I.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA

GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005
FACTS:
Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy
Astorga Garcia. He prayed that the child's middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia,
her mother's surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his
surname.
Trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate child and heir,
and pursuant to Art. 189 of the Family Code, she is now known as Stephanie Nathy
Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that Stephanie should be
allowed to use the surname Garcia as her middle name.
The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her relationship with her
natural mother should be maintained and preserved, to prevent any confusion and
hardship in the future, and under Article 189 she remains to be an intestate heir of her
mother.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the
surname of her natural mother as her middle name.
RULING:
Yes. there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like
Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mothers surname, we find no reason why she
should not be allowed to do so.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An Act Allowing
Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father) is silent as to what middle
name a child may use. Article 365 of the CC merely provides that an adopted child shall
bear the surname of the adopter. Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal
effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter.
Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) an legitimate child by virtue of
her adoption, Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child
without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father
and her mother.
Ver 2:
Facts: Honorato B. Catindig, filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged that Stephanie's middle name be changed to
"Garcia," her mother's surname, and that her surname be changed to "Catindig." the trial
court granted the petition for adoption. Petitioner then filed for clarification and/or
reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her
biological mother as her middle name. The trial court denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration as there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the
surname of his biological mother as his middle name.

Issue: Whether an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle
name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Ruling: There is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like
Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother's surname. The court finds no reason why
she should not be allowed to do so.
II.

Landingin vs. Republic, GR No. 164948, June 27, 2006, digested

Posted by Pius Morados on March 17, 2012

(Special Proceedings Adoption: Consent and Abandonment)
Facts: Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition for the
adoption of 3 minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos, the formers brother, and Amelia
Ramos. She alleged in her petition that when her brother died, the children were left to
their paternal grandmother for their biological mother went to Italy, re-married there and
now has 2 children by her second marriage and no longer communicates from the time
she left up to the institution of the adoption. After the paternal grandmother passed
away, the minors were being supported by the petitioner and her children abroad and
gave their written consent for their adoption.
A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption and
narrated that Amelia, the biological mother was consulted with the adoption plan and
after weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented.
However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker as witness and offer in
evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Petitioner also failed to
present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent to the adoption.
Issue: WON a petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of the
adoptees biological mother.
Held: No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the biological
parent(s) of the child, if known is necessary to the adoption. The written consent of the
legal guardian will suffice if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be
obtained.
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to
protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers,
and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner
of the proposed adoption.
The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of the
decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his
consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and
re-establish in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written
consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal
obligations of love and support. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time
undisturbed in the care of others is not such abandonment. To dispense with the

requirements of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of
adoption.
Ver 2:
FACTS: Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of America (USA), of
Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition for the adoption of
minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born
on. The minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioners brother
(deceased), and Amelia Ramos- who went to Italy, re-married there and now has two
children by her second marriage and no longer communicated with her children .
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for adoption is invalid for lack of consent of the
biological mother?
HELD:
No. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to
protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers,
and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner
of the proposed adoption. When she filed her petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No.
8552 was already in effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent of the
biological parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the
minors will suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors
had indeed abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the written consent of their
legal guardian.
III.
In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Jude Lim
GR No. 168992-93, May 21, 2009
FACTS:
Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were
childless. Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown
as shown by a certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it
appears as if they were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then
married an American Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000. Petitioner decided to
adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who
simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of
Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then 25 years old and already
married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and her husband
including Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit.
ISSUE: WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.
HELD:
Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the
case at bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercised parental authority.
The use of the word shall signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is

mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the
child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to
require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice
since there are certain requirements that he must comply as an American Citizen. He
must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements on residency
and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant
to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. It
includes caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and
development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being.
Ver 2:
FACTS:
Spouses Monina P. Lim and Primo Lim were childless. Subsequently, two minor children,
whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban. Being
so eager to have children of their own, Monina and Primo registered the children to make
it appear that they were the childrens parents. The children were named Michelle P. Lim
and Michael Jude P. Lim. The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were
their own. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. On 27 December 2000, Monina married
Angel Olario, an American citizen.
Monina decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to
individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed separate petitions for
adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then 25 years old
and already married and Michael was 18 years and 7 months old. Michelle and her
husband, Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their
Affidavits of Consent.
On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. The
trial court ruled that since Monina had remarried, she should have filed the petition
jointly with her new husband.
Monina appealed contending that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it is
the duty of the court and the State to protect the paramount interest and welfare of the
child to be adopted. Petitioner argued that the legal maxim dura lex sed lex is not
applicable to adoption cases. She argued that joint parental authority is not necessary in
this case since, at the time the petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and
already married, while Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental authority is not
anymore necessary since they have been emancipated having attained the age of
majority.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.
2. Whether the adoption should be granted considering that the alien spouse consented
to the adoption
3. Whether or not joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the children
have been emancipated having reached the age of majority.

HELD:
1. No. The law is explicit. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in the following
cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided,
however, That the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other, which was not present in the
case at bar. (Section 7, Article III of RA 8552)
The use of the word shall means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the
child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a
legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also
insures harmony between the spouses. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by
petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in
denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7.
First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her
husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And
third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.
2. No. The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of
Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must comply being
an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552
such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of
the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three
continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain
such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in
his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopters country as the
latters adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the
trial.
These requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt
cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not
relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario.
Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.
3. Petitioners contention is untenable. Parental authority includes caring for and rearing
the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral,
mental and physical character and well-being. The father and the mother shall jointly
exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. Even the
remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the
children, unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or
property of the children.
It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation that is, when he attains
the age of majority or 18 years of age emancipation terminates parental authority

over the person and property of the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for
all acts of civil life. However, parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal
adoption.
Even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a
legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear
the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive support from their parents; and
(3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive
parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological
parents are entitled such as support and successional rights. (In Re Petition for Adoption
of Michelle Lim and Michael Lim, GR No. 168992-93, May 21, 2009)