Acts of Human, Human Acts

Nature of Human Acts

Human act is an act which proceeds from the deliberated freewill of a
man. In ethics, the term deliberated means merely advertence or
knowledge in intellect of what one is about and what this means. The act,
then, has to be advertently or knowingly done by the agent so that it may be
called human act.
The term agent technically refers to the one who performing the
human act. Now, it is obvious that human acts requires the use of both the
rational faculties of knowing (intellect) and willing (freewill). The way human
act is performed is systematically in its constitutive elements.

Elements of Human Acts

1. Knowledge means that the act is done in the light of the agents
knowing faculty. He is aware and conscious of what he is doing. He
knows what the performance of human act means.
2. Freedom means the act is performed in accordance with and not
against the will. It is under the control of will determining the act. In
other words, the power resides in the will to choose to do or not to
do an act. It is therefore, a free act done without any element of
force or coercion.
The will is a blind faculty. It cannot act in the dark. It needs the
light of knowledge in the intellect to elicit an act. The intellect
has to obtain knowledge of something first before the will can
will to tend toward it or not. The will cannot choose to do it or
not. The will cannot choose to do or not to do that which is
known to the intellect.
The exercise of the freedom of the will is limited by the
knowledge of the intellect knows, the freer the will is in exercising
its power to choose to do or not to do an act.
3. Voluntariness means the act done by the agent intentional.
When he voluntarily performs an act, the agent intends it as a
product of his decision which is within the power of his will. In other
words, a voluntary act is a willed act, an act that is willfully done. It
proceeds from the employment of knowledge and freedom. This
agent cannot voluntary do an act if he does not know it in his

intellect. He also cannot voluntarily do it without freedom.

Voluntariness takes place only when knowledge and freedom are
present.
Education: A Human Act
Educating or teaching is a human act because of the three constitutive
elements at play. The discussion of topics, impartation of knowledge, transfer
of learning, and molding of character of pupils and students are acts of
knowingly, freely, and voluntarily performed by educator.

Acts of Man
Act of man is an act that does not proceed from the deliberate freewill
of man. In contrast with human act, act of man does not require employment
of the rational faculties of intellect and freewill. The three elements of a
human act are not present.
1. There is no element of knowledge. An act of man is not deliberately
done with human act, act of man does not require employment d
the rational faculties of intellect and freewill. The three elements of
human act are not present.
2. There is no element of freedom. An act of man is not freely done
which means that the power of the freewill to determine the act it
chooses to elicit or not is not invoked and employed. It is not a free
act.
3. There is no element of voluntariness. An act of man does not
proceed from both knowledge and freedom, requiring no decision of
the will to make the agent intend and willfully do such an act or not.
It is an involuntary act.
Human Act is Governed by the Norm of Morality
Morality is the measure of relation between human act performed and
its norm. Ultimately, norm refers to the Divine Reason and Will manifested in
eternal la w which can be recognized in order of existence of things. How the
Divine Reason and Will governed the universe is expressed in the way that
everything exists, in what is it is and in its last end toward which its
existence is directed. If a things exists this or that way because of what it is
(and cannot be what it is not) and takes a given course towards certain
direction, it must be what Divine Reason and Will mandate. However, as far
as he is concerned, man exists the way they are. Man can recognize, by his

reason and observe the Divine Reason and Will, in freedom, by the means of
human acts.
Deducing from the aforementioned, the expression of the Divine
Reason and Will takes place both in eternal law by the way the order of
existence of things and in human reason (conscience) constitute the norm of
morality the eternal law as the ultimate norm, the conscience as the
proximate norm.
As previous said, the relation may either be an agreement or
disagreement of the act to its norms, so that a good act is that which is
agreement with right reason and Gods eternal law whereas, evil act is that
which is in disagreement with or in opposition to the said norms.
Since it is a matter of measuring up the distinction between an act is in
conformity with the norm and an act in transgression of the norm, the norm
of morality applies only to those acts that can be classified as good or evil.
Now, human act is, of course, performed with the rational faculties of
intellect and freewill at play and is therefore, deliberate, free, and voluntary.
Otherwise, it is not human. Practically, every human act performed stands in
relation to the norm of morality, that is, either in agreement or disagreement
with it, either good or evil. Hence, a human act is moral act and that is the
act subjected to moral judgment as worthy of praise or blame, reward or
punishment.
Human acts are moral acts because they proceed from the rational
faculties of man within which the capacity to do good and avoid evil in the
light of truth which is inscribed. The distinction between good and evil is
determined in reference to their relation with the dictates of right reason and
Gods eternal law.
Indifferent act is that which is neither in agreement nor in
disagreement with right reason and eternal law. It is silent in terms of its
relation with them. It can be considered a human act in as much as it is
deliberately, freely, and voluntarily done.
Nevertheless, an indifferent act just exists in theory. As a matter of
experience, it become either good or evil act depending on the motive of the
agent and its surrounding circumstances.
Moreover, by reason of its definition, a human act proceeds from a
rational being. It is an act proper to the human person, an act that
distinctively and exclusively belongs to the human person in the temporal
order. It is his very act.

Thus, a human act is an act that is imputable to the agent. To put it in

simple terms, imputability means that the act is attributed to the agent and
that he is responsible and accountable for it. Imputability may take place as
a matter of praiseworthiness or culpability. It is praiseworthy when the act is
good, culpable when it is evil. It stems from the fact that the act is
knowingly, freely, and willfully/voluntarily done. Reason dictates that a
deliberate, free, and voluntary act should be ascribed to mans responsibility.
Is an act of man imputable to the agent? Obviously not. It would be
unreasonable to impute the said act to the agent when the three elements of
a human act are not present. The agent is not accountable for the act of man
performed and the norm of morality is not concerned with it.
Therefore, it is an act of man which cannot be imputed to the agent.
Nevertheless, the act of overhearing as an act of man can turn out to be
human act.
It is said that no voluntary act is possible when there are no elements
of knowledge and freedom. Responsibility comes when knowledge and
freedom are present, indicating a voluntary act. The gravity of responsibility
which the agent faces in the performance of a human act depends on the
degree of willfulness or voluntariness used. The degree of willfulness or
voluntariness springs from the degrees of knowledge and free at work. In
other words, the greater or lesser the knowledge and freedom, the higher or
lower the degree of voluntariness. The higher or lower the degree of
voluntariness, the graver or lesser the responsibility.

Degrees of Voluntariness of Human Acts

Msgr. Paul Glenn enumerated the different degrees of voluntary acts,
to wit;
1. Perfect and Imperfect
Perfect Voluntariness is present in the human act when the agent
fully knows and fully intends the act.
Imperfect Voluntariness is present when there is some defect in the
agents knowledge or intention or in both.

2. Simple and Conditional

Simple Voluntariness is present in a human act performed whether
the agent likes or dislikes doing it. It pertains to an act done for it is
simply intended, or undone for it simply not intended.

Conditional Voluntariness is present in the agents wish to do

something other than that which he is actually doing, but doing it with
repugnance or dislike. The existence of a certain specific condition or
situation is that which defines and necessitates the voluntariness of an
act, which, under normal or ordinary circumstances, is not intended to
be performed.
3. Direct and Indirect
Direct Voluntariness is present in a human act willed in itself. Being
willed in itself means that the act is done as a means to achieve an
end which is the goal or purpose for which the agent is doing the act.
In short, the act is directly willed to attain an end which is necessarily
and directly intended.
Indirect Voluntariness is present in that human act which is the
foreseen result of another directly willed act. The indirect voluntary act
is an act serving as an effect that is not directly intended, of an act
serving as its cause which is directly intended.
4. Positive and Negative
Positive Voluntariness is present in a human act of committing, of
doing, or performing. In a way, it is referred to as an act of
commission.
Negative Voluntariness is present in a human act of omitting, of not
doing, or of refraining from performing. In a way, it is referred to as an
act of omission.
5. Actual, Virtual, Habitual, and Interpretative
Actual Voluntariness is present in a human act willed here and now.
Virtual Voluntariness is present in a human act done as a result of or
by virtue of a formerly elicited actual intention, even if that intention is
forgotten here and now. In other words, the intention that has been
made previously has a power or virtue that endures even if forgotten.
Habitual Voluntariness is present in human act done in harmony with,
but not as a result of, a formerly elicited and unrevoked actual
intention.
Interpretative Voluntariness is that voluntariness which, in the
judgment of prudence and common sense, would actually be present
had the opportunity or ability for it be given. The act is done

proceeding from an intention interpreted not as present but would be

present had proper knowledge and freedom been available to consent
and wish for the performance of such an act.
Determinants of the Morality of Human Act
1. The act itself refers to the deed done or performed. It is
technically called the object of nature. It is the primary determinant
of morality. By merely looking at the act, one can say if it is good or
evil. It exists as such apart from the other determinants without,
however, denying that the motive and circumstances can diminish
or aggravate the moral imputability of an act. Of course, if the act is
indifferent, then, its morality is determined by the motive of the
agent and the circumstances under which it is performed.
Intrinsic morality pertains to the fact that there is an act
which is, in itself, capable or not, of being ordered to the dictates
of right reason, human nature and, Gods eternal law. The
goodness or evil resides in the act itself.
Intrinsically good act is an act whose goodness proceeds
from its very nature capable of being ordered to the good and to
the ultimate end which is God apart from the two other
determinants of morality. It is good as it is in itself.
Intrinsically evil act is an act whose evil proceeds from its
very nature, incapable of being ordered to the nature of the
human person and to God. It is evil in itself regardless of motive
and circumstances.
2. The motive of the agent refers to the end, purpose, or goal to be
achieved by means of the act. It is the objective for which the act is
done. In short, it is the intention of the agent in performing the act.
The motive of the agent plays a qualifying role, like the
circumstances, in the morality of an act. Even though intrinsic
morality resides in the object of an act independently from the other
determining elements of morality, an act which is good, in itself,
may turn out to be evil by reason of the evil motive of the one
performing it.
3. The circumstances refer to the conditions in which the act is done
affecting its morality in one way or another. They exist outside of
the nature of the act and are not of the essence of the act.

However, if they arise in the execution of an act, then,

circumstances can indeed qualify it in its concrete performance.
They can increase or diminish the goodness of an act, and can
aggravate or mitigate the evil of an act.
Those which intensify the goodness or badness of an act are
called circumstances that make good better evil or worse, without
however, adding new moral character of goodness or evil. Whereas,
there are circumstances that add new goodness or new evil malice
to the act performed. They are called circumstances that change
the nature of an act from simple to complex.
Different Circumstances
The Circumstance of a Person refers to the agent performing the
act or to the person to whom the act is done.
The Circumstance of Quantity or Quality of the Act refers to
what is the extent of the act.
The Circumstance of Place refers to the venue the act is performed.
The Circumstance of Means or Instrument refers to that which is
used and employed in the performance of an act. It is deemed associated
with the act in its performance.
The Circumstance of Manner refers to the condition in which the act
is done or how it is performed by the agent.
The Circumstance of Time refers to the duration within which an act
is done, when it is performed, and how long an intention to do it takes place.
The Circumstance of the Motive of the Agent. This has already
been elaborated with special consideration apart from all other
circumstances.

Moral Principles in the Judgment of Morality

1. A good act which is done for a good motive becomes doubly
good. The goodness becomes doubled because the act takes on a new
goodness out of a good motive. And if the good act is done out of
several good motives, a new goodness is taken from each of them.

2. An evil act which is done for an evil motive becomes doubly

evil. The evil becomes doubled because it takes on a new malice of
evil without of an evil motive. And if the evil act is done out of several
evil motives, a new malice of evil is given birth by each of them.
3. A good act which is done for an evil motive becomes evil. It
goes to show that any evil motive is strong enough to vitiate the
goodness of an act. The good act turns out to be entirely evil if the evil
motive is the only and very reason for which the act is done, and if the
evil of said motive is grave though it is not the entire motive of the act.
On the other hand, the good act turns out to be partially evil motive is
not the whole reason in the performance of said act and if the motive
is not gravely evil.
4. An evil act which is done for a good motive does not become
good. To say that a good motive makes an evil act good is to disregard
the fact that the performance of human act proceeds from the
deliberate will and from motive. It is the will that determines an act it
freely chooses to do, whether good or evil. And if it chooses to do evil,
the act done is evil.
5. An indifferent act which is done for good motive becomes
good. The good motive qualifies the act as good.
6. An indifferent act which is done for an evil motive becomes
evil. The evil motive qualifies the act as evil.

Moral Principle Governing the Circumstances of the Act

1. Circumstances can make an indifferent act good or evil.
The moral quality of an indifferent act making it good or evil
derived from circumstances surrounding it.
2. Circumstances can make a good act evil. The act is tainted
with evil malice (taken from the circumstance under which it is
performed), making it evil.
3. Circumstances can never make an evil good. No
circumstance can ever justify the performance of an evil act for it
is, in itself, not in keeping with the order of right reason and
Gods eternal law.

4. Circumstances can cause new goodness in a good act or

new malice in an evil act. They can add a specifically new
moral character of goodness and evil act so that its nature may
change from a simple to complex one.
5. A gravely evil circumstance destroys the entire goodness
of an objectively good act.
6. A not so gravely evil circumstance does not destroy the
entire goodness of an objectively good act.
Conditions Affecting Morality of Human Act
1. Ignorance simply means the absence and lack of knowledge.
Ignorance of the Law is the absence or lack of knowledge
of the existence of the certain law.
Ignorance of the Fact is the absence or lack of knowledge
of the violation of certain law. The agent knows there is an
existing law, however, he is not aware that he already violating
it.
Private Ignorance is the absence of knowledge that
ought to be present. No amount of excuse from culpability can
ever be invoked in such an ignorance. It holds the agent
altogether responsible.
Kinds of Ignorance
As far as the agent is concerned, in whom it exists, ignorance is of two
kinds. Ignorance of the law and ignorance of fact may fall under either of
them, namely;
Invincible Ignorance is that kind of ignorance which cannot be
dispelled because it is not within the capacity of the agent to do so and
obtain knowledge. It may proceed from either the two sources:

The agent may not know that he does not know. He is ignorant that he
is ignorant.

The agent may know that he does not know and exerts a reasonably
sufficient effort to get rid of his ignorance, but is unable to acquire
knowledge and remain ignorant.

Vincible Ignorance is that kind of ignorance which can be dispelled because

it is within the capacity of the agent to do so. Here, knowledge is obtainable
if sufficient and diligent efforts are exerted.
Kinds of Vincible Ignorance

Simple Vincible Ignorance is that kind of vincible ignorance in

which the agent exerts certain but not sufficiently enough effort
to dispel his ignorance and obtain knowledge.

Supine Vincible Ignorance is that kind of vincible ignorance in

the agent has a capacity but does not exerts any effort at all to
dispel his ignorance and obtain knowledge.

Affected Vincible Ignorance is that kind of vincible ignorance in

which the agent exerts positive effort to deliberately foster his
ignorance in order to escape that responsibility that knowledge
may require. This is the worst type of vincible ignorance because
it is willfully established by the agent himself as an immediate
excuse for any violation stemming from it.

Ethical Principle No. 1: Vincible ignorance does not destroy the

voluntariness of an act.
Even when the absence or lack of knowledge is evident in vincible
ignorance, the fact cannot be negated that the vincibly ignorant person know
of his ignorance and his ability to take it away from which a sense of duty to
acquire knowledge emanates. Yet insufficient effort is done, making him
remain ignorant. Since the knowledge that he does not know and does not
exert reasonably adequate effort, that knowledge has an indirect bearing
upon the act performed in vincible ignorance.
Ethical Principle No. 2: Vincible ignorance lessens the voluntaries of
an act.
Although it is not destroyed, voluntariness is diminished by the presence
of vincible ignorance. The agent know that he is ignorant and that he has the
capacity and obligation to dispel it by acquiring knowledge. Nonetheless, the
act which is performed per se proceeds from absence or lack of knowledge,
impairing its voluntariness. If it is impaired, voluntariness becomes indirect
and imperpect.
Ethical Principle No. 3: Affected (vincible) ignorance, in one way,
lessens, in other way, increases voluntariness.

Despite the fact that it is deliberately and positively fostered, affected

ignorance is undeniably the absence or lack of knowledge. The voluntariness
of the act which proceeds from it is impaired, and therefore, indirect and
imperfect. In this light voluntariness is lessened.

2. Concupiscence is the rebellion of the passions against

reason (It) is revolt of the sense faculties of man against the
dominion of his higher faculty of reason. All men perceive this
revolt within themselves.
Even though human nature by reason of the rational
faculties of intellect and freewill, tends toward the good and
avoids evil in the light of truth, it is sometimes revolted against
by the lower faculties. Theologically, though it is in itself good,
human nature is wounded because of original sin and that there
leaves a certain proneness to temptation. However, as far as
ethics is concerned, concupiscence simply means the sense of
inclination of a sense appetite towards its object.
Two Types of Concupiscence
Antecedent Concupiscence pertains to the occurrence of passions prior
to the act of the will and is not therefore willfully fostered.
Consequent Concupiscence - pertains to the occurrence of passions
deliberately fostered by the will.
Ethical Principle No. 1: Antecedent concupiscence diminishes the
voluntary nature of an act.
Antecedent concupiscence impairs both knowledge and freedom
whose full employment determines the perfect voluntary of an act.
Ethical Principle No. 2: Consequent concupiscence does not
diminish the voluntary nature of an act.
Consequent concupiscence does not impair knowledge and freedom,
which both determine the perfect voluntary nature of an act.

3. Fear is an agitation of the mind brought by the apprehension

of an impending evil.
Types of Fear

Light Fear is that in which the evil threatening is present but slight, or
serious but remote.
Grave Fear is that which the evil threatening is serious and severe.
Intrinsic Fear is that in which the evil threatening proceeds from
within oneself.
Extrinsic Fear is that in which the evil threatening proceeds from
outside of the self. It is of two kinds:
o Necessary Extrinsic Fear is that agitation brought about by the
outside forces of nature.
o Free Extrinsic Fear is the agitation that proceeds from freewill of
another. The others choice of action is that which is feared by
one experiencing free extrinsic fear.
Ethical Principle: Fear diminishes the voluntary nature of an
act.
An act done out of fear or because of fear is one way simply voluntary
and in another, conditionally voluntary.
4. Violence is an external force extorted by a free cause to
coerce the other into doing that which is contrary to his will. The
free cause refers to the person who has the freewill to inflict the
said force upon victim.

Two Types of Perfect Violence

Physically Perfect Violence is that in which the victim uses

every possible means of resisting at the command of his will.
Morally Perfect Violence is that in which the victim makes use
of all powers of resistance that can be employed. It entails
judgment of reason about the kind of resistance which is due
and necessary so that no useless form of resistance may be
applied.
Imperfect Violence is that in which sufficient resistance is no
exerted despite the available opportunity and capacity to
terminate the violence.

Ethical Principle No. 1: Acts elicited by the will are not subject to
violence; external acts caused by violence to which due resistance is
offered are in no wise imputable to the agent victim.

Ethical Principle No. 2: That which is done under the influence of

imperfect violence is less voluntary, and so the moral responsibility
is lessened but not taken away completely.

Group 3: Acts of Human, Human Acts

Maiko Gil Hiwatig

Roselle Maglinao
Carla Mae Delas Alas
Althea Rose Vinson
Pinky Muro
Jhed Maandal
Julie Mae Mores
Allyssa Faye Borbon