South China Sea History

Introduction
The name of South China Sea is the dominant term used in English for the sea, and the
name in most European languages is equivalent, but it is sometimes called by different names in
China's neighboring countries, often reflecting historical claims to hegemony over the sea. The
English name is a result of early European interest in the sea as a route from Europe and South
Asia to the trading opportunities of China1. In the sixteenth century Portuguese sailors called it
the China Sea (Mar da China); later needs to differentiate it from nearby bodies of water led to
calling it the South China Sea. The International Hydrographic Organization refers to the sea as
"South China Sea (Nan Hai)"
The South China Sea channels a third of the worlds shipping and is rich with islands,
fisheries, oil and gas deposits. It is also one the most disputed areas in Southeast Asia and has the
most potential for armed conflict. China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia
and Brunei have made overlapping territorial claims to these waters, as well as to some of the
islands and rocky outcrops in them such as the Paracels and the Spratly Islands. Long time ago
exactly on mid-19th century, sovereignty, territorial, and uninhabitable islands of continental use
mapping and demarcation to claim it2. South China Sea territory dispute happened also 19th
century3. Its history divided into 5 history4 :

Before national Sovereignty

The colonial Condominium
Decolonization and cold war
Sino-American Rapprochement and Cooperation
ASEAN and The China threat (now)

Because of limited trustworthy and reliable sources, this paper will only explain
ASEAN and The China Threat. In 1990s there are two parts: Before and after the
1 (Limits of Oceans and Seas, 2010)
2 (Mappinghistory.uoregon.edu, n.d.)
3 (Jacobs, 2014)
4 (Beckman, 2011)

Taiwan Straits crisis of 1996. Talk of a Chinese threat or creeping Chinese

assertiveness became dominant themes in debates about regional security. The
fear of a resurgent China reached its climax in 1995, when it was discovered that
the Chinese navy had built 811 articial island on Mischief Reef in the Spratlys,
close to the Philippines, and in 1996, when China launched missiles in military
exercises in the Taiwan Straits during the run up to the rst free presidential
elections in Taiwan. The tide turned when President William J. Clinton decided to
meet the Chinese challenge and sent a US carrier force into the Taiwan Strait. This
demonstrated that the US navy was not on its way out. The United States had also
responded to the Mischief Reef crisis by stating in May 1995 that it would not
tolerate any interference with shipping. Ironically, the Sino-American relationship,
which had been tense since 1989, improved after the Taiwan Strait crisis.
China needed a strategic partnership with the USA, and
also strove to further improve its relations with its former foes in Southeast Asia 5.
Singapore did not meet Chinese criticism when it offered new base facilities to the
US navy at Changi. Nor did China protest when the Philippines signed and ratied a
new Visiting Forces Agreement with the United States in 19981999. Meanwhile
the US Commander-in- Chief Pacic (CINCPAC) managed a discrete, but persistent
effort to demonstrate US technological supremacy and foster condence building
measures. The main aim was to discourage rogue states and engage China. Still
Washington maintained its neutrality in the disputes over the Spratly and Paracel
Islands. Throughout the 19905, the main dividing line, as far as the territorial
disputes were concerned, was between the ASEAN and China 6. This put Taiwan in a
difficult position. On the one hand it maintained the same Chinese claims as the
PRC, and Beijing made it clear to Taipei that it appreciated the Taiwanese occupation
of Itu Aba. On the other hand, Taiwans security policy brought it closer to the
Southeast Asian countries that were all apprehensive of the growing strength of the
PRC. Taiwan fell between two stools, and also could not make its voice heard at any
formal meetings, since it did not enjoy international recognition/g In July 1992, the
foreign ministers of ASEAN agreed on a joint declaration on the South China Sea,
with the aim of precluding the use of violence. Still it remained an open question if
5 (Yujuico, n.d.)
6 (South China Sea: Background Note, n.d.)

the Southeast Asian countries would be able to speak with one voice. Among the
ASEAN members, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines had overlapping claims in the
Spratly area. In 1995, Vietnam membership in ASEAN meant that one more
claimant/had joined the fray. Yet during the Mischief Reef crisis of 1995, ASEAN did
come out in unanimous and strong support of the Philippines. Mischief Reef
remained a bone of contention between China and the Philippines throughout the
decade, with a second crisis in 1998 when China renewed its construction work
there. ASEANs unity, however, did not remain as rm in 1995. With the dramatic
political events resulting from the Asian Crisis 199798, Malaysias relations with
the other ASEAN countries worsened. In 1999, Malaysia pursued its own course in
the Spratlys, occupying additional reefs and moving closer to China.
This provoked renewed efforts to reinforce ASEAN
unity, with Thailand taking over some of Indonesias former role in brokering
between the member states. In the rst half of the 1995, China refused to discuss
the dispute in the South China Sea formally with ASEAN, and said it would only
discuss the problem bilaterally with each of the states concerned. China later
softened this attitude and allowed the matter to be raised in the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF)7, which was established in 1993. After the Mischief Reef crisis, the
Philippines successfully negotiated with China (and also with Vietnam) for the
signing of a bilateral code-of- conduct forbidding the use of force in the disputed
areas. In 1999, at the initiative of the Philippines, ASEAN also agreed on a draft
regional code-of-conduct which aimed not only at precluding the use of violence,
but also at putting a hold on any further occupation of reefs. China agreed to
negotiate with ASEAN about such a codeofconduct, but came up with its own
proposal, emphasizing joint cooperation schemes rather than conflict prevention.
ASEAN and China held two rounds of negotiations in 2000, but did not arrive at an
agreed text.

The main features of the 1990s were a

continued growth in Chinese regional influence and naval strength, a reaffirmation

of US naval preeminence, the introduction of informal multilateral diplomacy
between all the South China Sea states, and a growing awareness of threats to sh
stocks and the marine environment. Bilateral agreements were reached on maritime
delimitation and oil or shery cooperation in the Gulf of Thailand and the Gulf of
7 (Bader, 2014)

Tonkin- However, not even in the post-cold war period was there any attempt to
enter into formal negotiations about maritime delimitation in the central part of the
South China Sea, or about the fate of the Spratlys.

References
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