Boiler/Steam Generator Plant Safety & Protection

The overall objective of the boiler/steam generator plant protection is to ensure safe operation
and to avoid damage to the main plant components.
1.0

Boiler/Steam Generator Hazards.

Some of the more serious hazards related to boiler/steam generators are as follows.
a. Loss of flame in a single burner should shut down the affected burner. Loss of all
flame should shut off all fuel immediately to the boiler.
b. Operating the boiler with the drum water level low enough to cause damage to the
boiler. Such a water level should shut off the fuel immediately.
c. Operating the boiler with its water and steam sides under very high or over-pressure,
and without protection against excessive over-pressures.
d. Boiler in operation with the forced draft (F.D) fan(s) running and the induced draft
(I.D) fans not in operation. An interlock should prevent this.
e. Loss of a single forced (F.D) or induced (I.D) draft fan; in the case of both fans
working in pair. An interlock should close the dampers on the failed fan immediately.
f. Operating the boiler with the drum water level at a very high level above the normal
working level, which can cause damage to the superheater and steam turbine. The
boiler has to shut down by shutting off the fuel immediately.
g. Operating a balanced draft boiler with excessive pressure in the boiler furnace. While
some pressure might be tolerated very temporarily, pressure above a set point level
should immediately trip or shut off the all fuel to the boiler/steam generator.
h. Any reheat spray water should be shut off immediately if a turbine trips to avoid
water damage to the turbine by back flow through the cold reheat steam line.

2.0

Boiler/Steam Generator Protection System.

The overall boiler/steam generator protection and interlock system and requirements are
based on:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

Flame failure and interruption of fuel or air supply or ignition energy to the burners.
Furnace pressure.
Loss of feed water and low drum water level.
Water and steam sides excessive over-pressure.
Very high drum level and failure of feed water regulating controls.
Loss of steam demand and loss of boiler circulating pumps.

2.1

Flame failure and interruption of fuel or air supply or ignition energy to the
burners.

2.1.1 The above conditions are favorable to boiler furnace explosions.

The basic cause of furnace explosions is the ignition of an accumulated combustible
mixture within the confined space of the furnace or associated boiler passes, ducts and
fans that convey the gasses of combustion to the stack. A furnace explosion may result
from ignition of this accumulation if the quantity of combustible mixture and the
proportion of air to fuel are such that an explosive force is created within the boiler
furnace enclosure.
Numerous situations can arise in connection with the operation of a boiler furnace
that will produce explosive conditions. The most common are:
i. An interruption of fuel or air supply or ignition energy to the burners, sufficient to
result in momentary loss of flames, followed by restoration and delayed re-ignition of
an accumulation.
ii. Fuel leakage into an idle furnace and the ignition of the accumulation by a spark or
other source of ignition.
iii. Repeated unsuccessful attempts to light-off without appropriate purging of the
furnace, resulting in the accumulation of an explosive mixture.
2.1.2 Boiler furnace explosions are generally a result of the following conditions:
a. The accumulation of unburned fuel in the furnace due to incomplete combustion, loss
of ignition or leakage of fuel valves.
b. The mixture of the unburned fuel with air in explosive proportions.
c. The application of sufficient heat to raise the temperature of the fuel air-mixture to
the ignition point.
The accumulation of an explosive mixture of fuel and air occurs as a result of loss of
flame or incomplete combustion at one or more burners in the presence of another
burners operating normally or during lighting of additional burners. This situation also
occurs as a result of a complete furnace flameout and the ignition of the accumulation by
a spark or ignition source, such as attempting to light burner(s).
2.1.3 The accumulation of unburned fuel may result from different situations which include the
following:
a. The main/master fuel valve or burner fuel inlet valves leak on inactive fuel
compartments.
b. The burner flames/fires are extinguished and the fuel is not shut off promptly.
c. The fuel is not burning as rapidly as it is entering the furnace. Uncompleted
combustion occurs.
d. During starting up, difficulty is experienced establishing ignition.

2.2

Furnace pressure.
The boiler/steam generators for the generating units in TNB and the IPPs in Malaysia are
provided with a combination of forced draft (FD) fans for supplying the required air flow
and induced (ID) fans for regulating the gas flow to achieve balanced furnace operation.
Typically, the furnace pressure operating set-point is at 0.5 mbar. This avoids
hazardous gas and flame leaks outward from the furnace, and an excessive ingress of air
into the furnace from outside the system. Under major transient operating conditions, or
due to plant or control system failure, large excursions of furnace pressure or suction can
arise, and damage to the furnace or the ducting can occur.
In the event of complete loss of ID or FD fans, the boiler firing trip is immediately
activated. If there is uncontrolled tripping of just one ID or FD fan, the necessary
protective action depends upon the design limit of the furnace in relation to the
achievable fan head characteristics, and on the ability to maintain safe furnace
combustion.

2.3

Loss of feed water and low drum water level.

The level of water in the boiler drum is normally controlled by the feed water control
system acting on the feed water regulating valves.
An excessive drop in drum water level reduces the efficiency of separating steam and
water in the drum, and increases the entrainment of steam in the down comer water. This
results in a reduced heat transfer coefficient at the inner furnace wall tubing, with the
consequent departure from nucleated boiling (DNB). This can cause an excessive
increase in metal temperature giving rise to tube failure or severe corrosion. Hence, once
the boiler water level falls to the minimum designed level, immediate tripping of the
boiler firing is required.
The poor quality of circulating water which can arise from a low drum level can further
be aggravated should the cause of low drum level be a total loss of flow; e.g due to loss
of the duty feed pump. This situation further increases the down comer water inlet
enthalpy and may result in the critical DNB arising before the normal low water level is
reached. As such, modern large capacity utility boilers are normally provided with three
(3) 50% MCR electric feed pumps (EFP).

2.4

Boiler water and steam side excessive over-pressure.

For the boiler water and steam side protection against excessive over-pressure and also to
comply with the Factories and Machinery regulations on essential fittings and mountings
on boilers, an approved design and number of safety valves are required to be fitted on
each boiler. The design, number and size of safety valves fitted to the boiler are as
discussed in the subject topic Boiler FMD Regulations and Inspection.

2.5

Very high drum level and failure of feed water regulating controls.
If the level of feed flow is in excess of the prevailing steam flow, then ultimately the rise
in drum water level will result in water carryover to the boiler superheater causing tubes
overheating and failure. Very high drum water level can lead to wet steam ingress into
the steam turbine, causing rapid chilling and distortion in the turbine steam valves and
inlet stages, leaving the turbine vulnerable to major damage.
Note: Boiler protection based on high drum level is not a standard or common practice
in all major utilities.

2.6

Loss of steam demand and loss of boiler circulating pumps.

In assisted circulation boilers, the boiler protection must ensure that the number of
circulation pumps operational is adequate for the prevailing firing conditions. The normal
operational practice is always to run with the maximum number of pumps available.
If fewer than the specified minimum number of circulating pumps are operational, a
boiler firing trip is immediately activated.

Boiler Heat Recovery Steam Generator (HRSG) Regulations, Standards and Codes
Important and relevant regulations, standards and codes with respect to the design, construction,
installation, testing and operation of power boilers and HRSGs include the following:
1. Factories and Machinery (Steam Boiler and Unfired Pressure Vessel) Regulations 1970,
Malaysia.

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

Codes, rules and specifications for materials First Schedule.

Design, construction, workmanship and tests Second and Third Schedules.
Inspection authorities and Certificate of Fitness Fourth Schedule.
Boiler operation and competency certification.
Noise exposures and limits, Regulations 1989.

2. Environmental Quality Act and Regulations, Malaysia.

a. Air quality, emissions and control of discharges on gaseous, solid and liquid scheduled
wastes and effluents.
b. Noise emission.
3. International Standards and Codes on Power Boilers and HRSGs.
a. ANSI/ASME Standards for Power Boilers and Unfired Pressure Vessel Codes
Sections 1, 2 and 3.
b. ANSI/ASME Standards B 31.1: Boiler Power Piping.
c. British Standards BS 1113 Water tube boilers and their integral superheaters.
d. Technical Regulations for Steam Boilers TRD/TUV, Germany.
e. ANSI/ASME Performance Test Code (PTC) 4.1: Steam Generating Units.
f. ANSI/NFPA 85C Standards for Prevention of Furnace Explosions and Implosions in
Multiple Burner Boiler Furnaces.
g. ANSI/NFPA Standards for Prevention of Furnace Explosion in Multiple Burner BoilerFurnaces using the following fuel types:
i. ANSI/NFPA 85B: Boiler gas firing.
ii. ANSI/NFPA 85D: Boiler fuel oil firing.
iii. ANSI/NFPA 85E: Pulverized coal.
Notes: ANSI: American National Standards Institute, USA. ASME: American Society of
Mechanical Engineers, USA NFPA: National Fire Protection Association, USA.

.....

AlfJJtomation, protection interlocks and manual controls

,
OIL

TURBINE
GENERATOR

BOILER

....,_
GRID
CONNECTION

COAL

BOILER/
TURBINE
INTERTRIPS

TURBINE
PROTECTION

BURNER
IMANAGEMENT
PROTECTION

..

BOILER .
PROTECTION

-~-

ELECTRICAL
INTERTRIPS

.~
~

....

1'UM1Nt
UNIT

Flo. 3.11

OveNll tUlk ,.,;etion amngemeiit

,,_

s.+

-$i;t/ u;il;

The number and size of safety valves fitted is such that,

with the vilves fully open, the maximum evaporafion

of the boiler can be discharged without a rise in drum
pressure of more than l09o of the highest set pressure.
The valves are fitted on the. drum and superheater
outiet,'with those on the latter being. sized to pass at
!,east 2A0/u

of the maximum evaporation of the boiier

fo provide coolant steam and prevent overheating of

the superheater tubes.
In selecting the set pressures for the drum and superheater safety valves the following factors have to be
considered:

The margin" between normal operaling pressure and

set pressure to minimise lifting of the valve due
lo normal operational pressure fluctuations.

Relative set pressures of drum and superheater valves

ensure that .superheater valves lift before drum
valves, and drum valves reseat before superhea[er
valves.

to

Reseat pressure should be higher than normal op"

erating pressure.
Safety valves on the reheater m.ust be sized to pass
maximum reheater flow without a rise in reheater inlet
pressure of more than 10Vo sf t6e highest set pressure.
Protection of the reheater tubes is afforded by having
the valves witb the Iowest ser pressure on the outlet
sid.e and with a capacity of not less than 2090 of
the reheat maximum flow. ,"
The types of safety valve used are:

Digect loaded safety valve

Supplementa.ry loaded safety yslyg

rvhich has, until the pressur.e at

a safety valve in which

- pressure underneath
loading due to the fluid
the valve di.sc is opposed by direct mechanical load"""tti'6
ing. The two types used are the spring type (see
Fig 3.27) and the torsion bar (see Fig 3.28).
a safety valve

-the inlet of the

safety valve reaches a set pressure, an additional

force (sr"rpplementary load) to increase the sealing
force which may be provided by means of an extraneous power source which is reljably released
when the pressure at the inlet of the safcty valve
reaches lhe set pressure; also it attains its certified

simmering which can occur with direct loaded valves

when the fluid pressure approaches the valve set pres-

sure. Simmering results in steam flowing through a

srnall area of opening and this often results in seat
damage. The use of supplementary loaded valves permits the set pressure to be approximately 590 above
normal operating pressure without incurring problerns
of inadvertent lift or simmering during operationA typical supplementary loaded valve is shown in
Fie 3.29.
The safety valve escape pipes are led to the nearest convenient point on the boiler house roof and
where necessary incorporate silencers to rninimise noise
nuisance rvhen the valve lifts. Provision needs to be
made in the escape pipework to accommodate the
relative expansion between the valve and the escape
pipe. Drains are required to handle the condensed
steam irf tire valves and PiPing.

5.5

The boiler main steam stop vaives are located as near

as practicable to the superheater outlet, allowing for

SLOTTED NUT

DOME

ADJUSTING SCFEW
SPRING PLATE

SPINDLE BALL

Steam stoP valves

LOCKNUT
EASING LEVEF

accessibilitY.

design of the parallel slide type of valve

used is shown in Fig 3'30 and has a venturi throat to
reduce the diameter of the valve discs and seats' This
'results
in a small force acting on the valve seats and
easier operation together with reductions in
for
makes
the body diameter and thickness, spindle diameter'

A typical

control gear, overall height, weight and cost of the

valve. Such advantages serve to compensate for any
increase in steam. pressure drop over a valve with a

BODY STUD

AND NUT

constant bore.

The small spring between the discs keeps the discs

on the seat when there is no pressure in the line and
VALVE DISK BALL
prevents snla)l particles of debris coming between
OUTLET
DISC
SETTING
no scoring
RETAINII.]G CLIP
scFEw n "t th.m. It is of the utmost importance that
will
leakage
or
of the seats or discs should occur'
BLOW DOWN
VALVE DISK
have
seats
RING
result. To prevent tltis, the discs and the
a facing of a very hard aiioy deposited on to them'
SEAT
SECUBING
These faces are ground smooth and lapped so that
PIN
at least 15Vo of the widih of the faces are in contact
all round the circumferellce of the face' The smail
spring has no effect in sealing tire valve as thrs is
maintained by the steam pressure rvithin the body
Ftc. 3.2.7 Typical spring type safety valve construction
of the valve.
' A small bypass valve, with interconnecting pipesupplemendischarge capacity in the event of the
work betrveen lhe iniet and outlet branches, is used
tary loading not being released at an overllressure
to reciuce the pressure differential across the main
not exceeding l15Vo of the set prssure' steam stop valve when opening. This reduces the startsafety
loaded
(indirect
valve
safety
pilot-operated
r A
ing torque and enables a smaller molor to be used'
conand
initiated
is
which
of
valve) the operation
The valve internal fitments, however, are suitabie
pilot
valve
a
from
discharged
trolled by the fluid
for the full clifferential pressure' The main valve and
valve'
safety
loaded
direct
which is itself a
the bypass valve are motor operated, with the opening or closing of the bypass valve being arranged
to
It is now CEGB practice on high pressure boilers
in sequence with the main stop vaive'
use supplementary loaded valves since these prevent
VALVE DiSK
HOLDER

ttt1

ALST6IM

SYSTEM OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS

BOILER GENERAL OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS

PROTECTION AND ADJ USTMENT

As long as there is fire in the furnace, a suitable protection must be provided for the
superheater and the reheater elements. This is especially important when there is no
demand for steam, as when starting up, shutting down or after a turbine trip. During these

periods of no steam flow through the turbine, adequate flow through superheater and
reheater is ensured by the HP by-pass on the superheater circuit and by the LP bypass/Reheater outlet start-up vent on the Reheater circuit.
During start-up, care must be taken not to overheat the superheater or reheater eiements.
Particuiarly during ihe first stage of a cold or warm start-up, the firing rate must be
controiled to keep the maximum furnace exit gas temperature from exceeding 550 "C. A
thermocouple probe is used to measure the furnace exit gas temperatures.

Protection for unexpected over-pressure is provided by safety valves. Safeiy valves are
installed on both HP and LP cir:cuits.

On the HP circuits, safety valves are installed at the drum and at the superheater outlet.
The reheater safety valves are located on the outlet headers.

Boiler Safetv valves arranqement

Safety Valve
HADO1 AA1O.1F
HADOl AA1O2F

HADOl AAlO3F
HADOl AA1O4F
HAH92 AAOOl F
HAH92 AAOO2F
HAJ61 AAOO,lF
HAJ61 AAOO2F
HAJ61 AAOO3F
HAJ61 AAOO4F
HAJ61 AAOOsF
HAJ62 AAOOl F
HAJ62 AAO02F
HAJ62 AAOO3F
HAJ62 AAOO4F
HAJ62 AAOO5F

LOCATION
Drum
Drum
Drum
Drum

Superheater outlet
Superheater outlet
Reheater outlet
Reheater outlet
Reheater outlet
Reheater outlet
Reheater outlet
Reheater outlet
Reheater outlet
Reheater outlet
Reheater outlet
Reheater outlet

OPERATING CONDIT]ONS
ReliefPressure
Flow
(bar eff.)
212
212
212

210
194

194
48.5
50
50
50
48.5
50

(vh)
546.31
546.3

546.31
537.80
121.78
121

220.07
227.54
227.54

227.54
220.07
227.54

trn

227 54

48.5

220.07

50
50

227 54
227.54

LEVEF
(VALVE SPINDLE}

BEAFING SHAFT (2)

LOADING LEVER
BOLL ER

TORSION BAF

TOFSION BAR
BEARING SHAFT {2)
VALVE
SPINDLE

LOAOING
ROD

TOROUE ADJUSTMENT
FOR'BLOWDOWN'

WORM AND
SPINDLE

TORQUE ADJUSTN,IENT
FOFI 'SET PRESSURE'

<-

)\

loN

i.l.)

\\:;Z

VALVE GUIDE NUT

VAI.VE GUIDE

SPUR WHEEL

LOCKING
VALVE
SP IAIDLE

LOCKING PIN

PLATE

VALVE GUiDE

NUT

LOCKING
PLATE

INDICATOR
POINTER

PINION'WHEEL

SPUN'WFIEEL

LOCKING
PIN NUT

VALVE
LIP

Fi6. 3.28 Typical torsion bar safety valve constructio!1

t?

Fr6. 3.29 Typical supplementary loaded salety valve construction

{9

Feedwater arrangements and boiler fittings and mountings

DISC SPRING

FIc. 3.30 Typical venturi parallel slide

const

valve

ruction

Ftc. 3.31 Typical paiallel slide blowdown

construction

valve