UY V.

SANDIGANBAYAN (2001)
DOCTRINE: THE OMBUDSMAN IS CLOTHED WITH AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION AND TO PROSECUTE ALL CRIMINAL CASES
INVOLVING PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES, NOT ONLY THOSE WITHIN THE
JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, BUT THOSE WITHIN THE JURISDICTION
OF THE REGULAR COURTS AS WELL
RELEVANT LAWS:
SECTIONS 11 AND 15 OF RA 6770
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties.--The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this
primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of
Government, the investigation of such cases;
xxx
Section 11 grants the Office of the Special Prosecutor, an organic component of the Office
of the Ombudsman under the latters supervision and control, the power to conduct
preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. It states:
Sec. 11. Structural Organization. x x x
xxx
(3) The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall be composed of the Special Prosecutor and
his prosecution staff. The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall be an organic component
of the Office of the Ombudsman and shall be under the supervision and control of the
Ombudsman.
(4) The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall, under the supervision and control and upon
authority of the Ombudsman, have the following powers:
(a) To conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan;
(b) To enter into plea bargaining agreements; and
(c) To perform such other duties assigned to it by the Ombudsman.

FACTS:

PRESENT CASE: motion for further clarification filed by Ombudsman

Desierto re: SCs ruling 99 and resolution dated 2000 stating that the
power of the Ombudsman extends only to cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and that the Ombudsman has no authority to prosecute
cases falling within the jurisdiction of regular courts.
CONTEXT
George Uy, a Deputy Comptroller, together with 19 co accused, were
charged with
six (6) informations for estafa through falsification of official documents
and one (1) information for violation of Section 3 (e), R.A. No. 3019
Sandiganbayan calls for a reinvestigation
Special Prosecutor (office under the Ombudsman) endorsed that the
case of estafa be replaced with informations for violation of Section 3
(e) of R.A. No. 3019, and such be charged against Uy and 10 co
accused
Special Prosecutor Desierto reduced those to be charged for violation
of R.A. No. 3019 to five, Uy included
from the five remaining accused, two were dropped (again), leaving Uy
and two others to face the six separate informations for violation of
Section 3 (e), R.A. 3019
Uy filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to Quash, Sandiganbayan
denied Uys petition

RELEVANT ISSUE: SCOPE OF THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION POWERS OF

THE OMBUDSMAN

1999 DECISION: In this connection, it is the prosecutor, not the

Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the corresponding information/s
against petitioner in the regional trial court. The Ombudsman exercises
prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan

2000 DECISION: The clear import of such pronouncement is to recognize

the authority of the State and regular provincial and city prosecutors
under the Department of Justice to have control over prosecution of cases
falling within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The investigation and
prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman relate to cases rightfully falling
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan under Section 15 (1) of R.A.
6770 ("An Act Providing for the Functional and Structural Organization of
the Office of the Ombudsman, and for other purposes") which vests upon
the Ombudsman "primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan" And this is further buttressed by Section 11 (4a) of R.A.
6770 which emphasizes that the Office of the Special Prosecutor shall
have the power to "conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute
criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan." Thus,
repeated references to the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction clearly
serve to limit the Ombudsman's and Special Prosecutor's
authority to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan

ISSUE + RULING

W/N THE SCOPE OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE OMBUDSMAN IS LIMITED TO THE

CASES COGNIZABLE BY THE SANDIGANBAYAN?
- NO.
- THE OMBUDSMAN IS CLOTHED WITH AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION AND TO PROSECUTE ALL CRIMINAL CASES
INVOLVING PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES, NOT ONLY THOSE WITHIN
THE JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, BUT THOSE WITHIN THE
JURISDICTION OF THE REGULAR COURTS AS WELL (RA 6770, SECS. 11
&15)
- The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the
Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified
pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient
the law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts
Sec. 15 (1) and Sec. 11 (4) should not be construed as confining the
scope of the investigatory and prosecutor powers of the Ombudsman
Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction
over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan does not
necessarily imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases
involving public officers and employees cognizable by other
courts not incompatible with the discharge of his duty to
investigate and prosecute other offenses committed by public
officers and employees
the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be
equated with the limited authority of the Special Prosecutor
under Section 11 of RA 6770 as the Office of the Special
Prosecutor (power to conduct preliminary investigation and to
prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan) is merely a component of the Office of
the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and
control and upon authority of the Ombudsman
- The authority of the Ombudsman to prosecute cases involving public
officers and employees before the regular courts does not conflict with the
power of the regular prosecutors under the Department of Justice to
control and direct the prosecution of all criminal actions under Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Rules of Court must be read
in conjunction with RA 6770 which charged the Ombudsman with the duty
to investigate and prosecute all illegal acts and omissions of public officers
and employees. The Court held in the case of Sanchez vs.
Demetriou that the power of the Ombudsman under Section 15 (1) of RA
6770 is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent
authority in respect of the offense charged

SALES V. SANDIGANBAYAN
DOCTRINE: THE RIGHT OF THE STATE TO PROSECUTE IS NOT A CARTE
BLANCHE FOR GOVERNMENT AGENTS TO DEFY AND DISREGARD THE RIGHTS OF

ITS CITIZENS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. CONFINEMENT, REGARDLESS OF

DURATION, IS TOO A HIGH A PRICE TO PAY FOR RECKLESS AND IMPULSIVE
PROSECUTION.
FACTS:
-

2-AUG-99: Reynolan Sales, the incumbent mayor of Pagudpud, Ilocos

Norte, fatally shot his political rival, Atty. Benemerito in an alleged
shootout in a barangay of said municipality
After said shooting, Sales surrendered and placed himself under the
custody of the police and then asked that he be brought to the Provincial
PNP Headquarters
3-AUG-99: P. Chief Insp. Agno and the wife of the deceased filed a criminal
complaint for Murder against petitioner at MCTC Bangui, Ilocos Norte
Presiding judge, Hon. Calvan, conducted a preliminary examination of the
witnesses, found probable cause, and thereafter issued an order for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest with no bail recommended
4-AUG-99: by virtue of the warrant Sales was transferred to the provincial
jail
5-AUG-99: Judge Calvan issues a resolution forwarding the records of the
case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action an
NBI parallel investigation report date August 13 was also submitted to the
office of the provincial prosecutor
19-AUG-99: Sales received a subpoena dated Aug. 18 from the Provincial
Prosecutor directing him to file his counter-affidavits + affidavits of his
witnesses + other documents within 10 days after receipt he submitted
such documents the next day
While the foregoing proceedings were ongoing, petitioner filed a petition
for habeas corpus with the Court of Appeals alleging that: 1.] the order
and warrant of arrest for which petitioner was detained is null and void for
being issued by respondent judge who was disqualified by law from acting
on the case by reason of his affinity to private respondent Thelma
Benemerito; and 2.] the preliminary examination by respondent judge was
so illegally and irregularly conducted as to oust the said judge of
jurisdiction over the case CA GRANTED THE PETITION 1. Judge is a
relative within the third degree of Benemerito (wife); 2. the preliminary
examination conducted by respondent Judge does not accord with the
prevailing rules (he followed old rules)
After receipt of the records of the case from Judge Calvan as well as
petitioner-accuseds counter-affidavits, the Ilocos Norte Provincial
Prosecutor, instead of conducting a preliminary investigation of his own,
merely forwarded the said records to the Ombudsman for the latter to
conduct the same
It appears that petitioner was only apprised of the foregoing inaction on
the case by the Provincial Prosecutor when he received on September 10 a
Memorandum dated September 2, 1999, filed by private respondents
counsel, requesting that the case, I.S. No. 99-548, be remanded to Office
of the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation and, thereafter, for the
prosecution of the appropriate indictments before the Sandiganbayan
27-JAN-00: Petitioner received a notice from the Ombudsman directing him
to file his counter-affidavits, thinking that he had already submitted his

counter-affidavits to Provincial Prosecutor as far back as August 1999, he

found the directive superfluous and did not act on it
25-MAY-00: Graft Investigation Officer Vivar recommended the filing of an
information for murder against petitioner + 4 others before the
Sandiganbayan Ombudsman approved it on 16-JUNE
Petitioner belatedly received a copy of the foregoing Resolution of the
graft investigation officer only on June 21, 2000, and because he was thus
effectively prevented from seeking a reconsideration thereof, he then filed
a Motion To Defer Issuance Of Warrant Of Arrest pending determination of
probable cause dated June 22, 2000 SB DENIED SUCH MOTION
Hence, this petition

ISSUE + RULING
WHETHER OR NOT THE OMBUDSMAN FOLLOWED THE PROPER PROCEDURE IN
CONDUCTING A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION and, corollarily, WHETHER OR NOT
PETITIONER WAS AFFORDED AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD AND TO SUBMIT
CONTROVERTING EVIDENCE?
-

NO, and NO.

FIRST, the records show that the supposed preliminary
investigation was conducted in installments by at least three (3)
different investigating officers, none of whom completed the
preliminary investigation. There was not one continuous proceeding
but rather a case of passing the buck, so to speak, the last one being the
Ombudsman hurriedly throwing the buck to the Sandiganbayan
SECOND, the charge against herein petitioner is Murder, a non-bailable
offense. The gravity of the offense alone, not to mention the fact that the
principal accused is an incumbent mayor whose imprisonment during the
pendency of the case would deprive his constituents of their duly-elected
municipal executive, should have merited a deeper and more thorough
preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman, however, did nothing of
the sort and instead swallowed hook, line and sinker the
resolution and recommendation of Graft Investigation Officer II
Cynthia V. Vivar, among them the finding that, aside from the averment
of respondent that the victim fired at him and he was only forced to fire
back, no other evidence was adduced to indicate that such was what
happened.
THERE WERE A LOT OF DUBIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES THAT
WARRANTED A MORE THOROUGH INQUIRY
four affidavits on record which state in categorical terms that it
was the victim who first fired at petitioner with his Armalite rifle
and that petitioner merely returned fire this was ignored by
the Ombudsman
two (2) different autopsies on the cadaver of the victim, one
indicating that the victim sustained two (2) wounds only and the
other showing that the victim had three (3) wounds
the Ombudsman also glossed over the adamant refusal of the
private respondent to subject the cadaver of the victim to a
paraffin test
Prosecutors are endowed with ample powers in order that they may
properly fulfill their assigned role in the administration of justice. It

should be realized, however, that when a man is haled to court on a

criminal charge, it brings in its wake problems not only for the accused
but for his family as well. Therefore, it behooves a prosecutor to weigh
the evidence carefully and to deliberate thereon to determine the
existence of a prima facie case before filing the information in
court. Anything less would be a dereliction of duty.
THIRD, a person under preliminary investigation by the Ombudsman is
entitled to file a motion for reconsideration of the adverse resolution
pursuant to Sec. 7 of the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman this was
not followed in the case at bar; the Information was filed without first
affording petitioner-accused his right to file a motion for reconsideration
the denial thereof is tantamount to a denial of the right itself to a
preliminary investigation
This fact alone already renders preliminary investigation conducted in
this case incomplete. The inevitable conclusion is that the petitioner
was not only effectively denied the opportunity to file a motion for
reconsideration of the Ombudsmans final resolution but also deprived
of his right to a full preliminary investigation preparatory to
the filing of the information against him
FOURTH, it was patent error for the Sandiganbayan to have relied purely
on the Ombudsmans certification of probable cause given the prevailing
facts of this case much more so in the face of the latters flawed report and
one-sided factual findings
FIFTH, the respondent Judge committed a grave error when he relied
solely on the Prosecutors certification and issued the questioned Order
dated July 5, 1990 without having before him any other basis for his
personal determination of the existence of probable cause
While the task of conducting a preliminary investigation is assigned
either to an inferior court magistrate or to a prosecutor, only a judge
may issue a warrant of arrest. When the preliminary investigation is
conducted by an investigating prosecutor, in this case the
Ombudsman, the determination of probable cause by the investigating
prosecutor cannot serve as the sole basis for the issuance by the court
of a warrant of arrest. This is because the court with whom the
information is filed is tasked to make its own independent
determination of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of
arrest
The Judge must go beyond the Prosecutors certification and
investigation report whenever necessary. He should call for the
complainant and witnesses themselves to answer the courts
probing questions when the circumstances so require

DISUCUSSION RE: PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

-

[t]he purpose of a preliminary investigation or a previous inquiry of some

kind, before an accused person is placed on trial, is to secure the innocent
against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution and to protect him
from an open and public accusation of a crime, from the trouble, expenses
and anxiety of a public trial
also intended to protect the state from having to conduct useless and
expensive trials

While the right is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, it is

a component part of due process in criminal justice. The right to have a
preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to
trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of
incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or
technical right; it is a substantive right. To deny the accuseds claim
to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him of the full measure
of his right to due process
The officer conducting the same investigates or inquires into the facts
concerning the commission of the crime with the end in view of
determining whether or not an information may be prepared against the
accused
A preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the
merits of the case
Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so that
when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound as a matter of law
to order an acquittal. A preliminary investigation has been called a judicial
inquiry. It is a judicial proceeding. An act becomes a judicial proceeding
when there is an opportunity to be heard and for the production of and
weighing of evidence, and a decision is rendered thereon
The authority of a prosecutor or investigating officer duly empowered to
preside or to conduct a preliminary investigation is no less than a
municipal judge or even a regional trial court judge he is and must be
considered to be a quasi-judicial officer because a preliminary
investigation is considered a judicial proceeding

HEGERTY V. CA
DOCTRINE: A PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, BY THE NATURE OF HIS OFFICE, IS UNDER
NO COMPULSION TO FILE A CRIMINAL INFORMATION WHERE NO CLEAR LEGAL
JUSTIFICATION HAS BEEN SHOWN, AND NO SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF GUILT
NOR PRIMA FACIE CASE HAS BEEN PRESENTED BY THE PETITIONER.
FACTS:
-

Respondent Allan Nash alleged that petitioner Rodney Hegerty, together

with the deceased Don Judevine and James Studenski, invited him to
invest in a foreign exchange scheme with a guaranteed return of 10.45%
per annum on the money invested. From July 1992 to November 28, 1997,
Nash invested a total of US$236,353.34

Sometime in December 1997, Hegerty informed Nash that all his

investments had been lost after he lent a portion of the investment to
Swagman Hotels and Travel, Inc., of which he was a stockholder.

Initially, Hegerty offered to return to Nash half of his total investment, but
later on withdrew the offer.

After his demands were ignored, Nash filed a complaint-affidavit against

Hegerty before the City Prosecutor of Manila for estafa

For his part, Hegerty denied making any invitation to Nash to invest his
money in any foreign exchange scheme. Neither did he divert any portion
of such investment to the Swagman Group of Companies. He, however,
admitted his acquaintance with Judevine and Studenski but denied that
they were his business partners. He likewise disclaimed any knowledge of
or participation in any of the receipts and cash vouchers presented by
Nash supposedly as proofs of his investments.

The City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint for estafa against Hegerty for
insufficiency of evidence.

Upon receipt of a copy of the said resolution on June 16, 1999, counsel of
Nash filed a motion for reconsideration. On May 8, 2000, Nash himself
received a copy of the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.

On May 19, 2000, Nash filed an appeal with the Department of Justice
(DOJ), however, the same was dismissed for having been filed out of
time. He filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied again for
having been filed beyond the reglementary period of ten (10) days.

Undaunted, Nash filed with the Court of Appeals a petition

for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, contending that the DOJ acted in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed his
appeal and denied his motion for reconsideration CA GRANTED SUCH
PETITION

Hence, this petition for review

ISSUE + RULING
W/N THE CITY PROSECUTOR ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
DISMISSING THE CRIMINAL COMPLAINT FOR ESTAFA AGAINST HEGERTY?
-

NO.
GAD: By grave abuse of discretion is meant, such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of
law.
IN THIS CASE, the Court found no evidence to prove that the City
Prosecutor abused, much less gravely abused, his discretion when he
dismissed the complaint for estafa filed against Hegerty.
Moreover, the appeal filed by respondent with the Department of Justice
was out of time

DISCUSSION RE: PROSECUTOR

-

A PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, BY THE NATURE OF HIS OFFICE, IS UNDER NO

COMPULSION TO FILE A CRIMINAL INFORMATION WHERE NO CLEAR LEGAL

JUSTIFICATION HAS BEEN SHOWN, AND NO SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF

GUILT NOR PRIMA FACIECASE HAS BEEN PRESENTED BY THE PETITIONER.
The determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation or
reinvestigation is recognized as an executive function exclusively of the
prosecutor. An investigating prosecutor is under no obligation to file a
criminal action where he is not convinced that he has the quantum of
evidence at hand to support the averments. Prosecuting officers have
equally the duty not to prosecute when after investigation or
reinvestigation they are convinced that the evidence adduced was not
sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Thus, the determination of the
persons to be prosecuted rests primarily with the prosecutor who is vested
with discretion in the discharge of this function
The remedy of mandamus does not lie to compel the City Prosecutor to file
an Information against petitioner. There being no showing of grave abuse
of discretion which will warrant the reversal of the dismissal of the
complaint against petitioner, there is also no ground to issue a writ of
mandamus.

PEOPLE V. SANDIGANBAYAN (2013)

SHORT OF THE LONG With the Ombudsmans finding that the extortion
(intimidation) was perpetrated on February 13, 2001 and that there was transfer of
Mark Jimenez US $1,999,965.00 to Coutts Bank Account HO 133706 on February 23,
2001 in favor of the accused, there is no reason why within a reasonable period from
these dates, the complaint should not be resolved. The act of intimidation was there,
the asportation was complete as of February 23, 2001 why was the information filed
only on April 18, 2008. For such a simple charge of Robbery there is nothing more to
consider and all the facts and circumstances upon which to anchor a resolution
whether to give due course to the complaint or dismiss it are on hand. The case is
more than ripe for resolution. Failure to act on the same is a clear transgression of
the constitutional rights of the accused. A healthy respect for the constitutional
prerogative of the accused should have prodded the Ombudsman to act within
reasonable time.
FACTS: not yet complete
-

12-NOV-02: Cong. Villarama of Bulacan delivered a privilege speech in the

House of Representatives denouncing acts of bribery allegedly committed by
a high ranking government official whom he then called the "2 Million Dollar
Man."
Office of the President directed the PAGC to conduct an inquiry on the
allegations of Cong. Villarama
PAGC sent written communications to Cong. Villarama, Cong. Mark Jimenez,
Senator Panfilo Lacson and respondent Secretary of Justice Hernando B. Perez
inviting them to provide information and documents on the alleged bribery
subject of the expos Villarama replied that Secretary Perez was the
government official who "ha[d] knowledge or connection with the bribery
subject of his expos
Sec. Perez however denied such allegations
25-NOV-02: Cong. Jimenez delivered a privilege speech confirming Cong.
Villaramas expos

Ombudsman Marcelo requested PAGC to submit documents relevant to

the expos
Cong. Jimenez complied on December 23, 2002 by submitting his complaintaffidavit to the Office of the Ombudsman
On the same day, the Special Action Team of the Fact Finding and Intelligence
Research Office (FIRO) of the Office of the Ombudsman referred Cong.
Jimenezs complaint-affidavit to the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation
Bureau and to the Administrative Adjudication Board, both of the Office of the
Ombudsman, for preliminary investigation and administrative adjudication,
respectively Led to the criminal case against Perez et al. and to the
administrative case against Perez
2-JAN-03: a Special Panel composed of Atty. Evelyn Baliton, Atty. Mary Susan
Guillermo and Atty. Jose de Jesus was created to evaluate and conduct an
investigation
Secretary Perez, through counsel, requested Ombudsman Marcelo that the
Office of the Ombudsman itself directly verify from the Coutts Bank whether
he (Secretary Perez) had ever held any account in that bank to which the sum
of US$2 Million had been remitted by Cong. Jimenez
15-JAN-03: Ombudsman Marcelo approved the recommendation of the Special
Panel to refer the complaint of Cong. Jimenez to FIRO for a full-blown factfinding investigation
4-JUNE-03: the Office of the Ombudsman received the letter dated May 30,
2003 from the counsel of Cong. Jimenez, submitting the supplemental
complaint-affidavit dated April 4, 2003 of Cong. Jimenez
3-JUL-03 LETTER: Secretary Perez, through counsel, sought the dismissal of
the complaint for lack of probable cause
17-JUL-03: Assistant Ombudsman Pelagio S. Apostol informed Secretary Perez
about the letter from Coutts Bank stating that "Hernando B. Perez" had no
account with it, and assured that the letter would be considered in the final
resolution of the case
22-AUG-05: Ombudsman Marcelo created a new Special Panel to evaluate
CPL-C-02-1992, and, if warranted, to conduct administrative and preliminary
investigations, thereby superseding the creation of the Special Panel formed
on January 2, 2003
14-NOV-05: the Field Investigation Office (FIO) completed its fact-finding
investigation and filed complaints against:
Former Justice Secretary Hernando B. Perez, Rosario S. Perez, Ernesto L.
Escaler, Ramon C. Arceo and John Does for violation of Section 3(b) of R.A.
No. 3019;
Former Justice Secretary Hernando B. Perez for violation of the following:
Section 8 in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713, Article 183 (Perjury) of
the Revised Penal Code, and Article 171, par. 4 (Falsification) of the RPC;
and
Former Justice Secretary Hernando B. Perez, Rosario S. Perez, Ernest L.
Escaler, Ramon C. Arceo and John Does for violation of the provisions of
R.A. 1379
23-NOV-05: the Special Panel directed Secretary Perez (who had meanwhile
resigned from office), his wife Rosario S. Perez (Mrs. Perez), Escaler and Arceo
to submit their counter-affidavits; in a separate order issued on the same
date, the Special Panel also directed Perez to submit his counter-affidvait in a
different case
29-NOV-05: the respondents filed an urgent motion for extension of time to
file their counter-affidavits

2-DEC-05: the counsel for Escaler entered his appearance and sought the
extension of the time to file Escalers counter-affidavit
5-DEC-05: the Special Panel ordered the respondents to file their counteraffidavits within ten days from December 4, 2005, or until December 14, 2005
7-DEC-05: Asst. Ombudsman Apostol issued PAMO Office Order No. 22, Series
of 2005, creating a new team of investigators to assist in the preliminary
investigation and administrative adjudication of OMB-C-C-02-0857L, OMB-C-A02-0631L (administrative case), OMB-CC-05-0633K to OMB-C-C-0635K
(forfeiture proceedings under Republic Act No. 1379) the office order
cancelled and superseded PAMO Office Order No. 01-2003, Series of 2003.
12-DEC-05: former Secretary Perez, Mrs. Perez and Arceo filed an urgent
motion to be furnished copies of the complaints
13-DEC-05: they submitted a consolidated joint counter-affidavit dated
December 12, 2005
15-DEC-05: the respondents filed a manifestation to which they attached the
affidavit of Atty. Chona Dimayuga
20-DEC-05: Escaler, instead of filing his counter-affidavit, moved to disqualify
the Office of the Ombudsman from conducting the preliminary investigation,
and to require the Special Panel to turn over the investigation to the
Department of Justice (DOJ)
22-DEC-05: the respondents submitted the affidavit of Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencito Zuo
29-DEC-05: the Special Panel denied the motion to disqualify the Office of the
Ombudsman from conducting the preliminary investigation, and ordered
Escaler to submit his counter-affidavit within five days from notice
4-JAN-06: Cong. Jimenez filed an urgent motion for extension of the period to
file his opposition to the motion earlier filed by Escaler, and to be granted a
new period to reply to the consolidated joint counter-affidavit of the Perezes
and Arceo
9-JAN-0610-FEB-06: Cong. Jimenez filed urgent motions for time to file his
opposition, the last of them seeking an extension until February 10, 2006
21-FEB-06: the Perezes and Arceo reiterated their urgent motion to be
furnished copies of the complaints
22-FEB-06: Cong. Jimenez opposed Escalers motion to disqualify the Office of
the Ombudsman Escaler asked for at least 20 days from February 17, 2006
(or until March 9, 2006) within which to reply to Cong. Jimenezs opposition to
his motion
9-MAR-06: Escaler replied to Cong. Jimenezs opposition
28-MAR-06: Cong. Jimenez sought leave to file a rejoinder to Escalers reply
15-MAY-06: Escaler moved for the reconsideration of the order of December
29, 2005
25-MAY-06: the Special Panel denied Escalers motion for reconsideration;
directed the FIO "to let respondent Escaler examine, compare, copy and
obtain any and all documentary evidence described, attached to and forming
part of the complaints" of the cases; and granted Escaler an extension of five
days within which to submit his counter-affidavit ESCALER FAILED TO
SUBMIT HIS COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT W/IN THE LAPSE OF 5 DAYS PRELIM.
INVESTIGATION TERMINATED
23-AUG-06: Escaler commenced in this Court a special civil action
for certiorari with application for a TRO
6-NOV-06: The Special Panel issued a joint resolution, finding probable cause
and recommending that criminal informations be filed against the
respondents

5-JAN-07: Ombudsman Gutierrez approved the joint resolution of the special

panel
11-JAN-07: the Perezes and Arceo sought the reconsideration of the joint
resolution,40 and supplemented their motion for that purpose with additional
arguments on January 15, 2007
17-JAN-07: Arceo filed an ex parte motion for leave to admit attached
supplemental motion for reconsideration
24-JAN-07: Perezes and Arceo filed an urgent motion to suspend proceedings.
On
6-FEB-07: Escaler also filed a motion to suspend proceedings ex abundanti ad
cautelam
15-MAR-07: Cong. Jimenez asked for time to comment on the respondents
motion for reconsideration. He filed another motion for extension of the time
to comment on April 27, 2007
18-SEPT-07: the Perezes prayed that the proceedings be held in abeyance to
await the ruling on their application for intervention in Escalers action in the
Court. On October 1, 2007, they filed a motion to dismiss
2-OCT-07: Cong. Jimenez submitted his affidavit of desistance. Thus, on
October 4, 2007, the Perezes filed an ex parte motion for resolution on the
basis of the desistance by Cong. Jimenez
26-JAN-08: the Special Panel issued an omnibus resolution denying the
original and supplemental motions for reconsideration of the Perezes and
Arceo; their motion to suspend the proceedings; Escalers motion to suspend
proceedings ex abundanti ad cautelam; and the Perezes motion to dismiss
18-APR-08: the Perezes brought a petition for certiorari with an application for
a writ of preliminary injunction in this Court
18-APR-08: the Office of the Ombudsman filed in the Sandiganbayan four
informations against respondents violation of Sec. 3 of RA 3019; ROBBERY;
VIOLATING RPC 171; VIOLATING SEC. 7 OF 3019 IN REL. TO SEC. OF RA 6713
8-MAY-08: the Perezes moved to quash the information. Escaler presented a
similar motion to quash ex abundanti ad cautelam on May 12, 2008, while
Arceo adopted the motions of the Perezes and Escaler on May 13, 2008. On
June 4, 2008, the Office of the Ombudsman countered with a consolidated
opposition DENIED BY THE SB ON 17 JUL 08
Respondents separately sought the reconsideration of the resolution of denial
of their motions to quash
13-NOV-08: the Sandiganbayan First Division granted the motions for
reconsideration
The State moved for the reconsideration during pendency of this MFR, case
was raffled to the third division
21-APR-09: The Third Division denied the Ombudsmans MFR
22-JUN-09: the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) assailed in this Court via
petition for certiorari the resolution of the Sandiganbayan promulgated on July
17, 2008 quashing the information in Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0265 and
the resolution promulgated on April 21, 2009 denying the States motion for
reconsideration
18-NOV-09: the Court denied the Perezes urgent motion for leave to file a
motion to dismiss for being a prohibited pleading, and instead required the
respondents to comment on the petition, among other things

ISSUES + RULING

WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, NOT

THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN THAT HAD THE AUTHORITY TO FILE THE
PETITIONS TO ASSAIL THE SANDIGANBAYAN RESOLUTIONS?
-

NO.

The Office of the Ombudsman is empowered to file an appeal

or certiorari from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court

That only the Solicitor General may represent the People on appeal
or certiorari in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings is the general rule, but the rule admits the exception
concerning "all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the
Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman,
through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the
Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A, issued in 1986." (SEE SEC. 4 (C) OF RA 8249)

WHETHER THE STATE, AS THE PETITIONER IN G.R. NO. 188165 AND G.R. NO.
189063, RESORTED TO THE WRONG REMEDY IN ASSAILING THE RESOLUTIONS OF
THE SANDIGANBAYAN DISMISSING THE CRIMINAL CHARGES AGAINST THE
RESPONDENTS THROUGH PETITIONS FOR CERTIORARI INSTEAD OF PETITIONS
FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI?
-

YES.

The petitions for certiorari brought by the State must nonetheless be

dismissed for failure to show any grave abuse of discretion on the part of
Sandiganbayan in issuing the assailed resolutions.

A special civil action for certiorari is an independent action based on the

specific grounds provided in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and
can prosper only the jurisdictional error, or the grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the inferior court
or judge is alleged and proved to exist.

The writ of certiorari being a remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in

character, whose purpose is to keep an inferior court within the bounds of
its jurisdiction, or to prevent an inferior court from committing such grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction, or to relieve
parties from arbitrary acts of courts (i.e., acts that courts have no power or
authority in law to perform) is not a general utility tool in the legal
workshop, and cannot be issued to correct every error committed by a
lower court the petitioner must show that, one, the tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, and, two, there is neither an appeal nor any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose
of amending or nullifying the proceeding

WHETHER OR NOT THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN QUASHING
THE INFORMATION BY APPLYING THE DEFINITION OF TRANSACTION IN SORIANO,
JR. V SANDIGANBAYAN, 131 SCRA 188?
-

NO.

The Sandiganbayan correctly applied the restrictive meaning of

the term transaction as used in Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No.
3019 adopted in Soriano, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan

WHETHER OR NOT THE SANDIGANABAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
DISMISSED THE CRIMINAL CASE DUE TO THE INORDINATE DELAY OF THE OFFICE
OF THE OMBUDSMAN IN BRINGING THE CRIMINAL ACTION AGAINST
RESPONDENTS AS TO VIOLATE THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO THE SPEEDY
DISPOSITION OF CASES?

NO.

The Sandiganbayan did not commit any grave abuse of discretion

in finding that there had been an inordinate delay in the
resolution against respondents of the charge in Criminal Case No.
SB-08-CRM-0266

CONTEXT: Upon its finding that the Office of the Ombudsman had incurred
inordinate delay in resolving the complaint Cong. Jimenez had brought
against the respondents, the Sandiganbayan dismissed Criminal Case No.
SB-08-CRM-0266 mainly to uphold their constitutional right to the speedy
disposition of their case

DISCUSSION RE: RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES: The

constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the
accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases,
including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including
judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. While the concept of speedy
disposition is relative or flexible, such that a mere mathematical reckoning
of the time involved is not sufficient, the right to the speedy disposition of
a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated when the
proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays;
or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured;
or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed
to elapse without the party having his case tried

WAS THE DELAY ON THE PART OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

VEXATIOUS, CAPRICIOUS, AND OPPRESSIVE? YES.
FROM THE FACTS, IT CAN BE GLEANED THAT the Office of the
Ombudsman had taken an unusually long period of time just to

investigate the criminal complaint and to determine whether to

criminally charge the respondents in the Sandiganbayan. Such long
delay was inordinate and oppressive, and constituted under the
peculiar circumstances of the case an outright violation of the
respondents right under the Constitution to the speedy disposition of
their cases.
It is incumbent for the State to prove that the delay was reasonable, or
that the delay was not attributable to it in both regards, the State
miserably failed

BUSUEGO V. OMBUDSMAN
FACTS:
-

Private respondent Rosa Busuego filed a complaint for concubinage ,

violation of RA 9262, and grave threats before the Office of the
Ombudsman against her husband, herein petitioner, Alfredo Busuego,
Chief of Hospital of the Davao Regional Hospital
Alfredo allegedly kept letters and pictures from and of different
women
Physically and verbally abused her
Did not give her and their children support when they were in the
US
Had his mistress live in their conjugal home
On one occasion, Alfredo threatened them that he will gun them
down if he chanced upon them in Tagum City

Alfredo Busuego DENY DENY DENY

Alfredo made short shrift of Rosas charges of violation of Republic Act No.
9262 and Grave Threats. He claimed that, at no time, did he threaten, the
lives or, to harm his wife, their family and members of their household. He
only berated the help for perpetrating gossip about his behavior and
conduct.
In their subsequent exchange of responsive pleadings, Rosa maintained
Alfredos culpability, and naturally, Alfredo claimed innocence.
In the course thereof, the procedural issue of Rosas failure to implead Sia
and de Leon as respondents cropped up. Alfredo insisted that Rosas
complaint ought to be dismissed for failure to implead his alleged
concubines as respondents.
Specifically to dispose of that issue, the Ombudsman scheduled a
clarificatory hearing where both Rosa and Alfredo were represented by

their respective counsels Ombudsman: just amend the complaint,

implead the alleged mistresses
-

Rosa submitted an Ex-Parte Manifestation on the last known addresses of

Julie de Leon and Emy Sia

the Ombudsman issued a Joint Order4 impleading Sia and de Leon as

party-respondents in the complaint for Concubinage and directing them to
submit their respective counter-affidavits within a period of time

Sia and de Leon did not submit their respective counter-affidavits: a copy
of the Joint Order sent to Sias last known address was returned to the
Ombudsman with the notation on the Registry Return Receipt No. 1624
"Return to Sender; removed," while a copy thereof to de Leon was
received on 3 September 2008 by Ananias de Leon

Alfredo filed his Comment to the 24 June 2008 Order with Motion to
Dismiss and/or Refer the charges to the Appropriate Provincial/City
Prosecutor praying for dismissal of the complaint for: (1) failure to implead
the two mistresses in violation of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code;
and in the alternative, (2) referral of the complaint to the Office of the City
Prosecutor Rosa filed her reply

OMBUDSMAN disposed raised procedural infirmities; found probable

cause to indict Alfredo and Sia MFR DENIED

ISSUE + RULING
W/N THE OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FINDING
PROBABLE CAUSE TO INDICT HIM AND SIA FOR CONCUBINAGE?
-

NO.

The Ombudsman has full discretionary authority in the determination of

probable cause during a preliminary investigation. This is the reason why
judicial review of the resolution of the Ombudsman in the exercise of its
power and duty to investigate and prosecute felonies and/or offenses of
public officers is limited to a determination of whether there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Courts are not empowered to substitute their judgment for that of the
Ombudsman.

THE COURTS REPLIES TO ALBERTOS CONTENTIONS:

First. Alfredo insists that the Ombudsmans automatic inclusion, over
his vehement objections of Sia and de Leon as party-respondents,
violates Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 5, Rule 110
of the Rules of Court

 The submission of Alfredo is belied by the fact that the

Ombudsman merely followed the provisions of its Rules of
Procedure. The Ombudsman merely facilitated the amendment
of the complaint to cure the defect pointed out by Alfredo. We
agree with the Ombudsman that it would be superfluous to
dismiss the complaint when amendment thereof is allowed by its
Rules of Procedure and the Rules of Court.

Second. Alfredo claims that the Ombudsman should have referred

Rosas complaint to the Department of Justice (DOJ), since the crime of
Concubinage is not committed in relation to his being a public officer.

The Ombudsmans primary jurisdiction, albeit concurrent with

the DOJ, to conduct preliminary investigation of crimes involving
public officers, without regard to its commission in relation to
office, had long been settled
The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses
involving public officers or employees is concurrent with other
government investigating agencies such as provincial, city and
state prosecutors. However, the Ombudsman, in the exercise of
its primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any stage, from any
investigating agency of the government, the investigation of
such cases APPLYING THAT RULING IN THIS CASE, THE
OMBUDSMAN HAS PRIMARY JURISDICTION, ALBEIT CONCURRENT
WITH THE DOJ, OVER ROSAS COMPLAINT, AND AFTER
CHOOSING TO EXERCISE SUCH JURISDICTION, NEED NOT DEFER
TO THE DICTATES OF A RESPONDENT IN A COMPLAINT, SUCH AS
ALFREDO. IN OTHER WORDS, THE OMBUDSMAN MAY EXERCISE
JURISDICTION TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE DOJ
Third. Alfredo next argues that Rosa had pardoned his concubinage,
having admitted to knowing of his womanizing and yet continuing with
their relationship as demonstrated in Rosas annual visits to him in
Davao City.
There is nothing in the record which can be construed as pardon
or condonation. It is true that the offended party has to a
considerable extent been patient with her husband's
shortcomings, but that seems to have been due to his promises
of improvement; nowhere does it appear that she has consented
to her husband's immorality or that she has acquiesced in his
relations with his concubine
Fourth. Alfredo next grasps at Liza S. Diambangans affidavit of
recantation to eliminate his probable culpability for concubinage.

 The Court generally looked with disfavor upon retraction of

testimonies previously given in court. Affidavits of recantation
are unreliable and deserve scant consideration. The asserted
motives for the repudiation are commonly held suspect, and the
veracity of the statements made in the affidavit of repudiation
are frequently and deservedly subject to serious doubt IN THIS
CASE, LIZA S. DIAMBANGANS TESTIMONY MERELY CORROBORATES
THE STILL STANDING STORY OF ROBERT AND MELISSA
DIAMBANGAN, THE OTHER HELPER IN THE BUSUEGO HOUSEHOLD.
CLEARLY, THE TWOS CONSISTENT STORY MAY STILL BE THE BASIS
OF THE OMBUDSMANS FINDING OF A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF
CONCUBINAGE AGAINST ALFREDO AND SIA.
Finally. Despite his vigorous arguments, Alfredo claims that there is
simply no basis for indicting him and Sia for concubinage
While such a claim is not necessarily preposterous we hold that
such is a matter of defense which Alfredo should raise in court
given that Rosa s complaint and its accompanying affidavits
have created a prima facie case for Concubinage against Alfredo
and Sia.

OCAMPO V. HON. ABANDO

DOCTRINE: IN THE CONTEXT OF A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION, THE RIGHT TO
DUE PROCESS OF LAW ENTAILS THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD. IT SERVES TO
ACCORD AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE PRESENTATION OF THE RESPONDENTS SIDE
WITH REGARD TO THE ACCUSATION. AFTERWARDS, THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER
SHALL DECIDE WHETHER THE ALLEGATIONS AND DEFENSES LEAD TO A
REASONABLE BELIEF THAT A CRIME HAS BEEN COMMITTED, AND THAT IT WAS THE
RESPONDENT WHO COMMITTED IT. OTHERWISE, THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER IS
BOUND TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT.
"THE ESSENCE OF DUE PROCESS IS REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD AND
SUBMIT EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF ONE'S DEFENSE." WHAT IS PROSCRIBED IS LACK
OF OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD. THUS, ONE WHO HAS BEEN AFFORDED A CHANCE
TO PRESENT ONES OWN SIDE OF THE STORY CANNOT CLAIM DENIAL OF DUE
PROCESS.

FACTS:
-

CONTEXT: On 26 August 2006, a mass grave was discovered by elements

of the 43rd Infantry Brigade of the Philippine Army at Sitio Sapang Daco,
Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte. The mass grave contained skeletal
remains of individuals believed to be victims of "Operation Venereal
Disease" (Operation VD) launched by members of the Communist Party of
the Philippines/New Peoples Army/National Democratic Front of the

Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) to purge their ranks of suspected military

informers.
-

ANTECEDENT FACTS:
P C/Insp. Almaden of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Regional
Office 8 and Staff Judge Advocate Captain Allan Tiu of the 8th Infantry
Division of the Philippine Army sent 12 undated letters to the Provincial
Prosecutor of Leyte through Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Vivero
The letters requested appropriate legal action on 12 complaintaffidavits attached therewith accusing 71 named members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples Army/National
Democratic Front of the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) of murder,
including petitioners herein along with several other unnamed
members

The letters narrated that on 26 August 2006, elements of the 43rd

Infantry Brigade of the Philippine Army discovered a mass grave site of
the CPP/NPA/NDFP at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan,
Inopacan, Leyte. Recovered from the grave site were 67 severely
deteriorated skeletal remains believed to be victims of Operation VD
The Initial Specialist Report dated 18 September 2006 issued by
the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City, was
inconclusive with regard to the identities of the skeletal remains
and even the length of time that they had been buried the
report recommended the conduct of further tests to confirm the
identities of the remains and the time window of death
Almost a month later, the Case Secretariat of the Regional and
National Inter-Agency Legal Action Group (IALAG) came up with
the names of ten (10) possible victims after comparison and
examination based on testimonies of relatives and
witnesses12 complaint-affidavits were from relatives of the
alleged victims of Operation VD all of them swore that their
relatives had been abducted or last seen with members of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP and were never seen again they also expressed
belief that their relatives remains were among those discovered
at the mass grave site.
On the basis of the 12 letters and their attachments, Prosecutor Vivero
issued a subpoena requiring, among others, petitioners to submit their
counter-affidavits and those of their witnesses. Petitioner Ocampo
submitted his counter-affidavit Echanis and Baylosis did not file
counter-affidavits because they were not allegedly served a copy of the
complaint counsel of Ladlad made a formal entry of appearance
during the PI, but did not file a counter-affidavit averring that he was
not issued a subpoena

 In a Resolution Prosecutor Vivero recommended the filing of an

Information for 15 counts of multiple murder against 54 named
members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP, including petitioners herein
The Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Hilongos, Leyte,
Petitioner Ocampo filed an Ex Parte Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory
Hearing dated 5 March 2007 prior to receiving a copy of the Resolution
recommending the filing of the Information
Judge Abando issued an Order finding probable cause "in the
commission by all mentioned accused of the crime charged." He
ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against them with no
recommended bail for their temporary liberty
Petitioner Ocampo filed before us this special civil action for certiorari
and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the
annulment of the 6 March 2007 Order of Judge Abando and the 16
February 2007 Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero OSG required to
comment on the petition and set the case for oral arguments
Afterwards, the parties were ordered to submit their memoranda within
10 dayson 3 April 2007, the Court ordered the provisional release of
petitioner Ocampo under a P100,000 cash bond
An order suspending the proceedings was issued by herein respondent
While the proceedings were suspend, Echanis was arrested by virtue of
the warrant issued by the aforesaid judge
Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed a Motion for Judicial
Reinvestigation/ Determination of Probable Cause with Prayer to
Dismiss the Case Outright and Alternative Prayer to Recall/ Suspend
Service of Warrant DENIED
The case was re-raffled to RTC Manila, Branch 32 (RTC Manila) presided
by Judge Thelma Bunyi-Medina Judge Medina suspended the
proceedings of the case pending the resolution of G.R. No. 176830 by
this Court
Ladlad filed with the RTC Manila a Motion to Quash and/or Dismiss

 Echanis filed before us a special civil action for certiorari and

prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment
of the 30 April 2008 Order of Judge Abando and the 27 October 2008
Order of Judge Medina
Baylosis filed before us a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court also seeking the
annulment of the 30 April 2008 Order of Judge Abando and the 27
October 2008 Order of Judge Medina the Court consolidated the two;
and further consolidated the petitions by the different parties involved
the Court ordered the provisional release of petitioner Echanis
Department of Justice (DOJ) filed its Opposition to petitioner Ladlads
motion to quash before the RTC Manila. The trial court conducted a
hearing on the motion on 13 February 2009 denied
Ladlad filed before us a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the 6 May 2009 and 27
August 2009 Orders of Judge Medina consolidated with the other
petitions
Ladlad filed an Urgent Motion to Fix Bail; Baylosis filed a Motion to
Allow Petitioner to Post Bail granted
ISSUES + RULING
WHETHER PETITIONERS WERE DENIED DUE PROCESS DURING PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION AND IN THE ISSUANCE OF THE WARRANTS OF ARREST?
-

NO.
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION.
Contentions: Echanis and Baylosis allege that they did not receive a copy
of the complaint and the attached documents or evidence; Ladlad claims
that he was not served a subpoena due to the false address indicated in
the 12 undated letters of P C/Insp. Almaden and Army Captain Tiu to
Prosecutor Vivero; Ocampo claims that Prosecutor Vivero, in collusion with
P C/Insp. Almaden and Army Captain Tiu, surreptitiously inserted the
Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad in the records of the case
without furnishing petitioner Ocampo a copy
The respondents were issued and served with Subpoena at their
last known address for them to submit their counter-affidavits and
that of their witnesses the Resolution stated that efforts were
undertaken to serve subpoenas on the named respondents at their
last known addresses. This is sufficient for due process. It was only
because a majority of them could no longer be found at their last
known addresses that they were not served copies of the complaint
and the attached documents or evidence
In connection with LADLADS claim (sent to a fake address), we take
note of the fact that the subpoena to Fides Lim, petitioner Ladlads
wife, was sent to the same address, and that she was among those

mentioned in the Resolution as having timely submitted their

counter-affidavits
The Court also found no merit in Ocampos allegation of collusion
ISSUANCE OF WARRANT OF ARREST
the allegations of petitioners point to factual matters indicated in the
affidavits of the complainants and witnesses as bases for the
contention that there was no probable cause for petitioners indictment
for multiple murder or for the issuance of warrants for their arrest. As
stated above, the trial judges appreciation of the evidence and
conclusion of facts based thereon are not interfered with in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion. Again, "he sufficiently complies
with the requirement of personal determination if he reviews the
[I]nformation and the documents attached thereto, and on the basis
thereof forms a belief that the accused is probably guilty of the crime
with which he is being charged."

WHETHER THE MURDER CHARGES AGAINST PETITIONERS SHOULD BE DISMISSED

UNDER THE POLITICAL OFFENSE DOCTRINE?
-

NO.
Under the political offense doctrine, "common crimes, perpetrated in
furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their character as "common"
offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime of which they
are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished separately from
the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of
a graver penalty when a killing is committed in furtherance of rebellion,
the killing is not homicide or murder. Rather, the killing assumes the political
complexion of rebellion as its mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and
punished as rebellion alone
However, this is not to say that public prosecutors are obliged to consistently
charge respondents with simple rebellion instead of common crimes. No one
disputes the well-entrenched principle in criminal procedure that the
institution of criminal charges, including whom and what to charge, is
addressed to the sound discretion of the public prosecutor
But when the political offense doctrine is asserted as a defense in the trial
court, it becomes crucial for the court to determine whether the act of killing
was done in furtherance of a political end, and for the political motive of the
act to be conclusively demonstrated

To recall, on 12 May 2006, an Information for the crime of rebellion, was filed
before the RTC Makati against petitioners and several others.

However, petitioners were never arraigned in Criminal Case No. 06-944. Even
before the indictment for rebellion was filed before the RTC Makati, petitioners
Ocampo, Echanis and Ladlad had already filed a petition before this Court to
seek the nullification of the Orders of the DOJ denying their motion for the
inhibition of the members of the prosecution panel due to lack of impartiality
and independence. When the indictment was filed, petitioners Ocampo,
Echanis and Ladlad filed supplemental petitions to enjoin the prosecution of
Criminal Case No. 06-944. SC eventually ordered the dismissal of the rebellion
case. It is clear then that a first jeopardy never had a chance to attach no
double jeopardy
1awp++i1

DOJ V. ALAON
FACTS:
-

Private complainant AAA filed a complaint against Alaon charging him with
the crime of rape occurring on 3 separate but successive occasions

The first incident transpired sometime in October 2000, while she was picking
guavas that had fallen from trees at a construction site beside Alaons house
in Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte. Alaon pulled AAA towards a guava tree;
removed her shorts and underwear and simultaneously undressed himself;
laid her on a bench and forcibly inserted his penis into her vagina

Alaon denied such allegations averring that the complainants family

fabricated such claims in retaliation to their eviction from the land which
he owned
The Provincial Prosecution Office of Daet, Camarines Norte found probable
cause to indict Alaon for three (3) counts of rape MFR downgraded to
acts of lasciviousness thereafter, an information against Alaon was filed
before the RTC CamNorte
Then DOJ Sec. Datumanong directed the Provincial Prosecutor to(1)
forward the entire records of the case for automatic review, citing the
interest of justice and pursuant to the residual authority of the Secretary
of Justice of supervision and control over the prosecutors of the
Department of Justice; and (2) defer the filing of the Information for acts
of lasciviousness against Alaon, or, in the event an Information has been
filed in court, move for suspension of proceedings against Alaon, in order
not to render the automatic review moot and academic.

Basis:

AAAs mothers letter narrating what happened to AAA who is

said to be suffering from an intellectual disablitity

The assistant prosecutor then sent a letter to Judge Intia requesting the
withdrawal of the information for acts of lasciviousness

Judge Intia, for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, separately found

probable cause for the crime of acts of lasciviousness against Alaon
issuance of warrant was held in abeyance

The proceedings were likewise suspended by the RTC

-

the Prosecutor then filed an Explanation/Manifestation

Alarmed, Alaon filed a Manifestation with Urgent Motion to Set Case for
Arraignment with a prayer to lift the RTCs suspension of proceedings and
to immediately set the case for arraignment in accordance with an
accuseds right to speedy trial.
The RTC issued an Order: (1) granting Alaons motion and setting the case
for arraignment; and (2) confirming the earlier finding of judicial probable
cause against Alaon for the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness.
During arraignment on 11 June 2003, Alaon entered a plea of not guilty
Prosecutor filed a motion to withdraw appearance denied Prosecutor
Estrellado filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings which Alaon opposed
RTC denied it again trial resumed
On 18 March 2008, with the propriety of the offense charged still at issue
within the prosecution, specifically the DOJ, then Undersecretary of the

DOJ, Ernesto Pineda, issued the previously adverted to Resolution, setting

aside the downgrading of the crime charged against Alaon from rape to
acts of lasciviousness. The DOJ reinstated the previous charge of rape
against Alaon and directed the filing of an Information against him for
three (3) counts of rape in relation to Republic Act No. 7610 Alaon filed
for a petition for certiorari before the CA GRANTED
ISSUES + RULING
1. W/N THE DOJ SECRETARY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION WHEN HE ACTED ON
THE LETTER REQUEST OF BBB, THE MOTHER OF AAA?
- NO.
- There is no quarrel about the Secretary of Justices power of review over
the actions of his subordinates, specifically public prosecutors. This power
of review is encompassed in the Secretary of Justices authority of
supervision and control over the bureaus, offices, and agencies under him,
subject only to specified guidelines (SEE CHAPTER 7, SEC. 38(1) OF EO
292)
- Founded on the power of supervision and control over his subordinates,
the Court did not find abuse of discretion, much more grave abuse of
discretion, by the Secretary of Justice when he took cognizance of BBBs
letter and treated it as a petition for review from the provincial
prosecutors resolution. It cannot be said that in this case, there was an
absence of a petition for review. There was in fact an appeal from the
prosecutors resolution, although not as described in the National
Prosecution Service Rules on Appeal. There was, tersely put, an appeal
that the Secretary of Justice had ample power to act upon. In fact, the
Secretary of Justice acted on the letter request of BBB. What was done
was not a motu propio review.
2. W/N ALAON WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS,
AS HE WAS NOT GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD ON THE LETTERAPPEAL OF BBB?
- YES.
- The conduct of preliminary investigation is subject to the requirements of
both substantive and procedural due process. Preliminary investigation is
considered as a judicial proceeding wherein the prosecutor or
investigating officer, by the nature of his functions, acts as a quasi-judicial
officer.
- Even at the stage of petition for review before the Secretary of Justice, the
requirements for substantive and procedural due process do not abate.
- The DOJ makes much of the fact that Alaon ostensibly knew of BBBs
appeal to the Secretary of Justice This assertion of the DOJ cannot
equate to compliance with procedural due process. To begin with,
Prosecutor Estrellado mistakenly thought that Alaon had filed a petition for
review. The confusion got clarified only after Judge Intia required the
prosecutor to submit a copy of the petition for review. Thereafter, Alaon
also made a manifestation raising the error in the prosecutors assertion,
and moved for the lifting of the suspension of proceedings and setting the
arraignment of the case

Alaon cannot be charged with notice that the Secretary of Justice

had treated the letter of BBB as a petition for review. Notice in
this case, as a function of an opportunity to be heard, a
component of procedural due process, was not met. Once the

Secretary of Justice decided to treat the letter of BBB as an

appeal, he should have required Alaon to comment thereon. Even
if the letter did not comply with the requirements for an appeal
under the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rules on Appeal,
indeed, precisely for such reason, the Secretary of Justice was
duty-bound, as the one hearing the case, to afford Alaon,
respondent therein, an opportunity to be heard to satisfy
procedural due process. On this score, the DOJ abused its
discretion when it rode roughshod over Alaons rights as it
accommodated private complainant.

DOJ Secretary acted in excess of his jurisdiction CA decision affirmed

EXTRA NOTES:
-

Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court requires the concurrence of two

elements for the issuance of a writ of certiorari: (1) that a tribunal, board
or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or
in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (2) there is no appeal, nor
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law .

ESTRADA V. OMBUDSMAN
DOCTRINE: IT IS A FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE THAT THE ACCUSED IN A
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION HAS NO RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE THE
WITNESSES WHICH THE COMPLAINANT MAY PRESENT. SECTION 3, RULE 112
OF THE RULES OF COURT EXPRESSLY PROVIDES THAT THE RESPONDENT
SHALL ONLY HAVE THE RIGHT TO SUBMIT A COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT, TO
EXAMINE ALL OTHER EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY THE COMPLAINANT AND,
WHERE THE FISCAL SETS A HEARING TO PROPOUND CLARIFICATORY QUESTIONS
TO THE PARTIES OR THEIR WITNESSES, TO BE AFFORDED AN OPPORTUNITY TO
BE PRESENT BUT WITHOUT THE RIGHT TO EXAMINE OR CROSS-EXAMINE.
FACTS:
-

25-NOV-13: the Ombudsman served upon Sen. Estrada a copy of the

complaint in OMB-C-C-13-0313, filed by the NBI and Atty. Baligod, which
prayed, among others, that criminal proceedings for Plunder as defined in
RA No. 7080 be conducted against Sen. Estrada Sen. Estrada filed his
counter-affidavit in OMB-C-C-13-0313 on 9 January 2014

3-DEC-13: the Ombudsman served upon Sen. Estrada a copy of the

complaint in OMB-C-C-13-0397, filed by the FIO of the Ombudsman, which
prayed, among others, that criminal proceedings for Plunder be conducted
against Sen. Estrada Sen. Estrada filed his counter-affidavit in OMB-C-C13-0397 on 16 January 2014

Eighteen of Sen. Estradas co-respondents in the two complaints filed their

counter-affidavits between 9 December 2013 and 14 March 2014

20-MAR-14: Sen. Estrada filed his Request to be Furnished with Copies of

Counter-Affidavits of the Other Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses
and Other Filings DENIED BY THE OMBUDSMAN

28-MAR-14: the Ombudsman issued in OMB-C-C-13-0313 and OMB-C-C13-0397 a Joint Resolution which found probable cause to indict Sen.
Estrada and his co-respondents with one count of plunder and 11 counts
of violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019.

Sen. Estrada filed a Motion for Reconsideration (of the Joint Resolution
dated 28 March 2014) dated 7 April 2014. Sen. Estrada prayed for the
issuance of a new resolution dismissing the charges against him

Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the Ombudsmans

27 March 2014 Order denying his Request, Sen. Estrada filed the
present Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and sought to annul and set
aside the 27 March 2014 Order

ISSUES + RULING
W/N THE OMBUDSMANS DENIAL IN ITS MARCH 27 2014 ORDER OF SEN.
ESTRADAS REQUEST CONSTITUTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION?
-

NO.

First. There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a

respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents.

Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his Request for the counteraffidavits of his co-respondents violates his constitutional right to due
process. Sen. Estrada, however, fails to specify a law or rule
which states that it is a compulsory requirement of due
process in a preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman
furnish a respondent with the counter-affidavits of his corespondents. Neither Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure nor Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman supports Sen. Estradas claim.

What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require is

for the Ombudsman to furnish the respondent with a copy of the
complaint and the supporting affidavits and documents at the time
the order to submit the counter-affidavit is issued to the
respondent.

MOREOVER, what Section 4(b) refers to are affidavits of the

complainant and his witnesses, not the affidavits of the corespondents. Obviously, the counter-affidavits of the co-respondents
are not part of the supporting affidavits of the complainant. No grave
abuse of discretion can thus be attributed to the Ombudsman for the
issuance of the 27 March 2014 Order which denied Sen. Estradas
Request

Second, Section 4(b) states that the investigating officer shall issue an
order attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and all other supporting
documents, directing the respondent to submit his counter-affidavit. The
affidavits referred to in Section 4(b) are the affidavits mentioned in Section
4(a). Clearly, the affidavits to be furnished to the respondent are the
affidavits of the complainant and his supporting witnesses.

Third, Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that [t]he respondent shall have the right to examine the
evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been
furnished and to copy them at his expense. A respondents right to
examine refers only to the evidence submitted by the complainant.
Thus, whether under Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
or under Rule II of the Ombudsmans Rules of Procedure, there is no
requirement whatsoever that the affidavits executed by the corespondents should be furnished to a respondent.

DISCUSSION RE: PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

the conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the determination
of probable cause, and probable cause merely implies probability of
guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. A preliminary
investigation is not a part of the trial and it is only in a trial where an
accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to
confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence.
the rights of a respondent in a preliminary investigation are limited to
those granted by procedural law
It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a preliminary
investigation has no right to cross-examine the witnesses
which the complainant may present. Section 3, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court expressly provides that the respondent shall
only have the right to submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all
other evidence submitted by the complainant and, where the
fiscal sets a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the
parties or their witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be
present but without the right to examine or cross-examine
probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should
be determined in a summary manner. Preliminary investigation
is not a part of trial and it is only in a trial where an accused
can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to

confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his

innocence
Furthermore, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on
the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a
preliminary investigation. If by its very nature a preliminary
investigation could be waived by the accused, we find no compelling
justification for a strict application of the evidentiary rules

Moreover, a person under preliminary investigation, as Sen. Estrada is in

the present case when he filed his Request, is not yet an accused person,
and hence cannot demand the full exercise of the rights of an accused
person
W/N THE PRESENT PETITION IS FILED PREMATURELY?

YES.

Sen. Estrada should have filed a Motion for Reconsideration A motion for
reconsideration allows the public respondent an opportunity to correct its
factual and legal errors. Sen. Estrada, however, failed to present a
compelling reason that the present Petition falls under the exceptions to
the general rule that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is required
prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari. This Court has reiterated in
numerous decisions that a motion for reconsideration
is mandatory before the filing of a petition for certiorari.

THE PRESENT PETITION ALSO CONSTITUTES FORUM SHOPPING, THUS, IT

SHOULD BE SUMMARILY DISMISSED

Sen. Estrada resorted to simultaneous remedies by filing this

Petition alleging violation of due process by the Ombudsman even as
his Motion for Reconsideration raising the very same issue remained
pending with the Ombudsman. This is plain and simple forum shopping,
warranting outright dismissal of this Petition.cralawre