1.

The Holy See vs. Rosario, Jr., December 1,

1994

FACTS:
Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty
over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is
represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio.
Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc.,
is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate
business. This petition arose from a controversy over
a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters
(Lot 5-A, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 390440)
located in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro
Manila and registered in the name of petitioner. Said
Lot 5-A is contiguous to Lots 5-B and 5-D which are
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 271108
and 265388 respectively and registered in the name
of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The three
lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr.
Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers.
Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private
respondent. In view of the refusal of the squatters to
vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute
arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility
of evicting and clearing the land of squatters.
Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale
by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and
Development Corporation

subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit

but claimed that it acquired said property for the site
of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the
Philippines. Private respondent failed to dispute said
claim.
Holy See is immune from suit for the act of selling
the lot of concern is non proprietary in nature. The
lot was acquired by petitioner as donation from
Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not
for commercial purposes, but for the use of
petitioner to construct thereon the official place of
residence of Papal Nuncio. The decision to transfer
the property and the subsequent disposal thereof
are likewise clothed with a governmental character.
Petitioner did not sell the lot for profit or gain. It
merely wanted to dispose of the same because the
squatters living thereon made it almost impossible
for petitioner to use it for the purpose of donation.
Hence, Holy See proved that he/she was entitled of
immunity from suit when Department of Foreign
Affairs has formally intervened and certified that the
Embassy of Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic
mission to the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED
and the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183 against
petitioner is DISMISSED.

ISSUE:
2.

Sec. of Justice v. Hon. Lantion, Jan 18, 2000

WON Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its

business relations regarding selling a lot to a private
entity.

Lessons: Extradition Process

HELD:

Laws: Extradition Treaty between the Philippines

and the United States, PD 1069, Bill of Rights

YES - As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the

1987 Constitution, we have adopted the generally
accepted principles of International Law. Even
without this affirmation, such principles of
International Law are deemed incorporated as part
of the law of the land as a condition and
consequence of our admission in the society of
nations.
In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and
sold lands in the ordinary course of a real estate
business, surely the said transaction can be
categorized as an act jure gestionis. However,
petitioner has denied that the acquisition and

FACTS:
In accordance to "Extradition Treaty Between the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines and
the Government of the United States of America"
(RP-US Extradition Treaty), the Department of
Justice received from the Department of Foreign
Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a
request for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the
United States attached with the Grand Jury
Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S.
District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other
supporting documents on June 18, 1999. Mr.

1|Page

Jimenez was charged with the following:

i. 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to
defraud the United States; 2 counts; Maximum
Penalty: 5 years/count)
ii. 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax;4
counts; Maximum Penalty:5 years/count)
iii. 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television;
2 counts; Maximum Penalty: 5 years/count)
iv. 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; 6
counts; Maximum Penalty: 5 years/count)
v. 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of
another; 33 counts; Maximum Penalty: less than 1
year)
The Department of Justice denied Mr. Jimenez
request for extradition documents based
on the following:
i. Article 7 of the Extradition Treaty between the
Philippines and the United States enumerates the
documentary requirements and establishes the
procedures under which the documents submitted
shall be received and admitted as
evidence. Evidentiary requirements are under
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1069. Evaluation by the
Department of the documents is not a preliminary
investigation nor akin to preliminary investigation of
criminal cases. Thus, the constitutionally
guaranteed rights of the accused in all criminal
prosecutions are not available. It merely determines
the compliance of the Requesting Government with
the procedures and requirements under the relevant
law and treaty. After the filing of the petition for
extradition, the person sought to be extradited will
be furnished by the court with copies of the petition.
ii. The Department of Justice under P.D. No. 1069 is
the counsel of the foreign governments in all
extradition requests. Furthermore, Article 7 of the
RP-US Extradition Treaty provides that the Philippine
Government must represent the interests of the
United States in any proceedings arising out of a
request for extradition. Thus, it must comply with
the request of the United States Government to
prevent unauthorized disclosure of the subject
information.
iii. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties provides that "Every treaty in force is
binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith". Extradition is a

tool of criminal law enforcement and to be effective,

requests for extradition or surrender of accused or
convicted persons must be processed expeditiously.
Mr. Jimenez filed with filed with the Regional Trial
Court of the National Capital Judicial Region a
petition presided over by the Honorable Ralph C.
Lantion against the Secretary of Justice, the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation:
i. mandamus to compel the Department to furnish
the extradition documents
ii. Certiorari to set aside Departments letter dated
July 13, 1999 denying his request
iii. Prohibition to restrain the Department from
considering the extradition request and from filing
an extradition petition in court
iv. Enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the
Director of the NBI from performing any act directed
to the extradition
v. application for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction
Honorable Ralph C. Lantion ordered the Secretary of
Justice, the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs and the Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation to maintain the status quo by
refraining from committing the acts complained of,
from conducting further proceedings in connection
with the request of the United States Government,
from filing the corresponding Petition with a
Regional Trial court and from performing any act
directed to the extradition for a period of 20 days
from service of the order.
Hon. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Philippines ordered Hon.
Lantion to cease and desist from enforcing the
order. Due to transcendental importance, the Court
brushed aside peripheral procedural matters which
concern the proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-94684
and the TRO and proceded on the issues.
ISSUE:
Whether or NOT the evaluation procedure is not a
preliminary investigation nor akin to preliminary
investigation of criminal cases

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Whether or NOT the twin basic due process rights

granted by Sec. 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court on
the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint, the
affidavits, and other supporting documents and the
right to submit counter-affidavits and other
supporting documents within 10 days from receipt is
dispensable
Whether or NOT the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern granted
under Sec. 7 of Art. III of the 1987 Constitution is
violated
HELD:
NO - The Extradition Request (Sec. 4. PD 1069) is
made by the Foreign Diplomat of the
Requesting State, addressed to the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs has
the executive authority to conduct the evaluation
process which, just like the extradition proceedings
proper, belongs to a class by itself or is sui generis. It
is not a criminal investigation but it is also erroneous
to say that it is purely an exercise of ministerial
functions. At such stage, the executive authority has
the power:
1) to make a technical assessment of the
completeness and sufficiency of the extradition
papers in form and substance
2) to outrightly deny the request if on its face and
on the face of the supporting documents the crimes
indicated are not extraditable
3) to make a determination whether or not the
request is politically motivated, or that the offense is
a military one which is not punishable under nonmilitary penal legislation.
The process may be characterized as an investigative
or inquisitorial process (NOT an exercise of an
administrative body's quasi-judicial power) (Sec. 5.
PD 1069 and Pars. 2 and 3, Art. 7 of the RP-US
Extradition Treaty) that is indispensable to
prosecution. The power of investigation consists in
gathering, organizing and analyzing evidence, which
is a useful aid or tool in an administrative agency's
performance of its rule-making or quasi-judicial
functions.
In Ruperto v. Torres, the Court laid down the test of

determining whether an administrative body is

exercising judicial functions or merely investigatory
functions applies to an administrative body
authorized to evaluate extradition documents. If
the only purpose for investigation is to evaluate
evidence submitted before it based on the facts and
circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is
not authorized to make a final pronouncement
affecting the parties, then there is an absence of
judicial discretion and judgment. Thus, the role of
the administrative body is limited to an initial finding
of whether or not the extradition petition can be
filed in court. The court has the power to determine
whether or not the extradition should be
effected. The evaluation procedure (in contrast to
ordinary investigations) may result in the deprivation
of liberty of the prospective extraditee or accused
(Sec. 2[c] of PD 1069) at 2 stages:
1) provisional arrest of the prospective extradite
pending the submission of the request
This is because the Treaty provides that in case of
urgency, a contracting party may request the
provisional arrest of the person sought pending
presentation of the request (Par. 1, Art. 9 of the RPUS Extradition Treaty) to prevent flight but he shall
be automatically discharged after 60 days (Par. 4 of
the RP-US Extradition Treaty) or 20 days (Sec. 20[d]
PD 1069) if no request is submitted. Otherwise, he
can be continuously detained, or if not, subsequently
rearrested (Par. 5, Art 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty)
2) temporary arrest of the prospective extradite
during the pendency of the extradition petition in
court (Sec. 6, PD 1069).
The peculiarity and deviant characteristic of the
evaluation procedure is that:
1) there is yet no extradite; BUT
2) it results in an administrative if adverse to the
person involved, may cause his immediate
incarceration
The evaluation process partakes of the nature of a
criminal investigation. Similar to the evaluation
stage of extradition proceedings, a preliminary
investigation, which may result in the filing of an
information against the respondent, can possibly
lead to his arrest, and to the deprivation of his
liberty. The characterization of a treaty
in Wright was in reference to the applicability of the
prohibition against an ex post facto law. It had

3|Page

nothing to do with the denial of the right to notice,

information, and hearing.
In this case, the extradition request was delivered to
the Department of Foreign Affairs on June 17, 1999
(the following day the Department of Justice
received the request). Thus, the Department of
Foreign Affairs failed to discharge its duty of
evaluating the same and its accompanying
documents.
Extradition Petition
After delivery of the Extradition Request by the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of
Justice, the latter shall designate and authorize an
attorney in his office to take charge of the case (Par.
1, Sec. 5, PD 1069). The attorney shall file a written
Extradition Petition with the proper regional trial
court, with a prayer that the court take the
extradition request under consideration (Par. 2, Sec.
5, PD 1069). The presiding judge shall issue an order
summoning the prospective extradite to appear and
to answer the petition. The judge may issue a
warrant of arrest if it appears that the immediate
arrest and temporary detention of the accused will
best serve the ends of justice or to prevent
flight (Par. 1, Sec. 6, PD 1069).
Extradition Hearing
The provisions of the Rules of Court, insofar as
practicable and not inconsistent with the summary
nature of the proceedings, shall apply during the
Extradition Hearing (Par. 1, Sec. 9, PD 1069) The
attorney may represent the Requesting state. (Sec.
8, PD 1069). The Courts decision on whether the
petition is extraditable based on the application of
the dual criminality rule and other conditions
mentioned in Article 2 of the RP-US Extradition
Treaty or whether or not the offense for which
extradition is requested is a political one (Par. 3,
Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty) shall be
final and immediately executory (Sec. 12, PD 1069)
and appealable with the Court of Appeals where the
provisions of the Rules of Court governing appeal in
criminal cases in the Court of Appeals shall apply
except for the required 15-day period to file brief
(Sec. 13, PD 1069).

Yes - Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law

precludes the twin rights of notice and hearing from
a prospective extradite. In the absence of a law or
principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair
play. Petitioner contends that United States
requested the Philippine Government to prevent
unauthorized disclosure of confidential
information. Such argument, however has been
overturned by petitioner's revelation that everything
it refuses to make available at this stage would be
obtainable during trial. If the information is truly
confidential, the veil of secrecy cannot be lifted at
any stage of the extradition proceedings. The
constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even
call for "justice outside legality," since private
respondent's due process rights, although not
guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by
constitutional guarantees.
However in this case, with the meticulous nature of
the evaluation, which cannot just be completed in an
abbreviated period of time due to its intricacies and
certain problems in the extradition papers (such as
those that are in Spanish and without the official
English translation, and those that are not properly
authenticated) it cannot to be said to be
urgent. Therefore, notice and hearing requirements
of administrative due process cannot be dispensed
with and shelved aside.
No - During the evaluation procedure, no official
governmental action of our own government has as
yet been done; hence the invocation of the right is
premature. Later, and in contrast, records of the
extradition hearing would already fall under matters
of public concern, because our government by then
shall have already made an official decision to grant
the extradition request.
WHEREFORE, DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner
is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of
the extradition request and its supporting papers,
and to grant him a reasonable period within which
to file his comment with supporting evidence.

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3.

International School vs. Quisimbing GR

128845 June 1, 2000

FACTS:
The ISM, under Presidential Decree 732, is a
domestic educational institution established
primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic
personnel and other temporary residents.
The local-hires union of the ISM were crying foul
over the disparity in wages that they got compared
to that of their foreign teaching counterparts.
These questions are asked to qualify a teacher into a
local or foreign hire.

hires and local hires, the former enjoying only a

limited tenure, having no amenities of their own in
the Philippines and have to be given a good
compensation package in order to attract them to
join the teaching faculty of the School.
The union appealed to the Supreme Court.
The petitioner called the hiring system
discriminatory and racist.
The school alleged that some local hires were in fact
of foreign origin. They were paid local salaries.
ISSUE:

a.....What is one's domicile?

Whether or not the hiring system is violative of the

equal protection clause.

b.....Where is one's home economy?

HELD:

c.....To which country does one owe economic

allegiance?

Yes - Public policy abhors discrimination. The Article

on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress
to "give highest priority to the enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the right of all
people to human dignity

d.....Was the individual hired abroad specifically to

work in the School and was the School responsible
for bringing that individual to the Philippines?
Should any answer point to Philippines, the person is
a local hire. The School grants foreign-hires certain
benefits to the foreign hires such as housing,
transportation, and 25% more pay than locals under
the theory of (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b)
limited tenure. The first was grounded on leaving his
home country, the second was on the lack of tenure
when he returns home.
The negotiations between the school and the union
caused a deadlock between the parties.
The DOLE resolved in favor of the school, while Dole
Secretary Quisimbing denied the unions motion for
reconsideration.
He said, The Union cannot also invoke the equal
protection clause to justify its claim of parity. It is an
established principle of constitutional law that the
guarantee of equal protection of the laws is not
violated by legislation or private covenants based on
reasonable classification. A classification is
reasonable if it is based on substantial distinctions
and apply to all members of the same class. Verily,
there is a substantial distinction between foreign

The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires

every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith."
International law prohibits discrimination, such as
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights. The latter promises Fair wages and
equal remuneration for work of equal value without
distinction of any kind.
In the workplace, where the relations between
capital and labor are often skewed in favor of
capital, inequality and discrimination by the
employer are all the more reprehensible.
The Constitution also directs the State to promote
"equality of employment opportunities for all."
Similarly, the Labor Code provides that the State
shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of
sex, race or creed. Article 248 declares it an unfair
labor practice for an employer to discriminate in
regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization.

5|Page

In this jurisdiction, there is the term equal pay for

equal work, pertaining to persons being paid with
equal salaries and have similar skills and similar
conditions. There was no evidence here that foreignhires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively
than the local-hires.
The State, therefore, has the right and duty to
regulate the relations between labor and capital.
These relations are not merely contractual but are so
impressed with public interest that labor contracts,
collective bargaining agreements included, must
yield to the common good.[
For the same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the
foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as
valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. The
dislocation factor and limited tenure affecting
foreign-hires are adequately compensated by certain
benefits accorded them which are not enjoyed by
local-hires, such as housing, transportation, shipping
costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances.
In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification
employed by respondent School to justify the
distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and
local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no
reasonable distinction between the services
rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires.
Obiter:
However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same
bargaining unit as the local-hires. It does not appear
that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to
be grouped together with local-hires for purposes of
collective bargaining. The collective bargaining
history in the School also shows that these groups
were always treated separately. The housing and
other benefits accorded foreign hires were not given
to local hires, thereby such admixture will nbot
assure any group the power to exercise bargaining
rights.
The factors in determining the appropriate collective
bargaining unit are (1) the will of the employees
(Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the
employees' interest, such as substantial similarity of
work and duties, or similarity of compensation and
working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests

Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4)

similarity of employment status.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE.
The petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The Orders
of the Secretary of Labor and Employment dated
June 10, 1996 and March 19, 1997, are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as they uphold the
practice of respondent School of according foreignhires higher salaries than local-hires.
4.

In Re: Max Shoop Nov 29, 1920

FACTS:
- Max Shoop is applying for admission to practice law
in the Philippines under Par. 4 of the Rules for the
Examination of Candidates for Admission to the
Practice of Law. It was shown in his application that
he was practicing for more than 5 years in the
highest court of the State of New York.
- The said rule requires that:
New York State by comity confers the privilege of
admission without examination under similar
circumstances to attorneys admitted to practice in
the Philippine Islands. (Aside from comity, the
satisfactory affidavits of applicants must show they
have practiced at least 5 years in any (district or
circuit or highest) court of the US or territory of it.
But admission is still in the discretion of the court.)
- The rule of New York court, on the other hand,
permits admission without examination in the
discretion of the Appellate Division in several cases:
1.

Provided that the applicant also practiced 5

years as a member of the bar in the highest
law court in any other state or territory of
the American Union or in the District of
Columbia

2.

The applicant practiced 5 years in another

country whose jurisprudence is based on
the principles of the English Common Law
(ECL).

ISSUE:
WON under the New York rule as it exists the
principle of comity is established

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HELD:

ISSUE:

- The Philippines is an UNORGANIZED TERRITORY of

the US, under a civil gov't. established by the
Congress.
- In interpreting and applying the bulk of the written
laws of this jurisdiction, and in rendering its
decisions in cases NOT covered by the letter of the
written law, this court relies upon the theories and
precedents of Anglo-American cases, subject to the
limited exception of those instances where the
remnants of the Spanish written law present welldefined civil law theories and of the few cases where
such precedents are inconsistent with local customs
and institutions.
- The jurisprudence of this jurisdiction is based upon
the ECL in its present day form of Anglo-American
Common Law to an almost exclusive extent.
- New York permits conferring privileges on
attorneys admitted to practice in the Phils. similar to
those privileges accorded by the rule of this court.
- Petition granted. Decision is based on the
interpretation of the NY rule; doesnt establish a
precedent with respect to future applications.

Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and

valid.

5.

HELD:
No The court found RA No. 972 unconstitutional
for the following reasons:
1.

2.

3.

4.
5.

In Re: Cunanan 94 Phil 534, March 18, 1954

FACTS:
Congress passed Republic Act Number 972,
commonly known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953.
Inaccordance with the said law, the Supreme Court
then passed and admitted to the bar those
candidateswho had obtained an average of 72 per
cent by raising it to 75 percent.After its approval,
many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed
petitions for admission to the barinvoking its
provisions, while other motions for the revision of
their examination papers were still pendingalso
invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground
for admission. There are also others who havesought
simply the reconsideration of their grades without,
however, invoking the law in question. To
avoidinjustice to individual petitioners, the court first
reviewed the motions for reconsideration,
irrespective ofwhether or not they had invoked
Republic Act No. 972.

6.

The law is a manifest encroachment on the

constitutional responsibility of the Supreme
Court to render the ultimate decision on
who may be admitted and may continue in
the practice of law according to existing
rule.
It is, in effect, a judgment revoking the
resolution of the Supreme Court on the
petitions which only the Court may revise or
alter, directly violating the Constitution.
Congress has exceeded its legislative power
to repeal, alter and supplement the rules on
admission to the Bar by the disputed law.
It is a class legislation.
Article 2 of RA No. 972 is not embraced in
the title of the law, contrary to what the
Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable
from the provisions of article 1, the entire
law is void.
Aguirre vs Aguirre 58 SCRA 461, August 15,
1974

FACTS:
Leoncia, Luis, and Luningning Aguirre filed a petition
for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals that
was actually in favor of them but the petitioners
claimed that it was short of what they should be
entitled to under the law. Respondents were
Vicenta, Felipe, Andrea, Caridad, Soccoro, Severino
(substitute to deceased father Dominador), Luis
Aguirre Jr. and Cristeta Lamahang, and the CA. The
Court of First Instance of Batangas acted favorably
on the partition and damages of the properties
among the descendants of the spouses Gregorio
Aguirre and Regina Antolin. But petitioners appealed
to the Court of Appeals because of the failure of the
trial court to award them damages on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. But the CA said this was an

7|Page

error and found out that the damages suffered by

the petitioners amounted to P1,000 yearly since
1955. But the dispositive (transfer of ownership)
portion of CA s decision simply says P1,000 without
qualification; hence the petition for review. The
P1,000 represents the value of corn, rice, mangoes
copras, salt, among other s which the plaintiffs were
entitled to but were not able to received because of
unjustified acts of the defendants. P800 was
supposed to have originated from the properties of
Gregorio Aguirre and Regina Antolin while P200 was
supposed to ha ve come from properties of
Melencio Aguirre and Fructuosa Perez. Properties of
Melecio Aguirre and Fructuosa Perez included
unsurveyed coconut lands with an area of 500
hectares. The coconut plantation in Jaybanga, Lobo,
Batangas has 3,000 fruit bearing coconut tress while
the rice lands were cultivated by about 50 families,
residing as permanent tenants. Petitioners received
shares of palay, salt, mangoes, corn only until 1954.
In 19 55, Felipe, Dominador, Caridad and Socorro
divided the 1/6 of the share due the petitioners and
gave these to a certain Cristeta Lamahang. Aside
from the P1,000 yearly damage, the CA also awarded
attorney s fees of P5,000 ; moral damages of P2,000;
exemplary damages of P1,000 and even fees for
expert witness of P500.

- Yes - Petitioners were entitled to interest at the

legal rate from the date of the judgment of the trial
court.
- No - There is no sufficient legal basis for this.
7.

People vs Malmstedt 198 SCRA 401, June

19, 1991

FACTS:
In an information filed against the accusedappellant Mikael Malmstead was charged before the
RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet, for violation of Section
4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended.
Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national,
entered the Philippines for the third time in
December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the
country sometime in 1982 and 1985.
In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio
City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of the
following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in
that place for two (2) days. Then in the 7 in the
morning of May 11, 1989, the accused went to
Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada.

ISSUE(S):
Whether the CA erred in sts and costs
Whether petitioners are tied to them as a result
failing to qualify the yearly damages to petitioners
failing to sentence defendants to pay petitioners
inters entitled to corresponding adjustment of the
amounts grant of the rise in the dollar exchange rate
HELD:
CAs decision was affirmed with modification:
- Yes - The dispositive portion of its decision simply
says P1,000 without qualific ation, which is a
manifest ambiguity, if not inconsistency. There can
be hardly any doubt that it was the intention of the
CA to allow the recovery of the yearly damages it
found out to have suffered by the petitioners. We
must admit that the delays in the administration of
justice could be avoided if greater care were taken in
the drafting of the dispositive portions of decisions

At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same

day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the
Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command
(NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his
men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer
14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the
purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the
Cordillera Region. The order to establish a
checkpoint in the said area was prompted by
persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada
were transporting marijuana and other prohibited
drugs. Moreover, information was received by the
Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same
morning that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in
his possession prohibited drugs. The group
composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in
coordination with Tublay Police Station, set up a
checkpoint at the designated area at about 10:00
o'clock in the morning and inspected all vehicles
coming from the Cordillera Region.

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The two (2) NARCOM officers started their

inspection from the front going towards the rear of
the bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding
the bus was seated at the rear thereof.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge
on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on
accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for
accused's passport and other identification papers.
When accused failed to comply, the officer required
him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on
his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a
pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag,
as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspiciouslooking objects wrapped in brown packing tape,
prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped
objects. The wrapped objects turned out to contain
hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for
questioning. But before he alighted from the bus,
accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from
the luggage carrier. Upon stepping out of the bus,
the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy
bear was found in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears,
the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the
same which did not feel like foam stuffing. It was
only after the officers had opened the bags that
accused finally presented his passport.
Accused was then brought to the headquarters of
the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet
for further investigation. At the investigation room,
the officers opened the teddy bears and they were
found to also contain hashish. Representative
samples were taken from the hashish found among
the personal effects of accused and the same were
brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical
analysis.
In the chemistry report, it was established that the
objects examined were hashish. a prohibited drug
which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an
information was filed against accused for violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act.

ACCUSEDS DEFENSE
During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of
"not guilty." For his defense, he raised the issue of
illegal search of his personal effects. He also claimed
that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM
officers in his pouch bag and that the two (2)
travelling bags were not owned by him, but were
merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple
whom he met in Sagada. He further claimed that the
Australian couple intended to take the same bus
with him but because there were no more seats
available in said bus, they decided to take the next
ride and asked accused to take charge of the bags,
and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa
Station.
The trial court found the guilt of the accused Mikael
Malmstedt established beyond reasonable doubt.
Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court
finding him guilty of the crime charged, accused
argues that the search of his personal effects was
illegal because it was made without a search warrant
and, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were
discovered during the illegal search are not
admissible as evidence against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision of the trial court should
be reversed (or affirmed) because the accused
argues that the search and arrest was made without
a warrant
HELD:
No - The Constitution guarantees the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures. However, where the search is made
pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to
obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a
warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private
person under the following circumstances.
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A
peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

9|Page

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested

has committed is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
Accused was searched and arrested while
transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was
actually being committed by the accused and he was
caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made
upon his personal effects falls squarely under
paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law,
which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful
arrest. While it is true that the NARCOM officers
were not armed with a search warrant when the
search was made over the personal effects of
accused, however, under the circumstances of the
case, there was sufficient probable cause for said
officers to believe that accused was then and there
committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and
circumstances which could lead a reasonable,
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed, and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought
to be searched. Warrantless search of the personal
effects of an accused has been declared by this Court
as valid, because of existence of probable cause,
where the smell of marijuana emanated from a
plastic bag owned by the accused, 10 or where the
accused was acting suspiciously, 11 and attempted
to flee.
The appealed judgment of conviction by the trial
court is hereby affirmed. Costs against the accusedappellant.

8.

Morales vs Paredes 55 Phil 565, December

29, 1930

FACTS:
Pedro, Rosendo, and Prudencio Gavino applied for
the registration of a parcel of land situated in the
poblacion of the municipality of San Quintin,
Pangasinan, and on June 23, 1930, the application
was granted and a decision to that effect rendered.
Baltazar Morales, the petitioner, now claims to be
the owner of the la nd but was not advised on the
registration proceedings until the early part of S
eptember 1930. He eventually filed a motion,
through his counsel Nicolas Belmont e, on
September 18 in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Pangasinan for the re consideration of the June 23
decision and as the record shows, the motion may st
ill be pending. Without dismissal of the motion
mentioned, the movant brought th e present action
before the Supreme Court (SC) praying that the
aforesaid decisi on be set aside and that a new trial
be granted in accordance with Section 513 o f the
Code of Civil Procedure.
ISSUE:
Whether Mr. Morales has legal contention in his
petition filed at the SC.
HELD:
No - The plaintiff has unfortunately mistaken his
remedy. Assuming without decidi ng that the
allegations of fraud in his complaint are true, the
proper remedy is to petition for a review under
Section 38 of the Land Registration Act (LRA). The
plaintiff s contention that such review cannot be
made until the final decree has been issued is not in
accordance with the view adopted by the SC as can
be gleaned in the case of Rivera vs. Moran (48 Phil.,
836), wherein it was pointed ou t by the court that
Sec. 38 of the LRA, which provides that a petition for
revie w of such a decree on the grounds of fraud
must be filed within one year after en try of the
decree , be given further reflection and that what it
meant would have been better expressed by stating
that such petitions must be presented before th e
expiration of one year from the entry of the decree.
Statutes must be given a reasonable construction
and there can be no possible reason for requiring the

10 | P a g e

co mplaining party to wait until the final decree is

entered before urging his clai m of fraud. The
plaintiff s view of the extent of actions under Sec.
513 of the Co de of Civil Procedure is erroneous. The
SC had no jurisdiction to reopen judgmen ts under
that section if other adequate remedies are
available, and such remedie s are not lacking in the
present case. The case is therefore dismissed by the
SC with the costs against the plaintiff.
9.

Delta Motors vs. CA 276 SCRA 212

FACTS:
State Investment House Inc. filed a motion for
clarification wherein it asked for the decision for
being mere obiter dictum, the following paragraph in
the Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals. SIHI
argued that the paragraph was not necessary to the
decision of the case before it 34 and cannot be
considered binding for the purpose of establishing
precedent; likewise, the Resolution itself did not
decide the incident on its merits or consider and
dispose of the issues, nor determine the respective
rights of the parties concerned. The paragraph was
deleted by CA. Delta filed an instant petition
challenging the paragraph contained a finding or
affirmation of fact, thus could not have constituted
orbiter delictum
Issue:
Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error
in deleting the phrase SIHI protested as orbiter
delictum.
Held:
The Instant Petition is DISMISSED. The assailed
phrase was indeed a orbiter delictum [1] as it
touched upon a matter not raised by petitioner
expressly in its petition assailing the dismissal of its
notice of appeal. It was not a prerequisite in
disposing of the aforementioned issue. The body of
the resolution did not contain any discussion on such
matter nor mention any principle of law to support
such statement it is remark made, or opinion
expressed, by a judge in his decision upon a cause,
by the way, that is, incidentally or collaterally,
and not directly upon a point not necessarily
involved in the determination of the cause, or

introduced by way of illustration, or analogy, or

argument. Such are not binding as precedent.
10. LEE vs. COURT OF APPEALS and VICENCIO
VDA. DE SIMEON, November 28, 1975
FACTS:
On June 25, 1965, Emiliano Simeon and Alberta
Vicencio, husband and wife, brought an action in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal to compel spouses
Vita Uy Le e and Henry Lee to resell to them a parcel
of land situated in Sitio Parugan-Iba Barrio San Jose,
Antipolo, Rizal. The land, a homestead with an area
of about 2 .7342 hectares, is presently covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 57279 issued by the
Register of Deeds of Rizal in the names of
defendants Vita Uy Lee and Henry Lee. Defendants
filed in due time their answer with affirmative
defenses. After trial, the court decided in favor of
Simeon and Vicencio. The counterclaim of the
defendants are dismissed. Defendants (now
petitioners) filed a motion for new trial and later an
urgent motion for reconsideration which were both
denied by the trial court in its orders of March 23,
1964 and June 25, 1964. The case is now before us
on a petition for certiorari filed by spouses Vita Uy
Lee and Henry Lee. On appeal to the Court of
Appeals, the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal was affirmed in toto. A timely motion for
reconsideration was filed by defendants-appellants
(now petitioners) to no avail. Petitioners maintain
that the Court of Appeals erred in not making
"sufficient and complete findings of fact on all issues
properly raised as to fully conserve petitioners' right
to appeal to this Supreme Court on questions of law
before it." More specifically, petitioners assail the
failure of the Court of Appeals to include in its
decision the complete text of the three letters sent
by respondent ( now substituted by surviving
spouse) Emiliano Simeon to petitioner Vita Uy Lee
before the expiration of the period within which
redemption could be made petitioners intimating
that such omission has impaired their position on
appeal as another question is raised by them on the
basis of the terminology of the three letters.
Issues: Whether or not the period to reconvey the
property, subject of this case, under the provisions
of Commonwealth Act No. 141 has prescribed
(expired or lapsed).
Ruling: Yes - it has prescribed (expired or lapsed).
The rule that tender of payment of the repurchase

11 | P a g e

price is necessary to exercise the right of redemption

finds support in civil law. Article 1616 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, in the absence of an
applicable provision in Commonwealth Act No. 141,
furnishes the guide, to wit: "The vendor cannot avail
himself of the right of repurchase without returning
to the vendee the price of the sale ..." It is clear that
the mere sending of letters by vendor Simeon
expressing his des ire to repurchase the property
without an accompanying tender of redemption
price fell short of the requirements of law. Having
failed to properly exercise his right of redemption
within the statutory five-year period, the right is lost
and the same can no longer be revived by the filing
of an action to compel redemption after the lapse of
the period. Petitioner Vita Uy Lee was justified in
ignoring the letters sent her by respondent Emiliano
Simeon because the mere mention t herein of
respondent's intention to redeem the property,
without making tender o f payment, did not
constitute a bona fide offer of repurchase. The rule
that tender of the repurchase price is dispensed with
where the vendee has refused to permit the
repurchase is premised on the ground that under
such circumstance the vendee will also refuse the
tender of payment. From petitioner Lee's silence
which we have shown above to be justified, no such
deduction can be made. Unlike a f lat refusal, her
silence did not close the door to respondent
Simeon's subsequent tender of payment, had he
wished to do so, provided that the same was made
within five-year period. Yet he neglected to tender
payment and, instead, merely filed an action to
compel re-conveyance after the expiration of the
period. The Supreme Court, therefore, in the light of
the above ruling reversed the decision of the Court
of Appeals.
11. Gerona, et. al v SEC. OF EDUCATION, 106
Phil 2, Aug. 12, 1959
FACTS:
1. Petitioners belong to the Jehovas Witness whose
children were expelled from their schools when they
refused to salute, sing the anthem, recite the pledge
during the conduct of flag ceremony. DO No. 8
issued by DECS pursuant to RA 1265 which called
for the manner of conduct during a flag ceremony.
The petitioners wrote the Secretary of Education on
their plight and requested to reinstate their children.
This was denied.

2. As a result, the petitioners filed for a writ of

preliminary injunction against the Secretary and
Director of Public Schools to restrain them from
implementing said DO No. 8.
3. The lower court (RTC) declared DO 8 invalid and
contrary to the Bill of Rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not DO 8 is valid or
constitutional
HELD: DO 8 is valid. Saluting the flag is not a
religious ritual and it is for the courts to determine,
not a religious group, whether or not a certain
practice is one.
1. The court held that the flag is not an image but a
symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem
of national sovereignty, of national unity and
cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and the
Constitution guarantee and protect. Considering the
complete separation of church and state in our system
of government, the flag is utterly devoid of any
religious significance. Saluting the flag consequently
does not involve any religious ceremony.
After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual
is or is not a religious ceremony must rest with the
courts. It cannot be left to a religious group or sect,
much less to a follower of said group or sect;
otherwise, there would be confusion and
misunderstanding for there might be as many
interpretations and meanings to be given to a certain
ritual or ceremony as there are religious groups or
sects or followers.
2. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the
Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption
form or non-compliance with reasonable and nondiscriminatory laws, rules and regulations
promulgated by competent authority. In enforcing the
flag salute on the petitioners, there was absolutely no
compulsion involved, and for their failure or refusal
to obey school regulations about the flag salute they
were not being persecuted. Neither were they being
criminally prosecuted under threat of penal sanction.
If they chose not to obey the flag salute regulation,
they merely lost the benefits of public education
being maintained at the expense of their fellow
citizens, nothing more. According to a popular
expression, they could take it or leave it. Having
elected not to comply with the regulations about the
flag salute, they forfeited their right to attend public
schools.

12 | P a g e

3. The Filipino flag is not an image that requires

religious veneration; rather it is symbol of the
Republic of the Philippines, of sovereignty, an
emblem of freedom, liberty and national unity; that
the flag salute is not a religious ceremony but an act
and profession of love and allegiance and pledge of
loyalty to the fatherland which the flag stands for;
that by authority of the legislature, the Secretary of
Education was duly authorized to promulgate
Department Order No. 8, series of 1955; that the
requirement of observance of the flag ceremony or
salute provided for in said Department Order No. 8,
does not violate the Constitutional provision about
freedom of religion and exercise of religion; that
compliance with the non-discriminatory and
reasonable rules and regulations and school
discipline, including observance of the flag ceremony
is a prerequisite to attendance in public schools; and
that for failure and refusal to participate in the flag
ceremony, petitioners were properly excluded and
dismissed from the public school they were
attending.

12. Ebralinag v Division Supt. of Cebu, 219

SCRA 256, (1993)
Facts: Two special civil actions for certiorari,
Mandamus and Prohibition were filed and
consolidated for raising same issue. Petitioners
allege that the public respondents acted without or
in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion. Respondents ordered expulsion of 68 HS
and GS students of Bantayan, Pinamungajan,
Caracar, Taburan and Asturias in Cebu. Public school
authorities expelled these students for refusing to
salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite
the Panatang Makabayan required by RA1265.
They are Jehovahs Witnesses believing that by doing
these is religious worship/devotion akin to idolatry
against their teachings. They contend that to compel
transcends constitutional limits and invades
protection against official control and religious
freedom. The respondents relied on the precedence
of Gerona et al v. Secretary of Education.
Gerona doctrine provides that we are a system of
separation of the church and state and the flag is
devoid of religious significance and it doesnt involve
any religious ceremony. The freedom of religious

belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not mean

exception from non-discriminatory laws like the
saluting of flag and singing national anthem. This
exemption disrupts school discipline and
demoralizes the teachings of civic consciousness and
duties of citizenship.
Issue: Whether or Not religious freedom has been
violated.
Held: Religious freedom is a fundamental right of
highest priority. The 2 fold aspect of right to religious
worship is: 1.) Freedom to believe which is an
absolute act within the realm of thought. 2.)
Freedom to act on ones belief regulated and
translated to external acts. The only limitation to
religious freedom is the existence of grave and
present danger to public safety, morals, health and
interests where State has right to prevent. The
expulsion of the petitioners from the school is not
justified.
The 30 yr old previous GERONA decision of expelling
and dismissing students and teachers who refuse to
obey RA1265 is violates exercise of freedom of
speech and religious profession and worship.
Jehovahs Witnesses may be exempted from
observing the flag ceremony but this right does not
give them the right to disrupt such ceremonies. In
the case at bar, the Students expelled were only
standing quietly during ceremonies. By observing the
ceremonies quietly, it doesnt present any danger so
evil and imminent to justify their expulsion. What
the petitioners request is exemption from flag
ceremonies and not exclusion from public schools.
The expulsion of the students by reason of their
religious beliefs is also a violation of a citizens right
to free education. The non-observance of the flag
ceremony does not totally constitute ignorance of
patriotism and civic consciousness. Love for country
and admiration for national heroes, civic
consciousness and form of government are part of
the school curricula. Therefore, expulsion due to
religious beliefs is unjustified.
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED.
Expulsion is ANNULLED.

13 | P a g e

13. Mariano Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, GR. No. 553,

June 17, 1993
FACTS: Petitioner is a member of the legal
profession. He claims that he is offended and
ashamed by the advertisements issued by The Legal
Clinic as they are champertous, unethical,
demeaning of the law profession and destructive of
the confidence of the community in the integrity of
lawyers. Respondent meanwhile admits the
publication and issuance of said advertisements but
claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law.
The Legal Clinic renders support services through
paralegals with the use of modern computers and
electronic machines.
ISSUE: Whether or not the services offered by
respondent (The Legal Clinic) as advertised
constitutes practice of law. In either case, whether
the same can properly be suspect of advertisements
herein complained.
HELD: YES. The Court agrees with the observations
of the various bar associations that the activities of
respondent, as advertised, constitute the practice of
law. The use of the name _The Legal Clinic_ gives the
impression that respondent corporation is being
operated by lawyers and thus renders legal services.
While some of the services being offered merely
involves mechanically and technically know how,
these will not suffice to justify an exception. Though
Respondent Corporation does not represent clients
in court, it is still engaged in the practice of law as
this is not limited merely to court appearances but
extends to legal research, giving legal advice and
contract drafting. Moreover, the advertisements in
quest ion (annex B) are meant to induce the
performance of acts contrary to law, morals, public
order and public policy. What is important is that
respondent corporation is engaged in the practice of
l aw by the nature of the services it offers (though
rendered by paralegals) which thereby brings it
within the statutory prohibitions against the
publication of such advertisements. It is highly
unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or
skills law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer
degrades himself and his profession who stoops to
and adopts the practices of mercantilism by
advertising his services or offering them in public.
The Court resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN
respondent from issuing or causing the publication
or dissemination of any advertisement in any form

which is of the same tenor and purpose as Annexes

A and B.
14. IN RE: DALMACIO DE LOS ANGELES Case
No. 350 August 7, 1959
FACTS: Atty. Dalmacio de los Angeles was convicted
of the crime of attempted bribery in a final decision
rendered by the Court of Appeals and was sentenced
to two years, four months and one day of destierro
and to pay a fine of P2300, with subsidiary destierro
in case of insolvency.
ISSUES: Under Section 1, Rule 128, of the Rules of
Court, he was required to show reason why he
should not be disbarred. In written explanation he
appealed to the sympathy and mercy of this Court
considering that he has six children to support. He
made manifest to the court that if he ever
committed what is attributed to hi m, it was merely
due to an error of judgment.
HELD: He was disbarred from the roll of attorneys.
Under Section 25, Rule 127, a member of the bar
may be removed from his office a s attorney if he is
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude the
reason be ind this rule being that the continued
possession of a good moral character is a requisite
condition for the rightful continuance of the lawyer
in the practice of law with the result that the loss of
such qualification justifies his disbarment. And since
bribery is admittedly a felony involving moral
turpitude, this court is constrained to decree his
disbarment as ordained by Section 21 of Rule 127.

15. Valmonte v. De Villa, G.R. No. 83988, May

24, 1990, 185 SCRA 665
Facts: Petitioners are members of the Union of
Lawyers and Advocates for People s Rights. Their
petition for prohibition seeking the declaration of
checkpoints as unconstitutional was dismissed.
Petitioners filed the instant motion and
supplemental motion for reconsideration.
Respondents are General Renato de Villa and the
National Capital region District Command.
Checkpoints may be allowed and installed by the
government. In its decision, the Court does not
legalize all checkpoints, declaring instead that
checkpoints are not illegal per se. In fact,
checkpoints are used as security measure in order to

14 | P a g e

entrap criminals, considering recent and on-going

events such as the sixth attempted coup dtat
staged last December 1, 1989, the NPA move against
the armed forces, murders, sex crimes and
smuggling. As long as the vehicle is neither searched
nor its occupants subjected to a body search and the
inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search,
said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative
of an individual s right against unreasonable search.
A routine checkpoint stop involves only a brief
detention of travellers, answering a brief question or
two. If vehicles are stopped and extensively
searched, it is because of some probable cause
which justifies reasonable belief that either the
motorist is a law-offender or the contents of the
vehicle are or have been instruments of some
offense.
Issue: W/N checkpoints are constitutional.
Held: Yes. Completely banning checkpoints is to lose
sight of the fact that the real objective behind their
use is necessary. The government has the equal
right, under its police power, to select the
reasonable means and methods for best achieving
them. Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude on
the motoring public and cannot be considered as
violative of an individual s right against unreasonable
search. Potential interference is minimal and
checkpoint operations involve less discretionary
enforcement activity. The Courts decision was
concerned with power, on whether the government
employing the military has the power to install said
checkpoints, and does not validate nor condone
abuses committed by the military manning the
checkpoints. The Court assumes that the men in
uniform are assigned to the checkpoints to protect
the citizenry. Motion for reconsideration is denied.
16. COLUMBIA PICTURES, INC. VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, G.R. No. 110318, August 28,
1996.
FACTS: Petitioners are foreign corporations that
lodged a formal complaint with the NBI for violation
of PD No. 49, as amended, a.k.a. Decree on the
Protection of Intellectual Property and sought its
assistance in their anti-film piracy drive. Surveillance
operations of various video establishments in Metro
Manila were then made, including that of Sunshine
Home Video Inc. in Magallanes, Makati. On

November 14, 1987, NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes

applied for a search warrant with the court a quo
against Sunshine. Agent Reyes and other witnesses,
Mr. Rene C. Baltazar and Atty. Rico V. Domingo,
provided affidavits and depositions during the
hearing of the application for the warrant. Search
Warrant No. 87-053 for violation of sec. 56 of PD No.
49 was then issued. On December 14, 1987, at 1:45
p.m., the warrant was served and a receipt of
properties tendered to Mr. Danilo A. Pelindario,
registered owner-proprietor of Sunshine. On
December 16, 1987, A Return of Search Warrant was
filed with the Court. Then, a Motion to Lift the Order
of Search Warrant was filed but was later denied for
lack of merit. A Motion for Reconsideration of the
Order of denial was filed and then granted b y the
court, citing the fact that master tapes of
copyrighted films were never presented in the
proceedings for the issuance of the search warrants
in question. Petitioners thereafter appealed the
order of the Trial Court granting private respondents
motion for reconsideration, to the Court of Appeals.
Said appeal was dismissed and the motion for
reconsideration thereof denied. Hence, this petition
was brought to Court particularly challenging the
validity of respondent court s retroactive application
of the ruling in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., promulgated on August 19,
1988 (long after hearing of application for search
warrant of Sunshine) in dismissing petitioner s
appeal and upholding the quashal of the search
warrant by the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling in 20th Century Fox
Film Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
ordering that for the determination of probable
cause to support the issuance of a search warrant in
copyright infringement cases involving video grams,
the production of the master tape for comparison
with the allegedly pirated copies is necessary, should
be retroactively applied as grounds for quashal of a
search warrant previously issued.
HELD: NO. The 20th Century Fox ruling cannot be
retroactively applied to the instant case because
there was satisfactory compliance with the then
prevailing standards under the law for determination
of probable cause. The lower court could not have
possibly expected more evidence from petitioners in
their application for a search warrant other than
what the law and jurisprudence, then existing and
judicially accepted, required with respect to finding
of probable cause. Decisions of this Court, although

15 | P a g e

in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of

what the laws mean. According to the Article 8 of
the New Civil Code, judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution s all form
part of the legal system. The settled rule supported
by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal
maxim legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet e
interpretation placed upon the written law by a
competent court has the force of law. But when a
doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different
view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied
prospectively, and should not apply to parties who
had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith
thereof.

applications for search warrants against the video

outlets owned by the private respondents. These
applications were consolidated and heard by the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 132. On
September 4, 1985, the lower court issued the
desired search warrants on the basis of probable
cause. After the raids occurred, respondents then
filed for a Motion to Lift Search War rants. Acting on
the Motion to Lift Search Warrants, the lower court
issued an order lifting the warrants issued earlier.
The petitioner thereafter filed a motion for
reconsideration, but was denied. The Court of
Appeals denied the petitioner for certiorari likewise
filed by the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment and resolution

of respondent Court of Appeals, and necessarily
inclusive of the order of the lower court dated Nov.
22, 1988, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
order of the court a quo of September 5, 1 988
upholding the validity of Search Warrant No. 87-053
is hereby REINSTATED and said court is DIRECTED to
take and expeditiously proceed with such
appropriate proceedings as may be called for in this
case. Treble costs are further assessed against
private respondents.

Issue: W/N the search warrants were properly lifter

by the judge for want of probably cause.

NOTES PRINCIPLE OF PROSPECTIVITY Applies not

only to original or amendatory statutes and
administrative rulings and circulars, but also, and
properly so to judicial decisions.
Lex prospicit, non respicit the law looks forward not
backward.
17. 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA 655
Facts: The petitioner sought the assistance of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NB I) to conduct
searches and seizures in connection with the latter s
anti-film piracy campaign. Through a lettercomplaint dated August 26, 1985, the petitioner
alleged that certain videotape outlets all over the
Metro Manila were engaged in the unauthorized
sale and renting out of copyrighted films, in video
tape form which constitutes a flagrant violation of
Presidential Decree No. 49 (Decree on the Protection
of Intellectual Property) Acting on the lettercomplaint, the NBI conducted surveillance and
investigation of the outlets pinpointed by the
petitioner and subsequently filed three (3)

Ruling: Yes, Based on Sec. 2 Art. 3 of the 1987

Constitution provide that no warrant shall be issued
except upon probable cause. This constitutional
guarantee is a time-honoured precept, which
circumscribes governmental action with regard to
the procurement of a search warrant. In the case of
Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff, AFP, the Court had
occasion to de fine probably cause for a valid search
as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched. It was likewise held by
the Court that this constitutional provision demands
no less than personal knowledge by the complainant
or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance
of a search warrant may be justified in order to
convince the judge, not the individual making the
affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of
the existence of probable cause.
In the case at bar, the lower court lifted the
questioned search warrants against the private
respondents on the ground that it acted on the
application for the issuance of the said search
warrants and granted it on the misrepresentations of
applicant NBI and its witnesses that infringement of
copyright or a piracy of a particular film have been
committed. The lower court ruled that there was no
probable cause that the private respondents violated
PD No. 49. As found by the lower court, the NBI
agents who acted as witnesses did not have personal
knowledge of the subject matter of their testimony
which has the alleged commission of the offense by
the private respondents. Only the petitioner s

16 | P a g e

counsel who was also a witness during the

application for the issuance of the search warrants
stated that he had personal knowledge that the
confiscated tapes owned by the private respondents
were pirated tapes taken from master tapes
belonging to the petitioner. However, the lower
court did not give much credence to his testimony in
view of the fact that the master tapes of the
allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the court
during the application. It was thus ruled that the
presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted
films which the pirated films allegedly copied, was
necessary for the validity of search warrants against
those who have in their possession the pirated films.
The court cannot presume that duplicate or copied
tapes were necessarily reproduced from master
tapes that it owns. The essence of copyright
infringement is the similarity or at least the
substantial similarity of the purported pirated works
to the copyrighted work. Hence, t he applicant must
present to the court the copyrighted films to
compare them with the purchased evidence of the
videotapes allegedly pirated to determine whether
the latter is unauthorized reproduction of the
former. This linkage of the copyrighted films to the
probable cause. Mere allegations as to the existence
of the copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the
issuance of a search warrant. Moreover, the Court
ruled that the questioned warrants were in the
nature of general warrants, against citing the case of
Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff, AFP, w herein the
search warrants in question were declared void by
the Supreme Court. The articles described in the
search warrants television sets, video cassette
recorders, rewinders, and tape cleaners are articles
which can be found in a vide o tape store engaged in
the legitimate business of lending or renting out of
video tapes.
18. Quinto vs Comelec GR 189698, Feb 22 2010
Facts:
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce
and administer election laws, COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of
Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of
Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in
Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and
Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No.
8678 provide:

SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.a)

Any person holding a public appointive office or
position including active members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and
employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position
shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of
his certificate of candidacy for the same or any
other elective office or position.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto
resigned from their offices the moment they file
their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino
A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in
the government and who intend to run in the
coming elections, filed the instant petition for
prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of
the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678
as null and void. Petitioners also contend that
Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the
assailed COMELEC resolution, contains two
conflicting provisions. These must be harmonized or
reconciled to give effect to both and to arrive at a
declaration that they are not ipso facto resigned
from their positions upon the filing of their CoCs.
Issue: whether the second proviso in the third
paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section
4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of
the equal protection clause
Held: Yes.
In considering persons holding appointive positions
as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the
filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned
all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones,
the law unduly discriminates against the first class.
The fact alone that there is substantial distinction
between those who hold appointive positions and
those occupying elective posts, does not justify such
differential treatment.
In order that there can be valid classification so that
a discriminatory governmental act may pass the
constitutional norm of equal protection, it is

17 | P a g e

necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid

classification be complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
The first requirement means that there must be real
and substantial differences between the classes
treated differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent
Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and
Highways, a real and substantial distinction exists
between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles
sufficient to justify its classification among those
prohibited from plying the toll ways. Not all
motorized vehicles are created equala twowheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily
overturned than a four-wheel vehicle.
Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid
if it does not comply with the second requirement
if it is not germane to the purpose of the law.
The third requirement means that the classification
must be enforced not only for the present but as
long as the problem sought to be corrected
continues to exist. And, under the last requirement,
the classification would be regarded as invalid if all
the members of the class are not treated similarly,
both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the
Court finds that the differential treatment of persons
holding appointive offices as opposed to those
holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes
of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to
prevent the use of a governmental position to
promote ones candidacy, or even to wield a
dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate.
The measure is further aimed at promoting the
efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public
service by eliminating the danger that the discharge
of official duty would be motivated by political
considerations rather than the welfare of the public.
The restriction is also justified by the proposition

that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena,

while still in office, could result in neglect or
inefficiency in the performance of duty because they
would be attending to their campaign rather than to
their office work.
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the
law, then the assailed provision cannot be
constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid
classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that
the classification must be germane to the purposes
of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive
office or an elective one, the evils sought to be
prevented by the measure remain. For example, the
Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet
for that matter, could wield the same influence as
the Vice-President who at the same time is
appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent past,
elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to take
charge of national housing, social welfare
development, interior and local government, and
foreign affairs). With the fact that they both head
executive offices, there is no valid justification to
treat them differently when both file their CoCs for
the elections. Under the present state of our law,
the Vice-President, in the example, running this
time, let us say, for President, retains his position
during the entire election period and can still use the
resources of his office to support his campaign.
As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or
partisanship in the discharge of the functions of his
appointive office, the inverse could be just as true
and compelling. The public officer who files his
certificate of candidacy would be driven by a greater
impetus for excellent performance to show his
fitness for the position aspired for.
There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive
officials differently from the elective ones. The
classification simply fails to meet the test that it
should be germane to the purposes of the law. The
measure encapsulated in the second proviso of the
third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in
Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal protection
clause.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
GRANTED. The second proviso in the third paragraph
of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of

18 | P a g e

the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of

COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are declared as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

19. JM Tuason vs Mariano 85 SCRA 644,

October 23, 1978
FACTS:
The case began when Manuela Aquial and Maria
Aquial filed a complaint in forma pauperis in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal Pasig Branch X,
wherein they prayed that they be declared the
owners of a parcel of land located at Balara,
Marikina, and Rizal, docketed as Civil Case No. 8943.
They alleged that sometime in 1960, or after J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. had illegally entered upon that
land, they discovered that it had been fraudulently
or erroneously included in OCT No. 735 of the
Registry of Deeds of Rizal. They further alleged that
transfer certificates of title, derived from OCT No.
735, were issued to J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., et.al.
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on
the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, improper venue,
prescription, laches and prior judgment. The
plaintiffs opposed that motion. The lower court
denied it. The grounds of the motion to dismiss were
pleaded as affirmative defenses in the answer of
Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. They insisted
that a preliminary hearing be held on those
defenses. The Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
filed the instant civil actions of certiorari and
prohibition praying, inter alia, that the trial court be
ordered to dismiss the complaint and enjoined from
proceeding in the said case, and a writ of preliminary
injunction was issued.
ISSUE:
Whether or not OCT No. 735 and the titles derived
therefrom can be questioned at this late hour by
respondents Aquial and Cordova.
HELD:
NO. The trial court was directed to dismiss Civil Case
8943 with prejudice and without costs.
Considering the governing principle of stare decisis
et non quieta movere (follow past precedents and
do not disturb what has been settled), respondents
Aquial and Cordova cannot maintain their action in
Civil Case No. 8943 without eroding the long settled
holding of the courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and
no longer open to attack.It is against public policy

that matters already decided on the merits be relitigated again and again, consuming the courts time
and energies at the expense of other litigants.

20. Islamic Directorate vs CA 272 SCRA 454,

May 14, 1997
FACTS: In 1971, Islamic leaders organized and
incorporated the ISLAMIC DIRECTORATE OF T HE
PHILIPPINES (IDP). In the same year, IDP purchased
property in Culiat, Tandang Sora, Q.C. In 1972,
Martial Law was declared and most members fled to
escape political prosecution. Thereafter, two Muslim
groups came about, the Carpizo Group and the
Abbas/Tamano group. Both claim to be the
legitimate IDP. In 1986, SEC declared that neither
were legitimate IDP. Both were prescribed to
prepare and adopt by-laws for submission. Once
approved, elections can occur but neither adhered In
1989, with no properly concluded Board of Trustees
of the IDP, the Caprizo Group, sold two lands to
private respondent Inglesia Ni Cristo (INC)
authorizing Ms Ligon as the mortgagee. In 1991, the
Tamano Group, filed a petition (SEC case No.4012)
before the SEC se eking to declare null and void the
sale of property by the Caprizo Group. Tamana won
the case in 1993. Meanwhile, the INC filed a civil
case no. Q-90-6937 against Ms. Ligon, to comply
with Caprizo s obligations, which was ruled in 1991
in favor of the INC despite t he judge being informed
of the SEC case No. 4012. Tamano Group sought to
intervene in the civil case no. Q-90-6937, but was
denied on grounds of lack of juridical personality of
the IDP-Tamano Group. Ligon, then filed in the Court
of Appeals a petition for certiorari in GRN SP-279 73
which was dismissed so she further petitioned it for
review before the Supreme Court docketed as GRN
107751. In 1993, INC filed a Motion of Intervention
in SEC case No. 4012 but was denied because the
cause had been final and executory. INC filed it in
the Court of Appeals by way of certiorari docketed
as CA-C.G. SP No. 33295. The petition was granted in
1993. IDP-Tamano Group then filed for instant
petition for review in 1994 stating the Court of
Appeals gravely erred in: Not upholding the
jurisdiction of the SEC to declare nullity of the sale.
Encouraging multiplicity of suits Not applying the
principles of estoppel and laches. While this pended,
the Supreme Court rendered judgment in GRN
107751. Ms. Ligons petition denied and affirmed the
1992 decision in CA-G.R No. SP-27973.

19 | P a g e

ISSUE: Whether or not res judicata applies in the

Court of Appeals decision for granting INC s petition
in CA-C.G. SP No. 33295. Whether or not the Courts
of Appeal commit reversible error in setting aside
that portion of the SEC s Decision in SEC case no.
4012 which declared the sale of land between the
IDP-Caprizo group and INC, null and void.
HELD: NO. Res judicata basically means that the case
before the court has already been resolved by
another court, with the same parties, therefore the
court at hand should be dismissed. There are two
concepts by which res judicata is known. The first
being bar by prior judgment where between the first
case where the judgment w as rendered and the
second case the judgment was invoked, there is
identity in p arties, subject matters, and cause of
action. When the three identities are present the
judgment on the merits rendered in the first
constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent
action. The other concept which is conclusive of
judgment , wherein there is identity of parties in
both cases but no identity of cause of action, then
the judgment is conclusive in the second case only as
to those matters actually and directly controverted
and determined and not as to matters merely
involved therein.
Neither of these cases find res judicata because
while there is identity in the subject matter (the IDP
property), there is no identity in the parties of both
cases. YES. The CA committed reversible error as
according to Sec 3 and 5 of the Presidential Decree
No. 902-A, there can be no question as to the
authority of the SEC to pass ruling on who the
legitimate Board of Trustees are within a corporation
. Based on this reasoning that they can declare who
the Board are, it can also b e said that they can
declare those that are not on the Board or are
considered illegitimate. Since it was found that no
correct elections occurred nor any ruling was passed
on as to who was the legitimate IDP, Caprizo had no
right, under the IDP s name to sell any land that
belonged to the IDP. This is found in Article 1 318 of
the New Civil Code which states that to constitute a
valid contract all three elements must be present:
consent of the contracting parties, object certain
which is the subject matter of the contract and cause
of obligation which is established. Clearly, there was
no consent of the contracting parties since the
Caprizo group is not the legitimate owner.

21. Villanueva vs CA 285 SCRA 180, January 28,

1998
Facts: On March 16, 1989, petitioner Baltazar
Villanueva filed a complaint for re-conveyance of
property with damages against Grace Villanueva and
Francisco Villanueva. The complaint was dismissed
on October 29, 2990 for failure of the plaintiff and
his counsel to appear during the pre-trial and trial. A
motion for reconsideration was filed to reinstate the
complaint but was denied by the Court finding the
motion not well taken and not meritorious. On
November 26, 1991, petitioner filed another
complaint at the Regional Trial Court, OC, for
annulment of title and damages with prayer for a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction involving the same real
property. A motion to dismiss was file by private
respondent on the ground that the petitioners cause
of action is barred by prior judgment to which
petitioner filed an op position. The RTC denied the
motion to dismiss on the ground that the Court, in
the exercise of its equity jurisdiction would not
disregard the fundamental principle that the rules of
procedure are not to be applied with rigidity since
they are designed to help secure justice, not to
override the same. Furthermore, the petitioner filed
a Supplemental Complaint. The same was admitted
by the trial court. The private respondents moved to
dismiss raising once again the reasons for forumshopping, res judicata and estoppel. The trial court
denied said motion to dismiss. The private
respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals assailing the orders of the lower
court. The C.A rendered a decision upholding the
ground for dismissal but urge private respondents
there to elevate this decision to the Supreme Court
who alone has power to suspend the rules.
ISSUES: Whether or not res judicata applies to the
two complaints filed by the petition r?
If res judicata is applicable, whether or not the facts
and circumstances are justifiable for the relaxation
or suspension of res judicata in favor of obtaining
substantial justice?
HELD: Yes, res judicata applies to both cases since all
four elements for res judicata are present. These
are:
a) The former judgment or order must be final b) It

20 | P a g e

must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it

was rendered after a consideration of the evidence
or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of
the case. c) It must have been rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties d) there must be, between the first and
second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter
and of cause of action.
No, because the facts and circumstances are not
justifiable for the relaxation of res judicata. The
records show no reason for petitioner s failure to
prosecute. The motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied for not being well-taken and not
meritorious. Moreover, if petitioner felt aggrieved by
the order of denial he should have filed an appeal,
there from, instead of allowing said order to become
final and executory. The fact that petitioner did not
further pursue the matter signifies that either he
acknowledged the correctness of the order or he
realized that it was not worth continuing the case.
Moreover, it took him ten months to file the second
case after the dismissal of the first, exhibiting a lack
a dais cal attitude unworthy of judicial sympathy. For
his fault and complacence, petitioner cannot now
take refuge under the rule that justice should not be
sacrifice to technicality. Therefore the petition is
DENIED for lack of merit
22. People vs Pinuila 103 Phil 992, May 30,
1958
Facts: The defendant A. Bignay, along with coaccused D.Pinuila and Conrado Diaz, were charged in
the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, with
the murder of th e sleeping Buenaventura Dideroy in
the early morning of October 20,1948 aboard Barge
No. 560 of the Visayan Stevedoring Company, which
was at that time anchored offshore from the mouth
of the Victorias River in the municipality of Victorias
in the province of Negros Oriental. The mastermind
of the crime was D.Pinuila, who had a grudge against
the victim, and it was he who paid the other two an
amount of two pesos each for their help in killing
B.Dideroy. They were witnessed by Bonifacio del
Cano, a shipmate of the victim, who awoke and
managed to survive the attack; he positively
identified them later at the trial. A motion for
dismissal was filed by the defense on the grounds
that the jurisdiction of the Court had not yet been
established as the scene of the crime was on a boat
floating offshore and not actually on the grounds of

the municipality of Victorias. The motion was

sustained by the Court and the case dismissed, but
this was appealed by the Government. Despite the
objections of the defense who invoked the principle
of double-jeopardy, the Court of Appeals decided on
March 28,1952 that the jurisdiction of the trial court
had indeed been proven, therefore the appeal of the
Government did not involve double-jeopardy and
remanded the case for further proceedings. In the
interim however, the accused were released due to
a court order by a petition f r habeas corpus, and
only A.Bignay was able to be re apprehended for a
resumption of criminal proceedings. During the
retrial, the defense no longer raised the issue of
double jeopardy, and concentrated on the issue of
the validity of evidence beyond reasonable doubt.
The defendant was found guilty of having committed
murder, but after taking into consideration the time
he had already spent incarcerated before his release
and after his re arrest, a total of 7 years, as well as
his voluntary surrender and other factors, the court
became inclined to be lenient to the defendant. By
applying the law on indeterminate sentence, the
court then found him entitled to the minimum
degree of the penalty for the crime reclusion
temporal, thus sentencing him to a term of not less
than 12 years of prision major and not more than 17
years, 4 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal.
However, while the case was discussed and before it
was voted upon, Chief Justice Paras raised the
question of double-jeopardy and claimed that the
defendant should now be acquitted, having been
placed in jeopardy already once.
Issue: Whether or not the defendant is indeed in
double-jeopardy, and should therefore be acquitted.
Held: No. In the opinion of the Court, with 9 justices
concurring and 2 dissenting, the defendant has
already been proven guilty indeed beyond
reasonable doubt, and t he question of doublejeopardy had already been answered when the
Court revoked the original order for dismissal of the
trial court and remanded the case for further
proceedings, in the process ruling that appeal did
not violate prohibition against double-jeopardy.
Since the ruling had already long been decided, it
should have already become "the law of the case",
meaning that it could not be modified or changed
anymore, especially since the defense failed to raise
the question of double-jeopardy in the retrial, and
this failure may be regarded as a waiver of that
particular defense. Furthermore, while the "law of

21 | P a g e

the case" rule is subject to judicial discretion, this

discretion is supposed to be used wisely with the
objective of helping justice by punishing the guilty,
not thwarting it by letting the guilty escape
unpunished.
23. Solid Manila Corp. vs Bio Hong 195 SCRA
748, April 8, 1991
Facts: Solid Manila Corp. owned a parcel of land in
the vicinity of another parcel owned by Bio Hong
Trading Co., Inc. The private respondent (i.e., Bio
Hong Trading Co., Inc.) acquired the land from a
prior owner who, in the deed of sale, indicated an
easement of way (covering approximately 914 sq. m.
of private respondent s lot) for the construction of a
private alley In consideration for the easement, the
prior owner decreased the selling price b y Php
287,200 The construction of the private alley was
annotated in the private respondent s title. The
pertinent provisions were: alley shall not be closed
alley shall remain open at all times, and no
obstructions whatsoever shall be placed thereon
shall allow the public to use the same Sometime in
1983, private respondent constructed steel gates
that precluded unhampered use of the alley While
the appeal of the private respondent at the Court of
Appeals (CA) was in progress for the original case,
the private respondent filed for a petition at the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) to cancel the annotation.
The court granted such petition.
Issues: Whether or not the CA erroneously reversed
the trial courts summary judgement? Whether or
not the CA erroneously held that merger had
extinguished the easement?
Held: The Supreme Court (SC) ruled in favor of the
petitioner on both counts. The decision of the CA
was set aside; the RTC s decision was however
reinstated. Additionally, the private respondent and
its counsel were asked to show cause why they
should not be punished for contempt of court. The
counsel was also facing administrative charges for
forum shopping.
Rationale: The Supreme Court found merit on the
petition with regard to the summary judgment
rendered by the RTC. The SC invalidated the private
respondents defense of merger because of the
defenses impossibility. Also, the SC ruled that the
sale undoubtedly preserved the existing easement

which affirmed the RTC s decision to render a

summary judgment. Further, the decision of the CA
on the case referred to a t the last bullet point of the
case facts concerning the nullification of the
easement (i.e., the annotation) became the LAW OF
THE CASE. By the CA s decision, the rights of the
parties regarding the easement were established.
This was used by the SC to render a favorable
holding to the petitioner. The SC ruled that there
was no merger since there was no full ownership of
both lands. Besides, the SC pointed out that the
servitude was a personal one
24. Philippine Blooming Mills Employees vs
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. 51 SCRA
189
FACTS: Petitioner/s is a legitimate labor union
composed of employees of the respondent.
Petitioners (Tolentino, Padgrigano, Roxas, de Leon,
Paciente, Vacuna, Pagcu, M unsod are officers of
PBMEO That on March 1, 1969, the union decided to
stage a mass demonstration at Malacanang on
March 4 to protest against alleged abuses of the
Pasig police. Those participating in the
demonstration are workers in the 1st shift, regular
2nd and 3r d shifts. The unions informed the
Company of their planned demonstration On March
2, the Company learned of the demonstration and
on March 3 at 11 am, it called for a meeting where
the union confirmed the demonstration. The
Company warned the union that the workers of the
1st shift, without leave of absence approved by the
company who fail to report on March 4 shall be
dismissed because it is a violation of the NO
LOCKOUT, NO STRIKE in the existing Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Another meeting was
convoked at 5 pm reiterating the same and
appealing to the P BMEO but the union countered
that it was too late to change their plans. March 4, at
950 am, PBMEO adviser Wilfred Ariston sent a
cablegram to the company containing REITERATING
REQUEST EXCSUE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING
DEMO MARCH 4, 1969 Company filed charges
against petitioner in the 1st shit with violation of the
C BA Under the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR),
PBMEO was found guilty of bargaining in bad faith
and the officers of PBMEO, as a consequence, were
considered to have lost their status as employees in
PBMCI On Sept 19, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of said order dated S ep 15 on the
grounds that it is contrary to law and evidence as

22 | P a g e

well asked for 1 0 days within which to file their

arguments Their motion was 2 days late according to
the rules of CIR and accordingly DISMI SSED.
ISSUES: W/N the motion for reconsideration filed by
PBMEO which was DISMISSED be reversed and the
officers of the PBMEO who were removed from
employment be reinstated.
HELD: Yes. The decision of the CIR to dismiss the
petition based on technicality (being 2 days late) was
rendered null and void. (The constitutional rights
have dominance over procedural rules.) And, the
company was directed to reinstate the eigth officers
with full backpay from date of separation minus the
one day s pay and whatever earnings they might
have realized from other sources during their
separation from service. (The removal from
employment of the officers were deemed too harsh
a punishment for their actions)
25. Echegaray vs Sec of Justice 301 SCRA 96,
January 19, 1999
FACTS: The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction
of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of
rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law
spouse. The supreme penalty of death was to be
imposed upon him. He then filed motion for recon
and a supplemental motion for recon raising
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 and the
death penalty for rape. Both were denied.
Consequently, Congress changed the mode of
execution of the death penalty from electrocution to
lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177,
designating death by lethal injection. Echegaray filed
a Petition for prohibition from carrying out the lethal
injection against him under the grounds that it
constituted 1. cruel, degrading, or unusual
punishment, 2. Being violative of due process, 3. a
violation of the Philippines obligations under
international covenants, 4. an undue delegation of
legislative power by Congress, an unlawful exercise
by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate,
and an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by
the Secretary of Justice. In his motion to amend, the
petitioner added equal protection as a ground.
The Solicitor General stated that the Supreme Court
has already upheld the constitutionality of the Death
Penalty Law, and has declared that the death penalty
is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual

punishment; execution by lethal injection, as

authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned
rules, is constitutional, lethal injection being the
most modern, more humane, more economical,
safer and easier to apply (than electrocution or the
gas chamber); in addition to that, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not
expressly or impliedly prohibit the imposition of the
death penalty.
Issues:
1. is the lethal injection a cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment?
2. Is it a violation of our international treaty
obligations?
3. Is it discriminatory (pertaining to sec 17)?
Held:
1. No
Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection
constitutes cruel, degrading and inhuman
punishment because (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to
provide for the drugs to be used in carrying out
lethal injection, the dosage for each drug to be
administered, and the procedure in administering
said drug/s into the accused; (2) its implementing
rules are uncertain as to the date of the execution,
time of notification, the court which will fix the date
of execution, which uncertainties cause the greatest
pain and suffering for the convict; and (3) the
possibility of mistakes in administering the drugs
renders lethal injection inherently cruel. It is wellsettled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per
se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.
In Harden v. Director of Prisons- punishments are
cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death;
but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the
meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It
implies there something inhuman and barbarous,
something more than the mere extinguishment of
life. Would the lack in particularity then as to the
details involved in the execution by lethal injection
render said law cruel, degrading or inhuman? The
Court believes not. Petitioner contends that Sec. 16
of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which court will
fix the time and date of execution, and the date of
execution and time of notification of the death
convict. As petitioner already knows, the court
which designates the date of execution is the trial
court which convicted the accused. The procedure is
that the judgment is entered fifteen (15) days after
its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the records
are remanded to the court below including a

23 | P a g e

certified copy of the judgment for execution. Neither

is there any uncertainty as to the date of execution
nor the time of notification. As to the date of
execution, Section 15 of the implementing rules
must be read in conjunction with the last sentence
of Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177 which provides that the
death sentence shall be carried out not earlier than
one (1) year nor later then eighteen (18) months
from the time the judgment imposing the death
penalty became final and executory, without
prejudice to the exercise by the President of his
executive clemency powers at all times. Hence, the
death convict is in effect assured of eighteen (18)
months from the time the judgment imposing the
death penalty became final and executor wherein he
can seek executive clemency and attend to all his
temporal and spiritual affairs. Petitioner also
contends that the infliction of wanton pain in case
of possible complications in the intravenous
injection that respondent Director is an untrained
and untested person insofar as the choice and
administration of lethal injection is concerned,
renders lethal injection a cruel, degrading and
inhuman punishment. This is unsubstantiated. First.
Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented
evidence that lethal injection required the expertise
only of phlebotomists and not trained personnel and
that the drugs to be administered are unsafe or
ineffective. Petitioner simply cites situations in the
United States wherein execution by lethal injection
allegedly resulted in prolonged and agonizing death
for the convict, without any other evidence
whatsoever. Second. Petitioner overlooked Section
1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which requires
that all personnel involved in the execution
proceedings should be trained prior to the
performance of such task. We must presume that
the public officials entrusted with the
implementation of the death penalty will carefully
avoid inflicting cruel punishment. Third. Any
infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely
incidental in carrying out the execution of death
penalty and does not fall within the constitutional
proscription against cruel, degrading and inhuman
punishment. In a limited sense, anything is cruel
which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since
punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict,
it may be said that all punishments are cruel. But of
course the Constitution does not mean that crime,
for this reason, is to go unpunished. The cruelty
against which the Constitution protects a convicted
man is cruelty inherent in the method of

punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in

any method employed to extinguish life humanely.
2. Yes
Violation of international treaties? In countries
which have not abolished the death penalty,
sentence of death may be imposed only for the most
serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at
the time of the commission of the crime and not
contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant
and to the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty
can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment
rendered by a competent court. The punishment
was subject to the limitation that it be imposed for
the most serious crimes. Included with the
declaration was the Second Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty was
adopted by the General Assembly on December 15,
1989. The Philippines neither signed nor ratified said
document.
3. Petition denied.
Petitioner contends that Section 17 of the
Implementing Rules is unconstitutional for being
discriminatory. SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE
EXECUTION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE. Execution by
lethal injection shall not be inflicted upon a woman
within the three years next following the date of the
sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon any
person over seventy (70) years of age. In this latter
case, the death penalty shall be commuted to the
penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory
penalties provided in Article 40 of the Revised Penal
Code. Petitioner contends that Section 17 amends
the instances when lethal injection may be
suspended, without an express amendment of
Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
section 25 of R.A. No. 7659, stating that the death
sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman while
she is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery,
nor upon any person over seventy years of age.
While Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659,
suspends the implementation of the death penalty
while a woman is pregnant or within one (1) year
after delivery, Section 17 of the implementing rules
omits the one (1) year period following delivery as
an instance when the death sentence is suspended,
and adds a ground for suspension of sentence no
longer found under Article 83 of the Revised Penal
Code as amended, which is the three-year reprieve
after a woman is sentenced. This addition is, in

24 | P a g e

petitioners view, tantamount to a gender-based

discrimination. Being an implementing rule, Section
17 must not override, but instead remain consistent
and in harmony with the law it seeks to implement.

ISSUE(S):
1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable
controversy.
2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.

26. Estrada vs Desierto 353 SCRA 452, March 2,

2001
FACTS:
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong
doings involving bribe-taking, illegal gambling, and
other forms of corruption were made against
Estrada before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.
On November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by
the Hor and, on December 7, impeachment
proceedings were begun in the Senate during which
more serious allegations of graft and corruption
against Estrada were made and were only stopped
on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic
to the President, succeeded in suppressing damaging
evidence against Estrada. As a result, the
impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the
entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate
President Pimentel resigned after casting his vote
against Estrada.

On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their

support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA
Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election
to be held concurrently with congressional and local
elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not
run in this election. On January 20, SC declared that
the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that
Estrada constructively resigned his post. At noon,
Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the
crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his
family later left Malacaang Palace. Erap, after his
fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI.
It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman
from conducting any further proceedings in cases
filed against him not until his term as president ends.
He also prayed for judgment confirming Estrada to
be the lawful and incumbent President of the
Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to
discharge the duties of his office.

3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.

4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.
5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be
enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.

RULING:
1. Political questions- "to those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a
particular measure."
Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA
People Power II:
EDSA I

EDSA II

exercise of the people

power of
revolution which
overthrew the whole
government.

exercise of people
power of freedom of
speech and freedom
of assemblyto petition
the government for
redress of grievances
which only affected
the office of the
President.

extra
constitutional and the
legitimacy of the new
government that
resulted from it cannot
be the subject of
judicial review

intra
constitutional and the
resignation of the
sitting President that it
caused and the
succession of the Vice
President as President
are subject to judicial
review.

25 | P a g e

presented a political
question;

involves legal
questions.

The cases at bar pose legal and not political

questions. The principal issues for resolution require
the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the
1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII,
and the allocation of governmental powers under
Sec 11 of Art VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling
on the scope of presidential immunity from suit.
They also involve the correct calibration of the right
of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.
2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to
resign and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both were
present when President Estrada left the Palace.
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts
and circumstantial evidence bearing material
relevant issuesPresident Estrada is deemed to
have resigned constructive resignation.
SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada
could not be doubted as confirmed by his leaving
Malacaang Palace. In the press release containing
his final statement:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the
respondent as President;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing
process (he did not say that he was leaving due to
any kind of disability and that he was going to
reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability
disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the
opportunity to serve them as President (without
doubt referring to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future
challenge that may come in the same service of the
country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in
promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
Intent to resignmust be accompanied by act of
relinquishmentact or omission before, during and
after January 20, 2001.

3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176

expressly stating its support to Gloria MacapagalArroyo as President of the Republic of the
Philippines and subsequently passed H.R. 178
confirms the nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr.
As Vice President. Senate passed HR No. 83 declaring
the Impeachment Courts as Functius Officio and has
been terminated. It is clear is that both houses of
Congress recognized Arroyo as the President.
Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that
the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the
Congress has clearly rejected his claim of inability.
The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial
power for this is political in nature and addressed
solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. In fine,
even if Estrada can prove that he did not resign, still,
he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on
leave on the ground that he is merely unable to
govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest
by Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the de
jure, president made by a co-equal branch of
government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in
character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft
and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can
these crimes, especially plunder which carries the
death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of
immunity of a non-sitting president. He cannot cite
any decision of this Court licensing the President to
commit criminal acts and wrapping him with posttenure immunity from liability. The rule is that
unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the
State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting
as such but stands in the same footing as any
trespasser.
5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial
and the free press are incompatible. Also, since our
justice system does not use the jury system, the
judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened
individual, cannot be easily manipulated by mere
publicity. The Court also said that Estrada did not
present enough evidence to show that the publicity
given the trial has influenced the judge so as to
render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the
Court said that the cases against Estrada were still

26 | P a g e

undergoing preliminary investigation, so the

publicity of the case would really have no permanent
effect on the judge and that the prosecutor should
be more concerned with justice and less with
prosecution.

27. Tecson vs COMELEC GR 161434, March 3,

2004
FACTS: On December 31, 2003, Ronald Allan Kelley,
also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., file d his certificate
of candidacy for the position of President of the
Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng
Nagkakaisang Pilipino Party at the Commis sion on
Elections. On January 9, 2004, Victorino X. Fornier
initiated a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify
the said candidate as he had misrepresented himself
in his COC for he was not a natural born Filipino. He
was able to produce several public documents that
supported his petition to the COMELEC. On January
23, 2004, the COMELEC dismissed the petition for
lack of merit. The petitioner soon after filed for
reconsideration but it was denied on February 6,
2004. Four days after, February 10, 2004, the
petitioner assailed the decision of the COMEL EC to
the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: W/n Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando
Poe Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen or not.
HELD: YES. FPJ is a natural-born Filipino as it was
proven that his father was also a Filipino citizen. This
statement in turn was proven as documents were
able to show that Lorenzo Pou, FPJs grandfather,
was a Filipino. The death certificate of Puo
presented by the respondent shows that Pou died at
the age of 84 in 1954 in Pangasinan. By taking into
account Pous age at the year of his death, he would
have been born in 1870. Furthermore, the petitioner
was not able to show that Pou was not in the
Philippines during this period of time. It would then
have to be assumed that Pou was in the Philippine
Islands all this time. This would make Pou a Filipino
citizen by virtue of the Philippine Bill of 1902 which
declared that Filipino citizens are those who resided
in the Philippine Islands. Pous citizenship would
then extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of FPJ. By
the time FPJ w as born, the 1935 Constitution had
taken into effect and it had declared that children,

regardless of whether they are legitimate or

illegitimate, are considered to be Filipino citizens if
their fathers are Filipino citizens themselves. This
fact also erases any doubts that were raised by the
petitioner that FPJ was also illegitimate which would
have prevented him from taking on the citizenship of
his father.
28. Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro GR L14078, March 7, 1919
FACTS:
The case is an application for habeas corpus in favor
of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of
Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being
illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial
officials of that province. Rubi and his companions
are said to be held on the reservation established at
Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos
is said to be held under the custody of the provincial
sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away
from the reservation.
The provincial governor of Mindoro and the
provincial board thereof directed the Manguianes in
question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site
on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the
provincial governor and approved by the provincial
board. The action was taken in accordance with
section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917,
and was duly approved by the Secretary of the
Interior as required by said action.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917
reads as follows:
SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christian upon sites
selected by provincial governor. With the prior
approval of the Department Head, the provincial
governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a
course is deemed necessary in the interest of law
and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their
habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be
selected by him an approved by the provincial board.

Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this

section of the Administrative Code.

27 | P a g e

ISSUE:
Does section 2145 of the Administrative Code of
1917 constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative
power by the Philippine Legislature to a provincial
official and a department head, therefore making it
unconstitutional?
HELD:
No. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred
authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be
exercised by the provincial governor and the
provincial board.
In determining whether the delegation of legislative
power is valid or not, the distinction is between the
delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall
be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of
the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no
valid objection can be made. Discretion may be
committed by the Legislature to an executive
department or official. The Legislature may make
decisions of executive departments of subordinate
official thereof, to whom it has committed the
execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.
The growing tendency in the decision is to give
prominence to the "necessity" of the case.
In enacting the said provision of the Administrative
Code, the Legislature merely conferred upon the
provincial governor, with the approval of the
provincial board and the Department Head,
discretionary authority as to the execution of the
law. This is necessary since the provincial governor
and the provincial board, as the official
representatives of the province, are better qualified
to judge when such as course is deemed necessary
in the interest of law and order. As officials charged
with the administration of the province and the
protection of its inhabitants, they are better fitted to
select sites which have the conditions most
favorable for improving the people who have the
misfortune of being in a backward state.
Hence, Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of
1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative
power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial
official and a department head.

28 | P a g e