To Protect and to Serve: Police Defamation

Suits Against California Citizens Who Report

Officer Misconduct
Lee S. Brenner and Hajir Ardebili

Police officers occupy a unique

position of trust in our society.
They are responsible for enforcing
the law and protecting society from
criminal acts. They are given the
authority to detain and to arrest
and, when necessary, use deadly
force. This authority ultimately rests
upon the communitys confidence
in the integrity of its police force.1

The twentieth anniversary of the

beating of motorist Rodney King by
a group of Los Angeles police officers
was observed on March3, 2011.2 The
grainy home video footage of the
incident, captured by an onlooker and
broadcast worldwide, brought the issue of police brutality to the forefront
of public consciousness.3 Two decades
later, confrontations between the
police and citizens remain a regular
fixture of American society.4 One
recent example is the fatal shooting
of Oscar Grant, an unarmed civilian,
by a Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART)
officer in Oakland, California, in the
early morning hours of New Years
Day in 2009.5 As the Grant case demonstrates, technological advances like
camera phones have made it possible
to record events as they happen and to
upload the recordings, almost instantaneously, to the Internet.6
Not all altercations between the
police and the public are captured on
video or reported by the media. To the
contrary, a significant number of complaints of excessive force, discourtesy,
bias, and other officer misconduct do
not garner the same national attention as the King and Grant cases. For
example, in Los Angeles County alone,
in the second quarter of 2010, citizens
Lee S. Brenner (lbrenner@whiteo.com) is
a partner and Hajir Ardebili (hardebili@
whiteo.com) is an associate in the Los Angeles office of Kelley Drye & Warren LLP.

filed 1,132 reports with the Los Angeles

Police Department (LAPD) concerning
alleged misconduct by LAPD employees.7 During that three-month period,
there were 595 allegations of unauthorized force and false imprisonment
and 104 allegations of biased policing,
including racial bias.8 These reports
are not formal lawsuits but are merely
allegations of misconduct that citizens
brought to the attention of LAPD.
LAPD investigated its own officers
and, in the vast majority of instances,
sided with the officers rather than the
citizens. For example, of the 595 allegations of unauthorized force and
false imprisonment, LAPD found that
only four of the citizen reports were
sustainable. Of the 104 allegations
of biased policing, LAPD sustained
none. These statistics do not reflect
an anomaly but are consistent with
the results over a three-year period.
Between 2008 and 2010, there were
a total of 694 allegations of unauthorized force, with only eleven of
those reports sustained (a rate of 1.6
percent).9 For that same period, only
eight of 570 reports of false imprisonment were sustained (or 1.4 percent).10
No reports of biased policing were
sustained between 2008 and 2010.11
Publicly, LAPD encourages citizens
to bring instances of officer misconduct to its attention. The LAPD official
website proclaims that Quality Service
Is Your Right, explaining that [i]n
order to continue to provide quality
service to the community, we need your
assistance. This is your Police Department and we welcome your comments.
We encourage you to let us know about
the quality of service you receive from
our employees.12 The LAPD website
also provides a link to a report form (in
seven different languages) that a citizen
may fill out and submit to LAPDs Internal Affairs department.13
Notwithstanding LAPDs public

statements, reporting citizens may

rightfully be pessimistic about the likelihood that misbehaving officers will
actually be disciplined, particularly
given the extremely low percentage of
sustained allegations.14 But they are
unaware of an even greater risk: the
possibility of being sued for defamation by the very officers against whom
they filed their reports. Citizens might
assume that their constitutional rights
of free speech would protect them
from being haled into court for filing a
misconduct report against an officer,15
but they would be wrong in California.
A California statute provides police
officers with a unique, police officer
specific avenue to sue citizens who file
reports of alleged police misconduct.16
Official Proceeding Privilege
Under 47(b)
Pursuant to 47(b) of the California
Civil Code, when a citizen contacts
law enforcement to make a report and
to instigate law enforcement personnel
to respond, the communication typically enjoys an unqualified privilege,
known as the official proceeding
privilege.17 Under this privilege, statements urging law enforcement personnel to investigate suspected violations
of law are absolutely privileged and
shielded from tort liability.18 A communication to an official agency which
is designed to prompt action is considered a part of an official proceeding
for purposes of Civil Code section
47,19 thereby creating an absolute
privilege for such proceedings.
The privilege established by 47(b)
is intended to assure utmost freedom
of communication between citizens
and public authorities whose responsibility is to investigate and remedy
wrongdoing.20 The idea behind the
absolute privilege is that [t]here must
be an open channel of communication
by which citizens can call attention to

Published in Communications Lawyer, Volume 28, Number 1, June 2011. 2011 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved. This information or any portion thereof may not be
copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.

suspected wrongdoing. That channel

would quickly close if its use subjected
the user to a risk of liability for libel.
... Thus the absolute privilege is essential.21 In accordance with this
principle, California has a policy of
encouraging reports concerning suspected misconduct or unfitness by law
enforcement officers.22
The privilege applies not only to
communications with official agencies
but also to statements made in judicial
proceedings, including testimony in
court and statements made in pleadings.23 The rationale for the privilege
in this context is to afford litigants
and witnesses . . . freedom of access
to the courts without fear of facing subsequent tort actions based on
their statements.24 In this regard, the
privilege encourages open channels
of communication and the presentation of evidence in judicial proceedings.25 As the California courts have
long recognized, [t]he importance of
unabashed input into investigations
outweighs the occasional harm which
may befall a defamed individual.26
Reports of Police Misconduct
Exempt from 47
Prior to the 1982 enactment of
California Civil Code 47.5, a citizen
report of police misconduct was absolutely privileged under 47.27 With the
enactment of 47.5, however, the California Legislature expressly created a
statutory exception to the official proceedings privilege for reports of police
misconduct. Section 47.5 permits a
police officer to bring an action for
defamation against an individual who
has filed a complaint with that officers
employing agency alleging misconduct, criminal conduct, or incompetence, if that complaint is false, the
complaint was made with knowledge
that it was false and that it was made
with spite, hatred, or ill will.28
Accordingly, for a complainant
to be liable for defamation under
47.5, an officer must establish all
of the following: (1) one has filed a
report with that officers employing
agency alleging misconduct, criminal conduct, or incompetence; (2)
the report is false; (3) the report was
made with knowledge that it was
false; and (4) the report was made
with spite, hatred, or ill will.29

At first blush, it might appear that

the prerequisites for a claim under
47.5 establish a high bar for liability.
Moreover, general principles of defamation law would seem to make it difficult for an officer to prevail on a defamation claim. For instance, generally,
public figures such as police officers
cannot recover damages for defamation
unless they prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant made
the allegedly defamatory statement
with knowledge of its falsity or with
serious doubts about the truth of the
statement.30 Moreover, in order for the
complainant to avoid liability, it is not
necessary that every word of the complaint be literally true. In this regard, a
plaintiff has not proven falsity so long
as the statement appears substantially
true.31 As the U.S. Supreme Court has
acknowledged, [m]inor inaccuracies
do not amount to falsity so long as the
substance, the gist, the sting, of the
libelous charge be justified.32
In theory, the foregoing principles
may provide some protection to a
complainant defending against an officer suit under 47.5. As a practical
matter, however, the prospect of squaring off against an officer in court will
likely deter citizens from filing a report
against a California police officer in
the first place. Making matters worse,
the police officer may file a complaint
against the citizen in small claims
court, in which case the citizen is not
entitled to a jury trial33 and cannot be
represented by a lawyer at the trial.34
At that small claims trial, it will be the
citizens word against the sworn testimony of a police officer, who generally
has much more experience testifying
in court, and possibly exercise more
sway with the judge, than the average
citizen. An award of damages in the
officers favor, and against the citizen
who filed the police report, is therefore
a startlingly real possibility. Moreover,
a citizen against whom an officer prevails and obtains a judgment in small
claims court has no recourse because
the judgment of the superior court in
a small claims action is generally final
and cannot be appealed to the California Court of Appeal.35
At the trial level, even if the officer has difficulty proving that he
sustained any economic injury as a
result of a false citizen complaint (the
vast majority of citizen allegations are

categorically rejected by LAPD),36 the

citizen may still have to pay the officer
damages, such as emotional damages.
Constitutional Challenges
The values of freedom of communication and accountability on which
the official proceedings privilege is
founded inevitably raise questions
about the constitutionality of the
carve-out for police officers under
47.5. Federal and state courts in
California, however, have reached
inconsistent conclusions about the
constitutionality of the law, the status
of which remains unsettled.

Publicly, LAPD
encourages citizens
to bring instances of
officer misconduct
to its attention.
California: Walker and Loshonkohl
The California Court of Appeal, the
states intermediate appellate court,
has reached conflicting conclusions regarding the constitutionality of 47.5,
with the most recent decision holding
that the law is valid.
In its 2001 decision in Walker v.
Kiousis, the court held that section47.5 impermissibly regulates
speech based on [its] content . . . and
therefore violates the constitutional
right of free speech.37 The Walker
courts opinion was based on the notion that 47.5 treat[s] citizen complaints against police officers differently from complaints against all other
government officers.38 The court also
noted that 47.5 discriminates based
on viewpoint because it makes actionable only a defamatory complaint
against a police officer rather than
applying the exception to all defamatory statements made in an official
investigation of alleged police misconduct (whether made by the complainant, officer, or other witness).39
The Walker court also found that
the content-based discrimination created by 47.5 was not supported by
a compelling governmental interest
for the same reason that the privilege

Published in Communications Lawyer, Volume 28, Number 1, June 2011. 2011 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved. This information or any portion thereof may not be
copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.

under 47(b) exists in the first instance, i.e., that providing citizens
open access to the government to
report illegal activity outweighs the
occasional harm sustained by one who
is defamed.40 Based on these findings,
the court concluded that section 47.5
is unconstitutional on its face.41
Notwithstanding the intuitive logic
of the Walker courts reasoning, in
2003 a different division of the appellate court reached the opposite
conclusion in Loshonkohl v. Kinder.42
Loshonkohl held that 47.5 does not
violate the First Amendment because
the nature of the content-based discrimination does not present a realistic
possibility of the official suppression
of ideas.43 The Loshonkohl court focused on the scienter requirement of
47.5, reasoning that the law does
not suppress all complaints of police
misconduct but only those complaints
that are knowingly false.44 In this
regard, the Loshonkohl court relied
on the California Supreme Courts
decision in People v. Stanistreet.45
Stanistreet, which was decided a year
after Walker, upheld the constitutionality of a California Penal Code
statute that makes it a misdemeanor
to file a knowingly false allegation of
misconduct against a peace officer.46
The Stanistreet courts holding was
similarly based on the idea that only
knowingly false complaints would be
suppressed under the statute at issue.47
As for the Walker courts observation that 47.5 discriminates based on
viewpoint by making actionable only
complaints against police officers, the
Loshonkohl court summarily disposed
of the concern, finding that [i]t was
entirely reasonable for the Legislature
to make a policy judgment that only
formal complaints against peace officers should be exempted from the
absolute litigation privilege of section
47(b).48 Thus, the court concluded
that 47.5 is constitutional.49
Accordingly, California state courts
appear likely to uphold the constitutionality of 47.5, given the California
Supreme Courts decision in Stanistreet to uphold the constitutionality of
a similar statute and the Loshkonkohl
decision.
Federal: 47.5 Not Resolved
After the trial court decision in Walker,
a federal district court in California

held in Gritchen v. Collier that 47.5

is unconstitutional on its face because
it violates the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.50 The Gritchen courts
conclusion was based on the same
reasoning as Walker: by treating citizen complaints against police officers
differently from complaints against all
other government officers, 47.5 makes
an impermissible content-based discrimination against a type of speech.51
In Haddad v. Wall, another California
federal district court likewise held that
47.5 is an unconstitutional contentbased restriction on speech.52 In Haddad, the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of Californiaheld that
47.5 impermissibly discriminates on
the basis of the content of the speech
which it purports to regulate, and thus
facially violates the First Amendment
as incorporated in the Fourteenth
Amendment.53
Ultimately, however, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district courts decision in
Gritchen, finding that the police officer was not acting under color of
state law in threatening to sue [the
complaining citizen] for defamation
under 47.5.54 Based on that finding,
the Ninth Circuit held that there was
no federal jurisdiction and did not
reach the question of whether 47.5 is
constitutional.55 Haddad met a similar
fate: the Ninth Circuit vacated the
district courts order and its finding
that 47.5 is unconstitutional, once
again on the basis that there was no
federal subject matter jurisdiction.56
Thus, to date, the Ninth Circuit has
not reached any conclusion regarding
the constitutionality of 47.5.
A Frightening Proposition
A fair number of citizens, including
lawyers, probably would be surprised
to learn that they could be sued for filing a police report, particularly when
the police department expressly invites
them to file reports and even provides
a form, in seven languages no less, to
do so. But as long as 47.5 remains
on the books (where it remains now,
unchallenged), citizens who believe
that they have been mistreated by the
police would be advised to consider
the implications of filing a report
against an officer. They should know
that filing a report subjects them to
the possibility of being named in a

defamation lawsuit by that officer.

They also should be aware that they
may have to face that officer as the
defendant in a small claims court
action, where they have no right to
be represented by a lawyer in the trial
and have virtually no right to appeal
an unfavorable decision. The bottom
line? Citizens should know that they
are putting their rights and money at
stake when they file a police misconduct report in California.
The suggestion that citizens would
be prudent to remain silent in the face
of police misconduct is antithetical
to the First Amendment as well as
to policy considerations supporting
the filing of misconduct complaints.
Nevertheless, the risk of being the
target of an officers lawsuit as a result
of filing a complaint is a genuine one
that a prospective complainant must
weigh against the benefits of reporting the misconduct. The complainant
also must consider the strong likelihood that the officer against whom
the complaint is filed will not face discipline in any event. No matter how
right they may be, citizens stand the
risk of getting sued for defamation,
losing, and having to pay damages to
the police officer.
If a report against a police officer is
filed, complainants should be certain
that none of the statements in the complaint could be proven false. It would
be wise to state the supporting facts in
a manner that is succinct and devoid of
unnecessary elaboration or inflammatory rhetoric rather than risk being accused of recounting events inaccurately
or displaying spite or ill will toward
the officer. The complainant should
attempt to compile as much supporting evidence as possible, e.g., witness
statements, photographs, or video.
Many police officers regularly make
audio recordings of their interactions
with the public during traffic stops, and
thus the officer will almost certainly
have some evidence regarding the matters described in the complaint. If
interviewed by the police in connection
with their report of officer misconduct,
the citizen should be aware that the
ostensibly neutral interviewer may be
a friend or work colleague of the allegedly offending officer.
The complainant should also
understand that the complaint will
be very closely scrutinized, with the

Published in Communications Lawyer, Volume 28, Number 1, June 2011. 2011 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved. This information or any portion thereof may not be
copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.

veracity of each statement carefully

considered and compared to every
other statement in an effort to ferret
out any falsities. One should acknowledge that a judge might assume that
the officer is telling the truth (particularly a judge who interacts with the
police on a regular basis). Further,
once the fact finder concludes that a
statement in the complaint is untruthful, it will be even more difficult for
the complainant to maintain credibility vis--vis the officer against whom
the complaint was filed.
Further, in many cases, the citizen
reporter will have to account for the
actions that may have triggered the
officers alleged misconduct. Assume,
for example, that an officer allegedly used excessive force in response
to a complainant resisting arrest. If
the judge or jury determines that the
complainant has an incentive to exaggerate or lie or that the complaint
against the officer is retaliatory, then
it may be easy to conclude that any
false statements in the complaint were
made with knowledge of their falsity
and with malice against the officer.
Particularly in light of the realistic
possibility that the complainant will
ultimately have to pay damages to the
officer, filing a report of police misconduct may seem a fools errand.
Notably, a citizen who files a formal
lawsuit against a police officer for the
same alleged misconduct has more
protection than the same citizen who
files a police report. Filing a lawsuit
offers the protections of the litigation privilege under 47(b), thereby
precluding an officer from relying on
statements made in the litigation as
a basis for liability against the victim
of the alleged misconduct in a later
defamation action. Accordingly, under California law, a citizen who files
a lawsuit against a police officer has
greater rights and protections than a
person who puts the exact same allegations in a misconduct report.57
This nonsensical result is precisely the
absurdity created by 47.5 of the California Civil Code.
Conclusion
In California, citizen reports urging
law enforcement personnel to investigate suspected violations of law
are privileged and shielded from tort
liability, unless those reports concern

alleged misconduct by the police officers themselves. This reality in California makes no sense and ignores the
public policy considerations underlying the official proceedings privilege. Is
the need for utmost freedom of communication between citizens and public authorities whose responsibility is
to investigate and remedy wrongdoing
somehow less when it is a police officer
who commits the malfeasance? Is the
fact that such channel of communication will quickly close if a citizen is
subject to risk of liability for libel for
reporting misconduct somehow immaterial when it is the police themselves
who are committing misconduct? Why
is Californias policy of encouraging
reports concerning suspected misconduct or unfitness by law enforcement
officers being ignored? As it stands
today, the law in California is that the
importance of unabashed input into
investigations outweighs the occasional
harm which may befall a defamed individual,58 unless that allegedly defamed
individual is a police officer.
Endnotes
1. Shaddox v. Bertani, 110 Cal. App.
4th 1406, 1416 (2003).
2. Joel Rubin, Andrew Blankstein &
Scott Gold, Twenty Years After the Beating
of Rodney King, the LAPD Is a Changed
Operation, L.A. Times, Mar.3, 2011,
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/03/
local/la-me-king-video-20110301.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.; see also Matthew B. Stannard & Demian Bulwa, BART Shooting
Captured on Video, SFGate.com, Jan.7,
2009, http://articles.sfgate.com/2009-01-07/
news/17199495_1_videos-use-of-forceexperts-officer-johannes-mehserle.
6. Rubin et al., supra note 2.
7. L.A. Police Dept, Discipline Report
for Quarter 2, at 2 (2010), www.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/QDR_2ND_QTR_2010_
FINAL.pdf.
8. Id. at 4.
9. Id. at 16.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Official Website of the Los
Angeles Police Department, www.
lapdonline.org/our_communities/
content_basic_view/9217.
13. Id.
14. See L.A. Police Dept, supra
note 7, at 4.

15. People v. Quiroga, 16 Cal. App. 4th

961, 966 (1993) (The appellant possessed
the right under the First Amendment to
dispute [the officers] actions. The First
Amendment protects a significant amount
of verbal criticism and challenge directed
at police officers. ... Indeed, the freedom
of individuals verbally to oppose or challenge police action without thereby risking
arrest is one of the principal characteristics by which we distinguish a free nation
from a police state. While the police may
resent having abusive language directed at
them, they may not exercise the awesome
power at their disposal to punish individuals for conduct that is not merely lawful,
but protected by the First Amendment.
(citing Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461
(1987); Duran v. City of Douglas, Ariz.,
904 F.2d 1372, 1378 (9th Cir. 1990)).
16. See Cal. Civ. Code 47.5.
17. Cal. Civ. Code 47(b); Hagberg v.
Cal. Fed. Bank FSB, 32 Cal. 4th 350, 364
(Cal. 2004); Walker v. Kiousis, 93 Cal.
App. 4th 1432, 1439 (2001) (investigation
of citizen complaint against law enforcement officer is official proceeding authorized by law for purposes of California
Civil Code 47(b)); Williams v. Taylor, 129
Cal. App. 3d 745, 75354 (1982) (absolute
privilege applies for statements made to local police department); Chabak v. Monroy,
154 Cal. App. 4th 1502, 151314 (2007)
(even allegedly false reports to police are
absolutely protected and privileged under
California Civil Code 47(b)).
18. Hagberg, 32 Cal. 4th at 364.
19. Id. at 370; Shaddox v. Bertani, 110
Cal. App. 4th 1406, 140809 (2003) (finding that a person enjoys absolute statutory immunity under section47, subdivision(b)(3) from making a communication,
which leads to an official investigation of a
police officers conduct or competence).
20. Hagberg, 32 Cal. 4th at 360.
21. Id. at 36465.
22. Shaddox, 110 Cal. App. 4th at 1412.
23. See Hagberg, 32 Cal. 4th at 361.
24. Silberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal. 3d 205,
213 (Cal. 1990) (internal citations omitted).
25. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 189 Cal. App. 3d 961, 970
(1987).
26. Long v. Pinto, 126 Cal. App. 3d 946,
94950 (1981); see also Silberg, 50 Cal. 3d
at 21314; Tiedemann v. Superior Court,
83 Cal. App. 3d 918, 92526 (1978).
27. Imig v. Ferrar, 70 Cal. App. 3d 48,
5457 (1977).
28. Cal. Civ. Code 47.5.
29. Cal. Civ. Code 47.5; Hagberg, 32

Published in Communications Lawyer, Volume 28, Number 1, June 2011. 2011 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved. This information or any portion thereof may not be
copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.

Cal. 4th at 370.

30. Khawar v. Globe Intl, Inc., 19 Cal.
4th 254, 279 (Cal. 1998).
31. Vogel v. Felice, 127 Cal. App. 4th
1006, 1021 (2005) (emphasis in original).
32. Id. at 1021 (quoting Masson v. New
Yorker Mag., Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 51617
(1991)).
33. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 116.770(b).
34. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 116.530(a),
116.540(a). A litigant in small claims court
is permitted, however, to be represented by
an attorney at a de novo trial of the small
claims case (i.e., on appeal of the judgment
to the superior court). Cal. Civ. Proc. Code
116.770(c).
35. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 116.780(a).
Although a defendant may obtain appellate review by extraordinary writ, an
appellate court will not entertain a writ
petition merely to consider a claim that the
superior court judge erred. Linton v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. App. 4th 1097, 1099 n.2
(1997); Pitzen v. Superior Court, 120 Cal.
App. 4th 1374, 1379 (2004).
36. Citizen complaints that are deemed

unfounded are removed from an officers

general personnel file. Cal. Penal Code
832.5(c) (Complaints by members of the
public that are determined ... to be frivolous ... or unfounded or exonerated ...
shall not be maintained in that officers general personnel file.). The California Penal
Code further provides that unfounded complaints generally may not be used for punitive or promotional purposes. Cal. Penal
Code 832(c)(2). Accordingly, a plaintiff
officer suing under 47.5 may not be able
to demonstrate that he suffered economic
harm as a result of a false complaint.
37. Walker v. Kiousis, 93 Cal. App. 4th
1432, 1437 (2001).
38. Id. at 144849 (quoting Gritchen
v. Collier, 73 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1153 (C.D.
Cal. 1999).
39. Id. at 1449 (emphasis in original).
40. Id. at 1455 (quoting Imig v. Ferrar,
70 Cal. App. 3d 48, 56 (1977)).
41. Id. at 1457.
42. 109 Cal. App. 4th 510 (2003), rehg
denied, 2003 Cal. App. LEXIS 1052 (2003),
rev. denied, 2003 Cal. LEXIS 6531 (Cal.

2003), cert denied, 541 U.S. 938 (2004).

43. Id. at 518.
44. Id. at 51718.
45. 29 Cal. 4th 497 (Cal. 2002).
46. Id. at 501.
47. Id. at 50910.
48. Loshonkohl, 109 Cal. App. 4th at 518.
49. Id.
50. 73 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1153 (C.D.
Cal. 1999).
51. Id.
52. Haddad v. Wall, 107 F. Supp. 2d
1230, 123839 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
53. Id. at 1238.
54. Gritchen v. Collier, 254 F.3d 807,
814 (9th Cir. 2001).
55. Id.
56. Haddad v. Wall, 48 F. Appx 279
(9th Cir. 2002).
57. Cal. Civ. Code 47(b); see Hagberg
v. Cal. Fed. Bank FSB, 32 Cal. 4th 350,
361 (Cal. 2004); Silberg v. Anderson, 50
Cal. 3d 205 (Cal. 1990).
58. Long v. Pinto, 126 Cal. App. 3d 946
(1981) (citing King v. Borges, 28 Cal. App.
3d 27, 34 (1972)).

Published in Communications Lawyer, Volume 28, Number 1, June 2011. 2011 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved. This information or any portion thereof may not be
copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.