to question an interlocutory
order.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
A. DID THE CA COMMIT A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION and/or REVERSIBLE
ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THE RTC ORDERS DATED MARCH 7, 2005 AND MAY 4,
2005 ARE MERELY INTERLOCUTORY?
B. DID THE CA COMMIT A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION and/or REVERSIBLE
ERROR WHEN IT DISMISSED OUTRIGHT THE APPEAL FROM SAID RTC ORDERS,
WHEN IT SHOULD HAVE DECIDED THE APPEAL ON THE MERITS?14
The core issue presented is whether the March 7, 2005 and May 4, 2005 Orders on the matter of
support pendente lite are interlocutory or final.
This Court has laid down the distinction between interlocutory and final orders, as follows:
x x x A "final" judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be
done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the
evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties
are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for
instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as
deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing
more remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties next move (which among others,
may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and

ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes "final" or, to use the
established and more distinctive term, "final and executory."
xxxx
Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Courts task of
adjudicating the parties contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each
other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is "interlocutory" e.g.,
an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a motion for extension
of time to file a pleading, or authorizing amendment thereof, or granting or denying applications for
postponement, or production or inspection of documents or things, etc. Unlike a "final" judgment or
order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an "interlocutory" order may not be questioned on
appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment
rendered in the case.15 [Emphasis supplied]
The assailed orders relative to the incident of support pendente lite and support in arrears, as the
term suggests, were issued pending the rendition of the decision on the main action for declaration
of nullity of marriage, and are therefore interlocutory. They did not finally dispose of the case nor did
they consist of a final adjudication of the merits of petitioners claims as to the ground of
psychological incapacity and other incidents as child custody, support and conjugal assets.
The Rules of Court provide for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite which may be availed
of at the commencement of the proper action or proceeding, or at any time prior to the judgment or
final order.16 On March 4, 2003, this Court promulgated the Rule on Provisional Orders17 which shall
govern the issuance of provisional orders during the pendency of cases for the declaration of nullity
of marriage, annulment of voidable marriage and legal separation. These include orders for spousal
support, child support, child custody, visitation rights, hold departure, protection and administration
of common property.
Petitioner contends that the CA failed to recognize that the interlocutory aspect of the assailed
orders pertains only to private respondents motion to reduce support which was granted, and to her
own motion to increase support, which was denied. Petitioner points out that the ruling on support in
arrears which have remained unpaid, as well as her prayer for reimbursement/payment under the
May 19, 1998 Order and related orders were in the nature of final orders assailable by ordinary
appeal considering that the orders referred to under Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 61 of the Rules of
Court can apply only prospectively. Thus, from the moment the accrued amounts became due and
demandable, the orders under which the amounts were made payable by private respondent have
ceased to be provisional and have become final.
We disagree.
The word interlocutory refers to something intervening between the commencement and the end of
the suit which decides some point or matter but is not a final decision of the whole controversy.18 An
interlocutory order merely resolves incidental matters and leaves something more to be done to
resolve the merits of the case. In contrast, a judgment or order is considered final if the order
disposes of the action or proceeding completely, or terminates a particular stage of the same
action.19 Clearly, whether an order or resolution is final or interlocutory is not dependent on
compliance or non-compliance by a party to its directive, as what petitioner suggests. It is also
important to emphasize the temporary or provisional nature of the assailed orders.
Provisional remedies are writs and processes available during the pendency of the action which may
be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and interests therein pending

rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final judgment in the case. They are
provisional because they constitute temporary measures availed of during the pendency of the
action, and they are ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon the result
of the main action.20 The subject orders on the matter of support pendente lite are but an incident to
the main action for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Moreover, private respondents obligation to give monthly support in the amount fixed by the RTC in
the assailed orders may be enforced by the court itself, as what transpired in the early stage of the
proceedings when the court cited the private respondent in contempt of court and ordered him
arrested for his refusal/failure to comply with the order granting support pendente lite.21 A few years
later, private respondent filed a motion to reduce support while petitioner filed her own motion to
increase the same, and in addition sought spousal support and support in arrears. This fact
underscores the provisional character of the order granting support pendente lite. Petitioners theory
that the assailed orders have ceased to be provisional due to the arrearages incurred by private
respondent is therefore untenable.
1wphi1

Under Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, appeal from
interlocutory orders is not allowed. Said provision reads:
SECTION 1. Subject of appeal. - An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to
be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;
(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment;
(c) An interlocutory order;
(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;
(e) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or
compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent;
(f) An order of execution;
(g) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate
claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints, while the main case is
pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom; and
(h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice;
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party
may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. (Emphasis supplied.)
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil
action under Rule 65 provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Having chosen the wrong remedy in questioning the
subject interlocutory orders of the RTC, petitioner's appeal was correctly dismissed by the CA.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED, for lack of merit. The Decision dated
September 9, 2008 and Resolution dated December 15, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 85384 are AFFIRMED.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.