cases

[G.R. No. 154130. October 1, 2003.]

BENITO
ASTORGA,
petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINES, respondent.

PEOPLE

OF

THE

FACTS: On the 1st day of September, 1997, and for sometime

subsequent thereto, at the Municipality of Daram, Province of Samar,
petitioner, a public officer, being the Municipal Mayor of Daram,
Samar unlawfully and feloniously detained Elpidio Simon, Moises
dela Cruz, Wenifredo Maniscan, Renato Militante and Crisanto Pelias,
DENR Employees, at the Municipality of Daram, by not allowing them
to leave the place, without any legal and valid grounds thereby
restraining and depriving them of their personal liberty for nine (9)
hours, but without exceeding three (3) days.
ISSUE: Whether or not Astorga committed arbitrary detention even if
such does not involve physical restraint?
HELD: The prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping and illegal
detention is that the curtailment of the victim's liberty need not
involve any physical restraint upon the victim's person. If the acts
and actuations of the accused can produce such fear in the mind of
the victim sufficient to paralyze the latter, to the extent that the
victim is compelled to limit his own actions and movements in
accordance with the wishes of the accused, then the victim is, for all
intents and purposes, detained against his will.
In the case at bar, the restraint resulting from fear is evident. Inspite
of their pleas, the witnesses and the complainants were not allowed
by petitioner to go home.
[A.M. No. MTJ-93-813. September 15, 1993.]
FERNANDO CAYAO, complainant, vs. JUDGE JUSTINIANO A. DEL
MUNDO
Facts: As a result of an almost head-on collision of the bus being
driven by petitioner and the owner-type jeepney where respondent
judge is a passenger, herein petitioner was made to choose between
3 different alternative punishment by the respondent judge. He
chosed to be detained for 3 days with a waiver of detention. As a
result, he was detained in the municipal jail for 3 days.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of arbitrary
detention although petitioner was not actually put behind bars?

Held: While it is true that complainant was not put behind bars as
respondent had intended, however, complainant was not allowed to
leave the premises of the jail house. The idea of confinement is not
synonymous only with incarceration inside a jail cell. It is enough to
qualify as confinement that a man be restrained, either morally or
physically, of his personal liberty (Black's Law Dictionary, 270
[1979]). Under the circumstances, respondent judge was in fact
guilty of arbitrary detention when he, as a public officer, ordered the
arrest and detention of complainant without legal grounds.
[G.R. No. L-37007. July 20, 1987.]
RAMON S. MILO, in his capacity as Assistant Provincial Fiscal of
Pangasinan, and ARMANDO VALDEZ, petitioners, vs. ANGELITO C.
SALANGA, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan (Branch IV), and JUAN TUVERA, SR., respondents.
That on or about the 21st day of April, 1973, at around 10:00 o'clock
in the evening, in barrio Baguinay, Manaoag, Pangasinan, Juan
Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captain, with the aid of some other private
persons, namely Juan Tuvera, Jr., Bertillo Bataoil and one Dianong,
maltreated one Armando Valdez by hitting with butts of their guns
and fists blows and immediately thereafter, without legal grounds,
with deliberate intent to deprive said Armando Valdez of his
constitutional liberty, accused Barrio captain Juan Tuvera, Sr., Cpl.
Tomas Mendoza and Pat. Rodolfo Mangsat, members of the police
force of Mangsat Pangasinan, conspiring, confederating and helping
one another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
lodge and lock said Armando Valdez inside the municipal jail of
Manaoag, Pangasinan for about eleven (11) hours.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT A BARRIO CAPTAIN MAY BE GUILTY OF THE
CRIME OF ARBITRARY DETENTION?
HELD:
The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested with
authority to detain or order the detention of persons accused of a
crime. Such public officers are the policemen and other agents of the
law, the judges or mayors. Long before Presidential Decree 299 was
signed into law, barrio lieutenants (who were later named barrio
captains and now barangay captains) were recognized as persons in
authority. In various cases, this Court deemed them as persons in
authority, and convicted them of Arbitrary Detention. One need not
be a police officer to be chargeable with Arbitrary Detention. It is

accepted that other public officers like judges and mayors, who act
with abuse of their functions, may be guilty of this crime.
[G.R. No. 126252. August 30, 1999.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JESUS GARCIA y
MANABAT, accused-appellant.
Facts: In an information filed before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio
City, herein accused-appellant Jesus Garcia was charged with the
crime of illegal possession of five kilos of marijuana. Upon
arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. After trial on the
merits, the court a quo rendered a decision on February 20, 1996
finding the accused-appellant guilty of illegal possession of
prohibited drugs and sentenced him. to suffer the maximum penalty
of death.
Issue: Whether or not the accused was detained more than what is
required by law considering that it was a warrantless arrest?
.
Held: The police officers cannot be held liable for arbitrarily detaining
appellant at the CIS office. Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, penalizes a public officer who shall detain another for
some legal ground and fail to deliver him to the proper authorities for
36 hours for crimes punishable by afflictive or capital penalties. In
the present case, the record bears that appellant was arrested for
possession of five (5) kilos of marijuana on November 28, 1994 at 2
p.m., a crime pun[ishable with reclusion perpetua to death. He was
detained for further investigation and delivered by the arresting
officers to the court in the afternoon of the next day. Clearly, the
detention of appellant for purposes of investigation did not exceed
the duration allowed by law, i.e., 36 hours from the time of his arrest.
[G.R. No. 134503. July 2, 1999.]
JASPER AGBAY, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE DEPUTY
OMBUDSMAN FOR THE MILITARY, SPO4 NEMESIO NATIVIDAD, JR. and
SPO2 ELEAZAR M. SOLOMON, respondents.
Facts: On September 7, 1997, petitioner Agbay and a certain
Jugalbot were arrested and detained for the alleged violation of RA
7610. The next day, a case was filed against them in the MCTC.
Petitioner, however, filed a complaint against private respondents
before the Office of the Ombudsman for failure to deliver the
detained petitioner to the proper judicial authority within 36 hours

from arrest. Said complaint was transferred to the Deputy

Ombudsman for the Military who recommended the dismissal of the
complaints.
Issue: Whether or not there was a delay in the delivery of Agbay, as
prescribed by Article 125?
On the alleged violation of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
petitioner contended that the proper judicial authority is the Regional
Trial Court, not the MCTC. The Court, however, ruled that upon the
filing of the complaint with the MTC, the intent behind Art. 125 is
satisfied considering that the detained person is informed of the
crime imputed against him. Hence, such filing interrupted the period
prescribed in Art. 125.
[G.R. No. 137182. April 24, 2003.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ABDILA SILONGAN et al
FACTS:
For automatic review was the decision convicting appellants of the
crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Serious Illegal Detention and
sentencing them to death. Records revealed that Alexander Saldana
with three companions went to a town in Sultan Kudarat to meet
Macapagal Silongan. The meeting, however, did not go well as
Alexander and his companions were abducted. Ransom was
demanded for their release but no agreement was reached.
Eventually, only Alexander remained in detention by his abductors
and for 5 months. He was later released in exchange of the person
caught delivering the ransom note.
ISSUE: Whether or not the crime committed was politically motivated
as to warrant a charge of rebellion?
HELD: As held in Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga
Del Norte vs. CA, 78 the political motivation for the crime must be
shown in order to justify finding the crime committed to be rebellion.
Merely because it is alleged that appellants were members of the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front or of the Moro National Liberation Front
does not necessarily mean that the crime of kidnapping was
committed in furtherance of a rebellion. Here, the evidence adduced
is insufficient for a finding that the crime committed was politically
motivated. Neither have the appellants sufficiently proven their
allegation that the present case was filed against them because they
are rebel surrenderees.

[G.R. No. 106826. January 18, 2001.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. OSCAR et al
FACTS: Appellants, together with several other co-accused, in an
amended information were charged with kidnapping with murder
committed against Jacinto Magbojos. Appellants interposed the
defense of alibi who claimed that they were in Metro Manila at the
time the crime was committed. No eyewitness saw the actual killing
of the victim, but appellants were convicted of murder on the basis
of several circumstantial evidence deduced from the testimonies of
three (3) prosecution witnesses. Arturo Inopia testified that in the
early morning of the day of the incident, appellants, together with
the other accused, armed with long firearms, represented
themselves to be NPA members and told him that their mission is to
get the victim; that according to the deceased wife, Erlinda, four
armed men forcibly took her husband who was then wearing white
short pants with green lining and red Adidas shirts; that Elpidio
Labajata saw the accused inside the house of Inopia and the victim
hogtied by coralon rope and appeared very weak and with abrasions
on his face.
ISSUE: Whether or not the other crimes committed should be treated
as absorbed in rebellion?
Held: It was held that in the absence of a showing that accused were
engaged in rebellion, the crime of kidnapping with murder must be
treated separately; that the totality of the circumstantial evidence
taken together constitute one unbroken chain leading to the fair and
reasonable conclusion that appellants, to the exclusion of others, are
responsible for the victim's death; that alibi is unavailing in the face
of positive identification; and that in the absence of evidence on how
the killing was executed, the crime committed is only homicide, not
murder.
[G.R. No. 112235. November 29, 1995.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELIAS LOVEDIORO
y CASTRO, defendant-appellant.
FACTS: Off-duty policeman SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was walking along
Burgos St., away from the Daraga, Albay Public Market when accused
suddenly walked beside him, pulled a .45 caliber gun from his waist,
aimed the gun at the policeman's right ear and fired. The man who
shot Lucilo had three other companions with him, one of whom shot

the fallen policeman four times as he lay on the ground. After taking
the latter's gun, the man and his companions boarded a tricycle and
fled.
Issue: Whether or not rebellion is the proper charge and not murder?
Held: Divested of its common complexion therefore, any ordinary
act, however grave, assumes a different color by being absorbed in
the crime of rebellion, which carries a lighter penalty than the crime
of murder. In deciding if the crime committed is rebellion, not
murder, it becomes imperative for our courts to ascertain whether or
not the act was done in furtherance of a political end. The political
motive of the act should be conclusively demonstrated. It is not
enough that the overt acts of rebellion are duly proven. Both purpose
and overt acts are essential components of the crime. With either of
these elements wanting, the crime of rebellion legally does not exist.
In fact, even in cases where the act complained of were committed
simultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion, if the killing,
robbing, or etc., were accomplished for private purposes or profit,
without any political motivation, it has been held that the crime
would be separately punishable as a common crime and would not
be absorbed by the crime rebellion.
[G.R. No. 100231. April 28, 1993.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODRIGO
DASIG et al
FACTS: On the 4th day of August, 1987, in the city of Mandaue,
accused, self-confessed rebels, conspiring and confederating
together and helping one another, with intent to kill, treachery,
evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and use of motor
vehicle, all armed with unlicensed firearms, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one
Redempto Manatad, a police officer on traffic duty, at his vital
portion which caused his death soon thereafter, knowing beforehand
that the victim was a policeman who was then in the performance of
his official duties.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused should be charged with rebellion
instead of direct assault?
Held: The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vast
movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. Acts

committed in furtherance of rebellion though crimes in themselves

are deemed absorbed in one single crime of rebellion. The act of
killing a police officer, knowing too well that the victim is a person in
authority is a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act
done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot be made a basis of a
separate charge.
ENRIQUE "TOTOY" RIVERA Y DE GUZMAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
FACTS:On the 20th day of March, 1993, at Tomay, Shilan,
Municipality of La Trinidad, Province of Benguet, Philippines, accused
employed force and seriously resist one Lt. EDWARD M. LEYGO,
knowing him to be a policeman, by then and there challenging the
latter to a fistfight and thereafter grappling and hitting the said
policeman on his face, thus injuring him in the process while the
latter was actually engaged in the performance of his official duties.
ISSUE: Whether or not direct assault was committed?
Held: Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed
in two ways: first, by any person or persons who, without a public
uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any
of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and
sedition; and second, by any person or persons who, without a public
uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist
any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the
performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance.
Unquestionably, petitioner's case falls under the second mode, which
is the more common form of assault and is aggravated when: (a) the
assault is committed with a weapon; or (b) when the offender is a
public officer or employee; or (c) when the offender lays hand upon a
person in authority.
[G.R. No. 88189. July 9, 1996.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
ABALOS, accused-appellant.

plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

TIBURCIO

.
FACTS: On the 20th day of March, 1983, at nighttime, in the
Municipality of Catbalogan, Province of Samar accused, with
deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation

and knowing fully well that one Sofronio Labine was an agent of a
person in authority being a member of the Integrated National Police
with station at Catbalogan, Samar, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attacked, assaulted and struck said Sofronio Labine with
a piece of wood, which said accused ha(d) conveniently provided
himself for the purpose while said P/Pfc. Sofronio Labine, a duly
appointed and qualified member of the said INP, was engaged in the
performance of his official duties or on the occasion of such
performance, that is, maintaining peace and order during the
barangay fiesta of Canlapwas, of said municipality, thereby inflicting
upon him 'Lacerated wound 2 inches parietal area right. Blood oozing
from both ears and nose' which wound directly caused his death.
ISSUE: Wheter or not there was direct assault?
Appellant committed the second form of assault, the elements of
which are that there must be an attack, use of force, or serious
intimidation or resistance upon a person in authority or his agent;
the assault was made when the said person was performing his
duties or on the occasion of such performance, and the accused
knew that the victim is a person in authority or his agent, that is,
that the accused must have the intention to offend, injure or assault
the offended party as a person in authority or an agent of a person in
authority
Here, Labine was a duly appointed member of the then INP in
Catbalogan, Samar and, thus, was an agent of a person in authority
pursuant to Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
[G.R. No. 84921. June 8, 1993.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLANDO DURAL et al
FACTS: On the 31st day of January, 1988 at Caloocan City, MetroManila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, attacked, assaulted and employed
personal violence upon the persons of TSGT CARLOS PABON PC and
CIC RENATO MANGLIGOT PC, as duly appointed and qualified
members of the Philippine Constabulary, CAPCOM, Camp Bagong
Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig, while the latter were engaged in the
performance of their official duties, knowing the said TSGT CARLOS
PABON PC and CIC RENATO MANGLIGOT PC, to be agents of persons
in authority by then and there shooting TSGT. CARLOS PABON, PC
and CIC RENATO MANGLIGOT PC, on the different parts of their

bodies, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious physical injuries,

which eventually caused their death.
Issue: Whether or not the complex crime of murder with direct
assault was committed?
Held: There is no doubt in Our minds that appellant Dural and the
two (2) other gunmen knew that the victims, Babon and Mangligot,
were members of the Philippine Constabulary detailed with the
CAPCOM as they were then in uniform and riding an official CAPCOM
car. The victims, who were agents of persons in authority, were in
the performance of official duty as peace officers and law enforcers.
For having assaulted and killed the said victims, in conspiracy with
the other two (2) gunmen, appellant Dural also committed direct
assault under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code. The crimes he
committed, therefore, are two (2) complex crimes of murder with
direct assault upon an agent of a person in authority.
[G.R. Nos. 76338-39. February 26, 1990.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RENATO TAC-AN Y HIPOS,
accused-appellant.
FACTS: That, on or about the 14th day of December, 1984 in the City of Tagbilaran,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without any justifiable cause and with intent to kill, evident premeditation,
treachery, while acting under the influence of drugs, with cruelty and deliberately
augmenting the suffering of the victim, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shot one Francis Ernest Escao, a teacher, with the use
of an unlicensed SMITH & WESSON Airweight caliber .38 revolver with Serial
Number 359323 hitting and inflicting upon the latter the following gunshot wounds or
injuries.
ISSUE; Whether a teacher is considered a public officer so as to appreciate it as a
generic aggravating circumstance?
HELD: In applying the provisions of Articles 148 and 151 of this Code, teachers,
professors and persons charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized
private schools, colleges and universities, and lawyers in the actual performance of
their professional duties or on the occasion of such performance, shall be deemed
persons in authority. (As amended by P.D. No. 299, September 19,1973 and Batas
Pambansa Blg. 873, June 12,1985)."
Careful reading of the last paragraph of Article 152 will show that while a teacher or
professor of a public or recognized private school is deemed to be a "person in

authority," such teacher or professor is so deemed only for purposes of application of

Articles 148 (direct assault upon a person in authority), and 151 (resistance and
disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such person) of the Revised
Penal Code.
[G.R. No. 113218. November 22, 2001.]
ALEJANDRO TECSON, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS: Alejandro Tecson, herein petitioner, was arrested and charged with the crime
of illegal possession and use of counterfeit US dollar notes, as defined and penalized
under Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code. The prosecution's case was founded on
the testimonies of the arresting officers, Pedro C. Labita and Johnny Marqueta, who
both acted as poseur buyers, that a buy-bust operation was conducted by the combined
agents of the Central Bank of the Philippines and the US Secret Service, and that the
petitioner was therein caught in flagrante delicto in the possession of and in the act of
offering to sell counterfeit 10 pieces of 100 US dollar notes.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was counterfeiting considering that there was no
haggling as to the price of the fake dollar notes?
HELD: The Court further held that the absence of haggling as to the price of the
subject fake US dollar notes between the petitioner and the poseur buyers did not
negate the fact of the buy-bust operation. Mere possession, coupled with intent to use
the counterfeit US dollar notes, as proven in the case at bar, was sufficient to constitute
the crime. Moreover, the Court did not give credit to petitioner's allegation that he was
framed-up by the Central Bank agents. This hackneyed defense of alleged frame-up of
the accused caught in flagrante delicto during a buy-bust operation had been viewed
with disdain by the courts for it is easy to concoct and difficult to prove. Besides, the
arresting officers were legally presumed to have regularly performed their official
duties. Petitioner failed to overcome by any credible evidence to the contrary this legal
presumption.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 150910. February 6, 2006.]
BIENVENIDO GONZALUDO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
FACTS: On the 20th day of January, 1993 in the City of Bacolod accused, conspiring,
confederating and acting in concert, with intent to gain, defrauded the herein offended
party, Anita Manlangit Vda. de Villaflor in the following manner, to wit: that accused

Rosemarie Gelogo alias Rosemarie G. commitedacts of falsification by preparing

and/or causing to be prepared a public document denominated as a Deed of Sale dated
January 20, 1993 entered as Doc. No. 402, Page No. 81, Book No. XVII, Series of
1993 of the Notarial Register of Atty. Ramon B. Clapiz, to the effect that she is the
lawful owner of the said house and affixing or causing to be affixed thereon her name
and signature.
ISSUE: Whether the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents
is the right offense considering an element is missing in the crime of estafa?
HELD: We find no cogent reason to depart from this settled principle that the deceit,
which must be prior to or simultaneously committed with the act of defraudation, must
be the efficient cause or primary consideration which induced the offended party to
part with his money or property and rule differently in the present case.
While it may be said that there was fraud or deceit committed by Rosemarie in this
case, when she used the surname "Villaflor" to give her semblance of authority to sell
the subject 2-storey house, such fraud or deceit was employed upon the Canlas spouses
who were the ones who parted with their money when they bought the house.
However, the Information charging Rosemarie of estafa in the present case, alleged
damage or injury not upon the Canlas spouses, but upon private complainant, Anita
Manlangit. Since the deceit or fraud was not the efficient cause and did not induce
Anita Manlangit to part with her property in this case, Rosemarie cannot be held liable
for estafa. With all the more reason must this be for herein petitioner.
[G.R. No. 128213. December 13, 2005.]
AVELLA GARCIA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
FACTS: On or about the month of January, 1991 in Pasay City Abella Garcia, being
then in possession of a receipt for Five Thousand Pesos dated January 21, 1991 issued
by one Alberto Quijada, Jr. as partial down payment of the sale of a house and lot
situated at No. 46 P. Gomez St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila by Albert Quijada, Jr. to
accused, made alterations and wrote words, figures and phrases to the original receipt
which completely changed its meaning by making appear thereon that it was issued on
January 24, 1991 in the amount of Fifty Five Thousand Pesos (P55,000.00) when in
truth and in fact, the said accused fully well knew that the receipt was only for the
amount of Five Thousand Pesos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the charge of falsification of a private
document is proper?

HELD: Given the admissions of Avella that she altered the receipt, and without
convincing evidence that the alteration was with the consent of private complainant,
the Court holds that all four (4) elements have been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
As to the requirement of damage, this is readily apparent as it was made to appear that
Alberto had received P50,000 when in fact he did not. Hence, Avella's conviction.