AFRICA VS CALTEX

FACTS:
In March 1948, in Rizal Avenue, Manila, a tank truck was hosing gasoline into the
underground storage of Caltex. Apparently, a fire broke out from the gasoline
station and the fire spread and burned several houses including the house of
Spouses Bernabe and Soledad Africa. Allegedly, someone (a passerby) threw a
cigarette while gasoline was being transferred which caused the fire. But there was
no evidence presented to prove this theory and no other explanation can be had as
to the real reason for the fire. Apparently also, Caltex and the branch owner (Mateo
Boquiren) failed to install a concrete firewall to contain fire if in case one happens.
ISSUE: Whether or not Caltex and Boquiren are liable to pay for damages.
HELD: Yes. This is pursuant to the application on the principle of res ipsa loquitur (the transaction speaks for itself) which
states: where the thing which caused injury, without fault of the injured person, is under the exclusive control of the
defendant and the injury is such as in the ordinary course of things does not occur if he having such control use proper care,
it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of the explanation, that the injury arose from defendants want of care. The
gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of Caltex and Boquiren. A fire
occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The persons who knew or could have known how the
fire started were Boquiren, Caltex and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and
reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want of care.

Note that ordinarily, he who charges negligence shall prove it. However, res ipsa loquitur is the exception because the
burden of proof is shifted to the party charged of negligence as the latter is the one who had exclusive control of the thing
that caused the injury complained of.

GOTESCO INVESTMENT VS CHATTO

FACTS: Gloria Chatto and her 15-yr old daughter, Lina, went to see a movie Mother
Dear at SuperamaI, owned by Gotesco Investment Corp. Plenty of people were
watching the film so they could not findseats at the balcony level.Hardly 10 mins
after entering the theater, the ceiling of its balcony collapsed. Pandemoniumensued
in the darkness of the theater but the two women were able to crawl their way out
and walked tonearby FEU hospital. Both were treated for physical injuries which
would incapacitate them for a period of 2-4 weeks.
ISSUE: WON Gotesco is liable
HELD: Yes. It is settled that the owner or proprietor of a place of public amusement
impliedly warrants thatthe premises, appliances and amusement devices are safe
for the purpose for which they are designed,the doctrine being subject to no other
exception or qualification than that he does not contract againstunknown defects
not discoverable by ordinary or reasonable means.This implied warranty has given
rise to the rule that:Where a patron of a theater or other place of public amusement

is injured, and the thing thatcaused the injury is wholly and exclusively under the
control and management of the defendants, and theaccident is such as in the
ordinary course of events would not have happened if proper care had
beenexercised, its occurrence raises a presumption or permits of an inference of
negligence on the part of thedefendant.

Cebu Shipyard v William G.R. No. 132607. May 5, 1999

Facts:
Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc. repaired marine vessels while the
Prudential is in the non-life insurancebusiness. William Lines, Inc., the owner of M/V
Manila City, a luxury passenger-cargo vessel, which caught fire and sank. At the
time of the incident, subject vessel was insured with Prudential for P45M for hull and
machinery. CSEW was insured for only Php 10 million for the shiprepairers liability
policy. They entered into a contract where negligence was the only factor that could
make CSEW liable for damages. Moreover, liability of CSEW was limited to only Php
1million for damages. The Hull Policy included an Additional Perils (INCHMAREE)
Clause covering loss of or damage to the vessel through the negligence of, among
others, ship repairmen.
William brought Manila City to the dry dock of CSEW for repairs. The officers and
cabin crew stayed at the ship while it was being repaired. After the vessel was
transferred to the docking quay, it caught fire and sank, resulting to its total loss.
William brought suit against CSEW alleging that it was through the latters
negligence that the ship caught fire and sank. Prudential was impleaded as coplaintiff after it had paid the value of insured items. It was subrogated to 45 million,
or the value it claimed to indemnify.
The trial court brought judgment against CSEW 45 million for the ship indemnity, 65
million for loss of income, and more than 13 million in other damages. The CA
affirmed the TC decision.
CSEW contended that the cause of the fire was due to Williams hotworks on the
said portion of the ship which they didnt ask CSEW permission for.
Prudential, on the other hand, blamed the negligence of the CSEW workers in the
instance when they didnt mind rubberinsulation wire coming out of the airconditioning unit that was already burning.
Hence this MFR.
For the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply to a given situation, the following
conditions must concur: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily

occur unless someone is negligent; and (2) that the instrumentality or agency which
caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with
negligence.
The facts and evidence reveal the presence of these conditions. First, the fire would
not have happened in the ordinary course of things if reasonable care and diligence
had been exercised.
Second, the agency charged with negligence, as found by the trial court and the CA
and as shown by the records, is CSEW, which had control over subject vessel when
it was docked for annual repairs.
What is more, in the present case the trial court found direct evidence to prove that
the workers didnt exercise due diligence in the care of subject vessel. The direct
evidence substantiates the conclusion that CSEW was really negligent even without
applying such doctrine.
Consunji vs. Court of Appeals
FACTS:
At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M.
Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. On
May 9, 1991, Jose Juegos widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceaseds employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc.
The employer raised, among other defenses, the widows prior availment of the
benefits from the State Insurance Fund. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in
favor of the widow Maria Juego.
On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the
RTC in toto.
D. M. Consunji then sought the reversal of the CA decision.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioner is held liable under the grounds of negligence.
RULING:
1. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or transaction speaks for itself)
is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie
negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute
for specific proof of negligence. It has the following requisites: (1) the
accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is
negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was
under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3)the

injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person injured. All the requisites for the
application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar, thus
a reasonable presumption or inference of appellants negligence arises.
Petitioner does not cite any other evidence to rebut the inference or
presumption of negligence arising from the application of res ipsa loquitur, or
to establish any defense relating to the incident.

LAYUGAN VS IAC
FACTS:
Cargo truck owned by Isidro, driven by Serrano bumped Layugan while the latter
and his companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck.
Layugan filed an action for damages against Isidro.
Defendant admitted his ownership of the vehicle involved in the accident driven by
Daniel Serrano. Defendant countered that the plaintiff was merely a bystander, not
a truck helper being a brother-in-law law of the driver of said truck; that the truck
allegedly being repaired was parked, occupying almost half of the right lane towards
Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, right after the curve; that the proximate cause of the
incident was the failure of the driver of the parked truck in installing the early
warning device.
ISSUE:
2. WON LAYUGAN IS NEGLIGENT
3. WON DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR CAN BE APPLIED?
HELD:
1. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided
by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable
man would not do 24 or as Judge Cooley defines it, "(T)he failure to observe for
the protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby
such other person suffers injury. 25
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may
be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use

that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have
used in the same situation? (Picart vs Smith) If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
The evidence on record discloses that three or four meters from the rear of the
parked truck, a lighted kerosene lamp was placed. Whether the cargo truck was
parked along the road or on half the shoulder of the right side of the road would be
of no moment taking into account the warning device consisting of the lighted
kerosene lamp placed three or four meters from the back of the truck. 30 But despite
this warning which we rule as sufficient, the Isuzu truck driven by Daniel Serrano, an
employee of the private respondent, still bumped the rear of the parked cargo truck.
As a direct consequence of such accident the petitioner sustained injuries on his left
forearm and left foot. His left leg was later amputated from below the knee when
gangrene had set in. 31
It is clear from the foregoing disquisition that the absence or want of care of Daniel
Serrano has been established by clear and convincing evidence. It follows that in
stamping its imprimatur upon the invocation by respondent Isidro of the doctrine of
Res ipsa loquitur to escape liability for the negligence of his employee, the
respondent court committed reversible error.
2. Doctrine OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR is stated thus: "Where the thing which
causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and
the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if
those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the
accident arose from want of care. 33 Or as Black's Law Dictionary 34 puts it:
Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself . Under doctrine of "res ipsa
loquitur" the happening of an injury permits an inference of negligence where
plaintiff produces substantial evidence that injury was caused by an agency
or instrumentality under exclusive control and management of defendant,
and that the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things would
not happen if reasonable care had been used.
The private respondent is sued under Art. 2176 in relation to Art. 2180, paragraph
5, of the Civil Code. In the latter, when an injury is caused by the negligence of a
servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the
servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection, or both. Such
presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure and consequently, may be
rebutted. If follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the
court that in the selection and in the supervision he has exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is
relieved from liability. 45 In disclaiming liability for the incident, the private
respondent stresses that the negligence of his employee has already been

adequately overcome by his driver's statement that he knew his responsibilities as a

driver and that the truck owner used to instruct him to be careful in driving. 46
We do not agree with the private respondent in his submission. In the first place, it
is clear that the driver did not know his responsibilities because he apparently did
not check his vehicle before he took it on the road. If he did he could have
discovered earlier that the brake fluid pipe on the right was cut, and could have
repaired it and thus the accident could have been avoided. Moveover, to our mind,
the fact that the private respondent used to intruct his driver to be careful in his
driving, that the driver was licensed, and the fact that he had no record of any
accident, as found by the respondent court, are not sufficient to destroy the finding
of negligence of the Regional Trial Court given the facts established at the
trial 47 The private respondent or his mechanic, who must be competent, should
have conducted a thorough inspection of his vehicle before allowing his driver to
drive it. In the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case, we hold that Isidro
failed to prove that the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of
his employees which would exculpate him from solidary liability with his driver to
the petitioner. But even if we concede that the diligence of a good father of a family
was observed by Isidro in the supervision of his driver, there is not an iota of
evidence on record of the observance by Isidro of the same quantum of diligence in
the supervision of his mechanic, if any, who would be directly in charge in
maintaining the road worthiness of his (Isidro's) truck. But that is not all. There is
paucity of proof that Isidro exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection of his driver, Daniel Serrano, as well as in the selection of his mechanic, if
any, in order to insure the safe operation of his truck and thus prevent damage to
others. Accordingly, the responsibility of Isidro as employer treated in Article 2180,
paragraph 5, of the Civil Code has not ceased.
SD MARTINEZ VS WILLIAM VAN BUSKIRK
Facts:
1. On the 11th day of September, 1908, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding
a carromata in Ermita, Manila when a delivery wagon owned by the defendant (used
for the transportation of fodder and to which two horses are attached), came from
the opposite direction, while their carromata went close to the sidewalk in order to
let the delivery wagon pass by. However, instead of merely passing by, the horses
ran into the carromata occupied by the plaintiff with her child and overturned it,
causing a serious cut upon the plaintiffs head.
3. The defendant contends that the cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at
the time of the accident, was actually a good servant and was considered a safe
and reliable cochero. He also claims that the cochero was tasked to deliver some
forage at Calle Herran, and for that purpose the defendants employee tied the
driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon for the purpose of

unloading the forage to be delivered. However, a vehicle passed by the driver and
made noises that frightened the horses causing them to run. The employee failed to
stop the horses since he was thrown upon the ground.
4. From the stated facts, the court ruled that the defendant was guilty of
negligence. The court specifically cited a paragraph of Article 1903 of the Civil
Code. Hence, this is appeal to reverse such decision.

Issue: Whether or not the employer, who has furnished a gentle and
tractable team (of horses) and a trusty and capable driver, is liable for the
negligence of such driver.

NO. The cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the
manner described by the evidence in this case. It is believed that acts or
performances which, in a long time, have not been destructive and which are
approved by the society are considered as custom. Hence, they cannot be
considered as unreasonable or imprudent.
The reason why they have been permitted by the society is that they are beneficial
rather that prejudicial. One could not easily hold someone negligent because of
some act that led to an injury or accident. It would be unfair therefore to render the
cochero negligent because of such circumstances.
The court further held that it is a universal practice of merchants during that time
to deliver products through horse-drawn vehicles; and it is also considered universal
practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they were left during the
accident. It has been practiced for a long time and generally has not been the cause
of accidents or injuries the judgment is therefore reversed.
RODRIGUEZ et al vs.CA et al
FACTS: A a fire broke out which razed two apartment buildings, owned by plaintiffsappellants Rodriguezes and partially destroying a commercial building. They filed a
case for damages against defendants-appellees Vilorias and Young. The complaint
alleged that by reason of the gross negligence and want of care of the construction
workers and employees of the defendants-appellees, the bunkhouse or workers
quarters in the construction site caught fire spreading rapidly, burning the adjacent
buildings owned by plaintiffs-appellants.
Defendant-appellee Young, the building contractor, contended that he can not be
held responsible even if there was negligence on the part of the employees for he
had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and

supervision of his workers. As counterclaim, defendant-appellee Young sought for

moral damages, exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
The Vilorias also alleged that plaintiffs-appellants had no cause of action against
them. The fire court not have been caused by gross negligence of their workers for
they did not have any worker in the construction of their building. The said
construction was being undertaken by the independent contractor, Young, who hired
and supervised his own workers. As counterclaim, they prayed for moral damages,
exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
After trial and reception of evidence, the court a quo resolved that the fire was not
caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendantsappellants. The decision stated that plaintiffs-appellants failed to establish that the
fire was the result of defendants-appellees or their workers negligence.
The CA affirmed the trial courts decision but the award of damages in favor of
defendants-appellees including the award of attorneys fees are DELETED and SET
ASIDE.
FGU VS GP SARMIENTO
FACTS:
G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS) undertook to deliver on June 18, 1994, 30
units of Condura S.D. white refrigerators aboard its Isuzu truck driven by Lambert
Eroles, to the Central Luzon Appliances in Dagupan City. While traversing the North
Diversion Road along McArthur highway in Barangay Anupol, Bamban, Tarlac, it
collided with an unidentified truck, causing it to fall into a deep canal, resulting in
damage to the cargoes.
FGU, an insurer of the shipment, paid the value of the covered cargoes
(P204,450.00) to Concepcion Industries, Inc.,. Being subrogee of CIIs rights &
interests, FGU, in turn, sought reimbursement from GPS. Since GPS failed to heed
the claim, FGU filed a complaint for damages & breach of contract of carriage
against GPS and Eroles with the RTC. In its answer, respondents asserted that GPS
was only the exclusive hauler of CII since 1988, and it was not so engaged in
business as a common carrier. Respondents further claimed that the cause of
damage was purely accidental.
GPS filed a motion to dismiss the complaint by way of demurrer to evidence on the
ground that petitioner had failed to prove that it was a common carrier.
The RTC granted the motion to dismiss on April 30, 1996. It subsequently dismissed
the complaint holding that GPS was not a common carrier defined under the law &
existing jurisprudence. The subsequent motion for reconsideration having been

denied, FGU interposed an appeal to the CA. The CA rejected the FGUs appeal &
ruled in favor of GPS. It also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur is applicable in the instant case.
HELD:
1. Res ipsa loquitur holds a defendant liable where the thing which caused the injury
complained of is shown to be under the latters management and the accident is
such that, in the ordinary course of things, cannot be expected to happen if those
who have its management/control use proper care. In the absence of the
defendants explanation, it affords reasonable evidence that the accident arose
from want of care. It is not a rule of substantive law and does not create an
independent ground of liability. Instead, it is regarded as a mode of proof, or a mere
procedural convenience since it furnishes a substitute for, and relieves the plaintiff
of, the burden of producing specific proof of negligence. The maxim simply places
the burden of going forward with the proof on the defendant.
However, resort to the doctrine may only be allowed when:
(a) the event is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur in the absence of
negligence;
(b) other responsible causes are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence (includes
the conduct of the plaintiff and third persons); and
(c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the defendants duty to the
plaintiff.
Thus, it is not applicable when an unexplained accident may be attributable to one
of several causes, for some of which the defendant could not be responsible.
Res ipsa loquitur generally finds relevance whether or not a contractual relationship
exists between the plaintiff and the defendant, for the inference of negligence
arises from the circumstances and nature of the occurrence and not from the nature
of the relation of the parties. Nevertheless,for the doctrine to apply, the requirement
that responsible causes (other than those due to defendants conduct) must first be
eliminated should be understood as being confined only to cases of pure (noncontractual) tort since obviously the presumption of negligence in culpa contractual
immediately attaches by a failure of the covenant or its tenor.
On the other hand, while the truck driver, whose civil liability is predicated on culpa
acquiliana, can be said to have been in control & management of the vehicle, it is
not equally shown that the accident has been exclusively due to his negligence. If it

were so, the negligence could allow res ipsa loquitur to properly work against him.
However, clearly this is not the case.
RCPI VS CA
Loreto Dionela received a telegram via the Radio Communications of the
Philippines, Inc. (RCPI). However, at the end of the telegram were the following:
SA IYO WALANG PAKINABANG DUMATING KA DIYAN WALA KANG PADALA DITO KAHIT
BULBUL MO
The said portion of the telegram was not intended for Loreto. Loreto sued RCPI for
damages based on Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 19.- Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.
ART. 20.-Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
In its defense, RCPI averred that there was no intention to malign Loreto and that
the attached message was an insider joke between RCPI employees which was not
meant to be attached. RCPI also disclaimed liability as it insisted it should be held
liable for the libelous acts of its employees.
Loreto however averred that the said message was read by his employees and it
affected greatly his business reputation. The trial court ruled in favor of Loreto. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the liability of RCPI
is predicated under Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court. The
cause of action of private respondent is based on Articles 19 and 20 of the new Civil
Code as well as respondents breach of contract thru negligence of its own
employees. RCPI is not being sued for its subsidiary liability.
RCPI was negligent as it failed to take the necessary or precautionary steps to avoid
the occurrence of the humiliating incident now complained of. The company had not
imposed any safeguard against such eventualities and this void in its operating
procedure does not speak well of its concern for their clienteles interests.
Negligence here is very patent. This negligence is imputable to appellant and not to
its employees. RCPI should be held liable for the acts of its employees. As a
corporation, RCPI acts and conducts its business through its employees. It cannot
now disclaim liability for the acts of its employees. To hold that the RCPI is not liable

directly for the acts of its employees in the pursuit of its business is to deprive the
general public availing of the services of RCPI of an effective and adequate remedy.
HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. BALANDAN, et al.FACTS:
Guillermo Balandan and his wife is claiming damages in the sum of P2,000 for the
death of their son, Mario. Petitioner was the owner of an Ice plant, who had in their
premises 2 tanks filled of water, 9 feet deep. The factory was fenced but Ingress
and egress was easily made because the gates were always open and there was no
guard assigned in the said gate. Also the tanks didnt have any barricade or fence.
One day when Mario was playing with his friend, they saw the tank inside the
factory and began playing and swimming inside it. While bathing, Mario sank to the
bottom of the tank, only to be fished out later, already as a cadaver, having died of
asphyxia secondary to drowning. The lower decided in the favor of the parents
saying that the petitioner is liable for damages due to the doctrine of attractive
nuisance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of attractive nuisance is applicable in this case?
RULING: NO.
The doctrine of attractive nuisance states that One who maintains on his premises
dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in
play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing
therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured
thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises. American
Jurisprudence shows us that the attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not
applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some
unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location. In
the case bar, the tanks themselves cannot fall under such doctrine thus the
petitioners cannot be held liable for Marios death.
DEL ROSARIO VS MANILA ELECTRIC

ATIENZA VS EVANGELISTA

ROQUE VS MAGTANGGOL
HEREDIA VS SALINAS
RAYNERA VS HICETA

RAYNERA V HICETA [G.R. No. 120027. April 21, 1999.] EDNA A. RAYNERA, for herself
and on behalf of the minors RIANNA and REIANNE RAYNERA, petitioners, vs.
FREDDIE HICETA and JIMMY ORPILLA, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioners herein are heirs of Reynaldo Raynera who was killed by an accident on
his way home at about 2:00 A.M. Respondents, Freddie Hiceta and Jimmy Orpilla
were owner and driver, respectively, of an Isuzu truck trailer which was involved in
the said accident. On March 23, 1989, at about 2:00 in the morning, Reynaldo
Raynera was on his way home. He was riding a motorcycle traveling on the
southbound lane of East Service Road, Cupang, Muntinlupa. The Isuzu truck was
travelling ahead of him at 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. 4 The truck was loaded with
two (2) metal sheets extended on both sides, two (2) feet on the left and three (3)
feet on the right. There were two (2) pairs of red lights, about 35 watts each, on
both sides of the metal plates. 5 The asphalt road was not well lighted. At some
point on the road, Reynaldo Raynera crashed his motorcycle into the left rear
portion of the truck trailer, which was without tail lights. Due to the collision,
Reynaldo sustained head injuries and truck helper Geraldino D. Lucelo 6 rushed him
to the Paraaque Medical Center. Upon arrival at the hospital, the attending
physician, Dr. Marivic Aguirre, 7 pronounced Reynaldo Raynera dead on arrival.
At time of his death, Reynaldo was manager of the Engineering Department,
Kawasaki Motors (Phils.) Corporation. The heirs of the deceased demanded from
respondents' payment of damages arising from the death of Reynaldo as a result of
the vehicular accident. The respondents refused to pay the claims. Petitioners,
hence, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Manila a complaint for damages against
respondents' owner and driver of the Isuzu truck. Petitioners sought recovery of the
damages caused by the negligent operation of the truck- trailer at nighttime on the
highway, without tail the lights.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) Trial Court: rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. The trial court held that
respondents' negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of the victim's
death. The trial court also applied the doctrine of contributory negligence and
reduced the responsibility of respondents by 20%.
(2) Court of Appeals: held that the victim's bumping into the left rear portion of the
truck was the proximate cause of his death, and consequently, absolved
respondents from liability.
ISSUE:
Whether the truck is responsible for the accident
RULING: No.
Despite the absence of tail lights and license plate, respondents' truck was visible in
the highway. It was traveling at a moderate speed, approximately 20 to 30

kilometers per hour. It used the service road, instead of the highway, because the
cargo they were hauling posed a danger to passing motorists. In compliance with
the Land Transportation Traffic Code (Republic Act No. 4136)" 25 respondents
installed 2 pairs of lights on top of the steel plates, as the vehicle's cargo load
extended beyond the bed or body thereof.
DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE; THE DRIVERS OF THE VEHICLES "WHO BUMP
THE REAR OF ANOTHER VEHICLE" ARE PRESUMED TO BE THE CAUSE OF THE
ACCIDENT, UNLESS CONTRADICTED BY OTHER EVIDENCE; CASE AT BAR. It has
been said that drivers of vehicles "who bump the rear of another vehicle" are
presumed to be "the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence."
The rationale behind the presumption is that the driver of the rear vehicle has full
control of the situation as he is in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the responsibility to avoid the collision with
the front vehicle lies with the driver of the rear vehicle. Consequently, no other
person was to blame but the victim himself since he was the one who bumped his
motorcycle into the rear of the Isuzu truck. He had the last clear chance of avoiding
the accident.
He was traversing the service road where the prescribed speed limit was less than
that in the highway.