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Note: This case was decided before August 3, 1988 when the Family Code
took effect. It became the basis for the codification of Article 26 (2) of the
Family Code.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce
judgment was rendered in the Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996;
and
(2) Whether the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its
consequent legal effects?
RULING:
(1) Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case. When Divorce
Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet
Recognized as One. From the foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that
Rebecca did not have that status of, or at least was not yet recognized as, a
Filipino citizen when she secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of
divorce from the Dominican Republic.
(2) The Divorce is valid. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no
longer husband and wife to each other.
As the divorce court formally pronounced: "[T]hat the marriage between
MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is
hereby dissolved x x x leaving them free to remarry after completing the
legal requirements."
The Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign
divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a
fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse. Be this as it
may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she
secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the
States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce
decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as
here, sufficient.
The fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen
by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of
the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, standing alone,
work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an
American citizen on February 22, 1996.
In determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad would come within
the pale of the country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning
point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.
One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca's underlying petition before
the RTC, Vicente's motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition thereof, with
Conflict Of Laws Digest: Phil. Export And Foreign Loan Guarantee Corp. V.
V.P. Eusebio Construction Inc. (2004)
G.R. No. 140047
March 31, 2003
Lessons Applicable: No conflicts rule on essential validity of contracts
(conflicts of law)
FACTS:
HELD: YES.
law is that of the State that "has the most significant relationship to the
transaction and the parties Another authority proposed that all matters
relating to the time, place, and manner of performance and valid excuses
for non-performance are determined by the law of the place of
performance or lex loci solutionis, which is useful because it is
undoubtedly always connected to the contract in a significant way
In this case, the laws of Iraq bear substantial connection to the
transaction, since one of the parties is the Iraqi Government and the
place of performance is in Iraq. Hence, the issue of whether respondent
VPECI defaulted in its obligations may be determined by the laws of Iraq.
However, since that foreign law was not properly pleaded or proved, the
presumption of identity or similarity, otherwise known as the processual
presumption, comes into play. Where foreign law is not pleaded or, even
if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same
as ours
delay or the non-completion of the Project was caused by factors not
imputable to the respondent contractor such as the war in Iraq
petitioner as a guarantor is entitled to the benefit of excussion, that is,
it cannot be compelled to pay the creditor SOB unless the property of the
debtor VPECI has been exhausted and all legal remedies against the said
debtor have been resorted to by the creditor. It could also set up
compensation as regards what the creditor SOB may owe the principal
debtor VPECI. In this case, however, the petitioner has clearly waived
these rights and remedies by making the payment of an obligation that
was yet to be shown to be rightfully due the creditor and demandable of
the principal debtor.
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER THE ARTICLE
26 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
Held:
Respondent Orbecido who has the burden of proof, failed to submit
competent evidence showing his allegations that his naturalized American
wife had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried. Therefore, the
Petition of the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The Decision and
Resolution of the RTC Br. 32 of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur is hereby SET
ASIDE.
Art. 26 (2) Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
have capacity to remarry under the Philippine laws.
Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code only applies to case where at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was
solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was
naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce
granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American
citizen while residing in the U. S. A. Therefore, the 2nd par. of Art. 26 does
not apply to the instant case.
However, the legislative intent must be taken into consideration and rule of
reason must be applied. The Supreme Court ruled that par. 2 of Art. 26
should be construed and interpreted to include cases involving parties who,
at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of then becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a
divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry
as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage. To rule otherwise would be sanction absurdity and injustice. Were
the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import
would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A stature may
therefore be extended to case not within the literal meaning of its terms, so
long as they come within its spirits or intent.
the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the
judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed
under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
Anent the second issue, we hereby declare that the trial court has
jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has parental
custody, including the care, support and education of the children, namely
Carolynne and Alexandra Roehr. Let the records of this case be remanded
promptly to the trial court for continuation of appropriate proceedings.
fuel oils (bunker fuels) to the Vessel. Petitioner Crescent granted and
confirmed the request through an advice via facsimile dated November 2,
1995. As security for the payment of the bunker fuels and related services,
petitioner Crescent received two (2) checks in the amounts of
US$100,000.00 and US$200,000.00. Thus, petitioner Crescent contracted
with its supplier, Marine Petrobulk Limited (Marine Petrobulk), another
Canadian corporation, for the physical delivery of the bunker fuels to the
Vessel.
On or about November 4, 1995, Marine Petrobulk delivered the bunker
fuels amounting to US$103,544 inclusive of barging and demurrage charges
to the Vessel at the port of Pioneer Grain, Vancouver, Canada. The Chief
Engineer Officer of the Vessel duly acknowledged and received the delivery
receipt. Marine Petrobulk issued an invoice to petitioner Crescent for the
US$101,400.00 worth of the bunker fuels. Petitioner Crescent issued a
check for the same amount in favor of Marine Petrobulk, which check was
duly encashed.
Having paid Marine Petrobulk, petitioner Crescent issued a revised invoice
dated November 21, 1995 to "Portserv Limited, and/or the Master, and/or
Owners, and/or Operators, and/or Charterers of M/V Lok Maheshwari" in
the amount of US$103,544.00 with instruction to remit the amount on or
before December 1, 1995. The period lapsed and several demands were
made but no payment was received. Also, the checks issued to petitioner
Crescent as security for the payment of the bunker fuels were dishonored
for insufficiency of funds. As a consequence, petitioner Crescent incurred
additional expenses of US$8,572.61 for interest, tracking fees, and legal
fees.
On May 2, 1996, while the Vessel was docked at the port of Cebu City,
petitioner Crescent instituted before the RTC of Cebu City an action "for a
sum of money with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of
preliminary attachment" against respondents Vessel and SCI, Portserv
and/or Transmar.
On May 3, 1996, the trial court issued a writ of attachment against the
Vessel with bond at P2,710,000.00. Petitioner Crescent withdrew its prayer
for a temporary restraining order and posted the required bond.
On May 18, 1996, summonses were served to respondents Vessel and SCI,
and Portserv and/or Transmar through the Master of the Vessel. On May 28,
1996, respondents Vessel and SCI, through Pioneer Insurance and Surety
Corporation (Pioneer), filed an urgent ex-parte motion to approve Pioneers
letter of undertaking, to consider it as counter-bond and to discharge the
attachment. On May 29, 1996, the trial court granted the motion; thus, the
letter of undertaking was approved as counter-bond to discharge the
attachment.
ISSUE:
Whether the Philippine court has or will exercise jurisdiction and entitled to
maritime lien under our laws on foreign vessel docked on Philippine port
and supplies furnished to a vessel in a foreign port?
RULING:
In a suit to establish and enforce a maritime lien for supplies furnished to a
vessel in a foreign port, whether such lien exists, or whether the court has
or will exercise jurisdiction, depends on the law of the country where the
supplies were furnished, which must be pleaded and proved.
The Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis trilogy of cases, which replaced such singlefactor methodologies as the law of the place of supply. The multiple-contact
test to determine, in the absence of a specific Congressional directive as to
the statutes reach, which jurisdictions law should be applied. The
following factors were considered: (1) place of the wrongful act; (2) law of
the flag; (3) allegiance or domicile of the injured; (4) allegiance of the
defendant shipowner; (5) place of contract; (6) inaccessibility of foreign
forum; and (7) law of the forum. This is applicable not only to personal
injury claims arising under the Jones Act but to all matters arising under
maritime law in general
The Court cannot sustain petitioner Crescents insistence on the application
of P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 and hold that a
maritime lien exists. Out of the seven basic factors listed in the case of
Lauritzen, Philippine law only falls under one the law of the forum. All
other elements are foreign Canada is the place of the wrongful act, of the
allegiance or domicile of the injured and the place of contract; India is the
law of the flag and the allegiance of the defendant shipowner. Applying P.D.
No. 1521,a maritime lien exists would not promote the public policy behind
the enactment of the law to develop the domestic shipping industry.
Opening up our courts to foreign suppliers by granting them a maritime lien
under our laws even if they are not entitled to a maritime lien under their
laws will encourage forum shopping. In light of the interests of the various
foreign elements involved, it is clear that Canada has the most significant
interest in this dispute. The injured party is a Canadian corporation, the
sub-charterer which placed the orders for the supplies is also Canadian, the
entity which physically delivered the bunker fuels is in Canada, the place of
contracting and negotiation is in Canada, and the supplies were delivered in
Canada.
4. Lex Fori
The law of the forum governs all matters pertaining to procedural or
remedial rights.
B. Applicability of Foreign Laws and its Exceptions
WHEN FOREIGN LAW, EVEN THOUGH APPLICABLE, MAY NOT BE GIVEN
APPLICATION:
1. Foreign law contravenes prohibitive law or public policy of the forum
2. Relationship of the parties affects public interest
3. Real property is involved (apply lex rei sitae)
4. Foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established
public policy of the forum
5. Foreign law is procedural in nature (lex fori governs procedural matters)
6. Foreign law is penal in nature
EXCEPTION: CONTRARY TO SOUND PUBLIC POLICY
Bank of America, NT vs. American Realty Corporation, .G.R No.
133876, Dec. 29, 1999
FACTS:
Bank of America, duly licensed to do business in the Philippines and existing
under the laws of California, USA, granted US Dollar loans to certain
foreign corporate borrowers. These loans were secured by two real estate
mortgages by American Realty, a domestic corporation. When the borrowers
defaulted, Bank of America sued them before English courts. While these
cases were pending, Bank of America likewise judicially foreclosed the real
estate mortgages in the Philippines. Thus, American Realty sued for
damages against Bank of America.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bank of America can judicially foreclose the real
estate mortgages despite pendency of the civil suits before English courts
HELD:
English law purportedly allows the filing of judicial foreclosure of mortgage
despite pendency of civil suit for collection. But English law was never
properly impleaded and proven. Thus, the doctrine of processual
presumption applies.
SC further held that even assuming arguendo that English laws were
proven, said foreign law would still no find applicability. When the foreign
law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and establishedpublic
policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be
applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
those which have for their object public order, public policy and good
customs shall not be rendered ineffective b laws or judgments promulgated,
or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. The
public policysought to be protected in the instant case is the principle
imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting of a single cause of
action.
Moreover, the foreign law should not be applied when its application would
work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum.
C. Authentication, Electronic Evidence and Judicial Cognizance of Foreign
Judgments
**To be recognized by Philippine courts, foreign laws and judgments must
be alleged and proved.
HOW FOREIGN PUBLIC DOCUMENTS ARE PROVED:
1. Official publication
2. Certified true copy or one attested by the officer having the legal custody
of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such
officer has custody
The certificate must be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in
the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept
Authenticated by his seal of office
**If the foreign law or judgment does not comply with the above
requirements, it will not be recognized and the Doctrine of Processual
Presumption will apply (Philippine courts will assume the foreign law is the
same as Philippine laws).
GENERAL RULE: Philippine courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice of foreign laws.
EXCEPTIONS:
Where there are exceptional circumstances when the foreign laws are
already within the actual knowledge of the court (generally known or
actually ruled upon in a prior case)
Where the courts are familiar with the specific foreign laws (e.g. Spanish
civil law)
Where the adverse party did not dispute the application of foreign law
Where the tribunal is a quasi-judicial body which is not bound by strict
rules of technicality
that Saudi labor laws shall govern all matters relating to the termination of
Grans employment; that under Saudi labor laws, Grans termination due to
incompetence and insubordination is valid; that Grans insubordination and
incompetence is outlined in the termination letter Gran received. The labor
arbiter dismissed the labor case but on appeal, the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the decision of the arbiter. The
Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the NLRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Saudi labor laws should be applied.
HELD: No. The specific Saudi labor laws were not proven in court. EDI did
not present proof as to the existence and the specific provisions of such
foreign law. Hence, processual presumption applies and Philippine labor
laws shall be used. Under our laws, an employee like Gran shall only be
terminated upon just cause. The allegations against him, at worst, shall only
merit a suspension not a dismissal. His incompetence is not proven because
prior to being sent to Saudi Arabia, he underwent the required trade test to
prove his competence. The presumption therefore is that he is competent
and that it is upon OAB and EDI to prove otherwise. No proof of his
incompetence was ever adduced in court. His alleged insubordination is
likewise not proven. It was not proven that the submission of daily track
records is part of his job as a computer specialist. There was also a lack of
due process. Under our laws, Gran is entitled to the two notice rule
whereby prior to termination he should receive two notices. In the case at
bar, he only received one and he was immediately terminated on the same
day he received the notice.
Lastly, the quitclaim may not also release OAB from liability. Philippine laws
is again applied here sans proof of Saudi laws. Under Philippine Laws, a
quitclaim is generally frowned upon and are strictly examined. In this case,
based on the circumstances, Gran at that time has no option but to sign the
quitclaim. The quitclaim is also void because his separation pay was merely
2,948 Riyal which is lower than the $850.00 monthly salary (3,190 Riyal).
VILLAREAL vs. CA
G.R. No. 107314 September 17, 1998
FACTS:The complaint to recover damages for killing petitioner's husband
Jose Villareal was filed with the RTC of Makati, Metro Manila. It was found
that prior to the filing of the complaint, the Sevillas had abruptly left the
country and had started disposing of their properties in the Philippines. On
August 39, 1988, petitioners filed a Motion for Leave to Serve Summons by
Publication which was later granted by the trial court. Meanwhile, at the
instance of petitioner Patricia, an information charging private respondents
with murder was filed on October 10, 1988 with the RTC of Makati.
Defendants were declared in Default for failure to file their Answer within
the 60-day period counted from the last day of publication and petitioners
were then allowed to present evidence ex-parte. After presenting their
evidence, petitioners amended their complaint to make it conform to the
evidence. The trial court admitted the Amended Complaint and granted
petitioners' Motion for Extra-territorial Service of Summons. Accordingly,
summons was published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the
newspaper Abante. Copies of the Amended Complaint, the summons, and
the order were sent by registered mail to the last known addresses of
private respondents at Paraaque, Metro Manila and the United States. On
February 7, 1990, counsel for private respondents, Teresita Marbibi, filed a
Notice of Appearance on their behalf. On February 14, 1990, again through
counsel, private respondents filed a verified Motion to Lift Order of Default
with Motion for Reconsideration. On March 27, 1990, the trial court issued
an order denying the Motion to Lift Order of Default with Motion for
Reconsideration, on the ground that private respondents herein failed to
comply with the requirements of Rule 18. On April 2, 1990, the trial court
rendered a decision finding private respondents liable for the killing of Jose
Villareal. Subsequent motions, without questioning courts jurisdiction,
were later filed by the private respondents but were also later denied by the
trial court. Thus on September 11, 1991, private respondents filed in the CA
a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with preliminary
injunction, alleging (1) that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over
them since they are non-resident defendants and petitioners' action is
purely in personam and (2) that they were denied due process of law. CA
granted the petition. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but their motion
was denied by the appellate court in a resolution dated September 30,
1992. Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the private
respondents.
RULING: It is true that where the defendant in an action in personam is a
non-resident, as in this case, and refuses to appear and submit to the
Marcopper Mining Corporation was unable to pay its loans from the Asian
Development Bank (ADB). Later, ADB transferred all its rights to collect
from Marcopper to MR Holdings, Ltd. In order to pay MR Holdings,
Marcopper assigned all its assets to MR Holdings and executed therefor a
Deed of Assignment in MR Holdings favor.
Meanwhile, another creditor of Marcopper, Solidbank Corporation, won a
case against Marcopper. The court then issued a writ of execution directing
Sheriff Carlos Bajar to levy Marcoppers assets.
if
a
foreign
corporation does
business in
the
Philippines without a license, it cannot sue before the Philippine courts;
2.
3.
ISSUE:
1. W/N there is grounds of forum non conveniens
2. W/N there is litis pendentia
HELD: Denied
1. NO.
This Court further ruled that while it is within the discretion of the
trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should
do so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special
circumstances require the court's desistance; and that the propriety of
dismissing a case based on this principle of forum non conveniens
requires a factual determination, hence it is more properly considered a
matter of defense
2. NO.
FACTS:
Northwest, a US corporation, and Sharp, a Filipino corporation but with a
branch in Japan, entered into an agreement whereby the former authorized
the latter to sell its air transportation tickets. Sharp, however, was unable to
remit the proceeds of the ticket sales, prompting Northwest to sue for
collection in Japan. Summons was served on Sharps branch office in Japan
but because the manager authorized to receive summons was said to be in
Manila, the same was also served on Sharps Manila head office through
diplomatic channels. Sharp nevertheless failed to appear during the hearing
and judgment was rendered. Northwest now filed a case before the
Philippine court to enforce the foreign judgment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Japanese court acquired jurisdiction over the
person of Sharp
HELD:
The domicile of a corporation belongs to the state where it was
incorporated. In a strict technical sense, such domicile as a corporation may
have is single in its essence and a corporation can only have one domicile
which is the state of its creation. Nonetheless, a corporation formed in one
state may, for certain purposes, be regarded as a resident in another state
in which it has offices and transacts business.
In as much as Sharp was admittedly doing business in Japan through its
duly registered branches at the time the collection suit against it was filed,
then in the light of the processual presumption, Sharp may be deemed a
resident of Japan, and, as such, was amenable to the jurisdiction of the
courts therein and may be deemed to have assented to the said courts
lawful methods of serving process.
Facts:
Abelardo and Margarita were lawfully married. Marital differences,
squabbles and irreconcilable conflicts transpired between the spouses, such
that sometime in 1979, they agreed to separate from bed and board.
Margarita then left for the United States with her children. She filed with
the courts of California a petition to divorce her husband, and it was
granted.
Abelardo and Margarita executed an Agreement of Separation of
Properties, which was duly granted by the RTC Makati.
Meanwhile, Abelardo commenced the proceeding on the voiding his
marriage with Margarita on account of psychological incapacity. As
Margarita was in the US, Abelardo initially moved that summons be served
through the International Express Courier Service. The court a quo denied
the motion. Instead, it ordered that summons be served by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks, at the same time furnishing respondent a copy of the order, as well
as the corresponding summons and a copy of the petition at the given
address in the United States through the Department of Foreign Affairs, all
at the expense of Abelardo. An Officers return was duly submitted
declaring the completion of the service of summons. Finally, the marriage
was declared void through Article 36 Family Code by the RTC.
Margarita appeared before the Consulate Office in San Francisco to sign
the agreement on separation of property. Abelardo allegedly threatened to
cut off all financial and material support to their children if Margarita did
not sign the documents.
9 years later, Margarita contested such declaration of nullity of marriage on
account of extrinsic fraud and questioned the court that it did not acquire
jurisdiction over her, hence such decision is void and ineffectual.
Issue:
WON Margarita was validly served with summons in the case for
declaration of nullity of her marriage with Abelardo? YES
WON there was extrinsic fraud in the preparation and filing by Abelardo of
the Petition for Dissolution of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains and its
annex, the Agreement of Separation of Properties? NO
Held:
As a rule, when the defendant does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines, Philippine courts cannot try any case against him because of
the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he
voluntarily appears in court. But when the case is one of actions in rem or
quasi in rem enumerated in Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court,
Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. In such
instances, Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction
over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential.
Jurisdiction over the person of a non-resident defendant in an action in rem
or quasi in rem is not necessary. The trial and appellate courts made a clear
factual finding that there was proper summons by publication effected
through the Department of Foreign Affairs as directed by the trial court.
Thus, the trial court acquired jurisdiction to render the decision declaring
the marriage a nullity.
Under Section 15 of Rule 14, a defendant who is a non-resident and is not
found in the country may be served with summons by extraterritorial
service in four instances: (1)when the action affects the personal status of
the plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is
property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien
or interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded consists,
wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property
located in the Philippines; or (4) when the property of the defendant has
been attached within the Philippines.
In these instances, extraterritorial service of summons may be effected
under any of three modes: (1) by personal service out of the country, with
leave of court; (2) by publication and sending a copy of the summons and
order of the court by registered mail to the defendants last known address,
also with leave of court; or (3) by any other means the judge may consider
sufficient. The trial courts prescribed mode of extraterritorial service does
not fall under the first or second mode specified in Section 15 of Rule 14,
but under the third mode.