Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 187320

January 26, 2011

ATLANTA INDUSTRIES, INC. and/or ROBERT CHAN, Petitioners,

vs.
APRILITO R. SEBOLINO, KHIM V. COSTALES, ALVIN V. ALMOITE, and JOSEPH S. SAGUN, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
For resolution is the petition for review on certiorari 1 assailing the decision2 and the resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
rendered on November 4, 2008 and March 25, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP. No. 99340. 4
The Antecedents
The facts are summarized below.
In the months of February and March 2005, complainants Aprilito R. Sebolino, Khim V. Costales, Alvin V. Almoite, Joseph S.
Sagun, Agosto D. Zao, Domingo S. Alegria, Jr., Ronie Ramos, Edgar Villagomez, Melvin Pedregoza, Teofanes B. Chiong, Jr.,
Leonardo L. dela Cruz, Arnold A. Magalang, and Saturnino M. Mabanag filed several complaints for illegal dismissal,
regularization, underpayment, nonpayment of wages and other money claims, as well as claims for moral and exemplary
damages and attorneys fees against the petitioners Atlanta Industries, Inc. (Atlanta) and its President and Chief Operating Officer
Robert Chan. Atlanta is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of steel pipes.
The complaints were consolidated and were raffled to Labor Arbiter Daniel Cajilig, but were later transferred to Labor Arbiter
Dominador B. Medroso, Jr.
The complainants alleged that they had attained regular status as they were allowed to work with Atlanta for more than six (6)
months from the start of a purported apprenticeship agreement between them and the company. They claimed that they were
illegally dismissed when the apprenticeship agreement expired.
In defense, Atlanta and Chan argued that the workers were not entitled to regularization and to their money claims because they
were engaged as apprentices under a government-approved apprenticeship program. The company offered to hire them as regular
employees in the event vacancies for regular positions occur in the section of the plant where they had trained. They also claimed
that their names did not appear in the list of employees (Master List) 5 prior to their engagement as apprentices.
On May 24, 2005, dela Cruz, Magalang, Zao and Chiong executed a Pagtalikod at Pagwawalang Saysay before Labor Arbiter
Cajilig.
The Compulsory Arbitration Rulings
On April 24, 2006, Labor Arbiter Medroso dismissed the complaint with respect to dela Cruz, Magalang, Zao and Chiong, but
found the termination of service of the remaining nine to be illegal. 6 Consequently, the arbiter awarded the dismissed workers
backwages, wage differentials, holiday pay and service incentive leave pay amounting to P1,389,044.57 in the aggregate.
Atlanta appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). In the meantime, or on October 10, 2006, Ramos,
Alegria, Villagomez, Costales and Almoite allegedly entered into a compromise agreement with Atlanta. 7 The agreement
provided that except for Ramos, Atlanta agreed to pay the workers a specified amount as settlement, and to acknowledge them at
the same time as regular employees.

On December 29, 2006,8 the NLRC rendered a decision, on appeal, modifying the ruling of the labor arbiter, as follows: (1)
withdrawing the illegal dismissal finding with respect to Sagun, Mabanag, Sebolino and Pedregoza; (2) affirming the dismissal of
the complaints of dela Cruz, Zao, Magalang and Chiong; (3) approving the compromise agreement entered into by Costales,
Ramos, Villagomez, Almoite and Alegria, and (4) denying all other claims.
Sebolino, Costales, Almoite and Sagun moved for the reconsideration of the decision, but the NLRC denied the motion in its
March 30, 20079 resolution. The four then sought relief from the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court. They charged that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in: (1) failing to recognize their prior employment
with Atlanta; (2) declaring the second apprenticeship agreement valid; (3) holding that the dismissal of Sagun, Mabanag,
Sebolino and Melvin Pedregoza is legal; and (4) upholding the compromise agreement involving Costales, Ramos, Villagomez,
Almoite and Alegria.
The CA Decision
The CA granted the petition based on the following findings: 10
1. The respondents were already employees of the company before they entered into the first and second
apprenticeship agreements Almoite and Costales were employed as early as December 2003 and,
subsequently, entered into a first apprenticeship agreement from May 13, 2004 to October 12, 2004; before
this first agreement expired, a second apprenticeship agreement, from October 9, 2004 to March 8, 2005 was
executed. The same is true with Sebolino and Sagun, who were employed by Atlanta as early as March 3,
2004. Sebolino entered into his first apprenticeship agreement with the company from March 20, 2004 to
August 19, 2004, and his second apprenticeship agreement from August 20, 2004 to January 19, 2005. Sagun,
on the other hand, entered into his first agreement from May 28, 2004 to October 8, 2004, and the second
agreement from October 9, 2004 to March 8, 2005.
2. The first and second apprenticeship agreements were defective as they were executed in violation of the
law and the rules.11 The agreements did not indicate the trade or occupation in which the apprentice would be
trained; neither was the apprenticeship program approved by the Technical Education and Skills
Development Authority (TESDA).
3. The positions occupied by the respondents machine operator, extruder operator and scaleman are
usually necessary and desirable in the manufacture of plastic building materials, the companys main
business. Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun were, therefore, regular employees whose dismissals were
illegal for lack of a just or authorized cause and notice.
4. The compromise agreement entered into by Costales and Almoite, together with Ramos, Villagomez and
Alegria, was not binding on Costales and Almoite because they did not sign the agreement.
The petitioners themselves admitted that Costales and Almoite were initially planned to be a part of the compromise agreement,
but their employment has been regularized as early as January 11, 2006; hence, the company did not pursue their inclusion in the
compromise agreement.12
The CA faulted the NLRC for failing to appreciate the evidence regarding the respondents prior employment with Atlanta. The
NLRC recognized the prior employment of Costales and Almoite on Atlantas monthly report for December 2003 for the CPS
Department/Section dated January 6, 2004. 13 This record shows that Costales and Almoite were assigned to the companys first
shift from 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. The NLRC ignored Sebolino and Saguns prior employment under the companys Production
and Work Schedule for March 7 to 12, 2005 dated March 3, 2004, 14 as they had been Atlantas employees as early as March 3,
2004, with Sebolino scheduled to work on March 7-12, 2005 at 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m., while Sagun was scheduled to work for
the same period but from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. The CA noted that Atlanta failed to challenge the authenticity of the two
documents before it and the labor authorities.
Atlanta and Chan moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in a resolution rendered on March 25, 2009. 15 Hence,
the present petition.
The Petition

Atlanta seeks a reversal of the CA decision, contending that the appellate court erred in (1) concluding that Costales, Almoite,
Sebolino and Sagun were employed by Atlanta before they were engaged as apprentices; (2) ruling that a second apprenticeship
agreement is invalid; (3) declaring that the respondents were illegally dismissed; and (4) disregarding the compromise agreement
executed by Costales and Almoite. It submits the following arguments:
First. The CAs conclusion that the respondent workers were company employees before they were engaged as apprentices was
primarily based on the Monthly Report16 and the Production and Work Schedule for March 7-12, 2005, 17 in total disregard of the
Master List18 prepared by the company accountant, Emelita M. Bernardo. The names of Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun
do not appear as employees in the Master List which "contained the names of all the persons who were employed by and at
petitioner."19
Atlanta faults the CA for relying on the Production and Work Schedule and the Monthly Report which were not sworn to, and in
disregarding the Master List whose veracity was sworn to by Bernardo and by Alex Go who headed the companys accounting
division. It maintains that the CA should have given more credence to the Master List.
Second. In declaring invalid the apprenticeship agreements it entered into with the respondent workers, the CA failed to
recognize the rationale behind the law on apprenticeship. It submits that under the law, 20 apprenticeship agreements are valid,
provided they do not exceed six (6) months and the apprentices are paid the appropriate wages of at least 75% of the applicable
minimum wage.
The respondents initially executed a five-month apprenticeship program with Atlanta, at the end of which, they "voluntarily and
willingly entered into another apprenticeship agreement with the petitioner for the training of a second skill" 21 for five months;
thus, the petitioners committed no violation of the apprenticeship period laid down by the law.
Further, the apprenticeship agreements, entered into by the parties, complied with the requisites under Article 62 of the Labor
Code; the companys authorized representative and the respondents signed the agreements and these were ratified by the
companys apprenticeship committee. The apprenticeship program itself was approved and certified by the TESDA. 22 The CA,
thus, erred in overturning the NLRCs finding that the apprenticeship agreements were valid.
Third. There was no illegal dismissal as the respondent workers tenure ended with the expiration of the apprenticeship agreement
they entered into. There was, therefore, no regular employer-employee relationship between Atlanta and the respondent workers.
The Case for Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun
In a Comment filed on August 6, 2009, 23 Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun pray for a denial of the petition for being
procedurally defective and for lack of merit.
The respondent workers contend that the petition failed to comply with Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which requires
that the petition be accompanied by supporting material portions of the records. The petitioners failed to attach to the petition a
copy of the Production and Work Schedule despite their submission that the CA relied heavily on the document in finding the
respondent workers prior employment with Atlanta. They also did not attach a copy of the compromise agreement purportedly
executed by Costales and Almoite. For this reason, the respondent workers submit that the petition should be dismissed.
The respondents posit that the CA committed no error in holding that they were already Atlantas employees before they were
engaged as apprentices, as confirmed by the companys Production and Work Schedule. 24 They maintain that the Production and
Work Schedule meets the requirement of substantial evidence as the petitioners failed to question its authenticity. They point out
that the schedule was prepared by Rose A. Quirit and approved by Adolfo R. Lope, head of the companys PE/Spiral Section.
They argue that it was highly unlikely that the head of a production section of the company would prepare and assign work to the
complainants if the latter had not been company employees.
The respondent workers reiterate their mistrust of the Master List 25 as evidence that they were not employees of the company at
the time they became apprentices. They label the Master List as "self-serving, dubious and even if considered as authentic, its
content contradicts a lot of petitioners claim and allegations," 26 thus 1. Aside from the fact that the Master List is not legible, it contains only the names of inactive employees.
Even those found by the NLRC to have been employed in the company (such as Almoite, Costales and
Sagun) do not appear in the list. If Costales and Almoite had been employed with Atlanta since January 11,

2006, as the company claimed, 27 their names would have been in the list, considering that the Master List
accounts for all employees "as of May 2006" the notation carried on top of each page of the document.
2. There were no entries of employees hired or resigned in the years 2005 and 2006 despite the "as of May
2006" notation; several pages making up the Master List contain names of employees for the years 1999 2004.
3. The fact that Atlanta presented the purported Master List instead of the payroll raised serious doubts on the
authenticity of the list.
In sum, the respondent workers posit that the presentation of the Master List revealed the "intention of the herein petitioner[s] to
perpetually hide the fact of [their] prior employment."28
On the supposed apprenticeship agreements they entered into, Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun refuse to accept the
agreements validity, contending that the companys apprenticeship program is merely a ploy "to continually deprive [them] of
their rightful wages and benefits which are due them as regular employees." 29 They submit the following "indubitable facts and
ratiocinations:"30
1. The apprenticeship agreements were submitted to TESDA only in 2005 (with dates of receipt on "1/4/05"
& "2/22/05"31 ), when the agreements were supposed to have been executed in April or May 2004. Thus, the
submission was made long after the starting date of the workers apprenticeship or even beyond the
agreements completion/termination date, in violation of Section 23, Rule VI, Book II of the Labor Code.
2. The respondent workers were made to undergo apprenticeship for occupations different from those
allegedly approved by TESDA. TESDA approved Atlantas apprenticeship program on "Plastic Molder" 32 and
not for extrusion molding process, engineering, pelletizing process and mixing process.
3. The respondents were already skilled workers prior to the apprenticeship program as they had been
employed and made to work in the different job positions where they had undergone training. Sagun and
Sebolino, together with Mabanag, Pedregoza, dela Cruz, Chiong, Magalang and Alegria were even given
production assignments and work schedule at the PE/Spiral Section from May 11, 2004 to March 23, 2005,
and some of them were even assigned to the 3:00 p.m. 11:00 p.m. and graveyard shifts (11:00 p.m. 7:00
a.m.) during the period.33
4. The respondent workers were required to continue as apprentices beyond six months. The TESDA
certificate of completion indicates that the workers apprenticeship had been completed after six months. Yet,
they were suffered to work as apprentices beyond that period.
Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun resolutely maintain that they were illegally dismissed, as the reason for the termination of
their employment notice of the completion of the second apprenticeship agreement did not constitute either a just or
authorized cause under Articles 282 and 283 of the Labor Code.
Finally, Costales and Almoite refuse to be bound by the compromise agreement 34 that Atlanta presented to defeat the two
workers cause of action. They claim that the supposed agreement is invalid as against them, principally because they did not sign
it.
The Courts Ruling
The procedural issue
The respondent workers ask that the petition be dismissed outright for the petitioners failure to attach to the petition a copy of the
Production and Work Schedule and a copy of the compromise agreement Costales and Almoite allegedly entered into material
portions of the record that should accompany and support the petition, pursuant to Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In Mariners Polytechnic Colleges Foundation, Inc. v. Arturo J. Garchitorena 35 where the Court addressed essentially the same
issue arising from Section 2(d), Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, 36 we held that the phrase "of the pleadings and other material
portions of the record xxx as would support the allegation of the petition clearly contemplates the exercise of discretion on the

part of the petitioner in the selection of documents that are deemed to be relevant to the petition. The crucial issue to consider
then is whether or not the documents accompanying the petition sufficiently supported the allegations therein." 37
As in Mariners, we find that the documents attached to the petition sufficiently support the petitioners allegations. The
accompanying CA decision38 and resolution,39 as well as those of the labor arbiter 40 and the NLRC,41 referred to the parties
position papers and even to their replies and rejoinders. Significantly, the CA decision narrates the factual antecedents, defines the
complainants cause of action, and cites the arguments, including the evidence the parties adduced. If any, the defect in the
petition lies in the petitioners failure to provide legible copies of some of the material documents mentioned, especially several
pages in the decisions of the labor arbiter and of the NLRC. This defect, however, is not fatal as the challenged CA decision
clearly summarized the labor tribunals rulings. We, thus, find no procedural obstacle in resolving the petition on the merits.
The merits of the case
We find no merit in the petition. The CA committed no reversible error in nullifying the NLRC decision 42 and in affirming the
labor arbiters ruling,43 as it applies to Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun. Specifically, the CA correctly ruled that the four
were illegally dismissed because (1) they were already employees when they were required to undergo apprenticeship and (2)
apprenticeship agreements were invalid.
The following considerations support the CA ruling.
First. Based on company operations at the time material to the case, Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun were already
rendering service to the company as employees before they were made to undergo apprenticeship. The company itself recognized
the respondents status through relevant operational records in the case of Costales and Almoite, the CPS monthly report for
December 200344 which the NLRC relied upon and, for Sebolino and Sagun, the production and work schedule for March 7 to
12, 200545 cited by the CA.
Under the CPS monthly report, Atlanta assigned Costales and Almoite to the first shift (7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.) of the Sections
work. The Production and Work Schedules, in addition to the one noted by the CA, showed that Sebolino and Sagun were
scheduled on different shifts vis--vis the production and work of the companys PE/Spiral Section for the periods July 5-10,
2004;46 October 25-31, 2004;47 November 8-14, 2004;48 November 16-22, 2004;49 January 3-9, 2005;50 January 10-15, 2005;51
March 7-12, 200552 and March 17-23, 2005.53
We stress that the CA correctly recognized the authenticity of the operational documents, for the failure of Atlanta to raise a
challenge against these documents before the labor arbiter, the NLRC and the CA itself. The appellate court, thus, found the said
documents sufficient to establish the employment of the respondents before their engagement as apprentices.
Second. The Master List54 (of employees) that the petitioners heavily rely upon as proof of their position that the respondents
were not Atlantas employees, at the time they were engaged as apprentices, is unreliable and does not inspire belief.
The list, consisting of several pages, is hardly legible. It requires extreme effort to sort out the names of the employees listed, as
well as the other data contained in the list. For this reason alone, the list deserves little or no consideration. As the respondents
also pointed out, the list itself contradicts a lot of Atlantas claims and allegations, thus: it lists only the names of inactive
employees; even the names of those the NLRC found to have been employed by Atlanta, like Costales and Almoite, and those
who even Atlanta claims attained regular status on January 11, 2006, 55 do not appear in the list when it was supposed to account
for all employees "as of May 6, 2006." Despite the "May 6, 2006" cut off date, the list contains no entries of employees who were
hired or who resigned in 2005 and 2006. We note that the list contains the names of employees from 1999 to 2004.
We cannot fault the CA for ignoring the Master List even if Bernardo, its head office accountant, swore to its correctness and
authenticity.56 Its substantive unreliability gives it very minimal probative value. Atlanta would have been better served, in terms
of reliable evidence, if true copies of the payroll (on which the list was based, among others, as Bernardo claimed in her affidavit)
were presented instead.1wphi1
Third. The fact that Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun were already rendering service to the company when they were made
to undergo apprenticeship (as established by the evidence) renders the apprenticeship agreements irrelevant as far as the four are
concerned. This reality is highlighted by the CA finding that the respondents occupied positions such as machine operator,
scaleman and extruder operator - tasks that are usually necessary and desirable in Atlantas usual business or trade as
manufacturer of plastic building materials. 57 These tasks and their nature characterized the four as regular employees under

Article 280 of the Labor Code. Thus, when they were dismissed without just or authorized cause, without notice, and without the
opportunity to be heard, their dismissal was illegal under the law.58
Even if we recognize the companys need to train its employees through apprenticeship, we can only consider the first
apprenticeship agreement for the purpose. With the expiration of the first agreement and the retention of the employees, Atlanta
had, to all intents and purposes, recognized the completion of their training and their acquisition of a regular employee status. To
foist upon them the second apprenticeship agreement for a second skill which was not even mentioned in the agreement itself, 59 is
a violation of the Labor Codes implementing rules 60 and is an act manifestly unfair to the employees, to say the least. This we
cannot allow.
Fourth. The compromise agreement 61 allegedly entered into by Costales and Almoite, together with Ramos, Villagomez and
Alegria, purportedly in settlement of the case before the NLRC, is not binding on Costales and Almoite because they did not sign
it. The company itself admitted 62 that while Costales and Almoite were initially intended to be a part of the agreement, it did not
pursue their inclusion "due to their regularization as early as January 11, 2006." 63
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. 1wphi1 The assailed decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner Atlanta Industries, Inc.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 114337 September 29, 1995

NITTO ENTERPRISES, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ROBERTO CAPILI, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul the decision 1 rendered by public
respondent National Labor Relations Commission, which reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Briefly, the facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Nitto Enterprises, a company engaged in the sale of glass and aluminum products, hired Roberto Capili
sometime in May 1990 as an apprentice machinist, molder and core maker as evidenced by an apprenticeship
agreement 2 for a period of six (6) months from May 28, 1990 to November 28, 1990 with a daily wage rate of
P66.75 which was 75% of the applicable minimum wage.
At around 1:00 p.m. of August 2, 1990, Roberto Capili who was handling a piece of glass which he was working on,
accidentally hit and injured the leg of an office secretary who was treated at a nearby hospital.
Later that same day, after office hours, private respondent entered a workshop within the office premises which was
not his work station. There, he operated one of the power press machines without authority and in the process
injured his left thumb. Petitioner spent the amount of P1,023.04 to cover the medication of private respondent.
The following day, Roberto Capili was asked to resign in a letter 3 which reads:
August
2, 1990
Wala siyang tanggap ng utos mula sa superbisor at wala siyang experiensa kung papaano gamitin
and "TOOL" sa pagbuhat ng salamin, sarili niyang desisyon ang paggamit ng tool at may
disgrasya at nadamay pa ang isang sekretarya ng kompanya.
Sa araw ding ito limang (5) minute ang nakakalipas mula alas-singko ng hapon siya ay pumasok
sa shop na hindi naman sakop ng kanyang trabaho. Pinakialaman at kinalikot ang makina at
nadisgrasya niya ang kanyang sariling kamay.

Nakagastos ang kompanya ng mga sumusunod:

Emergency
and
Medecines (sic) and others 317.04

doctor

fee

P715.00

Bibigyan siya ng kompanya ng Siyam na araw na libreng sahod hanggang matanggal ang tahi ng
kanyang kamay.
Tatanggapin niya ang sahod niyang anim na araw, mula ika-30 ng Hulyo at ika-4 ng Agosto, 1990.
Ang kompanya ang magbabayad ng lahat ng gastos pagtanggal ng tahi ng kanyang kamay,
pagkatapos ng siyam na araw mula ika-2 ng Agosto.
Sa lahat ng nakasulat sa itaas, hinihingi ng kompanya ang kanyang resignasyon, kasama ng
kanyang comfirmasyon at pag-ayon na ang lahat sa itaas ay totoo.

Naiintindihan ko ang lahat ng nakasulat sa itaas, at ang lahat ng ito ay aking pagkakasala sa hindi
pagsunod sa alintuntunin ng kompanya.
(Sgd.)
Roberto
Capili
Roberto Capili
On August 3, 1990 private respondent executed a Quitclaim and Release in favor of petitioner for and in
consideration of the sum of P1,912.79. 4
Three days after, or on August 6, 1990, private respondent formally filed before the NLRC Arbitration Branch,
National Capital Region a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of other monetary benefits.
On October 9, 1991, the Labor Arbiter rendered his decision finding the termination of private respondent as valid
and dismissing the money claim for lack of merit. The dispositive portion of the ruling reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the termination is valid and for cause, and the money claims
dismissed for lack of merit.
The respondent however is ordered to pay the complainant the amount of P500.00 as financial
assistance.
SO ORDERED. 5
Labor Arbiter Patricio P. Libo-on gave two reasons for ruling that the dismissal of Roberto Capilian was valid. First,
private respondent who was hired as an apprentice violated the terms of their agreement when he acted with gross
negligence resulting in the injury not only to himself but also to his fellow worker. Second, private respondent had
shown that "he does not have the proper attitude in employment particularly the handling of machines without
authority and proper training. 6

On July 26, 1993, the National Labor Relations Commission issued an order reversing the decision of the Labor
Arbiter, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby set aside. The respondent is hereby directed to
reinstate complainant to his work last performed with backwages computed from the time his
wages were withheld up to the time he is actually reinstated. The Arbiter of origin is hereby
directed to further hear complainant's money claims and to dispose them on the basis of law and
evidence obtaining.
SO ORDERED. 7
The NLRC declared that private respondent was a regular employee of petitioner by ruling thus:
As correctly pointed out by the complainant, we cannot understand how an apprenticeship
agreement filed with the Department of Labor only on June 7, 1990 could be validly used by the
Labor Arbiter as basis to conclude that the complainant was hired by respondent as a plain
"apprentice" on May 28, 1990. Clearly, therefore, the complainant was respondent's regular
employee under Article 280 of the Labor Code, as early as May 28,1990, who thus enjoyed the
security of tenure guaranteed in Section 3, Article XIII of our 1987 Constitution.
The complainant being for illegal dismissal (among others) it then behooves upon respondent,
pursuant to Art. 227(b) and as ruled in Edwin Gesulgon vs. NLRC, et al. (G.R. No. 90349, March
5, 1993, 3rd Div., Feliciano, J.) to prove that the dismissal of complainant was for a valid cause.
Absent such proof, we cannot but rule that the complainant was illegally dismissed. 8
On January 28, 1994, Labor Arbiter Libo-on called for a conference at which only private respondent's
representative was present.
On April 22, 1994, a Writ of Execution was issued, which reads:
NOW, THEREFORE, finding merit in [private respondent's] Motion for Issuance of the Writ, you
are hereby commanded to proceed to the premises of [petitioner] Nitto Enterprises and Jovy Foster
located at No. l 74 Araneta Avenue, Portero, Malabon, Metro Manila or at any other places where
their properties are located and effect the reinstatement of herein [private respondent] to his work
last performed or at the option of the respondent by payroll reinstatement.
You are also to collect the amount of P122,690.85 representing his backwages as called for in the
dispositive portion, and turn over such amount to this Office for proper disposition.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.
The issues raised before us are the following:
I

WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT AN APPRENTICE.
II
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAD NOT ADEQUATELY PROVEN THE
EXISTENCE OF A VALID CAUSE IN TERMINATING THE SERVICE OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT.
We find no merit in the petition.
Petitioner assails the NLRC's finding that private respondent Roberto Capili cannot plainly be considered an
apprentice since no apprenticeship program had yet been filed and approved at the time the agreement was executed.
Petitioner further insists that the mere signing of the apprenticeship agreement already established an employerapprentice relationship.
Petitioner's argument is erroneous.
The law is clear on this matter. Article 61 of the Labor Code provides:
Contents of apprenticeship agreement. Apprenticeship agreements, including the main rates of
apprentices, shall conform to the rules issued by the Minister of Labor and Employment. The
period of apprenticeship shall not exceed six months. Apprenticeship agreements providing for
wage rates below the legal minimum wage, which in no case shall start below 75% per cent of the
applicable minimum wage, may be entered into only in accordance with apprenticeship program
duly approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment. The Ministry shall develop standard
model programs of apprenticeship. (emphasis supplied)
In the case at bench, the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent was executed on May
28, 1990 allegedly employing the latter as an apprentice in the trade of "care maker/molder." On the same date, an
apprenticeship program was prepared by petitioner and submitted to the Department of Labor and Employment.
However, the apprenticeship Agreement was filed only on June 7, 1990. Notwithstanding the absence of approval by
the Department of Labor and Employment, the apprenticeship agreement was enforced the day it was signed.
Based on the evidence before us, petitioner did not comply with the requirements of the law. It is mandated that
apprenticeship agreements entered into by the employer and apprentice shall be entered only in accordance with the
apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment.
Prior approval by the Department of Labor and Employment of the proposed apprenticeship program is, therefore, a
condition sine quo non before an apprenticeship agreement can be validly entered into.
The act of filing the proposed apprenticeship program with the Department of Labor and Employment is a
preliminary step towards its final approval and does not instantaneously give rise to an employer-apprentice
relationship.

Article 57 of the Labor Code provides that the State aims to "establish a national apprenticeship program through the
participation of employers, workers and government and non-government agencies" and "to establish apprenticeship
standards for the protection of apprentices." To translate such objectives into existence, prior approval of the DOLE
to any apprenticeship program has to be secured as a condition sine qua non before any such apprenticeship
agreement can be fully enforced. The role of the DOLE in apprenticeship programs and agreements cannot be
debased.
Hence, since the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent has no force and effect in the
absence of a valid apprenticeship program duly approved by the DOLE, private respondent's assertion that he was
hired not as an apprentice but as a delivery boy ("kargador" or "pahinante") deserves credence. He should rightly be
considered as a regular employee of petitioner as defined by Article 280 of the Labor Code:
Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be
deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the
employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of
which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or
services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the
season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph:
Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service
is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in
which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists. (Emphasis
supplied)
and pursuant to the constitutional mandate to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare." 9
Petitioner further argues that, there is a valid cause for the dismissal of private respondent.
There is an abundance of cases wherein the Court ruled that the twin requirements of due process, substantive and
procedural, must be complied with, before valid dismissal exists. 10 Without which, the dismissal becomes void.
The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process. This simply means that
the employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his
representative, if he so desires.
Ample opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the employee to enable him to
prepare adequately for his defense including legal representation. 11
As held in the case of Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., Inc. v. NLRC: 12
The law requires that the employer must furnish the worker sought to be dismissed with two (2)
written notices before termination of employee can be legally effected: (1) notice which apprises
the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the
subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him (Sec. 13,
BP 130; Sec. 2-6 Rule XIV, Book V, Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code as

amended). Failure to comply with the requirements taints the dismissal with illegality. This
procedure is mandatory, in the absence of which, any judgment reached by management is void
and in existent (Tingson, Jr. vs. NLRC, 185 SCRA 498 [1990]; National Service Corp. vs. NLRC,
168 SCRA 122; Ruffy vs. NLRC. 182 SCRA 365 [1990]).
The fact is private respondent filed a case of illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter only three days after he was
made to sign a Quitclaim, a clear indication that such resignation was not voluntary and deliberate.
Private respondent averred that he was actually employed by petitioner as a delivery boy ("kargador" or
"pahinante").
He further asserted that petitioner "strong-armed" him into signing the aforementioned resignation letter and
quitclaim without explaining to him the contents thereof. Petitioner made it clear to him that anyway, he did not
have a choice. 13
Petitioner cannot disguise the summary dismissal of private respondent by orchestrating the latter's alleged
resignation and subsequent execution of a Quitclaim and Release. A judicious examination of both events belies any
spontaneity on private respondent's part.
WHEREFORE, finding no abuse of discretion committed by public respondent National Labor Relations
Commission, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 122917 July 12, 1999

MARITES BERNARDO, ELVIRA GO DIAMANTE, REBECCA E. DAVID, DAVID P. PASCUAL, RAQUEL
ESTILLER, ALBERT HALLARE, EDMUND M. CORTEZ, JOSELITO O. AGDON GEORGE P. LIGUTAN JR.,
CELSO M. YAZAR, ALEX G. CORPUZ, RONALD M. DELFIN, ROWENA M. TABAQUERO, CORAZON C. DELOS
REYES, ROBERT G. NOORA, MILAGROS O. LEQUIGAN, ADRIANA F. TATLONGHARI, IKE CABANDUCOS,
COCOY NOBELLO, DORENDA CANTIMBUHAN, ROBERT MARCELO, LILIBETH Q. MARMOLEJO, JOSE E.
SALES, ISABEL MAMAUAG, VIOLETA G. MONTES, ALBINO TECSON, MELODY V. GRUELA, BERNADETH D.
AGERO, CYNTHIA DE VERA, LANI R. CORTEZ, MA. ISABEL B. CONCEPCION, DINDO VALERIO, ZENAIDA
MATA, ARIEL DEL PILAR, MARGARET CECILIA CANOZA, THELMA SEBASTIAN, MA. JEANETTE
CERVANTES, JEANNIE RAMIL, ROZAIDA PASCUAL, PINKY BALOLOA, ELIZABETH VENTURA, GRACE S.
PARDO and TIMOSA, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that qualified disabled persons be granted the same terms and
conditions of employment as qualified able-bodied employees. Once they have attained the status of regular
workers, they should be accorded all the benefits granted by law, notwithstanding written or verbal contracts to the
contrary. This treatments is rooted not merely on charity or accomodation, but on justice for all.
The Case
Challenged in the Petition for Certiorari 1 before us is the June 20, 1995 Decision 2 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), 3 which affirmed the August, 22 1994 ruling of Labor Arbiter Cornelio L. Linsangan. The
labor arbiter's Decision disposed as follows: 4
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the above-mentioned complaint
for lack of merit.
Also assailed is the August 4, 1995 Resolution 5 of the NLRC, which denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts were summarized by the NLRC in this wise: 6
Complainants numbering 43 (p. 176, Records) are deaf-mutes who were hired on various
periods from 1988 to 1993 by respondent Far East Bank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters
and Counters through a uniformly worded agreement called "Employment Contract for
Handicapped Workers". (pp. 68 & 69, Records) The full text of said agreement is quoted
below:
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT FOR
HANDICAPPED WORKERS
This Contract, entered into by and between:
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, a universal banking
corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws
of the Philippines, with business address at FEBTC Building, Muralla,
Intramuros, Manila, represented herein by its Assistant Vice President,
MR. FLORENDO G. MARANAN, (hereinafter referred to as the
"BANK");
-and, years old, of legal age, , and
residing at (hereinafter referred to as the ("EMPLOYEE").
WITNESSETH : That
WHEREAS, the BANK, cognizant of its social responsibility, realizes
that there is a need to provide disabled and handicapped persons gainful
employment and opportunities to realize their potentials, uplift their
socio-economic well being and welfare and make them productive,
self-reliant and useful citizens to enable them to fully integrate in the
mainstream of society;

WHEREAS, there are certain positions in the BANK which may be

filled-up by disabled and handicapped persons, particularly deaf-mutes,
and the BANK ha[s] been approached by some civic-minded citizens
and authorized government agencies [regarding] the possibility of
hiring handicapped workers for these positions;
WHEREAS, the EMPLOYEE is one of those handicapped workers
who [were] recommended for possible employment with the BANK;
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing
premises and in compliance with Article 80 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines as amended, the BANK and the EMPLOYEE have entered
into this Employment Contract as follows:
1. The BANK agrees to employ and train the EMPLOYEE, and the
EMPLOYEE agrees to diligently and faithfully work with the BANK,
as Money Sorter and Counter.
2. The EMPLOYEE shall perform among others, the following duties
and responsibilities:
i. Sort out bills according to color;
ii. Count each denomination per
hundred, either manually or with
the aid of a counting machine;
iii. Wrap and label bills per
hundred;
iv. Put the wrapped bills into
bundles; and
v. Submit bundled bills to the bank
teller for verification.
3. The EMPLOYEE shall undergo a training period of one (1) month,
after which the BANK shall determine whether or not he/she should be
allowed to finish the remaining term of this Contract.
4. The EMPLOYEE shall be entitled to an initial compensation of
P118.00 per day, subject to adjustment in the sole judgment of the
BANK, payable every 15th and end of the month.1wphi1.nt
5. The regular work schedule of the EMPLOYEE shall be five (5) days
per week, from Mondays thru Fridays, at eight (8) hours a day. The
EMPLOYEE may be required to perform overtime work as
circumstance may warrant, for which overtime work he/she [shall] be
paid an additional compensation of 125% of his daily rate if performed
during ordinary days and 130% if performed during Saturday or [a] rest
day.
6. The EMPLOYEE shall likewise be entitled to the following benefits:

i. Proportionate 13th month pay

based on his basic daily wage.
ii. Five (5) days incentive leave.
iii. SSS premium payment.
7. The EMPLOYEE binds himself/herself to abide [by] and comply
with all the BANK Rules and Regulations and Policies, and to conduct
himself/herself in a manner expected of all employees of the BANK.
8. The EMPLOYEE acknowledges the fact that he/she had been
employed under a special employment program of the BANK, for
which reason the standard hiring requirements of the BANK were not
applied in his/her case. Consequently, the EMPLOYEE acknowledges
and accepts the fact that the terms and conditions of the employment
generally observed by the BANK with respect to the BANK's regular
employee are not applicable to the EMPLOYEE, and that therefore, the
terms and conditions of the EMPLOYEE's employment with the
BANK shall be governed solely and exclusively by this Contract and
by the applicable rules and regulations that the Department of Labor
and Employment may issue in connection with the employment of
disabled and handicapped workers. More specifically, the EMPLOYEE
hereby acknowledges that the provisions of Book Six of the Labor
Code of the Philippines as amended, particularly on regulation of
employment and separation pay are not applicable to him/her.
9. The Employment Contract shall be for a period of six (6) months or
from to unless earlier terminated by the BANK for any just
or reasonable cause. Any continuation or extension of this Contract
shall be in writing and therefore this Contract will automatically expire
at the end of its terms unless renewed in writing by the BANK.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties, have hereunto affixed their
signature[s] this day of , at Intramuros, Manila,
Philippines.
In 1988, two (2) deaf-mutes were hired under this Agreement; in 1989 another two (2); in
1990, nineteen (19); in 1991 six (6); in 1992, six (6) and in 1993, twenty-one (21). Their
employment[s] were renewed every six months such that by the time this case arose,
there were fifty-six (56) deaf-mutes who were employed by respondent under the said
employment agreement. The last one was Thelma Malindoy who was employed in 1992
and whose contract expired on July 1993.
xxx xxx xxx
Disclaiming that complainants were regular employees, respondent Far East Bank and
Trust Company maintained that complainants who are a special class of workers the
hearing impaired employees were hired temporarily under [a] special employment
arrangement which was a result of overtures made by some civic and political
personalities to the respondent Bank; that complainant[s] were hired due to "pakiusap"
which must be considered in the light of the context career and working environment
which is to maintain and strengthen a corps of professionals trained and qualified officers
and regular employees who are baccalaureate degree holders from excellent schools

which is an unbending policy in the hiring of regular employees; that in addition to this,
training continues so that the regular employee grows in the corporate ladder; that the
idea of hiring handicapped workers was acceptable to them only on a special arrangement
basis; that it was adopted the special program to help tide over a group of workers such as
deaf-mutes like the complainants who could do manual work for the respondent Bank;
that the task of counting and sorting of bills which was being performed by tellers could
be assigned to deaf-mutes that the counting and sorting of money are tellering works
which were always logically and naturally part and parcel of the tellers' normal functions;
that from the beginning there have been no separate items in the respondent Bank
plantilla for sortes or counters; that the tellers themselves already did the sorting and
counting chore as a regular feature and integral part of their duties (p. 97, Records); that
through the "pakiusap" of Arturo Borjal, the tellers were relieved of this task of counting
and sorting bills in favor of deaf-mutes without creating new positions as there is no
position either in the respondent or in any other bank in the Philippines which deals with
purely counting and sorting of bills in banking operations.
Petitioners specified when each of them was hired and dimissed, viz: 7

NAME OF PETITIONER

WORKPLACE

Date Hired

Date Dismissed

1. MARITES BERNARDO

Intramuros

12-Nov-90

17-Nov-93

2. ELVIRA GO DIAMANTE

Intramuros

24-Jan-90

11-Jan-94

3. REBECCA E. DAVID

Intramuros

16-Apr-90

23-Oct-93

4. DAVID P. PASCUAL

Bel-Air

15-Oct-88

21-Nov-94

5. RAQUEL ESTILLER

Intramuros

2-Jul-92

4-Jan-94

6. ALBERT HALLARE

West

4-Jan-91

9-Jan-94

7. EDMUND M. CORTEZ

Bel-Air

15-Jan-91

3-Dec-93

8. JOSELITO O. AGDON

Intramuros

5-Nov-90

17-Nov-93

9. GEORGE P. LIGUTAN JR.

Intramuros

6-Sep-89

19-Jan-94

10. CELSO M. YAZAR

Intramuros

8-Feb-93

8-Aug-93

11. ALEX G. CORPUZ

Intramuros

15-Feb-93

15-Aug-93

12. RONALD M. DELFIN

Intramuros

22-Feb-93

22-Aug-93

13. ROWENA M. TABAQUERO

Intramuros

22-Feb-93

22-Aug-93

14. CORAZON C. DELOS REYES

Intramuros

8-Feb-93

8-Aug-93

15. ROBERT G. NOORA

Intramuros

15-Feb-93

15-Aug-93

16. MILAGROS O. LEQUIGAN

Intramuros

1-Feb-93

1-Aug-93

17. ADRIANA F. TATLONGHARI

Intramuros

22-Jan-93

22-Jul-93

18. IKE CABUNDUCOS

Intramuros

24-Feb-93

24-Aug-93

19. COCOY NOBELLO

Intramuros

22-Feb-93

22-Aug-93

20. DORENDA CATIMBUHAN

Intramuros

15-Feb-93

15-Aug-93

21. ROBERT MARCELO

West

31 JUL 93 8

1-Aug-93

22. LILIBETH Q. MARMOLEJO

West

15-Jun-90

21-Nov-93

23. JOSE E. SALES

West

6-Aug-92

12-Oct-93

24. ISABEL MAMAUAG

West

8-May-92

10-Nov-93

25. VIOLETA G. MONTES

Intramuros

2-Feb-90

15-Jan-94

26. ALBINO TECSON

Intramuros

7-Nov-91

10-Nov-93

27. MELODY B. GRUELA

West

28-Oct-91

3-Nov-93

28. BERNADETH D. AGERO

West

19-Dec-90

27-Dec-93

29. CYNTHIA DE VERA

Bel-Air

26-Jun-90

3-Dec-93

30. LANI R. CORTEZ

Bel-Air

15-Oct-88

10-Dec-93

31. MARIA ISABEL B.CONCEPCION

West

6-Sep-90

6-Feb-94

32. DINDO VALERIO

Intramuros

30-May-93

30-Nov-93

33. ZENAIDA MATA

Intramuros

10-Feb-93

10-Aug-93

34. ARIEL DEL PILAR

Intramuros

24-Feb-93

24-Aug-93

35. MARGARET CECILIA CANOZA

Intramuros

27-Jul-90

4-Feb-94

36. THELMA SEBASTIAN

Intramuros

12-Nov-90

17-Nov-93

37. MA. JEANETTE CERVANTES

West

6-Jun-92

7-Dec-93

38. JEANNIE RAMIL

Intramuros

23-Apr-90

12-Oct-93

39. ROZAIDA PASCUAL

Bel-Air

20-Apr-89

29-Oct-93

40. PINKY BALOLOA

West

3-Jun-91

2-Dec-93

41. ELIZABETH VENTURA

West

12-Mar-90

FEB 94 [sic]

42. GRACE S. PARDO

West

4-Apr-90

13-Mar-94

43. RICO TIMOSA

Intramuros

28-Apr-93

28-Oct-93

As earlier noted, the labor arbiter and, on appeal, the NLRC ruled against herein petitioners. Hence, this recourse to
this Court. 9
The Ruling of the NLRC
In affirming the ruling of the labor arbiter that herein petitioners could not be deemed regular employees under
Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, Respondent Commission ratiocinated as follows:
We agree that Art. 280 is not controlling herein. We give due credence to the conclusion
that complainants were hired as an accommodation to [the] recommendation of civic
oriented personalities whose employment[s] were covered by . . . Employment
Contract[s] with special provisions on duration of contract as specified under Art. 80.
Hence, as correctly held by the Labor Arbiter a quo, the terms of the contract shall be the
law between the parties. 10
The NLRC also declared that the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons was not applicable, "considering the prevailing
circumstances/milieu of the case."
Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners cite the following grounds in support of their cause:
I. The Honorable Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the
petitioners money sorters and counters working in a bank were not regular
employees.
II. The Honorable Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the
employment contracts signed and renewed by the petitioners which provide for a
period of six (6) months were valid.
III. The Honorable Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in not applying the
provisions of the Magna Carta for the Disabled (Republic Act No. 7277), on proscription
against discrimination against disabled persons. 11
In the main, the Court will resolve whether petitioners have become regular employees.
This Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious. However, only the employees, who worked for more than six months and whose
contracts were renewed are deemed regular. Hence, their dismissal from employement was illegal.
Preliminary Matter:
Propriety of Certiorari
Respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company argues that a review of the findings of facts of the NLRC is not
allowed in a petition for certiorari. Specifically, it maintains that the Court cannot pass upon the findings of public
respondent that petitioners were not regular employees.
True, the Court, as a rule, does not review the factual findings of public respondents in a certiorari proceeding. In
resolving whether the petitioners have become regular employees, we shall not change the facts found by the public
respondent. Our task is merely to determine whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in applying the
law to the established facts, as above-quoted from the assailed Decision.
Main Issue
Are Petitioners Regular Employee?
Petitioners maintain that they should be considered regular employees, because their task as money sorters and
counters was necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank. They further allege that their contracts
served merely to preclude the application of Article 280 and to bar them from becoming regular employees.
Private respondent, on the other hand, submits that petitioners were hired only as "special workers and should not in
any way be considered as part of the regular complement of the Bank." 12 Rather, they were "special" workers under
Article 80 of the Labor Code. Private respondent contends that it never solicited the services of petitioners, whose
employment was merely an "accommodation" in response to the requests of government officials and civic-minded
citizens. They were told from the start, "with the assistance of government representatives," that they could not
become regular employees because there were no plantilla positions for "money sorters," whose task used to be
performed by tellers. Their contracts were renewed several times, not because of need "but merely for humanitarian
reasons." Respondent submits that "as of the present, the "special position" that was created for the petitioners no
longer exist[s] in private respondent [bank], after the latter had decided not to renew anymore their special
employment contracts."
At the outset, let it be known that this Court appreciates the nobility of private respondent's effort to provide
employment to physically impaired individuals and to make them more productive members of society. However,
we cannot allow it to elude the legal consequences of that effort, simply because it now deems their employment
irrelevant. The facts, viewed in light of the Labor Code and the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, indubitably show
that the petitioners, except sixteen of them, should be deemed regular employees. As such, they have acquired legal
rights that this Court is duty-bound to protect and uphold, not as a matter of compassion but as a consequence of law
and justice.
The uniform employment contracts of the petitioners stipulated that they shall be trained for a period of one month,
after which the employer shall determine whether or not they should be allowed to finish the 6-month term of the
contract. Furthermore, the employer may terminate the contract at any time for a just and reasonable cause. Unless
renewed in writing by the employer, the contract shall automatically expire at the end of the term.1wphi1.nt
According to private respondent, the employment contracts were prepared in accordance with Article 80 of the
Labor code, which provides;
Art. 80. Employment agreement. Any employer who employs handicapped workers
shall enter into an employment agreement with them, which agreement shall include:

(a) The names and addresses of the handicapped workers to be

employed;
(b) The rate to be paid the handicapped workers which shall be not less
than seventy five (75%) per cent of the applicable legal minimum
wage;
(c) The duration of employment period; and
(d) The work to be performed by handicapped workers.
The employment agreement shall be subject to inspection by the Secretary of Labor or his
duly authorized representatives.
The stipulations in the employment contracts indubitably conform with the aforecited provision. Succeeding events
and the enactment of RA No. 7277 (the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons), 13 however, justify the application of
Article 280 of the Labor Code.
Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers and renewed the
contracts of 37 of them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to 1993. Verily, the renewal of the contracts of the
handicapped workers and the hiring of others lead to the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and necessary to
the bank. More important, these facts show that they were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their positions.
In other words, their disability did not render them unqualified or unfit for the tasks assigned to them.
In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled employee should be given the
same terms and conditions of employment as a qualified able-bodied person. Section 5 of the Magna Carta provides:
Sec. 5. Equal Opportunity for Employment. No disabled person shall be denied access
to opportunities for suitable employment. A qualified disabled employee shall be subject
to the same terms and conditions of employment and the same compensation, privileges,
benefits, fringe benefits, incentives or allowances as a qualified able bodied person.
The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons necessarily removes the employment contracts from the
ambit of Article 80. Since the Magna Carta accords them the rights of qualified able-bodied persons, they are thus
covered by Article 280 of the Labor Code, which provides:
Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written agreement to the
contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an
employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to
perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade
of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of
the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is
seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding
paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service,
whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered as regular employee
with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue
while such activity exists.
The test of whether an employee is regular was laid down in De Leon v. NLRC, 14 in which this Court held:

The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the reasonable

connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the
usual trade or business of the employer. The test is whether the former is usually
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The connection can
be determined by considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the
scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also if the employee has been
performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance is not continuous and
merely intermittent, the law deems repeated and continuing need for its performance as
sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensibility of that activity to the business.
Hence, the employment is considered regular, but only with respect to such activity, and
while such activity exist.
Without a doubt, the task of counting and sorting bills is necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank.
With the exception of sixteen of them, petitioners performed these tasks for more than six months. Thus, the
following twenty-seven petitioners should be deemed regular employees: Marites Bernardo, Elvira Go Diamante,
Rebecca E. David, David P. Pascual, Raquel Estiller, Albert Hallare, Edmund M. Cortez, Joselito O. Agdon, George
P. Ligutan Jr., Lilibeth Q. Marmolejo, Jose E. Sales, Isabel Mamauag, Violeta G. Montes, Albino Tecson, Melody V.
Gruela, Bernadeth D. Agero, Cynthia de Vera, Lani R. Cortez, Ma. Isabel B. Concepcion, Margaret Cecilia Canoza,
Thelma Sebastian, Ma. Jeanette Cervantes, Jeannie Ramil, Rozaida Pascual, Pinky Baloloa, Elizabeth Ventura and
Grace S. Pardo.
As held by the Court, "Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code put an end to the pernicious practice of making
permanent casuals of our lowly employees by the simple expedient of extending to them probationary appointments,
ad infinitum." 15 The contract signed by petitioners is akin to a probationary employment, during which the bank
determined the employees' fitness for the job. When the bank renewed the contract after the lapse of the six-month
probationary period, the employees thereby became regular employees. 16 No employer is allowed to determine
indefinitely the fitness of its employees.
As regular employees, the twenty-seven petitioners are entitled to security of tenure; that is, their services may be
terminated only for a just or authorized cause. Because respondent failed to show such cause, 17 these twenty-seven
petitioners are deemed illegally dismissed and therefore entitled to back wages and reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges. 18 Considering the allegation of respondent that the job of money sorting is no
longer available because it has been assigned back to the tellers to whom it originally belonged, 18 petitioners are
hereby awarded separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. 20
Because the other sixteen worked only for six months, they are not deemed regular employees and hence not entitled
to the same benefits.
Applicability of the
Brent Ruling
Respondent bank, citing Brent School v. Zamora 21 in which the Court upheld the validity of an employment contract
with a fixed term, argues that the parties entered into the contract on equal footing. It adds that the petitioners had in
fact an advantage, because they were backed by then DSWD Secretary Mita Pardo de Tavera and Representative
Arturo Borjal.
We are not persuaded. The term limit in the contract was premised on the fact that the petitioners were disabled, and
that the bank had to determine their fitness for the position. Indeed, its validity is based on Article 80 of the Labor
Code. But as noted earlier, petitioners proved themselves to be qualified disabled persons who, under the Magna
Carta for Disabled Persons, are entitled to terms and conditions of employment enjoyed by qualified able-bodied
individuals; hence, Article 80 does not apply because petitioners are qualified for their positions. The validation of
the limit imposed on their contracts, imposed by reason of their disability, was a glaring instance of the very
mischief sought to be addressed by the new law.

Moreover, it must be emphasized that a contract of employment is impressed with public interest. 22 Provisions of
applicable statutes are deemed written into the contract, and the "parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and
their relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other." 23 Clearly,
the agreement of the parties regarding the period of employment cannot prevail over the provisions of the Magna
Carta for Disabled Persons, which mandate that petitioners must be treated as qualified able-bodied employees.
Respondent's reason for terminating the employment of petitioners is instructive. Because the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP) required that cash in the bank be turned over to the BSP during business hours from 8:00 a.m. to
5:00 p.m., respondent resorted to nighttime sorting and counting of money. Thus, it reasons that this task "could not
be done by deaf mutes because of their physical limitations as it is very risky for them to travel at night." 24 We find
no basis for this argument. Travelling at night involves risks to handicapped and able-bodied persons alike. This
excuse cannot justify the termination of their employment.
Other Grounds Cited by Respondent
Respondent argues that petitioners were merely "accommodated" employees. This fact does not change the nature of
their employment. As earlier noted, an employee is regular because of the nature of work and the length of service,
not because of the mode or even the reason for hiring them.
Equally unavailing are private respondent's arguments that it did not go out of its way to recruit petitioners, and that
its plantilla did not contain their positions. In L. T. Datu v. NLRC, 25 the Court held that "the determination of
whether employment is casual or regular does not depend on the will or word of the employer, and the procedure of
hiring . . . but on the nature of the activities performed by the employee, and to some extent, the length of
performance and its continued existence."
Private respondent argues that the petitioners were informed from the start that they could not become regular
employees. In fact, the bank adds, they agreed with the stipulation in the contract regarding this point. Still, we are
not persuaded. The well-settled rule is that the character of employment is determined not by stipulations in the
contract, but by the nature of the work performed. 26 Otherwise, no employee can become regular by the simple
expedient of incorporating this condition in the contract of employment.
In this light, we iterate our ruling in Romares v. NLRC: 27
Art. 280 was emplaced in our statute books to prevent the circumvention of the
employee's right to be secure in his tenure by indiscriminately and completely ruling out
all written and oral agreements inconsistent with the concept of regular employment
defined therein. Where an employee has been engaged to perform activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business of the employer, such employee is
deemed a regular employee and is entitled to security of tenure notwithstanding the
contrary provisions of his contract of employment.
xxx xxx xxx
At this juncture, the leading case of Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora proves instructive. As
reaffirmed in subsequent cases, this Court has upheld the legality of fixed-term
employment. It ruled that the decisive determinant in "term employment" should not be
the activities that the employee is called upon to perform but the day certain agreed upon
the parties for the commencement and termination of their employment relationship. But
this Court went on to say that where from the circumstances it is apparent that the periods
have been imposed to preclude acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, they
should be struck down or disregarded as contrary to public policy and morals.
In rendering this Decision, the Court emphasizes not only the constitutional bias in favor of the working class, but
also the concern of the State for the plight of the disabled. The noble objectives of Magna Carta for Disabled

Persons are not based merely on charity or accommodation, but on justice and the equal treatment of qualified
persons, disabled or not. In the present case, the handicap of petitioners (deaf-mutes) is not a hindrance to their
work. The eloquent proof of this statement is the repeated renewal of their employment contracts. Why then should
they be dismissed, simply because they are physically impaired? The Court believes, that, after showing their fitness
for the work assigned to them, they should be treated and granted the same rights like any other regular employees.
In this light, we note the Office of the Solicitor General's prayer joining the petitioners' cause. 28
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The June 20, 1995 Decision and the August
4, 1995 Resolution of the NLRC are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company
is hereby ORDERED to pay back wages and separation pay to each of the following twenty-seven (27) petitioners,
namely, Marites Bernardo, Elvira Go Diamante, Rebecca E. David, David P. Pascual, Raquel Estiller, Albert Hallare,
Edmund M. Cortez, Joselito O. Agdon, George P. Ligutan Jr., Liliberh Q. Marmolejo, Jose E. Sales, Isabel
Mamauag, Violeta G. Montes, Albino Tecson, Melody V. Gruela, Bernadeth D. Agero, Cynthia de Vera, Lani R.
Cortez, Ma. Isabel B. Concepcion, Margaret Cecilia Canoza, Thelma Sebastian, Ma. Jeanette Cervantes, Jeannie
Ramil, Rozaida Pascual, Pinky Baloloa, Elizabeth Ventura and Grace S. Pardo. The NLRC is hereby directed to
compute the exact amount due each of said employees, pursuant to existing laws and regulations, within fifteen days
from the finality of this Decision. No costs.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Vitug, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Footnotes