Notas: Teora de Juegos

Jose Jaime Paredes Peralta

12 de septiembre de 2016
1.

set of players i = {1, 2, . . . , n}.

Strategy

Strategy spaces for the players S1 , S2 , . . . , Sn .

Definition A complete contingent plan for a player in the

game.

Payoff functions: u1 , u2 , . . . , un .
i Si , where Si is the set of probability
distributions over the strategies of all players except
player i.

Si Strategy space: set composing each of the strategies

of player i in the game.
S Vector of strategies, one for each player.
4.

S = S1 S2 Sn

Definition A belief of player i is a probability distribution

over the strategies of the other players. Such a probability
is denoted i .

Si strategy profile foer everyone except player i.

2.

Beliefs

Payoff function

Properties
Definition
ui : S R s S

3.

i 0
X

i (si ) = 1

A function whose domain is the set of sstrategy profiles and

whose range is the real numbers so that, for each strategy
profile s S that the players could choose, ui (s) is players
is payoff in the game.
5.

Mixed Strategy

Normal form

selecting a strategy according to a probability distribution.

A complete normal form description includes:

Generix mixed strategy for a player i is i Si .

1

si Si

6.

Expected Payoff

9.

A pure strategy si is strictly dominated if there is a strategy (pure or mixed) i Si such that

When player i has a belief i about the other players

strategies and plans to select si

ui (i , si ) > ui (si , si ) si Si

The expected payoff is the weighted average that he would

get if she played si and the other players play i :
X

ui (si , i ) =

of the other player.

i (si )ui (si , si )

10.

siSi

7.

Dominance

Best Response
Suppose player i has a belief i Si about the strategies played by the other players. Player is strategy si Si
is a best response if

Rationality

ui (si , i ) ui (s0i , i ) si Si

Definition If a players action will determine which of

several outcomes will occur in a game, then this player
will select the action that leads to the outcome he most
prefers.

, and is denoted BRi (i ).

11.

Weak Dominance

Informal Def A player plays to maximize his payoff.

A mixed startegy i weakly dominates pure strategy si if
8.

ui (i , si ) ui (si , si ) si Si

Common Knowledge

and ui (, si ) > ui (si , s0i ) for at least one strategy s0i

Si .

Definition A particular fact F is said to be common knowledge between players if:

Each player knows F.

12.

Each player knows that each other player knows that

each other player knows F.
Players have a shared understanding of the entire game.
Common knowledge doesnt give any information of where
a player is in the extensive form.
2

Rationalizable Strategies