Concepcion vs.

Court of Appeals and Almonte (2005)

Summary Cases:

Gerardo Concepcion vs. Court of Appeals and Almonte

Subject: The legitimacy status and filiation of a child is determined by law and not by the parties;
Gerardo, not being the legal husband, has no standing to impugn the legitimacy of Jose Gerardo;
Presumption of legitimacy and how it may be rebutted; Presumption of legitimacy was not rebutted in this
case; The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy; Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a child; The
birth certificate is evidence only of filiation of the child, but proof of filiation is necessary only when the
legitimacy of the child is being questioned; Birth certificate is merely prima facie evidence of the facts
contained therein; Rights of legitimate child vs illegitimate child; Gerardo cannot impose his surname on
Jose Gerardo; Gerardo cannot insist on visitation rights; Paramount interest of the child
Facts:
Gerardo B. Concepcion (petitioner) and Ma. Theresa Almonte (private respondent) were married on
were married on December 29, 1989. A year later, on December 8, 1990, the couple had a child named
Jose Gerardo.
In December 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground
of bigamy. He alleged that nine years before he married Ma. Theresa, or on December 10, 1980, she
had married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never annulled. Gerardo also found out that Mario
was still alive.
Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario when she was twenty years old. She, however, averred that
the marriage was a sham and that she never lived with Mario at all.
The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresa's marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting when she married
Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to be an
illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was
granted visitation rights.
Ma. Theresa moved for reconsideration to remove Gerardo's visitation rights. Gerardo opposed the
motion and insisted on his visitation rights and the retention of 'Concepcion' as Jose Gerardo's surname.
Applying the "best interest of the child" principle, the trial court denied Ma. Theresa's motion and affirmed
Gerardo's visitation rights.
Ma. Theresa elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA initially affirmed the lower court's
ruling. However, upon motion for reconsideration of Ma. Theresa, the CA reversed its earlier ruling and
held that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first
marriage. The CA reasoned that Ma. Theresa was legitimately married to Mario Gopiao when the child
Jose Gerardo was born on December 8, 1990. Therefore, the child - under the law - is the legitimate
child of the legal and subsisting marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario Gopiao. Therefore, Gerardo
can claim neither custody nor visitorial rights over the child Jose Gerardo. Further, [Gerardo] cannot
impose his name upon the child.
The CA brushed aside the common admission of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa that Jose Gerardo was their
son. It instead invoked Article 167 of the Family Code: "The child shall be considered legitimate although
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the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress."
Hence, this petition.
Held:
The legitimacy status and filiation of a child is determined by law and not by the parties
1. The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Article 164 of the Family Code is clear A
child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate.
2. As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family
Code provides: The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against
its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
Gerardo, not being the legal husband, has no standing to impugn the legitimacy of Jose Gerardo
3. Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1)(b)of the Family Code. He cannot. He has no standing in law to dispute
the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresa's husband Mario or, in a proper case, his heirs, who can
contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife. Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a
strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo
and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never became her husband and thus never
acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.
Presumption of legitimacy and how it may be rebutted
4. The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage, particularly during the
period of conception. To overthrow this presumption on the basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code,
it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access that could have enabled the
husband to father the child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not
disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary.
5. The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of physical impossibility
of coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately
preceded the birth of the child.
6. To rebut the presumption, the separation between the spouses must be such as to make marital
intimacy impossible. This may take place, for instance, when they reside in different countries or
provinces and they were never together during the period of conception. Or, the husband was in prison
during the period of conception, unless it appears that sexual union took place through the violation of
prison regulations.
Presumption of legitimacy was not rebutted in this case
7. Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living together in Fairview, Quezon City,
Mario was living in Loyola Heights which is also in Quezon City. Fairview and Loyola Heights are only a
scant four kilometers apart. Not only did both Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the same city but also
that no evidence at all was presented to disprove personal access between them. Considering these
circumstances, the separation between Ma. Theresa and her lawful husband, Mario, was certainly not
such as to make it physically impossible for them to engage in the marital act.
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8. Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the assumption should be
presented by him who asserts the contrary. There is no such evidence here. Thus, the presumption of
legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the issue of the marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario,
stands.
The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy
9. Gerardo relies on Ma. Theresa's statement in her answer to the petition for annulment of marriage that
she never lived with Mario. He claims this was an admission that there was never any sexual relation
between her and Mario, an admission that was binding on her.
10. First, the import of Ma. Theresa's statement is that Jose Gerardo is not her legitimate son with Mario
but her illegitimate son with Gerardo. This declaration - an avowal by the mother that her child is
illegitimate - is the very declaration that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. An assertion by
the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived
within a valid marriage.
11. Second, even assuming the truth of her statement, it does not mean that there was never an
instance where Ma. Theresa could have been together with Mario or that there occurred absolutely no
intercourse between them. All she said was that she never lived with Mario. She never claimed that
nothing ever happened between them. The fact is that both of them were living in Quezon City during the
time material to Jose Gerardo's conception and birth. Thus, the impossibility of physical access was
never established beyond reasonable doubt.
12. Third, to give credence to Ma. Theresa's statement is to allow her to arrogate unto herself a right
exclusively lodged in the husband, or in a proper case, his heirs. A mother has no right to disavow a
child because maternity is never uncertain. Hence, Ma. Theresa is not permitted by law to question Jose
Gerardo's legitimacy.
Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a child
13. Gerardo's insistence that the filiation of Jose Gerardo was never an issue both in the trial court and in
the appellate court does not hold water. The fact that both Ma. Theresa and Gerardo admitted and
agreed that Jose Gerardo was born to them was immaterial. That was, in effect, an agreement that the
child was illegitimate. If the Court were to validate that stipulation, then it would be tantamount to
allowing the mother to make a declaration against the legitimacy of her child and consenting to the denial
of filiation of the child by persons other than her husband. These are the very acts from which the law
seeks to shield the child.
14. Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a child. Otherwise,
the child will be at the mercy of those who may be so minded to exploit his defenselessness.
The birth certificate is evidence only of filiation of the child, but proof of filiation is necessary
only when the legitimacy of the child is being questioned
15. The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardo's birth certificate is misplaced. It has no evidentiary value
in this case because it was not offered in evidence before the trial court. The rule is that the court shall
not consider any evidence which has not been formally offered.
16. Moreover, the law itself establishes the status of a child from the moment of his birth. Although a
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record of birth or birth certificate may be used as primary evidence of the filiation of a child, as the status
of a child is determined by the law itself, proof of filiation is necessary only when the legitimacy of the
child is being questioned, or when the status of a child born after 300 days following the termination of
marriage is sought to be established. Here, the status of Jose Gerardo as a legitimate child was not
under attack as it could not be contested collaterally and, even then, only by the husband or, in
extraordinary cases, his heirs. Hence, the presentation of proof of legitimacy in this case was improper
and uncalled for.
Birth certificate is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein
17. In addition, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. As prima
facie evidence, the statements in the record of birth may be rebutted by more preponderant evidence. It
is not conclusive evidence with respect to the truthfulness of the statements made therein by the
interested parties. Between the certificate of birth which is prima facie evidence of Jose Gerardo's
illegitimacy and the quasi-conclusive presumption of law (rebuttable only by proof beyond reasonable
doubt) of his legitimacy, the latter shall prevail. Not only does it bear more weight, it is also more
conducive to the best interests of the child and in consonance with the purpose of the law.
Rights of legitimate child vs illegitimate child
18. It perplexes us why both Gerardo and Ma. Theresa would doggedly press for Jose Gerardo's
illegitimacy while claiming that they both had the child's interests at heart. The law, reason and common
sense dictate that a legitimate status is more favorable to the child. In the eyes of the law, the legitimate
child enjoys a preferred and superior status. He is entitled to bear the surnames of both his father and
mother, full support and full inheritance. On the other hand, an illegitimate child is bound to use the
surname and be under the parental authority only of his mother. He can claim support only from a more
limited group and his legitime is only half of that of his legitimate counterpart. Having only his best
interests in mind, we uphold the presumption of his legitimacy.
Gerardo cannot impose his surname on Jose Gerardo
19. As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the surnames of his father Mario and
mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on surnames. A person's
surname or family name identifies the family to which he belongs and is passed on from parent to child.
Hence, Gerardo cannot impose his surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes of the law, not related
to him in any way.
20. The matter of changing Jose Gerardo's name and effecting the corrections of the entries in the civil
register regarding his paternity and filiation should be threshed out in a separate proceeding.
Gerardo cannot insist on visitation rights
21. In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, Article 49 of the Family Code
grants visitation rights to a parent who is deprived of custody of his children. Such visitation rights flow
from the natural right of both parent and child to each other's company. There being no such parent-child
relationship between them, Gerardo has no legally demandable right to visit Jose Gerardo.
Paramount interest of the child
22. Our laws seek to promote the welfare of the child. Article 8 of PD 603, otherwise known as the Child
and Youth Welfare Code, is clear and unequivocal:
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Article 8. Child's Welfare Paramount. - In all questions regarding the care, custody, education and
property of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
23. Article 3 (1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the Philippines is a
signatory is similarly emphatic:
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the
child shall be a primary consideration.
24. The State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other
conditions prejudicial to their development. It is mandated to provide protection to those of tender years.
Through its laws, the State safeguards them from every one, even their own parents, to the end that their
eventual development as responsible citizens and members of society shall not be impeded, distracted
or impaired by family acrimony. This is especially significant where, as in this case, the issue concerns
their filiation as it strikes at their very identity and lineage.

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