CHAPTER TWO

Introduction
This chapter focuses on the factors which led to the adoption of the Nairobi Protocol on small
arms and light weapons in the Horn of Africa. It will also capture a comprehensive overview of
the protocol. To achieve that, this study will review factors which specifically led to the adoption
of the Nairobi Protocol and its achievements.
Proliferation of Small arms in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa
There has been protracted intra-state and inter-state conflict in the horn of Africa and the great
lakes region characterized by some of the worst human conflicts in the African continent most of
which are resource-based. Conflicts and incidents of cattle-rustling and natural resources
involving south Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, northern Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda,
and north-western border area between Kenya and Somalia, continue to be unstable and violent
which consequently hinder prospects for socioeconomic development in the entire sub-region.
The tools of this violence consists of SALW which continue to inflict tremendous pain and death
in the region especially when coupled with internal politics.
Somalia has been for years without effective government authority, and is today regarded as the
major transit point for weapons to the region. There have been allegations that terrorist groups
such as the Somali-based Al-Itihaad are using the country for training and use charitable
organizations to transfer money and smuggle arms.1 Many Somali militia are said to be involved
in the trafficking of arms that can reach as far as Ethiopia and downtown Nairobi. In the Great
Lakes region, Cheruiyot gives insights of how violence has decreased commercial activity along

1 Cheruiyot L(2004). The Role of Civil Society in the control and management of the proliferation of
illicit SALW in the Horn of Africa M.A Thesis, unpublished, IDIS, University of Nairobi, 2004. P 10

the Congo River, a primary transport network. 2 Armed banditry along the region has also
curtailed the supply of cash crops and transport markets, forcing farmers to abandon commercial
harvests leading to food scarcity.
The presence of excessive and easily accessible quantities of small arms and light weapons in the
region have resulted in devastating violence, displacement of people, human right abuses and a
violation of international humanitarian law in the region. The arms fuel wars and sustain
conflicts between and within states hence resulting to increased insecurity and instability. All
these occurrences necessitated legislation of protective framework to safeguard national interests
and security in the region, hence the signing of Nairobi Declaration and adoption of the Nairobi
protocol.
The small arms problem in Kenya
The proliferation of small arms in Kenya pre-dates 19th-century British colonialism. Gunrunning
in the Kenyas hinterland was the result of an established trade that escalated raids for slaves,
livestock, ivory, and other game trophies by Ethiopian raiders and Arab merchants. 3 Current
challenges regarding urban insecurity and small arms proliferation in Kenya can be traced back
to the Mau Mau anti-colonial struggle of the 1950s. Mau Mau fighters are believed to have
introduced illicit firearms to the Nairobi Area and Central Province. 4 The 1979 collapse of the Idi
Amin regime led to vandalism of armouries in military barracks in northern Uganda, which fed
small arms proliferation in North Rift. Similarly, the overthrow of Ethiopias Mengistu Haile
2 Ibid
3 Wepundi, Manasseh. 2010. Study on Practical Disarmament for the RECSA Region. Unpublished
report. Nairobi: Regional Centre on Small Arms/Institute for Security Studies
4Katumanga, Musambayi and Lionel Cliffe. 2005. Nairobi A City Besieged: The Impact of Armed
Violence on Poverty and Development. Bradford: Centre for International Cooperation and Security

Mariam contributed to increased small arms flows to northern Kenya. 5 The place for small arms
proliferation in the country intensified with the advent of the post-election violence in December
2007. According to the report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (Waki
report), a total of 1,133 people died as a consequence of the unrest. More than 3,500 Kenyans
suffered injuries and over 100,000 private properties were destroyed. The Waki Report observed
that gunshots accounted for 962 casualties out of whom 405 died. 6 Saabala documented that the
entry points of small arms in Kenya included Mandera, Moyale, El Wak, Lokichoggio, and
Isiolo, located in the north-eastern and upper eastern regions of Kenya.7
In fact, in 1997 the Kenya Police closed a market near Isiolo that was known as a small arms
supermarket, but illegal small arms trade persisted (HRW, 2002, p. 11). Hence, in general terms,
northern Kenya, confronted by the multiple challenges of underdevelopment, interethnic
resource-based conflicts, and proximity to war-prone neighbouring countries, has had the highest
prevalence of small arms, with the highest estimations put at over 100,000 in 2003.8
Law enforcement efforts to control the proliferation of small arms have also faced challenges.
This is mainly in the area of the inadequate physical presence of law enforcement officers, poor
infrastructure, corruption, the scarcity of resources, and difficult terrain in the small arms and
5 Adan, M and Pkalya R. (2005). Closed to Progress: An Assessment of the Socio-economic Impacts of
Conflict on Pastoral and Semi-pastoral Economies in Kenya and Uganda. Nairobi: ITDG
6 CIPEV (Commission of Inquiry into Post-election Violence). (2008). Report of the Findings of the
CIPEV. Nairobi: Government Printers.
7 Sabala, K. .(2002). The Proliferation, Circulation and Use of Illegal Firearms in Urban Centers: The
Case of Nairobi, Kenya. In Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC). Small Arms in the Horn of
Africa: Challenges, Issues and Perspectives. Brief No. 23. Bonn: BICC, pp. 3641.
8 Wepundi M et al .(2012). Availability of Small Arms and Perceptions of Security in Kenya: Nairobi:
Kenya

conflict hotspot areas. Some police security initiatives have equally posed blowback challenges.
For instance, Bevan (2008, p. 17) observes that the Kenya Police supplies almost 50 per cent of
the ammunition that circulates illegally in Turkana North in order to provide the Turkana with
some defence against rival groups in Sudan and Uganda.9 The presence and wide availability of
small arms and light weapons worsens the security situation in Kenya. Though the availability of
arms can be attributed to the fall of regimes in Ethiopia (1991), Rwanda (1994), Uganda (1979
and 1986) and Somalia (1991), there has also been a steady stream of weapons into the region
from numerous arms producers such as Ukraine, Russia, China and the USA. The weapons have
become the means to achieve an end such as the recent and the ongoing terrorist attacks in
Kenya, rebel group in Uganda (LRA) and the recent attempted coup in South Sudan. All these
factors have contributed to the adoption of the Nairobi protocol on small arms and light weapons.
Reasons for Arms ownership in Kenya
This research endeavoured to establish the reasons why proliferation of SALW in Kenya is still
at large despite numerous calls for voluntary disarmament and forced disarmament by the
government. Respondents who participated in this research had numerous reasons as to why
people owned SALW. Majority of the respondents (80 per cent) cited protection from eminent
threat as the major reason as to why there was huge proliferation of SALW in Kenya. Those
interviewed had various reasons advanced as to why people possessed weapons. The need to
guard property, especially livestock in pastoralist areas ranked as the most indicated reason for
arms ownership.
The need to protect ones community from neighbouring clans and communities and defending
the village were equally significant factors. Other important reasons mentioned for ownership of
9 Bevan, James. (2007). Between a Rock and Hard Place: Armed Violence in African Pastoral
Communities. Geneva: Small Arms Survey and UNDP

firearms were fear of future conflict and personal protection. Furthermore, a relatively large
portion city (urban) respondents (14 per cent) mentioned that in their opinion firearms may be
owned as part of a tradition or with the intention to conduct criminal activities (72 percent).
Majority of urban respondents interviewed (60 per cent) mentioned criminality rather than
human security as the major motivation why there was proliferation of SALW in the city
(Nairobi).
Other reasons advanced by respondents in this research as to why people own arms included
reasons such as: part of work equipment, valuable family property, for scaring away potential
aggressors, fear of post-election violence in future, protection from criminals as well protection
from police brutality. Considering that communities, particularly in arid and semi-arid areas,
have a history of inter-group rivalry, firearms are essential weapons for fighting off inter-group
attacks. Associated concerns fuelling demand for guns includes: seeking protection from gangs
and the fear of possible war or instability. There are also cultural motivations for arms ownership
especially in arid and semi-arid areas, especially in livestock keeping areas.
Livestock rustling and inter-ethnic conflicts still persist in northern Kenya, and this feeds the
quest for arms, since it builds communities self-defence capabilities. In the North Rift region,
pastoralist communities are often locked in intense resource-based conflicts as groups seek to
access and control water and pasture.
Respondents were tasked to explain where the SALW in their countries originate from. Majority
of those who responded (70 per cent) indicated Somalia as the main source of fire arms in
Kenya. Others mentioned South Sudan (10 per cent), Ethiopia (10 per cent) and Uganda (10 per
cent). Some studies on SALW support the claim by the respondents. Wepundi et al state that,
Somalia is perceived to be the main source of most arms in Kenya, but firearms are also thought

to come from Ethiopia, Uganda, and Southern Sudan as well.10 Therefore, the conflict in Somalia
is a contributing factor to proliferation of SAWL in Kenya.
Review of the Nairobi protocol
The Nairobi declaration was signed on 15th March 2000 by foreign Affairs ministers drawn from
11 countries in both the great lakes region and the Horn of Africa region. Essentially, the Nairobi
declaration outlined the measures with which the national governments would undertake to
combat proliferation of illegal arms in their respective countries as well it was the policy
framework which would later usher the Nairobi Protocol. Consequently, in April 2004, 11
countries from the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa region adopted the Nairobi Protocol for the
Prevention, Control and Reduction of SALW.
State parties signatory to the Nairobi Declaration are: Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo,
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Somalia. The state parties to
the Nairobi Declaration recognize that the problem of the proliferation of small arms and light
weapons derives mainly from the past and ongoing armed conflicts in the region as well as from
the illicit trade and terrorist activities.
As stipulated in the Nairobi protocol and stated by Gikonyo, State Parties agreed to control and
regulate the transfer, possession, storage, disposal and destruction of small arms and light
weapons.11 They also agreed to adopt legislative measures, facilitate information exchange and
improve operational capacity to counter the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the

10 Wepundi et al.(2012) Availability of Small Arms and Perceptions of Security in Kenya: An

Assessment. Geneva. GIIDS
11 Gikonyo, J.K (2012). The Illicit Proliferation and use of Small Arms and Light Weapons and Human
Security in East Africa: A Case Study of Kenya. Nairobi. UoN Press

region.12
Objectively, the essence of adopting the Nairobi declaration was anchored on fundamental pillars
of preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit manufacture, trafficking, possession, use and
excessive and destabilizing accumulation of small arms and light weapons in the sub-region; to
promote information-sharing and cooperation between governments in the sub-region in matters
relating to the illicit trafficking and proliferation of small arms and light weapons; to promote
cooperation at the sub-regional level to combat effectively the small arms and light weapons
problem, in collaboration with relevant Partners; to encourage accountability, law enforcement
and efficient control and management of small arms and light weapons held by states parties and
civilians.
As Gikonyo asserts, the Protocol requires certain national legislative measures, the strengthening
of operational capacity and sufficient measures to control SALW both state-owned and in
civilian possession. Other provisions cover tracing, safe disposal, transfer of SALW and
brokering.13 The Member States agreed to cooperate in terms of mutual legal assistance, law
enforcement and transparency, information exchange and harmonization. RECSA (Regional
Centre on Small Arms) is an inter-governmental legal entity with an international juridical
personality which was created to solidify the cause of Nairobi protocol. It is the regional
secretariat based in Nairobi.
The body works with National Focal Points in an effort to fulfil the major objectives of the
Nairobi initiative: reducing the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons which
12 Nairobi Protocol (Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and
Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States). 2004. Nairobi, 21
April.
13 Ibid

contributes to prolonged conflicts, political instability and violent crime, pursuing peaceful
resolutions to conflicts in the region and improving regulation of the possession and transfer of
small arms to promote human security.
Achievements of the Nairobi Protocol
The Nairobi Protocol has been implemented by the government of Kenya since its adoption in
2004. Major milestones have been achieved towards its main objectives. The establishment of
the Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons (KNFP) as an interagency
directorate within the Office of the President, Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and
Internal Security has ensured an inclusive multi-disciplinary and multi-stakeholder approach to
small arms management. A special report compiled by the office of IG (Inspector General)
Kenya Police, indicated that KNFP has coordinated efforts towards the the realization of a
peaceful, secure and prosperous society free of illicit SALW.
This has been achieved through stockpile management, the undertaking of relevant capacity
building among law enforcement agencies and other players in small arms, awareness raising on
the dangers of illicit small arms, and institutional capacity strengthening for mitigating small
arms challenges.14 Another notable achievement includes the establishment of a functional
directorate and the formation of the National Steering Committee on Conflict Management and
Peace building (NSC). In stockpile management, while disarmament operations such as Okoa
Maisha and Dumisha Amani are entirely overseen by independent command chains, the KNFP
coordinates efforts to publicly destroy recovered Arms. By March 2010 Kenya had destroyed

14 KNFP (Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons). (2003). Kenya Country
Report to the UN Biennial Conference on the Implementation of the UN Programme of Action. Nairobi:
KNFP.

over 25,000 illegal arms and 50,000 rounds of ammunition.15

The Nairobi protocol has enabled the government to embark on riffle and ammunition marking
processes through acquisition of marking machines. The KNFP has acquired five firearmsmarking machines and by May 2011 had marked over 60,000 firearms. 16 Noteworthy, it has also
overseen the improvement of data records, and the installation of software for tracking brokerage
and trade in arms. Marking government firearms has strengthened identification and traceability,
significantly reducing the misuse of these firearms.
Another key achievement of the Nairobi Protocol has been effective stockpile management,
which has been articulated in the KNFP Strategic Plan 2010/112014/15. It is a new undertaking
of comprehensive national small arms surveys and mapping in Kenya. This is aimed at
estimating the possible number of illicit arms in the country, establishing arms movement and
trends, and informing the process for future local and regional initiatives, including disarmament
efforts. Data acquired from the Central Firearms Bureau indicates that in 2015 alone 1,411 guns
and 17,997 rounds of ammunition
Were recovered.17
Overall achievement of Nairobi Protocol in controlling SALW in Kenya
Respondents were asked to assess the level of success of government (Nairobi Protocol) in
controlling the proliferation of illicit small arms in the past several years. Whereas 70 per cent of
respondent rated government arms control initiatives as successful, a lower proportion of
respondents (20 per cent) gave a different verdict. While 40 per cent of urban respondents felt
15 Op Cit p.9
16 Ibid
17 Interview at Central Firearms Bureau, Nairobi, 29 August 2016

government efforts have been unsuccessful, only 30 per cent of them contradicted this view.
A similar question assessing perceptions on the effectiveness of arms control instruments yielded
a comparable response trend. While the views of police officers were equally split between those
who considered the instruments effective (50 per cent) and those who considered them weak (50
per cent), the majority of other respondents (70 per cent) felt that the arms control regime is
weak. To them, persisting insecurity and arms challenges in Kenya are an image of the
government: the state is viewed as not having done its best due to weak mechanisms and bad
governance. The government is viewed as either unwilling to comprehensively deal with the
small arms menace or as failing to deploy sufficient security personnel to enforce law and order.
The level of awareness of arms control instruments among respondents is relatively low. An
analysis among both groups reveals that only 40 per cent are generally more aware of an
international or regional protocols. More than half of the respondents (60 per cent) are not aware
of any international or regional protocols signed relating to small arms. This may point to the
possibility that since they are diverse, members of CSOs whose mandates concern issues other
than peace and security are less likely to know about small arms management instruments and
issues. In this case, it would be necessary to have a broad target group for small arms and light
weapons awareness-raising and capacity-building initiatives.
Asked if they were aware of any arrests relating to illicit arms, majority of respondents in this
research indicated that there were no prosecutions of small arms-related cases in their area. 30
per cent of respondents confirmed knowledge of arrests. But 60 per cent of respondents were not
aware of such arrests. This is a clear indication that criminal proceedings on illicit arms
ownership in the country was minimal partly due to corrupt nature of the police force among
other reasons.

However, despite the numerous achievement noted and realized by the government of Kenya in
implementing the Nairobi Protocol, there still exist several obstacles which hinder successful
implementation and reduction of SALW in Kenya. These challenges will be discussed in depth in
the subsequent chapter.
Chapter findings
Intra-state and inter-state conflict in the horn of Africa and the great lakes region are the main
catalysts fuelling increased proliferation of SALW in the region. The arms fuel wars and sustain
conflicts between and within states hence resulting to increased insecurity and instability.
Somalia has been pointed as the main source of illegal SALW in Kenya. Additionally, Northern
Kenya, confronted by the multiple challenges of underdevelopment, interethnic resource-based
conflicts, and proximity to war-prone neighbouring countries, has had the highest prevalence of
small arms, with the highest estimations put at over 100,000 in 2003. Majority of the respondents
(80 per cent) cited protection from eminent threat as the major reason as to why there was huge
proliferation of SALW in Kenya (Read-why they owned arms). 11 countries from the Great
Lakes and Horn of Africa region adopted the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and
Reduction of SALW. The Nairobi protocol has enabled the government to embark on riffle and
ammunition marking, stockpile management, as well it is undertaking comprehensive national
small arms surveys and mapping in Kenya. This is aimed at estimating the possible number of
illicit arms in the country, establishing arms movement and trends, and informing the process for
future local and regional initiatives, including disarmament efforts.

References