Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
defendant got irritated andprovoked to maltreat the plaintiff by word and deed.
Unable to induce thedefendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease of
maltreatingher, plaintiff was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge
inthe home of her parents. The plaintiff appeals for a complaint against her
husband forsupport outside of the conjugal domicile. However, the defendant
objectsthat the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cause of action
Issue:Whether or not Goitia can claim for support outside of the conjugaldomicile
Ruling: There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code,t h e t e r m
" s p o u s e " e m b r a c e s c o m m o n l a w r e l a t i o n f o r p u r p o s e s o f exemption
from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and maliciousmischief
committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Codea r t i c l e , i t i s
s a i d , m a k e s n o d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n a c o u p l e w h o s e cohabitation
is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who arehusband and wife de
facto. But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold
that the provisions of the Civil Code, unlessexpressly providing to the contrary
as in Article 144, when referring to a"spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded
spouse. Petitioner vis--visVitaliana was not a lawfully wedded spouse; in
fact, he was not legallycapacitated to marry her in her lifetime.Custody of the
dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to hersurviving brothers and sisters
(the Vargases).
Cosca vs. Palaypayon237 SCRA 249
Facts:Ramon C. Sambo and other complainants filed an administrativecomplaint to
the Offi ce of the Court Administrator against Judge Lucio Palaypayon and
Nelia Baroy, respondents, for the following offenses:
1.Illegal solemnization of marriage
2.Falsifi cation of the monthly reports of cases3.Bribery in consideration of
an appointment in court4.Non-issuance of receipt for cash bond
received5.Infi delity in the custody of detained prisoners, and6.Requiring
payment of fi ling fees from exempted entities
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriageseven without the
requisite of marriage license. Thus, several couples wereable to get married by the
simple expedient of paying the marriage fees tor e s p o n d e n t B a r o y , d e s p i t e
t h e a b s e n c e o f m a r r i a g e l i c e n s e . A s a consequence, their marriage
contracts did not reflect any marriage licensenumber. In addition, the
respondent judge did not sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate the
date of solemnization, the reason beingthat he allegedly had to wait for the
marriage license to be submitted bythe parties which was usually several days after
the ceremony. Indubitably,the marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil
registrar.
Issue:Whether or not respondent judge is liable of illegal solemnization of marriage.
Ruling:O n t h e c h a r g e r e g a r d i n g i l l e g a l m a r r i a g e s , t h e Fa m i l y
C o d e pertinently provides that the formal requisite of marriage, inter alia, a
validm a r r i a g e l i c e n s e e x c e p t i n t h e c a s e s p r o v i d e d f o r
t h e r e i n . Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the
essential orformal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab
initio andthat, while an irreg ularity in the formal requisites shall not aff ect
thevalidity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularityshall
be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. Thus, respondent judge is
liable for illegal solemnization of marriage.
ssue:Whether or not the death of plaintiff in action for legal separationbefore final
decree abated the action
Ruling:An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the
bed-and-board separation of the spouses is purely personal. The CivilCode of the
Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing onlythe innocent spouse
and no one else to claim legal separation; and in itsArticle 108, by providing that
the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stopor abate the proceedings and even
rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in
character, it follows that the death of o n e p a r t y t o t h e a c t i o n c a u s e s t h e
death of the action itself
actio personalis moritur cum persona.
Gandionco vs. PearandaG.R. No. L-72984 November 27, 1987
Facts: Teresita Gandionco, legal wife of the petitioner, Froilan Gandionco,fi led with
the RTC of Misamis Oriental a complaint against petitioner for legal
separation on the ground of concubinage with a petition for supportand payment of
damages. Teresita also filed a complaint for concubinageagainst petitioner with
MTC of General Santos City. And again for theapplication for the
provisional remedy of support pendente lite. Therespondent Judge Pearanda
ordered the payment of support pendentelite .Petitioner contends that the civil
action for legal separation and theincidents thereto should be suspended in
view of the criminal case forconcubinage.
already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of o n e
party to the action causes the death of the action itself
actio personalis moritur cum persona.
Issue:W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e c i v i l a c t i o n f o r l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n s h a l l
b e suspended on the case of concubinage
Ruling:Petition is dismissed. A civil action for legal separation based
onconcubinage may proceed ahead of or simultaneously with a
criminalaction for concubinage for the action for legal separation is not to
recovercivil liability arising from the offense. Civil action is not one to enforce the
civil liability arising from the offense even if both the civil and criminal actions arise
from or are relatedto the same offense. Support pendente lite , as a remedy, can be
availed of in an action for legal separation and granted at the discretion of the
judge.
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 10695, March 18, 2015
CRESCENCIANO M. PITOGO, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOSELITO TROY
SUELLO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
Crescenciano M. Pitogo (Pitogo) purchased a motorcycle from Emcor, Inc.
However, Emcor, Inc. allegedly failed to cause the registration of the
motorcycle under his name. Pitogo, thus, filed a Civil Complaint before the
Regional Trial Court against EMCOR, Inc.1
The motorcycle was eventually registered in Pitogos name based on three
(3) documents notarized by respondent Atty. Joselito Troy Suello (Suello). 2
The documents indicate that they are registered in Suellos notarial register
as follows:
1. Deed of Assignment between
Maria P. Ponce / Rogelio
Ponce and EMCOR, Inc.
2. Deed of Sale with Assumption
of Mortgage between Maria P.
Ponce and Mariza G. Ono-on
3. Deed of Sale with Assumption
of Mortgage between Mariza
G. Ono-on and Crescenciano M.
Pitogo
Pitogo obtained a copy of the three (3) documents from the Land
Transportation Office, Danao City, Cebu. On August 3, 2009, he went to
Suellos office to have them certified. Pitogo claims that when he called
Suello the next day to tell him about the importance of these documents to
his civil case, Suello disowned the documents.6 Suello instead ordered his
secretary to give Pitogo a copy of his notarial register.7
In the letter dated August 7, 2009, Pitogo reiterated to Suello that the
documents were important in his civil case pending before the Regional Trial
Court. He requested Suello to certify the authenticity and veracity of the
three (3) documents he obtained from the Land Transportation Office. 8 He
wanted to determine if the documents were duly notarized by Suello or were
merely fabricated.9 Pitogo did not receive a reply from Suello.10
On September 10, 2009, Pitogo filed his Affidavit-Complaint against Suello
before the Cebu Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Pitogo
alleges that there were discrepancies between the three (3) documents
notarized by Suello and Suellos entries in his notarial register.11
Specifically, Pitogo claims that Suellos notarial register showed that the
above entries pertain to the following documents:
a. Doc. No. 436: Deed of Absolute Sale of Mr. Roel D. Rago;12
b. Doc. No. 437: Deed of Absolute Sale of Mrs. Conchita Pitogo Tautho; 13
c. Doc. No. 235: Contract to Sell of BF Property Development Corporation. 14
In his Answer to the Affidavit-Complaint, Suello denies having notarized the
three (3) documents obtained from the Land Transportation Office. 15 He
denies the allegation that he disowned the documents. 16 He admits that he
certified the documents as true copies.17
In his Position Paper, Suello explains that it was his secretary who certified
Pitogos documents on August 3, 2009.18 Pitogo called Suello the next day to
ask for a certification.19 When he advised Pitogo that he can get it at his
office after verifying the documents, Pitogo informed him that his secretary
already certified them as true copies.20 Suello told Pitogo that his secretary
was not given such authority.21
Suello also claims that Pitogo threatened to file an administrative case
against him if he did not issue a certification stating whether the documents
were really notarized by him or were fabricated.22 According to Suello,
Pitogo needed the certification that the three (3) documents used to register
the motorcycle under his name were fabricated so he could claim P1.7
million in damages for EMCOR, Inc.s alleged non-registration of his
motorcycle.23 Pitogos claim against EMCOR, Inc. was apparently mooted by
the registration of the motorcycle under his name.
On January 10, 2012, Commissioner Hector B. Almeyda of the Commission
(7) The name and address of each credible witness swearing to or affirming
the persons identity;
(8) The fee charged for the notarial act;
(9) The address where the notarization was performed if not in the notarys
regular place of work or business; and
(10) Any other circumstance the notary public may deem of significance or
relevance.
....
(e) The notary public shall give to each instrument or document executed,
sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in
his register, and shall also state on the instrument or document the page/s
of his register on which the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left
between entries.
Failure to properly record entries in the notarial register is also a ground for
revocation of notarial commission:
SECTION 1. Revocation and Administrative Sanctions. . . . .
(b) In addition, the Executive Judge may revoke the commission of, or
impose appropriate administrative sanctions upon, any notary public who:
....
(2) fails to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register
concerning his notarial acts[.]30
Notarial acts give private documents a badge of authenticity that the public
relies on when they encounter written documents and engage in written
transactions. Hence, all notaries public are duty-bound to protect the
integrity of notarial acts by ensuring that they perform their duties with
utmost care. This court explained in Bote v. Judge Eduardo:31
A notarial register is prima facie evidence of the facts there stated. It has
the presumption of regularity and to contradict the veracity of the entry,
evidence must be clear, convincing, and more than merely
preponderant. . . .
....
. . . Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested
with such substantial public interest that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private
Designated Acting Member per S.O. No. 1951 dated March 18, 2015.
Rollo, p. 3.
Id.
Id. at 6. (The document entry states: Doc No. 436; Book No. 88; Page No.
83; Series of 2009.)
3
Id. at 7.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 4.
10
Id.
11
Id. at 34.
The copy of the notarial register attached to the records does not indicate
the Book Number.
12
The copy of the notarial register attached to the records does not indicate
the Book Number.
13
Rollo, p. 4. The copy of the notarial register attached to the records does
not indicate the Book Number. The page number indicated is 47.
14
15
Id. at 29.
16
Id. at 30.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 75.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 76.
23
Id. at 77.
24
Id. at 9293.
25
Id. at 89.
26
Id. at 95.
27
Id. at 95.
28
Id. at 102.
29
30
31
32
Id. at 202203.
Rollo, p. 30.
34
35
Id. at 75.
A.C. No. 9385, November 11, 2013, 709 SCRA 1 [Per J. Del Castillo,
Second Division].
38
39
Id. at 12.
A.C. No. 8776, March 22, 2015 - ANTONINA S. SOSA, Complainant, v. ATTY.
MANUEL V. MENDOZA, Respondent.
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 8776, March 22, 2015
ANTONINA S. SOSA, Complainant, v. ATTY. MANUEL V.
MENDOZA, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before this Court is the Complaint for the disbarment/suspension of Atty.
Manuel V. Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza) filed on October 22, 2010 by Antonina
S. Sosa (Ms. Sosa), for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility arising from non-payment of debt. 1
This Court, in a Resolution dated April 18, 2012, referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.2
On May 11, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with
modification the Investigating Commissioners report and recommendation.
The IBP resolved to suspend Atty. Mendoza from the practice of law for six
(6) months, likewise ordering him to return the amount of the debt with
legal interest.3
On December 10, 2013, the IBP Director for Bar Discipline transmitted to
this Court the Notice of the Resolution and the records of the case. 4
The Factual Background
Ms. Sosa alleged that on July 28, 2006, she extended a loan of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Atty. Mendoza at an interest of twenty-five
thousand pesos (P25,000.00) to be paid not later than September 25, 2006.
They agreed that a penalty or collection charge of ten percent (10%) per
month shall accrue in case of default.5
To ensure the payment of the obligation, Atty. Mendoza signed a promissory
note and issued a postdated check for P500,000.00. 6
Atty. Mendoza failed to comply with his obligation on due date. Upon
demand to pay, he requested Ms. Sosa not to deposit the postdated check.
She acceded and deferred the deposit of the check based on Atty. Mendozas
promise that he would later pay. The check was subsequently
returned/dishonored after Ms. Sosa finally deposited it sometime in October
2006; it was Drawn Against Insufficient Funds. Ms. Sosa then obtained the
services of a lawyer, Atty. Ernesto V. Cabrera (Atty. Cabrera), to legally
address Atty. Mendozas failure to pay.
On January 11, 2010, Atty. Cabrera sent a letter7 to Atty. Mendoza
demanding payment of the loan plus interest and collection charges. Atty.
Mendoza ignored the demand letter despite receipt, as proven by the
Registry Receipt and Registry Return Receipt. 8 Likewise, he did not, in any
manner, contact Ms. Sosa to explain why he failed to pay.
In view of the repeated failure of Atty. Mendoza to pay, Ms. Sosa filed the
complaint for disbarment or suspension, charging Atty. Mendoza for violation
of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This Rule states that
[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Acting on the complaint, this Court required Atty. Mendoza to comment on
the complaint in a Resolution dated January 10, 2011. 9 He filed an Urgent
Motion for Extension on March 18, 2011, 10which this Court granted in a
Resolution dated October 19, 2011. Atty. Mendoza finally filed his Brief
Comment on January 10, 2012.11
Atty. Mendoza admitted in his Brief Comment the existence of the loan and
that it is a valid obligation. However, he alleged that he only received One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) from one Elenita Cruz (Elenita), a
friend of the complainant. Atty. Mendoza did not attach an affidavit from
Elenita nor any evidence proving that he only received P100,000.00.12
The Proceedings before the IBP
On July 4, 2012, Investigating Commissioner Honesto A. Villamor issued the
Notice of Mandatory Conference/Hearing scheduled on August 16, 2012.
When the case was called for hearing, only Atty. Cabrera appeared. Atty.
Cabrera marked the complainants documentary exhibits and the mandatory
conference was subsequently declared terminated. The parties were then
directed to submit their respective verified position papers, documentary
exhibits and/or affidavits of their witnesses, if any, within fifteen (15) days.
In her position paper,13 Ms. Sosa reiterated her allegations in her ComplaintAffidavit. She argued that Atty. Mendoza is liable not only administratively
but also civilly.
Atty. Mendoza, in his Manifestation,14admitted that (i) he arrived late during
the scheduled hearing; (ii) he had on hand Six Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P600,000.00); (iii) he was advised by the Hearing Officer to communicate
with the complainants counsel; and (iv) the validity of his obligation and
that he has to pay the same.
Atty. Mendoza did not make good his offer to pay despite the express
manifestation he made.15
The IBP Findings
The Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Mendoza liable not only
administratively but also civilly. He gave credence to Ms. Sosas allegations
that Atty. Mendoza failed to pay the loan despite Ms. Sosas attempts to
collect. He also took notice of Atty. Mendozas admission that the obligation
is valid.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted with modification the findings of the
upon maturity but Atty. Mendoza failed to pay. In fact, Ms. Sosa deferred
depositing the postdated check upon Atty. Mendozas request, and based on
his promises that he would pay. Despite all these, he still failed to comply
with his obligation. Worse, the check when finally deposited was
dishonored, a fact that Atty. Mendoza did not dispute.
Atty. Mendoza further claimed he had P600,000.00 on hand during the
hearing with the IBP Investigating Officer.21 He allegedly failed to deliver the
amount to Ms. Sosa or her counsel because he arrived late.
We find Atty. Mendozas excuse to be flimsy. It could have been very easy for
him to deliver the P600,000.00 to Ms. Sosa if he had the real intention to
pay. In fact, Ms. Sosa wrote, through her counsel, Atty. Mendoza asking him
to settle his obligation because of his manifestation that he already had the
money.22
It is unclear to us why Atty. Mendoza ignored Ms. Sosas request for
settlement after claiming that he already had the needed funds. He was
either lying he had the money, or had no intention of paying in the first
place. Atty. Mendoza was also not candid with the IBP Investigating Officer
when he claimed he had P600,000.00 and that he was ready to pay his
obligation. What is clear is that his obligation remains outstanding after all
these years.
In Yuhico v. Atty. Gutierrez23 this Court sitting en banc held:
We have held that deliberate failure to pay just debts constitute gross
misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from
the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice
and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not only
legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and
fair dealing so that the peoples faith and confidence in the judicial system is
ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties to
society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients, which
include prompt payment of financial obligations. They must conduct
themselves in a manner that reflects the values and norms of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. [Emphasis
supplied.]
Other than his claim that he was disposing of real properties in order to
settle his obligation,24 Atty. Mendoza failed to explain why he failed to pay
despite his admission of a just and valid loan. Whatever his reasons or
excuses may be, dire financial condition does not justify non-payment of
debt, as we have held in Yuhico. 25
MENDOZA is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility with
a STERN WARNING that commission of the same or similar offense in the
future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.
SO ORDERED.
Del Castillo, Mendoza, Perlas-Bernabe,** and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Brion,* J., (Acting Chairperson)
Endnotes:
Designated as Acting Chairperson, per Special Order No. 1955 dated March
23, 2015.
*
Id. at 54.
Id., unpaged.
Id., unpaged.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 4-9.
Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
10
Id. at 21.
11
Id. at 45-46.
12
Id.
13
Records of the case (CBD No. 12-3468), pp. 4-11; rollo unpaged.
14
15
16
17
Santos, Sr. v. Atty. Beltran, 463 Phil. 372 (2003), citing Spouses Whitson
v. Atienza,457 Phil. 11 (2003).
18
19
20
21
Id.
22
Id.
650 Phil. 225, 230 (2010). See also Lao v. Atty. Medel, 453 Phil. 115
(2003).
23
Rollo, p. 45.
24
25
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Anacta v. Atty. Resurreccion, A.C. No. 9074, August 14, 2012, 678 SCRA
352, 355.
31
33
34
Id. at 301.
SYNTHESIS
A.M. No. P-09-2673 (A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-857-P), October 21, 2014 FRUMENCIO E. PULGAR, Petitioner, v. PAUL M. RESURRECCION AND
MARICAR M. EUGENIO, Respondents.
EN BANC
A.M. No. P-09-2673 (A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-857-P), October 21, 2014
FRUMENCIO E. PULGAR, Petitioner, v. PAUL M. RESURRECCION AND
MARICAR M. EUGENIO,Respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Any employee or official of the Judiciary who usurps the functions of another
employee or official, or illegally exacts money from law practitioners and
litigants is guilty of grave misconduct, and may be dismissed from the
service even for the first offense.
The Charge
In his complaint-affidavit dated March 15, 2000, Atty. Frumencio E. Pulgar
denounced Court Interpreter Paul M. Resurreccion of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 276, in Muntinlupa City, for committing acts of extortion,
illegal exaction, and blackmail by using his position to extort money from
him, a law practitioner, in exchange for non-existent goodwill, and for
violation of Administrative Circular No. 31-90. 1
In the course of the investigation of the complaint-affidavit filed against
Resurreccion, Court; Stenographer Maricar M. Eugenio testified in favor of
Resurreccion. She thereby laid the responsibility for the ex parte reception of
the evidence on Gina Bacayon, then the acting clerk of court. She claimed
that being the stenographer recording the ex parte presentation of evidence
on February 26, 1997, she was the one who had asked for the payment of
the transcript of the stenographic notes from Atty. Pulgar. However, her
testimony invited suspicion of her covering up Resurreccion's malfeasance,
leading to her being likewise investigated and made to answer for
dishonesty.
Antecedents
In his complaint-affidavit, Atty. Pulgar set forth Resurreccion's acts in the
following manner:2
1.
I am the counsel for the petitioner in Civil Case No. 95-079 entitled
Rey O. Chand vs. Armenia P. Chand for Annulment of marriage
based on Art. 36 of the Family Code;
chanroble slaw
2.
The complaint was filed in April 1996 and eventually the aforeindicated case was set for hearing before the Commissioner
on February 26, 1997;
chanrobleslaw
3.
Herein affiant presented his first and only witness, the petitioner Rey
O. Chand and he testified on the factual grounds on why the marriage
celebrated between him and the defendant should be dissolved;
chanrobleslaw
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
On May 25, 2000, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), acting on the
complaint-affidavit, required Resurreccion to submit his comment within ten
days from receipt.3
In his comment,4 Resurrection tendered the following explanations:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
have no right to the amount due to the stenographer. It was Atty. Pulgar
who instead shouted, embarrassed probably, because he knew that his client
told us that he had remitted the payment for the TSN to Atty. Pulgar by way
of a check, issued to him. But Atty. Pulgar never paid the stenographer for
the transcript. All that he paid for was the Commissioner's fee. Surely, if
there is any amount due me, I cannot announce this and demand for it in a
loud manner, specially, if I am "committing graft." Why would I OPENLY
demand the money from Atty. Pulgar in the presence of lawyers and other
people. It was him, shame that made him defensive knowing that the sum
for the stenographer was kept by him.
Par. 10 is strongly disputed. Asking for any sum from any lawyer or party
litigant, much more "extort", is never tolerated in our office. My presiding
judge will gun me down, and I mean literally, because she carries a gun, if
this is ever done by anyone of her staff.
Finally, it is impossible for me or anyone of us to ask money from the
LOSING party, should we ever ask, which never happened!
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this baseless, unfounded,
tramped-up (sic) and malicious charge by this negligent, penny squelching,
and blundering lawyer, who did not pay the TSN even though he received the
sum from his client, be dismissed.
Upon the recommendation of then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco,
Jr.,5 the Court called upon then Executive Judge Norma C. Perello (Judge
Perello) of the Regional Trial Court in Muntinlupa City (RTC in Muntinlupa
City) to investigate the complaint-affidavit, and to report and submit her
recommendations thereon.6
On December 12, 2002, Judge Perello submitted her report and
recommendation to the OCA, stating that the complaint-affidavit against
Resurreccion should be dismissed due to what she perceived as the failure of
Atty. Pulgar to substantiate his charge.7
On April 24, 2003, however, the OCA rejected the findings and
recommendation of Judge Perello, and, instead, recommended that the case
be referred to another investigator in the person of Judge Juanita TomasGuerrero (Judge Guerrero) of the RTC in Muntinlupa City.8 Accordingly, on
June 16, 2003, the Court directed Judge Guerrero to conduct further
investigation, and to submit her report and recommendation; and to exhaust
all possible means to locate Atty. Pulgar.9
In the ensuing hearings conducted by Judge Guerrero, Court Stenographer
Maricar Eugenio of the RTC in Muntinlupa City testified that it was Gina
Bacayon, then acting clerk of court, who had received the evidence ex
parte in the case of Atty. Pulgar;10 that being the stenographer who had
recorded the ex parte presentation of evidence on February 26, 1997,11 she
had asked for the payment of the transcript of the stenographic notes from
Atty. Pulgar;12 and that she had submitted a duplicate copy of the transcript
of the stenographic notes.13
Report and Recommendation of
Investigating Judge Guerrero
In her report and recommendation dated October 22, 2003, 14 Judge
Guerrero made the following conclusions and recommendations, to wit:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
CONCLUSIONS:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court concludes that the following scenarios
must have happened on February 26, 1997 and February 21, 2000:
On February 26, 1997, after the case of Rey Chand was called, the Court
allowed the petitioner to present evidence ex-parte because of the failure of
Armenia Chand to file her Answer. As is the practice and being the Acting
Branch Clerk of Court, Mr. Resurreccion was allowed to receive the evidence
of the petitioner while the Court was busy hearing other cases ready for trial.
Since Mr. Resurreccion, being also the Court Interpreter, was needed in the
courtroom, he had to call Ms. Gina Bucayon, the Acting Clerk of Court, who
is also not a lawyer, to attend to the ex-parte proceedings. This is probably
the reason why Ms. Bucayon's handwritings appeared in the minutes of
February 26, 1997 and why Mr. Resurreccion claimed that he did not know
Atty. Pulgar as he had not met him. As was the practice, Atty. Pulgar could
have given the fee for the ex-parte to Mr. Resurreccion through Ms. Bucayon.
Then, Mr. Oswaldo Serdon went to the court office and delivered the balance
of the ex-parte proceedings but which failed to reach Mr. Resurreccion as he
had just left it on a table. In the meantime, the Rey Chand case was
dismissed.
Subsequently, while Mr. Chand was following up his case after it was revived,
he mentioned that he has paid the commissioner's fee inclusive of
stenographer's fee to his lawyer (Atty. Pulgar) for the ex-parte proceedings
of February 26, 1997. So, when Atty. Pulgar appeared again on February 21,
2000, Ms. Thelma Manlingit who was familiar with Atty. Pulgar, had to call
the attention of Mr. Resurreccion about Mr. Pulgar's presence in the
courtroom. Mr. Resurrecion, then demanded payment of what was due him
as commissioner's fee since he failed to receive it from either Atty. Pulgar or
his liaison officer. Atty. Pulgar got irked by the demand for said fee and
shouted because as far as he was concerned no amount was due since the
Rey Chand case was already dismissed.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
Mr. Paul Resurreccion could not be held liable for extorting money from Atty.
Pulgar because Extortion is defined as compelling of a person by a wrongful
and illegal means (duress, threats, etc.) to give up money or property. There
was neither force nor intimidation committed by Mr. Resurreccion in
demanding money from a lawyer or litigant.
However, the Court finds Mr. Resurreccion guilty of exacting money for some
legal fees that do not exist. While Sec. 6, Rule 130 of the 1997 Rules of
Procedure allows a judge to delegate the reception of evidence to its clerk of
court who is a member of the bar in defaults or ex-parte hearings, the
Supreme Court does not give the commissioner the privilege to collect
money from the litigant or lawyer as legal fees for this purpose. Rule 141 of
the Rules of Court enumerates the numerous legal fees that may be
collected by the courts, commissioner's fees for receiving evidence are not
one of them. The demand thereof under the guise of a commissioner's fee is
illegal and tantamount to conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of
the service.
Employees of the Judiciary are expected to be examples of integrity, honesty
and uprightness. Their conduct should be characterized by propriety and
decorum. Mr. Paul Resurreccion being the designated Acting Branch Clerk of
Court of RTC Branch 276 should be an exemplar of all these
characteristics. The Manual of Clerks of Court that prohibits the
collection of commissioner's fees in an ex-parteproceeding binds
him. Furthermore, he and his lawyer's act of dictating upon his witness, Rey
O. Chand on what to say in an investigation is detestable and contumacious,
to say the least, he being a judicial employee whose main task is to see to it
that the administration of justice is upheld.
The Respondent's actions also caused needless anxiety and shame on the
part of the complainant thereby diminishing the latter's faith not only with
the Regional Trial Courts of Muntinlupa but in the entire Judiciary. The
gradual erosion of public confidence in the Judiciary caused by the failure of
Mr. Resurreccion to uphold the objective of the Supreme Court in improving
public service and preserving the people's faith and confidence in the
government, is constitutive of the offense Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service for which respondent must be made answerable.
xxxx
As this is the first time that the respondent committed the act complained of,
it is hereby recommended that MR. PAUL RESURRECCION be suspended for
one (1) year from service without pay. Any repetition of the same act shall
be dealt with more severely.15
chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
2.
temple of justice.23
At the time material to this administrative case, Resurreccion was the Court
Interpreter of Branch 276 of the RTC in Muntinlupa City. In order to maintain
the trust and confidence of the people in the Judiciary, therefore, he should
have acted within the limits of his authority as such. Although his Presiding
Judge designated him as commissioner to receive evidence ex parte in some
cases, he still could not discharge or perform that task because he was not a
member of the Philippine Bar, and thus had no authority whatsoever to act
or serve as such commissioner to receive the evidence ex parte of any of the
parties. But, as the records indicated, he served as such commissioner. His
deliberate assumption of the duties of a commissioner for that purpose
blatantly transgressed the limits of his official functions as the Court
Interpreter, and constituted unmitigated usurpation of powers. Such
irregularity was undeniable, because the language of Section 9, Rule 30 of
the Rules of Court, of which he and his Presiding Judge were well aware, was
straightforward and unequivocal,viz:
C hanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Dismissal from the service was called for because of the grave nature of
Resurreccion's offense, fie thereby revealed his absolute unworthiness to
remain in the service of the Judiciary. Indeed, he should not be allowed to
serve a minute longer in the Judiciary lest the reputation and integrity of the
service be prejudiced. Under Section 46, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, serious dishonesty and grave
misconduct, among others, are grave offenses punishable by dismissal from
the service.
As to Eugenio, the OCA justifiably pointed out that her evident intention in
testifying in the investigation of Resurreccion was to refute the charge that
he had been the one who had conducted the ex parte hearing on February
26, 1997 despite his being not qualified to do so.26 It was quite obvious that
she wanted to give the impression that it was physically impossible for
Resurreccion to demand the commissioner's fee from Atty. Pulgar if a
different person had received the evidence ex parte. Such thinly veiled
attempt to mislead the investigator in the quest for the truth during the
administrative hearings constituted simple dishonesty nonetheless,
considering that Judge Guerrero's clear judicial vision still saw through the
attempt in order to reach the most logical conclusion that:
x x x As is the practice and being the Acting Branch Clerk of Court, Mr.
Resurreccion was allowed to receive the evidence of the petitioner while the
Court was busy hearing other cases ready for trial. Since Mr. Resurreccion,
being also the Court Interpreter, was needed in the courtroom, he had to
call Ms. Gina Bucayon, the Acting Clerk of Court, who is also not a
lawyer, to attend to theex-parte proceedings. This is probably the
reason why Ms. Bucayon's handwritings appeared in the minutes of
February 26, 1997 and why Mr. Resurreccion claimed that he did not
know Atty. Pulgar as he had not met him. As was the practice, Atty.
Pulgar could have given the fee for the ex-parte to Mr. Resurreccion
through Ms. Bucayon. Then, Mr. Oswaldo Serdon went to the court
office and delivered the balance of the ex-parteproceedings but
which failed to reach Mr. Resurreccion as he had just left it on the
table, x x x.27
Simple dishonesty is categorized as a less grave offense, and is punishable
by suspension of one month and one day to six months for the first offense;
six months and one day to one year for the second offense; or dismissal for
the second offense. In Santiago v. Jovellanos.28 we meted suspension of four
months with a warning to a branch clerk of court of the MTC in Pangasinan
for her false testimony. In the case of Eugenio, we should suspend her from
the service without pay for six months, a penalty that the Court hopes will
quickly bring her to realize the seriousness of her offense. Although this is
not her first administrative case, she being already held administratively
liable for simple neglect of duty and meted a fine of P5,000.00 for not
transcribing her stenographic notes in relation to habeas
corpus proceedings,29 such previous case is not a factor here because of the
dissimilarity of the offenses. Even so, she has to be warned to be more
prudent in her actuations as an employee of the Judiciary.
WHEREFORE, the Court:
1. FINDS AND PRONOUNCES Court Interpreter PAUL M.
RESURRECCION of Branch 276, Regional Trial Court, in Muntinlupa
City GUILTY of GRAVE MISCONDUCT; and DISMISSES him from the
service, with forfeiture of all benefits except accrued leave credits and with
prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned and -controlled corporations;
chanroble slaw
cralawlawlibrary
Id. at 6.
Id. at 7-10.
Id. at 12-14.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 38-42.
Id. at 46-48.
Id. at 49.
10
Id. at 284.
11
Id. at 288.
12
Id,
13
Id. at 444-445.
14
Id. at 617-628.
15
Id. at 625-627.
16
Id. at 627.
17
Id. at 637-646.
18
Id. at 645-646.
19
Id. at 648.
20
Id. at 656-658.
21
Id. at 664-679.
22
Id. at 678-679.
Galindes v. Susbilla-De Vera. A.M. No. P-13-3126 (Formerly A.M. OCA IPI
No. 09-3273-P), February 4, 2014, 715 SCRA 172. See also Velasco v.
Baterbonia, A.M. P-06-2161 (Formerly A.M. OCA 1P1 No. 05-2115-P),
September 25, 2012, 681 SCRA 666, 673; Office of the Court Administrator
v. Redo, A.M. No. P-04-1813 (Formerly A.M. No. 04-5-119-MeTC), May 31,
2011, 649 SCRA 552, 566-567.
23
25
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26
27
G.R. No. 184045, January 22, 2014 - SPOUSES NICASIO C. MARQUEZ AND
ANITA J. MARQUEZ, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES CARLITO ALINDOG AND
CARMEN ALINDOG, Respondents.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 184045, January 22, 2014
Since Gutierrez defaulted in the payment of his loan obligation, Anita sought
the extra-judicial foreclosure of the subject property. At the public auction
sale held on January 19, 2000, Anita emerged as the highest bidder for the
amount of P1,171,000.00. 9 Upon Gutierrezs failure to redeem the same
property within the prescribed period therefor, title was consolidated under
TCT No. T-4193910 on November 5, 2001 (in the name of Anita J. Marquez,
married to Nicasio C. Marquez) which, however, bore an annotation of
adverse claim11 dated March 2, 2000 in the names of respondents-spouses
Carlito and Carmen Alindog (Sps. Alindog). Said annotation was copied from
an earlier annotation on TCT No. T-13443 made only after the subject
propertys mortgage to Sps. Marquez.
Subsequently, or on March 21, 2000, Sps. Alindog filed a civil case for
annulment of real estate mortgage and certificate of sale with prayer for
damages against Sps. Marquez and a certain Agripina Gonzales (Gonzales)
before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-1966 (annulment case). In
their complaint,12 Sps. Alindog alleged that they purchased13 the subject
property from Gutierrez way back in September 1989, but were unable to
secure a certificate of title in their names because Gonzales - to whom they
have entrusted said task - had deceived them in that they were assured that
the said certificate was already being processed when such was not the
case.14 Eventually, they found out that the property had already been
mortgaged to Sps. Marquez, and that when they tried to contact Gonzales
for an explanation, she could no longer be found. Separately, Sps. Alindog
averred that when the mortgage was executed in favor of Sps. Marquez,
Gutierrez was already dead.15
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In their defense,16 Sps. Marquez disputed Sps. Alindogs ownership over the
subject property, arguing that the purported sale in the latters favor was
never registered and therefore, not binding upon them. Further, they insisted
that their certificate of title, TCT No. T-41939, was already indefeasible, and
cannot be attacked collaterally.
Meanwhile, on March 16, 2005, Anita filed an ex-parte petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession17 (ex-parte petition) before the RTC,
docketed as LRC Case No. TG-05-1068, claiming that the same is ministerial
on the courts part following the consolidation of her and her husbands title
over the subject property. Impleaded in said petition are Sps. Gutierrez,
including all persons claiming rights under them.
The RTC Rulings and Subsequent Proceedings
In an Order18dated August 1, 2005, the RTC granted Anitas exparte petition and thereby directed the issuance of a writ of possession in
her favor. Consequently, a notice to vacate19 dated September 23, 2005 was
issued by Acting Sheriff Teodorico V. Cosare (Sheriff Cosare) against Sps.
Gutierrez and all persons claiming rights under them. Sps. Alindog were
served with a copy of the said notice to vacate on September 27, 2005. 20
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in Sps. Alindogs favor, records nonetheless show that said order was not
extended to a full 20-day TRO.23 To this end, the Sheriffs Return24 dated
November 14, 2005 shows that Sheriff Cosare was able to implement the
writ of possession on November 11, 2005, turning over the possession of the
subject property to Sps. Marquez.
After further proceedings on the injunction case, the RTC, through
an Order25dated November 14, 2005, issued a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining Sps. Marquez from taking possession of the subject
property until after the controversy has been fully resolved on the merits.
The said issuance was based on the RTCs appreciation of the initial evidence
adduced by Sps. Alindog, concluding that they appear to have a right to be
protected. Thus, notwithstanding the consolidation of Sps. Marquezs title
over the subject property, the RTC granted Sps. Alindogs prayer for
injunctive relief, holding that any further dispossession on their part would
cause them irreparable injury.26
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The CA Ruling
In a Decision35 dated February 29, 2008, the CA denied Sps. Marquezs
petition as it found no grave abuse of discretion on the RTCs part when it
issued the injunctive writ that enjoined Sps. Marquez from taking possession
of the subject property. It observed that Sps. Alindog had indeed
adducedprima facie proof of their right to possess the subject
property36 while the annulment case was pending, adding that the latters
right to remain in possession37 proceeds from the fact of the subject
propertys earlier sale to them. Thus, while Sps. Marquez concededly had a
xxxx
It is thus settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the
absolute owner of the property purchased if it is not redeemed
during the period of one year after the registration of the sale. As
such, he is entitled to the possession of the said property and can
demand it at any time following the consolidation of ownership in his
name and the issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of title.
The buyer can in fact demand possession of the land even during the
redemption period except that he has to post a bond in accordance with
Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended. No such bond is required after the
redemption period if the property is not redeemed. Possession of the land
then becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as confirmed owner. Upon
proper application and proof of title, the issuance of the writ of
possession becomes a ministerial duty of the court. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied; citations and emphases in the original omitted)
In the case of Spouses Espiridion v. CA,43 the Court expounded on the
ministerial nature of the foregoing issuance as follows: 44
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33,45 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (Rules) pertinently provides that the
possession of the mortgaged property may be awarded to a purchaser in an
extra-judicial foreclosure unless a third party is actually holding the
property by adverse title or right. In the recent case of Rural Bank of
Sta. Barbara (Iloilo), Inc. v. Centeno,46 citing the case of China Banking
Corp., the Court illumined that the phrase a third party who is actually
holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor contemplates a
situation in which a third party holds the property by adverse title or
right, such as that of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary. The co-owner,
agricultural tenant, and usufructuary possess the property in their own right,
and they are not merely the successor or transferee of the right of
possession of another co-owner or the owner of the property.
Notably, the property should not only be possessed by a third party,
but also held by the third party adversely to the judgment
obligor.47 In other words, as mentioned in Villanueva v. Cherdan Lending
Investors Corporation,48 the third person must therefore claim a right
superior to that of the original mortgagor.
In this case, it is clear that the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of
Sps. Marquez, who had already consolidated their title over the extrajudicially foreclosed property, is merely ministerial in nature. The general
rule as herein stated - and not the exception found under Section 33, Rule
39 of the Rules - should apply since Sps. Alindog hinged their claim over the
subject property on their purported purchase of the same from its previous
owner, i.e., Sps. Gutierrez (with Gutierrez being the original mortgagor).
Accordingly, it cannot be seriously doubted that Sps. Alindog are only the
latters (Sps. Gutierrez) successors-in-interest who do not have a right
superior to them.
That said, the RTC therefore gravely abused its discretion when it issued the
injunctive writ which enjoined Sps. Marquez from taking possession of the
subject property. To be sure, grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower
court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence.49 Here, while the RTC had initially issued a writ of possession
in favor of Sps. Marquez, it defied existing jurisprudence when it effectively
rescinded the said writ by subsequently granting Sps. Alindogs prayer for
injunctive relief. The RTCs finding anent the initial evidence adduced by Sps.
Alindog constitutes improper basis to justify the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction in their favor since, in the first place, it had no
authority to exercise any discretion in this respect. Jurisprudence is clear on
the matter: without the exception under Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules
availing, the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser of an
extra-judicially foreclosed property - such as Sps. Marquez in this case should come as a matter of course, and, in such regard, constitutes only a
ministerial duty on the part of the court. Besides, it was improper for the
RTC to have issued a writ of preliminary injunction since the act sought to be
enjoined, i.e., the implementation of the writ of possession, had already
been accomplished in the interim and thus, rendered the matter moot. Case
law instructs that injunction would not lie where the acts sought to be
enjoined had already become fait accompli (meaning, an accomplished or
consummated act).50Hence, since the consummation of the act sought to be
restrained had rendered Sps. Alindogs injunction petition moot, the issuance
of the said injunctive writ was altogether improper.
All told, by acting averse to well-settled jurisprudential rules and resultantly
depriving Sps. Marquez of their right of possession over the subject property,
the Court therefore concludes that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in
this case. In effect, the CAs contrary ruling thereto is hereby reversed and
set aside, which consequentially leads to the nullification of the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the RTC in favor of Sps. Alindog, and the
reinstatement of the writ of possession issued by the same court in favor of
Sps. Marquez. It must, however, be noted that these pronouncements are
without prejudice to any separate action which Sps. Alindog may file in order
to recover ownership of the subject property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 29,
2008 and Resolution dated August 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 97744, as well as the Orders dated November 14, 2005 and
January 17, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18 in
SCA No. TG-05-2521 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly,
the writ of preliminary injunction in SCA No. TG-05-2521 is NULLIFIED,
while the Writ of Possession in LRC Case No. TG-05-1068 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio,(Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo, and Perez, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
Rollo, pp. 10-32.
Id. at 42-43.
Id. at 71-72.
Id. at 76-77.
Id. at 73-75.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 80-81.
10
Id. at 82-83.
11
Id. at 83.
12
Id. at 84-87.
13
14
Id. at 36-37.
15
Id. at 37.
17
Id. at 105-108.
18
Id. at 113.
19
Id. at 115.
20
Id. at 118.
21
Id. at 116-120.
22
Rollo, p. 69.
23
24
Id. at 114.
25
Id. at 69-70
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26
Id. at 70.
Sec. 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser
may petition the Court of First Instance of the province or place where the
property or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof
during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to
the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the
debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the
mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this Act. Such
petition shall be made under oath and filed in form of an ex parte motion in
the registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is registered, or in
special proceedings in the case of property registered under the Mortgage
Law or under section one hundred and ninety-four of the Administrative
Code, or of any other real property encumbered with a mortgage duly
registered in the office of any register of deeds in accordance with any
existing law, and in each case the clerk of the court shall, upon the filing of
such petition, collect the fees specified in paragraph eleven of section one
hundred and fourteen of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six, as
amended by Act Numbered Twenty-eight hundred and sixty-six, and the
court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession issue,
addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property is situated,
who shall execute said order immediately.
28
31
33
34
Id. at 44-67.
35
Id. at 35-41.
36
Id. at 39.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 40.
39
Id. at 207-220.
40
Id. at 42-43.
41
43
44
Id. at 667-668.
47
48
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