Art.

46
Orlando Villanueva v. Court of Appeals and Lilia CanalitaVillanueva (October 27, 2006)
Art. 48
Florence Malcampo-Sin v. Philipp Sin, G.R. No. 137590 (March 26,
2001)
Estrellita Juliajvo-Llave v. Republic, Haja Putri Zorayda Tamano
and Adib Ahmad Tamano, G. R. No. 169766 (March 30, 2011)

FIRST DIVISION

ORLANDO VILLANUEVA, G.R. No. 132955

Petitioner,
Present:
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
LILIA CANALITA-VILLANUEVA Promulgated:
Respondents.
October 27, 2006
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the
January 26, 1998 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832,
affirming with modification the Decision [2] dated January 12, 1996 of the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172 in Civil Case No.
3997-V-92 (a) dismissing petitioner's petition for the annulment of his
marriage to private respondent and (b) ordering him to pay moral and
exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs. Also assailed is the March 5,
1998 Resolution[3] denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva
got married on April 13, 1988 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. On November 17,
1992, Orlando filed with the trial court a petition for annulment of his
marriage alleging that threats of violence and duress forced him into
marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did not get her pregnant
prior to the marriage; that he never cohabited with her after the marriage;
and that he later learned that private respondent's child died during delivery
on August 29, 1988.[4]
In her answer with compulsory counterclaim, [5] Lilia prayed for the dismissal
of the petition, arguing that petitioner freely and voluntarily married her; that
petitioner stayed with her in Palawan for almost a month after their

marriage; that petitioner wrote letters to her after he returned to Manila,

during which private respondent visited him personally; and that petitioner
knew about the progress of her pregnancy, which ended in their son being
born prematurely. Private respondent also prayed for the payment of moral
and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs.
On January 12, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Dismissing the above-entitled case; and
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant moral damages
in the amount of P100,000.00, exemplary damages in the
amount of P50,000.00, and attorney's fees in the amount of
P20,000.00, plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[6]
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts dismissal of the petition and
the award of attorneys fees and costs, but reduced the award of moral and
exemplary damages to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively. The Court
of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, hence, the instant
petition for review based on the following assigned errors:
I. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN NOT GRANTING THE ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE THE
CONSENT OF THE PETITIONER HAVING BEEN OBTAINED BY FRAUD,
INTIMIDATION AND UNDUE AND IMPROPER PRESSURE AND INFLUENCE PLUS
THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NO COHABITATION WHATSOEVER BETWEEN
PETITIONER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
II. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS ERROR
IN AWARDING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AS WELL AS
ATTORNEY'S FEES, SAID AWARDS NOT BEING THOSE ALLOWED BY
LAW.[7]
The issues for resolution are (a) whether the subject marriage may be
annulled on the ground of vitiated consent; and (b) whether petitioner should
be liable for moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees and
costs.
The petition is partly granted.
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with those

of the trial court, as in the instant case, are generally binding on this Court. [8]
We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner freely and
voluntarily married private respondent and that no threats or intimidation,
duress or violence compelled him to do so, thus
To begin with, We are at once disturbed by the circumstance that despite the
alleged coerced consent which supposedly characterized his marriage with
Lilia on April 13, 1988, it was only on November 17, 1992 or after a span of
not less than four (4) years and eight (8) months when Orlando took serious
step to have the same marriage annulled. Unexplained, the prolonged
inaction evidently finds basis in Lilias allegation that this annulment suit was
filed by Orlando solely in the hope that a favorable judgment thereon would
bolster his defense, if not altogether bring about his acquittal in the criminal
case for bigamy which was then already pending against him. Unfortunately,
however, let alone the fact that the criminal case was admittedly decided
ahead with a judgment of conviction against Orlando x x x even the very
outcome of the present case disappointed his expectation. At this late, with
his appeal in the bigamy case still pending with this Court x x x Orlando must
be hoping against hope that with a decree of annulment ensuing from this
Court, he may yet secure an acquittal in the same bigamy charge. Viewed in
this perspective, the instant appeal is, therefore, understandable.
But even in terms of merit, the recourse must have to fall.
Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on
the ground that he did not freely consent to be married to the
appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a
reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger
to his life and safety, to wit: the harassing phone calls from the
appellee and strangers as well as the unwanted visits by three men
at the premises of the University of the East after his classes thereat,
and the threatening presence of a certain Ka Celso, a supposed
member of the New Peoples Army whom appellant claimed to have
been hired by appellee and who accompanied him in going to her
home province of Palawan to marry her.
The Court is not convinced that appellants apprehension of danger to
his person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter
voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the
time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security
guard in a bank. Given his employment at that time, it is reasonable
to assume that appellant knew the rudiments of self-defense, or, at
the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harms way. For
sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed made to bear upon
appellant, what with the fact that he never sought the assistance of
the security personnel of his school nor the police regarding the

activities of those who were threatening him. And neither did he

inform the judge about his predicament prior to solemnizing their
marriage.
Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made
to believe by appellee that the latter was pregnant with his child
when they were married. Appellants excuse that he could not have
impregnated the appellee because he did not have an erection during
their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at worst. The
complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate with
the appellee. His counsel also conceded before the lower court that
his client had a sexual relationship with the appellee x x x. He also
narrated x x x that sometime in January 1988, he and the appellee
went to a hotel where the sexual act was consummated, with the
defendant on top x x x.
Instead of providing proofs that he was tricked into marrying his wife,
appellant resorted to undermining the credibility of the latter by
citing her testimony that her child was born, and died, on August 29,
1989, a year off from August 29, 1988, the date of fetal death as
appearing in the registry of deaths of the Office of the Civil Registrar
of Puerto Princesa City x x x.
To Our mind, appellant cannot make capital of the lapse because it is
inconsequential, as there is no controversy regarding the date of
death of appellees fetus. Nevertheless, during the continuation of the
cross-examination of the appellee, she declared that her child was
prematurely born on August 29, 1988, matching the date in the
certification of the Civil Registrar x x x. The Court is not prepared to
disbelieve the appellee and throw overboard her entire testimony
simply on account of her confusion as to the exact date of the death
of the fetus, especially when she herself had presented documentary
evidence that put August 29, 1988 as the date her fetus died.
Appellants propensity to rely on his perceived weakness of the
appellees evidence continues in his argument that if indeed there is
truth to her claim that she was impregnated sometime in December
1987, then she could not have a premature delivery on August 29,
1988, as she had testified during the trial, because the 35-week
period of pregnancy is complete by that time. Whether the appellees
impression that she had delivered prematurely is correct or not will
not affect the fact that she had delivered a fetus on August 29, 1988.
In the light of appellants admission that he had a sexual intercourse
with his wife in January 1988, and his failure to attribute the latters
pregnancy to any other man, appellant cannot complain that he was
deceived by the appellee into marrying her.

Appellant also puts in issue the lower courts appreciation of the

letters allegedly written by him to the appellee. During his crossexamination, when confronted with thirteen (13) letters, appellant
identified the seven (7) letters that he sent to the appellee, but
denied the remaining six (6) x x x. The letters admitted by the
appellant contained expressions of love and concern for his wife, and
hardly the rantings of a man under duress. During the re-direct
examination, however, appellant suddenly changed mind and denied
authorship of those seven (7) letters, claiming that he was forced to
admit them because he was threatened with harm by the appellee. If
he was laboring under duress when he made the admission, where
did he find the temerity to deny his involvement with the remaining
six (6) letters? The recantation can only be motivated by a hindsight
realization by the appellant of the evidentiary weight of those letters
against his case.
As to the second assignment of error, appellant cannot claim that his
marriage should be annulled due to the absence of cohabitation
between him and his wife. Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a
ground to annul a marriage. Otherwise, the validity of a marriage will
depend upon the will of the spouses who can terminate the marital
union by refusing to cohabitate. The failure to cohabit becomes
relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the
grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent,
insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the
appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on
any of those grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld.[9]
We also agree that private respondent is entitled to attorneys fees. Article
2208 (11) of the Civil Code provides that attorneys may be awarded where
the court deems it just and equitable under the circumstances, as in the
instant case.
We, however, delete the award of moral and exemplary damages for lack of
factual and legal basis. There is nothing in the records or in the appealed
decision that would support an award of moral damages. In justifying the
award, the Court of Appeals merely said thus:
It is not difficult to imagine the suffering of the appellee from the baseless
portrayal of her by the appellant as the perpetrator of fraudulent schemes to
trap an unwilling mate. x x x[10]
However, the aforesaid finding is only a supposition as it has no reference to
any testimony of private respondent detailing her alleged physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded

feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury as would entitle
her to moral damages.
In Mahinay v. Velasquez, Jr.,[11] we held that:
In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be
pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the
like. While respondent alleged in his complaint that he suffered
mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and moral shock,
he failed to prove them during the trial. Indeed, respondent should
have taken the witness stand and should have testified on the mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and other emotional and
mental suffering he purportedly suffered to sustain his claim for
moral damages. Mere allegations do not suffice; they must be
substantiated by clear and convincing proof. No other person
could have proven such damages except the respondent himself as
they were extremely personal to him.
As private respondent is not entitled to moral damages, a fortiori, she is not
entitled to exemplary damages. This is clear in Article 2234 of the Civil Code,
which provides:
ART. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved,
the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or
compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of
whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. In case liquidated
damages have been agreed upon, although no proof of loss is necessary in
order that such liquidated damages may be recovered, nevertheless, before
the court may consider the question of granting exemplary in addition to the
liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show that he would be entitled to
moral, temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the stipulation
for liquidated damages.
Hence, exemplary damages is allowed only in addition to moral damages
such that no exemplary damages can be awarded unless the claimant first
establishes his clear right to moral damages. [12] In the instant case, private
respondent failed to satisfactorily establish her claim for moral damages,
thus she is not likewise entitled to exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The January 26, 1998
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832 affirming with
modification the January 12, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 dismissing
petitioners petition for the annulment of his marriage with private
respondent, is AFFIRMED. However, the award of moral and exemplary
damages is DELETED for lack of basis.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137590. March 26, 2001]
FLORENCE MALCAMPO-SIN, petitioner, vs. PHILIPP T. SIN,
respondent.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Family Code emphasizes the permanent nature of marriage, hailing it as
the foundation of the family.[1] It is this inviolability which is central to our
traditional and religious concepts of morality and provides the very bedrock
on which our society finds stability. [2] Marriage is immutable and when both
spouses give their consent to enter it, their consent becomes irrevocable,
unchanged even by their independent wills.
However, this inviolability depends on whether the marriage exists and is
valid. If it is void ab initio, the permanence of the union becomes irrelevant,
and the Court can step in to declare it so. Article 36 of the Family Code is the

justification.[3] Where it applies and is duly proven, a judicial declaration can

free the parties from the rights, obligations, burdens and consequences
stemming from their marriage.
A declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code
requires the application of procedural and substantive guidelines. While
compliance with these requirements mostly devolves upon petitioner, the
State is likewise mandated to actively intervene in the procedure. Should
there be non-compliance by the State with its statutory duty, there is a need
to remand the case to the lower court for proper trial.
The Case

[4]

What is before the Court is an appeal from a decision of the Court of

Appeals[5] which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 158,
Pasig City[6] dismissing petitioner Florence Malcampo-Sins (hereafter
Florence) petition for declaration of nullity of marriage due to psychological
incapacity for insufficiency of evidence.
The Facts

On January 4, 1987, after a two-year courtship and engagement, Florence

and respondent Philipp T. Sin (hereafter Philipp), a Portugese citizen, were
married at St. Jude Catholic Parish in San Miguel, Manila.[7]
On September 20, 1994, Florence filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
158, Pasig City, a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage against
Philipp.[8] Trial ensued and the parties presented their respective
documentary and testimonial evidence.
On June 16, 1995, the trial court dismissed Florences petition.[9]
On December 19, 1995, Florence filed with the trial court a notice of appeal
to the Court of Appeals.[10]
After due proceedings, on April 30, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated
its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Appeal is DISMISSED. The
Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Cost against the Appellant.[11]
On June 23, 1998, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for
reconsideration of the aforequoted decision.[12]
On January 19, 1999, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.[13]
Hence, this appeal.[14]
The Courts Ruling

We note that throughout the trial in the lower court, the State did not
participate in the proceedings. While Fiscal Jose Danilo C. Jabson [15] filed with
the trial court a manifestation dated November 16, 1994, stating that he
found no collusion between the parties, [16] he did not actively participate
therein. Other than entering his appearance at certain hearings of the case,
nothing more was heard from him. Neither did the presiding Judge take any
step to encourage the fiscal to contribute to the proceedings.
The Family Code mandates:
Article 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to

it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between

the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed
(underscoring ours).
In the cases referred to in the preceeding paragraph, no judgment shall be
based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
It can be argued that since the lower court dismissed the petition, the evil
sought to be prevented (i.e., dissolution of the marriage) did not come about,
hence, the lack of participation of the State was cured. Not so. The task of
protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and
zealous participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of
marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and
genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well. This is made clear
by the following pronouncement:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision,[17] briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the petition. The SolicitorGeneral shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095 (underscoring ours).[18]
The records are bereft of any evidence that the State participated in the
prosecution of the case not just at the trial level but on appeal with the Court
of Appeals as well. Other than the manifestation filed with the trial court on
November 16, 1994, the State did not file any pleading, motion or position
paper, at any stage of the proceedings.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Erlinda Matias Dagdag,[19] while we upheld
the validity of the marriage, we nevertheless characterized the decision of
the trial court as prematurely rendered since the investigating prosecutor
was not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence before the
judgment was rendered. This stresses the importance of the participation of
the State.
Having so ruled, we decline to rule on the factual disputes of the case, this
being within the province of the trial court upon proper re-trial.
Obiter Dictum

For purposes of re-trial, we guide the parties thus: In Republic vs. Court of
Appeals,[20] the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of
the Family Code are as follows (omitting guideline (8) in the enumeration as
it was already earlier quoted):
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity
of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It
decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected

by the state. The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage
and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a) medically or
clinically identified, b) alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by
experts and d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological-not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically (sic) ill to such an extent that the person could not have known
the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified
as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their I dos. The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence,
a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less
ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,

should be given great respect by our courts.

The Fallo

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the appealed decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CV No. 51304, promulgated on April 30,
1998 and the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City in
Civil Case No. 3190, dated June 16, 1995.
Let the case be REMANDED to the trial court for proper trial.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[G. R. No. 169766, March 30 : 2011]
ESTRELLITA JULIAJVO-LLAVE, PETITIONER, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO AND ADIB AHMAD A.
TAMANO, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A new law ought to affect the future, not what is past. Hence, in the
case of subsequent marriage laws, no vested rights shall be impaired that
pertain to the protection of the legitimate union of a married couple.
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision [1] dated
August 17, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR. CVNo. 61762 and its
subsequent Resolution[2] dated September 13, 2005, which affirmed the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring
petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llave's (Estrellita) marriage to Sen. Mamintal AJ.
Tamano (Sen. Tainano) as void ab initio.
Factual Antecedents
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita
twice -initially under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in
Cotabato City[3] and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an
RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993. [4] In their marriage
contracts, Sen. Tamano's civil status was indicated as 'divorced.'
Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as
Sen. Tamano's wife, and upon his death, his widow.
On November 23,1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano
(Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and
in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano's legitimate children with Zorayda, [5] filed
a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of
marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The
complaint[6] alleged, inter alia, that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31,
1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he
married Estrellita in 1993. The complaint likewise averred that:
11. The marriage of the deceased and Complainant Zorayda, having been
celebrated under the New Civil Code, is therefore governed by this law.
Based on Article 35 (4) of the Family Code, the subsequent marriage entered
into by deceased Mamintal with Defendant Llave is void ab initio because he

contracted the same while his prior1 marriage to Complainant Zorayda was
still subsisting, and his status being declared as "divorced" has no factual or
legal basis, because the deceased never divorced Complainant Zorayda in
his lifetime, and he could not have validly done so because divorce is not
allowed under the New Civil Code;
11.1 Moreover, the deceased did not and could not have divorced
Complainant Zorayda by invoking the provision of P.D. 1083, otherwise
known as the Code of Muslim Persona! Laws, for the simple reason that the
marriage of the deceased with Complainant Zorayda was never deemed,
legally and factually, to have been one contracted under Muslim law as
provided under Art. 186 (2) of P.D. 1083, since they (deceased and
Complainant Zorayda) did not register their mutual desire to be thus covered
by this law;[7]
Summons was then served on Estrellita on December 19, 1994. She then
asked from the court for an extension of 30 days to file her answer to be
counted from January 4, 1995, [8] and again, another 15 days[9] or until
February 18, 1995, both of which the court granted.[10]
Instead of submitting her answer, however, Estrellita filed a Motion to
Dismiss[11] on February 20, 1995 where she declared that Sen. Tamano and
Zorayda are both Muslims who were married under the Muslim rites, as had
been averred in the latter's disbarment complaint against Sen. Tamano. [12]
Estrellita argued that the RTC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
case because under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1083, or the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (Muslim Code), questions and issues
involving Muslim marriages and divorce fall under the exclusive jurisdiction
of shari'a courts.
The trial court denied Estrellita's motion and asserted its jurisdiction over the
case for declaration of nullity.[13] Thus, Estrellita filed in November 1995 a
certiorari petition with this Court questioning the denial of her Motion to
Dismiss. On December 15, 1995, we referred the petition to the CA [14] which
was docketed thereat as CA-GR. SP No. 39656.
During the pendency of CA-GR. SP No. 39656, the RTC continued to try the
case since there can be no default in cases of declaration of nullity of
marriage even if the respondent failed to file an answer. Estrellita was
allowed to participate in the trial while her opposing parties presented their
evidence. When it was A Estrellita's turn to adduce evidence, the hearings
set for such purpose[15] were postponed mostly at her instance until the trial
court, on March 22, 1996, suspended the proceedings [16] in view of the CA's
temporary restraining order issued on February 29,1996, enjoining it from
hearing the case. [17]

Eventually, however, the CA resolved the petition adverse to Estrellita in its

Decision dated September 30, 1996.,[18] Estrellita then elevated the appellate
court's judgment to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari
docketed as GR.No. 126603.[19]
Subsequent to the promulgation of the CA Decision, the RTC ordered
Estrellita to present her evidence on June 26, 1997. [20] As Estrellita was
indisposed on that day, the hearing was reset to July 9, 1997. [21] The day
before this scheduled hearing, Estrellita again asked for a postponement.[22]
Unhappy with the delays in the resolution of their case, Zorayda and Adib
moved to submit the case for decision [23], reasoning that Estrellita had long
been delaying the case. Estrellita opposed, on the ground that she has not
yet filed her answer as she still awaits the outcome of GR. No. 126603.[24]
On June 29, 1998, we upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC of Quezon City, [25]
stating as one of the reasons that as shari'a courts are not vested with
original and exclusive jurisdiction in cases of marriages celebrated under
both the Civil Code and PD 1083, the RTC, as a court of general jurisdiction,
is not precluded from assuming jurisdiction over such cases. In our
Resolution dated August 24,1998,[26] we denied Estrellita's motion for
reconsideration[27] with finality.
A few days before this resolution, or on August 18,1998, the RTC rendered
the aforementioned judgment declaring Estrellita's marriage with Sen.
Tamano as void ab initio.[28 ]
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC, finding that the marital ties of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda were
never severed, declared Sen. Tamano's subsequent marriage to Estrellita as
void ah initio for being bigamous under Article 35 of the Family Code of the
Philippines and under Article 83 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. [29] The
court said:
A comparison between Exhibits A and B (supra) immediately shows that the
second marriage of the late Senator with [Estrellita] was entered into during
the subsistence of his first marriage1 with [Zorayda]. This renders the
subsequent marriage void from the very beginning. The fact that the late
Senator declared his civil status as "divorced" will not in any way affect the
void character of the second marriage because, in this jurisdiction, divorce
obtained by the Filipino spouse is not an acceptable method of terminating
the effects of a previous marriage, especially, where the subsequent
marriage was solemnized under the Civil Code or Family Code. [30] Ruling of
the Court of Appeals
In her appeal,[31] Estrellita argued that she was denied her right to be
heard as a the RTC rendered its judgment even without waiting for the
finality of the Decision of the Supreme Court in GR. No. 126603. She claimed

that the RTC should have required her to file her answer after the denial of
her motion to dismiss. She maintained that Sen. Tamano is capacitated to
marry her as his marriage and subsequent divorce with Zorayda is governed
by the Muslim Code. Lastly, she highlighted Zorayda's lack of legal standing
to question the validity of her marriage to the deceased.
In dismissing the appeal in its Decision dated August 17, 2004; [32] the CA held
that Estrellita can no longer be allowed to file her answer as she was given
ample opportunity to be heard but simply ignored it by asking for numerous
postponements. She never filed her answer despite the lapse of around 60
days, a period longer than what was prescribed by the rules. It also ruled
that Estrellita cannot rely on her pending petition for certiorari with the
higher courts since, as an independent and original action, it does not
interrupt the proceedings in the trial court.
As to the substantive merit of the case, the CA adjudged that Estrellita's
marriage to Sen. Tamano is void ab initio for being bigamous, reasoning that
the marriage of Zorayda and Sen. Tamano is governed by the Civil Code,
which does not provide for an absolute divorce. It noted that their first
nuptial celebration was under civil rites, while the subsequent Muslim
celebration was only ceremonial. Zorayda then, according to the CA, had the
legal standing to file the action as she is Sen. Tamano's wife and, hence, the
injured party in the senator's subsequent bigamous marriage with Estrellita.
In its September 13, 2005 Resolution,[33] the CA denied Estrellita's Motion for
Reconsideration/Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration where it debunked
the additional errors she raised. The CA noted that the allegation of lack of
they public prosecutor's report on the existence of collusion in violation of
both Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court [34] and Article 48 of the Family
Code[35] will not invalidate the trial court's judgment as the proceedings
between the parties had been adversarial, negating the existence of
collusion. Assuming that the issues have not been joined before the RTC, the
same is attributable to Estrellita's refusal to file an answer. Lastly, the CA
disregarded Estrellita's allegation that the trial court erroneously rendered its
judgment way prior to our remand to the RTC of the records of the case
ratiocinating that GR. No. 126603 pertains to the issue on the denial of the
Motion to Dismiss, and not to the issue of the validity of Estrellita's marriage
to Sen. Tamano.
The Parties'Respective Arguments
Reiterating her arguments before the court a quo, Estrellita now argues
that the CA erred in upholding the RTC judgment as the latter was
prematurely issued, depriving her of the opportunity to file an answer and to
present her evidence to dispute the allegations against the validity of her
marriage. She claims that Judge Macias v. Macias[36] laid down the rule that
the filing of a motion to dismiss instead of an answer suspends the period to
file an answer and, consequently, the trial court is obliged to suspend

proceedings while her motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction

has not yet been resolved with finality. She maintains that she merely
participated in the RTC hearings because of the trial court's assurance that
the proceedings will be without prejudice to whatever action the High Court
will take on her petition questioning the RTC's jurisdiction and yet, the RTC
violated this commitment as it rendered an adverse judgment on August 18,
1998, months before the records of GR. No. 126603 were remanded to the
CA on November 11, 1998.[37] She also questions the lack of a report of the
public prosecutor anent a finding of whether there was collusion, this being a
prerequisite before further proceeding could be held when a party has failed
to file an answer in a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Estrellita is also steadfast in her belief that her marriage with the late
senator is valid as the latter was already divorced under the Muslim Code at
the time he married her. She asserts that such law automatically applies to
the marriage of Zorayda and the deceased without need of registering their
consent to be covered by it, as both parties are Muslims whose marriage was
solemnized under Muslim law. She pointed out that Sen. Tamano married all
his wives under Muslim rites, as attested to by the affidavits of the siblings of
the deceased.[38]
Lastly, Estrellita argues that Zorayda and Adib have no legal standing to file
suit because only the husband or the wife can file a complaint for the
declaration of nullity of marriage under Supreme Court Resolution A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC.[39]
Refuting the arguments, the Solicitor General (Sol Gen) defends the CA's
reasoning and stresses that Estrellita was never deprived of her right to be
heard; and, that filing an original action for certiorari does not stay the
proceedings of the main action before the RTC.
As regards the alleged lack of report of the public prosecutor if there is
collusion, the Sol Gen says that this is no longer essential considering the
vigorous opposition of Estrellita in the suit that obviously shows the lack of
collusion. The Sol Gen also supports private respondents' legal standing to
challenge the validity of Estrellita's purported marriage with Sen. Tamano,
reasoning that any proper interested party may attack directly or collaterally
a void marriage, and Zorayda and Adib have such right to file the action as
they are the ones prejudiced by the marital union.
Zorayda and Adib, on the other hand, did not file any comment
Issues
The issues that must be resolved are the following:
1.
Whether the CA erred in affirming the trial court's judgment, even
though the latter was rendered prematurely because: a) the judgment was

rendered without waiting for the Supreme Court's final resolution of her
certiorari petition, i.e., GR. No. 126603; b) she has not yet filed her answer
and thus was denied due process; and c) the public prosecutor did not even
conduct an investigation whether there was collusion;
2. Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was
bigamous; and
3. Whether Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing to have Estrellita's
marriage declared void ab initio.
Our Ruling
Estrellita s refusal to file an answer eventually led to the loss of her right to
answer; and her pending petition for certiorari/review on certiorari
questioning the denial of the motion to dismiss before the higher courts does
not at all suspend the trial proceedings of the principal suit before the RTC of
Quezon City.
Firstly, it can never be argued that Estrellita was deprived of her right
to due process. She was never declared in default, and she even actively
participated in the trial to defend her interest.
Estrellita invokes Judge Macias v. Macias [40]to justify the suspension of the
period to file an answer and of the proceedings in the trial court until her
petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the denial of her Motion to
Dismiss has been decided by this Court. In said case, we affirmed the
following reasoning of the CA which, apparently, is Estrellita's basis for her
argument, to wit
However, she opted to file, on April 10, 2001, a 'Motion to
Dismiss? instead of filing an Answer to the complaint The filing of
said motion suspended the period for her to file her Answer to the
complaint. Until said motion is resolved by the Respondent Court
with finality, it behooved the Respondent Court to suspend the
hearings of the case on the merits. The Respondent Court, on April
19,2001, issued its Order denying the 'Motion to Dismiss' of the Petitioner.
Under Section 6, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure [now Section
4], the Petitioner had the balance of the period provided for in Rule 11 of the
said Rules but in no case less than five (5) days computed from sendee on
her of the aforesaid Order of the Respondent Court within which to file her
Answer to the complaint x x x[41]' (Emphasis supplied.)
Estrellita obviously misappreciated Macias. All we pronounced therein
is that the trial court is mandated to suspend trial until it finally resolves the
motion to dismiss that is filed before it. Nothing in the above excerpt states
that the trial court should suspend its proceedings should the issue of the
propriety or impropriety of the motion to dismiss be raised before the
appellate courts. In Macias, the trial court failed to observe due process in

the course of the proceeding of the case because after it denied the wife's
motion to dismiss, it immediately proceeded to allow the husband to present
evidence ex parte and resolved the case with undue haste even when, under
the rules of procedure, the wife still had time to file an answer. In the instant
case, Estrellita had no time left for filing an answer, as she filed the motion to
dismiss beyond the extended period earlier granted by the trial court after
she filed motions for extension of time to file an answer.
Estrellita argues that the trials court prematurely issued its judgment, as it
should have waited first for the resolution of her Motion to Dismiss before the
CA and, subsequently, before this Court. However, in upholding the RTC, the
CA correctly ailed that the pendency of ,a petition for certiorari does not
suspend the proceedings before the trial court. "An application for certiorari
is an independent action which is not part or a continuation of the trial which
resulted in the rendition of the judgment complained of." [42] Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is explicit in stating that "[t]he petition shall not interrupt the
course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from
further proceeding in the case."[43] In fact, the trial court respected the CA's
temporary restraining order and only after the CA rendered judgment did the
RTC again require Estrellita to present her evidence.
Notably, when the CA judgment was elevated to us by way of Rule 45, we
never issued any order precluding the trial court from proceeding with the
principal action. With her numerous requests for postponements, Estrellita
remained obstinate in refusing to file an answer or to present her evidence
when it was her turn to do so, insisting that the trial court should wait first for
our decision in GR. Mo. 126603. Her failure to file an answer and her refusal
to present her evidence were attributable only to herself and she should not
be allowed to benefit from her own dilatory tactics to the prejudice of the
other party. Sans her answer, the trial court correctly proceeded with the trial
and rendered its Decision after it deemed Estrellita to have waived her right
to present her side of the story. Neither should the lower court wait for the
decision in GR. No. 126603 to become final and executory, nor should it wait
for its records to be remanded back to it because GR. No. 126603 involves
strictly the propriety of the Motion to Dismiss and not the issue of validity of
marriage.
The Public Prosecutor issued a report as
to the non-existence of collusion.
Aside from Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the
Rules of Court, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) [44] also requries
the participation of the public prosecutor in cases involving void marriages. It
specifically mandates the prosecutor to submit his investigation report to
determine whether there is collusion between the parties:

Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor.- (1) Within one month

after receipt of the court order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8
above, the public prosecutor shall submit a report to the court stating
whether the parties are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties
and their respective counsels, if any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall slate the basis
thereof in his report. The parties shall file their respective comments on the
finding of collusion within ten days from receipt of a copy of the report. The
court shall set the report for hearing and if convinced that the parties are in
collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set
the case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear
for the State at the pre-trial.
Records show that the trial court immediately directed the public prosecutor
to submit the required report, [45] which we find to have been sufficiently
complied with by Assistant City Prosecutor Edgardo T. Paragua in his
Manifestation dated March 30,1995, [46] wherein he attested that there could
be no collusion between the parties and no fabrication of evidence because
Estrellita is not the spouse of any of the private respondents.
Furthermore, the lack of collusion is evident in the case at bar. Even
assuming that there is a lack of report of collusion or a lack of participation
by the public prosecutor, just as we held in Tuason v. Court of Appeals, [47] the
lack of participation of a fiscal does not invalidate the proceedings in the trial
court:
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and
legal separation proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists
between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed or
fabricated. Petitioner's vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings
negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is
no allegation by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated
by any of the parties. Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the
nonintervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between
the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the
trial court.[48]
The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the late Sen. Tamano;
their marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano's subsequent
marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was
celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. [49] The only law

in force governing marriage relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims

alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one
marriage can exist at any given time. [50] Under the marriage provisions of the
Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the efifectivity of Republic
Act No. 394[51] which was not availed of during its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano's prior marriage to Zorayda has
been severed by way of divorce under PD 1083, [52] the law that codified
Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly,
Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to "marriage and divorce
wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim
and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code
in any part of the Philippines." But we already ruled in GR. No. 126603 that
"Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties
were married both in civil and Muslim rites."[53]
Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law
cannot retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain
rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda. The former explicitly
provided for the prospective application of its provisions unless otherwise
provided:
Art. 186 (1). Effect of code on past acts. Acts executed prior to the
effectivity of this Code shall be governed by the laws in force at the time of
their execution, and nothing herein except as otherwise specifically provided,
shall affect their validity or legality or operate to extinguish any right
acquired or liability incurred thereby.
It has been held that:
The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that all laws
operate prospectively, unless the contrary appears or is clearly, plainly and
unequivocably expressed or necessarily implied; accordingly, every case of
doubt will be resolved against the retroactive operation of laws. Article 186
aforecited enunciates the general rule of the Muslim Code to have its
provisions applied prospectively, and implicitly upholds the force and effect
of a pre-existing body of law, specifically, the Civil Code - in respect of civil
acts that took place before the Muslim Code's enactment.[54]
An instance of retroactive application of the Muslim Code is Article 186(2)
which states:
A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the effectivity of this Code
in accordance with non-Muslim law shall be considered as one contracted
under Muslim law provided the spouses register their mutual desire to
thiseffect.

Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for the marriage
to be considered as one contracted under the Muslim law, the registration of
mutual consent between Zorayda and Sen. Tamano will still be ineffective, as
both are Muslims whose marriage was celebrated under both civil and
Muslim laws. Besides, as we have already settled, the Civil Code governs
their personal status since this was in effect at the time of the celebration of
their marriage. In view of Sen. Tamano's prior marriage which subsisted at
the time Estrellita married him, their subsequent marriage is correctly
adjudged by the CA as void ab initio.
Zorayda andAdib, as the injured parties, have the legal personalities to file
the declaration of nullity of marriage. A.M. No. 02-11-10SC, which limits to
only the husband or the wife the filing of a petition for nullity is prospective
in application and does not shut out the prior spouse from filing suit if the
ground is a bigamous subsequent marriage.
Her marriage covered by the Family Code of the Philippines," [55]
Estrellita relies on A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003
claiming that under Section 2(a) [56] thereof, only the husband or the wife, to
the exclusion of others, may file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity,
therefore only she and Sen. Tamano may directly attack the validity of their
own marriage.
Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void marriage can
file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. However, this
interpretation does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.
In explaining why under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only the spouses may file the
petition to the exclusion of compulsory or intestate heirs, we said:
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and
Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:
(1) Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of
voidable marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
Such petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the
spouses or by the State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of
voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such
petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by
the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right
to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights
prior to the death of their predecessor, and hence can only question.the
validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in

the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve
marriage and not to seek its dissolution.[57]
Note that the Rationale makes it clear that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10SC refers to the "aggrieved or injured spouse." If Estrellita's interpretation is
employed, the prior spouse is unjustly precluded from filing an action. Surely,
this is not what the Rule contemplated.
The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had
only discovered during the connubial period that the fnarriage was
bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should
parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it
would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage
void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be
given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter
is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens
the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but
most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The
subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse
and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the
Constitution.
Indeed, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC precludes the son from
impugning the subsequent marriage. But in the case at bar, both Zorayda
and Adib have legal personalities to file an action for nullity. Albeit the
Supreme Court Resolution governs marriages celebrated under the Family
Code, such is prospective in application and does not apply to cases already
commenced before March 15,2003.[58]
Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellita's
marriage in November 1994.
While the Family Code is silent with respect to the proper party who can file a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it
has been held that in a void marriage, in which no marriage has taken place
and cannot be the source of rights, any interested party may attack the
mairiage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even
beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. [59] Since A.M. No. 02-1110-SC does not apply, Adib, as one of the children of the deceased who has
property rights as an heir, is likewise considered to be the real party in
interest in the suit he and his mother had filed since both of them stand to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.[60]
Since our Philippine laws protect the marital union of a couple, they should
be interpreted in a way that would preserve their respective rights which
include striking down bigamous marriages. We thus find the CA Decision
correctly rendered.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed August 17, 2004

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. CV No. 61762, as well as its
subsequent Resolution issued on September 13, 2005, are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.