Ramirez vs.

Court of Appeals [GR 93833, 28 September 1995]

Facts: A civil case for damages was filed by Socorro D. Ramirez in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that Ester S. Garcia, in a
confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated
her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's
dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy."
In support of her claim, Ramirez produced a verbatim transcript of the event
and sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation
in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs
awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil
case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made
by Ramirez. As a result of Ramirez's recording, of the event and alleging that
the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, Garcia filed a
criminal case before Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of
Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and
other related violations of private communication, and other purposes."
Ramirez was charged of violation of the said Act, in an information dated 6
October 1988. Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, Ramirez filed a Motion to
Quash the
Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense, particularly a violation of RA 4200. In an order dated 3 May 1989,
the trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with Ramirez that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense under RA 4200; and that the
violation punished by RA 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a
person other than a participant to the communication. From the trial court's
Order, Garcia filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court,
which forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by
the First Division) of 19 June 1989. On 9
February 1990, the Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision
declaring the trial court's order of 3 May 1989 null and void. Consequently,
on 21 February 1990, Ramirez filed a Motion for Reconsideration which Court
of Appeals denied in its Resolution dated 19 June 1990.
Issue: Whether the party sought to be penalized by the Anti-wire tapping law
ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private
communication
Held: Section 1 of RA 4200 provides that "It shall be unlawful for any person,
not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or
spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using, any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication
or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however
otherwise described." The provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal
for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private

communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape

recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be
penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from
those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize
all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use
of the qualifier "any". Consequently, "even a (person) privy to a
communication who records his private conversation with another without
the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" under said provision of
RA 4200.
Further, the nature of the conversation is immaterial to a violation of the
statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the
information. What RA 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing,
intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices
enumerated therein.
The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an
offense under Section 1 of RA 4200. Furthermore, the contention that the
phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of RA 4200 does not include
"private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word
"communication" to a point of absurdity

ZULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996
Facts: This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals,
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which
ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her from private
respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On
March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of
medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private
respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her
husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private
correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings
cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The
documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal
separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which
petitioner had filed against her husband.
Issue:(1) Whether or not the documents and papers in question are
inadmissible in evidence;
Held:(1) No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible
in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of
communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable
simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's
infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be
enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there
is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires
otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the
evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in
breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for
any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage,
does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by
making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the
other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists.
Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of
communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what
one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity
that each owes to the other.

Navarro vs. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 153 (1999)

FACTS: Two local media men, Stanley Jalbuena, Enrique Lingan, in Lucena
City wnet to the police station to report alledged indecent show in one of the
night establishment shows in the City. At the station, a heated confrontation
followed between victim Lingan and accused policeman Navarro who was
then having drinks outside the headquarters, lead to a fisticuffs. The victim
was hit with the handle of the accused's gun below the left eyebrow, followed
by a fist blow, resulted the victim to fell and died under treatment. The
exchange of words was recorded on tape, specifically the frantic
exclamations made by Navarro after the altercation that it was the victim
who provoked the fight. During the trial, Jalbuena, the other media man ,
testified. Presented in evidence to confirm his testimony was a voice
recording he had made of the heated discussion at the police station
between the accused police officer Navarro and the deceased, Lingan, which
was taken without the knowledge of the two.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the voice recording is admissible in evidence in view
of RA 4200, which prohibits wire tapping.
2. Whether the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation or
threat on the part of the offended party and lack of intention to commit so
grave a wrong may be appreciated in favor of the accused.
HELD:
1. The answer is affirmative, the tape is admissible in view of RA 4200,
which prohibits wire tapping. Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice
recording he had made.
The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private
communications (Ramirez v Cpourt of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590 [1995]). Snce
the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its
tape recording is not prohibited.
2. The remarks of Lingan, which immediately preceded the acts of the
accused, constituted sufficient provocation. Provocation is said to be any
unjust or improper conduct of the offended party capable of exciting,
annoying or irritating someone. The provocation must be sufficient and must
immediately precede the act; and in order to be sufficient, it must be
adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong, which must be accordingly
proportionate in gravity. The mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to
commit so grave a wrong must also be considered. The exclamations made
by Navarro after the scuffle that it was Lingan who provoked him showed
that he had no intent to kill the latter.