CONSTI2_CIVIL LIABILITY FOR VIOLATION OF RIGHTS

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G.R. No. L-22554 August 29, 1975
DELFIN LIM and JIKIL TAHA, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FRANCISCO PONCE DE LEON AND ORLANDO MADDELA,
defendants-appellees.

detachment commander-in Balabac to impound and take custody of

the motor launch. 1

MARTIN, J.:

On June 26, 1962, Fiscal Ponce de Leon reiterated his request to the
Provincial Commander to impound the motor launch, explaining
that its subsequent sale to a third party, plaintiff-appellant Delfin
Lim, cannot prevent the court from taking custody of the same. 2
So, on July 6, 1962 upon order of the Provincial Commander,
defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela, Detachment Commander of
Balabac, Palawan, seized the motor launch "SAN RAFAEL" from
plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim and impounded it.

Appeal on a question of law from the decision of the Court of First

Instance of Palawan in Civil Case No. 416, entitled "Delfin Lim and
Jikil Taha vs. Francisco Ponce de Leon and Orlando Maddela",
dismissing the complaint of the plaintiffs and ordering them to pay
each of the defendants jointly and severally the sum of P500.00 by
way of actual damages; P500.00 by way of attorney's fees; and
P1,000.00 by way of exemplary damages.

On July 15, 1962 plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim pleaded with Orlando

Maddela to return the motor launch but the latter refused. Likewise,
on September 20, 1962, Jikil Taha through his counsel made
representations with Fiscal Ponce de Leon to return the seized
property to plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim but Fiscal Ponce de Leon
refused, on the ground that the same was the subject of a criminal
offense.

On April 29, 1961, plaintiff-appellant Jikil Taha sold to a certain

Alberto Timbangcaya of Brooke's Point, Palawan a motor launch
named M/L "SAN RAFAEL". A year later or on April 9, 1962 Alberto
Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal of Palawan alleging that after the sale Jikil Taha forcibly took
away the motor launch from him.

All efforts to recover the motor launch going to naught, plaintiffsappellants Delfin Lim and Jikil Taha, on November 19, 1962, filed
with the Court of First Instance of Palawan a complaint for damages
against defendants-appellees Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon and
Orlando Maddela, alleging that on July 6, 1962 Orlando Maddela
entered the premises of Delfin Lim without a search warrant and
then and there took away the hull of the motor launch without his
consent; that he effected the seizure upon order of Fiscal Ponce de
Leon who knew fully well that his office was not vested with
authority to order the seizure of a private property; that said motor
launch was purchased by Delfin Lim from Jikil Taha in consideration
of Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00), Two Thousand Pesos
(P2,000.00) of which has been given to Jikil Taha as advance
payment; that as a consequence of the unlawful seizure of the
motor launch, its sale did not materialize; and that since July 6,
1962, the said motor launch had been moored at the Balabac Bay,
Palawan and because of exposure to the elements it had become
worthless and beyond repair. For the alleged violation of their

Ricardo L. Manalilig for plaintiffs-appellants.

Iigo R. Pea for defendants-appellees.

On May 14, 1962, after conducting a preliminary investigation,

Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon in his capacity as Acting Provincial
Fiscal of Palawan, filed with the Court of First Instance of Palawan
the corresponding information for Robbery the Force and
Intimidation upon Persons against Jikil Taha. The case was docketed
as Criminal Case No. 2719.
On June 15, 1962, Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon, upon being
informed that the motor launch was in Balabac, Palawan, wrote the
Provincial Commander of Palawan requesting him to direct the

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constitutional rights, plaintiffs-appellants prayed that defendantsappellees be ordered to pay jointly and severally each of them the
sum of P5,750.00 representing actual, moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees.
In their answer, defendants-appellees denied the material
allegations of the complaint and as affirmative defenses alleged
that the motor launch in question which was sold by Jikil Taha to
Alberto Timbangcaya on April 29, 1961 was sometime in April 1962,
forcibly taken with violence upon persons and with intent to gain by
Jikil Taha from Alfredo Timbangcaya without the latter's knowledge
and consent, thus giving rise to the filing of a criminal charge of
robbery against Jikil Taha; that Fiscal Ponce de Leon, in his capacity
as Acting Provincial Fiscal of Palawan ordered Orlando Maddela to
seize and impound the motor launch "SAN RAFAEL", for being the
corpus delicti of the robbery; and that Orlando Maddela merely
obeyed the orders of his superior officer to impound said launch. By
way of counterclaim, defendants-appellees alleged that because of
the malicious and groundless filing of the complaint by plaintiffsappellants, they were constrained to engage the services of
lawyers, each of them paying P500.00 as attorney's fees; and that
they suffered moral damages in the amount of P5,000.00 each and
actual damages in the amount of P500.00 each. They also prayed
that each of them awarded exemplary damages in the amount of
P1,000.00.
On September 13, 1965, the trial court rendered its decision,
upholding the validity of the seizure of the motor launch on the
ground that "the authority to impound evidences or exhibits or
corpus delicti in a case pending investigation is inherent in the
Provincial Fiscal who controls the prosecution and who introduces
those exhibits in the court." Accordingly, the trial court dismissed
the complaint of plaintiffs-appellants and ordered them to pay
jointly and severally each of the defendants-appellees the amount
of P500.00 by way of actual damages another amount of P500.00
for attorney's fees and P1,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Hence, this appeal.

Two vital issues call for resolution by this Court. First, whether or
not defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon had the power to
order the seizure of the motor launch in question without a warrant
of search and seizure even if the same was admittedly the corpus
delicti of the crime. Second, whether or not defendants-appellees
are civilly liable to plaintiffs-appellants for damages allegedly
suffered by them granting that the seizure of the motor launch was
unlawful.
The gravamen of plaintiffs-appellants' argument is that the taking
of the motor launch on July 6, 1962 by Orlando Maddela upon the
order of Fiscal Ponce de Loon was in violation of the constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures since it was
done without a warrant.
The pertinent provision of the Constitution then in force reads:
3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable
cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized. 3
A cursory reading of the above provision easily brings into focus the
unreasonableness of the seizure of the aforementioned motor
launch. A search and seizure to be reasonable, must be effected by
means of a valid search warrant. And for a search warrant to be
valid: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable
cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the
applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable
cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the
complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4)
the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be
searched and persons or things to be seized. 4 Thus in a long line
of decisions, this Court has declared invalid search warrants which
were issued in utter disregard of the constitutional injunction. 5

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Defendants-appellees admitted that when Orlando Maddela
entered the premises of Delfin Lim and impounded the motor
launch he was not armed with a search warrant; that he effected
the seizure of the motor launch in the absence of and without the
consent of Delfin Lim. There can be no question that without the
proper search warrant, no public official has the right to enter the
premises of another without his consent for the purpose of search
and seizure. 6 And since in the present case defendants-appellees
seized the motor launch without a warrant, they have violated the
constitutional right of plaintiffs-appellants against unreasonable
search and seizure.

before issuing the corresponding warrant, whether or not probable

cause exists therefor. 8

Defendants-appellees however would want to justify the seizure of

the motor launch even without a warrant because of Fiscal Ponce
de Leon's alleged inherent power to order the seizure of a personal
property which is the corpus delicti of a crime, he being a quasi
judicial officer who has the control of the prosecution and the
presentation of the evidence in the criminal case. They argue that
inasmuch as the motor launch in question was allegedly stolen by
Jikil Taha from Timbangcaya, Fiscal Ponce de Leon could order its
seizure even without a search warrant. We cannot agree. Under the
old Constitution 7 the power to issue a search warrant is vested in a
judge or magistrate and in no other officer and no search and
seizure can be made without a proper warrant. At the time the act
complained of was committed, there was no law or rule that
recognized the authority of Provincial Fiscals to issue a search
warrant. In his vain attempt to justify the seizure of the motor
launch in question without a warrant Fiscal Ponce de Leon invoked
the provisions of Republic Act No. 732, which amended Sections
1674 and 1687 of the Revised Administrative Code. But there is
nothing in said law which confers upon the provincial fiscal; the
authority to issue warrants, much less to order without warrant the
seizure of a personal property even if it is the corpus delicti of a
crime. True, Republic Act No. 732 has broadened the power of
provincial fiscals to conduct preliminary investigations, but said law
did not divest the judge or magistrate of its power to determine,

The mere fact that a man is an officer, whether of high or low

degree, gives him no more right than is possessed by the ordinary
private citizen to break in upon the privacy of a home and subject
its occupant to the indignity of a search for the evidence of crime,
without a legal warrant procured for that purpose. No amount of
incriminating evidence whatever its source, will supply the place of
such warrant. At the closed door of the home be it palace or hovel
even bloodhounds must wait till the law, by authoritative process,
bids it open. (Emphasis supplied.)

Moreover, under Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court

9 which complement the constitutional provision earlier cited, two
principles are made clear, namely: (1) that in the seizure of a stolen
property search warrant is still necessary; and (2) that in issuing a
search warrant the judge alone determines whether or not there is
a probable cause. The fact that a thing is a corpus delicti of a crime
does not justify its seizure without a warrant. As held in U.S. v. de
los Reyes and Esguerra, 10 citing McClurg v. Brenton: 11

Defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon would also invoke lack of

time to procure a search warrant as an excuse for the seizure of the
motor launch without one. He claimed that the motor launch had to
be seized immediately in order to preserve it and to prevent its
removal out of the locality, since Balabac, Palawan, where the
motor launch was at the time, could only be reached after three to
four days' travel by boat. 12 The claim cannot be sustained. The
records show that on June 15, 1962 13 Fiscal Ponce de Leon made
the first request to the Provincial Commander for the impounding of
the motor launch; and on June 26, 1962 14 another request was
made. The seizure was not effected until July 6, 1962. In short,
Fiscal Ponce de Leon had all the time to procure a search warrant
had he wanted to and which he could have taken in less than a day,
but he did not. Besides, there is no basis for the apprehension that
the motor launch might be moved out of Balabac because even
prior to its seizure the motor launch was already without its engine.

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15 In sum, the fact that there was no time to secure a search
warrant would not legally justify a search without one. 16
As to whether or not they are entitled to damages, plaintiffsappellants anchor their claim for damages on Articles 32 and 2219
of the New Civil Code which provide in part as follows:
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual,
who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any
manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties
of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages.
xxx xxx xxx
(9) The rights to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.
xxx xxx xxx
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages
may also be adjudicated.
ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(6) Illegal search;
xxx xxx xxx
(1) Acts and action referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32,
34 and 35.
Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose constitutional
rights have been violated or impaired is entitled to actual and
moral damages from the public officer or employee responsible
therefor. In addition, exemplary damages may also be awarded. In
the instant case, plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim claimed that he
purchased the motor launch from Jikil Taha in consideration of

P3,000.00, having given P2,000.00 as advanced payment; that

since or seizure on July 6, 1962 the motor launch had been moored
at Balabac Bay and because of exposure to the elements it has
become worthless at the time of the filing of the present action;
that because of the illegality of the seizure of the motor launch, he
suffered moral damages in the sum of P1,000.00; and that because
of the violation of their constitutional rights they were constrained
to engage the services of a lawyer whom they have paid P1,500.00
for attorney's fees. We find these claims of Delfin Lim amply
supported by the evidence and therefore should be awarded the
sum of P3,000.00 as actual damages; P1,000.00 as moral damages
and P750.00 for attorney's fees. However, with respect co plaintiff
Jikil Taha, he is not entitled to recover any damage which he
alleged he had suffered from the unlawful seizure of the motor
launch inasmuch as he had already transferred the ownership and
possession of the motor launch to Delfin Lim at the time it was
seized and therefore, he has no legal standing to question the
validity of the seizure. Well settled is the rule that the legality of a
seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and
seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.
17 Consequently, one who is not the owner, lessee, or lawful
occupant of the premise searched cannot raise the question of
validity of the search and seizure. 18 Jikil Taha is not without
recourse though. He can still collect from his co-plaintiff, Delfin Lim
the unpaid balance of P1,000.00.
Defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon wanted to wash his hands
of the incident by claiming that "he was in good faith, without
malice and without the slightest intention of inflicting injury to
plaintiff-appellant, Jikil Taha" 19 when he ordered the seizure of the
motor launch. We are not prepared to sustain his defense of good
faith. To be liable under Article 32 of the New Civil Code it is enough
that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the
plaintiffs and it is not required that defendants should have acted
with malice or bad faith. Dr. Jorge Bocobo, Chairman of the Code
Commission, gave the following reasons during the public hearings

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of the Joint Senate and House Committees, why good faith on the
part of the public officer or employee is immaterial. Thus:
DEAN BOCOBO. Article 32, regarding individual rights; Attorney
Cirilo Paredes proposes that Article 32 be so amended as to make a
public official liable for violation of another person's constitutional
rights only if the public official acted maliciously or in bad faith. The
Code Commission opposes this suggestion for these reasons:
The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or
criminal. It is not necessary therefore that there should be malice or
bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose
of Article 32 which is the effective protection of individual rights.
Public officials in the past have abused their powers on the pretext
of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their
duties. Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end to official
abuse by the plea of good faith. In the United States this remedy is
in he nature of a tort.
Mr. Chairman, this article is firmly one of the fundamental articles
introduced in the New Civil Code to implement democracy. There is
no real democracy if a public official is abusing, and we made the
article so strong and so comprehensive that it concludes an abuse
of individual rights even if done in good faith, that official is liable.
As a matter of fact, we know that there are very few public officials
who openly and definitely abuse the individual rights of the
citizens. In most cases, the abuse is justified on a plea of desire to
enforce the law to comply with one's duty. And so, if we should limit
the scope of this article, that would practically nullify the object of
the article. Precisely, the opening object of the article is to put an
end to abuses which are justified by a plea of good faith, which is in
most cases the plea of officials abusing individual rights. 20
But defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela cannot be held
accountable because he impounded the motor launch upon the
order of his superior officer. While a subordinate officer may be held
liable for executing unlawful orders of his superior officer, there are
certain circumstances which would warrant Maddela's exculpation

from liability. The records show that after Fiscal Ponce de Leon
made his first request to the Provincial Commander on June 15,
1962 Maddela was reluctant to impound the motor launch despite
repeated orders from his superior officer. 21 It was only after he
was furnished a copy of the reply of Fiscal Ponce de Leon, dated
June 26, 1962, to the letter of the Provincial Commander, justifying
the necessity of the seizure of the motor launch on the ground that
the subsequent sale of the launch to Delfin Lim could not prevent
the court from taking custody of the same, 22 that he impounded
the motor launch on July 6, 1962. With said letter coming from the
legal officer of the province, Maddela was led to believe that there
was a legal basis and authority to impound the launch. Then came
the order of his superior officer to explain for the delay in the
seizure of the motor launch. 23 Faced with a possible disciplinary
action from his Commander, Maddela was left with no alternative
but to seize the vessel. In the light of the above circumstances. We
are not disposed to hold Maddela answerable for damages.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby
reversed and another one entered declaring the seizure illegal and
ordering defendant-appellee Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon to pay
to plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim the sum of P3,000.00 as actual
damages, plus P1,000.00 moral damages, and, in addition, P750.00
for attorney's fees. With costs against defendant-appellee Fiscal
Ponce de Leon.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. L-69866 April 15, 1988
ROGELIO ABERCA, RODOLFO BENOSA, NESTOR BODINO
NOEL ETABAG DANILO DE LA FUENTE, BELEN DIAZ-FLORES,
MANUEL MARIO GUZMAN, ALAN JAZMINEZ, EDWIN LOPEZ,
ALFREDO
MANSOS,
ALEX
MARCELINO,
ELIZABETH
PROTACIO-MARCELINO, JOSEPH OLAYER, CARLOS PALMA,
MARCO PALO, ROLANDO SALUTIN, BENJAMIN SESGUNDO,
ARTURO TABARA, EDWIN TULALIAN and REBECCA TULALIAN
petitioners,
vs.
MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER, COL. FIDEL SINGSON, COL.
ROLANDO ABADILLA, COL. GERARDO B. LANTORIA, COL.
GALILEO KINTANAR, 1ST LT. COL. PANFILO M. LACSON, MAJ.
RODOLFO AGUINALDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO, 1ST LT.
PEDRO TANGO, 1ST LT. ROMEO RICARDO, 1ST LT. RAUL
BACALSO, MSGT BIENVENIDO BALABA and REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XCV (95),
Quezon City, respondents.
YAP, J.:
This petition for certiorari presents vital issues not heretofore
passed upon by this Court. It poses the question whether the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil
action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military
personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed
under the Constitution. If such action for damages may be
maintained, who can be held liable for such violations: only the
military personnel directly involved and/or their superiors as well.
This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and
other violations of the rights and liberties of plaintiffs by various
intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as
Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver "to
conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist
(CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT
plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila," Plaintiffs allege, among

others, that complying with said order, elements of the TFM raided
several places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial
search warrants; that during these raids, certain members of the
raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items
belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without proper
warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after their
arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that
plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and
counsel; that military men who interrogated them employed
threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to
obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to
punish them; that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights
were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract
information and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to
terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previously
known to and sanctioned by defendants.
Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory damages amounting to
P39,030.00; moral damages in the amount of at least P150,000.00
each or a total of P3,000,000.00; exemplary damages in the
amount of at least P150,000.00 each or a total of P3,000,000.00;
and attorney's fees amounting to not less than P200,000.00.
A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, through their counsel,
then Solicitor-General Estelito Mendoza, alleging that (1) plaintiffs
may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their
detention in the guise of a damage suit because, as to them, the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2) assuming
that the courts can entertain the present action, defendants are
immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their
official duties; and (3) the complaint states no cause of action
against the defendants. Opposition to said motion to dismiss was
filed by plaintiffs Marco Palo, Danilo de la Fuente, Benjamin
Sesgundo, Nel Etabag, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin on July
8, 1983, and by plaintiffs Edwin Lopez, Manuel Mario Guzman, Alan
Jasminez, Nestor Bodino, Carlos Palma, Arturo Tabara, Joseph
Olayer, Rodolfo Benosa, Belen Diaz, Flores, Rogelio Aberca, Alex

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Marcelino and Elizabeth Marcelino on July 21, 1983. On November
7, 1983, a Consolidated Reply was filed by defendants' counsel.
Then, on November 8, 1983, the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Region, Branch 95, Judge Willelmo C. Fortun, Presiding, 1
issued a resolution granting the motion to dismiss. I sustained, lock,
stock and barrel, the defendants' contention (1) the plaintiffs may
not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their
detention in the guise of a damage suit because, as to them, the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2) that
assuming that the court can entertain the present action,
defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the
performance of their official duties; and (3) that the complaint
states no cause of action against defendants, since there is no
allegation that the defendants named in the complaint confiscated
plaintiffs' purely personal properties in violation of their
constitutional rights, and with the possible exception of Major
Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Sergeant Bienvenido Balabo committed acts
of torture and maltreatment, or that the defendants had the duty to
exercise direct supervision and control of their subordinates or that
they had vicarious liability as employers under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code. The lower court stated, "After a careful study of
defendants' arguments, the court finds the same to be meritorious
and must, therefore, be granted. On the other hand, plaintiffs'
arguments in their opposition are lacking in merit."
A motion to set aside the order dismissing the complaint and a
supplemental motion for reconsideration was filed by the plaintiffs
on November 18, 1983, and November 24, 1983, respectively. On
December 9, 1983, the defendants filed a comment on the
aforesaid motion of plaintiffs, furnishing a copy thereof to the
attorneys of all the plaintiffs, namely, Attys. Jose W. Diokno,
Procopio Beltran, Rene Sarmiento, Efren Mercado, Auguso Sanchez,
Antonio L. Rosales, Pedro B. Ella Jr., Arno V. Sanidad, Alexander
Padilla, Joker Arroyo, Rene Saguisag, Ramon Esguerra and Felicitas
Aquino.

On December 15, 1983, Judge Fortun issued an order voluntarily

inhibiting himself from further proceeding in the case and leaving
the resolution of the motion to set aside the order of dismissal to
Judge Lising, "to preclude any suspicion that he (Judge Fortun)
cannot resolve [the] aforesaid pending motion with the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge and to put an end to plaintiffs
assertion that the undersigned has no authority or jurisdiction to
resolve said pending motion." This order prompted plaintiffs to
reesolve an amplificatory motion for reconsideration signed in the
name of the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) of Mabini Legal Aid
Committee, by Attys. Joker P. Arroyo, Felicitas Aquino and Arno
Sanidad on April 12, 1984. On May 2,1984, the defendants filed a
comment on said amplificatory motion for reconsideration.
In an order dated May 11, 1984, the trial court, Judge Esteban
Lising, Presiding, without acting on the motion to set aside order of
November 8, 1983, issued an order, as follows:
It appearing from the records that, indeed, the following plaintiffs,
Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Fuente and Marco Palo, represented by
counsel, Atty. Jose W. Diokno, Alan Jasminez represented by
counsel, Atty. Augusta Sanchez, Spouses Alex Marcelino and
Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, represented by counsel, Atty. Procopio
Beltran, Alfredo Mansos represented by counsel, Atty. Rene
Sarmiento, and Rolando Salutin, represented by counsel, Atty. Efren
Mercado, failed to file a motion to reconsider the Order of
November 8, 1983, dismissing the complaint, nor interposed an
appeal therefrom within the reglementary period, as prayed for by
the defendants, said Order is now final against said plaintiffs.
Assailing the said order of May 11, 1984, the plaintiffs filed a
motion for reconsideration on May 28,1984, alleging that it was not
true that plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Fuente, Marco Palo,
Alan Jasminez, Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo
Mansos and Rolando Salutin failed to file a motion to reconsider the
order of November 8, 1983 dismissing the complaint, within the
reglementary period. Plaintiffs claimed that the motion to set aside
the order of November 8, 1983 and the amplificatory motion for

CONSTI2_CIVIL LIABILITY FOR VIOLATION OF RIGHTS

8
reconsideration was filed for all the plaintiffs, although signed by
only some of the lawyers.
In its resolution of September 21, 1984, the respondent court dealt
with both motions (1) to reconsider its order of May 11, 1984
declaring that with respect to certain plaintiffs, the resolution of
November 8, 1983 had already become final, and (2) to set aside
its resolution of November 8, 1983 granting the defendants' motion
to dismiss. In the dispositive portion of the order of September 21,
1984, the respondent court resolved:
(1) That the motion to set aside the order of finality, dated May 11,
1984, of the Resolution of dismissal of the complaint of plaintiffs
Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Fuente, Marco Palo, Alan Jasminez Alex
Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and
Rolando Salutin is deed for lack of merit;
(2) For lack of cause of action as against the following defendants,
to wit:
1. Gen Fabian Ver
2. Col. Fidel Singson
3. Col. Rolando Abadilla
4. Lt. Col. Conrado Lantoria, Jr.
5. Col. Galileo Montanar
6. Col. Panfilo Lacson
7. Capt. Danilo Pizaro

the motion to set aside and reconsider the Resolution of dismissal

of the present action or complaint, dated November 8, 1983, is also
denied but in so far as it affects and refers to defendants, to wit:
1. Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo, and
2. Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba
the motion to reconsider and set aside the Resolution of dismissal
dated November 3, 1983 is granted and the Resolution of dismissal
is, in this respect, reconsidered and modified.
Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari on March
15, 1985 seeking to annul and set aside the respondent court's
resolution of November 8, 1983, its order of May 11, 1984, and its
resolution dated September 21, 1984. Respondents were required
to comment on the petition, which it did on November 9, 1985. A
reply was filed by petitioners on August 26, 1986.
We find the petition meritorious and decide to give it due course.
At the heart of petitioners' complaint is Article 32 of the Civil Code
which provides:
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual
who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any
manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties
of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;

8. 1 Lt Pedro Tango

(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical

publication;

9. Lt. Romeo Ricardo

(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;

10. Lt. Raul Bacalso

(5) Freedom of suffrage;

CONSTI2_CIVIL LIABILITY FOR VIOLATION OF RIGHTS

9
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process
(7) of law;
(8) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken
for public use;
(9) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(10) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;
(11) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(12) The privacy of cmmunication and correspondence;
(13) The right to become a member of associations or societies for
purposes not contrary to law;
(14) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the
Government for redress of grievances;
(15) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(16) The rigth of the accused against excessive bail;
(17) The rigth of the aaccused to be heard by himself and counsel,
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face
to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance
of witness in behalf;
(18) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against ones
self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by
a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except
when the person confessing becomes a State witness;
(19) Freedom from excessive fines or cruel and unusual
punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance

with a statute which

unconstitutional; and

has

not

been

judicially

declared

(20) Freedom of access to the courts.

In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the
defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the
against grieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate
and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if
the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of
evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages
may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge
unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code
or other penal statute.
It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision is to
provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms
enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may
seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity. In times of great
upheaval or of social and political stress, when the temptation is
strongest to yield borrowing the words of Chief Justice Claudio
Teehankee to the law of force rather than the force of law, it is
necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties
are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to the transient needs or
imperious demands of the ruling power. The rule of law must
prevail, or else liberty will perish. Our commitment to democratic
principles and to the rule of law compels us to reject the view which
reduces law to nothing but the expression of the will of the
predominant power in the community. "Democracy cannot be a
reign of progress, of liberty, of justice, unless the law is respected
by him who makes it and by him for whom it is made. Now this
respect implies a maximum of faith, a minimum of Idealism. On
going to the bottom of the matter, we discover that life demands of

CONSTI2_CIVIL LIABILITY FOR VIOLATION OF RIGHTS

10
us a certain residuum of sentiment which is not derived from
reason, but which reason nevertheless controls. 2
Seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, the
respondents postulate the view that as public officers they are
covered by the mantle of state immunity from suit for acts done in
the performance of official duties or function In support of said
contention, respondents maintain that
Respondents are members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
Their primary duty is to safeguard public safety and order. The
Constitution no less provides that the President may call them "to
prevent or supress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection or
rebellion, or imminent danger thereof." (Constitution, Article VII,
Section 9).
On January 17, 1981, the President issued Proclamation No. 2045
lifting martial law but providing for the continued suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in view of the remaining
dangers to the security of the nation. The proclamation also
provided "that the call to the Armed Forces of the Philippines to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, insuitection rebellion and
subversion shall continue to be in force and effect."
Petitioners allege in their complaint that their causes of action
proceed from respondent General Ver's order to Task Force
Makabansa to launch pre-emptive strikes against communist
terrorist underground houses in Metro Manila. Petitioners claim that
this order and its subsequent implementation by elements of the
task force resulted in the violation of their constitutional rights
against unlawful searches, seizures and arrest, rights to counsel
and to silence, and the right to property and that, therefore,
respondents Ver and the named members of the task force should
be held liable for damages.
But, by launching a pre-emptive strike against communist
terrorists, respondent members of the armed forces merely
performed their official and constitutional duties. To allow

petitioners to recover from respondents by way of damages for acts

performed in the exercise of such duties run contrary to the policy
considerations to shield respondents as public officers from undue
interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats
of hability (Aarlon v. Fitzgerald 102 S. Ct. 2731-1 Forbes v. Chuoco
Tiaco, 16 Phil. 634), and upon the necessity of protecting the
performance of governmental and public functions from being
harassed unduly or constantly interrupted by private suits
(McCallan v. State, 35 Cal. App. 605; Metran v. Paredes, 79 Phil.
819).
xxx xxx xxx
The immunity of public officers from liability arising from the
performance of their duties is now a settled jurisprudence Alzua v.
Johnson, 21 Phil. 308; Zulueta v. Nicolas, 102 Phil. 944; Spalding v.
Vilas, 161 US 483; 40 L. Ed. 780, 16 S. Ct. 631; Barr v. Mateo, 360;
Butz v. Economon, 438 US 478; 57 L. Ed. 2d 895, 98 S. Ct. 2894;
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 US 232; Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, supra;
Miller v. de Leune, 602 F. 2d 198; Sami v. US, 617 F. 2d 755).
Respondents-defendants who merely obeyed the lawful orders of
the President and his call for the suppression of the rebellion
involving petitioners enjoy such immunity from Suit. 3
We find respondents' invocation of the doctrine of state immunity
from suit totally misplaced. The cases invoked by respondents
actually involved acts done by officers in the performance of official
duties written the ambit of their powers. As held in Forbes, etc. vs.
Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield: 4
No one can be held legally responsible in damages or otherwise for
doing in a legal manner what he had authority, under the law, to
do. Therefore, if the Governor-General had authority, under the law
to deport or expel the defendants, and circumstances justifying the
deportation and the method of carrying it out are left to him, then
he cannot be held liable in damages for the exercise of this power.
Moreover, if the courts are without authority to interfere in any

CONSTI2_CIVIL LIABILITY FOR VIOLATION OF RIGHTS

11
manner, for the purpose of controlling or interferring with the
exercise of the political powers vested in the chief executive
authority of the Government, then it must follow that the courts
cannot intervene for the purpose of declaring that he is liable in
damages for the exeercise of this authority.
It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, were merely responding to their duty, as they
claim, "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection,
rebellion and subversion" in accordance with Proclamation No. 2054
of President Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on January 27,
1981, and in pursuance of such objective, to launch pre- emptive
strikes against alleged communist terrorist underground houses.
But this cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving
commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to
disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the
individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution.
The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all
officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and
allegiance at all times.
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or
employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating
the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated
therein, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only
judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided
their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal
Code or other penal statute.
This is not to say that military authorities are restrained from
pursuing their assigned task or carrying out their mission with
vigor. We have no quarrel with their duty to protect the Republic
from its enemies, whether of the left or of the right, or from within
or without, seeking to destroy or subvert our democratic
institutions and imperil their very existence. What we are merely
trying to say is that in carrying out this task and mission,
constitutional and legal safeguards must be observed, otherwise,
the very fabric of our faith will start to unravel. In the battle of

competing Ideologies, the struggle for the mind is just as vital as

the struggle of arms. The linchpin in that psychological struggle is
faith in the rule of law. Once that faith is lost or compromised, the
struggle may well be abandoned.
We do not find merit in respondents' suggestion that plaintiffs'
cause of action is barred by the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus. Respondents contend that "Petitioners
cannot circumvent the suspension of the privilege of the writ by
resorting to a damage suit aimed at the same purpose-judicial
inquiry into the alleged illegality of their detention. While the main
relief they ask by the present action is indemnification for alleged
damages they suffered, their causes of action are inextricably
based on the same claim of violations of their constitutional rights
that they invoked in the habeas corpus case as grounds for release
from detention. Were the petitioners allowed the present suit, the
judicial inquiry barred by the suspension of the privilege of the writ
will take place. The net result is that what the courts cannot do, i.e.
override the suspension ordered by the President, petitioners will
be able to do by the mere expedient of altering the title of their
action."
We do not agree. We find merit in petitioners' contention that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not
destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal
arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional
rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal
arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the
individual to seek release from detention through the writ of
habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.
Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their right and cause of
action for damages are explicitly recognized in P.D. No. 1755 which
amended Article 1146 of the Civil Code by adding the following to
its text:
However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or
for a quasi-delict) arises from or out of any act, activity or conduct

CONSTI2_CIVIL LIABILITY FOR VIOLATION OF RIGHTS

12
of any public officer involving the exercise of powers or authority
arising from Martial Law including the arrest, detention and/or trial
of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one (1) year.
Petitioners have a point in contending that even assuming that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspends
petitioners' right of action for damages for illegal arrest and
detention, it does not and cannot suspend their rights and causes
of action for injuries suffered because of respondents' confiscation
of their private belongings, the violation of their right to remain
silent and to counsel and their right to protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and other
cruel and inhuman treatment.
However, we find it unnecessary to address the constitutional issue
pressed upon us. On March 25, 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino
issued Proclamation No. 2, revoking Proclamation Nos. 2045 and
2045-A and lifting the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. The question therefore has become moot and
academic.
This brings us to the crucial issue raised in this petition. May a
superior officer under the notion of respondent superior be
answerable for damages, jointly and severally with his
subordinates, to the person whose constitutional rights and
liberties have been violated?
Respondents contend that the doctrine of respondent superior is
applicable to the case. We agree. The doctrine of respondent
superior has been generally limited in its application to principal
and agent or to master and servant (i.e. employer and employee)
relationship. No such relationship exists between superior officers
of the military and their subordinates.
Be that as it may, however, the decisive factor in this case, in our
view, is the language of Article 32. The law speaks of an officer or
employee or person 'directly' or "indirectly" responsible for the
violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it

is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who must
answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly
responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to
the aggrieved party.
By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials
under the Constitution 5 acquires added meaning and asgilrnes a
larger dimension. No longer may a superior official relax his
vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure
in the thought that he does not have to answer for the
transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally
protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors that
propelled people power in February 1986 was the widely held
perception that the government was callous or indifferent to, if not
actually responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights.
While it would certainly be go naive to expect that violators of
human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing
damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no ones
terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are
directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint
tortfeasors.
In the case at bar, the trial court dropped defendants General
Fabian Ver, Col. Fidel Singson, Col. Rolando Abadilla, Col. Gerardo
Lantoria, Jr., Col. Galileo Kintanar, Col. Panfilo Lacson, Capt. Danilo
Pizarro, lst Lt. Pedro Tango, Lt. Romeo Ricardo and Lt. Ricardo
Bacalso from the acts of their subordinates. Only Major Rodolfo
Aguinaldo and Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba were kept as
defendants on the ground that they alone 'have been specifically
mentioned and Identified to have allegedly caused injuries on the
persons of some of the plaintiff which acts of alleged physical
violence constitute a delict or wrong that gave rise to a cause of
action. But such finding is not supported by the record, nor is it in
accord with law and jurisprudence.
Firstly, it is wrong to at the plaintiffs' action for damages 5 Section
1, Article 19. to 'acts of alleged physical violence" which
constituted delict or wrong. Article 32 clearly specifies as

CONSTI2_CIVIL LIABILITY FOR VIOLATION OF RIGHTS

13
actionable the act of violating or in any manner impeding or
impairing any of the constitutional rights and liberties enumerated
therein, among others
1. Freedom from arbitrary arrest or illegal detention;
2. The right against deprivation of property without due process of
law;
3. The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures;
4. The privacy of communication and correspondence;
5. Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self,
or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a
promise of immunity or reward to make a confession, except when
the person confessing becomes a state witness.
The complaint in this litigation alleges facts showing with abundant
clarity and details, how plaintiffs' constitutional rights and liberties
mentioned in Article 32 of the Civil Code were violated and
impaired by defendants. The complaint speaks of, among others,
searches made without search warrants or based on irregularly
issued or substantially defective warrants; seizures and
confiscation, without proper receipts, of cash and personal effects
belonging to plaintiffs and other items of property which were not
subversive and illegal nor covered by the search warrants; arrest
and detention of plaintiffs without warrant or under irregular,
improper and illegal circumstances; detention of plaintiffs at
several undisclosed places of 'safehouses" where they were kept
incommunicado and subjected to physical and psychological torture
and other inhuman, degrading and brutal treatment for the purpose
of extracting incriminatory statements. The complaint contains a
detailed recital of abuses perpetrated upon the plaintiffs violative of
their constitutional rights.
Secondly, neither can it be said that only those shown to have
participated "directly" should be held liable. Article 32 of the Civil

Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those directly,

as well as indirectly, responsible for its violation.
The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is
amply set forth in the complaint. It is well established in our law
and jurisprudence that a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
complaint states no cause of action must be based on what
appears on the face of the complaint. 6 To determine the
sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the
complaint, and no others, should be considered. 7 For this purpose,
the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the
facts alleged in the complaint. 8
Applying this test, it is difficult to justify the trial court's ruling,
dismissing for lack of cause of action the complaint against all the
defendants, except Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Master Sgt.
Bienvenido Balaba. The complaint contained allegations against all
the defendants which, if admitted hypothetically, would be
sufficient to establish a cause or causes of action against all of
them under Article 32 of the Civil Code.
This brings us to the last issue. Was the trial court correct in
dismissing the complaint with respect to plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca,
Danilo de la Puente, Marco Palo, Alan Jazminez, Alex Marcelino,
Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin,
on the basis of the alleged failure of said plaintiffs to file a motion
for reconsideration of the court's resolution of November 8, 1983,
granting the respondent's motion to dismiss?
It is undisputed that a timely motion to set aside said order of
November 8, 1983 was filed by 'plaintiffs, through counsel. True,
the motion was signed only by Atty. Joker P. Arroyo, counsel for
Benjamin Sesgulido; Atty. Antonio Rosales, counsel for Edwin Lopez
and Manuel Martin Guzman; Atty. Pedro B. Ella, Jr., counsel for
Nestor Bodino and Carlos Palma; Atty. Arno V. Sanidad, counsel for
Arturo Tabara; Atty. Felicitas S. Aquino, counsel for Joseph Olayer;
and Atty. Alexander Padilla, counsel for Rodolfo Benosa.

CONSTI2_CIVIL LIABILITY FOR VIOLATION OF RIGHTS

14
But the body of the motion itself clearly indicated that the motion
was filed on behalf of all the plaintiffs. And this must have been
also the understanding of defendants' counsel himself for when he
filed his comment on the motion, he furnished copies thereof, not
just to the lawyers who signed the motion, but to all the lawyers of
plaintiffs, to wit: Attys. Jose Diokno, Procopio Beltran, Rene
Sarmiento, Efren Mercado, Augusto Sanchez, Antonio Rosales,
Pedro Efla Jr., Arno Sanidad, Alexander Padilla, Joker Arroyo, Rene
Saguisag, Ramon Esguerra and Felicitas S. Aquino.
In filing the motion to set aside the resolution of November 8, 1983,
the signing attorneys did so on behalf of all the plaintiff. They
needed no specific authority to do that. The authority of an
attorney to appear for and in behalf of a party can be assumed,
unless questioned or challenged by the adverse party or the party
concerned, which was never done in this case. Thus, it was grave
abuse on the part of respondent judge to take it upon himself to
rule that the motion to set aside the order of November 8, 1953
dismissing the complaint was filed only by some of the plaintiffs,
when by its very language it was clearly intended to be filed by and
for the benefit of all of them. It is obvious that the respondent
judge took umbrage under a contrived technicality to declare that
the dismissal of the complaint had already become final with
respect to some of the plaintiffs whose lawyers did not sign the
motion for reconsideration. Such action tainted with legal infirmity
cannot be sanctioned.
Accordingly, we grant the petition and annul and set aside the
resolution of the respondent court, dated November 8, 1983, its
order dated May 11, 1984 and its resolution dated September 21,
1984. Let the case be remanded to the respondent court for further
proceedings. With costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

CONSTI2_CIVIL LIABILITY FOR VIOLATION OF RIGHTS

15
G.R. No. 86720 September 2, 1994
MHP GARMENTS, INC., and LARRY C. DE GUZMAN,
petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AGNES VILLA CRUZ,
MIRASOL
LUGATIMAN,
and
GERTRUDES
GONZALES,
respondents.
PUNO, J.:
The constitutional protection of our people against unreasonable
search and seizure is not merely a pleasing platitude. It vouchsafes
our right to privacy and dignity against undesirable intrusions
committed by any public officer or private individual. An
infringement of this right justifies an award for damages.
On February 22, 1983, petitioner MHP Garments, Inc., was awarded
by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, the exclusive franchise to sell
and distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms, supplies, badges, and
insignias. In their Memorandum Agreement, petitioner corporation
was given the authority to "undertake or cause to be undertaken
the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scout uniforms and
other scouting supplies." 1
Sometime in October 1983, petitioner corporation received
information that private respondents Agnes Villa Cruz, Mirasol
Lugatiman, and Gertrudes Gonzales were selling Boy Scouts items
and paraphernalia without any authority. Petitioner de Guzman, an
employee of petitioner corporation, was tasked to undertake the
necessary surveillance and to make a report to the Philippine
Constabulary (PC).
On October 25, 1983, at about 10:30 A.M., petitioner de Guzman,
Captain Renato M. Peafiel, and two (2) other constabulary men of
the Reaction Force Battalion, Sikatuna Village, Diliman, Quezon City
went to the stores of respondents at the Marikina Public Market.
Without any warrant, they seized the boy and girl scouts pants,
dresses, and suits on display at respondents' stalls. The seizure

caused a commotion and embarrassed private respondents.

Receipts were issued for the seized items. The items were then
turned over by Captain Peafiel to petitioner corporation for
safekeeping.
A criminal complaint for unfair competition was then filed against
private respondents. 2 During its pendency, petitioner de Guzman
exacted from private respondent Lugatiman the sum of THREE
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED PESOS (P3,100.00) in order to be
dropped from the complaint. On December 6, 1983, after a
preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed the
complaint against all the private respondents. On February 6, 1984,
he also ordered the return of the seized items. The seized items
were not immediately returned despite demands. 3 Private
respondents had to go personally to petitioners' place of business
to recover their goods. Even then, not all the seized items were
returned. The other items returned were of inferior quality.
Private respondents then filed Civil Case No. 51144 against the
petitioners for sums of money and damages. 4 In its Decision dated
January 9, 1987, the trial court ruled for the private respondents,
thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and
against defendants, ordering the latter jointly and severally:
1. To return the amount of P3,100.00 to plaintiff Mirasol Lugatiman
with interest at 12% per annum from January 12, 1984, the date of
the last receipt issued, until fully paid;
2. To pay plaintiff Agnes Villa Cruz the sum of P2,000.00 for the 26
pieces of girl scout items not returned;
3. To pay plaintiffs the amount of P50,000.00 for and as moral
damages and P15,000.00 for and as exemplary damages; and
4. P5,000.00 for and as attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
Costs against the defendants.

CONSTI2_CIVIL LIABILITY FOR VIOLATION OF RIGHTS

16
SO ORDERED.
The decision was appealed to the respondent court. On January 18,
1989, its Fifth Division, 5 affirmed the Decision with modification,
thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION; and, as modified, the dispositive portion thereof
now reads as follows:
Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs (private
respondents) and against defendants (petitioners), ordering the
latter jointly and severally;
1. To return the amount of P3,100.00 to plaintiff (respondent)
Mirasol Lugatiman and cancel her application for distributor's
license;
2. To pay plaintiff (respondent) Agnes Villa Cruz the sum of
P2,000.00 for the unreturned 26 pieces of girl scouts items with
interest at 12% per annum from June 4, 1984 (date the complaint
was filed) until it is fully paid;
3. To pay plaintiffs (respondents) the amount of P10,000.00 each,
or a total of P30,000.00, for and as moral damages; and P5,000.00
each, or a total of P15,000.00, for and as exemplary damages; and
4. To pay plaintiffs (respondents) P5,000.00 for and as attorney's
fees and litigation expenses.
Costs of the case a quo and the instant appeal are assessed jointly
and severally against defendants-appellants (petitioners) MHP
Garments, Inc. and Larry de Guzman.
SO ORDERED.
In this petition for certiorari, petitioners contend:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IMPUTING LIABILITY FOR

DAMAGES TO THE PETITIONERS WHO DID NOT EFFECT THE
SEIZURE OF THE SUBJECT MERCHANDISE.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT MADE A FINDING THAT
THE MANNER WITH WHICH THE CONFISCATION OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS WAS TORTIOUS BUT PENALIZED INSTEAD THE
PETITIONERS WHO DID NOT COMMIT THE ACT OF CONFISCATION.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FOUND FOR THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS AND AGAINST THE PETITIONERS.
We affirm.
Article III, section 2, of the Constitution protects our people from
unreasonable search and seizure. It provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized.
This provision protects not only those who appear to be innocent
but also those who appear to be guilty but are nevertheless to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. 6 In the case at
bench, the seizure was made without any warrant. Under the Rules
of Court, 7 a warrantless search can only be undertaken under the
following circumstance:
Sec. 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. - A person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything

CONSTI2_CIVIL LIABILITY FOR VIOLATION OF RIGHTS

17
which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant.
We hold that the evidence did not justify the warrantless search
and seizure of private respondents' goods. Petitioner corporation
received information that private respondents were illegally selling
Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia in October 1983. The specific
date and time are not established in the evidence adduced by the
parties. Petitioner de Guzman then made a surveillance of the
stores of private respondents. They reported to the Philippine
Constabulary and on October 25, 1983, the raid was made on the
stores of private respondents and the supposed illicit goods were
seized. The progression of time between the receipt of the
information and the raid of the stores of private respondents shows
there was sufficient time for petitioners and the PC raiding party to
apply for a judicial warrant. Despite the sufficiency of time, they did
not apply for a warrant and seized the goods of private
respondents. In doing so, they took the risk of a suit for damages in
case the seizure would be proved to violate the right of private
respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. In the case
at bench, the search and seizure were clearly illegal. There was no
probable cause for the seizure. Probable cause for a search has
been defined as "such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched." 8 These facts and
circumstances were not in any way shown by the petitioners to
justify their warrantless search and seizure. Indeed, after a
preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed
their complaint for unfair competition and later ordered the return
of the seized goods.
Petitioners would deflect their liability with the argument that it was
the Philippine Constabulary that conducted the raid and their
participation was only to report the alleged illegal activity of private
respondents.

While undoubtedly, the members of the PC raiding team should

have been included in the complaint for violation of the private
respondents' constitutional rights, still, the omission will not
exculpate petitioners.
In the case of Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, 9 we ruled for the recovery of
damages for violation of constitutional rights and liberties from
public officer or private individual, thus:
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual,
who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any
manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties
of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages.
xxx xxx xxx
(9) The rights to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.
xxx xxx xxx
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages
may also be adjudged.
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(6) Illegal search;
(1) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
32, 34, and 35.
Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose constitutional
rights have been violated or impaired is entitled to actual and
moral damages from the public officer or employee responsible
therefor. In addition, exemplary damages may also be awarded.
xxx xxx xxx

CONSTI2_CIVIL LIABILITY FOR VIOLATION OF RIGHTS

18
The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or
criminal. It is not necessary therefore that there should be malice or
bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose
of Article 32 which is the effective protection of individual rights.
Public officials in the past have abused their powers on the pretext
of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their
duties. Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end to official
abuse by plea of the good faith. In the United States this remedy is
in the nature of a tort. (emphasis supplied)
In the subsequent case of Aberca vs. Ver, 10 the Court En Banc
explained the liability of persons indirectly responsible, viz:
[T]he decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of
Article 32. The law speaks of an officer or employee or person
"directly or indirectly" responsible for the violation of the
constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the
actor alone (i.e., the one directly responsible) who must answer for
damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has
also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved
party.
xxx xxx xxx
While it would certainly be too naive to expect that violators of
human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing
damages suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain
terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are
directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint
tortfeasors.
xxx xxx xxx
[N]either can it be said that only those shown to have participated
"directly" should be held liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code
encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those directly, as
well as indirectly, responsible for its violations. (emphasis supplied)

Applying the aforecited provisions and leading cases, the

respondent court correctly granted damages to private
respondents. Petitioners were indirectly involved in transgressing
the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and
seizure. Firstly, they instigated the raid pursuant to their covenant
in the Memorandum Agreement to undertake the prosecution in
court of all illegal sources of scouting supplies. 11 As correctly
observed by respondent court:
Indeed, the acts committed by the PC soldiers of unlawfully seizing
appellees' (respondents') merchandise and of filing the criminal
complaint for unfair competition against appellees (respondents)
were for the protection and benefit of appellant (petitioner)
corporation. Such being the case, it is, thus, reasonably fair to infer
from those acts that it was upon appellant (petitioner) corporation's
instance that the PC soldiers conducted the raid and effected the
illegal seizure. These circumstances should answer the trial court's
query posed in its decision now under consideration as to why
the PC soldiers immediately turned over the seized merchandise to
appellant (petitioner) corporation. 12
The raid was conducted with the active participation of their
employee. Larry de Guzman did not lift a finger to stop the seizure
of the boy and girl scouts items. By standing by and apparently
assenting thereto, he was liable to the same extent as the officers
themselves. 13 So with the petitioner corporation which even
received for safekeeping the goods unreasonably seized by the PC
raiding team and de Guzman, and refused to surrender them for
quite a time despite the dismissal of its complaint for unfair
competition.
Secondly, Letter of Instruction No. 1299 was precisely crafted on
March 9, 1983 to safeguard not only the privilege of franchise
holder of scouting items but also the citizen's constitutional rights,
to wit:

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TITLE: APPREHENSION OF UNAUTHORIZED MANUFACTURERS AND
DISTRIBUTORS OF SCOUT PARAPHERNALIA AND IMPOUNDING OF
SAID PARAPHERNALIA.
ABSTRACT:
Directs all law enforcement agencies of the Republic of the
Philippines, to apprehend immediately unauthorized manufacturers
and distributors of Scout paraphernalia, upon proper application by
the Boy Scouts of the Philippines and/or Girl Scouts of the
Philippines for warrant of arrest and/or search warrant with a judge,
or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law; and
to impound the said paraphernalia to be used as evidence in court
or other appropriate administrative body. Orders the immediate and
strict compliance with the Instructions. 14
Under the above provision and as aforediscussed, petitioners
miserably failed to report the unlawful peddling of scouting goods
to the Boy Scouts of the Philippines for the proper application of a
warrant. Private respondents' rights are immutable and cannot be
sacrificed to transient needs. 15 Petitioners did not have the
unbridled license to cause the seizure of respondents' goods
without any warrant.
And thirdly, if petitioners did not have a hand in the raid, they
should have filed a third-party complaint against the raiding team
for contribution or any other relief, 16 in respect of respondents'
claim for Recovery of Sum of Money with Damages. Again, they did
not.
We have consistently ruled that moral damages are not awarded to
penalize the defendant but to compensate the plaintiff for the
injuries he may have suffered. 17 Conformably with our ruling in
Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, op. cit., moral damages can be awarded in
the case at bench. There can be no doubt that petitioners must
have suffered sleepless nights, serious anxiety, and wounded
feelings due the tortious raid caused by petitioners. Private
respondents' avowals of embarrassment and humiliation during the

seizure of their merchandise were supported by their testimonies.

Respondent Cruz declared:
I felt very nervous. I was crying to loss (sic) my goods and capital
because I am doing business with borrowed money only, there was
commotion created by the raiding team and they even stepped on
some of the pants and dresses on display for sale. All passersby
stopped to watch and stared at me with accusing expressions. I was
trembling and terribly ashamed, sir. 18
Respondent Lugatiman testified:
I felt very nervous. I was crying and I was very much ashamed
because many people have been watching the PC soldiers hauling
my items, and many/I (sic) heard say "nakaw pala ang mga iyan"
for which I am claiming P25,000.00 for damages. 19
While respondent Gonzalez stated thus:
I do not like the way the raid was conducted by the team sir
because it looked like that what I have been selling were stolen
items that they should be confiscated by uniformed soldiers. Many
people were around and the more the confiscation was made in a
scandalous manner; every clothes, T-shirts, pants and dresses even
those not wrapped dropped to the ground. I was terribly shamed in
the presence of market goers that morning. 20
Needles to state, the wantonness of the wrongful seizure justifies
the award of exemplary damages. 21 It will also serve as a stern
reminder to all and sundry that the constitutional protection against
unreasonable search and seizure is a virile reality and not a mere
burst of rhetoric. The all encompassing protection extends against
intrusions directly done both by government and indirectly by
private entities.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. We impose a SIX PERCENT (6%) interest from
January 9, 1987 on the TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) for the
unreturned twenty-six (26) pieces of girl scouts items and a

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TWELVE PERCENT (12%) interest, in lieu of SIX PERCENT (6%), on
the said amount upon finality of this Decision until the payment
thereof. 22 Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.