77

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 74431 November 6, 1989

PURITA MIRANDA VESTIL and AGUSTIN VESTIL, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, DAVID UY and TERESITA UY, respondents.
Pablo P. Garcia for petitioners.
Roberto R. Palmares for private respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
Little Theness Tan Uy was dead at the age of three. Her parents said she died because she was
bitten by a dog of the petitioners, but the latter denied this, claiming they had nothing to do with the
dog. The Uys sued the Vestils, who were sustained by the trial court. On appeal, the decision of the
court a quo was reversed in favor of the Uys. The Vestils are now before us. They ask us to set
aside the judgment of the respondent court and to reinstate that of the trial court.
On July 29, 1915, Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of the petitioners
in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil, at F. Ramos Street in Cebu City.
She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she was treated for "multiple lacerated
wounds on the forehead" 1 and administered an anti-rabies vaccine by Dr. Antonio Tautjo. She was
discharged after nine days but was readmitted one week later due to "vomiting of saliva." 2 The following
day, on August 15, 1975, the child died. The cause of death was certified as broncho-pneumonia. 3
Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as the
possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter. The Vestils rejected the
charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal,
and that in any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness. After trial, Judge Jose R. Ramolete of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu sustained the defendants and dismissed the complaint. 4
The respondent court arrived at a different conclusion when the case was appealed. 5 It found that the
Vestils were in possession of the house and the dog and so should be responsible under Article 2183 of
the Civil Code for the injuries caused by the dog. It also held that the child had died as a result of the dog
bites and not for causes independent thereof as submitted by the appellees. Accordingly, the Vestils were
ordered to pay the Uys damages in the amount of P30,000.00 for the death of Theness, P12,000.00 for
medical and hospitalization expenses, and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees.
In the proceedings now before us, Purita Vestil insists that she is not the owner of the house or of
the dog left by her father as his estate has not yet been partitioned and there are other heirs to the
property. Pursuing the logic of the Uys, she claims, even her sister living in Canada would be held

responsible for the acts of the dog simply because she is one of Miranda's heirs. However, that is
hardly the point. What must be determined is the possession of the dog that admittedly was staying
in the house in question, regardless of the ownership of the dog or of the house.
Article 2183 reads as follows:
The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for
the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. 'This
responsibility shall cease only in case the damages should come from force
majeure from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.
Thus, in Afialda v. Hisole, 6 a person hired as caretaker of a carabao gored him to death and his heirs
thereupon sued the owner of the animal for damages. The complaint was dismissed on the ground that it
was the caretaker's duty to prevent the carabao from causing injury to any one, including himself.
Purita Vestil's testimony that she was not in possession of Miranda's house is hardly credible. She
said that the occupants of the house left by her father were related to him ("one way or the other")
and maintained themselves out of a common fund or by some kind of arrangement (on which,
however, she did not elaborate ). 7 She mentioned as many as ten of such relatives who had stayed in
the house at one time or another although they did not appear to be close kin. 8 She at least implied that
they did not pay any rent, presumably because of their relation with Vicente Miranda notwithstanding that
she herself did not seem to know them very well.
There is contrary evidence that the occupants of the house, were boarders (or more of boarders
than relatives) who paid the petitioners for providing them with meals and accommodations. It also
appears that Purita Vestil had hired a maid, Dolores Jumao-as, who did the cooking and cleaning in
the said house for its occupants. 9 Her mother, Pacita, who was a nursemaid of Purita herself,
categorically declared that the petitioners were maintaining boarders in the house where Theness was
bitten by a dog. 10 Another witness, Marcial Lao, testified that he was indeed a boarder and that the Vestils
were maintaining the house for business purposes. 11 And although Purita denied paying the water bills for
the house, the private respondents submitted documentary evidence of her application for water
connection with the Cebu Water District, which strongly suggested that she was administering the house
in question. 12
While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of Vicente Miranda's
estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the time of the incident in
question. She was the only heir residing in Cebu City and the most logical person to take care of the
property, which was only six kilometers from her own house. 13 Moreover, there is evidence showing
that she and her family regularly went to the house, once or twice weekly, according to at least one
witness, 14 and used it virtually as a second house. Interestingly, her own daughter was playing in the
house with Theness when the little girl was bitten by the dog. 15 The dog itself remained in the house even
after the death of Vicente Miranda in 1973 and until 1975, when the incident in question occurred. It is
also noteworthy that the petitioners offered to assist the Uys with their hospitalization expenses although
Purita said she knew them only casually. 16
The petitioners also argue that even assuming that they were the possessors of the dog that bit
Theness there was no clear showing that she died as a result thereof. On the contrary, the death
certificate 17 declared that she died of broncho-pneumonia, which had nothing to do with the dog bites for
which she had been previously hospitalized. The Court need not involve itself in an extended scientific
discussion of the causal connection between the dog bites and the certified cause of death except to note

that, first, Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a result of the dog bites, and second,
that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, which ultimately caused her death, was a complication of rabies. That
Theness became afraid of water after she was bitten by the dog is established by the following testimony
of Dr. Tautjo:

COURT: I think there was mention of rabies in the report in the second admission?
A: Now, the child was continuously vomiting just before I referred to Dr. Co earlier in
the morning and then the father, because the child was asking for water, the father
tried to give the child water and this child went under the bed, she did not like to drink
the water and there was fright in her eyeballs. For this reason, because I was in
danger there was rabies, I called Dr. Co.
Q: In other words, the child had hydrophobia?
A: Yes, sir. 18
As for the link between rabies and broncho-pneumonia, the doctor had the following to say under
oath:
A: Now, as 1 said before, broncho-pneumonia can result from physical, chemical and
bacterial means. ... It can be the result of infection, now, so if you have any other
disease which can lower your resistance you can also get pneumonia.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Would you say that a person who has rabies may die of complication which is
broncho-pneumonia?
A: Yes.
Q: For the record, I am manifesting that this book shown the witness is know as
CURRENT DIANOSIS & TREATMENT, 1968 by Henry Brainerd, Sheldon Margen
and Milton Chaton. Now, I invite your attention, doctor, to page 751 of this book
under the title "Rabies." There is on this page, "Prognosis" as a result of rabies and it
says: Once the symptoms, have appeared death inevitably occurs after 2-3 days as
a result of cardiac or respiratory failure or generalized paralysis. After a positive
diagnosis of rabies or after a bite by a suspected animal if the animal cannot be
observed or if the bite is on the head, give rabies vaccine (duck embryo). Do you
believe in this statement?
A: Yes.
Q: Would you say therefore that persons who have rabies may die of respiratory
failure which leave in the form of bronco-pneumonia?
A: Broncho-pneumonia can be a complication of rabies.

19

On the strength of the foregoing testimony, the Court finds that the link between the dog bites and
the certified cause of death has beep satisfactorily established. We also reiterate our ruling in Sison
v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, 20 that the death certificate is not conclusive proof of the
cause of death but only of the fact of death. Indeed, the evidence of the child's hydrophobia is sufficient to
convince us that she died because she was bitten by the dog even if the death certificate stated a
different cause of death. The petitioner's contention that they could not be expected to exercise remote
control of the dog is not acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of the Civil Code holds the possessor liable even
if the animal should "escape or be lost" and so be removed from his control. And it does not matter either
that, as the petitioners also contend, the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting
her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause
injury. As for the alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the
time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal.
It is worth observing that the above defenses of the petitioners are an implied rejection of their
original posture that there was no proof that it was the dog in their father's house that bit Theness.
According to Manresa the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the
negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the
damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses
animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may
cause. 21
We sustain the findings of the Court of Appeals and approve the monetary awards except only as to
the medical and hospitalization expenses, which are reduced to P2,026.69, as prayed for in the
complaint. While there is no recompense that can bring back to the private respondents the child
they have lost, their pain should at least be assuaged by the civil damages to which they are entitled.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is AFFIRMED as above modified. The petition is DENIED,
with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Exhibit "2."
2 Exhibit "17,"p. 3.
3 Exhibit "7-A."
4 Decision, rollo, p. 32.
5 Campos, Jr., J., with Pascual, Camilon and Juado, JJ., concuring.
6 85 Phi1. 67.

7 TSN, October 28, 1978, pp. 17-18.

8 Ibid., pp. 16-17.
9 TSN, October 4, 1975, pp. 58-59.
10 Ibid. pp. 66.
11 TSN, January 19, 1976, pp. 30-31.
12 Exhibit "J."
13 Rollo, P. 18.
14 TSN, January 19, 1976, p. 53.
15 TSN, October 3, 1978, p. 17.
16 TSN, October 28, 1976, pp. 14-15.
17 Exhibit "7."
18 TSN, January 19, 1976, pp. 11-12.
19 TSN, November 10, 1977, pp. 34-37,
20 47 O.G. 1954. 21 Sangco, Torts and damages, 1978 Ed., p. 227.

Vestil v. IAC G.R. No. 74431

G.R. No. 74431 November 6, 1989

PURITA MIRANDA VESTIL and AGUSTIN VESTIL, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, DAVID UY and TERESITA UY, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
FACTS:
On July 29, 1915, Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of the petitioners in the house of the late
Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil, at F. Ramos Street in Cebu City. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital,
where she was treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead" 1 and administered an anti-rabies vaccine by Dr. Antonio
Tautjo. She was discharged after nine days but was readmitted one week later due to "vomiting of saliva." 2 The following day, on
August 15, 1975, the child died. The cause of death was certified as broncho-pneumonia. 3
Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as the possessors of "Andoy," the
dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter. The Vestils rejected the charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the deceased
Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and that in any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness. After trial, Judge Jose R.
Ramolete of the Court of First Instance of Cebu sustained the defendants and dismissed the complaint. 4
ISSUE:
In the proceedings now before us, Purita Vestil insists that she is not the owner of the house or of the dog left by her father as his
estate has not yet been partitioned and there are other heirs to the property.
RULING:
Pursuing the logic of the Uys, she claims, even her sister living in Canada would be held responsible for the acts of the dog
simply because she is one of Miranda's heirs. However, that is hardly the point. What must be determined is the possession of
the dog that admittedly was staying in the house in question, regardless of the ownership of the dog or of the house.
Article 2183 reads as follows:
The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although
it may escape or be lost. 'This responsibility shall cease only in case the damages should come from force majeure from the fault
of the person who has suffered damage.
Thus, in Afialda v. Hisole, 6 a person hired as caretaker of a carabao gored him to death and his heirs thereupon sued the owner
of the animal for damages. The complaint was dismissed on the ground that it was the caretaker's duty to prevent the carabao
from causing injury to any one, including himself.
While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that
she and her husband were its possessors at the time of the incident in question. She was the only heir residing in Cebu City and
the most logical person to take care of the property, which was only six kilometers from her own house. 13 Moreover, there is
evidence showing that she and her family regularly went to the house, once or twice weekly, according to at least one
witness, 14 and used it virtually as a second house. Interestingly, her own daughter was playing in the house with Theness when
the little girl was bitten by the dog. 15 The dog itself remained in the house even after the death of Vicente Miranda in 1973 and
until 1975, when the incident in question occurred. It is also noteworthy that the petitioners offered to assist the Uys with their
hospitalization expenses although Purita said she knew them only casually. 16
ISSUE:
The petitioners also argue that even assuming that they were the possessors of the dog that bit Theness there was no clear
showing that she died as a result thereof.
RULING:
On the contrary, the death certificate 17 declared that she died of broncho-pneumonia, which had nothing to do with the dog bites
for which she had been previously hospitalized. The Court need not involve itself in an extended scientific discussion of the
causal connection between the dog bites and the certified cause of death except to note that, first, Theness developed
hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a result of the dog bites, and second, that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, which ultimately

caused her death, was a complication of rabies. That Theness became afraid of water after she was bitten by the dog is
established by the testimony of Dr. Tautjo.
On the strength of the testimony, the Court finds that the link between the dog bites and the certified cause of death has \
satisfactorily established. We also reiterate our ruling in Sison v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, 20 that the death
certificate is not conclusive proof of the cause of death but only of the fact of death. Indeed, the evidence of the child's
hydrophobia is sufficient to convince us that she died because she was bitten by the dog even if the death certificate stated a
different cause of death. The petitioner's contention that they could not be expected to exercise remote control of the dog is not
acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of the Civil Code holds the possessor liable even if the animal should "escape or be lost" and so
be removed from his control. And it does not matter either that, as the petitioners also contend, the dog was tame and was
merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long
as they cause injury. As for the alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the time she
was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal.
According to Manresa the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the
presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and
on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage
which such animal may cause. 21
We sustain the findings of the Court of Appeals and approve the monetary awards except only as to the medical and
hospitalization expenses, which are reduced to P2,026.69, as prayed for in the complaint. While there is no recompense that can
bring back to the private respondents the child they have lost, their pain should at least be assuaged by the civil damages to
which they are entitled.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES AND SPS. MARGARITA AND DAVID SUZARA, Petitioners, v. ST.
THERESAS COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, AND JOHN DOES, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO JR., J.:
The individuals desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in society is an equally powerful
desire. Thus each individual is continually engaged in a personal adjustment process in which he balances
the desire for privacy with the desire for disclosure and communication of himself to others, in light of the
environmental conditions and social norms set by the society in which he lives.
~ Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)
The Case
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 19
of A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC,1 otherwise known as the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data. Petitioners herein assail
the July 27, 2012 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City (RTC) in SP. Proc. No. 19251CEB, which dismissed their habeas data petition.
The Facts
Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both minors, were, during the period
material, graduating high school students at St. Theresas College (STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January
2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne,
along with several others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments. These
pictures were then uploaded by Angela Lindsay Tan (Angela) on her Facebook 3 profile.
Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a computer teacher at STCs high school
department, learned from her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting

themselves from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Escudero then asked her students if they knew
who the girls in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia, Julienne, and Chloe Lourdes Taboada
(Chloe), among others.
Using STCs computers, Escuderos students logged in to their respective personal Facebook accounts and
showed her photos of the identified students, which include: (a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and
smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of
clothing that show virtually the entirety of their black brassieres. What is more, Escuderos students claimed
that there were times when access to or the availability of the identified students photos was not confined
to the girls Facebook friends,4 but were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user.5
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Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her students Facebook page, showed the
photos to Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol), STCs Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate action. Thereafter, following
an investigation, STC found the identified students to have deported themselves in a manner proscribed by
the schools Student Handbook, to wit:
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1.

Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus;

2.

Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts;

3.

Smoking and drinking alcoholic beverages in public places;

4.

Apparel that exposes the underwear;

5.

Clothing that advocates unhealthy behaviour; depicts obscenity; contains sexually suggestive
messages, language or symbols; and

6.

Posing and uploading pictures on the Internet that entail ample body exposure.

On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students in the pictures in question, reported, as
required, to the office of Sr. Celeste Ma. Purisima Pe (Sr. Purisima), STCs high school principal and
ICM6 Directress. They claimed that during the meeting, they were castigated and verbally abused by the STC
officials present in the conference, including Assistant Principal Mussolini S. Yap (Yap), Roswinda Jumiller,
and Tigol. What is more, Sr. Purisima informed their parents the following day that, as part of their penalty,
they are barred from joining the commencement exercises scheduled on March 30, 2012.
A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angelas mother, Dr. Armenia M. Tan (Tan), filed a Petition
for Injunction and Damages before the RTC of Cebu City against STC, et al., docketed as Civil Case No. CEB38594.7 In it, Tan prayed that defendants therein be enjoined from implementing the sanction that
precluded Angela from joining the commencement exercises. On March 25, 2012, petitioner Rhonda Ave
Vivares (Vivares), the mother of Julia, joined the fray as an intervenor.
On March 28, 2012, defendants in Civil Case No. CEB-38594 filed their memorandum, containing printed
copies of the photographs in issue as annexes. That same day, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order
(TRO) allowing the students to attend the graduation ceremony, to which STC filed a motion for
reconsideration.
Despite the issuance of the TRO, STC, nevertheless, barred the sanctioned students from participating in the
graduation rites, arguing that, on the date of the commencement exercises, its adverted motion for
reconsideration on the issuance of the TRO remained unresolved.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data, docketed as
SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB8 on the basis of the following considerations:
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1.

The photos of their children in their undergarments (e.g., bra) were taken for posterity before they
changed into their swimsuits on the occasion of a birthday beach party;

2.

The privacy setting of their childrens Facebook accounts was set at Friends Only. They, thus, have
a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected.

3.

Respondents, being involved in the field of education, knew or ought to have known of laws that
safeguard the right to privacy. Corollarily, respondents knew or ought to have known that the girls,
whose privacy has been invaded, are the victims in this case, and not the offenders. Worse, after
viewing the photos, the minors were called immoral and were punished outright;

4.

The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced without their
consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the photos and by
subsequently showing them to STCs officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of petitioners children
were intruded upon;

5.

The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and digital
images happened at STCs Computer Laboratory; and

6.

All the data and digital images that were extracted were boldly broadcasted by respondents through
their memorandum submitted to the RTC in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594.

To petitioners, the interplay of the foregoing constitutes an invasion of their childrens privacy and, thus,
prayed that: (a) a writ of habeas data be issued; (b) respondents be ordered to surrender and deposit with
the court all soft and printed copies of the subject data before or at the preliminary hearing; and (c) after
trial, judgment be rendered declaring all information, data, and digital images accessed, saved or stored,
reproduced, spread and used, to have been illegally obtained in violation of the childrens right to privacy.
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC, through an Order dated July 5, 2012, issued
the writ of habeas data. Through the same Order, herein respondents were directed to file their verified
written return, together with the supporting affidavits, within five (5) working days from service of the writ.
In time, respondents complied with the RTCs directive and filed their verified written return, laying down the
following grounds for the denial of the petition, viz: (a) petitioners are not the proper parties to file the
petition; (b) petitioners are engaging in forum shopping; (c) the instant case is not one where a writ
of habeas data may issue; and (d) there can be no violation of their right to privacy as there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy on Facebook.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 27, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for habeas data. The dispositive
portion of the Decision pertinently states:
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WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

The parties and media must observe the aforestated confidentiality.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.9
To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the minors
right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas data. Moreover, the court a
quo held that the photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as to who may view them,
lost their privacy in some way. Besides, the RTC noted, STC gathered the photographs through legal means
and for a legal purpose, that is, the implementation of the schools policies and rules on discipline.
Not satisfied with the outcome, petitioners now come before this Court pursuant to Section 19 of the Rule on
Habeas Data.10
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The Issues

The main issue to be threshed out in this case is whether or not a writ of habeas data should be issued given
the factual milieu. Crucial in resolving the controversy, however, is the pivotal point of whether or not there
was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the
minors involved in this case.
Our Ruling
We find no merit in the petition.
Procedural issues concerning the
availability of the Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security
is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the
person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.11 It is an independent and summary
remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an
individual, and to provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to
protect a persons right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such
information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. 12
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In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individuals right to informational
privacy, among others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas data as a procedure
designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age.13 The writ, however, will not
issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access to information about a person. Availment of the
writ requires the existence of a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life,
liberty or security on the other.14 Thus, the existence of a persons right to informational privacy and a
showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life,
liberty or security of the victim are indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be extended. 15
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Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to informational privacy, a habeas
datapetition will not prosper. Viewed from the perspective of the case at bar, this requisite begs this
question: given the nature of an online social network (OSN)(1) that it facilitates and promotes real-time
interaction among millions, if not billions, of users, sans the spatial barriers, 16 bridging the gap created by
physical space; and (2) that any information uploaded in OSNs leaves an indelible trace in the providers
databases, which are outside the control of the end-usersis there a right to informational privacy in
OSN activities of its users? Before addressing this point, We must first resolve the procedural issues in
this case.
The writ of habeas data is not only confined to
cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearancesContrary to respondents submission, the Writ
of Habeas Data was not enacted solely for the purpose of complementing the Writ ofAmparo in cases of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:

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Sec. 2. Who May File. Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas data. However, in
cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed by:
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(a)
(b)

Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely:

the spouse, children and parents; or
Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved
party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in
default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph. (emphasis
supplied)

Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only to cases of extralegal killings
or enforced disappearances, the above underscored portion of Section 2, reflecting a variance of habeas

data situations, would not have been made.

Habeas data, to stress, was designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information
age.17 As such, it is erroneous to limit its applicability to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
only. In fact, the annotations to the Rule prepared by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court,
after explaining that the Writ of Habeas Data complements the Writ of Amparo, pointed out that:
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The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce ones
right to privacy, more specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies against the
violation of such right can include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or
information or files in possession or in control of respondents. 18 (emphasis Ours)
Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data may also be availed of in cases outside of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances.
Meaning of engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or informationRespondents contention that the habeas data writ may not
issue against STC, it not being an entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party, while valid to a
point, is, nonetheless, erroneous.
To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available only against
abuses of a person or entity engaged in the business of gathering, storing, and collecting of data. As
provided under Section 1 of the Rule:
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Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official
or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party. (emphasis Ours)
The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys the idea that habeas data is
a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of private individuals or entities
engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her correspondences,
or about his or her family. Such individual or entity need not be in the business of collecting or storing data.
To engage in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To engage means to do or
take part in something.19 It does not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of a
business. What matters is that the person or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or
information about the aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such undertaking carries the element of
regularity, as when one pursues a business, and is in the nature of a personal endeavour, for any other
reason or even for no reason at all, is immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from getting to said
person or entity.
To agree with respondents above argument, would mean unduly limiting the reach of the writ to a very
small group, i.e., private persons and entities whose business is data gathering and storage, and in the
process decreasing the effectiveness of the writ as an instrument designed to protect a right which is easily
violated in view of rapid advancements in the information and communications technologya right which a
great majority of the users of technology themselves are not capable of protecting.
Having resolved the procedural aspect of the case, We now proceed to the core of the controversy.
The right to informational privacy on Facebook
The Right to Informational Privacy
The concept of privacy has, through time, greatly evolved, with technological advancements having an
influential part therein. This evolution was briefly recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S. Punos
speech, The Common Right to Privacy,20 where he explained the three strands of the right to privacy, viz:
(1) locational or situational privacy;21 (2) informational privacy; and (3) decisional privacy.22 Of the three,
what is relevant to the case at bar is the right to informational privacyusually defined as the right of
individuals to control information about themselves. 23
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With the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering and data sharing nowadays, not to
mention each systems inherent vulnerability to attacks and intrusions, there is more reason that every
individuals right to control said flow of information should be protected and that each individual should have
at least a reasonable expectation of privacy in cyberspace. Several commentators regarding privacy and
social networking sites, however, all agree that given the millions of OSN users, [i]n this [Social
Networking] environment, privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable expectations, but rather in some
theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking.24
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It is due to this notion that the Court saw the pressing need to provide for judicial remedies that would allow
a summary hearing of the unlawful use of data or information and to remedy possible violations of the right
to privacy.25 In the same vein, the South African High Court, in its Decision in the landmark case, H v.
W,26 promulgated on January 30, 2013, recognized that [t]he law has to take into account the changing
realities not only technologically but also socially or else it will lose credibility in the eyes of the people. x x x
It is imperative that the courts respond appropriately to changing times, acting cautiously and with wisdom.
Consistent with this, the Court, by developing what may be viewed as the Philippine model of the writ
of habeas data, in effect, recognized that, generally speaking, having an expectation of informational
privacy is not necessarily incompatible with engaging in cyberspace activities, including those that
occur in OSNs.
The question now though is up to what extent is the right to privacy protected in OSNs? Bear in mind that
informational privacy involves personal information. At the same time, the very purpose of OSNs is
socializingsharing a myriad of information,27 some of which would have otherwise remained personal.
Facebooks Privacy Tools: a response to
the clamor for privacy in OSN activities
Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the ability to interact and to stay connected to other
members of the same or different social media platform through the sharing of statuses, photos, videos,
among others, depending on the services provided by the site. It is akin to having a room filled with millions
of personal bulletin boards or walls, the contents of which are under the control of each and every user. In
his or her bulletin board, a user/owner can post anythingfrom text, to pictures, to music and videos
access to which would depend on whether he or she allows one, some or all of the other users to see his or
her posts. Since gaining popularity, the OSN phenomenon has paved the way to the creation of various
social networking sites, including the one involved in the case at bar, www.facebook.com (Facebook), which,
according to its developers, people use to stay connected with friends and family, to discover whats going
on in the world, and to share and express what matters to them.28
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Facebook connections are established through the process of friending another user. By sending a friend
request, the user invites another to connect their accounts so that they can view any and all Public and
Friends Only posts of the other. Once the request is accepted, the link is established and both users are
permitted to view the other users Public or Friends Only posts, among others. Friending, therefore,
allows the user to form or maintain one-to-one relationships with other users, whereby the user gives his or
her Facebook friend access to his or her profile and shares certain information to the latter.29
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To address concerns about privacy,30 but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed with different
privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a users profile31 as well as information uploaded by the
user. In H v. W,32 the South Gauteng High Court recognized this ability of the users to customize their
privacy settings, but did so with this caveat: Facebook states in its policies that, although it makes every
effort to protect a users information, these privacy settings are not fool-proof.33
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For instance, a Facebook user can regulate the visibility and accessibility of digital images (photos), posted
on his or her personal bulletin or wall, except for the users profile picture and ID, by selecting his or her
desired privacy setting:
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(a) Public - the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
(b) Friends of Friends - only the users Facebook friends and their friends can view the photo;
(b) Friends - only the users Facebook friends can view the photo;
(c) Custom - the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the Facebook user; and
(d) Only Me - the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set up barriers to broaden or limit

the visibility of his or her specific profile content, statuses, and photos, among others, from another users
point of view. In other words, Facebook extends its users an avenue to make the availability of their
Facebook activities reflect their choice as to when and to what extent to disclose facts about [themselves]
and to put others in the position of receiving such confidences.34 Ideally, the selected setting will be based
on ones desire to interact with others, coupled with the opposing need to withhold certain information as
well as to regulate the spreading of his or her personal information. Needless to say, as the privacy setting
becomes more limiting, fewer Facebook users can view that users particular post.
STC did not violate petitioners daughters right to privacy
Without these privacy settings, respondents contention that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in
Facebook would, in context, be correct. However, such is not the case. It is through the availability of
said privacy tools that many OSN users are said to have a subjective expectation that only those
to whom they grant access to their profile will view the information they post or upload
thereto.35
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This, however, does not mean that any Facebook user automatically has a protected expectation of privacy
in all of his or her Facebook activities.
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first necessary that said
user, in this case the children of petitioners, manifest the intention to keep certain posts private,
through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility.36 And this
intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSNs privacy tools. In other
words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in cyber world, of the users
invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.37
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Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or deny access to his or her post
or profile detail should not be denied the informational privacy right which necessarily accompanies said
choice.38 Otherwise, using these privacy tools would be a feckless exercise, such that if, for instance, a user
uploads a photo or any personal information to his or her Facebook page and sets its privacy level at Only
Me or a custom list so that only the user or a chosen few can view it, said photo would still be deemed
public by the courts as if the user never chose to limit the photos visibility and accessibility. Such position, if
adopted, will not only strip these privacy tools of their function but it would also disregard the very intention
of the user to keep said photo or information within the confines of his or her private space.
We must now determine the extent that the images in question were visible to other Facebook users and
whether the disclosure was confidential in nature. In other words, did the minors limit the disclosure of the
photos such that the images were kept within their zones of privacy? This determination is necessary in
resolving the issue of whether the minors carved out a zone of privacy when the photos were uploaded to
Facebook so that the images will be protected against unauthorized access and disclosure.
Petitioners, in support of their thesis about their childrens privacy right being violated, insist that Escudero
intruded upon their childrens Facebook accounts, downloaded copies of the pictures and showed said photos
to Tigol. To them, this was a breach of the minors privacy since their Facebook accounts, allegedly, were
under very private or Only Friends setting safeguarded with a password. 39 Ultimately, they posit that
their childrens disclosure was only limited since their profiles were not open to public viewing. Therefore,
according to them, people who are not their Facebook friends, including respondents, are barred from
accessing said post without their knowledge and consent. As petitioners children testified, it was Angela who
uploaded the subject photos which were only viewable by the five of them,40 although who these five are
do not appear on the records.
Escudero, on the other hand, stated in her affidavit 41 that my students showed me some pictures of girls
clad in brassieres. This student [sic] of mine informed me that these are senior high school [students] of
STC, who are their friends in [F]acebook. x x x They then said [that] there are still many other photos
posted on the Facebook accounts of these girls. At the computer lab, these students then logged into their
Facebook account [sic], and accessed from there the various photographs x x x. They even told me that
there had been times when these photos were public i.e., not confined to their friends in Facebook.
In this regard, We cannot give much weight to the minors testimonies for one key reason: failure to
question the students act of showing the photos to Tigol disproves their allegation that the photos were
viewable only by the five of them. Without any evidence to corroborate their statement that the images
were visible only to the five of them, and without their challenging Escuderos claim that the other students

were able to view the photos, their statements are, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant
consideration.42
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It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escuderos sworn account that her students, who are
the minors Facebook friends, showed her the photos using their own Facebook accounts. This only goes to
show that no special means to be able to view the allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by
Escuderos students,43 and that it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality,
viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is Public, it can be surmised that the photographs
in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners children positively
limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such were the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached
to the right to informational privacy. The ensuing pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez44 is most
instructive:
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[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and renounce all privacy
rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances such as here, where the Defendant did not employ
protective measures or devices that would have controlled access to the Web page or the photograph
itself.45
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Also, United States v. Maxwell46 held that [t]he more open the method of transmission is, the less privacy
one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public at large in the chat room or e-mail that is forwarded
from correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of privacy.
That the photos are viewable by friends only does not necessarily bolster the petitioners contention. In
this regard, the cyber community is agreed that the digital images under this setting still remain to be
outside the confines of the zones of privacy in view of the following:
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(1) Facebook allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its
users the tools to interact and share in any conceivable way;47
(2) A good number of Facebook users befriend other users who are total
strangers;48
(3) The sheer number of Friends one user has, usually by the hundreds;
and
(4) A users Facebook friend can share49 the formers post, or
tag50 others who are not Facebook friends with the former, despite its
being visible only to his or her own Facebook friends.
It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a posts or profile details privacy to Friends is no
assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the source of
the content. The users own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend
thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also,
when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who
shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at Friends.
To illustrate, suppose A has 100 Facebook friends and B has 200. A and B are not Facebook friends. If C, As
Facebook friend, tags B in As post, which is set at Friends, the initial audience of 100 (As own Facebook
friends) is dramatically increased to 300 (As 100 friends plus Bs 200 friends or the public, depending upon
Bs privacy setting). As a result, the audience who can view the post is effectively expandedand to a very
large extent.
This, along with its other features and uses, is confirmation of Facebooks proclivity towards user interaction
and socialization rather than seclusion or privacy, as it encourages broadcasting of individual user posts. In
fact, it has been said that OSNs have facilitated their users self-tribute, thereby resulting into the
democratization of fame.51 Thus, it is suggested, that a profile, or even a post, with visibility set at Friends
Only cannot easily, more so automatically, be said to be very private, contrary to petitioners argument.
As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned students Facebook

friends, respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion since it was the
minors Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were mere recipients of what were
posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to
them by persons who had legitimate access to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends
of the minors. Curiously enough, however, neither the minors nor their parents imputed any violation of
privacy against the students who showed the images to Escudero.
Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their contention that respondents reproduced and broadcasted the
photographs. In fact, what petitioners attributed to respondents as an act of offensive disclosure was no
more than the actuality that respondents appended said photographs in their memorandum submitted to the
trial court in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594.52 These are not tantamount to a violation of the
minors informational privacy rights, contrary to petitioners assertion.
In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be more precise, the photos of minor
students scantily clad, are personal in nature, likely to affect, if indiscriminately circulated, the reputation of
the minors enrolled in a conservative institution. However, the records are bereft of any evidence, other than
bare assertions that they utilized Facebooks privacy settings to make the photos visible only to them or to a
select few. Without proof that they placed the photographs subject of this case within the ambit of their
protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they have an expectation of privacy with respect to
the photographs in question.
Had it been proved that the access to the pictures posted were limited to the original uploader, through the
Me Only privacy setting, or that the users contact list has been screened to limit access to a select few,
through the Custom setting, the result may have been different, for in such instances, the intention to
limit access to the particular post, instead of being broadcasted to the public at large or all the users friends
en masse, becomes more manifest and palpable.
On Cyber Responsibility
It has been said that the best filter is the one between your childrens ears. 53 This means that selfregulation on the part of OSN users and internet consumers in general is the best means of avoiding privacy
rights violations.54 As a cyberspace community member, one has to be proactive in protecting his or her own
privacy.55 It is in this regard that many OSN users, especially minors, fail. Responsible social networking or
observance of the netiquettes56 on the part of teenagers has been the concern of many due to the
widespread notion that teenagers can sometimes go too far since they generally lack the people skills or
general wisdom to conduct themselves sensibly in a public forum. 57
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Respondent STC is clearly aware of this and incorporating lessons on good cyber citizenship in its curriculum
to educate its students on proper online conduct may be most timely. Too, it is not only STC but a number of
schools and organizations have already deemed it important to include digital literacy and good cyber
citizenship in their respective programs and curricula in view of the risks that the children are exposed to
every time they participate in online activities.58 Furthermore, considering the complexity of the cyber world
and its pervasiveness, as well as the dangers that these children are wittingly or unwittingly exposed to in
view of their unsupervised activities in cyberspace, the participation of the parents in disciplining and
educating their children about being a good digital citizen is encouraged by these institutions and
organizations. In fact, it is believed that to limit such risks, theres no substitute for parental involvement
and supervision.59
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As such, STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of teaching its students to be responsible in
their dealings and activities in cyberspace, particularly in OSNs, when it enforced the disciplinary actions
specified in the Student Handbook, absent a showing that, in the process, it violated the students rights.
OSN users should be aware of the risks that they expose themselves to whenever they engage in
cyberspace activities. Accordingly, they should be cautious enough to control their privacy and to exercise
sound discretion regarding how much information about themselves they are willing to give up. Internet
consumers ought to be aware that, by entering or uploading any kind of data or information online, they are
automatically and inevitably making it permanently available online, the perpetuation of which is outside the
ambit of their control. Furthermore, and more importantly, information, otherwise private, voluntarily
surrendered by them can be opened, read, or copied by third parties who may or may not be allowed access
to such.
It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their online dealings and activities and

must not be negligent in protecting their rights. Equity serves the vigilant. Demanding relief from the courts,
as here, requires that claimants themselves take utmost care in safeguarding a right which they allege to
have been violated. These are indispensable. We cannot afford protection to persons if they themselves did
nothing to place the matter within the confines of their private zone. OSN users must be mindful enough to
learn the use of privacy tools, to use them if they desire to keep the information private, and to keep track
of changes in the available privacy settings, such as those of Facebook, especially because Facebook is
notorious for changing these settings and the sites layout often.
In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not violate the minors privacy rights, We find no cogent
reason to disturb the findings and case disposition of the court a quo.
In light of the foregoing, the Court need not belabor the other assigned errors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated July 27, 2012 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB is hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

cralawred

Peralta, Villarama, Jr., Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

Issued on January 22, 2008.

Penned by Presiding Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr.

Facebook is a voluntary social network to which members subscribe and submit information. x x x. It has
created a worldwide forum enabling friends to share information such as thoughts, links, and photographs,
with one another. (H v. W., Case No. 12/10142, January 30, 2013, In the South Gauteng High Court,
Johannesburg, Republic of South Africa).
3

By using the Friends Only setting.

Using Public as their Privacy Setting.

ICM stands for the Missionary Sisters of the Immaculate Heart of Mary.

Entitled Dr. Armenia M. Tan, for and in behalf of her minor child v. St. Theresas College, High School
Department, Sr. Celeste Ma. Purisima Pe, Mrs. Mussolini S. Yap, Ms. Marnie D. Racaza, Ms. Kristine Rose
Ligot (sic), and Ms. Edita Josephine Yu.
7

Entitled Rhonda Ave S. Vivares, and Sps. Margarita and David Suzara v. St. Theresas College, Mylene
Rheza T. Escudero, and John Does.
8

Rollo, p. 39.

A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, February 2, 2008 [Sec. 19. Appeal. Any party may appeal from the judgment or
final order to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both.].
10

11

12

Id., Sec. 1.
Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012, 677 SCRA 385.

See Andres Guadamuz, Habeas Data and the European Data Protection Directive, in THE JOURNAL OF
INFORMATION, LAW AND TECHNOLOGY (JILT) (2001), cited in former Chief Justice Reynato S. Punos
speech, The Common Right to Privacy (2008).
13

14

Gamboa v. Chan, supra note 12.

15

See Roxas v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 189155, September 7, 2010, 630 SCRA 211.

In Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless World by Patricia Sanchez Abril, the term used to refer to the
physical space which poses a number of problems in privacy torts that occur in Cyberspace - a spaceless
world, is spatial linchpins. (Harvard Journal of Law & Technology, Vol. 21, Number 1 Fall 2007); See
also Kizza, Joseph Migga, Ethical and Social Issues in the Information Age, Third Edition, Springer-Verlag
London Limited 2007, p. 303 The totality of cyberspace is in reality a borderless self-regulating and
decentralized mosaic of communities with a variety of cultural, political, and religious agendas.
16

From Former Chief Justice Reynato Punos speech, The Writ of Habeas Data, delivered on 19 November
2007, at the UNESCO Policy Forum and Organizational Meeting of the Information for all Program (IFAP),
Philippine National Committee, citing Enrique Falcon, Habeas Data: Concepto y Procedimiento 23 (1996).
17

Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court, A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, Rule on the Writ of Habeas
Data (2008).
18

19

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/engage. Last accessed February 13, 2013.

Delivered before the Forum on The Writ of Habeas Data and Human Rights, sponsored by the National
Union of Peoples Lawyers on March 12, 2008 at the Innotech Seminar Hall, Commonwealth Ave., Quezon
City. (http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/speech/03-12-08-speech.pdf. Last Accessed, January 24, 2013).
20

Refers to the privacy that is felt in physical space, such as that which may be violated by trespass and
unwarranted search and seizure. Id.
21

Usually defined as the right of individuals to make certain kinds of fundamental choices with respect to
their personal and reproductive autonomy. Id.
22

23

Id.

Romano v. Steelcase, Inc. and Educational & Institutional Services Inc., Supreme Court of New York,
Suffolk County, 30 Misc. 3d 426; 907 N.Y.S.2d 650; 2010 N.Y. Misc. Lexis 4538; 2010 NY Slip Op 20388,
September 21, 2010, Decided. See also Kizza, Joseph Migga, Ethical and Social Issues in the Information
Age, Third Edition, Springer-Verlag London Limited 2007, p. 109, However, these days in the information
age, the value of privacy has been eroded. We can no longer guarantee our privacy. It has left many
wondering whether there is such a thing as privacy any more. x x x No one has guaranteed privacy any
more unless such an individual is no longer part of the society. Page 304 reads, According to recent
studies, personal privacy is becoming the number-one social and ethical issue of concern for the information
age. Advances in technology have brought with them gadgetry that have diminished individual private
spaces through electronic surveillance and monitoring, transmission, scanning, tapping, and fast and more
efficient means of collecting, categorizing, and sorting data.
24

25

Puno, The Common Right to Privacy, supra note 20.

26

Supra note 3. Penned by Judge N. P. Willis.

Including but not limited to the following: name, residence, email address, telephone or cellular phone
number, personal pictures, relationship status, date of birth, current location, relatives, hobbies and
interests, employment, profession, educational background, preferences, thoughts, messages,
conversations, internet memes, videos (ranging from personal videos to scene extracts from movies,
television shows, news,et cetera), photos, religious messages, political views, updates, commentaries and
reactions to current events, support and prayer petitions, as well as products and services.
27

28

29

30

http://newsroom.fb.com/Key-Facts. Last accessed January 24, 2013.

H v. W, supra note 3.
Id.

A users profile contains basic information about the account owner, i.e. Profile Picture, Full name,
Birthdate, Address, Place of Work, Profession, a list of the users Facebook Friends, among others. It is
31

akin to an Identification Card.

32

Supra note 3.

33

Id.

34

Westin, Alan, Privacy and Freedom, cited in Valerie Steeves work, Reclaiming the Social Value of Privacy.

Newell, Bryce Clayton, Rethinking Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in Online Social Networks,
Richmond Journal of Law and Technology Vol. XVII, Issue 4, 2011, citing Avner Levin and Patricia Sanchez
Abril, Two Notions of Privacy Online, 11 V AND.J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1001, 1012 (2009)
(http://jolt.richmond.edu/v17i4/article12.pdf. Last accessed January 31, 2013)
35

It has been suggested that: focus on the individuals control over information allows him to decide for
himself what measure of privacy to grant certain topics. It can also relieve the burden of determining
responsibility for certain perceived privacy breaches. For example, it is clear that the online socializer who
posts embarrassing pictures of himself publicly and without heightened privacy settings is a victim of his
own reckless behavior. By publicizing embarrassing information, he voluntary relinquished controland a
legally recognizable privacy rightover it. (Avner Levin and Patricia Sanchez Abril, Two Notions of Privacy
Online, 11 V AND.J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1001, 1012 [2009])
36

In the same vein that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail messages stored in
computers that he alone could retrieve through use of his own assigned password. An objective expectation
of privacy exists with regard to e-mail messages that a person transmits electronically to other subscribers
of the same Internet service who have individually assigned passwords. (United States v. Maxwell,42 M.J.
568 (A.F.C.C.A. 1995), 45 M.J. 406 [C.A.A.F. 1996])
37

Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., Supreme Court of New York, Suffolk County, 30 Misc. 3d 426; 907 N.Y.S. 2d
650; 2010 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4538; 2010 NY Slip Op 20388, September 21, 2010.
38

39

Rollo, p. 54.

40

TSN, July 19, 2012, pp. 32-34; 37.

41

Rollo, p. 134

42

People v. Dolorido, G.R. No. 191721, January 12, 2011, 639 SCRA 496.

Since the students merely viewed the photographs using their own accounts which are linked to the
profiles of the minors, they being Facebook friends.
43

44

214 F. Supp. 2d at 225.

Furthermore, [a] person who places information on the information superhighway clearly subjects said
information to being accessed by every conceivable interested party. Simply expressed, if privacy is sought,
then public communication mediums such as the Internet are not adequate forums without protective
measures. Id.
45

46

47

45 M.J. 406 [C.A.A.F. 199]

McCarthy, Watson and Weldon-Siviy, Own Your Space: A Guide to Facebook Security.

McCarthy, Caroline, Facebook users pretty willing to add strangers as friends (2007)
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13577_3-9759401-36.html; https://threatpost.com/en_us/blogs/facebook-youshould-only-friend-people-you-know-no-seriously-were-not-kidding-081911;
http://blog.kaspersky.com/dont-be-facebook-friends-with-strangers/. Last accessed February 1, 2013.
48

Sharing allows a user to post content from another page or user, to his or her own page or to another
users page.
49

A tag is a special kind of link. When you tag someone, you create a link to their timeline. The post you tag
the person in may also be added to that persons timeline. For example, you can tag a photo to show whos
50

in the photo or post a status update and say who youre with. If you tag a friend in your status update,
anyone who sees that update can click on your friends name and go to their timeline. Your status update
may also show up on that friends timeline. (From Facebooks Help Center, http://www.facebook.com/. Last
accessed April 23, 2013)
From Patricia Sanchez Abrils Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless World, supra note 16, citing Lakshmi
Chaudhry, Mirror Mirror on the Web, The Nation, January 29, 2007.
51

52

53

Rollo, pp. 41-42.

Parry Aftab of WiredSafety.org.

Kizza, Joseph Migga, Ethical and Social Issues in the Information Age, Third Edition, Springer-Verlag
London Limited 2007, p. 117
54

55

Id. at 306.

Netiquette is the social code of network communication; it is the social and moral code of the internet
based on the human condition and the Golden Rule of Netiquette; it is a philosophy of effective internet
communication that utilizes common conventions and norms as a guide for rules and standards.
http://www.networketiquette.net/. Last accessed, February 18, 2013.
56

Technology Trend: Responsible Social Networking for Teens,http://www1.cyfernet.org/tech/06-08TeenUseSM.html. Last Accessed, February 18, 2013.
57

Kizza, Joseph Migga, supra note 54, at 341: Perhaps one of the most successful forms of deterrence has
been self-regulation. A number of organizations have formed to advocate parents and teachers to find a way
to regulate objectionable material from reaching our children. Also, families and individuals, sometimes
based on their morals and sometimes based on their religion, have made self-regulation a cornerstone of
their efforts to stop the growing rate of online crimes.
58

Childrens Safety on the Internet, Privacy Rights Clearing House, available at

https://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs21a-childrensafety.htm#1. Last Accessed, February 18, 2013.
59

Political Law Constitutional Law Bill of Rights Right to Privacy Online Privacy (Social
Media)
Remedial Law Special Proceedings Writ of Habeas Data

n January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresas College (STC),

uploaded on Facebook several pictures of her and her classmates (Nenita Daluz and
Julienne Suzara) wearing only their undergarments.
Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said photos to their teacher, Mylene
Escudero. Escudero, through her students, viewed and downloaded said pictures. She
showed the said pictures to STCs Discipline-in-Charge for appropriate action.
Later, STC found Tan et al to have violated the students handbook and banned them from
marching in their graduation ceremonies scheduled in March 2012.
The issue went to court but despite a TRO (temporary restraining order) granted by the
Cebu RTC enjoining the school from barring the students in the graduation ceremonies,
STC still barred said students.

Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and the other mothers filed a petition for
the issuance of the writ of habeas data against the school. They argued, among others,
that:
1. The privacy setting of their childrens Facebook accounts was set at Friends Only. They,
thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected.
2. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced
without their consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the
photos and by subsequently showing them to STCs officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts
of the children were intruded upon;
3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data,
and digital images happened at STCs Computer Laboratory;
They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed
copies of the subject data and have such data be declared illegally obtained in violation of
the childrens right to privacy.
The Cebu RTC eventually denied the petition. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas data is proper.
HELD: Yes, it is proper but in this case, it will not prosper.
Contrary to the arguments of STC, the Supreme Court ruled that:
1. The petition for writ of habeas data can be availed of even if this is not a case of
extralegal killing or enforced disappearance; and
2. The writ of habeas data can be availed of against STC even if it is not an entity engaged
in the business of gathering, collecting, or storing data or information regarding the person,
family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
First, the Rule on Habeas Data does not state that it can be applied only in cases of
extralegal killings or enforced disappearances. Second, nothing in the Rule would suggest
that the habeas data protection shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity
engaged in the business of gathering, storing, and collecting of data.
Right to Privacy on Social Media (Online Networking Sites)
The Supreme Court ruled that if an online networking site (ONS) like Facebook has privacy
tools, and the user makes use of such privacy tools, then he or she has a reasonable
expectation of privacy (right to informational privacy, that is). Thus, such privacy must be
respected and protected.

In this case, however, there is no showing that the students concerned made use of such
privacy tools. Evidence would show that that their post (status) on Facebook were published
as Public.
Facebook has the following settings to control as to who can view a users posts on his
wall (profile page):
(a) Public the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
(b) Friends of Friends only the users Facebook friends and their friends can view the
photo;
(c) Friends only the users Facebook friends can view the photo;
(d) Custom the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the
Facebook user; and
(e) Only Me the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The default setting is Public and if a user wants to have some privacy, then he must
choose any setting other than Public. If it is true that the students concerned did set the
posts subject of this case so much so that only five people can see them (as they claim),
then how come most of their classmates were able to view them. This fact was not refuted
by them. In fact, it was their classmates who informed and showed their teacher, Escudero,
of the said pictures. Therefore, it appears that Tan et al never use the privacy settings of
Facebook hence, they have no reasonable expectation of privacy on the pictures of them
scantily clad.
STC did not violate the students right to privacy. The manner which the school gathered the
pictures cannot be considered illegal. As it appears, it was the classmates of the students
who showed the picture to their teacher and the latter, being the recipient of said pictures,
merely delivered them to the proper school authority and it was for a legal purpose, that is,
to discipline their students according to the standards of the school (to which the students
and their parents agreed to in the first place because of the fact that they enrolled their
children there).

Read full text

Some notable foreign jurisprudence used by the Supreme Court in this case:
1. United States v. Gines-Perez: A person who places a photograph on the Internet
precisely intends to forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly
under circumstances such as here, where the Defendant did not employ protective

measures or devices that would have controlled access to the Web page or the photograph
itself.
2. United States v. Maxwell: The more open the method of transmission is, the less
privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public at large in the chat room or
e-mail that is forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of
privacy.
3. H v. W, (South Africa Case dated January 30, 2013): The law has to take into account
the changing realities not only technologically but also socially or else it will lose credibility
in the eyes of the people. x x x It is imperative that the courts respond appropriately to
changing times, acting cautiously and with wisdom.
This case recognized this ability of Facebook users to customize their privacy settings, but
did so with this caveat: Facebook states in its policies that, although it makes every effort to
protect a users information, these privacy settings are not foolproof.