SupremeCourtofthePhilippines

458Phil.504

SECONDDIVISION
G.R.No.151931,September23,2003
ANAMERSALAZAR,PETITIONER,VS.THEPEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINESANDJ.Y.
BROTHERSMARKETINGCORPORATION,RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CALLEJO,SR.,J.:
ThisisapetitionforreviewoncertiorariunderRule45ofthe1997RulesofCriminalProcedureoftheOrder[1]
of the Regional Trial Court, 5th Judicial Region, Legazpi City, Branch 5,[2] dated November 19, 2001, and its
Order[3]datedJanuary14,2002denyingthemotionforreconsiderationofthedecisionofthesaidcourtonthe
civilaspectthereofandtoallowhertopresentevidencethereon.
On June 11, 1997, an Information for estafa was filed against herein petitioner Anamer D. Salazar and co
accused Nena Jaucian Timario with the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, docketed as Criminal Case No.
7474whichreadsasfollows:
ThatsometimeinthemonthofOctober,1996,intheCityofLegazpi,Philippines,andwithinthejurisdictionof
thisHonorableCourt,theabovenamedaccused,conspiringandconfederatingwitheachother,withintentto
defraudbymeansoffalsepretensesorfraudulentactsexecutedsimultaneouslywiththecommissionofthe
fraud,didthenandtherewilfully,unlawfullyandfeloniously,onthepartofaccusedNENAJAUCIAN
TIMARIO,drewandissue[d]PRUDENTIALBANK,LEGASPICITYBRANCHCHECKNO.067481,dated
October15,1996,intheamountofP214,000.00infavorofJ.Y.BROTHERSMARKETINGCORPORATION,
representedbyitsBranchManager,JERSONO.YAO,andaccusedANAMERD.SALAZARendorsedand
negotiatedsaidcheckaspaymentof300cavansofriceobtainedfromJ.Y.BROTHERSMARKETING
CORPORATION,knowingfullywellthatatthattimesaidcheckwasissuedandendorsed,NenaJaucian
Timariodidnothavesufficientfundsinorcreditwiththedraweebanktocovertheamountcalledfortherein
andwithoutinformingthepayeeofsuchcircumstancethatwhensaidcheckwaspresentedtothedrawee
bankforpayment,thesamewasconsequentlydishonoredandrefusedpaymentforthereasonof
"ACCOUNTCLOSED"thatdespitedemands,accusedfailedandrefusedandstillfailandrefusetopay
and/ormakearrangementforthepaymentofthesaidcheck,tothedamageandprejudiceofsaidJ.Y.
BROTHERSMARKETINGCORPORATION.
CONTRARYTOLAW.[4]
Uponarraignment,thepetitioner,assistedbycounsel,enteredapleaofnotguilty.Trialthereafterensued.

TheEvidenceoftheProsecution
On October 15, 1996, petitionerAnamer Salazar purchased 300 cavans of rice from J.Y. Brothers Marketing
Corporation, through Mr. Jerson Yao. As payment for these cavans of rice, the petitioner gave the private
complainant Check No. 067481 drawn against the Prudential Bank, Legazpi City Branch, dated October 15,
1996, by one Nena Jaucian Timario in the amount of P214,000. Jerson Yao accepted the check upon the
petitioner's assurance that it was a good check. The cavans of rice were picked up the next day by the
petitioner. Upon presentment, the check was dishonored because it was drawn under a closed account
("Account Closed"). The petitioner was informed of such dishonor. She replaced the Prudential Bank check
withCheckNo.365704drawnagainsttheSolidBank,LegazpiBranch,which,however,wasreturnedwiththe
word"DAUD"(DrawnAgainstUncollectedDeposit).
Aftertheprosecutionresteditscase,thepetitionerfiledaDemurrertoEvidencewithLeaveofCourt[5]alleging
thatshecouldnotbeguiltyofthecrimeaschargedforthefollowingreasons:(a)shewasmerelyanindorserof
thecheckissuedbyNenaTimario,andArticle315,paragraph2(d)onestafapenalizesonlytheissuerofthe
checkandnottheindorserthereof(b)thereisnosufficientevidencetoprovethatthepetitionerconspiredwith
the issuer of the check, Nena Jaucian Timario, in order to defraud the private complainant (c) after the first
check was dishonored, the petitioner replaced it with a second one. The first transaction had therefore been
effectivelynovatedbytheissuanceofthesecondcheck.Unfortunately,herpersonalcheckwasdishonorednot
forinsufficiencyoffunds,butfor"DAUD,"whichinbankingparlancemeans"drawnagainstuncollecteddeposit."
Accordingtothepetitioner,thismeansthattheaccounthadsufficientfundsbutwasstillrestrictedbecausethe
deposit,usuallyacheck,hadnotyetbeencleared.
Theprosecutionfileditscomment/oppositiontothepetitioner'sdemurrertoevidence.
On November 19, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment acquitting the petitioner of the crime charged but
orderinghertoremittotheprivatecomplainanttheamountofthecheckaspaymentforherpurchase.Thetrial
court ruled that the evidence for the prosecution did not establish the existence of conspiracy beyond
reasonabledoubtbetweenthepetitionerandtheissuerofthecheck,hercoaccusedNenaJaucianTimario,for
thepurposeofdefraudingtheprivatecomplainant.Infact,theprivatecomplainant,JersonYao,admittedthat
he had never met Nena Jaucian Timario who remained at large. As a mere indorser of the check, the
petitioner'sbreachofthewarrantythatthecheckwasagoodoneisnotsynonymouswiththefraudulentactof
falsely pretending to possess credit underArticle 315(2)(d). The decretal portion of the trial court's judgment
readsasfollows:
WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,theaccusedAnamerD.SalazarisherebyACQUITTEDofthecrime
chargedbutisherebyheldliableforthevalueofthe300bagsofrice.AccusedAnamerD.Salazaris
thereforeorderedtopayJ.Y.BrothersMarketingCorporationthesumofP214,000.00.Costsagainstthe
accused.[6]
Within the reglementary period therefor, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the civil aspect of
thedecisionwithapleathathebeallowedtopresentevidencepursuanttoRule33oftheRulesofCourt.On

January14,2002,thecourtissuedanorderdenyingthemotion.
In her petition at bar, the petitioner assails the orders of the trial court claiming that after her demurrer to
evidencewasgrantedbythetrialcourt,shewasdenieddueprocessasshewasnotgiventheopportunityto
adduceevidencetoprovethatshewasnotcivillyliabletotheprivaterespondent.Thepetitionerinvokesthe
applicabilityofRule33oftheRulesofCivilProcedureinthiscase,contendingthatbeforebeingadjudgedliable
totheprivateoffendedparty,sheshouldhavebeenfirstaccordedtheproceduralreliefgrantedinRule33.
ThePetitionIsMeritorious
AccordingtoSection1,Rule111oftheRevisedRulesofCriminalProcedure
SECTION1.Institutionofcriminalandcivilactions.(a)Whenacriminalactionisinstituted,thecivilaction
fortherecoveryofcivilliabilityarisingfromtheoffensechargedshallbedeemedinstitutedwiththecriminal
actionunlesstheoffendedpartywaivesthecivilaction,reservestherighttoinstituteitseparatelyorinstitutes
thecivilactionpriortothecriminalaction.
Thereservationoftherighttoinstituteseparatelythecivilactionshallbemadebeforetheprosecutionstarts
presentingitsevidenceandundercircumstancesaffordingtheoffendedpartyareasonableopportunityto
makesuchreservation.
Whentheoffendedpartyseekstoenforcecivilliabilityagainsttheaccusedbywayofmoral,nominal,
temperate,orexemplarydamageswithoutspecifyingtheamountthereofinthecomplaintorinformation,the
filingfeesthereforshallconstituteafirstlienonthejudgmentawardingsuchdamages.
Wheretheamountofdamages,otherthanactual,isspecifiedinthecomplaintorinformation,the
correspondingfilingfeesshallbepaidbytheoffendedpartyuponthefilingthereofincourt.
ExceptasotherwiseprovidedintheseRules,nofilingfeesshallberequiredforactualdamages.
Nocounterclaim,crossclaimorthirdpartycomplaintmaybefiledbytheaccusedinthecriminalcase,but
anycauseofactionwhichcouldhavebeenthesubjectthereofmaybelitigatedinaseparatecivilaction.
(b)ThecriminalactionforviolationofBatasPambansaBlg.22shallbedeemedtoincludethe
correspondingcivilaction.Noreservationtofilesuchcivilactionseparatelyshallbeallowed.
Uponfilingoftheaforesaidjointcriminalandcivilactions,theoffendedpartyshallpayinfullthefilingfees
basedontheamountofthecheckinvolved,whichshallbeconsideredastheactualdamagesclaimed.
Wherethecomplaintorinformationalsoseekstorecoverliquidated,moral,nominal,temperateorexemplary
damages,theoffendedpartyshallpayadditionalfilingfeesbasedontheamountsallegedtherein.Ifthe
amountsarenotsoallegedbutanyofthesedamagesaresubsequentlyawardedbythecourt,thefilingfees
basedontheamountawardedshallconstituteafirstlienonthejudgment.

Wherethecivilactionhasbeenfiledseparatelyandtrialthereofhasnotyetcommenced,itmaybe
consolidatedwiththecriminalactionuponapplicationwiththecourttryingthelattercase.Iftheapplicationis
granted,thetrialofbothactionsshallproceedinaccordancewithsection2ofthisRulegoverning
consolidationofthecivilandcriminalactions.
ThelastparagraphofSection2ofthesaidruleprovidesthattheextinctionofthepenalactiondoesnotcarry
withittheextinctionofthecivilaction.Moreover,thecivilactionbasedondelictshallbedeemedextinguishedif
thereisafindinginafinaljudgmentinthecriminalactionthattheactoromissionfromwhichthecivilliability
mayarisedidnotexist.[7]
Thecriminalactionhasadualpurpose,namely,thepunishmentoftheoffenderandindemnitytotheoffended
party.Thedominantandprimordialobjectiveofthecriminalactionisthepunishmentoftheoffender.Thecivil
action is merely incidental to and consequent to the conviction of the accused. The reason for this is that
criminal actions are primarily intended to vindicate an outrage against the sovereignty of the state and to
imposetheappropriatepenaltyforthevindicationofthedisturbancetothesocialordercausedbytheoffender.
Ontheotherhand,theactionbetweentheprivatecomplainantandtheaccusedisintendedsolelytoindemnify
theformer.[8]
Unlesstheoffendedpartywaivesthecivilactionorreservestherighttoinstituteitseparatelyorinstitutesthe
civilactionpriortothecriminalaction,therearetwoactionsinvolvedinacriminalcase.Thefirstisthecriminal
actionforthepunishmentoftheoffender.ThepartiesarethePeopleofthePhilippinesastheplaintiffandthe
accused.Inacriminalaction,theprivatecomplainantismerelyawitnessfortheStateonthecriminalaspectof
theaction.Thesecondisthecivilactionarisingfromthedelict.Theprivatecomplainantistheplaintiffandthe
accusedisthedefendant.Thereisamergerofthetrialofthetwocasestoavoidmultiplicityofsuits.
Thequantumofevidenceonthecriminalaspectofthecaseisproofbeyondreasonabledoubt,whileinthecivil
aspectoftheaction,thequantumofevidenceispreponderanceofevidence.[9]UnderSection3,Rule1ofthe
1997RulesofCriminalProcedure,thesaidrulesshallgoverntheproceduretobeobservedinaction,civilor
criminal.
Theprosecutionpresentsitsevidencenotonlytoprovetheguiltoftheaccusedbeyondreasonabledoubtbut
alsotoprovethecivilliabilityoftheaccusedtotheoffendedparty.Aftertheprosecutionhasresteditscase,the
accused shall adduce its evidence not only on the criminal but also on the civil aspect of the case. At the
conclusionofthetrial,thecourtshouldrenderjudgmentnotonlyonthecriminalaspectofthecasebutalsoon
thecivilaspectthereof:
SEC.2.Contentsofthejudgment.Ifthejudgmentisofconviction,itshallstate(1)thelegalqualificationof
theoffenseconstitutedbytheactscommittedbytheaccusedandtheaggravatingormitigating
circumstanceswhichattendeditscommission(2)theparticipationoftheaccusedintheoffense,whetheras
principal,accomplice,oraccessoryafterthefact(3)thepenaltyimposedupontheaccusedand(4)thecivil
liabilityordamagescausedbyhiswrongfulactoromissiontoberecoveredfromtheaccusedbythe
offendedparty,ifthereisany,unlesstheenforcementofthecivilliabilitybyaseparatecivilactionhasbeen
reservedorwaived.

Incasethejudgmentisofacquittal,itshallstatewhethertheevidenceoftheprosecutionabsolutelyfailedto
provetheguiltoftheaccusedormerelyfailedtoprovehisguiltbeyondreasonabledoubt.Ineithercase,the
judgmentshalldetermineiftheactoromissionfromwhichthecivilliabilitymightarisedidnotexist.[10]
Theacquittaloftheaccuseddoesnotpreventajudgmentagainsthimonthecivilaspectofthecasewhere(a)
theacquittalisbasedonreasonabledoubtasonlypreponderanceofevidenceisrequired(b)wherethecourt
declared that the liability of the accused is only civil (c) where the civil liability of the accused does not arise
fromorisnotbaseduponthecrimeofwhichtheaccusedwasacquitted.Moreover,thecivilactionbasedonthe
delictisextinguishedifthereisafindinginthefinaljudgmentinthecriminalactionthattheactoromissionfrom
whichthecivilliabilitymayarisedidnotexistorwheretheaccuseddidnotcommittheactsoromissionimputed
tohim.
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the civil aspect of the
criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it would place the accused in
doublejeopardy.However,theaggrievedparty,theoffendedpartyortheaccusedorbothmayappealfromthe
judgmentonthecivilaspectofthecasewithintheperiodtherefor.
Aftertheprosecutionhasresteditscase,theaccusedhastheoptioneitherto(a)fileademurrertoevidence
withorwithoutleaveofcourtunderSection23,Rule119oftheRevisedRulesofCriminalProcedure,orto(b)
adducehisevidenceunlesshewaivesthesame.Theaforecitedrulereads:
Sec.23.Demurrertoevidence.Aftertheprosecutionrestsitscase,thecourtmaydismisstheactionon
thegroundofinsufficiencyofevidence(1)onitsowninitiativeaftergivingtheprosecutiontheopportunityto
beheardor(2)upondemurrertoevidencefiledbytheaccusedwithorwithoutleaveofcourt.
Ifthecourtdeniesthedemurrertoevidencefiledwithleaveofcourt,theaccusedmayadduceevidencein
hisdefense.Whenthedemurrertoevidenceisfiledwithoutleaveofcourt,theaccusedwaiveshisrightto
presentevidenceandsubmitsthecaseforjudgmentonthebasisoftheevidencefortheprosecution.
Themotionforleaveofcourttofiledemurrertoevidenceshallspecificallystateitsgroundsandshallbefiled
withinanonextendibleperiodoffive(5)daysaftertheprosecutionrestsitscase.Theprosecutionmay
opposethemotionwithinanonextendibleperiodoffive(5)daysfromitsreceipt.
Ifleaveofcourtisgranted,theaccusedshallfilethedemurrertoevidencewithinanonextendibleperiodof
ten(10)daysfromnotice.Theprosecutionmayopposethedemurrertoevidencewithinasimilarperiod
fromitsreceipt.
Theorderdenyingthemotionforleaveofcourttofiledemurrertoevidenceorthedemurreritselfshallnot
bereviewablebyappealorbycertioraribeforethejudgment.
Incriminalcases,thedemurrertoevidencepartakesofthenatureofamotiontodismissthecaseforfailureof
theprosecutiontoprovehisguiltbeyondreasonabledoubt.Inacasewheretheaccusedfilesademurrerto
evidence without leave of court, he thereby waives his right to present evidence and submits the case for

decisiononthebasisoftheevidenceoftheprosecution.Ontheotherhand,iftheaccusedisgrantedleaveto
fileademurrertoevidence,hehastherighttoadduceevidencenotonlyonthecriminalaspectbutalsoonthe
civilaspectofthecaseifhisdemurrerisdeniedbythecourt.
Ifdemurrerisgrantedandtheaccusedisacquittedbythecourt,theaccusedhastherighttoadduceevidence
onthecivilaspectofthecaseunlessthecourtalsodeclaresthattheactoromissionfromwhichthecivilliability
mayarisedidnotexist.Ifthetrialcourtissuesanorderorrendersjudgmentnotonlygrantingthedemurrerto
evidenceoftheaccusedandacquittinghimbutalsoonthecivilliabilityoftheaccusedtotheprivateoffended
party,saidjudgmentonthecivilaspectofthecasewouldbeanullityforthereasonthattheconstitutionalright
oftheaccusedtodueprocessistherebyviolated.AsweheldinAlontev.Savellano,Jr.:[11]
Section14,paragraphs(1)and(2),ofArticleIII,oftheConstitutionprovidesthefundamentals.
"(1)Nopersonshallbeheldtoanswerforacriminaloffensewithoutdueprocessoflaw.
"(2)Inallcriminalprosecutions,theaccusedshallbepresumedinnocentuntilthecontraryisproved,and
shallenjoytherighttobeheardbyhimselfandcounsel,tobeinformedofthenatureandcauseofthe
accusationagainsthim,tohaveaspeedy,impartial,andpublictrial,tomeetthewitnessesfacetoface,
andtohavecompulsoryprocesstosecuretheattendanceofwitnessesandtheproductionofevidencein
hisbehalf.However,afterarraignment,trialmayproceednotwithstandingtheabsenceoftheaccused
providedthathehasbeendulynotifiedandhisfailuretoappearisunjustifiable."
Jurisprudenceacknowledgesthatdueprocessincriminalproceedings,inparticular,require(a)thatthecourt
ortribunaltryingthecaseisproperlyclothedwithjudicialpowertohearanddeterminethematterbeforeit
(b)thatjurisdictionislawfullyacquiredbyitoverthepersonoftheaccused(c)thattheaccusedisgivenan
opportunitytobeheardand(d)thatjudgmentisrenderedonlyuponlawfulhearing.
Theaboveconstitutionalandjurisprudentiallypostulates,bynowelementaryanddeeplyimbeddedinour
owncriminaljusticesystem,aremandatoryandindispensable.Theprinciplesfinduniversalacceptanceand
areterselyexpressedintheoftquotedstatementthatproceduraldueprocesscannotpossiblybemet
withouta"lawwhichhearsbeforeitcondemns,whichproceedsuponinquiryandrendersjudgmentonlyafter
trial."[12]
Thisissobecausewhentheaccusedfilesademurrertoevidence,theaccusedhasnotyetadducedevidence
both on the criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence for the
prosecution. What the trial court should do is to issue an order or partial judgment granting the demurrer to
evidence and acquitting the accused and set the case for continuation of trial for the petitioner to adduce
evidenceonthecivilaspectofthecase,andfortheprivatecomplainanttoadduceevidencebywayofrebuttal
after which the parties may adduce their surrebuttal evidence as provided for in Section 11, Rule 119 of the
RevisedRulesofCriminalProcedure:
Sec.11.Orderoftrial.Thetrialshallproceedinthefollowingorder:
(a)Theprosecutionshallpresentevidencetoprovethechargeand,inthepropercase,thecivilliability.
(b)Theaccusedmaypresentevidencetoprovehisdefenseanddamages,ifany,arisingfromtheissuance

ofaprovisionalremedyinthecase.
(c)Theprosecutionandthedefensemay,inthatorder,presentrebuttalandsurrebuttalevidenceunlessthe
court,infurtheranceofjustice,permitsthemtopresentadditionalevidencebearinguponthemainissue.
(d)Uponadmissionoftheevidenceoftheparties,thecaseshallbedeemedsubmittedfordecisionunless
thecourtdirectsthemtoargueorallyortosubmitwrittenmemoranda.
(e)Whentheaccusedadmitstheactoromissionchargedinthecomplaintorinformationbutinterposesa
lawfuldefense,theorderoftrialmaybemodified.
Thereafter,thecourtshallrenderjudgmentonthecivilaspectofthecaseonthebasisoftheevidenceofthe
prosecutionandtheaccused.
In this case, the petitioner was charged with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal
Code.Thecivilactionarisingfromthedelictwasimpliedlyinstitutedsincetherewasnowaiverbytheprivate
offendedpartyofthecivilliabilitynorareservationofthecivilaction.Neitherdidhefileacivilactionbeforethe
institutionofthecriminalaction.
Thepetitionerwasgrantedleaveofcourttofileademurrertoevidence.Thecourtissuedanordergrantingthe
demurrer on its finding that the liability of the petitioner was not criminal but only civil. However, the court
renderedjudgmentonthecivilaspectofthecaseandorderedthepetitionertopayforherpurchasesfromthe
private complainant even before the petitioner could adduce evidence thereon. Patently, therefore, the
petitionerwasdeniedherrighttodueprocess.
INLIGHTOFALLTHEFOREGOING,thePetitionisGRANTED.TheOrdersdatedNovember19,2001and
January 14, 2002 are SET ASIDE AND NULLIFIED. The Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch 5, is
herebyDIRECTEDtosetCriminalCaseNo.7474forthecontinuationoftrialforthereceptionoftheevidence
inchiefofthepetitioneronthecivilaspectofthecaseandfortherebuttalevidenceoftheprivatecomplainant
andthesurrebuttalevidenceofthepartiesiftheyopttoadduceany.
SOORDERED.
Bellosillo,(Chairman),Quisumbing,AustriaMartinez,andTinga,JJ.,concur.

[1]Annex"A,"Rollo,pp.2425.

[2]PennedbyJudgeVladimirB.Brusola.

[3]Annex"C,"Rollo,p.29.

[4]

[4]Rollo,p.30.

[5]Annex"E,"id.at32.

[6]Id.at14.

[7]Sec.2,Rule111.

[8]Herrera,RemedialLaw,Vol.IV,2001ed.,p.160.

[9]Section1,RevisedRulesofEvidence.

[10]Section2,Rule120oftheRevisedRulesofCriminalProcedure.(Emphasissupplied).

[11]287SCRA245(1998).

[12]Id.at261.