Assignment 2

14.) G.R. No. L-23445

June 23, 1966

REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant,

vs.
FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, oppositors and appellees.
Facts:
Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962, single, without
descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid
and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios,
Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.
On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a
holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11 years
before her demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of
administration with the will annexed be issued to her.
On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate father and
mother of the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of her will.
Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal
heir of the deceased, oppositors who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct
ascending line were illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution is void.
On August 29, 1963, before a hearing was had on the petition for probate and objection thereto,
oppositors moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute preterition.
On September 6, 1963, petitioner registered her opposition to the motion to dismiss.
The court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will in question is a complete nullity and
will perforce create intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed the
petition without costs.
A motion to reconsider having been thwarted below, petitioner came to this Court on appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the will is a complete nullity.

Ruling:
The statute we are called upon to apply in Article 854 of the Civil Code which, in part, provides:
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct
line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator,
shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are
not inofficious...
Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them,
either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as
heirs nor are expressly disinherited." Disinheritance, in turn, "is a testamentary disposition
depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law.
Express as disinheritance should be, the same must be supported by a legal cause specified in the
will itself.
The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits
their names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in
which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition.
The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced
heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga
Nuguid. And, the will completely omits both of them: They thus received nothing by the
testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited.
This is a clear case of preterition. Such preterition in the words of Manresa "anulara siempre la
institucion de heredero, dando caracter absoluto a este ordenamiento referring to the mandate of
Article 814, now 854 of the Civil Code. The one-sentence will here institutes petitioner as the
sole, universal heir nothing more. No specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It
is in this posture that we say that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate.
The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question "a complete nullity". Article 854 of
the Civil Code in turn merely nullifies "the institution of heir". Considering, however, that the
will before us solely provides for the institution of petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more,
the result is the same. The entire will is null.

G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994

SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND, respondents.
Facts:
In the will, decedent named as devisees, the following: petitioners Roberto and Thelma Ajero,
private respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam S. Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe
Sand, Lisa S. Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr., and their children.
On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, for allowance of decedent's
holographic will. They alleged that at the time of its execution, she was of sound and disposing
mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence, and was in every respect capacitated to
dispose of her estate by will.
Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the
signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which
were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper
pressure and undue influence. The petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested
the disposition in the will of a house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He
claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its
sole owner.
Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court admitted the decedent's holographic will to
probate
On appeal, said Decision was reversed, and the petition for probate of decedent's will was
dismissed. The Court of Appeals found that, "the holographic will fails to meet the requirements
for its validity." 4 It held that the decedent did not comply with Articles 813 and 814 of the New
Civil Code, which read, as follows:
Art. 813: When a number of dispositions appearing in a holographic will are signed without
being dated, and the last disposition has a signature and date, such date validates the dispositions
preceding it, whatever be the time of prior dispositions.
Art. 814: In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will, the testator
must authenticate the same by his full signature.

It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and undated, or signed
but not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made thereon had not
been authenticated by decedent.
Thus, this appeal which is impressed with merit.
Issue: Whether or not said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.
Ruling:

In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures authenticity is the requirement
that they be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself, as provided under Article
810 of the New Civil Code, thus:
A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by
the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the
Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic
will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator.
A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of
the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign
and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such
failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-compliance
with the provisions of Article 814. In the case of Kalaw vs. Relova 132 SCRA 237 242 (1984), this
Court held:

Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the

testator in a holographic Will have not been noted under his signature, . . . the Will is not
thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased,
corrected or interlined. Manresa gave an identical commentary when he said "la omission
de la salvedad no anula el testamento, segun la regla de jurisprudencia establecida en la
sentencia de 4 de Abril de 1985."
Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of
the holographic will or on testator's signature, their presence does not invalidate the will
itself. The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes.
The instant petition is GRANTED.

Assignment No. 4 (13)

G.R. No. L-23915. September 28, 1970
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMILIO T. LOPEZ. SATURNINA M. VDA. DE
LOPEZ, administratrix-appellee, v. DAHLIA LOPEZ and ROY LOPEZ, minors,
represented by their mother and natural guardian LOLITA B. BACHAR
Facts:
On October 13, 1962 Saturnina M. Vda. de Lopez, judicial administratrix of the estate of the
deceased (Sp. Proc. No. 3740), filed with the lower court a project of partition adjudicating the
whole estate to herself and her legitimate children with the deceased. In an order dated March 30,
1964 the lower court approved the project of partition and declared the intestate proceeding
"terminated and closed for all legal purposes." Seventeen days thereafter, or on April 16, 1964,
the minors Dahlia and Roy, both surnamed Lopez, 1 represented by their mother, Lolita B.
Bachar, filed a motion to reopen the proceeding, together with a petition claiming that they were
illegitimate children of the deceased Emilio Lopez, born out of his extra-marital relations with
Lolita B. Bachar, and asking that their rights as such be recognized and their shares in the estate
given to them. The motion was opposed by the judicial administratrix on the ground that the
proceeding had already been ordered terminated and closed and the estate was already in the
hands of the distributees; and that the reopening of the intestate proceeding was not the proper
remedy, which should be an independent action against the individual distributees.
The Trial Court found that the said petition to reopen is not in order. The said proceeding was
already ordered closed and that the property was divided to their respective heirs. The movants
asked for reconsideration, which was denied, and thereupon appealed directly to this Court.
Issue 1: Whether or not the motion to reopen the estate proceeding was filed too late.
Issue 2: Whether or not such motion was the proper remedy.
Ruling:
Issue 1
Of vital importance is the fact that appellants motion to reopen, as well as the petition attached
thereto, is based on their claim that they are illegitimate children of the deceased. On the face of

such claim they are legal heirs of the deceased and hence entitled to share in his estate. Having
been omitted in the partition presented by the judicial administratrix and approved by the
Court, they were not bound thereby.
The general governing principle:
"A judicial partition in probate proceedings (and the same thing can be said of partition in
intestate proceedings) does not bind the heirs who were not parties thereto. No partition, judicial
or extrajudicial, could add one iota or particle to the interest which the petitioner had during the
joint possession. Partition is of the nature of a conveyance of ownership and certainly none of the
co-owners may convey to the others more than his own true right. A judicial partition in probate
proceedings is not final and conclusive, and not being of such definitive character to stop all
means of redress for a co-heir who has been deprived of his lawful share, such co-heir may still,
within the prescriptive period, bring an action for reivindication in the province where any of the
real property of the deceased may be situated."
The motion to reopen was not too late. The courts order declaring the intestate proceeding
closed did not become final immediately upon its issuance. It was no different from judgments or
orders in ordinary actions. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 72 provides that "in the absence of special
provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in
Special Proceedings." And judgments or orders in ordinary actions become final after thirty (30)
days from notice to the party concerned. In this case appellants motion to reopen was filed only
seventeen (17) days from the date of the order of closure. The remedy was therefore invoked on
time.
Issue 2
This Court held that all demands and claims filed by any heir, legatee or party in interest to a
testate or intestate succession, shall be acted upon and decided in the same special proceedings,
and not in a separate action, and the judge who has jurisdiction over the administration of the
inheritance, and who, when the time comes, will be called upon to divide and adjudicate it to the
interested parties, shall take cognizance of all such questions.
"In our opinion the court that approved the partition and the agreement in ratification thereof
may annul both whenever, as it is here alleged, the approval was obtained by deceit or fraud, and
the petition must be filed in the course of the intestate proceedings, for it is generally admitted
that the probate courts are authorized to vacate any decree or judgment procured by fraud, not
only while the proceedings in the course of which it was issued are pending, but even, as in this
case within a reasonable time thereafter." (as reiterated in Yusay v. Yusay Gonzales, 106 Phil.
46).
Finally, in the recent case of Uriarte v. Uriarte, Et Al., G.R. Nos. L-21938-39, May 29, 1970, this
Court, thru Justice Arsenio Dizon, pointed out that there are 2 alternatives for an acknowledged

natural child to prove his status and interest in the estate of the deceased parent, to wit: (1) to
intervene in the probate proceeding if it is still open; and (2) to ask for its reopening if it has
already been closed.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is set aside and the case is remanded to the court of
origin for further proceeding, with costs against appellee.