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  • Can Pakistan Survive Tariq Ali

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    Lucas Gazinhato
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    Classic Text about the Pakistanian State

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    Classic Text about the Pakistanian State

    Direitos autorais:

    © All Rights Reserved
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    Sinalizar o conteúdo como inadequado
    18 visualizações121 páginas

    Can Pakistan Survive Tariq Ali

    Enviado por

    Lucas Gazinhato
    Classic Text about the Pakistanian State

    Direitos autorais:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Baixe no formato PDF ou leia online no Scribd
    Sinalizar o conteúdo como inadequado
    de 121
    a Will there be civil war in Pakistan? Pakistan was the product of an ideological confection gown as the ‘two nations theory: This was a device invented by the Muslims in India with the purpose of carving out a separate state where they could develop unhindered by the dominant Hindu ruling class. In his hard-hitting survey of Pakistan today, Tariq Ali analyses its birth-pangs as a nation and the years from 1947 to the present, covering the political economy and the military dictatorships. He also assesses Pakistan from a geopolitical perspective — with particular reference to Afghanistan and Iran —and goes on to argue that the contradictions and tensions within the State, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and te Iranian Revolution have all contributed to Pakistan's chronic instability. «a Pelican Original ‘Comer sotoragh by Chis Yates oy Pakistan has been in existence for thirty-five years. For half this period the country has been under the hel of the Pakistan Army, a mercenary force ppar excellence, whose major ‘successes’ have been politico-military cam- ‘paigns against its own population. Since the distintegration of Pakistan and the establishment of Bangladesh in 1971-2, the ruling élites have been in search of a new identity. The collapse of populism and the execution of the country’s first and last elected prime minister, Zulfigar Ali Bhutto, has posed the question of survival. For the frst time in Pakistan's chequered history, many ordinary citizens in the majority province of the Punjab and the minority provinces of Sind, Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) are questioning the birth of the new state. ‘The Pakistan army has been in power since $ July 1977. Ithas attempted to utilize Islam in order to institutionalize a brutal dictatorship. On the external front, the army has mortgaged the country to the United States ‘once again. In return, it has willingly agreed to help service and police the Gulf states. Everything is forsale in Pakistan: its labour force, its army, its ‘women, its doctors and teachers are all leased to the oil-rich oligarchies in the Arab Gulf, Pakistan's uniformed mercenaries in Saudi Arabia are, in fact, strong enough to mount a coup in that country, should the need ever, arise. Inside Pakistan itself, misery reigns supreme. The sense of demoralization and despair can be gauged by the fact that many people Took eagerly to India and even the Soviet Union for salvation from this régime. In reality, relief will come only from within. The length of this third period of military rule is directly correlated with the level of mass struggle in the country. If there isa renewal of urban unrest, this régime will fall ‘The problem, however, extends beyond the current dictatorship and its front-man. Ever since its inception, Pakistan has prevented its intelligentsia from discussing its own history. The poets (Faiz, Jalib, Fakhar Zaman, ‘Ahmed Salim, Fehmida Riaz and many others) have occasionally managed to loosen this ideological straitjacket. Elsewhere silence has prevailed, sometimes broken by the whispers of Baluch insurgents or the loud explo- sions of the Bengalis. The question which now increasingly haunts the new 10 - Preface generations in Pakistan is not simply whether the country ean survive, but ‘whether its existence was necessary in the first place. This small book is an attempt to discuss hitherto taboo or undiscussed | ‘themes without inhibition. Some of the idess contained here have never ‘been publicly aired in Pakistan, The aim is to ensure that this material is read and discussed where it is most needed — and since ideas are notorious violaters of frontiers, one hopes that this book will reach its destination. 1 would like to thank all those Pakistanis who gave me relevant factual information, on condition that their anonymity was preserved. I would lke ‘also to thank the O.J. Trust for the modest, but necessary, help they provided in 1980, to enable me to work on this project. Lastly, many thanks are due to my editor at Penguin Books, Neil Middleton, forall his help and ‘encouragement, Tarig Ali London, 8 July 1982 INDIAN pein PAKISTAN AND SOUTH ASIA ‘Arabian Sea ogee Statistical Tables (ie 1965 figures do aot node East Pakistan) Demography, Culture and Armed Forces _ [Unie v96s [1975 [10 Population ition sa2 | 703 | 28 Dena tnbab per eile 2s. | 256 [Aum popsation growth % ao | 4 feta sora por 1000 five bie mm | as Titepetany S| Ur popaion x |e ‘iteaey ane sono? x, | ee ‘wicenes a’ | Ss _ Rade rend ie fe ay w | Ri Fore o | ‘rey 38 | a0 ‘ity expeniare mone er | Sa average 1960-70, 960; 6 197; 197; $16 yeas External Trade ' ot ives [is BALUCHISTAN Enea me %ave a7 | 61 | 18s province / ‘oul inpors? ions wo] 22) 54 “fol arcane 22) | 998 Rewmatas ta | Be| Det Manfacured goods as | &s| Soe Toul export Talons os] i 26 “ood €ardare 33 | ur] ae ‘Ran otras sie | jon | 8 Manat goods set | Sar] sss aio septien| impor ‘inl ts aso | ua] a7 pe se Spe 33 | 2b) ae A baad Kade Mii exoner | woo (Gedertcarcres) Jason sg) e) 3 (eae ian tows Kone Se) | oe tied ion 2) ta] oe PAKISTAN: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FRONTIERS, ARRAN 1 TMS 1 on-astor gods and serves. manufactured good; 1996 1978 Ezonomy Vets 196s [ims [io ‘Gros national prodact Wilion 5 43) 3 | uo fama growth % ie| U3 | 3 percepts 3 3" | ia | 2a Sactace of GDP “Agree % we) seo] 32 ‘inbioy Zhom pe) Bel ae ‘Sevier & BS) BS] Seven ___ gs as Pubic extern debe vans | aa | st | so Publceuemal dee ___|__oitons_{ as. {| _sa{ so ate of infation % [ax] ee { ur ‘Asive popslaion ay | wor | 2s “aereaee | ak | gy) ae ‘iy [ote | Gs | ie Semeee [at | en | ae Publ menting pe | wy | at | a Hea an | lat | aa, Defence aa Eneeey production 46 nergy consoption I re | me average 1960-1, serge 1970-7; 1978 average ISTO 98D 61965 Sure ows aot deuce Past Pitan; b 1974, 1978 wick of ona oul gual a “ure EMyERMET Contents Preface + 9 ‘Maps + 11 Statistical Tables « 13 1+ Origins - 15 2 + Post-Independence Realities: ‘The First Decade 1947-58 + 41 ‘The Gun and the Hat: Military-Bureaucratic Dictatorship 1958-69 - 62 4+ The Break-Up of Pakistan 1969-71 - 83 5 + The Populist Experiment Bhutto in Power 1971-7 - 99 6 + The Crisis of Legitimacy: Martial Law with an Islamic Face 1977-? » 133 " 7 + Between the Hammer and the Anvil: Geopolitics and the Super-Powers ~ 163 Appendixes: - 1 - Poem: For Dali, Who Dared to Struggle and Die - 199 2+ Interview: Murad Khan » 200 3» How the Landlords Won in Sind - 210 Notes + 215 Index + 231 Ppa i x Origins We have not ben elected or placed in power by the people, bu we are ere though our moral superiority, by the frce of circumstances, by the wll of Providence. This alone ‘anatates our charter to gover Ind. In dng the Best we can for the people, we are bound by ou conscience and not thet.” John Lawrence, Vioooy of ada, 064-9 ‘fired and continued to fire unt the crowd dspesed, an I considered ths as the least amount of firing which would produce the necessary mora and widespread effect twas. my duty to produce Twas 1 justify my action mare troops had boen at hand the ‘asuatfes would have Been ereaternpropotin. I! was no longer a question of merely sdspesing the crowd, but one of producing asufcent moral effect froma military ola of ew not only on tase who were present bul more especially throughout the Pani.” ener Dyer, 1919, ater vdring the massacre of ‘harmed Laisa spoil aly a ‘ahlanealiah egh, Amar Ofte ares ware: SsdEn do evn notes If the British had not colonized and ruled India for nearly fifteen decades, the confessional state of Pakistan would not have come into existence on 14 August 1947. This isnot to imply that dvide et impera was the central tenet of the colonial state from its inception. It is probable that if India had been granted ‘dominion status’ on the Canadian and Australian model in the late nineteenth or early twentieth centuries, the entire pattern of politcal and economic development would have been strikingly dffer- cent. The refusal of the British state to countenance such a solution aided the birth of Indian nationalism. In order to prevent the composite growth of such a movement, the strategists of the Raj sought to weaken the potential oftheir adversary at an early stage. They encouraged — both ideo- logically and through constitutional measures ~ the birth of communal politics throughout the subcontinent, Religious divisions, which prior to 16 + Origins the British seizure of power had been of minor importance, were ruth- lessly stimulated and utilized by successive consuls and pro-consuls to prevent the nationalist movement from feeling and acting upon its real strength. Communal historians in both India and Pakistan would no doubt challenge this view. For most of them, the concept of ‘nation’ is cither shrouded in a mystique stretching back (o Antiquity or the product ‘of Muslim tactics under British rule. A dialogue could be useful, but the possibility of one is somewhat remote, since debate becomes’ difficult when one is compelled to dispute, not material facts, but the ‘will of Providence’. ‘The growth of Islam in India was a direct consequence of the Mughal invasion in the third decade of the sixteenth century, and the ability of Babar and his successors to rule the country thereafter for neatly three hnundred years. The bulk of India’s Muslims were converts from Hinduism. ‘They represented between 20 and 25 per cent of the population throughout India at the beginning of the twentieth century. It is worth remembering, however, that the vast bulk of the conversions to Islam were voluntary: an active protest in most cases against the grotesque inequality institutionalized by the caste system. Mughal rule was based on welding together a ruling class regardless of nationality or creed. “Akbar (1556-1603), the most gifted of the Mughal rulers, established an administrative network for the collection of revenue and a military ap- pparatus for the maintenance of order that were not, and could not have been, based on the principle of religious loyalty. Akbar’s military and poli- tical successes vindicated his secular approsch. His attempt to promote a synthetic stat religion which would unite Muslims and Hindus foundered fon mass indifference. It was an audacious move, designed in reality to develop an ideology that would buttress the existing institutions of the Mughal state. Akbar's personal life symbolized his obsession with tran- sending all religious barriers: he married a Rajput princess. His successors ‘maintained the framework he had established. The last major Mughal monarch, Aurungzeb (1658-1707), contrary to communalist mythology, did not qualitatively break with that tradition. He was a devout Muslim, ‘but despite confessional excesses he preserved the basic composition of the ruling class. His generals were not chosen on the basis of religion and, asin the past, they defended the empire when ordered to do so. They fought with the same zeal to erush peasant jacqueres regardless of whether these were headed by Muslims or Hindus. "The Empire's collapse, as British rule was extended, did not come about because Akbar was a secularist or Aurungzeb an orthodox Muslim. It was ‘the cumulative result of Mughal economic policies, which were unproductive and based on the extraction of revenue and taxes from a peasantry which Origins - 17 obtained nothingin return. (tis true that the caste system helped to preserve rural docility, but the notion that the masses were passive throughout is ‘over-simpliied.) The real seeds of Mughal disintegration lay inthe character of the Mughal state. Its parasitic character meant that it was bound sooner ‘or later to antagonize those upon whom it relied for support. Provincial satraps wit independent armies, but economically dependent on the central state, began to rebel against the system. The later Mughals could only respond militarily, when what was needed were economic reforms from the top. A state-sponsored feudalism could have delayed the decline and held the British at bay, but the empire was rotten-ripe. It fll. ‘The replacement of the Mughal state did lead to a recomposition of the ‘old ruling classes. This did not affect Muslims alone, but also Hindus and Sikhs. It was this process that brought about the revolt of 1857 (the so- called “Indian Mutiny’): a last inter-communal attempt by the old rulers to resist the new. The stated purpose of the rising was to expel the British from India and put the last nominal Mughal king, Babadur Shah Zafar, on the throne, It was a doomed attempt, but had the effect of forcing the British to rule the country in name as well as in fact. The defeat of the old ruling classes was thus completed. Those who had relied on the old Court for employment — artisans as well as poets; retainers of every kind, including religious divines ~ all suffered. Those from the ruling classes who had fought against the British were punished and, in many cases, deprived of their rights to collect revenue or even their hereditary occupation of the land. “Muslims were held to be responsible for the rebellion by the ideologists of the Raj. This was factually incorrect and subsequently disappeared from propaganda pronouncements, but the Muslim gentry were now confronted by contradictory pressures. The ulema (Islamic clergy), for 2 combination of economic and religious reasons, were anti-British, Their most influential leaders proclaimed British India dar ul harb (enemy territory) and thus implied that a permanent jihad was mandatory for all Muslims. They en- ‘couraged Muslims to refrain from any collaboration with the new rulers. Their most vociferous opponent was Sir Syed Ahmed, a petty oficial in the state bureaucracy. Ahmed combated obscurantism with great verve and vigour. He established a Scientific Society in 1864 with the declared aim of {anslating English books on political economy, history and philosophy. ‘This was anathema to the theologians, but thei criticisms merely goaded ‘him further to outrage their sensibilities, He wrote: ‘The old Muhammaden books and the tone of their writings do not teach the followers of Islam independence of thought, perspicacity and simplicity; nor do they enable them to arrive at the truth of matters in LL NT I eT TET TO aii! 18 - Origins ‘general; on the contrary, they deceive and teach men to veil their meaning, to embellish their speech with fine words, to describe things wrongly and in irelevant terms, to fatter with false praise ... to pull themselves up With pride, haughtiness, vanity and sef-concet, to hate their fellow crea tures, to have no sympathy with them, to speak with exaggeration, to leave the history of the past uncertain and to relate facts like tales and ‘The tradition which Ahmed attacked proved to have strong roots. One could use very similar language to describe the outpourings of communalist and chauvinist ‘historians’ in contemporary India and Pakistan. If Ahmed hhad restricted himself to a critique of obscurantism, he might have attracted very litle attention. What made him a powerful figure in post-1887 India was that he combined his attacks on the ulema with a powerful plea for support to be given to the British take-over of the country. The ttle of two of his books ~ The Causes of the Indian Mutiny and Loyal Mohammedans of India — convey the flavour of the political project he had set himself, which ‘was soon to receive material and political backing from the British adminis- tration. ‘The clash between Almed’s pro-British modernism and the ulema con- tinued for several decades. Ahmed was allowed to set up a college in Aligarh to educate Muslims in the virtues of science and loyalty to the empire. The ulema divided into competing seminaries, the most prominent of which, Deoband, developed a layer of divines who regularly preached rebellion against the Raj and, on occasion, attempted to carry it out. The majority of the ulema were to remain strongly opposed to Muslim separatism and argue for a unified strugale against Britain. The Jamiyyat al Ulema-i-Hind was to argue, in the first years of the twentieth century, that: If non-Muslims occupy a Muslim land, which India was under the Mughals, it becomes the obligatory duty of Muslims of that land and of fothers to strive and retain independence. This jihad in India has to be ‘non-violent and it can be fought only in alliance with the Hindus, who constitute the majority community. In independence thus gained Muslims ‘and non-Muslims would be co-partners in creating society and adminis- tration which, though not modelled entirely on the conception of an Islamic state, would comprise effective and influential elements in it? ‘The tragedy of Indian Muslims and India was that no force existed that was capable of synthesizing Ahmed's rationalism and the anti-imperialist politi- cal thrust of the Deoband. There can be litle doubt that such a movernent would have been subjected to systematic harassment and repression, but it ‘would none the less have represented an incalculable gain. Origins + 19 ‘Ahmed and his successors advised Muslims to keep aloof from politics land serve the British. The formation of the Indian National Congress in 1885, a3 an organization which would pressurize London to grant reforms and some degree of self-rule, posed a few problems for loyalist Muslims, It ould hardly be argued at this stage that the Congress was either dominated ‘by Hindus or susceptible to ‘extremism It had, indeed, been set up explicitly to ensure that nationalistminded Indians would conduct their strugele within the framework laid dowa by the colonial state, But even the mild Fesolutions passed by the early Congress drew the wrath of Sir Syed and his coterie, They poured scorn on the whole project, putting forward the argu- ‘ment that any notion of a composite Indian nationalism was intolerable ‘This was now coupled with an ugly lism (which bordered on racism as far asthe Bengalis were concemed: some of Ahmed’s utterances reflecting the official view of Bengalis as an “infernal nuisance’ and “upstarts' could be Certainly categorized as racist) In theory, Islam was an egalitarian religion ‘whieh tolerated no caste distinction. All Muslims were equal before God. In fone of his speeches opposing the elective principle, however, Ahmed revealed his prejudices extremely clearly ask you, would our aristocracy like that a man of low caste or insignificant origin, though he be a B.A. or an M.A. and have the requisite ability, should be in a position of authority above them and have power fn making the laws that affect their lives and property? Never! Nobody ‘would like it .. The mea of good family would never like to trust their lives and property to people of low ranks. “This was not an isolated statement, It reflected the views of a sizable section of the Muslim landed aristocracy. Keeping aloof from polities and trusting the Rej was, for ths layer, not a question of sentiment, but the best possible ‘way to safeguard their property. The growth of even ‘moderate’ nationalist Sentiments was to meet with their strong disapproval "As the Indian National Congress gathered new forces behind its banners, it was felt necessary by the Raj to encourage the formation of Muslim party as a counterweight. There was not even any attempt to be subtle in bringing this about, The English Principal of the Aligarh College founded by Sir Syed, « Mr Archbold, acted as a broker between the Muslim gentry and the Viceroy. On 1 October 1906, Lord Minto received a deputation ‘which described itself as: “We the nobles, Jagirdars, Taluqdars, Zamindars, Lawyers and Merchants, subjects of His Majesty the King-Emperor in different parts of India,” It demanded separate electorates for Muslims and positive discrimination in state employment, highlighting their loyalty to the empire. Minto’s reply stressed the ‘representative character’ of the de~ putation and agreed with its basic demands. He pledged that the partition 20 - Origins of Bengal pushed through in 1905 by his predecessor Lord Curzon would ‘be maintained, and that Muslim Bengalis would be rewarded suitably for their loyalty. ‘The Muslim League was founded with the blessings of the Viceroy. Its founding charter stated that one of its central objects was ‘To foster a sense of loyalty to the British Empire among the Muslims of India’. The new League was to remain for long an alliance between Muslim landlords and British civil servants, There were some fears expressed that even a loyalist politcal party could become a conduit for more radical forces, but in the ‘event the lawyers were held at bay. In 1910, the Governor of the United Provinces (UP) confided to his Viceroy: have felt frightened lest the lawyer party, mainly consisting of young and irresponsible persons, would attain a predominant position in the League, and that they might at some time coalesce with the advanced Hindu politicians against the government on one or more questions and later on rue the fact that they had done so. think the Aga Khan has put tan effectual check to this, and that the League may be expected to be ‘much more conservative and stable than it once promised to be It would be far too simplistic to suggest that Mustim communalism was ‘merely the result of British intrigue. Though it was only the colonial state that could institutionalize communalism, two other factors were equally important in engendering it: the growing impact of the changing economic pattern in the cities, and the peculiar ideology of the Congress, both served {to strengthen separatism in parts ofthe subcontinent. Despite the fact that the Congress was theoretically a secular organization and that its appeal was directed to all Indians regardless of class or creed, its practice tended to belie this approach. This became clearer as the Congress moved into a phase of mass campaigns. Anti-British agitation carried out by the Congress was, in fact, heavily overlaid with Hindu sym- olism and mythology. During its 1905-11 campaign against the partition of Bengal, the Congress could have won the support of an overwbselming proportion of Muslim Bengalis. Apart from a small band of Muslim land- lords and ttle-holders, few favoured the division Curzon had imposed on ‘the subcontinent’s most politically developed and cultured province. Yet ‘the Congress leaders chose to conduet the movement by utilizing Hindu anthems and the worship of Hindu gods. Many Muslim nationalists were revolted by this imagery and withdrew from the movement. ‘The hostility to communal violence of Mohandas Gandhi, who rose to a ‘dominant position in the Congress between 1915 and 1919, is beyond dis- ‘pute; yet his entire political style was that of a Hindu leader. His speeches ‘were full of mystical symbolism deriving from the past of Hinduism and ere Origins © 21 ese oar aks betmen the Congres snd blatant comma Fein Te lo so a Hy nis ey ne cn nro resi ts ter a tle Capa a oe ca dy ws ptm en i ance ea an Cnc cay ae Hs a a poe ceca int signa mtn tee ten we a Marae ae tc Re Sve te eka es en RS ed nee te ee es ai Tnlereeama soiree ih Ce eles en ee Rocked Eh oe a ei coma n To on elnpet sro crete eat sya en ge care eee hy a ee gta eee So ef deg an ee anaceette en eenton neo ate re ae ene SO ee oe na ee es seen cl ecu ie sete Si aa eos nt aaa pe Spon te ig ul a at cele a i te a a i i ay as sats ey en So ne peters Se eh phe omtenc 22 + Origins Ina letter written to Marx while the above text was in preparation, Engels advised: ‘An Oriental government never had more than three departments: finance (plunder at home), war (plunder at home and abroad), and public ‘works (provision for reproduction). The British government in India has ‘administered Nos. 1 and 2 in a rather narrow-minded spirit and dropped No. 3 entirely, so that Indian agriculture is now being ruined.” In fact, 8 ‘Angus Maddison has convincingly demonstrated, the British administrators did not interfere a great deal with ‘traditional’ India.* There were a few, belated social reforms pushed through by Lord Bentinck, but the country. side (where 90 per cent of the population lived) was largely left intact, ‘The self-image of the British was modelled on the imperialism of ancient Rome, rather than on the Spanish Conquest in South America or even the French colonization of Indo-China. It was only a self-image. Britain's ‘motives were conditioned by objective necesities, The most effective way to ‘exploit India economically, while using it asa strategic military base to de- fend trade routes, defeat competitors and strengthen the empire, was to rely on one basic mechanism: the consent of the native ruling classes had tobe obtained. * Where this was not possible, they were to be deprived oftheir power and new pliant ruling classes were to be created. Hence it was natural that the villages were left as they had been under the Mughal empire. The hereditary distinctions imposed by the caste system were erucial for con. solidating the basis clas structure and maintaining the status quo. To inter~ fere with all this could well create a dangerous situation for the empire by lunleashing new social forces. It was clearly best to leave things as they had been when the British arrived. (Dr Irfan Habib has indeed shown in some

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