Supreme Court of the Philippines

412 Phil. 308

EN BANC

G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (UNDER THE ACRONYM
OFW), REPRESENTED HEREIN BY ITS SECRETARY-GENERAL,
MOHAMMAD OMAR FAJARDO, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS; CITIZENS DRUG WATCH; MAMAMAYAN AYAW SA
DROGA; GO! GO! PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE MARCOS LOYALIST
ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE LOCAL
AUTONOMY; CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY,
ENVIRONMENT AND PEACE; CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE
BUILDERS ASSOCIATION; SPORTS & HEALTH ADVANCEMENT
FOUNDATION, INC.; ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS CONTRACT
WORKERS (OCW); BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION AND OTHERS
UNDER ORGANIZATIONS/COALITIONS OF OMNIBUS
RESOLUTION NO. 3785; PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO; LAKAS
NUCD-UMDP; NATIONALIST PEOPLES COALITION; LABAN NG
DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO; AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO; PDPLABAN; LIBERAL PARTY; NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG BUHAY
HAYAANG YUMABONG; AND OTHERS UNDER POLITICAL
PARTIES OF OMNIBUS RESOLUTION NO. 3785. RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. NO. 147613. JUNE 26, 2001]
BAYAN MUNA, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;
NATIONALIST PEOPLES COALITION (NPC); LABAN NG
DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG MASANG
PILIPINO (PMP); LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP; LIBERAL PARTY;
MAMAMAYANG AYAW SA DROGA; CREBA; NATIONAL FEDERATION
OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS; JEEP; AND BAGONG BAYANI
ORGANIZATION, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the great
masses of our people who have less in life, but also to enable them to become veritable

lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly in the enactment of laws

designed to benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized and the underrepresented
not merely passive recipients of the States benevolence, but active participants in the
mainstream of representative democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and groups,
including those which now dominate district elections, to have the same opportunity to
participate in party-list elections would desecrate this lofty objective and mongrelize the
social justice mechanism into an atrocious veneer for traditional politics.
The Case
Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785[1] issued by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26,
2001. This Resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties,
including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the
disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was
intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political
parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.
The Factual Antecedents
With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for registration
filed by sectoral parties, organizations and political parties. According to the Comelec,
[v]erifications were made as to the status and capacity of these parties and organizations
and hearings were scheduled day and night until the last party w[as] heard. With the
number of these petitions and the observance of the legal and procedural requirements,
review of these petitions as well as deliberations takes a longer process in order to arrive
at a decision and as a result the two (2) divisions promulgated a separate Omnibus
Resolution and individual resolution on political parties. These numerous petitions and
processes observed in the disposition of these petition[s] hinder the early release of the
Omnibus Resolutions of the Divisions which were promulgated only on 10 February
2001.[2]
Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec Resolution
No. 3426 dated December 22, 2000, the registered parties and organizations filed their
respective Manifestations, stating their intention to participate in the party-list elections.
Other sectoral and political parties and organizations whose registrations were denied also
filed Motions for Reconsideration, together with Manifestations of their intent to
participate in the party-list elections. Still other registered parties filed their
Manifestations beyond the deadline.
The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations) of 154
parties and organizations, but denied those of several others in its assailed March 26, 2001
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which we quote:

We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this system of
proportional representation scheme will encourage multi-partisan [sic] and enhance the
inability of small, new or sectoral parties or organization to directly participate in this
electoral window.
It will be noted that as defined, the party-list system is a mechanism of proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered
with the Commission on Elections.
However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must recognize the fact that
there is a need to keep the number of sectoral parties, organizations and coalitions, down
to a manageable level, keeping only those who substantially comply with the rules and
regulations and more importantly the sufficiency of the Manifestations or evidence on the
Motions for Reconsiderations or Oppositions.[3]
On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a Petition
praying that the names of [some of herein respondents] be deleted from the Certified List
of Political Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List
System for the May 14, 2001 Elections and that said certified list be accordingly
amended. It also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents not
be counted or canvassed, and that the latters nominees not be proclaimed. [4] On April 11,
2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for Cancellation of
Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents. [5]
On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the two disqualification cases
to file Comments within three days from notice. It also set the date for hearing on April 26,
2001,[6] but subsequently reset it to May 3, 2001.[7] During the hearing, however,
Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely directed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.[8]
Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor
Party filed a Petition[9] before this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition, docketed as GR
No. 147589, assailed Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated April
17, 2001,[10] the Court directed respondents to comment on the Petition within a nonextendible period of five days from notice.[11]
On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition,
[12]
docketed as GR No. 147613, also challenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In
its Resolution dated May 9, 2001,[13] the Court ordered the consolidation of the two
Petitions before it; directed respondents named in the second Petition to file their
respective Comments on or before noon of May 15, 2001; and called the parties to an Oral

Argument on May 17, 2001. It added that the Comelec may proceed with the counting and
canvassing of votes cast for the party-list elections, but barred the proclamation of any
winner therein, until further orders of the Court.
Thereafter, Comments[14] on the second Petition were received by the Court and, on May
17, 2001, the Oral Argument was conducted as scheduled. In an Order given in open court,
the parties were directed to submit their respective Memoranda simultaneously within a
non-extendible period of five days.[15]
Issues:
During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address the
following issues:
1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises. More specifically,
is there no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law?
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors and organizations.
4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.[16]
The Courts Ruling
The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the Comelec
which will determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and
organizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution satisfy the requirements of
the Constitution and RA 7941, as specified in this Decision.
First Issue:
Recourse Under Rule 65
Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners under Rule 65 is improper
because there are other plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law.
[17]
The Office of the Solicitor General argues that petitioners should have filed before the
Comelec a petition either for disqualification or for cancellation of registration, pursuant to
Sections 19, 20, 21 and 22 of Comelec Resolution No. 3307-A[18]dated November 9, 2000.[19]
We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus Resolution

3785 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed
respondents to participate in the party-list elections of 2001. Indeed, under both the
Constitution[20] and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be brought before this Court in
a verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent Commission
en banc; hence, no motion for reconsideration was possible, it being a prohibited pleading
under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.[21]
The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the Comelec a Petition for
Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents. [22] The
Comelec, however, did not act on that Petition. In view of the pendency of the elections,
Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court, for there was no other adequate
recourse at the time. Subsequent events have proven the urgency of petitioners action; to
this date, the Comelec has not yet formally resolved the Petition before it. But a resolution
may just be a formality because the Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
has made its position on the matter quite clear.
In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie only in the
absence of any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy.[23] It has been held that certiorari
is available, notwithstanding the presence of other remedies, where the issue raised is one
purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency. [24] Indeed, the
instant case is indubitably imbued with public interest and with extreme urgency, for it
potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of the House of Representatives.
Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list system,
which this Court must urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to formulate guiding and
controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules.[25]
Finally, procedural requirements may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice,
when the issue involves the principle of social justice x x x when the decision sought to be
set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the
only adequate and speedy remedy available.[26]
Second Issue:
Participation of Political Parties
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that the inclusion of
political parties in the party-list system is the most objectionable portion of the questioned
Resolution.[27] For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the participation of major
political parties.[28] On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, like the
impleaded political parties, submits that the Constitution and RA No. 7941 allow political
parties to participate in the party-list elections. It argues that the party-list system is, in

fact, open to all registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations. [29]
We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot
be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political
parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of
Representatives may be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties
may be registered under the party-list system.
Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid,
except for those registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.
Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list
system, shall not be represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of election
inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to
appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.[30]
During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian S. Monsod
pointed out that the participants in the party-list system may be a regional party, a
sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO,[31] Magsasaka, or a regional party in
Mindanao."[32] This was also clear from the following exchange between Comms. Jaime
Tadeo and Blas Ople:[33]
MR. TADEO. Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay pwedeng paghati-hatian ng UNIDO,
PDP-Laban, PNP, Liberal at Nacionalista?
MR. OPLE. Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party list system sa lahat ng mga partido.
Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision was to
open up the system, in order to give a chance to parties that consistently place third or
fourth in congressional district elections to win a seat in Congress. [34] He explained: The
purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there were
certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or
1,500,000 votes. But they were always third or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they
have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives in
the Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is
essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party-list system.
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for a party-list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x. Section

3 expressly states that a party is either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition
of parties. More to the point, the law defines political party as an organized group of
citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct
of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption,
regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for
public office.
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political
parties in the party-list system. We quote the pertinent provision below:
x x x

xxx

xxx

For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the
basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth
Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
x x x

xxx

x x x

Indubitably, therefore, political parties even the major ones -- may participate in the
party-list elections.
Third Issue:
Marginalized and Underrepresented
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however,
that any political party -- or any organization or group for that matter -- may do so. The
requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of
the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of
the Constitution, provides as follows:
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance
with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives
shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban

poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector. (Emphasis supplied.)
Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished member of the
Constitutional Commission declared that the purpose of the party-list provision was to give
genuine power to our people in Congress. Hence, when the provision was discussed, he
exultantly announced: On this first day of August 1986, we shall, hopefully, usher in a new
chapter to our national history, by giving genuine power to our people in the legislature. [35]
The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact,
interspersed with phrases like in accordance with law or as may be provided by law; it
was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the Constitution. Hence,
RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in this wise:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall promote proportional representation in
the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system
of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof,
which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but
who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.
Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system
in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests
in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats
in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
The Marginalized and Underrepresented
to Become Lawmakers Themselves
The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation
by means of the Filipino-style party-list system, which will enable the election to the
House of Representatives of Filipino citizens,
1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties; and
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation
that will benefit the nation as a whole.

The key words in this policy are proportional representation, marginalized and
underrepresented, and lack [of] well-defined constituencies.
Proportional representation here does not refer to the number of people in a particular
district, because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to
numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the
representation of the marginalized and underrepresented as exemplified by the
enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals.
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list
organization or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and
underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5.[36]Concurrently, the persons
nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must be Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties.
Finally, lack of well-defined constituenc[y] refers to the absence of a traditionally
identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of
government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests identified with the
marginalized or underrepresented.
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are
marginalized and underrepresented become members of Congress under the party-list
system, Filipino-style.
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by
giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become
veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of the implementing
law, we repeat, is likewise clear: to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, x x x, to become members of the
House of Representatives. Where the language of the law is clear, it must be applied
according to its express terms.[37]
The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-list
system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:
SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of persons may register as a party,
organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC
not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or
secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or

sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching

thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of officers,
coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may
require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals.
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it
demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the
party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words
employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained
by reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus,
the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in
immediate association.[38]
The Party-List System Desecrated
by the OSG Contentions
Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor General
submits that RA No. 7941 does not limit the participation in the party-list system to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society.[39] In fact, it contends that any party
or group that is not disqualified under Section 6[40]of RA 7941 may participate in the
elections. Hence, it admitted during the Oral Argument that even an organization
representing the super rich of Forbes Park or Dasmarias Village could participate in the
party-list elections.[41]
The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG). We stress that the party-list system seeks to enable certain Filipino citizens
specifically those belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties to be elected to the House of Representatives. The assertion of the OSG that
the party-list system is not exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented disregards
the clear statutory policy. Its claim that even the super-rich and overrepresented can
participate desecrates the spirit of the party-list system.
Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers
cannot be appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The interests of these two
sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSGs position to treat them similarly defies
reason and common sense. In contrast, and with admirable candor, Atty. Lorna PatajoKapunan[42] admitted during the Oral Argument that a group of bankers, industrialists and
sugar planters could not join the party-list system as representatives of their respective
sectors.[43]

While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny minority,
they are neither marginalized nor underrepresented, for the stark reality is that their
economic clout engenders political power more awesome than their numerical limitation.
Traditionally, political power does not necessarily emanate from the size of ones
constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise more directly from the number and amount of
ones bank accounts.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the
majority who wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the party-list
system was enacted -- to give them not only genuine hope, but genuine power; to give them
the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific concerns of their constituencies;
and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of the State. In
its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the masses and ushers a new hope
for genuine change. Verily, it invites those marginalized and underrepresented in the past
the farm hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor, even those in the underground movement
to come out and participate, as indeed many of them came out and participated during the
last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and
desecrating this social justice vehicle.
Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the
congressional district elections normally dominated by traditional politicians and vested
groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives were set aside for the
party-list system. In arguing that even those sectors who normally controlled 80 percent of
the seats in the House could participate in the party-list elections for the remaining 20
percent, the OSG and the Comelec disregard the fundamental difference between the
congressional district elections and the party-list elections.
As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, [44] in
order to enhance the chance of sectoral groups and organizations to gain representation in
the House of Representatives through the simplest scheme possible.[45] Logic shows that
the system has been opened to those who have never gotten a foothold within it -- those
who cannot otherwise win in regular elections and who therefore need the simplest
scheme possible to do so. Conversely, it would be illogical to open the system to those who
have long been within it -- those privileged sectors that have long dominated the
congressional district elections.
The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood when compared to
a student dormitory open house, which by its nature allowsoutsiders to enter the
facilities. Obviously, the open house is for the benefit of outsiders only, not the dormers
themselves who can enter the dormitory even without such special privilege. In the same
vein, the open party-list system is only for the outsiders who cannot get elected through
regular elections otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized or overrepresented who
already fill the ranks of Congress.

Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats
under the party-list system would not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the
marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the law to enhance it. The
party-list system is a tool for the benefit of the underprivileged; the law could not have
given the same tool to others, to the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries.
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and prostituted by
those who are neither marginalized nor underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker of hope
be snuffed out. The clear state policy must permeate every discussion of the qualification of
political parties and other organizations under the party-list system.
Refutation of the
Separate Opinions
The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues, Justices Jose C. Vitug and Vicente V.
Mendoza, are anchored mainly on the supposed intent of the framers of the Constitution as
culled from their deliberations.
The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is that the primary
source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the
provision itself. The presumption is that the words in which the constitutional provisions
are couched express the objective sought to be attained.[46] In other words, verba legis still
prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear and equivocal should resort
be made to extraneous aids of construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of
the Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the
true intent or purpose of the provision being construed.[47]
Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, this Court stated in Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary[48] that the debates and proceedings of the
constitutional convention [may be consulted] in order to arrive at the reason and purpose
of the resulting Constitution x x x only when other guides fail as said proceedings are
powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the
constitutional convention are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and
as indicating the reason for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large
majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at the
polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the
constitution from what appears upon its face. The proper interpretation therefore depends
more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers
understanding thereof.
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is couched in clear
terms: the mechanics of the system shall be provided by law. Pursuant thereto, Congress

enacted RA 7941. In understanding and implementing party-list representation, we should

therefore look at the law first. Only when we find its provisions ambiguous should the use
of extraneous aids of construction be resorted to.
But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is obvious and clear from its plain words.
Section 2 thereof unequivocally states that the party-list system of electing congressional
representatives was designed to enable underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole
x x x. The criteria for participation is well defined. Thus, there is no need for recourse to
constitutional deliberations, not even to the proceedings of Congress. In any event, the
framers deliberations merely express their individual opinions and are, at best, only
persuasive in construing the meaning and purpose of the constitution or statute.
Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of Sections 2 and 5 of RA 7941 is not
an issue here. Hence, they remain parts of the law, which must be applied plainly and
simply.
Fourth Issue:
Grave Abuse of Discretion
From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the Comelec failed to appreciate
fully the clear policy of the law and the Constitution. On the contrary, it seems to have
ignored the facet of the party-list system discussed above. The OSG as its counsel admitted
before the Court that any group, even the non-marginalized and overrepresented, could
field candidates in the party-list elections.
When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections, violates or
ignores the Constitution or the law, its action can be struck down by this Court on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion.[49] Indeed, the function of all judicial and quasi-judicial
instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. [50]
In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately pleads for the outright
disqualification of the major political parties Respondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP, NPC, LP and
PMP on the ground that under Comelec Resolution No. 4073, they have been accredited
as the five (six, including PDP-Laban) major political parties in the May 14, 2001 elections.
It argues that because of this, they have the advantage of getting official Comelec Election
Returns, Certificates of Canvass, preferred poll watchers x x x. We note, however, that this
accreditation does not refer to the party-list election, but, inter alia, to the election of
district representatives for the purpose of determining which parties would be entitled to
watchers under Section 26 of Republic Act No. 7166.
What is needed under the present circumstances, however, is a factual determination of

whether respondents herein and, for that matter, all the 154 previously approved groups,
have the necessary qualifications to participate in the party-list elections, pursuant to the
Constitution and the law.
Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga
(MAD), because it is a government entity using government resources and privileges.
This Court, however, is not a trier of facts.[51] It is not equipped to receive evidence and
determine the truth of such factual allegations.
Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should first be given an
opportunity to show that they qualify under the guidelines promulgated in this Decision,
before they can be deprived of their right to participate in and be elected under the partylist system.
Guidelines for Screening
Party-List Participants
The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec for the latter to
determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations
allowed to participate in the party-list elections comply with the requirements of the law. In
this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the following guidelines, culled from
the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work.
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized
and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must
show -- through its constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of
government and track record -- that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests,
it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors.
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the
Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared
statutory policy of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of Representatives. In other
words, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political parties,
they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized and
underrepresented. The counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko and other similarly situated political
parties admitted as much during the Oral Argument, as the following quote shows:
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am not disputing that in my question. All I am saying is, the
political party must claim to represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors?

ATTY. KAPUNAN: Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes. [52]

Third, in view of the objections[53] directed against the registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang
Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the express constitutional
provision that the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. The
extent of the constitutional proscription is demonstrated by the following discussion during
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
MR. OPLE. x x x
In the event that a certain religious sect with nationwide and even international networks
of members and supporters, in order to circumvent this prohibition, decides to form its own
political party in emulation of those parties I had mentioned earlier as deriving their
inspiration and philosophies from well-established religious faiths, will that also not fall
within this prohibition?
MR. MONSOD. If the evidence shows that the intention is to go around the prohibition,
then certainly the Comelec can pierce through the legal fiction. [54]
The following discussion is also pertinent:
MR. VILLACORTA. When the Commissioner proposed EXCEPT RELIGIOUS GROUPS, he
is not, of course, prohibiting priests, imams or pastors who may be elected by, say, the
indigenous community sector to represent their group.
REV. RIGOS. Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody who represents the Iglesia ni Kristo,
the Catholic Church, the Protestant Church et cetera.[55]
Furthermore, the Constitution provides that religious denominations and sects shall not be
registered.[56] The prohibition was explained by a member[57] of the Constitutional
Commission in this wise: [T]he prohibition is on any religious organization registering as a
political party. I do not see any prohibition here against a priest running as a candidate.
That is not prohibited here; it is the registration of a religious sect as a political party. [58]
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941,
which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for
religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation,
organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly
through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least
two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered.[59]
Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group for violation of or
failure to comply with election laws and regulations. These laws include Section 2 of RA
7941, which states that the party-list system seeks to enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties x x x to become
members of the House of Representatives. A party or an organization, therefore, that does
not comply with this policy must be disqualified.
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an
entity funded or assisted by, the government. By the very nature of the party-list system,
the party or organization must be a group of citizens, organized by citizens and operated by
citizens. It must be independent of the government. The participation of the government or
its officials in the affairs of a party-list candidate is not only illegal [60] and unfair to other
parties, but also deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations to be elected to the House of
Representatives.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must
likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list
representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a
resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding
the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of
the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more
than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative
who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until
the expiration of his term.
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA
7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens who belong to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties. Surely, the interests of the youth
cannot be fully represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the working
class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine
representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the
nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. Senator Jose Lina explained
during the bicameral committee proceedings that the nominee of a party, national or
regional, is not going to represent a particular district x x x. [61]
Epilogue
The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: to enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and
who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation
and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become
members of the House of Representatives.
Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice principle that those
who have less in life should have more in law. The party-list system is one such tool
intended to benefit those who have less in life. It gives the great masses of our people
genuine hope and genuine power. It is a message to the destitute and the prejudiced, and
even to those in the underground, that change is possible. It is an invitation for them to
come out of their limbo and seize the opportunity.
Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the Comelec and the other
respondents that the party-list system is, without any qualification, open to all. Such
position does not only weaken the electoral chances of the marginalized and
underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It would gut the substance of the party-list
system. Instead of generating hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of enabling the
marginalized, it would further weaken them and aggravate their marginalization.

In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the party-list provisions of the
Constitution and RA 7941 are nothing more than a play on dubious words, a mockery of
noble intentions, and an empty offering on the altar of people empowerment. Surely, this
could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution and the makers of RA
7941.
WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which is hereby DIRECTED to
immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list
participants in the light of the guidelines enunciated in this Decision. Considering the
extreme urgency of determining the winners in the last party-list elections, the Comelec is
directed to begin its hearings for the parties and organizations that appear to have
garnered such number of votes as to qualify for seats in the House of Representatives. The
Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to this Court its compliance report within 30 days
from notice hereof.
The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec to refrain from
proclaiming any winner during the last party-list election, shall remain in force until after
the Comelec itself will have complied and reported its compliance with the foregoing
disposition.
This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections receipt thereof.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., in the result.
Vitug and Mendoza, JJ., see dissenting opinion.
Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., join the dissent of J. Vicente M.
Mendoza.
Ynares-Santiago, J., abroad on official business.

[1]

Signed by Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo and Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco,

Rufino S. B. Javier, Ralph C. Lantion, Mehol K. Sadain, Resurreccion Z. Borra and
Florentino A. Tuason Jr.
[2]

Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, p. 13; rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 40.

[3]

Ibid., pp. 21-22; rollo, pp. 48-49.

[4]

Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 272-273.

[5]

Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 250-263.

[6]

Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 282-283.

[7]

See rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 223.

[8]

TSN (GR No. 147589 and 147613), May 17, 2001, p. 49.

[9]

Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 4-73.

[10]

Rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 74.

[11]

Comments were filed by MAD, Bagong Bayani, The True Marcos Loyalists, the Comelec,
Partido ng Masang Pilipino, the Liberal Party, the Office of the Solicitor General, CREBA,
Lakas-NUCD-UMDP, the Philippine Local Autonomy Movement, Aksyon Demokratiko,
Citizens Drug Watch Foundation, Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, Ang Lakas ng OCW, and
Sports and Health Foundation.
[12]

Rollo (GR No. 147613), pp. 3-45.

[13]

Rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 46.

[14]

These were filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the Comelec, the Bagong Bayani
Organization, Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga, and the Philippine Local Autonomy Movement.
[15]

Memoranda were filed by Petitioners Bayan Muna and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor
Party; and Respondents Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga, CREBA, the Bagong Bayani
Organization, the Office of the Solicitor General, and Aksyon Demokratiko. Manifestations
instead of memoranda were filed by Lakas-NUCD and OCW.
[16]

See the May 17, 2001 Resolution, p. 2; rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 88.

[17]

See, e.g., the Bagong Bayani Organizations Memorandum, pp. 3-4; Aksyon
Demokratikos Memorandum, pp. 2-3; and MADs Memorandum, pp. 3-6.
[18]

Rules and regulations governing the filing of a petition for registration, a manifestation
to participate, and the names of nominees under the party-list system of representation in
connection with the May 14, 2001 national and local elections.
[19]

OSGs Memorandum, pp. 6-14; rollo (GR No. 147613), pp. 151-159.

[20]

Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, provides: Judicial power includes the duty of

the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
[21]

SECTION 1. What pleadings are not allowed. The following pleadings are not allowed:

xxx

xxx

xxx

d) motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or decision except in

election offense cases;
xxx

xxx

x x x

[22]

Docketed as SPA 01-113. As earlier noted, Akbayan also filed before the Comelec a
similar Petition, docketed as SPA-01-109. See Annexes 1 and 2, Comment of the Office of
the Solicitor General; rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 250 et seq. and 266 et seq.
[23]

Section 1, Rule 65. See Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan, 263 SCRA 222, October 16, 1996; BF
Corporation v. CA, 288 SCRA 267, March 27, 1998; GSIS v. Olisa, 304 SCRA 421, March 10,
1999; National Steel Corporation v. CA, GR No. 134437, January 31, 2000; Sahali v.
Comelec, GR No. 134169, February 2, 2000
[24]

Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 269 SCRA 316, March 7, 1997, per Panganiban, J. See also
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Commission on Elections, GR No. 133486, January
28, 2000; Central Bank v. Cloribel, 44 SCRA 307, April 11, 1972.
[25]

Salonga v. Cruz Pao, 134 SCRA 438, February 18, 1985, per Gutierrez, Jr., J. See also
Taada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997; Guingona v. Gonzales, 219 SCRA 326, March
1, 1993.
[26]

ABS-CBN v. Comelec, GR No. 133486, January 28, 2000, per Panganiban, J.

[27]

Petition of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, p. 15; rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 18.

[28]

Petition of Bayan Muna, p. 18; rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 20.

[29]

OSG Comment, p. 18; rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 244.

[30]

Emphasis supplied. See also 17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution.

[31]

It may be noted that when the Constitution was being drafted in the early days of the
post-Marcos era, UNIDO was the dominant political party.

[32]

Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 86.

[33]

Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 570.

[34]

Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 86.

[35]

Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 561.

[36]

Infra.

[37]

Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 747, February 26, 1997; Ramirez v. CA, 248 SCRA
590, September 28, 1995.
[38]

82 C.J.S. Statutes 331.

[39]

OSG Comment, p. 18; rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 244.

[40]

Infra.

[41]

TSN, May 17, 2001, pp. 147-148.

[42]

Counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko.

[43]

TSN, May 17, 2001, pp. 178-180.

[44]

Supra. See also 6, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, which reads: A free and open
party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people, subject
to the provisions of this Article.
[45]

Section 2 of RA 7941 states in part as follows: x x x. Towards this end, the State shall
develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature,
and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
[46]

JM Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413, February 18, 1970;
cited in Ruben C. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990 ed., p. 311. See also Gold Creek
Mining Corp. v. Rodriguez, 66 Phil 259, 264 (1938).
[47]

See Agpalo, ibid., p. 313.

[48]

194 SCRA 317, February 22, 1991, per Fernan, CJ; quoting Commonwealth v. Ralph, 111

Pa 365, 3 Atl 220.

[49]

Taada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997. See also Santiago v. Guingona, 298 SCRA
756, November 18, 1998; Miranda v. Aguirre, 314 SCRA 603, September 16, 1999; Garcia
v. HRET, 312 SCRA 353, August 12, 1999.
[50]

Veterans Federation Party et al. v. Comelec et al., GR No. 136781, October 6, 2000.

[51]

See Valmonte v. Court of Appeals, 303 SCRA 278, February 18, 1999; Inciong Jr. v. CA,
257 SCRA 578, June 26, 1996; Palomado v. NLRC, 257 SCRA 680, June 28, 1996; Heirs of
the Late Teodoro Guaring Jr. v. CA, 269 SCRA 283, March 7, 1997; Sesbreo v. Central
Board of Assessment Appeals, 270 SCRA 360, March 24, 1997; PCGG v. Cojuangco Jr., 302
SCRA 217, January 27, 1999.
[52]

TSN, May 17, 2001, p. 180.

[53]

Petition of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, p. 16; rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 19.

[54]

Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 636.

[55]

Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 589.

[56]

2 (5), Article IX (C).

[57]

Christian S. Monsod.

[58]

Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 634

[59]

See also 11, Comelec Resolution No. 3307-A.

[60]

See 2 (4), Article IX (B) of the Constitution. See also Article 261 (o), BP 881.

[61]

The bicameral conference committee on the disagreeing provision of Senate Bill No.
1913 and House Bill No. 3040, January 31, 1994, p. 4.

SEPARATE OPINION

MENDOZA, J., dissenting:

I vote to dismiss the petitions in these cases. I will presently explain my vote, but before I
do so it seems to me necessary to state briefly the facts and the issues.
THE FACTS

Petitioner Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party (OFW for short) is the political agency of
the Overseas Filipino Workers Movement, a non-stock and non-profit organization. On the
other hand, petitioner Bayan Muna is a political party representing peasants, workers,
women, the youth, and other marginalized sectors. Both were accredited by the
Commission on Elections in connection with the election for party-list representatives on
May 14, 2001.
Petitioners brought these suits in G.R. No. 147589, for certiorari and, in G.R. No.
147613, for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus for the purpose of seeking the
annulment of the registration of the following parties classified as political parties and
organizations/coalitions by the Commission on Elections:
Political Parties:
Partido ng Masang Pilipino (PMP),
Lakas NUCD-UMDP (LAKAS NUCD-UMDP),
Nationalist Peoples Coalition (NPC),
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP),
Aksyon Demokratiko (AKSYON),
Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-LABAN),
Liberal Party (LP),
Nacionalista Party (NP),
Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong
Organizations/Coalitions:
Citizens Drug Watch Foundation, Inc. (DRUG WATCH),
Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD),
Go! Go! Philippines Movement (GO, GO PHILIPPINES),
The True Marcos Loyalist (MARCOS LOYALIST),
Philippine Local Autonomy Movement, Inc. (PLAM),
Citizens Movement for Justice, Economy Environment and Peace (JEEP),
Chamber of Real Estate Builders Association (CREBA),
Sports and Health Advancement Foundation, Inc. (SHAF),
Ang Lakas ng Overseas Contract Workers (OCW),
Bagong Bayani Organization (BAGONG BAYANI),
National Federation of Sugar Planters (NFSP)

R.A. No. 7941, 5 provides that any party, organization, or coalition desiring to participate
in the party-list system must apply to the COMELEC for registration not later than 90 days
before the election. On the other hand, 4 of the same law requires that any party,
organization, or coalition which is already registered with the COMELEC should declare its
intention to participate in the party-list system 90 days before the election.
In its Resolution No. 3785, dated March 26, 2001, the COMELEC passed upon the
applications for registration or manifestations of intention of several parties, organizations,
and coalitions. On March 28, 2001, it issued a certified list of parties, organizations, or
coalitions entitled to participate in the May 14, 2001 elections. All in all, 148 parties,
organizations, and coalitions were accredited, including private respondents herein.
Petitioners OFW and Bayan Muna contend that the party-list system is exclusively for the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors of the Philippine society and that there is no
way by which other sectors not so identified, much less the major political parties, can
participate in the party-list elections. Petitioner Bayan Muna in particular calls attention to
the fact that seven of the respondent political parties (PMP, Lakas NUCD-UMDP, NPC, LDP,
AKSYON, PDP-LABAN, and LP) are actually the major political parties in the country today
as determined by the COMELEC in its Resolution No. 4073, dated May 3, 2001, and
charges that the rest of private respondents are pseudo party-list organizations which are
actually satellites of the major political parties and of big businesses.
Bayan Muna argues that the party-list system is intended to address the problem of
ineffective representation of underprivileged sectors of society and enhance direct peoples
action and participation in the decision-making process to counter-balance the territorial
representation of 80% of the House of Representatives, and that to allow participation in
the party-list system of respondent political parties and parties/coalitions would be to
defeat this purpose because these parties do not represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors.[1] For this reason, Bayan Muna prays that R.A. No. 7941, 11,
par. 2 be declared unconstitutional on the ground that, by banning the five major political
parties from participating in the party-list system only in the May 1998 elections, it leaves
them free to participate in subsequent elections.
On the other hand, the COMELEC argues:
[B]oth the Constitution and the Party-List System Act clearly allow, and they do not
prohibit, the participation of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations to participate in the party-list system, whether or not said parties or
organizations represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society. [2]
It cites the proviso of Art. VI, 5(2) of the Constitution that

For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women,
youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector,
as proof that marginalized sectors are not entitled to permanent seats in the House of
Representatives. In any event, it is contended that petitioners recourse is not to this Court
but to the COMELEC because whether a party, organization, or coalition represents
marginalized and underrepresented sectors is a question of fact, and this Court is not a
trier of facts. The COMELEC states that, as a matter of fact, petitioner Bayan Muna has
pending petitions to disqualify, based on this ground, respondents NPC, LDP, PMP, LAKAS
NUCD-UMDP, LP, MAD, CREBA, NFSP, JEEP, and BAGONG BAYANI.
THE ISSUES
The issues in these cases actually come down to the following:
(1) Whether the petitions filed in these cases should be dismissed for failure of petitioners
to exhaust administrative remedies in the COMELEC; and
(2) Whether the party-list system is exclusively for marginalized and underrepresented
sectors of society.
We shall deal with these issues in the order they are stated.
DISCUSSION
I.
While it is true that petitioner Bayan Muna has filed petitions for the disqualification of
respondents, the fact is that when the petitions in these cases were filed on April 16 and
17, 2001, the elections were just a month away, and there was doubt whether a resolution
of the petitions for disqualifications was forthcoming. In fact, up to the time of the elections
on May 14, 2001, the cases were still unresolved. Petitioners, therefore, had no other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law within the meaning of
Rule 65, 1-2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and were justified in resorting to the
extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.
From another point of view, there is no need for petitioners to await formal resolution of
their petitions as the COMELEC had already indicated in press statements its stand that
parties, organizations, or coalitions, whether or not representing marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, could participate in the election for the party-list system a

fact confirmed by it in its comment and memorandum in these cases. There is thus no basis
for insisting that petitioners should have exhausted administrative remedies before coming
to this Court.
Nor are the issues raised in these cases factual as the statement of the second issue above
plainly shows. It is only if the question whether the party-list system is limited to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors is answered in the affirmative will it be
necessary to determine the status of respondents.
II.
At the core of the controversy in these cases is the following provision of the Constitution:
Art. VI, 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a partylist system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives
shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law except the religious sector.
To carry out this provision of the Constitution, Congress enacted the Party-List System Act
(R.A. No. 7941), the pertinent provisions of which read:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Party. The State shall promote proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof,
which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but
who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.
Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system
in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests
in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats
in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.

SEC. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives.The party-list representatives shall

constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of
Representatives including those under the party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis
of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress
of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be
observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization,
or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
The most important single factor in determining the intention of the people from whom
the Constitution emanated is the language in which it is expressed. [3]The text of Art. VI,
5(1)(2) is quite clear. It provides for a party-list system of registered, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations, not for sectoral representation. Only for three
consecutive terms following the ratification of the Constitution and only with respect to
one-half of the seats allotted to party-list representatives does it allow sectoral
representation. Textually, Art. VI, 5(1)(2) provides no basis for petitioners contention that
whether it is sectoral representation or party-list system the purpose is to provide exclusive
representation for marginalized sectors, by which term petitioners mean the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth sectors.
Indeed, the two systems of representation are not identical. Party-list representation is a
type of proportional representation designed to give those who otherwise cannot win a seat
in the House of Representatives in district elections a chance to win if they have sufficient
strength on a nationwide basis. (In this sense, these groups are considered marginalized
and underrepresented.) Under the party-list system, representatives are elected from
multi-seat districts in proportion to the number of votes received in contrast to the winnertake-all single-seat district in which, even if a candidate garners 49.9% of the votes, he
gets no seat.
Thus, under the party-list system, a party or candidate need not come in first in order to
win seats in the legislature. On the other hand, in the winner-take-all single-seat district,

the votes cast for a losing candidate are wasted as only those who vote for the winner are
represented. To the extent then that it assures parties or candidates a percentage of seats
in the legislature that reflects their public support, the party-list system enables
marginalized and underrepresented sectors (such as, but not limited to, the labor, peasant,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth sectors) to obtain seats in
the House of Representatives. Otherwise, the party-list system does not guarantee to these
sectors seats in the legislature.
This is the method of representation adopted in the Constitution as answer to the problem
of underrepresentation.
In arguing that the party-list system is exclusively for the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, petitioner Bayan Muna argues that the constitutional intent in
adopting the party-list system must be searched for in the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.
The polestar of constitutional interpretation has been stated by this Court in Civil Liberties
Union v. Executive Secretary,[4] as follows:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the
constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting
Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are
powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the
constitutional convention are of value as showing the views of the individual members,
and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the
large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at
the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe
the constitution from what appears upon its face. The proper interpretation therefore
depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers
understanding thereof.
It is worth recalling the celebrated comment of Charles P. Curtis, Jr. on the role of history in
constitutional exegesis:
The intention of the framers of the Constitution, even assuming we could discover what it
was, when it is not adequately expressed in the Constitution, that is to say, what they
meant when they did not say it, surely that has no binding force upon us. If we look behind
or beyond what they set down in the document, prying into what else they wrote and what
they said, anything we may find is only advisory. They may sit in at our councils. There is no
reason why we should eavesdrop on theirs.[5]
Be that as it may, the Record of the Constitutional Commission speaks clearly against

petitioners reading of Art. VI, 5(1)(2). It shows clearly that the Constitutional Commission
rejected sectoral representation in preference to proportional representation.
As originally written, 5 of the Draft Article on the Legislative Department read:
SEC. 5. The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces and cities in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected from the sectors and party list. The sectoral or party list representatives shall in no
case exceed twenty percent of the entire membership of the House of Representatives.
Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and
adjacent territory, provided, however, that each city with a population of more than two
hundred thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section. [6]
As petitioner Bayan Muna states, two proposals for additional representation in the House
of Representatives were submitted by the Committee on Legislative Department: one for
sectoral representation, advocated by Commissioner Villacorta, and another one for partylist system, advocated by Commissioner Monsod. The two are not the same. As
Commissioner Monsod said in explaining his proposal:
MR. MONSOD. . . .
I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the proposal for the party list
system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation. Precisely, the party list
system seeks to avoid the dilemma of choice of sectors and who constitute the members of
the sectors. . . . In effect, a sectoral representation in the Assembly would mean that
certain sectors would have reserved seats; that they will choose among themselves who
would sit in those reserved seats. And then, we have the problem of which sector because
as we will notice in Proclamation No. 9, the sectors cited were the farmers, fishermen,
workers, students, professionals, business, military, academic, ethnic and other similar
groups. So these are the nine sectors that were identified here as sectoral
representatives to be represented in this Commission. The problem we had in trying to
approach sectoral representation in the Assembly was whether to stop at these nine sectors
or include other sectors. . . . Second, we had the problem of who comprise the farmers. . . .
A doctor may be a farmer; a lawyer may also be a farmer. And so, it is up to the discretion
of the person to say I am a farmer so he would be included in that sector.

. . . Under the party list system, there are no reserved seats for sectors. . . . This can be a
regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, Magsasaka or a regional party in
Mindanao. One need not be a farmer to say that he wants the farmers party to be
represented in the Assembly. Any citizen can vote for any party. At the end of the day, the
COMELEC will then tabulate the votes that had been garnered by each party or each
organization one does not have to be a political party and register in order to participate
as a party and count the votes and from there derive the percentage of the votes that
had been cast in favor of a party, organization or coalition.
....
We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral representation while at
the same time making sure that those who really have a national constituency or sectoral
constituency will get a chance to have a seat in the National Assembly. These sectors or
these groups may not have the constituency to win a seat on a legislative district basis.
They may not be able to win a seat on a district basis but surely, they will have votes on a
nationwide basis.
The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there
were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide, have about
1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third place or fourth place in each of
the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or
six representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative
districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party list
system.[7]
Commissioner Monsod, therefore, proposed to amend the phrase shall be elected from the
sectors and party list in 5 by replacing it with the following
THROUGH A PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED NATIONAL, REGIONAL OR
SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS.[8]
Attention should be paid to this proposal because with slight modification it later became
the basis of the present Art. VI, 5(1)(2).
The following exchange took place on the Monsod amendment:
MR. DAVIDE: Madam President, before accepting the proposed amendment, the
Committee would like to get some clarifications.
When the proponent speaks of OR SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS, is he
referring to any sector which the law may subsequently define?

MR. MONSOD: . . . . The party list system that is being advocated by this amendment is a
system that opens up the list to any regional, national or sectoral party. . . .
....
MS. AQUINO. The Committee would like to be clarified on this.
Do we understand the proponent correctly that this party list system is not necessarily
synonymous to sectoral representation?
MR. MONSOD: No, it is not necessarily synonymous, but it does include the right of
sectoral parties or organizations to register, but it is not exclusive to sectoral parties or
organizations.
MS. AQUINO. And that it does not likewise reserve any institutional seat for any sector? In
other words, it only enables it to be a part of the party list if it has the capacity to do so, but
it does not reserve any seat for the sectors.
MR. MONSOD. Yes, Madam President, this is not a reserve seat system. [9]

The proposed amendment was opposed by a group headed by Commissioner Villacorta,

which included Commissioners Tadeo, Lerum, and Bernas. Lerum said:
MR. LERUM. Madam President, in view of the explanation, I am objecting to this
amendment because it is possible that the labor sector will not be represented considering
that those who will vote are all the voters of the Philippines. In other words, the
representative of labor will be chosen by all the electors of the Philippines, and that is not
correct. My contention is that the sectoral representative must be selected by his own
constituents, and for that reason, I am objecting to this amendment.[10]
On the other hand, Tadeo objected on the ground that if allowed to participate in the partylist system, the major political parties could gobble up the sectoral parties. He said:
MR. TADEO. . . . . Kapag inilagay natin ang party list, papasukin ng political parties.
Mangigibabaw at kakainin din niyan hanggang mawala ang sektor.[11]
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political
party, it will dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din iyong sector. Lalamunin
mismo ng political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang

reserve. Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198
seats, reserved din ito sa political parties.[12]
Villacorta said he was objecting to the party-list system because it would not solve the
problem of ineffective representation of the underprivileged sectors. He said:
For too long since our people attained a semblance of self-government at the start of this
century, our legislators were elected based on their promise that they would represent the
little people of our land. With the exception of a few patriotic legislators, some of whom are
in our Commission today, members of the National Assemblies, the Congresses, and the
Batasans of the past did not devote themselves enough to the alleviation of the dismal
condition of our countrys poor and lower classes.
....
These realities convince us that there are no spokesmen and legislators who can best
represent the poor, the underprivileged, the marginalized than those coming from within
their ranks.[13]
To Commissioner Villacorta, only reserved seats for the sectors would give them effective
representation:
MR. MONSOD. My amendment merely says that it is THROUGH A PARTY LIST SYSTEM
OF REGISTERED NATIONAL, REGIONAL OR SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS.
My question is: Does the Honorable Commissioner object to this amendment?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, because it does not guarantee that the seats reserved for the party
list representatives will be reserved for the sectors.[14]
Because of the impasse, the discussion on Friday, July 25, 1986, on 5 was suspended to
allow the commissioners to come to an agreement. After one week, a compromise formula
was reached by the two groups and presented to the plenary session of the Commission on
August 1, 1986. In lieu of the phrase shall be elected from the sectors and the party list,
it was proposed that the following be inserted in 5 of the Draft Article:
THROUGH A PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND
SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS AS PROVIDED BY LAW. THE PARTY LIST
REPRESENTATIVES SHALL CONSTITUTE TWENTY PERCENT OF THE TOTAL MEMBERS
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PROVIDED THAT FOR THE FIRST TWO TERMS
AFTER THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION TWENTY-FIVE OF THE SEATS
ALLOCATED TO PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE FILLED BY SELECTION OR

ELECTION, AS PROVIDED BY LAW FROM THE LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR AND
YOUTH SECTORS.
However, although an agreement had apparently been reached, the advocates of sectoral
representation were not satisfied that it would be allowed only for two terms and only with
respect to one-half of the seats allocated for party-list representatives. Commissioner
Aquino proposed instead the following amendment of 5:
ELECTED THROUGH A PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED NATIONAL, REGIONAL
AND SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS, AS PROVIDED BY LAW. THE PARTY LIST
REPRESENTATIVES SHALL CONSTITUTE TWENTY PERCENT OF THE TOTAL MEMBERS
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. TWENTY-FIVE OF THE SEATS ALLOCATED TO
PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE FILLED BY ELECTION, AS PROVIDED BY
LAW, FROM THE LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR, WOMEN AND YOUTH SECTORS
When put to vote, however, Aquinos proposal was defeated with nineteen (19) voting in
favor, and twenty-two (22) voting against.[15]
The Commission then voted on the proposed amendment of Commissioner Monsod. With
only a few minor changes, it was approved by a vote of thirty-two (32) commissioners
against none.[16] As finally worded, the amendment reads:
SHALL BE FILLED AS PROVIDED BY LAW, BY SELECTION OR ELECTION, FROM THE
LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR, INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES, WOMEN,
YOUTH, AND SUCH OTHER SECTORS AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW, EXCEPT THE
RELIGIOUS SECTOR
Thus, the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission show that the party-list system is
not limited to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors referred to by petitioners,
i.e., labor, peasants, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and the youth,
but that it is a type of proportional representation intended to give voice to those who may
not have the necessary number to win a seat in a district but are sufficiently numerous to
give them a seat nationwide. It, therefore, misreads the debates on Art. VI, 5(1)(2) to say
that Although Commissioners Villacorta and Monsod differed in their proposals as to the
details of the party-list system, both proponents worked within the framework that the
party-list system is for the marginalized as termed by Comm. Villacorta and the
underrepresented as termed by Comm. Monsod, which he defined as those which are
always third or fourth place in each of the districts. [17]
Indeed, the two proposals put forth by them are basically different, and they do not have
the same basis. What the advocates of sectoral representation wanted was permanent
reserved seats for marginalized sectors by which they mean the labor, peasant, urban

poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth sectors. Under Art. VI, 5(2),
these sectors were given only one-half of the seats in the House of Representatives and
only for three terms. On the other hand, the third or fourth place(rs) in district elections,
for whom the party-list system was intended, refer to those who may not win seats in the
districts but nationwide may be sufficiently strong to enable them to be represented in the
House. They may include Villacortas marginalized or underprivileged sectors, but they
are not limited to them. There would have been no need to give the marginalized sectors
one-half of the seats for the party-list system for three terms if the two systems are
identical.
The objections raised against the accreditation of private respondents are the same ones
raised by Commissioners Villacorta, Tadeo, and Lerum, among others, to the Monsod
proposal which became the present Art. VI, 5(1)(2), namely, that certain sectors, like labor,
may not win seats in the House under the party-list system; that the big parties might
gobble up the sectoral parties; that the party-list system will not solve the problem of
ineffective representation of the underprivileged sectors. These objections, however, did
not carry the day, as the members of the Constitutional Commission voted 32-0 in favor of
the Monsod proposal. It is noteworthy that even those who spoke against the Monsod
proposal did not vote against it. To uphold these objections now would be to overrule the
Constitutional Commission and in effect amend the Constitution.
In sum, a problem was placed before the Constitutional Commission that the existing
winner-take-all one-seat district system of election leaves blocks of voters
underrepresented. To this problem of underrepresentation two solutions were proposed:
sectoral representation and party-list system or proportional representation. The
Constitutional Commission chose the party-list system. This Court cannot hold that the
party-list system is reserved for the labor, peasants, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, and youth as petitioners contend without changing entirely the
meaning of the Constitution which in fact mandates exactly the opposite of the reserved
seats system when it provides in Art. IX,C, 6 that A free and open party system shall be
allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people, subject to the provisions of
this Article.
Thus, neither textual nor historical consideration yields support for the view that the partylist system is designed exclusively for labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, and youth sectors. As Commissioner Ople said in supporting the
Monsod proposal:
In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political parties and mass organizations
to seek common ground. For example, we have the PDP-Laban and the UNIDO. I see no
reason why they should not be able to make common goals with mass organizations so that
the very leadership of these parties can be transformed through the participation of mass
organizations. And if this is true of the administration parties, this will be true of others like

the Partido ng Bayan which is now being formed. There is no question that they will be
attractive to many mass organizations. In the opposition parties to which we belong, there
will be a stimulus for us to contact mass organizations so that with their participation, the
policies of such parties can be radically transformed because this amendment will create
conditions that will challenge both the mass organizations and the political parties to come
together. And the party list system is certainly available, although it is open to all the
parties. It is understood that the parties will enter in the roll of the COMELEC the names of
representatives of mass organizations affiliated with them. So that we may, in time, develop
this excellent system that they have in Europe where labor organizations and cooperatives,
for example, distribute themselves either in the Social Democratic Party and the Christian
Democratic Party in Germany, and their very presence there has a transforming effect upon
the philosophies and the leadership of those parties.[18]
With respect to the cancellation of any party registered under the party-list system, 6 of
the Party-List System Act provides:
SEC. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may, motu proprio or
upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and
hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or
coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious
purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation,
organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly
through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least
two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered.

Petitioners allegations that certain parties or organizations, such as private respondents

MAD and Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, are disqualified under this provision are for the
COMELEC to determine after due notice and hearing. They are unfit for resolution in these
proceedings.
III.
On the other hand, the majority states:
The presumption is that the words in which the constitutional provisions are couched
express the objective sought to be attained. In other words, verba legis still prevails. Only
when the meaning of the words used is unclear and equivocal should resort be made to
extraneous aids of construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of the
Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the true
intent or purpose of the provision being construed.
....
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is couched in clear
terms: the mechanics of the system shall be provided by law. Pursuant thereto, Congress
enacted RA 7941. . . . Section 2 thereof unequivocally states that the party-list system of
electing congressional representatives was designed to enable underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole . . .
With due respect, I think the majority misapprehends the meaning of 2 of R.A. No. 7941.
The provision reads:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Party. The State shall promote proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof,
which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but
who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.
Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system
in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests
in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats
in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.

What this provision simply states is that the purpose of the party-list system is to promote
proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives and, that to achieve this end, a full, free and open party system in order
to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the
House of Representatives shall be guaranteed. Contrary to what the majority claims, 2
does not say that the party-list system is intended to enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations, and parties, and who lack welldefined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment
of appropriate legislation to win seats in the House of Representatives. What it says is that
the policy of the law is to promote proportional representation through a party-list system
of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations, and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation to win seats in the House. For while the representation of marginalized and
underrepresented sectors is a basic purpose of the law, it is not its only purpose. As
already explained, the aim of proportional representation is to enable those who cannot win
in the winner-take-all district elections a chance of winning. These groups are not
necessarily limited to the sectors mentioned in 5, i.e., labor, peasants, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, the elderly, the handicapped, women, the youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. These groups can possibly include other
sectors.
Indeed, how can there be a full, free and open party system if the election for the party
list system is to be limited to the sectors which are enumerated in 5 of the law, i.e., labor,
peasants, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, the elderly,
handicapped, women, the youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals? After all,
what is provided for is a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations each of which is separately defined in 3 of the law.
That the party-list system is not limited to these groups is also clear from 5 of the law:
SEC. 5. Registration. - Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization
or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than
ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating
its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or
organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its
constitution, bylaws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition
agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That
the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals.

There would be no need to provide specifically for the sectors if the party-list system is
reserved for them.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the petitions in these cases should be dismissed.

[1]

Memorandum for Petitioner Bayan Muna 17-18.

[2]

Memorandum for the COMELEC 23-24.

[3]

Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao v. Land Registration Commission, 102

Phil. 596, 627 (1957).
[4]

194 SCRA 317, 337-338 (1991), quoting Commonwealth v. Ralph, 111 Pa. 365, 3 Atl. 220
(1886).
[5]

LIONS UNDER THE THRONE 2 (1947) (emphasis in the original).

[6]

Committee on Legislative Power, Committee Report No. 22 (emphasis added).

[7]

2 RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 85-86, session of Tuesday, July 22,

1986 (emphasis added).
[8]

Id. at 252-253, session of Friday, July 25, 1986.

[9]

Id. at 253 (emphasis added).

[10]

Id. at 254, session of Friday, July 25, 1986.

[11]

Id. at 254.

[12]

Id. at 257.

[13]

Id. at 255.

[14]

Id. at 258.

[15]

Id. at 584, session of Friday, Aug. 1, 1986.

[16]

Id. at 589.

[17]

Memorandum for Petitoner Bayan Muna 13.

[18]

II RECORD 568, session of Friday, Aug. 1, 1986.

SEPARATE (DISSENTING) OPINION

VITUG, J.:
The 1987 Constitution, crafted at a time when the euphoria of the 1986 People Power had
barely subsided, recognized the vigor infused by civilian society in a cleansing political
reform and focused itself on institutionalizing civilian participation in daily governance. A
cause for concern was the not-too-unlikely perpetuation of a single party in power- a
convenient contrivance for authoritarian rule. Article VI, Section 5, subsection 2, of the
1987 Charter THE PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL CONSTITUTE TWENTY PER CENTUM OF
THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES INCLUDING THOSE UNDER THE PARTY
LIST FOR THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS. AFTER THE RATIFICATION OF THIS
CONSTITUTION, ONE-HALF OF THE SEATS ALLOCATED TO PARTY-LIST
REPRESENTATIVE SHALL BE FILLED, AS PROVIDED BY LAW, BY SELECTION OR
ELECTION FROM THE LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR, INDIGENOUS CULTURAL
COMMUNITIES, WOMEN, YOUTH, AND SUCH OTHER SECTORS AS MAY BE PROVIDED
BY LAW, EXCEPT THE RELIGIOUS SECTOR. was the result of long-drawn deliberations and compromises.
Immediately, after the resumption of the next Congress, then president Corazon C. Aquino,
exercising her transitory appointing powers, assigned to the reserved seats in the Lower
House, representatives of the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women and youth sector. The assignment was made from a selected list of names submitted
by the sectors themselves. The sectors would continue to enjoy these reserved seats for the
next three terms; thenceforth, they would have to participate in an electoral contest to
secure their representation in Congress.
Article 6, Section 5(2), however, not being self-executing, would wait for the legislature to
ordain the enabling law. Congress was to be circumscribed by the terms expressed in
Article 6, Section 5(2). -First, the system should only apply to the election of 20% of the
total composition of the House of Representatives, second, it would prescribe a mandatory

proportional representation scheme, and, third, it would allow participating parties and
organizations to be represented in voter's registration boards, board of election inspectors,
parties and organizations or similar entities.
On 03 March 1995, Republic Act 7941, also known as "An Act Providing for the Election of
Party-List Representatives Through the Party- List System, and Appropriating Funds
Therefor," was enacted. The enabling law laid the basis for COMELEC Resolution No.2847,
issued on July 1996, prescribing the "Rules and Regulations Governing the Elections of the
Party-List Representatives through the Party-List System." In the May 1998 first party-list
elections, the sectors were required, to test, for the first time, their political mettle in an
open electoral contest with other parties, groups and organizations under a party-list
system. While the elections had a low-voter turnout, seen largely as a result of public
unawareness of an electoral innovation, the recent 2001 multi-party list elections, however,
were different. This time, a huge number of parties, groups and coalitions applied for
registration with, and subsequently obtained accreditation from, the COMELEC. Six of
these groups were established political parties, namely PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO,
LAKAS NUCD-UMDP, NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION, LABAN NG
DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO, AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO, LIBERAL PARTY, NACIONALISTA
PARTY and PDP-LABAN.
The instant petition prays for the exclusion of these major parties on the ground that their
participation does not level the playing field for less known and less organized sectoral
groups still in dire need of election logistics and machinery. Arguing that the system is
open to the underrepresented and marginalized sectors, as well as other parties but only
on the condition that the latter field sectoral candidates themselves, herein petitioner
sought the disqualification of the large major political parties and groups which do not
represent any "genuine" sectoral interest.
A perusal of the novel electoral engineering, introduced by the Constitution into the
electoral system, would show the pertinent provisions to be stoically quiet on the
qualifications of a party, group or coalition to participate under the party-list system.
Instead, it has opted to rely on a subsequent statutory enactment to provide for the
system's focal particulars, which now lead us to the enabling law itself. Section 2 of R.A.
7941 reads "The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to
the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable the Filipino
citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties, and who lacked well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to
the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State
shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the

broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of

Representatives, by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the
legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible."
The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI, Section 5, subsection (2), of the
1987 Constitution took off from two staunch positions - the first headed by Commissioner
Villacorta, advocating that of the 20 percentum of the total seats in Congress to be
allocated to party-list representatives half were to be reserved to appointees from the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors. The proposal was opposed by some
Commissioners. Mr. Monsod expressed the difficulty in delimiting the sectors that needed
representation. He was of the view that reserving seats for the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors would stunt their development into full-pledged parties equipped
with electoral machinery potent enough to further the sectoral interests to be represented.
The Villacorta group, on the other hand, was apprehensive that pitting the unorganized and
less-moneyed sectoral groups in an electoral contest would be like placing babes in the
lion's den, so to speak, with the bigger and more established political parties ultimately
gobbling them up. R.A. 7941 recognized this concern when it banned the first five major
political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives from
participating in the party-list system for the first party-list elections held in 1998 (and to be
automatically lifted starting with the 2001 elections). The advocates for permanent seats
for sectoral representatives made an effort towards a compromise - that the party-list
system be open only to underrepresented and marginalized sectors. This proposal was
further whittled down by allocating only half of the seats under the party-list system to
candidates from the sectors which would garner the required number of votes. The
majority was unyielding. Voting 19-22, the proposal for permanent seats, and in the
alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups, was voted down.
The only concession the Villacorta group was able to muster was an assurance of reserved
seats for selected sectors for three consecutive terms after the enactment of the 1987
Constitution, by which time they would be expected to gather and solidify their electoral
base and brace themselves in the multi-party electoral contest with the more veteran
political groups.
The system, designed to accommodate as many groups as possible, abhors the monopoly of
representation in the Lower House. This intent is evident in the statutory imposition of the
three-seat cap, which prescribes the limit to the number of seats that may be gained by a
party or organization.[1] Votes garnered in excess of 6% of the total votes cast do not entitle
the party to more than three seats.
There is no express provision of the Constitution or in the enabling law that disallows major
political parties from participating in the party-list system and, at the same time, from
fielding candidates for legislative district representatives.
Perhaps the present controversy stems from a confusion of the actual character of the

party-list system. At first glance, it gives the impression of being a combination of

proportional representation for non-traditional parties and sectoral representation. The
first, proportional representation, on one end, is intended for no other reason than to open
up the electoral process for broader participation and representation. Sectoral
representation on the other, presupposes that every underrepresented sector be
represented in Congress. This impression of sectoral-based representation stems from the
provisions of Article 6, Section 5(2), of the Constitution, as well as R.A. 7941, in
enumerating specific sectors to be represented. In holding that the party list system is open
only to the underrepresented and marginalized sectors, the ponencia places much reliance
on Section 5 of R.A. 7941:
"SEC. 5. Registration. Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization
or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than
ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating
its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or
organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its
constitution, bylaws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition
agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That
the sectors shall include labor peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals.
"The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national newspapers of general
circulation.
"The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition within fifteen (15)
days from the date it was submitted for decision but in no case not later than sixty (60)
days before election."
It would seem to me that, construed along with Section 3(d) of the statute, defining a
"sectoral party," the enumeration was intended to qualify only "sectoral parties" and not the
other eligible groups (e.g., political parties, sectoral organizations and coalitions). Neither
Article 6, Section 5(2), nor R.A. 7941 intended to guarantee representation to all sectors of
society and, let alone, hand it over only to underrepresented and marginalized sectors. The
real aim, if the will of the majority of the Commissioners were to be respected, was to
introduce the concept of party-list representation.
The party-list system is limited to four groups - 1) political parties, 2) sectoral parties, 3)
sectoral organizations, and 4) coalitions. A political party is an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology, or platform, principles or policies for the general conduct of
government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly
nominate and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office. A

sectoral party is an organized group of citizens belonging to identifiable sectors, such as

those enumerated in Article 6, Section 5(2), of the 1987 Constitution, which includes the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities and women and those added
by R.A. 7941 like the fisherfolk, elderly, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers and
professionals. A sectoral organization is a group of citizens who share the same or similar
attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns. Coalition is an
aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for
election purposes.
A party or organization desiring to join the party-list system is required to register with the
COMELEC, together with a list of its five nominees for party-list representatives, arranged
according to the group's order of preference. In every election for the House of
Representatives, each voter casts two votes - one for the district representative of his
choice and another for the party or organization of his choice. The votes cast for the parties
and organizations are totaled nationwide. In contrast to the election of all other officials
where the rule of plurality (i.e., the candidate with the highest number of votes wins) is
adopted, the number of seats under the party-list system depends on the number of votes
received in proportion to the total number of votes cast nationwide. On the basis of the
number of registered voters in the recent elections, a group under the party-list system,
should get approximately half a million votes to be entitled to one seat.
At the center stage of this controversy are the political parties themselves. Undeniably,
political parties are an important feature in both democratic and authoritarian regimes. By
legitimizing the individuals and institutions that control political power, parties add an
important element of stability to a political system and also help organize the government
and electorate by recruiting candidates, conducting campaigns, encouraging partisan
attachments and generally educating the public, stimulating voter participation and
providing varying degrees of policy direction to government. The idea could also be seen as
a good training and recruiting ground for potential leaders. Advocates commend the multiparty as allowing the expression and the compromise of the many interests of a complex
society, including a range of ideological differences, conflicting political values and
philosophies. Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution is explicit - "A free and open party system
shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people." [2] The multi-party
system of proportional representation broadens the composition of the House of
Representatives to accommodate sectors and organizations that do not have well-defined
political constituencies and to facilitate access to minority or small parties.
A party-list nominee is subject to basically the same qualifications applicable to legislative
districts candidates,[3] with the exception of the additional requirement that he be
nominated in one list only, and provided, further, that he is not a candidate for any elective
office or has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. [4] A
nominee must actually belong to the sector which they purport to represent, otherwise,
there can be no true representation.[5] A nominee of the youth sector is further required to

be at least 25 but not more than 30 years of age on the day of the election. [6] Should he,
however, attain the age of 30 during his term, he is allowed to continue until the expiration
thereof.[7] Once elected, party-list representatives also enjoy the same term, rights and
privileges as do district representatives, except that they are not entitled to the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF).[8]
A feature of the party-list system is that political parties, sectoral groups and organizations,
coalitions and aggrupation acquire the status of "candidates" and their nominees relegated
to mere agents. Thus, if a party-list representative dies, becomes physically incapacitated,
removed from office by the party or the organization he represents, resigns, or is
disqualified during his term, his party can send another person to take his place for the
remaining period, provided the replacement is next in succession in the list of nominees
submitted to the COMELEC upon registration. Furthermore, a party-list representative who
switches party affiliations during his term forfeits his seat. [9] So, also, if a person changes
his sectoral affiliation within 6 months before the election, he will not be eligible for
nomination in party-list representative under his new party or organization. [10]
The argument raised by petitioners could not be said to have been overlooked as they
precisely were the same points subjected to intense and prolonged deliberations by the
members of the Constitutional Commission.
And, the polestar in the constructions of constitutions always remains --- "effect must be
given to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it." [11] The
law, in its clear formulation cannot give this tribunal the elbow-room for construction.
Courts are bound to suppose that any inconveniences involved in the application of
constitutional provisions according to their plain terms and import have been considered in
advance and accepted as less intolerable than those avoided, or as compensated by
countervailing advantages.[12] The ponencia itself, in ruling as it does, may unwittingly, be
crossing the limits of judicial review and treading the dangerous waters of judicial
legislation, and more importantly, of a constitutional amendment. While, the lament of
herein petitioners is understandable, the remedy lies not with this Court but with the
people themselves through an amendment of their work as and when better counsel
prevails.
WHEREFORE, I regret my inability to concur with my colleagues in their judgment. I am
thus constrained to vote for the dismissal of the petitions.

[1]

Section 11(b), R.A. 7941.

[2]

Bernas, pp. 355-358.

[3]

The Constitutional qualifications for legislative districts representatives apply to partylist nominees Section 6, Article 6, 1987 Constitution. No person shall be a member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and on the day of the
election, at lest twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and except the party-list
representative, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident
thereof for a period not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the elections.
[4]

Section 8, R.A. 7941.

[5]

Supangan, Jr. vs. Santos, 189 SCRA 56.

[6]

Section 9, R.A. 7941.

[7]

Ibid.

[8]

See the plenary deliberations (2nd reading) of House Bill No. 3043.

[9]

Section 15, R.A. 7941.

[10]

Ibid.

[11]

Whitman vs. Oxford National Bank 176 US 559, 44 L Ed 587, 20 Sct. 477.

[12]

People ex rel. Snowball vs. Pendegast, 96 Cal 289 St 126, 110 NE 485.