Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
OUT
ETHICS
BY
R. M.
HARE
CLARENDON PRESS
1997
OXFORD
PREFACE
T h e c o r e o f this b o o k i s m y A x e l H a g e r s t r m L e c t u r e s , given i n
Uppsala in 1 9 9 1 . 1 had planned to incorporate these, together with revisions of o t h e r papers, into a full-length book giving my considered
views on ethical theory. It was to have been given as t h e J o s Ferrater
M o r a Lectures at G i r o n a in Catalonia. B u t this too a m b i t i o u s project
was defeated by a series of strokes, w h i c h rendered me incapable, n o t
only of typing with m o r e t h a n one hand, but of thinking book-length
t h o u g h t s . I was very s o r r y to have to c a n c e l my visit to Catalonia, to
which I had been looking forward with pleasure.
1 5 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2
Typeset by Invisible Ink
Printed in Great Britain
on acid-free paper by
Biddies ltd, Guildford and King's Lynn
PREFACE
PREFACE
vi
l e c t u r i n g . T h i s formed t h e m a i n p a r t o f t h e Axel H a g e r s t r o m
Lectures. I have to t h a n k the very intelligent audience at Uppsala for
giving ( h e m s u c h a s t i m u l a t i n g r e c e p t i o n . I am printing t h e m as
delivered, with a few afterthoughts, but retaining the style of an oral
presentation.
Last. I have reprinted my paper 'Could K a n t have b e e n a Utilita r i a n ? ' from lltilitas 5. which h a s also appeared in Kant and Critique,
edited by R. M. Dancy. It w a s given, a m o n g o t h e r o c c a s i o n s , in
S t o c k h o l m on t h e s a m e visit to S w e d e n . I owe so m a n y of my o w n
ideas to Kant, and my interpretation of h i m as a quasi-utilitarian is so
unorthodox (though it now has supporters), that I thought it worth
reprinting here.
It will be obvious t h a t a b o o k so s t r u c t u r e d is b o u n d to c o n t a i n
overlaps. For example, points are m e n t i o n e d briefly in Chapter 1 but
taken up in m o r e detail in Chapters 3 to 7: a n d my interpretation of
K a n t figures in m a n y of t h e e a r l i e r c h a p t e r s before being fully e x plored in Chapter 8. This is unavoidable if the chapters are to be read
independently. S o m e people m a y w a n t to read j u s t C h a p t e r 1 as a
s u m m a r y of my ideas; but o t h e r s m a y find this too difficult a n d skip
on to Chapter 2, w h i c h is m u c h easier. And s o m e m a y n o t be interested in q u e s t i o n s of K a n t i a n exegesis. For these r e a s o n s I have decided to put up with some overlaps; but these are clearly signposted.
I have to t h a n k others besides the Swedes for c o m m e n t s on various
versions of these lectures. T h e y are too m a n y to list; but I have given
the n a m e s of those whose writings I found of most help with the K a n t
chapter in the bibliography. T h i s h a s been expanded into a full list of
my philosophical writings, as an aid to t h o s e w h o wish to study my
ideas, with t h e addition of a b s t r a c t s of my m o r e i m p o r t a n t r e c e n t
papers. I owe a lot to t h e e x c e l l e n t b i b l i o g r a p h y c o m p i l e d by Ulla
Wessels for the two volumes of 7.um moralisvhcn Darken (H 1 9 9 5 ) . the
proceedings of a conference on my work.
I have used an a u t h o r - d a t e system of reference, b e c a u s e it avoids
footnotes: but I have not t h o u g h t it n e c e s s a r y to cite the page n u m b e r s in c a s e s w h e r e it is e a s y to find t h e p a s s a g e referred to. T h e
r e a s o n is t h a t m a n y of t h e a r t i c l e s h a v e appeared in several p l a c e s
vii
CONTENTS
PART I.
THE E N T E R P R I S E OF MORAL
PHILOSOPHY
1. Philosophy of L a n g u a g e in Ethics
2. Defence of the Enterprise
i
29
3. Taxonomy
43
4 . Naturalism
63
5. Intuitionism
82
6. Emotivism
7. Rationalism
103
126
PART III.
KANT
147
167
Index
187
PART I
THE E N T E R P R I S E OF MORAL
PHILOSOPHY
I
P H I L O S O P H Y OF LANGUAGE IN E T H I C S
1.1.
THE E N T E R P R I S E OF M O R A L P H I L O S O P H Y
1.1, i
1.1.1
P H I L O S O P H Y OF LANGUAGE IN E T H I C S
other words used, if all t h e books on the top shelf are by Wittgenstein,
that the words are being used and understood in the senses t h a t m a k e
to the words which give rise to t h e m ; and this is true above all in
t i n g e n t fact t h a t , if he is u s i n g it in that s e n s e ( n a m e l y t h e s e n s e in
I. I. i
I. 1 . 2
P H I L O S O P H Y OF LANGUAGE IN E T H I C S
modality, and this is s h o w n by the fact that deontic logics c a n be syst e m a t i z e d w h i c h a r e in all or n e a r l y all r e s p e c t s a n a l o g o u s to t h e
other kinds of modal logic (Prior 1955: HI. i. 6 ) . T h e s a m e is even more
clearly t r u e of t h e word ' m u s t ' : its use to express m o r a l s t a t e m e n t s
like 'I must not tell h e r a lie' is analogous in most ways to its use to express alethic modal statements.
If, as is beginning to happen, viable systems of deontic logic can be
discovered w h i c h are adequate models of ordinary m o r a l l a n g u a g e ,
they will do as m u c h for the u n d e r s t a n d i n g of m o r a l a r g u m e n t s as
ordinary logic does for the understanding of o t h e r a r g u m e n t s . So, alt h o u g h it is of c o u r s e a c o n t i n g e n t fact t h a t English uses 'ought' to
express t h e m e a n i n g t h a t it does, it is n o t c o n t i n g e n t t h a t any l a n guage that has an equivalent s e n t e n c e i . e . a way of expressing the
s a m e t h o u g h t w i l l be bound by the s a m e rules of r e a s o n i n g . A n d
what the rules are. as the word is normally used, is discovered by asking how it is normally used.
As before, we do n o t have to use it in t h a t way. B u t w h e n we are arguing about moral problems we are arguing about w h e t h e r to accept
or reject c e r t a i n m o r a l judgements. Clearly, w h e t h e r an a r g u m e n t is
a good a r g u m e n t for accepting or rejecting a c e r t a i n j u d g e m e n t will
depend on what the j u d g e m e n t is. B u t what it is depends on what the
words used in e x p r e s s i n g it a r e being u n d e r s t o o d to m e a n . If t h e y
were being understood to m e a n something different, it would be a different j u d g e m e n t . B u t o n c e we are committed to discussing w h e t h e r
to a c c e p t or r e j e c t that j u d g e m e n t (i.e. t h e j u d g e m e n t w h i c h t h o s e
words express w h e n they are taken in that way) we are committed to
following the rules of r e a s o n i n g which t h a t way of t a k i n g t h e m det e r m i n e s . To l a k e t h e words in t h a t way is to accept t h a t the judgem e n t (with or w i t h o u t additional premisses) logically implies s u c h
and such o t h e r judgements, is inconsistent with s u c h a n d such other
j u d g e m e n t s , a n d so o n . So the s e n s e of the words, as before, determines which a r g u m e n t s about the questions we are asking are sound
o n e s . T h e r e f o r e , in order to d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e y a r e sound, we
have to e x a m i n e the senses of the words, i.e. the rules for their use in
arguments.
We c a n of course, as before, use words as we wish. B u t if we decide
THE E N T E R P R I S E OF MORAL P H I L O S O P H Y
L I. 2
I.
1.2
P H I L O S O P H Y OF LANGUAGE IN E T H I C S
t h e o r y o f m o r a l r e a s o n i n g , a n y m o r e t h a n t h e r e h a v e t o b e logical
facts t o s u b s t a n t i a t e logical r e a s o n i n g . T h e n e c e s s i t i e s w h i c h c o n -
not have been a reason for answering 'No' that o n e of the books was
T h e t e r m s p e e c h a c t ' w a s b r o u g h t i n t o c u r r e n c y b y } . L . Austin
o t h e r s e n s e ) . It is t h e r e f o r e in order, if we wish to d e t e r m i n e w h a t
rules we have to follow, to ask in w h a t sense the word was being used
founder of speech a c t theory: but the idea that n o t all speech acts are
All this is peculiarly true of words like 'ought', one of the most gen-
words 'blue' and 'red' are the same, but 'red' does not mean the s a m e
rules for its use by studying its logical properties. If true, this is, as we
s h a l l see. of f u n d a m e n t a l i m p o r t a n c e for e t h i c s . It m e a n s t h a t , a l -
sions w i t h i n t h e c l a s s e s o f s t a t e m e n t s a n d i m p e r a t i o n s , n o r t h a t
THE E N T E R P R I S E OF M O R A L P H I L O S O P H Y
I. 1 . 3
P H I L O S O P H Y OF LANGUAGE IN E T H I C S
ally e x c l u s i v e : p e r h a p s m o r a l j u d g e m e n t s s h a r e s o m e o f t h e prop-
the sentence, not necessarily a separate part of it. that indicates what
ment thai you are going to shut the door has a different illocutionary
force from the c o m m a n d that you shut the door. But different writers
Consider the two c o m m a n d s , that you open t h e door, and that you
or use it m i m e t i c a l l y ( 6 . 4 , H 1 9 8 9 0 ) e . g . on t h e s t a g e w i t h o u t
making a s t a t e m e n t or giving a c o m m a n d .
the s e n t e n c e s are articulated in such a way (as they are in most lan-
guages) as to distinguish the feature which marks the mood from the
t h a t w e have t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e difference b e t w e e n w h a t a r e n o w
rest: the two c o m m a n d s 'Open the door' and ' S h u t the window' s h a r e
Latin expressions ' and 'ibis ('Go' and 'You are going to go') have dif-
THE E N T E R P R I S E OF MORAI, P H I L O S O P H Y
IO
1.1- 3
I. 1 . 4
P H I L O S O P H Y OF LANGUAGE IN E T H I C S
ii
i m p e r a t i o n s b e l o n g s t o t h e latter g e n u s . W e m u s t n o t e v e n presup-
nificance, like that between strong and weak forms of the past tense
( 3 . 3 ) . But mood is not like this: the distinction between the mood-sign
uine, r e q u i r e s a c t i o n in c o n f o r m i t y with t h e m , in s i t u a t i o n s w h e r e
uses, w h i c h h a v e g e n e r a t e d a vast l i t e r a t u r e . S u c h a r e u s e s b y t h e
for example, the false thesis held by many, including Aristotle (An. Pr.
o u g h t n o t to. j u s t b e c a u s e i t i s w h a t h e o u g h t n o t t o ( H 1 9 9 2 ^ : 9 8 ) .
This is not t h e place to add to this literature; the point here is just that
' T h e colour red is a primary colour', but could not rewrite the second
cordant belief.
functions.
1 . 4 . I t i s time t o t u r n b a c k t o t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h a t place m o r a l
THE E N T E R P R I S E 0 1 - MORAL P H I L O S O P H Y
I. 1.4
I. 1.4
P H I L O S O P H Y OF LANGUAGE IN E T H I C S
1?
on the right. If the facts are just the same, they would supply a reason
1 . 5 . Before a s s i g n i n g t o m o r a l j u d g e m e n t s t h e i r p l a c e o n this
ontic logic have sometimes been set up which fail to make this distinc-
tion, using a single symbol (for example '()") for both 'ought' and t h e
ple a 'square of opposition' which works for 'ought' does not work for
o n e is c o m m a n d e d to do s o m e t h i n g (one is to or soil a c t in a c e r t a i n
way) as showing that o n e outfit to act in that way. This c a n have grave
imperatives
II
B e c a u s e m o r a l j u d g e m e n t s h a v e to he made for r e a s o n s , t h e
(namely the intention to test the obedience of the recruit). But in this
c a s e he could have said 'Left t u r n ' instead of 'Right turn' with equal
kind of choice.
the second situation. In the non-moral tactical example just used, the
14
THE E N T E R P R I S E OF MORAL P H I L O S O P H Y
I. i. 5
I. 1. S
P H I L O S O P H Y OF LANGUAGE IN E T H I C S
15
have called the phrastic. which the imperative shares with its c o r r e s -
r e a s o n is t h a t , as we h a v e s e e n , logic is d e t e r m i n e d by t h e r u l e s or
logic itself, for example formation rules and rules of inference, are im-
two. kinds of act. the third being the locutionary (Austin 1962: J O 8 ) .
And similarly with imperatives. Say 'Go on the i c e ' to a trusting child,
a n d he m a y go; b u t say it to an u n t r u s t i n g or r e b e l l i o u s o n e , a n d it
part of the m e a n i n g .
statement of fact. 1 would dispute this, but it would need too long an
if.
TIIH E N T E R P R I S E OF M O R A L P H I L O S O P H Y
I. 1 . 5
I. 1 . 6
P H I L O S O P H Y OF LANGUAGE IN E T H I C S
17
t h e m , entitles t h e h o u s e m a i d to infer t h e i m p e r a t i o n t h a t s h e is to
dust the table. So. if the housemaid is both logical and obedient, saying
t h a t , b e c a u s e m o r a l j u d g e m e n t s a r e m a t e r i a l for r a t i o n a l t h o u g h t
even if she has not heard of the standing order, and even if she is too
properties is no o b s t a c l e at all to t h e r a t i o n a l i t y of m o r a l t h i n k i n g .
S h e will not know what to do. because she has not been told that.
with the confusion about pragmatics that 1 have just been exposing,
vital ingredient in it ( 1 . 8 ) .
1.6.
B u t before s h o w i n g this, it is t i m e to a s k in w h a t s e n s e m o r a l
is not being sincere if he does not act accordingly (i.e. at t h e time and j
1 9 s i n ) . As we have seen,
B u t t h e r e a r e s o m e a m b i g u i t i e s h e r e w h i c h need t o b e unravelled.
illocutionary act of telling that. In telling to. one must not contradict
c a n m e a n t h r e e different t h i n g s . T h e y m a y d e n o t e t h e p e r s o n t o
w h o m an i m p e r a t i o n is spoken or w r i t t e n . Or they m a y d e n o t e t h e
person o r t h i n g t o w h i c h t h e g r a m m a t i c a l s u b j e c t o f t h e s e n t e n c e
getting to believe that, one may contradict oneself if that is the most
the gmnde dame in our previous example says to her butler ' T h e table
THE E N T E R P R I S E OF M O R A L P H I L O S O P H Y
IS
I. 1.6
I. 1. 7
P H I L O S O P H Y OF LANGUAGE IN E T H I C S
19
l ,
son spoken to is the butler; and the person who is charged with c o m -
In the present context it is the person charged that interests us. Let
us call her, not the addressee or the subject, but the c h a r g e e . A pre-
scriptive speech act is one such that, if I am the chargee, and I assent
Aristotle could say that she c a n backslide from t h e universal rule be-
good, m a d a m ' , she is not assenting sincerely if. though she could dust
not do justice to the subtlety of his solution to the problem, and I have
in a moral sense) that she ought to dust the table, and still slink off to
j u d g e m e n t s w h i c h is prescriptive, a n d if so w h a t is t h e r e l a t i o n b e -
n 4 7 " 2 5 ff.), Hume (1739: III. 1 . 1 ) , Kant (Gr B A 3 6 f. = 4 1 2 f.) and Mill
A n d t h e u n i v e r s a l i t y of t h e m o r a l prescription easily i n t r o d u c e s a
n o n - p r e s c r i p t i v e e l e m e n t i n t o its m e a n i n g . To e x p l a i n t h i s : if t h e
dusted, this rule will a s s u m e for her (obedient girl as she normally is)
fall into place (1M ch. 11). T h e second is that, as I shall be saying later,
A/T6.1).
It w a s his r e c o g n i t i o n , i n h e r i t e d from S o c r a t e s a n d P l a t o , t h a t
and. if they do, that is a real e n o u g h fact. And so is the fact t h a t she is
will not be able to escape the feeling of guilt caused in her by t h e sight
2(.
Till- E N T E R P R I S E OF MORAL P H I L O S O P H Y
I. I. 7
Li.7
P H I L O S O P H Y OF LANGUAGE IN E T H I C S
21
God. the attitudes that make us revere the laws of morality are a so-
may have carried this reverence to excess, and his moral law was no
doubt too simple and rigid. But society would collapse unless children
were brought up to feel bad when they do bad things; and we should
might not be able to talk about values to those w h o did not substan-
Critical moral thinking can also amend the principles if they are seen
are like factual statements in m a n y respects (on the face of it. they re-
It is easy, therefore, to think that they are like them in all respects. It is
are meeting a girl at the station and do not know her by sight, I m a y
a n d o t h e r s w h o h a v e b o r r o w e d t h e word a n d used i t i n a n o t h e r
thought fat girls more attractive, you would look for a different sort of
THE E N T E R P R I S E OF MORAL P H I L O S O P H Y
I. I. 7
I. 1 . 8
P H I L O S O P H Y OF LANGUAGE IN E T H I C S
23
ing pain for fun'), although the moral property is not the s a m e prop-
not.
said that it was an act of inflicting pain for fun but not wrong would
moral. Logic does not forbid the adoption of different moral standards
inconsistent standards at the s a m e time, and says that they will be in-
c o n s i s t e n t i f h e says c o n f l i c t i n g t h i n g s a b o u t s i t u a t i o n s w h i c h h e
agrees to be identical in their universal properties.
claims that, if there were two situations identical in all their univer-
j u d g e m e n t s is a l o g i c a l feature of t h e m , or e m b o d i e s a s u b s t a n t i a l
moral principle. A ground for holding the former view is that we react
1.8.
u n i v e r s a l p r o p e r t i e s and in t h e i r r e l a t i o n s to individuals m u s t be
t i o n a r y (cf. P l a t o , Rep. 4 3 6 d ) . In e i t h e r c a s e t h e r e c o u l d be an e x -
versalizability thesis.
stationary, so t h a t t h e disc c o n t i n u e d to o c c u p y t h e s a m e r e g i o n of
space, but that within this region it moved around its axis.
I n t h e first c a s e t h e r e c o u l d b e m a n y e x p l a n a t i o n s , b u t n o n e o f
8 5 ) w h o c l a i m t h a t t h e a c t u a l world c a n n o t b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d from
moral d i s t i n c t i o n s o n t h e g r o u n d o f a c t u a l i t y would b e r e j e c t e d o n
24
I. 1 . 8
I.
1. 8
P H I L O S O P H Y OF LANGUAGE IN E T H I C S
Let us try out this essentially Kantian method m o r e clearly, and re-
moral principle and not a logical doctrine will by this time be getting
prescriptive, as h a s b e e n argued, t h e n in m a k i n g o n e . I am a s k i n g
to r e a c h s u b s t a n t i a l c o n c l u s i o n s in m o r a l a r g u m e n t s . We must ask
that it be acted on. and. if sincere, must will this. B u t if they are also
universalizable, I a m , in m a k i n g o n e . implicitly m a k i n g i d e n t i c a l
still try to call the difference between actual and hypothetical morally
people. So we c a n n o t be i n t r o d u c i n g a s u b s t a n t i a l m o r a l principle
which people have thought otherwise is that the thesis does seem to
have i m p l i c a t i o n s of a s u b s t a n t i a l s o r t for m o r a l a r g u m e n t s , a n d
tial moral rabbit out of a logical hat. Moral philosophers have so often
c e p t u a l g r o u n d s t o p h r a s e s s u c h a s ' h u m a n needs', a n d h a v e t h e n
of this. T h e c a s e is a n a l o g o u s to w h a t I t h i n k a b o u t future s t a t e s of
myself w h i c h I e x p e c t to be a c t u a l . If I k n o w w h a t I s h a l l t h e n will,
2h
I. 1 . 8
I. 1 . 9
P H I L O S O P H Y OF LANGUAGE IN E T H I C S
27
can engage.
led h i m to try to justify what are only simple, general, prima facie in-
tions like that which I am presently in. which I can accept equally for
effect gives equal weight in my moral thinking to the wills of all those
s u b s t a n t i a l m o r a l ideas a n d i n t u i t i o n s . K a n t c a l l e d his m o s t - r e a d
ing all impartially and giving them weight according to their strength
(H 1996c).
1.9.
obtained by c o n s i d e r i n g w h a t full r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a h y p o t h e t i c a l
28
THE E N T E R P R I S E OF M O R A L P H I L O S O P H Y
I. 1.9
DEFENCE OF THE E N T E R P R I S E
THE E N T E R P R I S E OF M O R A L P H I L O S O P H Y
I. 2. 1
w h e t h e r or not he accepts pacifism, he is quite sure that there is somet h i n g w r o n g ( s o m e t h i n g very h a r d to specify e x a c t l y ) with his
c o u n t r y ' s policies and actions in Vietnam: t h a t however, even if it be
agreed that A m e r i c a is doing s o m e t h i n g morally wrong in V i e t n a m ,
t h a t by no m e a n s e n t a i l s t h a t he o u g h t to refuse d o w n r i g h t to be
drafted, or take evasive a c t i o n . For it m i g h t be that, a l t h o u g h his
c o u n t r y was doing wrong, his duty was to his country, right or
wrong. Or, if that be thought too e x t r e m e or too old-fashioned a position, he might think that he was not in a position to judge of the c o m plexities of world strategy, and t h a t it was his duty to leave t h e
decision to those who were belter informed than himself. Or he might
think that although, if one considers Vietnam in particular. America
was doing something wrong, to rebel against one's country would be
a greater evil than acquiescing in this degree of moral evil committed
by o n e ' s g o v e r n m e n t . He m i g h t be quite ready to admit that, if t h e
A m e r i c a n government were to b e c o m e like the Nazis and e m b a r k on
a policy of wholesale genocide (massacring all blacks, for example), it
would be his duty to rebel a g a i n s t it; b u t he m i g h t be in d o u b t
w h e t h e r the United States' government's actions in Vietnam were of
sufficient wickedness to justify him in refusing his n o r m a l duty as a
citizen. But what is one's n o r m a l duty as a citizen?
2 . 2 . I have done enough, perhaps, t o illustrate the complexity o f
the issues that arise in s u c h a c h o i c e - s i t u a t i o n . T h e r e is no r e a s o n
why I should have stopped where I did; I could easily have shown that
in fact the issues are even more complex. But let us stop for a m o m e n t
and try to sort out the complexities that we have encountered so far.
The first group of problems that we have to consider is that raised
by the pacifist position. W h a t is supposed to be wrong about going to
w a r and fighting? We might feel inclined at o n c e to answer t h a t w a r
a n d fighting a r e prima facie w r o n g b e c a u s e they involve killing or
wounding people (to say n o t h i n g of the e c o n o m i c loss that often results from w a r s and the p r e p a r a t i o n for t h e m ) . Most people would
a g r e e t h a t in general o n e o u g h t n o t to kill or wound people. B u t
and h e r e is the difficultymost people would also a g r e e t h a t t h e r e
are p a r t i c u l a r c a s e s in which it is legitimate to kill or w o u n d people
(in self-defence, for example). It is true, however, and important, t h a t
1.2.2
DEFENCE OF THE E N T E R P R I S E
32
THE E N T E R P R I S E OF M O R A L P H I L O S O P H Y
1.2.3
I. 2. 3
DEFENCE OF THE E N T E R P R I S E
33
T h e m a i n p o i n t t o n o t i c e w i t h all t h e s e p r o b l e m s is: u n l e s s o n e
w r o n g , o n e is unlikely to be able to a n s w e r w i t h a n y a s s u r a n c e t h e
feeding?'
sister died of the effects of a stroke, and the s a m e problem might eas-
p e r h a p s S o c r a t e s w a s a b o u t t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n two different
But this probably did not apply to artificial feeding. T h e working party
m y s e l f published a r t i c l e s on t h e m as well as s u b s c r i b i n g to t h e r e -
B o t h q u e s t i o n s a r e . o f c o u r s e , very i m p o r t a n t o n e s , a n d t h e y a r e
distinct from the question ' W h a t does wrong mean?', t h o u g h this too
is related.
o n e i s n a t u r a l l y led o n t o t h i n k a b o u t t h e p u t t i n g a w a y o f o t h e r
w a s b o r n deformed as a r e s u l t of t h a l i d o m i d e t a k e n by h e r w h e n
p r e g n a n t . And m o r e r e c e n t l y I h a v e t a k e n p a r t in d i s c u s s i o n s a n d
THE E N T E R P R I S E OF MORA I, P H I L O S O P H Y
34
I. 2. 4
I. z. 4
DEFENCE OF THE E N T E R P R I S E
35
s h o u l d b e r e c o m m e n d e d t o a n s w e r t h e prior q u e s t i o n . T h e n t h e y
might find it easier to draw the line, and find a footing on the slippery
slope.
T h e r e h a s been a great deal of controversy recently, especially in
c o n d u c t e d terribly old-fashioned,
and in p a r t i c u l a r t h e word
p h i l o s o p h e r s t o t h i n k t h a t t h e only q u e s t i o n s t h a t h a v e t o b e a n -
they escape and endanger the public; a great many of them are either
see i n due c o u r s e . B u t c e r t a i n l y t h e f a c t u a l q u e s t i o n s a r e t h e o n e s
not hopeless.
in fact to be.
(for e x a m p l e , by w a t c h i n g people's b e h a v i o u r at s c h o o l , t r u a n c y
being an obvious bad sign, which is said to be linked quite closely with
m e n s early, a n d c o n c e n t r a t e o u r e d u c a t i o n a l efforts o n t h o s e b o y s
and girls w h o have a good c h a n c e of turning into the sort of men and
into the armed forces and obeyed their orders, they would find them-
THE E N T E R P R I S E OF M O R A L P H I L O S O P H Y
I. 2. 5
I. 2 . 6
DEFENCE OF THE E N T E R P R I S E
37
T1I11 E N T E R P R I S E O F M O R A L P H I L O S O P H Y
1.2.6
t h e m o r a l words like 'good' and ' o u g h t ' a r c s u c h a s t o m a k e a r g u m e n t s of this sort valid or possible. T h e study of logic leads on inevitably to t h e study of l a n g u a g e . So in my first book I w a s rash
e n o u g h to define ethics as 'the logical study of the language of morals'
(LM Preface). For this I was taken to task, b e c a u s e it was t h o u g h t t h a t
I was a b e t t i n g t h e diversion of t h e activities of m o r a l p h i l o s o p h e r s
from s u b s t a n t i a l q u e s t i o n s of m o r a l i t y to w h a t were called verbal
q u e s t i o n s . B u t I hope it will be c l e a r by n o w that, if we a r e going to
have a hope of answering t h e s u b s t a n t i a l questions with any assurance, we shall have to tackle these verbal questions. For unless we understand fulhi what we. or what the opponents in a moral argument, or in a
theoretical argument about morals, are saying, we shall never be able to decide rationally any of the questions that arise.
S o . therefore, alongside t h e factual q u e s t i o n s t h a t have to be a n swered before we c a n make any progress with a moral problem, there
h a s to be put a n o t h e r class of q u e s t i o n : q u e s t i o n s about t h e m e a n ings of words. I have given the theoretical reason for this, namely t h a t
all argument, depends on logic, and what is or is not logically valid depends on what words m e a n . B u t I could equally well have quoted e m pirical e v i d e n c e . I f o n e looks a t a l m o s t a n y m o r a l a r g u m e n t , for
example those conducted in the correspondence columns of the
newspapers, o n e c a n n o t help noticing, interspersed a m o n g t h e factual a r g u m e n t s t h a t are b r o u g h t forward, frequent i n s t a n c e s w h e r e
t h e disputants are at cross-purposes owing to ambiguities in t h e use
of words. One of them, it may be, thinks t h a t some fact which he h a s
e s t a b l i s h e d proves s o m e m o r a l c o n c l u s i o n : his o p p o n e n t does n o t
t h i n k it proves a n y t h i n g of t h e kind. T h i s m a y be a sign merely that
they were understanding words in different senses.
So in t r y i n g to solve a m o r a l p r o b l e m we h a v e to get t h e facts
straight, and we have to be c l e a r about the m e a n i n g s of the words we
are using, including the m o r a l words. Only when we have done that
will it be clear w h e t h e r there are o t h e r questions that have to be a n swered w h i c h do not fall into either of these two classes. In particular,
only t h e n will it be clear w h e t h e r there is a residual class of ultimate
questions of value which are neither questions of fact nor questions
about the m e a n i n g s of words, and on which we c a n go on disagree-
1.2.6
DEFENCE OF THE E N T E R P R I S E
ing even w h e n we have agreed about t h e facts and a b o u t t h e m e a n ings of the words we are using.
So, really, investigation of the m e a n i n g s of the moral words plays a
key part in t h e study of m o r a l problems. It is only by u n d e r t a k i n g it
t h a t we s h a l l u n d e r s t a n d w h a t it is t h a t we a r e a r g u i n g a b o u t in a
m o r a l a r g u m e n t . A n d it is only by u n d e r t a k i n g it t h a t we shall find
out w h a t steps in t h e a r g u m e n t , if any, are valid. T h u s m o r a l philos o p h y t h e logical study o f t h e l a n g u a g e o f m o r a l s h a s a n indispensable p a r t to play in p r a c t i c a l m o r a l a r g u m e n t s . B u t it is also of
g r e a t i m p o r t a n c e t o e s t a b l i s h , a s only m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y c a n do,
w h e t h e r any m o r a l a r g u m e n t s a r e c o g e n t w h e t h e r , t h a t is to say,
m o r a l j u d g e m e n t s a r e t h e sort o f things o n e c a n a r g u e a b o u t a t all.
And this too c a n only be done by studying the moral words and their
logical properties.
2 . 7 . All this is so clearly true t h a t it really is surprising t h a t m a n y
writers have a t t a c k e d r e c e n t m o r a l philosophers for d i s c u s s i n g t h e
moral words, as if they o u g h t to have been discussing s o m e t h i n g else.
Certainly S o c r a t e s s t a r t e d t h e subject off by insisting on a study of
the m o r a l words, as 1 h a v e already m e n t i o n e d . Aristotle says of h i m
that h e was 'busying himself with m o r a l questions . . . and directing
the mind for t h e first time to definitions' {Met. 9 8 7 i ff.).
b
We m i g h t feel inclined to retort to those w h o a t t a c k m o r a l philosophy in this way. t h a t they dislike our studying t h e m o r a l words a n d
their m e a n i n g s b e c a u s e they do not want us to u n d e r s t a n d w h a t we
are saying w h e n we engage in moral a r g u m e n t t h a t they think that,
in moral matters, there is safety in obscurity. Undoubtedly there are a
lot of people going around in this area who positively prefer obscurity
to clarity. B u t to m a k e this a g e n e r a l a c c u s a t i o n would be unfair.
T h e r e are others w h o a t t a c k modern moral philosophy for a m o r e res p e c t a b l e r e a s o n t h o u g h n o t a n entirely c o g e n t o n e . T h e y t h i n k ,
rightly, t h a t t h e r e a r e i m p o r t a n t m o r a l q u e s t i o n s o f s u b s t a n c e t h a t
we have to answer, and t h a t moral philosophers o u g h t to be helping
us to answer t h e m . W i t h this we c a n agree. B u t t h e n they go on to say
that therefore moral philosophers ought to go straight on to t h e questions o f s u b s t a n c e , a n d n o t get side-tracked i n t o q u e s t i o n s a b o u t
m e a n i n g . T h e i r m i s t a k e i s n o t t o see t h a t t h e m o r a l p h i l o s o p h e r ' s
<>
T H E E N T E R P R I S E OF M O R A L P H I L O S O P H Y
I. 2. 7
distinctive c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e s u b s t a n t i v e m o r a l
questions is the investigation of the words and concepts, and thus the
logic, t h a t are being employed. If t h e y ask t h e m o r a l philosopher to
leave this c o n c e p t u a l discussion and get on to t h e substantial issues,
they a r e asking him to stop being a m o r a l philosopher. But I believe
that the conceptual discussion can c o n t r i b u t e to the practical discussion, and that I have shown this in my writings on practical issues. I
shall try to placate these opponents of modern moral philosophy by
discussing the theoretical issues always in relation to their bearing on
practical questions. I hope t h a t we shall end up seeing that t h e o r y is
relevant to practice.
1.2 Intuitionism
/
i.nObjectivistic
,.
naturalism
1.12 Sub......
icctivistic
' ,
..
naturalism
2. Non-descriptivism
P A R T II
THE AXEL HAGERSTROM LECTURES
A T A X O N O M Y OF E T H I C A L
THEORIES
^~ ..
2.22?
TAXONOMY
3.1.
I MUST s t a r t by s a y i n g h o w happy I a m t o be a d d r e s s i n g a
Swedish a u d i e n c e again on a topic in ethical theory. It is never difficult in Sweden, as it h a s b e c o m e in m a n y parts of t h e world, to find
s e r i o u s p h i l o s o p h e r s w h o a r e able t o discuss t h e s e q u e s t i o n s w i t h
clarity and rigour. I am also p a r t i c u l a r l y delighted to be giving l e c tures dedicated to t h e m e m o r y of Axel H a g e r s t r o m . He c o u l d justly
be called t h e pioneer, in r e c e n t times, of e t h i c a l non-descriptivism,
t h o u g h in fact views of this sort have a long history (see H 1 9 9 8 ) . He
X
X
-/
J
X
X
Subjeetivistic
naturalism
J
X
X
J
X
Intuitionism Emotivism
V
x
J
J
J
J
J
X
X X
X X
A T A X O N O M Y OF E T H I C A L T H E O R I E S
44
II. 3- i
II. 5. 1
TAXONOMY
45
t a n c e . For o n e o f t h e c h i e f t h i n g s t h a t i s d e m a n d e d o f t h e m o r a l
moral arguments, to learn how to tell good from bad ones. In this task
ethical theory, which reveals the logic of the moral concepts, is an es-
sential tool.
e s s e n t i a l prescriptive e l e m e n t i n t h e m e a n i n g o f m o r a l s t a t e m e n t s
ethical theory, as I am using the term, is not. Many writers now use
thing goes.
A T A X O N O M Y OF E T H I C A L T H E O R I E S
II. 3 . 1
II. 3. 2
TAXONOMY
47
merely what species of ethical theory there have been, but what
So w h a t I shall be a t t e m p t i n g in these lectures will be very a m b i tious (perhaps dangerously so). I shall try to show, in t h e c a s e of e a c h
and improve them, and end up with a theory thai satisfies all the re-
quirements.
his view of the relations between the two disciplines was the s a m e as
one. B u t I am m o r e optimistic.
levels: for example, 'family'. I do not think that Aristotle would have
m o n l y c h o o s e a m i s l e a d i n g o n e . n a m e l y w h e t h e r , a c c o r d i n g to a
A T A X O N O M Y OF E T H I C A L T H E O R I E S
II- 3- 2
H. 3- 3
TAXONOMY
49
moral properties (II 1976/), 19X50. 1995/)). If 1 demur to the claim that
that there are uny facts in the world. T h e world consists of things, not
directly b y t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s . T h i s leaves, a s a n o t h e r c o n s t i t u e n t o f
m e a n i n g , t h e s y n t a c t i c a l properties of s e n t e n c e s . For e x a m p l e , if a
conditionsbut not in the simple way that some people might think.
tions are.
conditions (H 19910, 1993,0. 1995b). This was the basis of the old veri-
ample, a s w e h a v e s e e n , t h e distinction b e t w e e n s t r o n g a n d w e a k
but which is now in disrepute in its early simple form which claimed
verbs is not ( 1 . 3 ) . If I say 'the sun shined' instead of 'the sun s h o n e ' , I
But s o m e a r e r e l e v a n t . T h e clearest e x a m p l e i s t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e -
' M e a n i n g ' has here to be understood as including both sense and ref-
'You will not stay here', but not from the imperative 'Go' to the indic-
people who have thought this, the victims of what Austin called 'the
of a n y p a r t i c u l a r t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s . So it is n o t t r u e , on a n y at all
t h e m e a n i n g of m o r a l s e n t e n c e s is entirely d e t e r m i n e d by t h e t r u t h
in the case of ordinary factual statements it is true that they get their
A T A X O N O M Y OF E T H I C A L T H E O R I E S
II. 3. 3
H. 3- 3
TAXONOMY
5i
c o n d i t i o n s , b e c a u s e t h e y just c a n n o t b e t r u e o r false. I m p e r a t i v e
h a s been effective: but 'You have been warned' simply reports t h e per-
f o r m a n c e of an i l l o c u t i o n a r y act, w h e t h e r or n o t t h e addressee h a s
actually been put on his guard.
3.4.
and Vanderveken 1985: 7.1 have called these in 1.3. H 19890 tropics. I
think Alston and Searle are right to say that there is a wide sense of
s t a t e m e n t h a s t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s (for non-descriptivists c a n a g r e e t o
erties o f s e n t e n c e s e x p r e s s i n g m o r a l s t a t e m e n t s m a k e t h e i r i l l o c u -
different illocutionary forces. For example 'You will go' could express
descriptivist can agree to); but further, that these truth conditions are
where you get money, so. equally, the word 'will' could be the sign of
ent from that in which the speaker intended it would have misunder-
t o b e used with t h e s a m e m e a n i n g , a l t h o u g h t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s
stood his meaning: the speaker was intending to perform one kind of
may vary ( 7 . 3 , H 1 9 9 3 9 , 1 9 9 5 b ) -
A T A X O N O M Y 0 1 - E T H I C A L THI-ORIKS
H. 3- 4
II. 3. 4
TAXONOMY
53
b y S t e v e n s o n ( 1 9 4 5 : 6 2 ) . H e d i s t i n g u i s h e d b e t w e e n the descriptive
qualities; they were, for me, the truth conditions of the s t a t e m e n t that
I made. T h a t is, if the person had not had these features, I would not
have made the statement, and if she had them, my existing moral
' p r a g m a t i c s ' which play such a large part in Stevenson's theory, and
is kind a n d g e n e r o u s , a n d does n o t c h e a t at c a r d s . If s h e c h e a t e d , I
tween t h e descriptive a n d t h e e v a l u a t i v e m e a n i n g o f m o r a l s t a t e -
would not call her a good person, and if she were n o t kind a n d gener-
ous I would not either. And of course we have to add to these qualities
B u t n o w suppose t h a t m y s t a n d a r d s c h a n g e . P e r h a p s I h a v e b e -
a n d t h a t k i n d n e s s a n d g e n e r o s i t y are a sign of w e a k - m i n d e d n e s s . I
c o n d i t i o n s of a m o r a l s t a t e m e n t h a v e c h a n g e d , its m e a n i n g as a
T h i s would n o t be so if t h e m e a n i n g of my words h a d e n t i r e l y
pressions like 'good'. Only philosophers with axes to grind deny this.
ment.
A T A X O N O M Y OF E T H I C A L T H E O R I E S
54
II. 3- 4
II-3-5
TAXONOMY
from t h e i r s y n t a c t i c a l features ( w h i c h m a y d e t e r m i n e t h e i r i l l o c u -
of m e a n i n g for m o r a l s t a t e m e n t s is t h e i r t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s . T h i s is
w h a t t h e n o n - d e s c r i p t i v i s t denies. H e t h i n k s , o n t h e c o n t r a r y , t h a t
e v a l u a t i v e m e a n i n g is s e c o n d a r y to t h e i r descriptive: b u t t h a t will
the sense that it still makes the s a m e evaluation of the s a m e act, per-
t h a t c o u l d n e v e r h a p p e n with o r d i n a r y descriptive o r f a c t u a l s t a t e -
1.5.
different s t a t e m e n t . W i t h m o r a l s t a t e m e n t s , by c o n t r a s t , ' S h e is a
ing it wrong.
also n o t b e t h e c a s e , a s w e s h a l l see, o n a n o b j e c t i v i s t i c n a t u r a l i s t
statements, and then a second stage in which we use this general for-
ing s o m e s u b s t a n t i a l m o r a l c l a i m s w h i c h is w h a t you a r e a l w a y s
doing when you are giving the truth conditions of moral statements.
T h e y a r e t h e very s a m e s t a n d a r d s a s t h o s e b y w h i c h w e m a k e t h e
different forms, is i n a d e q u a t e , I s h a l l t h e r e b y h a v e s h o w n t h a t o n e
claim.
1 said earlier that a descriptivist is s o m e o n e who thinks that, apart
A T A X O N O M Y OF E T H I C A L T H E O R I E S
II.
II. .V 6
TAXONOMY
57
too.
respective standards are the right ones. And about the word 'right' as
these issues those people have w h o think (as many beginner students
disputed.
but that the important issue between descriplivisls and non-descriptivists is not settled thereby (H 1995/). 1 9 9 M .
T h e i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n . I said, w a s w h e t h e r t h e r e a r e good a n d
bad w a y s of r e a s o n i n g a b o u t all t h e s e m a t t e r s : a b o u t w h e t h e r t h e
standards and truth conditions that are being used are t h e ones t h a t
t r u e . T h i s c o m e s t o t h e s a m e a s a s k i n g h o w w e c a n rightly r e a s o n
shall return to it ( 7 . 8 ) .
s a m e with it as I have just been doing with t h e word ' t r u e ' . You re-
the word 'true' h a s also certain formal properties which we must not
And this made his statement true according to the standards or truth
tion of the word 'true', which was first, I think, brought into the open
h a s been n e g l e c t e d . B u t t h e m o r e h a r d - b i t t e n person w h o c o n t r a -
A T A X O N O M Y OF E T H I C A L T H E O R I E S
II. 3- 7
II. 3. 7
TAXONOMY
59
and 'right', both of which are used for endorsing: but these I have dis-
s o m e o n e else says 'No, the sky is not blue', then we are indeed c o n t r a -
If I say that ;> (some statement) is true. I thereby endorse it. But it is
to endorse the statement that p (the statement that I have just made).
s e n s e s . W e c a n n o t c o n s i s t e n t l y a g r e e a b o u t t h e descriptive state o f
the sky and use the words in the same senses and still contradict e a c h
the statement 'pbul I don't believe that /;'. If I said '/>. but it is not true
2.72).
a b o u t . B u t in t h e 'good p e r s o n ' c a s e it m i g h t be t h a t we a g r e e d e x -
the things I said earlier about the variability of the truth conditions of
haved like that. By 'behaved like that' I m e a n that, for example, they
something which one can endorse, and which, if one can endorse it.
this could be so. even though different people might be using different
tress and did not hide cards in their sleeves in order to win the game.
moral statements behave just like any other kind of statement; but we
differ in that the truth conditions being used by one speaker may dif-
have truth conditions; and they have ( 4 ) these particular truth condi-
tions; bul in addition the illocutionary force requires (5) that they be
We may contrast this with what happens with ordinary purely de-
t h e truth c o n d i t i o n s , and s o w h a t r e m a i n s o f t h e m e a n i n g ( t h e
A T A X O N O M Y OF E T H I C A L T H E O R I E S
do
II. 3- 7
II. v S
TAXONOMY
6i
the two parties even t h o u g h they are using the words with different
7 o . FR 10.2).
( 1 9 X 5 : 1 4 0 ff.). O n e p a r t i c u l a r a r g u m e n t o f t h o s e w h o c l a i m this
People w h o d i s a g r e e with m y a n a l y s i s o f e v a l u a t i v e s e n -
3.8.
qualities very like them, so that people w h o do esteem them are likely
to esteem that person too. and call him kind. I c a n see no difficulty in
my predicting that this is what they will do. In order to m a k e this pre-
only have to be confident that they will. I find it surprising that people
gives much of his money to relieve distress. Nearly all of us would say
about t h e b e h a v i o u r o f t h e s e s e c o n d a r i l y e v a l u a t i v e o r t h i c k c o n -
and thin concepts: see LM 7.5. FR 2 . 7 . But they found them attractive
pected by most people in those called kind: he would be able to use the
of the word. Yet they are also, in their n o r m a l use. undeniably evalu-
h2
H-3-
nearly everyone to be c o m m e n d i n g h i m . So it is easy to see why descriptivists latched on to these words in the hope of casting doubt on
non-descriptivist theories. B u t a little m o r e attention to t h e analysis
NAT UR A L I S M
s h o w n , how the two e l e m e n t s in the m e a n i n g of these words are related and how they can be distinguished.
A T A X O N O M Y OF F i l l I t ' A I, T I I H O R I F S
II. 4-
II. 4. 1
N ATT IK A l . I S M
n o n - n a t u r a l i s t : I r e j e c t n a t u r a l i s m . B u t if I called myself a n o n -
ists. that is. with the kind of tlescriptivisls who reject naturalism (such
ments c a n be specified without using any moral terms, and those, the
intuitionisl ones, which say that they c a n n o t , f shall now try to show
that both these kinds of descriptivism. the naturalist kind and the in-
h a s to think that there are these siii generis properties like goodness
and wrongness which people, actions, etc. can have. T h e only defini-
tion that can be given of them is negative: we can say that a natural-
n e w n a t u r a l i s m s a r e n o t so different as is c o m m o n l y supposed;
ist is s o m e o n e w h o t h i n k s t h a t t h e truth c o n d i t i o n s of m o r a l
n a t u r a l i s m s . I d i s c u s s in t h e s a m e paper t h e w h o l e q u e s t i o n of
s c a n d a l o u s in this. P h i l o s o p h e r s c o n t i n u e to a r g u e about w h e t h e r
using other modal terms in the delinilion. In both the moral and the
modal cases the issue is w h e t h e r we can ever break out of the circle.
subject called 'deontic logic'. Deontic modalities like 'ought' have a lot
and the different sorts of modal logic which deal with these kinds of
n a t u r a l i s t . O t h e r kinds o f n a t u r a l i s t specify t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s o f
moral s t a t e m e n t s i n t e r m s o f t h e a l t i t u d e s , e t c . o f t h e people w h o
hh
A T A X O N O M Y OH E T H I C A L T H E O R I E S
II. 4- 2.
II. 4. 2
NATURALISM
67
for short I shall in what follows call objectivist naturalism simply 'nat-
be able to specify the sorts of actions to which they apply the words in
Suppose, therefore, that we were to try to find out what these truth
thing. We shall have discovered a rule for the application of the predi-
(hen have established J/JC truth conditions of the statements. But how
c a s e of predicates in g e n e r a l , we do it by e x a m i n i n g t h e l i n g u i s t i c
usage of native speakers of the language; and I can see no reason for
any different with moral predicates. Indeed, this seems to be the only
the English word 'red', for example, and t h u s find out the truth condi-
speak it). We shall discover that native speakers of English apply the
m e n t s c o n t a i n i n g the predicate ' w r o n g ' (in its moral use) are these:
b e c a u s e S w e d e n h a s a fairly h o m o g e n e o u s m o r a l c u l t u r e , a n d it
them, and false if in them the predicate 'wrong' is applied to the sorts
might be. though I rather doubt it. that all native speakers of Swedish
apply the word ' w r o n g ' to the very s a m e sorts of things. But even in
mals. 1 am quite sure that I shall tind m a n y Swedes w h o say that this
A T A X O N O M Y 0 1 ' K I T I I C A 1 , T111- O R I L S
W-4-2
is not wrong, but some w h o say that it is wrong. With English this is
even more obvious. There are a great m a n y kinds of thing which sonic
English speakers call wrong but others do not. Think, for example, of
abortion, or of lighting in wars ( 2 . 2 . 6 . 9 ) . So we shall not lind a single
rule for the correct application of the word (a set of truth conditions
for statements containing it) which will do for us what the rule for the
use of 'red' did. We shall not find a rule, that is. by c o n f o r m i n g to
w h i c h we c a n be sure of m a k i n g true moral s t a t e m e n t s . Rather, we
shall find a great m a n y rules, i n c o n s i s t e n t with one a n o t h e r , and
shall simply not know, by this method, how to use the word.
I want to ask. what is the status of these conflicting rules for the
use of w r o n g ? f o l l o w i n g the n a t u r a l i s t s , we have been a s s u m i n g
t h a t what we were discovering was a rule for the c o r r e c t application
of the word, and n o t h i n g m o r e , lint we now see that t h a t was not
what we were discovering. At least, if we were discovering a rule for
the correct application of the word, it was not a purely linguistic rule.
It was in fact a substantial moral rule ( 1 9 9 6 J ) . If one lot of people say
that abortion is wrong and a n o t h e r lot say it is not wrong, they a r e
not differing merely in their linguistic usage. They are expressing different m o r a l opinions. T h i s s h o w s very clearly w h a t is w r o n g with
n a t u r a l i s m . W h a t is w r o n g is that it pretends that w h a t a r e in fact
substantial moral principles are n o t h i n g more than linguistic rules.
Naturalism confuses learning morals with learning a language. Hut
the two are very different. If I have grown up thinking that abortion
is w r o n g . I have a c q u i r e d m o r e t h a n a m e r e linguistic skill. 1 have
acquired a moral principle, an attitude to abortion.
4. J. Now I think you will be able In see why the naturalist kind of
descriptivism leads inevitably to relativism (II 1995.'/)- T h e r e a r e in
most languages words which we translate 'wrong'. These words are,
as they are used, rough equivalents to one another. But the cultures
that use these words call quite different things wrong, hi one culture,
for example, it may be t h o u g h t wrong not to light for o n e ' s country,
in a n o t h e r more pacific culture it may be thought wrong to fight. T h e
important t h i n g to get hold of is t h a i , a l t h o u g h the people in t h e s e
cultures hold different opinions about the wrongness of lighting, they
may be using the word 'wrong', or its equivalents, in the s a m e sense.
M.4.3
NATURALISM
A T A X O N O M Y OF F T H I C A F THHORIFS
7<>
II. 4 3
II. 4. 4
NATURALISM
71
demn it. in which case his theory lands him in relativism. Or he says
hard to say what he thinks ' w r o n g ' does m e a n . And even if he says
people who call the act of fighting w r o n g and people w h o call it not
wrong are both right. They could both be right if the word m e a n s dif-
ferent things in the two cultures. But this loo is a kind of relativism.
about it now.
g u m e n t s like the one I have just been setting out it is simply assumed
reply that at any rate they are a special kind of word, which is distin-
colour words, fall into this class. For example, h o w do we tell w h a t ob-
jects people apply the word 'red' to? Redness is on the face of it an ob-
demning it.
for c o m m e n d i n g . To cite a c o m m o n n o n - m o r a l e x a m p l e (H 1 9 9 6 c :
sea. But there is a difference between saying that the hotel faces the
the fact that the hotel faces the sea c o m m e n d s it to someone depends
the word correctly to describe objects which they mistakenly think are
on whether he likes hotels t h a t face the sea. A person w h o did not like
red. It is t h e i r o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t is at fault, n o t t h e i r u s e of t h e l a n -
such hotels could without contradiction say that the hotel faced the
guage.
that it was a good hotel and still m a i n t a i n that it was not a good one.
of the word 'red' (that is, uses of it with a different m e a n i n g from that
II-4-S
II.4. 5
NATURALISM
7?
one of the things called wrong, they c a n simply write the deviant off
only standard uses of the words we are investigating: that is. only uses
which are free from both linguistic and observational mistakes. And
the only way. so far as I c a n see. to tell which uses are standard and
give up saying that moral properties are like secondary qualities such
as 'red'.
longer have, for our present purposes, to distinguish between use and
application.
speakers who all apply the word 'red' to the same objects, 'the s a m e '
but b e c a u s e t h e y a r e infractions o f s o m e h i g h e r a n d m o r e g e n e r a l
misses, that they are wrong. If this were so. then there would not, at
t h e m o r a l i t y o f fighting o r o f a b o r t i o n , b u t o n l y b e c a u s e t h e y dis-
perhaps true, though it has been argued (Lewis and Woodfield 19X5)
that the claim is not without its difficulties. So let us ask what would
needs: they differ only in that one side thinks that abortion (or light-
ing) would have this result, and the other thinks it would not.
which brings out well the difficulties of sustaining Ibis kind of objec-
for the word 'wrong', as I showed earlier. And in each of the cultures
word wrong', according to which this (not loving our enemies) is not
remarks, not for the first time, about the word 'needs' (see H 1979/1)-
74
A T A X O N O M Y OF E T H I C A L T H E O R I E S
II. 4- 6
T h e r e i s a dispute b e t w e e n t h o s e w h o t h i n k t h a t n e e d s c a n b e
absolute a n d those w h o t h i n k t h a t all needs are relative to s o m e end.
T h a t is. do all things needed have to be needed for s o m e purpose, or
c a n they be just needed? Certainly s o m e are needed for a purpose. For
example, I need transport to get to Stockholm; if I were n o t going a n y where. I would not need transport. Are there things needed w h i c h we
do not need in order to do anything, or for any purpose? Etymology is
on the side of those who deny this. T h e word 'need' in languages akin
to G e r m a n is closely linked with words for necessity. 'Need' in G e r m a n
is 'Not', and this is c o g n a t e with 'notwendig' and 'ntig', both m e a n i n g
' n e c e s s a r y ' . T h e s a m e is true of Latin. This seems to indicate t h a t for
something to be a need is for it to be a necessary condition for obtaining something else.;
On t h e o t h e r side, t h e r e a r e c e r t a i n l y i n s t a n c e s in w h i c h we say
t h a t s o m e b o d y needs s o m e t h i n g , b u t i n w h i c h the q u e s t i o n ' W h a t
for?' s e e m s out of place. If s o m e b o d y is 'in dire n e e d ' b e c a u s e of
poverty, it is easy to think t h a t he (or she) 'just needs' food, or help of
s o m e other kind. But this is a rather superficial argument. Obviously
he needs food, say, in order to survive. So far the need is relative to an
e n d . B u t . it will be said, everybody needs to survive; so t h e r e is an
a b s o l u t e need to survive lying b e h i n d the relative n e e d for food.
However, this is a mistake. Not everybody needs to survive. S o m e terminal patients in pain do not w a n t to live, and would not say t h a t they
needed to live. Living is for t h e m not a n e c e s s a r y condition for a n y thing else that they want.
One might try to get over this difficulty by putting, in place of 'survival', s o m e m o r e g e n e r a l t e r m like ' h u m a n flourishing'. T h i s w a s
first introduced, I think, as a translation of Aristotle's key term 'eudaimonid', c o m m o n l y b u t i n c o r r e c t l y t r a n s l a t e d h a p p i n e s s ' . I h a v e
a l r e a d y m e n t i o n e d b o t h t e r m s . B u t A r i s t o t l e h i m s e l f n o t e s t h e indeterminacy of m e a n i n g of such phrases. He says:
since all knowledge and choice aims at some good, what is it at which we say
politics aims, and what do we say is the highest of goods achieved by action?
In name, at any rate, we might almost say that it is agreed by the great majority. For both the many and the better sort say it is eudaimoni, and they un-
II. 4. 6
NATURALISM
75
derstand 'living well' and 'doing well' as the same as this. But about what eudaimonia is, they disagree, and the many do not give the same answer as the
wise. (Eth. Nic. K>95 i4 ff.)
a
76
A T A X O N O M Y OF E T H I C A L T H E O R I E S
II. 4. 6
II. 4. 7
NATURALISM
77
ever anybody's aims or purposes are. But if w h a t I have just been say-
ments (the application rules for m o r a l words) will vary from o n e per-
t i c u l a r kinds of n a t u r a l i s m , I h a v e n o t precluded t h e r e b e i n g s o m e
n o t t h i n k t h a t a n y b o d y would a g r e e t h a t t h a t is w h a t t h e y mean by
1 9 9 6 c ) . B u t t h e r e a r e still s o m e t h i n g s w r o n g w i t h it, a n d I d o u b t
A T A X O N O M Y OF E T H I C A L T H E O R I E S
II. 4-7
II. 4. 7
NATURALISM
79
m o n language. How this is to be done, I shall leave until later (7.4 ff.).
s u b s t a n c e w h i c h d o n o t b e l o n g t h e r e . T h e n a t u r a l i s t , for e x a m p l e ,
principles o f s u b s t a n c e , w h i c h c o n d e m n o n e kind o f b e h a v i o u r a n d
he is saying t h a t we have in a given culture to follow t h e rules of application of t h e m o r a l words in use in t h a t culture; a n d h e n c e , if t h e
ing of such words as 'right' and ' w r o n g ' and 'ought' as equivalent to
o f w h a t t h e n a t u r a l i s t s a y s ) , t h e m e m b e r s o f e a c h c u l t u r e will b e
v a r i o u s kinds of u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e prescriptions or p r o h i b i t i o n s , a n d
t h a t w h a t e v e r a n y b o d y says is w r o n g is w r o n g , a n d t h e s a m e for
c e r n e d m o r e w i t h t h e t h e o r e t i c a l troubles it gets i n t o . In p r a c t i c e , if
we were relativists, we should stop being able to say t h a t people w h o
8o
A T A X O N O M Y OF E T H I C A L T H E O R I E S
II. 4- 8
II. 4. 8
NATURALISM
8i
be rejected too.
II. 5. 1
5
INTUITIONISM
5 . 1 . IN this chapter I have to deal with the second of the two possible
types of descriptivism. w h i c h for w a n t of a better n a m e I am calling
'inluitionism'. You will r e m e m b e r t h a t I distinguished this from natu r a l i s m , the o t h e r type of descriptivism. N a t u r a l i s m , I said, is t h e
view that the truth conditions of m o r a l statements, which according
to descriptivism determine their m e a n i n g , have to be the possession
by actions, people, etc. of n o n - m o r a l propertiesthat is, of properties
specifiable in morally n e u t r a l terms. By contrast, inluitionism is t h e
view t h a t they are t h e p o s s e s s i o n of specifically m o r a l , sui generis
properties which c a n n o t be defined without introducing some moral
term into the dejiniens.
This m e a n s that the intuitionist is faced with a difficulty w h i c h the
n a t u r a l i s t e s c a p e s . How is he to specify t h e s e properties, or t h e s e
truth conditions, if he is forbidden to do so in non-moral terms? To revert to the project of linguistic research which I described in the last
chapter: suppose that we are trying to determine what are the truth
conditions, even within a single culture using a single language, of a
m o r a l s t a t e m e n t . If we were t r y i n g to be naturalists, we could proceed as we do with o r d i n a r y n o n - m o r a l words. We could, t h a t is to
say, look and see to w h a t things people in the culture applied t h e m ,
and then say t h a t t h a t was their c o r r e c t application. T h i s would involve being able to recognize the things the words were applied to as
belonging to a determinate class. And the naturalist (at least the objectivist n a t u r a l i s t t h a t we considered in C h a p t e r 4) would have to
c l a i m t h a t this could be done objectively. We could, I argued, do this
with the word 'red' if t h e r e were a standard application of the word
in the language. But if we a r e intuitionists. h o w are we to recognize
the class of acts that a word like ' w r o n g ' is applied to by speakers of
the language? For on the face of it people speaking the s a m e l a n g u a g e
INTUITIONISM
83
A T A X O N O M Y OF E T H I C A L T H E O R I E S
II. 5- 2
II. 5. 2
INTUITIONISM
85
86
A T A X O N O M Y OF E T H I C A L T H E O R I E S
IL 5- I
II. 5- 3
INTUITIONISM
87
d e m n murder, for e x a m p l e ( t h o u g h w h a t t h e y c o u n t a s m u r d e r
m o r a l t h i n k e r s i n all c u l t u r e s c o m i n g t o t h e s a m e c o n c l u s i o n s . T h i s
vious t h a t different m o r a l o p i n i o n s a r e i n n a t e in t h e m e m b e r s of
w e m i g h t a g r e e a t least t h a t t h e r e i s a n i n n a t e disposition t o t h i n k
w r o n g n e s s , for e x a m p l e , is a c o m m o n property s h a r e d by m a n y a c -
son's morality, but at least partly determines its form. This would tally
with Chomsky's view that there are 'universals' (as they are called) of
t u r e s ( 1 9 6 5 : 3 5 ) . A c c o r d i n g to this s u g g e s t i o n , there is a c o m m o n
m i g h t c o m e t o d o u b t its reliability i f o u r m o r a l o p i n i o n s c o n f l i c t e d
c o n s i s t e n t with my o w n , b u l I e x p r e s s no opinion on w h e t h e r it is
people t h a t we respected.
to adapt particular o p i n i o n s to c o n f o r m to t h e o t h e r s : b u t if a n y o n e
c o n d i t i o n s o f m o r a l s t a t e m e n t s i s n o t o u r o w n individual faculty o f
r e c o g n i t i o n o f m o r a l properties, b u t r a t h e r a c o n s e n s u s o f like-
88
A T A X O N O M Y OF E T H I C A L T H E O R I E S
II-5-4
INTUITIONISM
II. 5. 4
89
h a s frequently h a p p e n e d i n a r g u m e n t s b e t w e e n t h e m a n d t h e i r
i n t u i t i o n s are a reliable s o u r c e of m o r a l t r u t h , o n e or o t h e r p a r t y
o u r o w n it is likely to cover a g r e a t m a n y q u e s t i o n s , s o m e of t h e m
f u n d a m e n t a l . However, if any of t h e s e c o m m o n m o r a l o p i n i o n s is
from Dryden:
the other not; for this further intuition could in turn be challenged by
t h e party w h o h a d been put down by it. And it would be no better to
call in t h e intuitions of third or fourth parties, for they too could be
c h a l l e n g e d in t h e s a m e way. S o , t h e objection goes on, i n t u i t i o n i s m
m o m e n t t h a t i n t u i t i o n s will be found w h i c h a r e c o m m o n to m o s t or
only those of 'thoughtful and well-educated people' (W. 1). Ross 1930:
w h o have not been well educated. B u t recall what I said earlier about
e v e n if t h i s is so, if a n y b o d y were to c h a l l e n g e t h i s c o n s e n s u s , we
true that people's intuitions (that is their moral convictions) will vary
m o s t people h a v e t h e i n t u i t i o n s , a n d w e say t h a t t h o s e w h o d o n o t
start, we supposed, w i t h no d e t e r m i n a t e m o r a l o p i n i o n s . If t h i s is
to fighting or to m e a t - e a t i n g or to abortion, t h e r e is no c o n s e n s u s to
9(>
A T A X O N O M Y OF KTHICAL T H E O R I E S
H- 5- 4
II-
5-
INTUITIONISM
91
n o t by i n t u i t i o n . I n t u i t i o n by itself is no prophylactic a g a i n s t r e l a -
tivism.
n a t u r a l i s m called s u b j e c t i v i s m . We h a v e n o w r e a c h e d a p o i n t at
e t h i c a l t h e o r y in my n a r r o w s e n s e , b e c a u s e it is a b o u t m a t t e r s of
m o r a l s u b s t a n c e ( a b o u t w h a t w e o u g h t t o do) and n o t a b o u t w h a t
ing a s t a t e m e n t o f p s y c h o l o g i c a l fact a b o u t y o u r s . B u t t h e s e
s t a t e m e n t s t h a t t h e a c t i s w r o n g , and t h a t t h e a c t i s n o t w r o n g , a r e
n o t c o n s i s t e n t w i t h e a c h other. T h e s u b j e c t i v i s t m u s t t h e r e f o r e b e
S u b j e c t i v i s m is a form of n a t u r a l i s m , b e c a u s e it gives t h e t r u t h
m e n t verifiable e i t h e r by i n t r o s p e c t i o n or by o b s e r v a t i o n of my
ferent ways in which the fact of moral disagreement figures in the ar-
g u m e n t s a g a i n s t objectivistic n a t u r a l i s m , subjectivistic n a t u r a l i s m ,
ions, any attempt to establish a single set of truth conditions for moral
92
A T A X O N O M Y OF E T H I C A L T H E O R I E S
II. 5. 6
II- 5- 7
INTUITIONISM
93
w h o was thinking of driving away from a petrol station without paying. W h a t , I asked, is the difference, o t h e r t h a n a merely verbal one,
between w h a t intuitionists say about this situation and w h a t subjectivists say? Certainly t h e experience t h a t t h e y a r e b o t h a t t r i b u t i n g to
the person is the s a m e . It is the having of an attitude of disapproval,
or the having of a conviction t h a t the act would be wrong; b u t w h a t
is the difference? I c a n see no objection to saying t h a t those w h o have
moral convictions have moral attitudes, and vice versa. It o u g h t to be
a g r e e d o n all sides t h a t t h e p e r s o n i n m y e x a m p l e h a s b o t h t h e s e
things, or r a t h e r t h a t they are the s a m e thing.
T h e i n t u i t i o n i s t s a r e relying, in order to give us k n o w l e d g e of
moral truths, on a certain experience, which they call the having of a
m o r a l intuition. B u t the trouble i s t h a t s u c h e x p e r i e n c e s a r e s o m e t h i n g subjective. If I have this e x p e r i e n c e , t h e n I have it; t h e r e is a b solutely n o t h i n g t h a t c a n be appealed to, outside the experience itself,
w h i c h could s h o w w h e t h e r it was really so or n o t . If I have this e x perience. I c a n n o t be mistaken in thinking t h a t I have it. This, indeed,
is the a t t r a c t i o n , in o n e way, of the intuitionist theory, j u s t as it was
the attraction of the sense-datum theories t h a t used to be so popular
in epistemology. Here is s o m e t h i n g t h a t c a n n o t be disputed: I have
the experience called ' a n intuition t h a t a c e r t a i n a c t would be wrong',
and t h a t is all t h e r e is to be said. W h a t e v e r m a y h a p p e n to anybody
else, I have this e x p e r i e n c e , and, on t h e s t r e n g t h of it, a c c o r d i n g to
the intuitionists. I am entitled to say t h a t the act would be wrong.
But for this indisputability of t h e i n t u i t i o n we pay t o o h e a v y a
price. For i f n o t h i n g outside t h e e x p e r i e n c e c a n c o u n t a g a i n s t t h e
existence of the intuitionif, t h a t is to say, the m e r e having of the experience is t h e g u a r a n t e e t h a t it e x i s t s t h e n , by t h e s a m e token, it
c a n n o t tell us a b o u t a n y t h i n g outside the a c t u a l experience. All t h a t
we c a n be c e r t a i n of, by having this experience, is t h a t we have it.
W h a t this c o m e s to is that, for all the sound a n d fury t h a t went on
in the battle between the people w h o called themselves 'objectivists'
(that is, the intuitionists) and those w h o m they called 'subjectivists',
t h e r e was n o t h i n g o f s u b s t a n c e t h a t really divided t h e m . T h e intuitionists thought that, a c c o r d i n g to their theory, to say t h a t an a c t is
w r o n g was n o t j u s t to report on a subjective fact. B u t they were n o t
94
A T A X O N O M Y OF E T H I C A L T H E O R I E S
II. 5- 7
justified in saying this. For according to their theory the m e r e o c c u r r e n c e o f t h e e x p e r i e n c e w h i c h t h e y called a n intuition ( a n d w h i c h
II- 5- 7
INTUITIONISM
95
tion o f t h e m o r a l s t a t e m e n t . B u t i f so. t h e n t h e m o r a l s t a t e m e n t
g u a r a n t e e i n g n e s s is w h a t is really c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of intuition. T h e r e
a r e o t h e r kinds of o b j e c t i v i s m . I h a v e a l r e a d y talked a b o u t o b j e c t -
c u r r e n c e o f t h e e x p e r i e n c e g u a r a n t e e s t h e truth o f t h e m o r a l state-
ivistic n a t u r a l i s m , a n d w h e n I c o m e o n i n l a t e r c h a p t e r s t o n o n -
t a i n , at t h e s a m e t i m e as t h e position I h a v e just b e e n d i s c u s s i n g
a n t e e i n g n e s s o f m o r a l intuitions t h a t intuitionists h a v e t o h a n g o n
to, if t h e y a r e going to r e t a i n w h a t is e s s e n t i a l in i n t u i t i o n i s m . B u t
and the other its negation (for example, that an act is wrong, a n d t h a t
sistently to agree with both their statements. I hope you will note t h a t
q u a t e t a x o n o m y of e t h i c a l t h e o r i e s . It c o n c e r n s a division b e t w e e n
t h e e x p e r i e n c e g u a r a n t e e s t h e t r u t h o f t h e m o r a l s t a t e m e n t . For i f
m i s t a k e n a b o u t that. If he w e r e s a y i n g m o r e , t h e n t h e m e r e o c c u r -
o n e of t h e m t h a t an act is w r o n g , a n d t h e o t h e r t h a t it is n o t w r o n g ,
A T A X O N O M Y OF E T H I C A L T H E O R I E S
II. 5. 8
II. 5. 8
INTUITIONISM
97
t h a t t h o s e p r o p e r t i e s have t o b e d e s c r i b a b l e i n very g e n e r a l t e r m s
(that is. in unspecific, simple terms which do not go into great detail).
ciples: after t h a t w e c a n d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r p a r t i c u l a r a c t i o n s a r e
after is u s u a l l y specificity: t h e y do n o t w a n t us to m a k e o u r m o r a l
ple, we first determine t h a t lying is wrong, and then infer that to say a
a s lying', b u t w a n t t o b e allowed t o t a k e a c c o u n t , i n t h e i r m o r a l
t h i n k i n g , o f t h e details o f c a s e s , w h i c h may, t h e y t h i n k , b e h i g h l y
word 'general', which has led a lot of moral philosophers into confu-
r e l e v a n t . W i t h t h i s I a g r e e : it is often n e c e s s a r y to d i s c u s s c a s e s in
and not the mere fact that those individuals are involved in t h e m .
tions 'One ought never to tell lies' and 'One ought never to tell lies to
falls under the description 'lies' or 'lies told to business partners' (and
of m a k i n g m o r a l s t a t e m e n t s a b o u t f i c t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r s is a s t r o n g
viduals.
be used in t h e d e s c r i p t i o n s of t h e c a s e s we are m a k i n g o u r m o r a l
t e r m s . A n y f e a t u r e w h i c h w a s n o t so specifiable would h a v e to be
s o m e individual e s s e n c e o r h a e c c e i t y w h i c h w a s n o t describable e x -
specific: or is he a l l o w i n g us to m a k e t h e m a b o u t kinds of c a s e s
described in u n i v e r s a l t e r m s , provided t h a t t h e t e r m s a r e h i g h l y
or it. And these have to include the reasons for calling t h e person bad
specific?
This person' or 'this a c t ' , 'exactly like this person' or 'exactly like this
n.5.8
II.
5.8
INTUITIONISM
99
versal properties after all (H 1955a, FR 2 . 2 ) . But this is not the place to
m a n y duties a b o u t w h i c h we m a y be in d o u b t w h e t h e r to call t h e m
t h a t is, speak the truth. T h e s a m e holds if for speak the truth' we sub-
t e r m s of t h e difference b e t w e e n H u m e a n d K a n t . I t h i n k I am still a
s r
'ghHy
versalizable in one of these senses but not others. For example, a pru-
ping at t h e i n t e r e s t s of o u r o w n village or t r i b e . It is in o u r o w n
d e n t i a l j u d g e m e n t is u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e over a g e n t s , b u t n o t over
and seek to promote the interests of other tribes and even other
A T A X O N O M Y OF E T H I C A L T H E O R I E S
IOO
II. S. 8
r e a s o n m a y be t r u e of t h e gift of l a n g u a g e w h i c h is its v e h i c l e (H
1 9 8 1 b ) . So perhaps m o r a l l a n g u a g e is after all superior to s h m o r a l
language.
Parlit loo ( 1 9 8 4 : c h s . 6 ff.) argues for an extension of our c o n c e r n
beyond n a r r o w self-interest. H e says t h a t I h e s a m e a r g u m e n t s b y
II. 5. 8
INTUITIONISM
101
erned by such a universal rule. But shmoralities are not ruled out by
guage requires, and the question of how to motivate people to use it.
m a i n s . B u t this is n o t a q u e s t i o n for e t h i c a l t h e o r y in t h e n a r r o w
s e n s e . I c a n n o t so far see t h e s o l u t i o n to t h e s e p r o b l e m s , a n d h a v e
5 . 6 . 1 h a v e s i n c e t h e n tied up s o m e loose e n d s , a n d I h o p e t h a t I or
am sure that I myself prefer to use moral language, and can therefore
J02
A T A X O N O M Y OF E T H I C A L T H E O R I E S
IL 5- 9
are c e r t a i n maxims (to use K a n t ' s word) w h i c h we c a n n o t will to b e c o m e universal laws; a n d m a x i m s are a kind of prescriptions.
To a n t i c i p a t e w h a t I s h a l l be s a y i n g later: t h e r e a s o n why a pre-
scriptivist t h e o r y c a n avoid collapsing into relativism is t h a t t h e prescriptive element in the m e a n i n g of m o r a l statements, and especially
EMOTIVISM
o f t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e i r m o r a l s t a t e m e n t s ) t h a t they a r e all c o n -
tivist theories. We saw t h a t they were all destined to collapse into rel-
t h e y a r e saying, w h i c h a r e t h e s a m e w h a t e v e r t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e i r
moral opinions. But you may not understand this until I c o m e to out-
descriptive e l e m e n t i n t h e m e a n i n g o f m o r a l s t a t e m e n t s w h i c h c a n
e l e m e n t w a s n o t well c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y t h e f i r s t o f t h e n o n -
a pioneer, and discuss its merits and faults, t h e main fault being t h a t
descriptivist k i n d s of t h e o r y I s h a l l discuss, n a m e l y e m o t i v i s m .
However, t h e p r o p o n e n t s o f e m o t i v i s m . o f w h o m A x e l H a g e r s t r o m
s o n i n g impossible. T h e n I s h a l l p r e s e n t a t h e o r y w h i c h avoids t h i s
gesting t h a t there is a n o t h e r element in t h e m e a n i n g of m o r a l statem e n t s besides their s y n t a x and their truth conditions. If they h a d n o t
m a d e this step, t h e l a t e r a d v a n c e s t o w a r d s a n o b j e c t i v i s t e t h i c a l
t h e o r y would h a v e been impossible; for d e s c r i p t i v i s m h a s to be
rejected before this step c a n be made.
I shall in w h a t follows be criticizing emotivism in general, a n d n o t
any particular emotivist, and certainly not H a g e r s t r o m . S i n c e m a n y
of the modern emotivists make errors which are n o t essential to e m o tivism itself, it will be best if I c o n s t r u c t my o w n version of an e m o tivist theory w h i c h brings out most clearly t h e virtues and t h e faults
in emotivism. I do n o t intend this as a c a r i c a t u r e n o r as an Aunt Sally.
I intend it to r e p r e s e n t t h e best t h a t e m o t i v i s m c a n do. An e x a m p l e
will show w h a t I am up to. Charles S t e v e n s o n produced in 1 9 4 5 t h e
fullest exposition of an emotivist t h e o r y t h a t t h e r e h a s b e e n (unless
w e i n c l u d e A l l a n G i b b a r d ( 1 9 9 0 ) , w h o w a s o b v i o u s l y deeply influe n c e d by S t e v e n s o n ; G i b b a r d c a l l s h i m s e l f a ' n o r m - e x p r e s s i v i s t ' ) .
S t e v e n s o n ' s b o o k is m a d e very c o n f u s i n g by h i s i n c l u s i o n in his
,o
A T A X O N O M Y OF E T H I C A L T H E O R I E S
H. 6. i
11.6. 1
EMOTIVISM
A T A X O N O M Y OF E T H I C A L T H E O R I E S
II. 6.
II.
6. 2
EMOTIVISM
107
io8
A T A X O N O M Y OF E T H I C A L T H E O R I E S
IL 6. 3
ting people to do things. I have called this the 'verbal shove' theory of
the m e a n i n g of imperatives (1.5. II 1996/n. We find traces of views of
this sort in m a n y w r i t e r s (e.g. A. Ross 1 9 6 8 : 6 8 , see H 1969/): von
W r i g h t 1 9 6 3 : 1 4 9 f ; C a s t a e d a 1 9 7 4 : 4 5 . see H 1 9 7 6 c : S e a r l e a n d
Vanderveken 1985: 5 2 ) . I have been controverting t h e m t h r o u g h o u t
my career, but t h e m i s t a k e is very e a s y to m a k e (H T949. LM 12 f f .
1971/): s.f.). We often do use imperatives for getting people to do
things. A little reflection, however, will show that we c a n n o t explain
their m e a n i n g in this way. For, first of all, s e n t e n c e s in o t h e r m o o d s
a r e used to get people to do t h i n g s ; a n d secondly, i m p e r a t i v e s a r e
sometimes used with other purposes than to get people to do the Ihing
c o m m a n d e d or requested (the thing specified in the imperative). B u t
m e a n i n g has lo be something essential to the utterance of a s e n t e n c e .
If it is being used for s o m e other purpose t h a n shoving, that purpose
c a n n o t give its meaning, at least on this occasion of use. For example,
if I say 'Keep quiet', w h a t I am doing, on the 'verbal shove' theory, is
II. 6. 3
EMOTIVISM
109
trying lo get the person addressed to keep quiet, and this is the m e a n -
ary act, and the perlocutionary act. T h e distinction between the first
the oilier, as soon as he h a s shut t h e door, puts his ear to the keyhole
distinguished from w h a t you are doing in saying w h a t you say (in lo-
and, when the boys start lo talk, as he hoped they would, (lings open
possible in principle to e x p l a i n m e a n i n g in t e r m s of p e r l o c u t i o n a r y
11(>
A T A X O N O M Y OF E T H I C A L T H E O R I E S
II. 6. 4
II. 6 . 4
EMOTIVISM
in
a r e c o n c e r n e d w i t h , a n d n o t t h e getting. N o r is it t h e t r y i n g to get
t h e r e l e v a n t s e n s e of t h a t word, w i t h o u t h a v i n g a c o n v e n t i o n t h a t
g e n e r a l , is t h e difference b e t w e e n typical i m p e r a t i v e s a n d t y p i c a l
tell s o m e o n e to do a c e r t a i n t h i n g t h a t , for e x a m p l e , to u t t e r t h e
words 'Keep quiet' is to tell the people addressed to keep quietto per-
a s s e n t to e v e r y t h i n g t h a t I say. If I tell h i m t h a t J a n e is in t h e n e x t
and say 'Keep quiet' if you are speaking English. 'Chup mho if you are
People a r e n o t a l w a y s c o m p l a i s a n t ; s o m e t i m e s t h e y a r e n o t dis-
of the ways of so disposing him is to tell him to keep quiet; but t h e lin-
c o u n t e r s u g g e s t i b l e , like t h e bqys in t h e s c h o o l m a s t e r e x a m p l e , we
may say one thing in the hope t h a t they will believe, or do, the oppos-
1 12
A T A X O N O M Y OF E T H I C A L T H E O R I E S
II. 6.4
ll. 6.
EMOTIVISM
tive s t a t e m e n t s h a v e m e a n i n g . T h e r e f o r e t h e i r m e a n i n g m u s t b e
s o u g h t i n t h e i r p r a g m a t i c s . B u t b e c a u s e h e failed t o d i s t i n g u i s h
be c o n s t r a i n e d by l o g i c a l rules, even t h o u g h it is n o t g o v e r n e d by
m e n t s do n o t h a v e t h e i r m e a n i n g d e t e r m i n e d wholly by t h e i r t r u t h
disposed to do, the thing specified) to the false notion that an imperat-
c o n d i t i o n s , t h e r e c a n b e n o m o r a l a r g u m e n t , o r o n l y v e r y limited
lowers o f W i t t g e n s t e i n b y i n d i s c r i m i n a t e b a n d y i n g a b o u t o f t h e
c u t i o n a r y o r t h e i r p e r l o c u t i o n a r y use ( 1 . 5 ) . A u s t i n m e n t i o n s this
confusion (1.5 f., H 1996/)). If anybody uses it. one can be almost c e r -
If it is a m i s t a k e to t r y to e x p l a i n t h e m e a n i n g of imperatives irr
acts. 'Pragmatics' was one of a triad (the other two being 'syntactics'
s o m e o n e h a s j u s t b e e n drafted i n t o t h e a r m y a n d , h a v i n g pacifist
do with logic and rules for use separated from those which have not.
T h e t r o u b l e c a u s e d b y t h e word ' p r a g m a t i c s ' ( w h i c h predates
Austin's distinction), c o m e s out. very clearly when people say, for e x ample, t h a t the m e a n i n g of imperatives is constituted by their pragmatics.
u n w a r r a n t e d i n t e r f e r e n c e in a p e r s o n a l d e c i s i o n , to do a n y s u c h
thing as trying to get him to join the army. He asked for advice, not influence or i n d u c e m e n t .
However, o p p o n e n t s of emotivism often, h a v i n g pointed this out,
s t a t e m e n t s . H e called o n e o f t h e m a i n s e c t i o n s o f his b o o k ( 1 9 4 5 )
s e e m s t o h a v e a r g u e d a s follows: m o r a l s t a t e m e n t s (or e t h i c a l s e n -
ii4
A T A X O N O M Y OF E T H I C A L T H E O R I E S
II. 6. 5
II. 6. 6
EMOTIVISM
imperatives t h a t I h a v e b e e n a t t a c k i n g : a n d t h e y t h o u g h t , c o n s e -
prove t h a t m o r a l s t a t e m e n t s a r e n o t imperatives. It is n o t a c t u a l l y
ality of moral thinking they had to reject w h a t they loosely called 'the
you see this by a bit of autobiography, which I hope you will pardon.
d o t h a t b e c a u s e o f m y a v o i d a n c e o f t h e m i s t a k e a b o u t imperatives
a descriptivist s t a n d p o i n t . It b e c a m e c l e a r to me t h a t w h a t w a s
time rationalist. For 1 was quite c e r t a i n that the emotivists were right
For e x a m p l e , as we have seen (1.1 f.) the modus ponens form of argu-
about t h e i r c h a r a c t e r as i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t s : it is to say s o m e t h i n g
about their illocutionary force (in Austin's term), and n o t about their
t h e u s e o f t h e e x p r e s s i o n ' i f a n d t h e o t h e r words i n t h e s e n t e n c e s .
B u t an e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e m e a n i n g s of m o r a l words in t e r m s of per-
A T A X O N O M Y OF E T H I C A L THKORIES
II. 6. 6
II. 6. 7
EMOTIVISM
f u n d a m e n t a l m o r a l q u e s t i o n s . T h i s gives us t h e differentia w h i c h
that it is possible to say that moral statements and imperatives are dif-
f h a v e d i s c u s s e d so far. e m o t i v i s m , is an i r r a t i o n a l i s t s o r t of n o n -
ferent varieties of the kind of speech act called prescribing, and that,
c u t i o n a r y force, it does determine rules for their use, and thus gener-
my b o o k s how s u c h a r g u m e n t s c a n be c o n d u c t e d , a n d I will s u m -
Even in t h e c a s e of e m o t i v i s m it is possible t h a t i m p r o v e m e n t s
that all these forms of descriptivism are bound to collapse in one way
n8
A T A X O N O M Y OF E T H I C A L T H E O R I E S
IL 6. 7
II. 6. 8
EMOTIVISM
119
b u t I like to t h i n k of h i m as b e i n g in t h e s a m e c a m p as myself, a n d
turned.
sense (H 1 9 9 4 b ) .
T h e r e are, I t h i n k , six f e a t u r e s o f m o r a l s t a t e m e n t s t h a t w o u l d
m a k e m e w a n t t o r e j e c t a n y t h e o r y t h a t failed t o d o j u s t i c e t o t h e m .
o r attitude; a n d w e a r e t h e r e f o r e n o t s a y i n g t w o t h i n g s w h i c h a r e
u r a l i s m , t h o u g h if, as I h a v e c l a i m e d , t h e r e is no r e a l difference
o f t h e m o r a l words a n d t h e logic o f m o r a l a r g u m e n t w h i c h t h a t
b e t w e e n i n t u i t i o n i s m a n d subjectivism, i n t u i t i o n i s m fails it t o o . B u t
is a l w a y s fatal to t r y to s m u g g l e m o r a l o p i n i o n s of s u b s t a n c e i n t o
t h e a r g u m e n t does n o t like t h e c o n c l u s i o n s t o w h i c h h e i s t h e r e b y
120
A T A X O N O M Y OF E T H I C A L T H E O R I E S
II. 6. 8
II. 6. 8
EMOTIVISM
121
122
A T A X O N O M Y OF E T H I C A L T H E O R I E S
II. 6. 8
II. 6 . 9
EMOTIVISM
123
t e n c e s w h i c h used t o e x p r e s s s y n t h e t i c s t a t e m e n t s c h a n g e t h e i r
this r e q u i r e m e n t , t h a t m o r a l i t y a n d t h e m o r a l l a n g u a g e s h o u l d b e
t h e most r e m a r k a b l e i n v e n t i o n s o f t h e h u m a n r a c e , c o m p a r a b l e a t
i s t o help u s s o r t o u t c e r t a i n difficulties w h i c h a r e b o u n d t o a r i s e
ing t h e c o u r s e o f r e c o r d e d history. J u s t a s t h e a n c i e n t G r e e k s h a d
a g r e e m e n t s . T h e a n s w e r i s twofold. First, m a n y o f t h e s e d i s a g r e e -
I am not agreeing here with those who think that a mere alter-
124
A T A X O N O M Y OF E T H I C A L T H E O R I E S
IL 6. 9
F I
- ^
EMOTIVISM
II. 7.1
RATIONALISM
127
7
RATIONALISM
t h u s i s o n t h e t r a c k o f t h e universalizability o f m o r a l s t a t e m e n t s
i m p o r t a n t feature o f m o r a l s t a t e m e n t s w e h a v e t o i n c o r p o r a t e i n t o
our o w n theory.
t h o s e w h o w a n t to m a k e a c a r e e r in philosophy to do t h i s . A good
also likely to be, he will have a defensible theory. Veritati omnia consen-
t h e m a k i n g of a m o r a l s t a t e m e n t . Subjectivists h a v e n o t understood
beginning.
T h e i n t u i t i o n i s t s also h a d hold o f s o m e i m p o r t a n t t r u t h s , b o t h
sopher.
o f m o r a l s , t h e m o r a l c o n c e p t s a n d t h e i r logic, t o s h o w h o w w e c a n
A T A X O N O M Y OF E T H I C A L T H E O R I E S
128
II. 7. 1
II-7 2
RATIONALISM
129
Il is t h e r e q u i r e m e n t to prescribe in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e s e prin-
K a n t a n d do n o t n o t i c e t h a t he is n o t h i m s e l f a descriptivist. In t h e
m o s t f a m o u s o f h i s f o r m u l a t i o n s o f his C a t e g o r i c a l Imperative, h e
i o
3
A T A X O N O M Y OF E T H I C A L T H E O R I E S
H- 7- 2
IL 7- 3
RATIONALISM
131
s h o u l d s e e k his o w n selfish a d v a n t a g e a n d p a y n o a t t e n t i o n t o t h e
a m a x i m h a s b e e n obeyed. Of c o u r s e it goes w i t h o u t s a y i n g t h a t we
keep us on t h e m o r a l rails.
of t h e a c t i o n s prescribed. Could n o t a h a r d - h e a r t e d p e r s o n , w h o
w h a t 1 say in 8 . 2 I f , b e c a u s e he gives us s o m e i m p o r t a n t c l u e s on
detailed e x e g e s i s o f K a n t , a n y m o r e t h a n o f A r i s t o t l e o r P l a t o . I
t i o n s o f m o r a l s t a t e m e n t s , o r a b o u t m o r a l facts. H e speaks a b o u t
t h a t o u r m a x i r i l s s h o u l d b e observed w h a t e v e r individuals w e r e i n
Categorical Imperative.
o u t . t h e r e a r e s o m e very w i c k e d m a x i m s t h a t logically c o u l d b e
my t h i n k i n g . F o r e x a m p l e , it is n o t t h e c a s e t h a t I t h i n k I deserve
A T A X O N O M Y OF E T H I C A L T H E O R I E S
II. 7- 3
11
7 3
RATIONALISM
134
A TAXONOMY
OF
ETHICAL THEORIES
II.
7- 4
I I . 7.4
RATIONALISM
^35
Descriptivists therefore could n o t deploy it. You will now, I hope, see
t r a d i c t o r y ; so, i f w e t o o k t h e line o f s o m e i n t e r p r e t e r s o f K a n t , w e
must agree to'. If we could show that some moral statements have
e n t a t i o n o f a n o t h e r ' s s i t u a t i o n involves f o r m i n g p r e f e r e n c e s a s t o
m a k e a m o r a l s t a t e m e n t a b o u t t h e situation, a n d m o r a l s t a t e m e n t s
t h e a m o r a l i s t w h o will n o t m a k e a n y m o r a l s t a t e m e n t s a t all a b o u t
t h e s i t u a t i o n ; b u t I h a v e discussed h i m e n o u g h in MT 1 0 . 7 f f , H
formed a p r e f e r e n c e t h a t he should n o t be so t r e a t e d if he is a b l a c k
posed m a x i m . T h e r e i s o f c o u r s e t h e problem o f t h e f a n a t i c a l b l a c k -
w e a k a r g u m e n t s t h a t o n e often c o m e s a c r o s s . T h e y a r e a r g u m e n t s
t h a t i f all t h a t i s r e q u i r e d i s t h a t w e s h o u l d prescribe s o m e m a x i m
7.5.
i 6
3
A T A X O N O M Y OF E T H I C A L T H E O R I E S
H. 7- 5
RATIONALISM
II- 7- 5
137
c o n t e n t , j u s t a s s e n t e n c e s b e g i n n i n g 'It i s n e c e s s a r y t h a t . . . ' e n t a i l
t h e o r y satisfies r e q u i r e m e n t ( 5 ) , arguability, b y s h o w i n g h o w a r g u -
tivity o f m o r a l s t a t e m e n t s , c a n b e c o n d u c t e d . I h a v e a l s o a l r e a d y
shown t h a t t h e t h e o r y g u a r a n t e e s prescriptivity.
n e c e s s i t y o p e r a t o r g o v e r n i n g imperatives, i t will b e t h e c a s e t h a t
w r o n g n e s s is a p r o p e r t y in t h e o r d i n a r y sense, and t h u s s u p p o r t s
K a n t i a n a r g u m e n t s , universalizability a n d prescriptivity, a r e b o t h
is neutral between substantial opinions or claims. This, you will realize, is how my theory escapes t h a t relativism t h a t is t h e fate of all de-
7.6.
to c o n n e c t t h e m w i t h t h e feature of universalizability w h i c h I h a v e
13
A T A X O N O M Y OF E T H I C A L T H E O R I E S
II. 7- 6
II. 7.6
RATIONALISM
139
m e n t in t h e m e a n i n g of m o r a l s t a t e m e n t s w h i c h I called, following
w e r e w r o n g i n t h i n k i n g t h a t a p p l i c a t i o n c o n d i t i o n s for t h e m o r a l
d e t e r m i n e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s for m o r a l s t a t e m e n t s . T h e y w e r e a l s o
a p p l i c a t i o n c o n d i t i o n s c a n b e given i n n o n - m o r a l , objective t e r m s .
t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s of s t a t e m e n t s c o n t a i n i n g it, or a b o u t a m o r a l
t h a t s o m e o n e w h o t h i n k s an a c t w r o n g will t h i n k t h a t t h a t is a reason
for ethical theory is how we are to set about deciding rationally which
descriptive m e a n i n g , is still t h e r e . B u t if t h e m o r a l s t a t e m e n t is u n -
7.7.
T h e r e is a p r o b l e m w h i c h troubled S o c r a t e s a n d Aristotle,
c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h e social e n v i r o n m e n t i n which we do o u r m o r a l
t e r n a l i s t s like m e . A n i n t e r n a l i s t , w h o t h i n k s t h a t t o h o l d a m o r a l
a c k n o w l e d g e t o b e w r o n g . T h e r e a r e s o m e people w h o d o w h a t t h e y
h o o d ? T h e a n s w e r i s t h a t a r c h a n g e l s p e r h a p s could d o t h i s , b u t
humans cannot.
i o
4
A T A X O N O M Y OF E T H I C A L T H E O R I E S
H. 7- 7
II. 7. 7
RATIONALISM
141
t h e s e c h a r a c t e r s i n o t h e r p l a c e s ( F R c h . 5 , M T 3 . 7 , H 19920': c h . 6 ,
T h e t a s k of critical t h i n k i n g is to e x a m i n e t h e v a r i o u s standards,
ings and truth conditions, it is easy to see how someone could have a
o r a p p l i c a t i o n c o n d i t i o n s , o r criteria, o r t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s , o r prin-
m o n t o all c u l t u r e s t h a t ask m o r a l q u e s t i o n s , i s w h a t c o n s t r a i n s u s
moral thinking.
t h e v a l u e s o f t h e c u l t u r e . B u t i n v i r t u e o f t h e descriptive m e a n i n g
wrong, they know it to be true. So, like the m a n at the petrol station,
in a r r i v i n g at u t i l i t a r i a n principles v i a a K a n t i a n m e t h o d . T h o u g h
K a n t was n o t a u t i l i t a r i a n , t h e r e w a s n o t h i n g i n his t h e o r y o f t h e
142
A T A X O N O M Y OF E T H I C A L T H E O R I E S
II. 7- 7
theory. T h i s h a d r e g r e t t a b l e effects o n t h e w a y h e e x p o u n d e d t h e
theory. B u t in itself t h e t h e o r y is consistent with the adoption of utilitarian principles.
All this would not have been so bad if it had not been for a second
t h i n g t h a t misled h i m . H e s e e m s t o h a v e t h o u g h t t h a t m o r a l principles had to be simple. You m a y r e m e m b e r t h a t in 5.8 I spoke of t h e
confusion that m a n y people still m a k e between universality and generality. T h i s confusion goes b a c k to Aristotle's use of t h e t e r m 'kath'
holou for both c o n c e p t s . I t h i n k K a n t was a victim of this confusion.
It m a y have led h i m to insist t h a t m o r a l principles should be h i g h l y
general (that is. simple), w h e n all they had to be was universal (which
is consistent with their being, if need be, quite specific).
I have tried to a m e n d this defect in K a n t ' s exposition of his t h e o r y
by, in my o w n writings, d i s t i n g u i s h i n g b e t w e e n two levels of m o r a l
thinking, the critical and t h e intuitive. At the intuitive level our m o r a l
II. 7. 8
RATIONALISM
143
ical t h i n k i n g . W e t h e n need t o c o n d e n s e this v a s t q u a n t i t y o f inform a t i o n i n t o a simpler set of guidelines or intuitive principles for use
in our daily life. T h e task might seem impossible b u t for o n e thing: we
are n o t t h e f i r s t t o address it. People t h r o u g h o u t m a n y g e n e r a t i o n s
have faced t h e problem, and arrived at their solutions. We m a y expect
m o s t of t h e s e s o l u t i o n s to be wise ones, b e c a u s e t h e y h a v e b e e n devised by people w i t h a lot of e x p e r i e n c e of s i m i l a r p r o b l e m s , a n d of
the c o n s e q u e n c e s of pursuing various solutions to t h e m .
B u t some of these solutions may have been bad ones. T h e r e is
nothing infallible about the wisdom of t h e ages. We c a n alter o u r intuitive principles, t h o u g h with difficulty, if we wish. T h a t is t h e task of
critical thinking. B u t we should be cautious. T h o s e w h o have t h r o w n
over t h e a c c u m u l a t e d intuitions wholesale have often c o m e to regret
it. T h e r e is u s u a l l y m o r e to learn t h a n to discard from t h e legacy of
the past.
t h i n k i n g h a s indeed to c l e a v e to g e n e r a l principles ( t h o u g h n o t , I
t h e y were b r i n g i n g h i m u p ) . B u t a t t h e c r i t i c a l level a t w h i c h w e
e n o u g h people s t a n d i n g up for j u s t i c e a n d d e c e n c y in i n t e r n a t i o n a l
thinking may, indeed, lead us to adopt quite general principles for use
t h e requirement to universalize o u r m a x i m s .
144
A T A X O N O M Y OF E T H I C A L T H E O R I E S
II.
7. 8
RATIONALISM
145
r e v e r t t o t h e d r a c o n i a n p u n i s h m e n t s practised i n S i n g a p o r e ? T h e
a n s w e r lies in a careful e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of s u c h
s c h o o l c h i l d r e n in s t a t e s c h o o l s h a s been prohibited o n l y q u i t e
K i n g d o m , t h o u g h t h e c o u r t s m a y c o m e t o b a n it, especially t h e
European Court. And there is still a lot of support, both in Britain and
cogent here; if there were a danger of our sliding down this slope, we
I h a v e used this e x t r e m e e x a m p l e in o r d e r to i l l u s t r a t e h o w to
p r o v i n c e of t h e m o r a l p h i l o s o p h e r to find o u t t h e facts, b u t o n l y to
a r e m a d e in a l m o s t t o t a l i g n o r a n c e of w h a t it is and h o w to a r g u e
B u t t h e t o n g u e - i n - c h e e k proposal t h a t I m a d e w a s n o t t h a t w e
PART III
KANT
8
COULD KANT HAVE B E E N A
UTILITARIAN?
. . . the supreme end, the happiness of all mankind
(KrV A851 = B 8 7 9 = 549)
The law concerning punishment is a Categorical Imperative: and woe
to him who rummages around in the winding paths of a theory of
happiness, looking for some advantage to be gained by releasing the
criminal from punishment or by reducing the amount of i t . . .
( R / A i 9 6 = B226 = 3 3 i )
8 . 1 . M y a i m i n this c h a p t e r i s t o ask a question, n o t t o a n s w e r it. T o
a n s w e r it with confidence would require m o r e c o n c e n t r a t e d study of
K a n t ' s text t h a n I have yet h a d time for. I have r e a d his m a i n e t h i c a l
works, a n d formed s o m e t e n t a t i v e c o n c l u s i o n s w h i c h I s h a l l diffidently s t a t e . I h a v e a l s o read s o m e of his E n g l i s h - s p e a k i n g disciples
and would-be disciples, but not, I must admit, a n y of his G e r m a n expositors except L e o n a r d Nelson. B u t my purpose in raising t h e question is to enlist t h e help of others in answering it.
To m a n y the a n s w e r will seem obvious; for it is an accepted dogma
t h a t K a n t a n d t h e utilitarians stand at opposite poles of m o r a l philosophy. T h i s idea h a s been the c u r r e n t o r t h o d o x y at least since, in the
KANT
14
III. 8.
III. 8 . 1
149
t h o u g h t t h e y h a d found a f a t h e r in K a n t . J o h n R a w l s . in t u r n , h a s
w r i t i n g s i s h a p p y w h e n c o m m o n m o r a l c o n v i c t i o n s s u p p o r t his
M e t a p h y s i c o f M o r a l s ' . K a n t would n o t h a v e b e e n c o n t e n t , a s
philosophy.
rested o n a m i s t a k e ( 1 9 1 2 : title), b e g a n w h e n S o c r a t e s a n d P l a t o ,
its adherents to provide reasons for thinking as they did, set out in t h e
i t a r i a n i n d e e d , w h i c h few m o d e r n t h i n k e r s o f a n y p e r s u a s i o n
'disciples'.
I s h a l l be looking at s o m e of t h e s e a r g u m e n t s . To d e o n t o l o g i s t s
8.2.
I w a n t first t o draw a t t e n t i o n t o s o m e p a s s a g e s i n t h e
w h o seek lo shelter under Kant's wing they give small comfort; for if
any process of general thinking but in getting face to face with a par-
e x a m p l e s , t h o s e c o n c e r n e d w i t h duties t o oneself, a r e i n c o n s i s t e n t
c o n c e r n e d w i t h duties t o o t h e r s , a r e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h it. A s w e s h a l l
III. 8. 2
KANT
ISO
III. 8. 2
Fourth, as regards meritorious duties to others, the natural end which all
men seek is their own happiness. Now humanity could no doubt subsist if
everybody contributed nothing to the happiness of others but at the same
time refrained from deliberately impairing their happiness. This is. however,
merely to agree negatively and not positively with humanity as an end in itself
unless every one endeavours also, so far as in him lies, to further the ends of
others. For the ends of a subject who is an end in himself must, if this conception is to have its full effect in me, be also, as far as possible, my ends.
t o m a k e m o r a l j u d g e m e n t s . Probably w h a t t h e o b j e c t o r s a r e a t t a c k -
same, i.e. share the end. In the Tugendlehre Kant explains the relation
s i t u a t i o n , t o t r e a t t h e i n t e r e s t s , ends, o r p r e f e r e n c e s o f different
and 'Willkr, and the alleged distinction between will and desire. On
t h e o t h e r s on a p a r w i t h my o w n . T h i s , a c c o r d i n g to u t i l i t a r i a n s , is
Willkr, and identified with a kind of desire: 'nicht der Willkr, sondern
des Willens,
gesetzgebendes
ist,
die er annimmt,
und eine
zugleich allgemein-
solche allein
kann
zur
in adjudicating b e t w e e n t h e m w h e n t h e y conflict, t r e a t t h e m in t h e
called virtue').
E l s e w h e r e K a n t qualifies this e x p l a n a t i o n of w h a t it is to t r e a t
i 2
KANT
III. 8 . 2
III. 8. 3
153
w h o m K a n t h a s e a r l i e r spoken slightingly; a n d h e c o u l d c e r t a i n l y
o w n e q u a l interests. S o , if t h e o b j e c t i o n did u n d e r m i n e u t i l i t a r i a n -
an end' used in the second and fourth examples would provide no ar-
I s h o u l d like to m e n t i o n h e r e t h a t in my o w n a d a p t a t i o n of t h e
poses'.
people.
8 . 4 . B u t n o w w e m u s t t u r n t o a n o t h e r f a m o u s passage, t h e for-
stances.
the present situation, in which I occupy t h e role t h a t I do, but also for
KANT
154
III. 8 . 4
my a c t i o n . A n d this, a g a i n , is u t i l i t a r i a n i s m . To link it up w i t h t h e
III. 8. 4
155
be h a n d l e d in a u t i l i t a r i a n way in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e C a t e g o r i c a l
t h i n k t h a t t h i s s c o r e o u g h t t o give m u c h c o m f o r t t o m o d e r n a n t i -
o u t c o n t r a d i c t i o n will u n i v e r s a l l y t h a t t h o s e w h o would o t h e r w i s e
have to endure intolerable pain should kill themselves. This could in-
t h e Groundwork t h a t t h e r e is a t e n s i o n in K a n t ' s t h o u g h t b e t w e e n
b e c o m e so t h r o u g h my will. K a n t t h i n k s it is a good a r g u m e n t o n l y
b e c a u s e h e t h i n k s ( p e r h a p s o w i n g t o his rigorist u p b r i n g i n g ) t h a t
m a x i m s h a v e to be v e r y simple. If we h a v e a c h o i c e b e t w e e n t h e
KANT
i 6
5
III. 8. 5
III. 8. 5
157
in t h e top h a l f of a t a b l e h e a d e d ' T h e M a t e r i a l E l e m e n t of D u t y of
ter, or good will, as he sees it. is one formed by its o w n framing of uni-
fection; and 'the end of others, the promotion of which is also my duty'
I f this i s w h a t K a n t m e a n s , t h e n t h e u t i l i t a r i a n a n d t h e n o n -
ends of other people's wills on equal terms with its o w n ends; and this
advance others' ends only in so far as they are consistent with moral-
is to m e a n . As we a n s w e r t h e s e q u e s t i o n s we shall see t h a t t h e t e n -
source.
h a s to be o n e t h a t c a n be a l a w m a k i n g m e m b e r of s u c h a r e a l m (Gr
content does moral perfection have, for Kant, over and above the util-
t o a d v a n c e impartially, a r e t h o s e o n l y w h i c h a r e m o r a l , i.e. w h i c h
B A 9 2 = 4 4 3 , ' | t h e o n t o l o g i c a l c o n c e p t o f p e r f e c t i o n | s h o w s a n in-
versal m a x i m s i n a c c o r d a n c e with t h e e a r l i e r f o r m u l a t i o n s o f t h e
C a t e g o r i c a l I m p e r a t i v e . B u t i f t h e s e m a x i m s , a s t h e y m u s t , express
practical love, they too will be consistent with utilitarianism. For util-
selves disposed to make ourselves perfect. It would still not have been
d e t e r m i n e d w h a t t h e perfection, o r t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f t h e duty t o
KANT
III. 8. 5
HI. 8.6
159
practical love.
ultimate end being the furtherance of the ends of all. This objection is
strumental role. For me. it is said, the real moral thinking takes place
ing h o t c h - p o t c h (Mischmasch) of s e c o n d - h a n d o b s e r v a t i o n s a n d
s e m i - r a t i o n a l principles o n w h i c h t h e e m p t y - h e a d e d r e g a l e t h e m -
ourselves into good people, a n d fulfd o u r duties, not for its o w n sake
(hey are to retain their force for us, we have to treat them as ultimate.
G r o u n d w o r k . I t h i n k it is l e g i t i m a t e to r e g a r d t h e Groundwork as a
purely l o g i c a l e n q u i r y into t h e n a t u r e o f m o r a l r e a s o n i n g , a n d a s
s u c h i t o f c o u r s e m u s t n o t c o n t a i n appeals t o e m p i r i c a l facts, a n y
s e n s e t h a t we should u n d e r s t a n d p a s s a g e s s u c h as Tgl A 3 2 = 3 9 6 :
KANT
III. 8. 7
III. 8. 8
161
held substantial moral judgements; for the only source of these could
c a n a c c e p t o n l y s u c h c o n t e n t s o r o b j e c t s o f its volition a s c a n b e
we h a v e a c e r t a i n i n t u i t i o n is an e m p i r i c a l fact, and as s u c h is e x -
sense theories (Gr BA91 f. = 4 4 2 ) , and would equally have rejected in-
morality.
of m o r a l r e a s o n i n g w h i c h t h e e n q u i r y generates; a n d secondly, t h a t
be to say t h a t to be a u t o n o m o u s t h e will h a s to h a v e no r e g a r d to
people prefer is an e m p i r i c a l m a t t e r ; it h a s to be a s c e r t a i n e d o n c e
is w h a t K a n t m e a n t , b e c a u s e he c e r t a i n l y t h o u g h t it r e l e v a n t to t h e
s y s t e m we do n o t n e e d to a s s u m e t h a t people prefer o n e t h i n g or
162
KANT
III. 8. 8
III. 8. 8
163
rational will.
selfish i n c l i n a t i o n t h a t he h a s in mind. An e x a m p l e is Gr B A 8 = 4 9 6 .
and impartial.
Thirdly, K a n t , t h o u g h he m a k e s a c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n will
a n d i n c l i n a t i o n (Neigung), does n o t in fact always distinguish desire
a s i f K a n t c a m e t o see t h a t t h e r e a r e different t h i n g s t h a t c o u l d b e
'Willkur (sometimes translated ' c h o i c e ' ) . His Latin equivalent for this
mulate it incorrectly ( 1 . 8 , 7 . 8 , H 1 9 9 3 c : 1 2 3 . 1 9 9 8 b ) .
r64
KANT
III. 8 . 9
are on, or about, acts; for these are the judgements about w h i c h c o n sequentialists and anti-consequentialists are supposed to be disagreeing. To a c t is to m a k e a difference to the c o u r s e of events, a n d w h a t
the act is, is determined by w h a t difference. To revert to my previous
examples (hackneyed o n e s . I am afraid): if I am wondering w h e t h e r
to pull the trigger, the m a i n morally relevant consideration is that, if I
did. the m a n t h a t my g u n is pointing at would die. Killing, w h i c h is
the m o r a l l y w r o n g a c t , is causing d e a t h , thai is. doing s o m e t h i n g
which h a s death as a c o n s e q u e n c e . Similarly, w h a t is w r o n g a b o u t
lying is t h a t it is c a u s i n g s o m e o n e else to be deceived (to hold a false
o p i n i o n ) b y o n e s e l f s a y i n g s o m e t h i n g false. T h e intended c o n s e q u e n c e is w h a t m a k e s it w r o n g . It would not be lying if it were n o t
intended to have this c o n s e q u e n c e .
1 am not saying t h a t all t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of acts a r e m o r a l l y
relevant. Nor does any utilitarian have to say this. Many will be irrele v a n t . W h i c h are r e l e v a n t depends on w h a t m o r a l principles apply
t o the situation (the r e l e v a n t c o n s e q u e n c e s a r e those w h i c h t h e
principles forbid or r e q u i r e o n e to bring a b o u t ) . So w h a t t h e a n t i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t s o u g h t to be saying is s o m e t h i n g t h a t c o n s e q u e n tialists w h o u n d e r s t a n d t h e issue c a n also say: t h a t t h e r e a r e s o m e
c o n s e q u e n c e s which are morally relevant, and that we o u g h t to bring
about, or not bring about, those c o n s e q u e n c e s regardless of the other
c o n s e q u e n c e s w h i c h a r e m o r a l l y i r r e l e v a n t . T h u s J o u g h t to s p e a k
the truth and so inform the o t h e r party of it. even t h o u g h there will
also be the c o n s e q u e n c e t h a t I am disadvantaged thereby. It is still the
i n t e n t i o n t o bring a b o u t t h e c o n s e q u e n c e t h a t h e i s m i s i n f o r m e d
which makes telling a lie wrong. Kant could not have disagreed.
A further point of objection is related but slightly different. S o m e
of the consequences of actions are intended and some not. W h e n we
are speaking of the 'moral worth of the agent', or wondering w h e t h e r
to blame him, it is of course relevant w h e t h e r he intended the c o n s e quences or not. We can say, with Kant, that the only good thing without qualification is a good will (Gr BA1 = 393), m e a n i n g t h a t people
are judged by their intentions and not by the actual c o n s e q u e n c e s .
B u t let us for the present leave aside these post eventum j u d g e m e n t s
and consider the situation of s o m e o n e w h o is trying to decide w h a t to
III. 8. 9
165
R E F E R E N C E S AND B I B L I O G R A P H Y
i.
Hare
References in the text of the form 'H 1971a: 100' are to this part of the bibliography, the last figure being the page except where otherwise indicated. Dates
from 1997 are conjectural. References to The Language of Morals (1952b),
Freedom and Reason (19630), and Moral Thinking (1981a) take the form of the
letters 'LM', ' F R ' , and ' M r , respectively, followed by the section number.
References of the form '5.3' are to sections of this volume. The author is heavily indebted to Ulla Wessels. whose bibliography appears in H 1995a. Reprints
and translations into other languages are included where I have records of
them, but these are incomplete. Abstracts are given of the more important
recent papers.
1949. 'Imperative Sentences', Mind 58. Repr. in 1971c.
1950a. Review of E. W. Hirst, Morality and God, Philosophy 25.
1950b. Review of H. A. Prichard, Moral Obligation and Knowledge and
Perception, Oxford Magazine (15 June).
1950c. 'Theology and Falsification', University 1. Repr. in A. G. N. Flew and
A. Maclntyre, eds.. New Essays in Philosophical Theology (London: SCM
Press, 1955); in R. E. Santoni. ed., Religious Language (Bloomington, Ind.:
Indiana University Press, 1968): in 19920": and in other collections. Italian
translation in collection ed. by G. Gava (Liviana, 1972).
1951a. 'Freedom of the Will', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. vol.
25. Repr. in 1972b.
1951 b. Review of G. (.'. Field, The Philosophy of Plato, Mind 6 0 .
1951 <:. Review of S. E. Toulmin, An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics,
Philosophical Quarterly 1.
19510". Review of R. Lepley, ed.. Value: A Cooperative Inquiry, Mind 60.
1952a. Review of H. D. I,ewis, Morals and Revelation, Philosophy 27.
1952/). The Language of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Italian translation, Rome: Ubaldini, 1968: German, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1972:
Japanese, Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 1981; Portuguese, So Paolo: Martins
Fontes, 1996. Extracts in Danish translation, Copenhagen: Gyldendalike,
1976.
R E F E R E N C E S AND B I B L I O G R A P H Y
R E F E R E N C E S AND B I B L I O G R A P H Y
1960/7. 'A School for Philosophers', Ratio 2 (also in German edition). Repr. in
168
Press. 1976).
1955/).'Ethics and Politics' (two articles and letters). Listener (Oct.). Spanish
translation in Revista Universidad de San Carlos 33. First article repr. in
I972. in M. Wakin, ed.. War, Morality and the Military Profession (Boulder,
Colo.: Westview, 1979), and in P. Werhane, ed.. Ethical Issues in Business
(Englewood Cliffs. NJ: Prentice-Hall. 1991).
19560. Review of P. H. Nowell-Smith. FAhics. Philosophy 31.
1956b. Review of U. Scarpelli, Filosofia analtica e giurisprudenza, Mind 65.
1 9 5 7 0 . 'Geach: Good and Evil'. Analysis 1 7 . Repr. in P. Foot, ed., Theories of
Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1967) and in 1 9 7 2 / ) . Spanish
translation in E. Rabossi and F. S a l m e r n , eds.. Etica y Anlisis 1 (Mexico
City: Mexico University Press. 1 9 7 6 ) .
1957/7. 'Oxford Moral Philosophy' (letters). Lisiencr (21 Feb. and 28 Mar.).
1957c. Review of A. J. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge and B. Russell, Logic and
Knowledge. Spectator (4 Jan.).
1957/. Are Discoveries about the Uses of Words Empirical?', journal of
Philosophy 34. Full version in 19600.
1957c. Review of J. 0. Urmson. Philosophical Analysis and A. J. Ayer et al. The
Revolution in Philosophy, Philosophische Rundschau 5 (in German).
1 9 5 7 / . 'Religion and Morals' in B. G. Mitchell, ed., Faith and Logic (London:
Allen & Unwin).
1 9 5 9 . 'Broad's Approach to Moral Philosophy', in P. Schilpp, ed.. The
Philosophy of C. 1). Broad (New York: Tudor). Repr. in 1 9 7 1 c and in 1 9 7 K / .
19600. 'Philosophical Discoveries' (the full version of 19570"), Mind 69. Repr.
in A. Sesonske and N. Fleming, eds.. Plato's Meno (Belmont. Calif.:
Wadsworth. T965): R. Rorty, ed.. The Linguistic Turn (Chicago, 111.: Chicago
University Press, 1967); C. Lyas, ed.. Philosophy and Linguistics (London:
Macmillan. 1971): N. Bowie, ed., The Tradition of Philosophy (Belmont,
Calif: Wadsworth, 1986): and in 1971c. German translation in G.
Grewendorf and G. Meggle, eds., Linguistik und Philosophie (Frankfurt a.
M.: A t h e n u m . 1974).
I97TD.
I70
REFERENCES
AND
REFERENCES
BIBLIOGRAPHY
AND
BIBLIOGRAPHY
171
1971a. Review of L. van der Post, The Prisoner and the Bomb, New York Review
of Books 17 (20 May).
1971b. 'Wanting: Some Pitfalls', in R. Binkley et al, eds., Agent, Action and
Reason (Toronto, O n t : Toronto University Press). Repr. in 1971c. German
translation in A. Beckermann and G. Meggle, eds.. Analytische Handlungstheorie (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1985).
1971c. Practical Inferences, containing 1 9 4 9 , 1 9 6 9 0 . 1 9 7 0 0 , 1 9 7 1 b , 'Austin's
Distinction between Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts', and new appendices (London: Macmillan).
i97id. Essays on Philosophical Method, containing 1959a, 19600, 1960b,
1964c, 1965c, 'The Practical Relevance of Philosophy", and 'The Argument from Received Opinion' (London: Macmillan). Italian translation,
Armando, 1977.
i 9 7 i e . 'Drugs and the Role of the Doctor', and other contributions to I. T.
Ramsey and R. Porter, eds., Personality and Science (Edinburgh: Churchill
Livingstone).
1972a. 'Principles', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 73. Repr. in 1989b.
1972b. Essays on the Moral Concepts, containing 1951a (part), 1955a, 19570,
1 9 6 0 c 1963b, 1964a, and 'Wrongness and Harm' (London: Macmillan).
1972c. 'Rules of War and Moral Reasoning', Philosophy and Public ffairs 1.
Repr. in M. Cohen et al., eds., War and Moral Responsibility (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1974), and in 1989c.
i972d. Applications of Moral Philosophy, containing 1955b (first article), 19600"
(English version), 1964b, 1965b, 1 9 6 6 , 1 9 6 7 0 , 1 9 6 9 c , 'Reasons of State',
and 'Function and Tradition in Architecture' (London: Macmillan).
Japanese translation, Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 1981.
1972. Review of G. J. Warnock, The Object of Morality, Ratio 14 (also in
German edition).
1972/. 'Wissenschaft und praktische Philosophie', in A Diemer, ed., Proc. of 9.
Deutscher Kongress fr Philosophie und Wissenschaft (Meisenheim: Hain).
1973a. Critical Study, 'Rawls' Theory of Justice' I and II, Philosophical
Quarterly 23. Repr. in N. Daniels, ed., Reading Rawls (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1975), and in 1989b.
1973b. 'The Simple Believer', in G. Outka and J. P. Reeder, eds., Religion and
Morality (New York: Anchor Press). Repr. in T. Beauchamp et al., eds.,
Philosophy and the Human Condition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall,
1980), and in i992d.
i97 c.'Language and Moral Education', in G. Langford and D. J. O'Connor,
eds., New Essays in the Philosophy of Education (London: Routledge). Repr.
3
i 2
7
R E F E R E N C E S AND B I B L I O G R A P H Y
in 19790" with criticism by G. J. Warnock and reply, and in 19920" with reply
only.
1973d. 'Sad Moralny (Moral Judgment)', Etyka 11 (Warsaw), with abstracts in
English and Russian.
1974a. Comment on R. Edgley, 'Reason and Violence', in S. Krner, ed..
Practical Reason (Oxford: Blackwell).
7974b. 'The Abnormal Child: Moral Dilemmas of Doctors and Parents',
Documentation in Medical Ethics ~\. Repr. as 'Survival of the Weakest' in S.
Gorovitz, ed.. Moral Problems in Medicine (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall, 1976), and in 1993c. German translation in A. Leist, ed.. Um lieben
und Tod (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp. 1990).
1974c. 'Platonism in Moral Education: Two Varieties'. Monist 58. Repr. in
i992d. French translation in M. Canto-Sperber. ed.. volume of essays on
Plato's Meno (Paris: Jacob, 1990).
i974d. 'What Use is Moral Philosophy', TV discussion with A. J. P. Kenny, in
Philosophy in the Open (Milton Keynes: Open University).
19750. 'Contrasting Methods of Environmental Planning', in R. S. Peters, ed.,
Nature and Conduct, Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures (London:
Macmillan). Repr. in K. Goodpaster and K. Sayre, eds., Ethics and Problems
of the 21st Century (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979),
and in 1989c.
/
1975b. Autonomy as an Educational Ideal', in S. C. Brown, ed.iPhilosophers
Discuss Education (London: Macmillan). Repr. in I992d.
1975c. 'Abortion and the Golden Rule', Philosophy and Public Affairs 4. Repr. in
R. Baker and F. Elliston, eds., Philosophy and Sex (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus,
1975): in Moral Problems, ed. J. Rachels (New York: Harper & Row, 1978);
in D. Goldberg, ed., Ethical Theory and Society (New York: Holt Rinehart,
1987); and in 1993c. German translation in A. Leist, ed., Um Leben und
Tod (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp. 1990); Italian in G. Ferranti and S.
Maffettone, eds., Introduzione alia biotica (Naples: Liguori, 1991).
I975d. 'Euthanasia: A Christian View', Philosophie Exchange 2 (Proceedings of
Center for Philosophie Exchange). Repr. in ig92d.
19760. 'Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism', in H. D. Lewis, ed., Contemporary
British Philosophy 4 (London: Allen & Unwin). Repr. in A. K. Sen and
B. A. Williams, eds., Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1982); in D. Barnett, ed.. Western Moral Philosophy
(Mountain View, Calif.: Mayfield, 1994): and in 1989b.
1976b. 'Some Confusions about Subjectivity', in J. Bricke, ed.. Freedom and
Morality (Lawrence. Kan.: University of Kansas Press). Repr. in 1989b.
R E F E R E N C E S AND B I B L I O G R A P H Y
173
174
R E F E R E N C E S AND B I B L I O G R A P H Y
R E F E R E N C E S AND B I B L I O G R A P H Y
175
1 7
R E F E R E N C E S AND B I B L I O G R A P H Y
R E F E R E N C E S AND B I B L I O G R A P H Y
177
Four constituents in the expression of speech acts are distinguished: (1) the sign of
mood (indicative, imperative, etc.) or tropic: (2) the sign of subscription or neustic
(l-rege's judgement-stroke); (3) the sign of completeness or clistic: (4) the indication
of the content of the speech act. or phrastic. All contribute to the meaning and logical properties of speech acts. Various ordinary-language signs performing these
functions are noticed, and (2) defended against the usual objections of Wittgenstein
and others. It is asked which of these particles include which in their scopes, and in
what senses truth-value attaches to phrastics with or without the other particles.
1989ft. Essays in Ethical Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Contains
19640*, 19720,1973a, 1976a, 1976"), 1978b, 1979a, 1979a, 1984b, 1984/, 1985a,
1986b, 19861'. and 19940". Italian translation, Milan: II Saggiatore, 1992.
1989c. Essays on Political Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Contains
1972c, 1 9 7 5 0 , 1 9 7 6 c 19780", 1979b. 1979/. 1984c, 19840". 1984c 19843.
i 8
7
R E F E R E N C E S AND B I B L I O G R A P H Y
1985b, 1986c 1986/, 1987b, 'The Role of Philosophers in the Legislative Process', 'Rebellion', and 'The Rights of Employees: The European
Court of Human Rights and the Case of Young, James and Webster'.
Italian translation, Milan: II Saggiatore. 1995: Arabic (in part), Beirut:
Saqi, 1996.
i989<f. 'Brandt on Fairness to Happiness', with reply by R. B. Brandt, Social
Theory and Practice 15.
1989c. 'Una a p r o x i m a c i n kantiana a la poltica sanitaria', Agora 8. Repr. in
part as 'Health Care Policy: Some Options' in 1993c
1989/. Replies to Persson. Rabinowicz, Sandoe, and Wetterstrm, Theoria 55.
1989g. Interview with E Apsden. Times Higher Education Supplement (June).
1991a. 'Universal Prescriptivism', in P. Singer, ed., A Companion to Ethics
(Oxford: Blackwell). German translation in C. Fehige and G. Meggle, eds.,
Zum moralischen Denken (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1995).
1991b. 'Are there Moral Authorities?' in D. R. Bromham et al, eds.,
Reproductive Medicine (Berlin: Springer). Repr. in 1 9 9 2 a .
199IC. 'Kant utilitarista?', Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica 21.
English version in 1993a, German in C. Fehige and G. Meggle, eds., Zum
moralischen Denken (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1995).
1992a. 'Morality. Moral Theory and Applied and Professonal Ethics: Reply to
Bernard Gert', Professional Ethics 1.
1992b. 'One Philosopher's Approach to Business and Professional Ethics',
Business and Professional Ethics Journal 11. Repr. in C. Cowton and R. Crisp,
eds.. Business Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
1992c. 'What are Cities For? The Ethics of Urban Planning', in C. C. W. Taylor,
eds.. Ethics and the Environment (Oxford: Corpus Christi College). German
translation in 1995a: Italian in S. Moroni, ed.. collection on planning and
social justice (Milan: Franco Angeli, forthcoming).
1 9 9 2 . Essays on Religion and Education (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Contains 1950c. 1957/. 1964b. 1973b. 1973c. I 9 7 4 C J975'- >975d. 197^''.
1977c, 1 9 7 9 a . 1987c 'How did Morality Get a Bad Name?', and 'Satanism
and Nihilism'.
1 9 9 2 C 'Moral Terms'. 'Prescriptivism', 'Slavery', 'Universalizability', and
"Weakness of Will', in L. Becker, ed., Encyiopedia of Ethics (New York:
Garland).
1992/. 'Utilitarianism and Moral Education: Comment on S. Levy's Paper',
Studies in Philosophy and Education 11.
1993a Could Kant have been a Utilitarian?', Utilitas 5. Also in R. M. Dancy,
ed., Kant and Critique (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993). Repr. in 1998c.
R E F E R E N C E S AND B I B L I O G R A P H Y
179
R E F E R E N C E S AND B I B L I O G R A P H Y
R E F E R E N C E S AND B I B L I O G R A P H Y
19960". 'A New Kind of Ethical Naturalism?', in P. French et al, eds., Moral
181
University Press).
Vogler. Wimmer. and Wolf, in C. Fehige and G. Meggle. eds.. Zum moralis-
There is not much new about the 'new realism'. Ethical naturalists in particular
should not draw support from recent developments in metaphysics. Putnam's attempt, with his twin-earth argument, to establish a metaphysical necessity distinct
from logical or conceptual and from causal necessity fails, as can be shown by arguments derived from Von Wright and Sidelle. But even if it be accepted, Horgan
and Timmons (1992) have shown that Moore's open question argument can be
adapted to refute the new naturalism. This move depends on a distinction similar to
mine between evaluative and descriptive meaning.
chen Denken (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp). Contains also German translations of 1991a. 1992c, and 199 }fl.
1995/). 'Off on the Wrong Foot', in J. Couture and K. Nielsen, eds., On the
Relevance
of
Metaethics:
New
Essays
on
Metaetliics.
Canadian
Journal
of
Proceedings
of
18th
International
Wittgenstein
Congress
(Vienna:
Hlder-Pichler-Tempsky).
Brink's externalism is the view that one can fully endorse a moral judgement without any corresponding motivation. Brink holds that moral judgements could not be
prescriptive unless they were thought to be true; but this would be like saying that
(e.g.) imperatives cannot be prescriptive. The natural properties of actions, etc.. are
linked only contingently, nbt conceptually or metaphysically, to their moral properties. The link is a deliverance of our autonomous will. Brink's argument for realism from the existence of amoralism misfires. But I can support his utilitarianism
by better arguments.
1996/. 'Hare: A Philosophical Self-Portrait', in T. Mautner, ed., A Dictionary of
Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell).
1997a. 'Preferences of Possible People', in C. Fehige and U. Wessels, eds..
Preferences (Proceedings of Conference in S a a r b r c k e n , 1 9 9 2 ) (Berlin: De
Gruyter).
Hajdin's view in Dialogue 29 (1990), excluding from moral relevance external and
now-for-then preferences, is attractive. But it does not affect my argument for including as relevant the preferences of possible people. This claims that because actual people prefer, if happy, to exist, universalizability requires the extension of this
consideration lo possible people in identical situations. It supports a liberal view on
abortion: if the best family planning and population policy is being followed and
the number of procreated children is determinate, the non-procreation of this child
will make room for another child.
r997ft. Philosophy and Conflict', in 0. Neumaier et al.. eds., Applied Ethics in a
Troubled World (Proceedings of aborted 15th International Wittgenstein
Congress) (Dordrecht: Kluwer). The English version of 1994c.
1997c. Sorting Out Ethics, containing A Taxonomy of Ethical Theories' (the
Axel H g e r s t r m Lectures given in Uppsala in 1991), 'Defence of the
Enterprise', I993. 1996a, and bibliography of R. M. Hare's writings
1949-98 (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
R E F E R E N C E S AND B I B L I O G R A P H Y
R E F E R E N C E S AND B I B L I O G R A P H Y
I82
2.
Other Writings
References in the text of the form 'Alston, W. P. (1964:100)' are to this part of
the bibliography, the last n u m b e r being t h e page, unless otherwise indicated. Abbreviated titles of works in brackets, as used in text.
AI.EXY, R. ( 1 9 7 9 ) . 'R. M. Hares Regeln des moralischen Argumentierens und
L. Nelsons Abwegungsgesetz', inP. Schrder, ed.. Vernunft, Erkenntnis,
Sittlichkeit (Hamburg: Meiner, 1 9 7 9 ) .
ALSTON, W. P. ( 1 9 6 4 ) . Philosophy of Language (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall).
Prior Analytics (An. Pr.). LV Inierpretatione (De Int.), Metaphysics
(Met.). Nicomachean Ethics (Eth. Nie). References are to Bekker pages.
AUSTIN J. L. ( 1 9 6 1 ) . Philosophical Papers (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
( 1 9 6 2 ) . How lo Do Things with Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
ARISTOTLE.
AIIXTKR,
Press).
AYER, A. J. ( 1 9 3 6 ) . Language, Truth and Logic (London: Goilancz).
BLACKBURN. S ( 1 9 8 4 ) . Spreading the Word (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
CARNAP, R ( 1 9 3 2 ) . 'berwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der
Sprache', Erkenntnis 2.
!84
R E F E R E N C E S AND B I B L I O G R A P H Y
R E F E R E N C E S AND B I B L I O G R A P H Y
KANT, I. (1785). Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (Gr) (Riga: Hartknoch).
Translation by H. J. Paton, The Moral Law (London: Hutchinson. 1948).
References are to this work unless indicated.
( 1788). Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (KpV) (Riga: Hartknoch). Translation by L. W. Beck. Critique of Practical Reason (Indianapolis. Ind.: BobbsMerrill. 1956).
( 1790). Kritik der Urteilskraft, pt. T (KU) (Berlin: Lagarde). Translation by
J. C. Meredith, Kant's Critique of Aesthetic Judgement (Oxford: Oxford
University Press. 1911 ).
(1797). Metaphysische Anfangsgrnde der Rechtslehre (Rl) (Knigsberg:
Nicolovius). Translation by J. Ladd. The Metaphysical Elements of Justice
(Indianapolis. Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill. 1965)(1797). Metaphysische Anfangsgrnde der Tugendlehre (Tgl) (Knigsberg:
Nicolovius). Translation by M. Gregor, 77ie Doctrine of Virtue (New York:
Harper & Row, 1964).
LEWIS. D. K. (1973). Counterfactuals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
LEWIS, H. A. and WOODIIELD, A. (1985). 'Content and Community'.
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society supp. vol. 59.
Lo, P.-C. (1981 ). A Critical Rvaluation of the Alleged "Empty Formalism" of
Kantian Ethics'. Ethics 91.
LYONS, D. (1965). Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism (Oxford: Oxford University
Press).
MACINTYRE, A. (1984), 'Relativism. Power and Philosophy', Proceedings of the
American Philosophical Association 59 (1985).
MACKIE. J. Ii. (1977). Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Harmondsworth:
Penguin).
(1984). 'Rights, Utility and Universalization', with reply by Hare, in R.
Frey. ed.. Utility and Rights (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota
Press).
MILL, ). S. (1843). A System of Logic (London: Parker).
(1861). Utilitarianism. Eraser's Magazine. Reprinted London 1863.
MILLGRAM, E. (1995). 'Inhaltsreiche ethische Begriffe und die Unterscheidung zwischen Tatsachen und Werte', in C. Fehige and G. Meggle,
eds.. Zum moralischen Denken vol. i (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp).
MOORE. G . E. (1903). Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press).
(1912). Ethics (London: Oxford University Press).
MORRIS. C. W. (1938). 'Foundations of the Theory of Signs', International
Encyclopedia of Unified Science i. 2 (Chicago, III.: Chicago University Press).
185
REFERENCES
AND
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX
118.126
t37
inconsistency 6, 13 f., 22, 58-60, 83, 135
indicatives 14.49 f.. 111 f.. 116, 136; see
(ikoconstative
indiscernibles, identity of 23
inference 3 7 , 4 9 , 9 6 . 1 1 5
intuitions, intuitionism 63-6, 82-95,
116. 119-22, 127-9, 138-43. 148,
161; sir also moral sense
intuitive level see levels of moral thinking
Habermas. J. 7
INDEX
INDEX
188
languages, artificial 4
learning morals vs. learning a language
68
levels of moral thinking 27. 128, 139 f.,
142. 158
f,ewis. A. 72
Lewis. 1). 23
'like' 23. 97 f.
linguistic research 66-8. 71 f., 80. 82 f..
85. 87
Linnaeus 43. 46 f.
locutionary acts 14 f.. 109
logic 36-9, 44 f.. 49, 80. 101. 1 1 2 - 3 1 ,
136-8, 159. 161
and grammar 9 f., 86 f., 101
and language 4, 13, 25
logicality requirement 58 f.. 120 f.. 129.
137
love 72. 123. 156-8
lying 148. 162-4
McDowell.]. 117
Maclntyre. A. 70,81
Mackie.). 123, 134, 151
mathematics 105. 122
maxims 102. 130 f.. 1 3 5 , 1 4 2 , 1 5 3 - 7 ,
161 f.
meaning 1-28, 3 7 - 9 , 44 f., 48 f., 63.
76 f., 82, 103-19. 122 f.
and illocutionary force 14 f.. 50-2,
109 f 1 1 2 - 1 4 . 6
descriptive and evaluative 6, 20 f..
4 5 , 4 8 - 5 5 , 58-62, 6 9 , 1 0 2 - 4 , 113,
116, 123, 129, 137-41
meat-eating 85, 88 f.. 105
mephistics 3, 10
metaphysics 2. 9 f.. 98
and logic 9
of morals 27. 149, 159 f.
Mill. J. S. 18, 76. 122. 130, 145, 148. 151
Millgram. E. 61
mimesis 9 . 1 1 0
modal terms 136
modus ponens 3 7 . 1 1 5
mood and meaning 7 - 1 0 , 14. 5 1 , 1 0 7 f..
112
1 J
189
INDEX
INDEX
practicality requirement 119 C. 136
pragmatic inconsistency 58
pragmatics 1 3 - 1 6 , 4 9 , 52, 112 f.
preferences, preference-ulililarianism
76--K. 1 U- 1 iS. I S 1 - ? . iS9-f>3
prescriptions X. 11. 16-20. 25-7. 45. 52,
55. 76-81. 96.101. 107. 1 1 4 . 119 f.,
128 f.. 133-42
prescriptivism, universal 102. 1 1 5 , 1 3 0 ,
1.59
Prichard. H. A. 6 4 . 1 2 9 . 148 f.. 160
promising 1 1 0 . 1 4 9 - 5 4
prudence 98. 100 f.
psychological possibility 131
publicity requirement 124
punishment, capital 34. 144. 147 f.
191
lact-stating ones, runs afoul of Hare's claims about descriptive and prescriptive
meaning, which realists will reject. Yet Hare's sense of objectivity is not foreign,
I would imagine, to a kind of nondescriptivist (noncognitivist) expressivism, with
which Hare shows some sympathy.
Third, I doubt that there can be a clearer statement of where so much of
the trouble lies between Hare and his descriptivist critics than what appears in
this book. For the book's very framework forces the critic to conduct his argument in terms of rejecting Hare's account of the meaning and logical properties of the moral terms, wherein the meaning of statements containing those
terms is for Hare not exhausted by their syntax and truth conditions. Many
critics may accept this ground, play by Hare's rules, and reject the whole distinction between descriptive and prescriptive meaning. But other critics may not
want to be so constricted; for some may want to hold, for example, that moral
judgments are prescriptive to the extent that we think they are true, and this
in essence violates Hare's framework, since it makes prescriptivity depend on
truth and not be independent of il.
In sum, Hare has provided the best account of Hare on metaethics, whether
for adherents or critics of his universal prescriptivism.
R. G. FREY
Bowling Green State University
Harris, John, and Holm, Soren, eds. The Future of Human Reproduction: Ethics,
Choice, and Regulation.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. Pp. 254. $ 2 4 . 9 5 (paper).
The Future of Human Reproduction is a compilation of fourteen essays addressing
current and near-future reproductive techniques. One essay is on abortion; the
remainder deal with aspects of assisted reproduction. Contributors represent
diverse fields, including law, philosophy, social science, religion, and medical
professions. Their work is generally accessible, not requiring specialized background knowledge.
Each essay is independent, though some cluster around issues or themes.
With a few exceptions, the various contributors do not stake out and defend
opposing claims. When two or more essays address the same topic, they tend
to emphasize different approaches to it. Though more internal debate might
have been profitable, this technique works surprisingly well. The essays complement each other without much repetition.
* Chapter 1, by John Harris, is a concise survey of ethical issues relating to
a wide variety of contemporary methods of assisted/artificial reproduction. The
chapter provides a good setup for the rest of the book, as many of the topics
Harris briefly introduces here are explored at greater length in other essays.
Harris neady critiques several bad arguments. F o r example, ( 1 ) he points
out that in the case of a woman who wants to be implanted with her daughter's
fertilized egg, incredulously repeating the fact that the woman would simultaneously be the mother and grandmother of this child does not constitute an
argument against the procedure (p. 9 ) ; ( 2 ) he notes that those who criticize
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REVIEWS
mary on 42 he says that the difference between the two is that his view,
However, later (1201.) he allows that some emotivist theories allow "sub-
satisfactory ethical theory must entail that "some moral statements a r e in-
maybe the really important difference between emotivism and H a r e ' s theory, in I laic's eyes, is thai his theory, unlike emotivism, implies that even
fundamental moral d i s a g r e e m e n t s c a n be resolved rationally. And crucially,
he holds, this difference tells d e a r l y in favor of his view over emotivism.
that speakers in different cultures use moral terms with different descrip-
meating his approach to ethics is the idea that moral rationality consists in
tive meaning. F o r if it should turn out, f)ace H a r e , that we all use 'ought',
following the logic of the moral words ( 1 2 9 ) . This logic in turn rests on facts
etc. with the same descriptive meaning, then all moral disputes will turn
about linguistic usage (37). Indeed, setting aside irrational nonmoral beliefs,
nally using the p r o c e d u r e s that work for all such disputes. But this as-
self. Specifically, I would be mmn/ly irrational only if I both (i) prescribe uni-
and (ii) prescribe particularly that I (or someone else) do not-A in circum-
principle, Hare thinks, by showing either that one of the parties lo the dispute
its ability to explain how moral conflicts can be resolved rationally than
with its ability to explain how t h e r e a r e conflicts in the first placethat is,
the s a m e m e a n i n g .
A related point c o n c e r n s H a r e ' s "arguability r e q u i r e m e n t " ( 1 2 2 ) . I think
we should i n t e r p r e t it (see 1 2 1 ) as follows: a satisfactory ethical t h e o r y must
1 should point out that I lare's method of resolving irroral disputes has been
rtmndlv ciitie i?ed and is indeed implausible. See especially (libbard 1988.
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would say his view is irrational, quite apart from any possible self-contra-
ical Imperative.
quire thai what is valuable !>< p r o m o t e d . Kant can reply that s o m e values
honoring.
University
of Arizona
ethics. B u t
( 1 ) S o m e virtue ethicists c a n avoid the a r g u m e n t for duty. S u p p o s e that
all duties are derived from universal benevolence. T h e motive of universal
b e n e v o l e n c e then needs no c h e c k from a separate thought of duty; it is a
reliable motive for p r o d u c i n g dutiful actions. Baron makes a c h e c k s e e m
References
University Press.
H a r e , R. M. 1 9 9 5 . "A New Kind of Ethical Naturalism?" In Moral Concepts:
increase their humanity, but seems merely to stipulate that properly valuing