Existentialism - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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Existentialism|InternetEncyclopediaofPhilosophy
Existentialism
Existentialismisacatchalltermforthosephilosopherswhoconsiderthenatureofthehumanconditionasakeyphilosophical
problem and who share the view that this problem is best addressed through ontology. This very broad definition will be
clarifiedbydiscussingsevenkeythemesthatexistentialistthinkersaddress.Thosephilosophersconsideredexistentialistsare
mostly from the continent of Europe, and date from the 19th and 20th centuries. Outside philosophy, the existentialist
movement is probably the most wellknown philosophical movement, and at least two of its members are among the most
famousphilosophicalpersonalitiesandwidelyreadphilosophicalauthors.Ithascertainlyhadconsiderableinfluenceoutside
philosophy, for example on psychological theory and on the arts. Within philosophy, though, it is safe to say that this loose
movementconsideredasawholehasnothadagreatimpact,althoughindividualsorideascountedwithinitremainimportant.
Moreover,mostofthephilosophersconventionallygroupedunderthisheadingeitherneverused,oractivelydisavowed,the
term'existentialist'.EvenSartrehimselfoncesaid:Existentialism?Idontknowwhatthatis.So,thereisacasetobemade
that the term insofar as it leads us to ignore what is distinctive about philosophical positions and to conflate together
significantlydifferentideasdoesmoreharmthangood.
Inthisarticle,however,itisassumedthatsomethingsensiblecanbesaidaboutexistentialismasalooselydefinedmovement.
Thearticlehasthreesections.First,weoutlineasetofthemesthatdefine,albeitverybroadly,existentialistconcerns.Thisis
done with reference to the historical context of existentialism, which will help us to understand why certain philosophical
problems and methods were considered so important. Second, we discuss individually six philosophers who are arguably its
central figures, stressing in these discussions the ways in which these philosophers approached existentialist themes in
distinctive ways. These figures, and many of the others we mention, have full length articles of their own within the
Encyclopedia.Finally,welookverybrieflyattheinfluenceofexistentialism,especiallyoutsidephilosophy.
http://www.iep.utm.edu/existent/
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TableofContents
1. KeyThemesofExistentialism
a. PhilosophyasaWayofLife
b. AnxietyandAuthenticity
c. Freedom
d. Situatedness
e. Existence
f. Irrationality/Absurdity
g. TheCrowd
2. KeyExistentialistPhilosophers
a. SrenKierkegaard(18131855)asanExistentialistPhilosopher
b. FriedrichNietzsche(18441900)asanExistentialistPhilosopher
c. MartinHeidegger(18891976)asanExistentialistPhilosopher
d. JeanPaulSartre(19051980)asanExistentialistPhilosopher
e. SimonedeBeauvoir(19081986)asanExistentialistPhilosopher
f. AlbertCamus(19131960)asanExistentialistPhilosopher
3. TheInfluenceofExistentialism
a. TheArtsandPsychology
b. Philosophy
4. ReferencesandFurtherReading
a. GeneralIntroductions
b. Anthologies
c. PrimaryBibliography
d. SecondaryBibliography
e. OtherWorksCited
1.KeyThemesofExistentialism
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Althoughahighlydiversetraditionofthought,seventhemescanbeidentifiedthatprovidesomesenseofoverallunity.Here,
these themes will be briefly introduced they can then provide us with an intellectual framework within which to discuss
exemplaryfigureswithinthehistoryofexistentialism.
a.PhilosophyasaWayofLife
Philosophyshouldnotbethoughtofprimarilyeitherasanattempttoinvestigateandunderstandtheselfortheworld,orasa
specialoccupationthatconcernsonlyafew.Rather,philosophymustbethoughtofasfullyintegratedwithinlife.Tobesure,
there may need to be professional philosophers, who develop an elaborate set of methods and concepts (Sartre makes this
point frequently) but life can be lived philosophically without a technical knowledge of philosophy. Existentialist thinkers
tendedtoidentifytwohistoricalantecedentsforthisnotion.First,theancientGreeks,andparticularlythefigureofSocrates
but also the Stoics and Epicureans. Socrates was not only nonprofessional, but in his pursuit of the good life he tended to
eschew the formation of a 'system' or 'theory', and his teachings took place often in public spaces. In this, the existentialists
werehardlyunusual.Inthe19thand20thcenturies,therapidexpansionofindustrialisationandadvanceintechnologywere
oftenseenintermsofanalienationofthehumanfromnatureorfromaproperlynaturalwayofliving(forexample,thinkersof
GermanandEnglishromanticism).
ThesecondinfluenceonthinkingofphilosophyasawayoflifewasGermanIdealismafterKant.Partlyasaresponsetothe18th
centuryEnlightenment,andundertheinfluenceoftheNeoplatonists,SchellingandHegelboththoughtofphilosophyasan
activitythatisanintegralpartofthehistoryofhumanbeings,ratherthanoutsideoflifeandtheworld,lookingon.Laterinthe
19thcentury,Marxfamouslycriticisedpreviousphilosophybysayingthatthepointofphilosophyisnottoknowthingseven
toknowthingsaboutactivitybuttochangethem.Theconceptofphilosophyasawayoflifemanifestsitselfinexistentialist
thought in a number of ways. Let us give several examples, to which we will return in the sections that follow. First, the
existentialistsoftenundertookacritiqueofmodernlifeintermsofthespecialisationofbothmanualandintellectuallabour.
Specialisation included philosophy. One consequence of this is that many existentialist thinkers experimented with different
stylesorgenresofwritinginordertoescapetheeffectsofthisspecialisation.Second,anotionthatwecancall'immanence':
philosophy studies life from the inside. For Kierkegaard, for example, the fundamental truths of my existence are not
representationsnot,thatis,ideas,propositionsorsymbolsthemeaningofwhichcanbeseparatedfromtheirorigin.Rather,
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thetruthsofexistenceareimmediatelylived,feltandacted.Likewise,forNietzscheandHeidegger,itisessentialtorecognise
that the philosopher investigating human existence is, him or herself, an existing human. Third, the nature of life itself is a
perennialexistentialistconcernand,morefamously(inHeideggerandinCamus),alsothesignificanceofdeath.
b.AnxietyandAuthenticity
Akeyideahereisthathumanexistenceisinsomeway'onitsown'anxiety(oranguish)istherecognitionofthisfact.Anxiety
herehastwoimportantimplications.First,mostgenerally,manyexistentialiststendedtostressthesignificanceofemotionsor
feelings, in so far as they were presumed to have a less culturally or intellectually mediated relation to one's individual and
separateexistence.ThisideaisfoundinKierkegaard,aswementionedabove,andinHeidegger'sdiscussionof'mood'itisalso
one reason why existentialism had an influence on psychology. Second, anxiety also stands for a form of existence that is
recognitionofbeingonitsown.Whatismeantby'beingonitsown'variesamongphilosophers.Forexample,itmightmean
theirrelevance(orevennegativeinfluence)ofrationalthought,moralvalues,orempiricalevidence,whenitcomestomaking
fundamentaldecisionsconcerningone'sexistence.Asweshallsee,KierkegaardseesHegel'saccountofreligionintermsofthe
history of absolute spirit as an exemplary confusion of faith and reason. Alternatively, it might be a more specifically
theologicalclaim:theexistenceofatranscendentdeityisnotrelevantto(orispositivelydetrimentalto)suchdecisions(aview
broadlysharedbyNietzscheandSartre).Finally,beingonitsownmightsignifytheuniquenessofhumanexistence,andthus
thefactthatitcannotunderstanditselfintermsofotherkindsofexistence(HeideggerandSartre).
Relatedtoanxietyistheconceptofauthenticity,whichisletussaytheexistentialistspinontheGreeknotionof'thegoodlife'.
Asweshallsee,theauthenticbeingwouldbeabletorecogniseandaffirmthenatureofexistence(weshallshortlyspecifysome
of the aspects of this, such as absurdity and freedom). Not, though, recognise the nature of existence as an intellectual fact,
disengaged from life but rather, the authentic being lives in accordance with this nature. The notion of authenticity is
sometimesseenasconnectedtoindividualism.Thisisonlyreinforcedbythecontrastwithathemewewilldiscussbelow,that
of the 'crowd'. Certainly, if authenticity involves 'being on one's own', then there would seem to be some kind of value in
celebratingandsustainingone'sdifferenceandindependencefromothers.However,manyexistentialistsseeindividualismas
ahistoricalandculturaltrend(forexampleNietzsche),ordubiouspoliticalvalue(Camus),ratherthananecessarycomponent
of authentic existence. Individualism tends to obscure the particular types of collectivity that various existentialists deem
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important.
For many existentialists, the conditions of the modern world make authenticity especially difficult. For example, many
existentialists would join other philosophers (such as theFrankfurt School) in condemning an instrumentalist conception of
reason and value. The utilitarianism of Mill measured moral value and justice also in terms of the consequences of actions.
Later liberalism would seek to absorb nearly all functions of political and social life under the heading of economic
performance.Evaluatingsolelyintermsofthemeasurableoutcomesofproductionwasseenasreinforcingthesecularisationof
theinstitutionsofpolitical,socialoreconomiclifeandreinforcingalsotheabandonmentofanybroadersenseofthespiritual
dimension (such an idea is found acutely in Emerson, and is akin to the concerns of Kierkegaard). Existentialists such as
MartinHeidegger,HannaArendtorGabrielMarcelviewedthesesocialmovementsintermsofanarrowingofthepossibilities
ofhumanthoughttotheinstrumentalortechnological.Thisnarrowinginvolvedthinkingoftheworldintermsofresources,
andthinkingofallhumanactionasamaking,orindeedasamachinelike'function'.
c.Freedom
The next key theme is freedom. Freedom can usefully be linked to the concept of anguish, because my freedom is in part
defined by the isolation of my decisions from any determination by a deity, or by previously existent values or knowledge.
Many existentialists identified the 19th and 20th centuries as experiencing a crisis of values. This might be traced back to
familiar reasons such as an increasingly secular society, or the rise of scientific or philosophical movements that questioned
traditional accounts of value (for example Marxism or Darwinism), or the shattering experience of two world wars and the
phenomenon of mass genocide. It is important to note, however, that for existentialism these historical conditions do not
createtheproblemofanguishinthefaceoffreedom,butmerelycastitintohigherrelief.Likewise,freedomentailssomething
likeresponsibility,formyselfandformyactions.Giventhatmysituationisoneofbeingonitsownrecognisedinanxiety
thenbothmyfreedomandmyresponsibilityareabsolute.Theisolationthatwediscussedabovemeansthatthereisnothing
else that acts through me, or that shoulders my responsibility. Likewise, unless human existence is to be understood as
arbitrarily changing moment to moment, this freedom and responsibility must stretch across time. Thus, when I exist as an
authenticallyfreebeing,Iassumeresponsibilityformywholelife,foraprojectoracommitment.Weshouldnoteherethat
many of the existentialists take on a broadly Kantian notion of freedom: freedom as autonomy. This means that freedom,
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ratherthanbeingrandomnessorarbitrariness,consistsinthebindingofoneselftoalaw,butalawthatisgivenbytheselfin
recognitionofitsresponsibilities.ThisborrowingfromKant,however,isheavilyqualifiedbythenexttheme.
d.Situatedness
The next common theme we shall call situatedness. Although my freedom is absolute, it always takes place in a particular
context.Mybodyanditscharacteristics,mycircumstancesinahistoricalworld,andmypast,allweighuponfreedom.Thisis
whatmakesfreedommeaningful.SupposeItriedtoexistasfree,whilepretendingtobeinabstractionfromthesituation.In
thatcaseIwillhavenoideawhatpossibilitiesareopentomeandwhatchoicesneedtobemade,hereandnow.Insuchacase,
myfreedomwillbenaveorillusory.ThisconcretenotionoffreedomhasitsphilosophicalgenesisinHegel,andisgenerally
contrastedtothepurerationalfreedomdescribedbyKant.Situatednessisrelatedtoanotionwediscussedaboveunderthe
heading of philosophy as a way of life: the necessity of viewing or understanding life and existence from the inside. For
example, many 19th century intellectuals were interested in ancient Greece, Rome, the Medieval period, or the orient, as
alternativemodelsofalessspoiled,moreintegratedformoflife.Nietzsche,tobesure,sharedtheseinterests,buthedidsonot
uncritically:becausethehumanconditionischaracterisedbybeinghistoricallysituated,itcannotsimplyturnbacktheclockor
decide all at once to be other than it is (Sartre especially shares this view). Heidegger expresses a related point in this way:
human existence cannot be abstracted from its world because beingintheworld is part of the ontological structure of that
existence.Manyexistentialiststakemyconcretelyindividualbody,andthespecifictypeoflifethatmybodylives,asaprimary
fact about me (for example, Nietzsche, Scheler or MerleauPonty). I must also be situated socially: each of my acts says
somethingabouthowIviewothersbut,reciprocally,eachoftheiractsisaviewaboutwhatIam.Myfreedomisalwayssituated
with respect to the judgements of others. This particular notion comes from Hegels analysis of recognition, and is found
especiallyinSartre,deBeauvoirandJaspers.SituatednessingeneralalsohasanimportantphilosophicalantecedentinMarx:
economic and political conditions are not contingent features with respect to universal human nature, but condition that
naturefromthegroundup.
e.Existence
Although,ofcourse,existentialismtakesitsnamefromthephilosophicalthemeof'existence',thisdoesnotentailthatthereis
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homogeneityinthemannerexistenceistobeunderstood.Onepointonwhichthereisagreement,though,isthattheexistence
with which we should be concerned here is not just any existent thing, but human existence. There is thus an important
differencebetweendistinctivelyhumanexistenceandanythingelse,andhumanexistenceisnottobeunderstoodonthemodel
ofthings,thatis,asobjectsofknowledge.Onemightthinkthatthisisanoldidea,rootedinPlato'sdistinctionbetweenmatter
andsoul,orDescartes'betweenextendedandthinkingthings.Butthesedistinctionsappeartobejustdifferencesbetweentwo
typesofthings.Descartesinparticular,however,isoftencriticisedbytheexistentialistsforsubsumingbothundertheheading
'substance', and thus treating what is distinctive in human existence as indeed a thing or object, albeit one with different
properties. (Whether the existentialist characterisation of Plato or Descartes is accurate is a different question.) The
existentialists thus countered the Platonic or Cartesian conception with a model that resembles more the Aristotelian as
developedintheNichomacheanEthics. The latter idea arrives in existentialist thought filtered through Leibniz and Spinoza
andthenotionofastrivingforexistence.EquallyimportantistheelevationofthepracticalabovethetheoreticalinGerman
Idealists.ParticularlyinKant,whostressedtheprimacyofthe'practical',andtheninFichteandearlySchelling,wefindthe
notionthathumanexistenceisaction.Accordingly,inNietzscheandSartrewefindthenotionthatthehumanbeingisalland
only what that being does. My existence consists of forever bringing myself into being and, correlatively, fleeing from the
dead,inertthingthatisthetotalityofmypastactions.Althoughmyactsarefree,Iamnotfreenot to act thus existenceis
characterisedalsoby'exigency'(Marcel).Formanyexistentialists,authenticexistenceinvolvesacertaintensionberecognised
and lived through, but not resolved: this tension might be between the animal and the rational (important in Nietzsche) or
betweenfacticityandtranscendence(SartreanddeBeauvoir).
Inthe19thand20thcenturies,thehumansciences(suchaspsychology,sociologyoreconomics)werecomingtoberecognised
aspowerfulandlegitimatesciences.Tosomeextendatleasttheirassumptionsandmethodsseemedtobeborrowedfromthe
naturalsciences.WhilephilosopherssuchasDiltheyandlaterGadamerwereconcernedtoshowthatthehumanscienceshad
tohaveadistinctivemethod,theexistentialistswereinclinedtogofurther.Thefree,situatedhumanbeingisnotanobjectof
knowledgeinthesensethehumanalwaysexistsasthepossibilityoftranscendinganyknowledgeofit.Thereisaclearrelation
between such an idea and the notion of the 'transcendence of the other' found in the ethical phenomenology of Emmanuel
Levinas.
f.Irrationality/Absurdity
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Among the most famous ideas associated with existentialism is that of 'absurdity'. Human existence might be described as
'absurd'inoneofthefollowingsenses.First,manyexistentialistsarguedthatnatureasawholehasnodesign,noreasonfor
existing. Although the natural world can apparently be understood by physical science or metaphysics, this might be better
thoughtofas'description'thaneitherunderstandingorexplanation.Thus,theachievementsofthenaturalsciencesalsoempty
nature of value and meaning. Unlike a created cosmos, for example, we cannot expect the scientifically described cosmos to
answerourquestionsconcerningvalueormeaning.Moreover,suchdescriptioncomesatthecostofaprofoundfalsificationof
nature: namely, the positing of ideal entities such as 'laws of nature', or the conflation of all reality under a single model of
being. Human beings can and should become profoundly aware of this lack of reason and the impossibility of an immanent
understanding of it. Camus, for example, argues that the basic scene of human existence is its confrontation with this mute
irrationality.Asecondmeaningoftheabsurdisthis:myfreedomwillnotonlybeundeterminedbyknowledgeorreason,but
fromthepointofviewofthelattermyfreedomwillevenappearabsurd.Absurdityisthuscloselyrelatedtothethemeof'being
onitsown',whichwediscussedaboveundertheheadingofanxiety.EvenifIchoosetofollowalawthatIhavegivenmyself,
mychoiceoflawwillappearabsurd,andlikewisewillmycontinuouslyreaffirmedchoicetofollowit.Third,humanexistence
asactionisdoomedtoalwaysdestroyitself.Afreeaction,oncedone,isnolongerfreeithasbecomeanaspectoftheworld,a
thing.Theabsurdityofhumanexistencethenseemstolieinthefactthatinbecomingmyself(afreeexistence)ImustbewhatI
amnot(athing).IfIdonotfaceuptothisabsurdity,andchoosetobeorpretendtobethinglike,Iexistinauthentically(the
termsinthisformulationareSartre's).
g.TheCrowd
Existentialismgenerallyalsocarriesasocialorpoliticaldimension.Insofarasheorsheisauthentic,thefreedomofthehuman
being will show a certain 'resolution' or 'commitment', and this will involve also the being and particularly the authentic
beingofothers.Forexample,Nietzschethusspeaksofhis(orZarathustra's)workinaidingthetransformationofthehuman,
andthereisalsoinNietzscheastrikinganalysisoftheconceptoffriendshipforHeidegger,theremustbeanauthenticmodeof
beingwithothers,althoughhedoesnotdevelopthisideaatlengththesocialandpoliticalaspectofauthenticcommitmentis
muchmoreclearinSartre,deBeauvoirandCamus.
Thatisthepositivesideofthesocialorpoliticaldimension.However,leadinguptothispositiveside,thereisadescriptionof
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thetypicalformsthatinauthenticsocialorpoliticalexistencetakes.Manyexistentialistsemploytermssuchas'crowd','horde'
(Scheler)orthe'masses'(JosOrtegayGasset).Nietzsche'sdeliberatelyprovocativeexpression,'theherd',portraysthebulkof
humanitynotonlyasanimal,butasdocileanddomesticatedanimals.Noticethattheseareallcollectiveterms:inauthenticity
manifests itself as deindividuated or faceless. Instead of being formed authentically in freedom and anxiety, values are just
acceptedfromothersbecausethatiswhateverybodydoes.Thesetermsoftencarryadefinitehistoricalresonance,embodying
acritiqueofspecificallymodernmodesofhumanexistence.Allofthefollowingmightbeseenaseithercausesorsymptomsof
a world that is 'fallen' or 'broken' (Marcel): the technology of mass communication (Nietzsche is particularly scathing about
newspapers and journalists in Two Ages, Kierkegaard says something very similar), empty religious observances, the
specialisationoflabourandsocialroles,urbanisationandindustrialisation.Thethemeofthecrowdposesaquestionalsotothe
positive social or political dimension of existentialism: how could a collective form of existence ever be anything other than
inauthentic? The 19th and 20th century presented a number of mass political ideologies which might be seen as posing a
particularly challenging environment for authentic and free existence. For example, nationalism came in for criticism
particularlybyNietzsche.Socialismandcommunism:afterWWII,Sartrewascertainlyacommunist,buteventhenunafraidto
criticiseboththeFrenchcommunistpartyandtheSovietUnionforrigidorinadequatelyrevolutionarythinking.Democracy:
Aristotleinbook5ofhisPoliticsdistinguishesbetweendemocracyandochlocracy,whichlatteressentiallymeansrulebythose
incapable of ruling even themselves. Many existentialists would identify the latter with the American and especially French
concept of 'democracy'. Nietzsche and Ortega y Gasset both espoused a broadly aristocratic criterion forsocial and political
leadership.
2.KeyExistentialistPhilosophers
a.SrenKierkegaard(18131855)asanExistentialistPhilosopher
Kierkegaard was many things: philosopher, religious writer, satirist, psychologist, journalist, literary critic and generally
consideredthefatherofexistentialism.Beingborn(inCopenhagen)toawealthyfamilyenabledhimtodevotehislifetothe
pursuitsofhisintellectualinterestsaswellastodistancinghimselffromtheeverydaymanofhistimes.
Kierkegaards most important works are pseudonymous, written under fictional names, often very obviously fictional. The
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issueofpseudonymityhasbeenvariouslyinterpretedasaliterarydevice,apersonalquirkorasanillustrationoftheconstant
tensionbetweenthephilosophicaltruthandexistentialorpersonaltruth.Wehavealreadyseenthatfortheexistentialistsitis
ofequalimportancewhatonesaysandthewayinwhichsomethingissaid.Thisformspartoftheattempttoreturntoamore
authentic way of philosophising, firstly exemplified by the Greeks. In a work like Either/Or (primarily a treatise against the
Hegelians)theoreticalreflectionsarefollowedbyreflectionsonhowtoseducegirls.Thepointistostressthedistancebetween
the anonymously and logically produced truths of the logicians and the personal truths of existing individuals. Every
pseudonymous author is a symbol for an existing individual and at times his very name is the key to the mysteries of his
existence (like in the case of Johanes de Silentio, fictional author of Fear and Trembling, where the mystery of Abrahams
actionscannotbetold,beingaproductofandbelongingtosilence).
Kierkegaardhasbeenassociatedwithanotionoftruthassubjective(orpersonal)butwhatdoesthismean?Theissueislinked
withhisnotoriousconfrontationwiththeDanishChurchandtheacademicenvironmentofhisdays.Kierkegaardsworktakes
placeagainstthebackgroundofanacademiadominatedbyHegeliandialecticsandasocietywhichreducesthecommunication
withthedivinetotheeverydayobservanceoftheritualisticsideofaninstitutionalizedChristianity.HegelisforKierkegaardhis
archenemynotonlybecauseofwhathewritesbutalsowhatherepresents.HegelisguiltyforKierkegaardbecausehereduced
thelivingtruthofChristianity(thefactthatGodsufferedanddiedontheCross)tojustanothermoment,whichnecessarilywill
beovercome,inthedialecticaldevelopmentoftheSpirit.WhileHegeltreatsGodasaBegriff(aconcept),forKierkegaardthe
truth of Christianity signifies the very paradoxicality of faith: that is, that it is possible for the individual to go beyond the
ethicalandneverthelessorratherbecauseofthisveryactofdisobediencetobelovedbyGod.Famously,forHegelallthatis
real is rational where rationality means the historically articulated, dialectical progression of Spirit whereas for
Kierkegaard the suspension of rationality is the very secret of Christianity. Against the cold logic of the Hegelian system
Kierkegaardseeksatruthwhichistruthforme(Kierkegaard1996:32).Christianityinparticularrepresentstheattemptto
offeroneslifetotheserviceofthedivine.Thiscannotbeargued,itcanonlybelived.Whileatheologianwilltrytoarguefor
thevalidityofhispositionsbyarguingandcounterarguing,atrueChristianwilltrytolivehislifethewayJesuslivedit.This
evidentlymarksthecontinuationoftheHellenicideaofphilosophyasawayoflife,exemplifiedinthepersonofSocrateswho
did not write treatises, but who died for his ideas. Before the logical concepts of the theologians (in the words of Martin
Heidegger who was hugely influenced by Kierkegaard) man can neither fall to his knees in awe nor can he play music and
dancebeforethisgod(Heidegger2002:42).Theideaofsubjectivetruthwillhaveseriousconsequencestothephilosophical
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understanding of man. Traditionally defined as animale rationale (the rational animal) by Aristotle and for a long time
worshiped as such by generations of philosophical minds, Kierkegaard comes now to redefine the human as the passionate
animal. What counts in man is the intensity of his emotions and his willingness to believe (contra the once all powerful
reason) in that which cannot be understood. The opening up by Kierkegaard of this terra incognita of mans inner life will
cometoplayamajorroleforlaterexistentialists(mostimportantlyforNietzsche)andwillbringtolightthefailingsandthe
weaknessesofanoveroptimistic(becausemodelledaftertheNaturalsciences)modelofphilosophywhichwastaughttotalka
lotconcerningthetruthofthehuman,whenallitunderstoodaboutthehumanwasamutilatedversion.
In the Garden of Eden, Adam and Eve lived in a state of innocence in communication with God and in harmony with their
physical environment. The expulsion from the Garden opened up a wide range of new possibilities for them and thus the
problemofanxietyarose.Adam(theHebrewwordforman)isnowfreetodeterminethroughhisactionstherouteofthings.
Naturally,thereisatensionhere.Thehuman,createdinGodsimage,isaninfinitebeing.LikeGodhealsocanchooseandact
accordingtohiswill.Simultaneously,though,heisafinitebeingsinceheisrestrictedbyhisbody,particularsocioeconomic
conditionsandso forth. This tension between the finite and infinite is the source of anxiety. Butunlikea Hegeliananalysis,
Kierkegaard does not look for a way out from anxiety on the contrary he stresses its positive role in the flourishing of the
human. As he characteristically puts it: Because he is a synthesis, he can be in anxiety and the more profoundly he is in
anxiety, the greater is the man (Kierkegaard 1980:154). The prioritization of anxiety as a fundamental trait of the human
beingisatypicalexistentialistmove,eagertoassertthepositiveroleofemotionsforhumanlife.
PerhapsthemostfamousworkofKierkegaardwasFearandTrembling,ashortbookwhichexhibitsmanyoftheissuesraised
byhimthroughouthiscareer.FearandTremblingretellsthestoryoftheattemptedsacrificeofIsaacbyhisfatherAbraham.
GodtellsAbrahamthatinordertoprovehisfaithhehastosacrificehisonlyson.Abrahamobeys,butatthelastmomentGod
intervenesandsavesIsaac.Whatisthemoralofthestory?Accordingtoourmoralbeliefs,shouldntAbrahamrefusetoexecute
Godsviciousplan?IsntoneofthefundamentalbeliefsofChristianitytherespecttothelifeofother?Theanswerisnaturally
affirmative.AbrahamshouldrefuseGod,andheshouldrespecttheethicallaw.ThenAbrahamwouldbeinagoodrelationwith
theLawitselfasintheexpressionalawabidingcitizen.OnthecontrarywhatAbrahamtriestoachieveisapersonalrelation
withtheauthorofthemorallaw.Thisauthorisneitherasymbolicfigurenoranabstractideaheissomeonewithaname.The
nameofGodistheunpronounceableTetragrammaton(YHVE),theunpronounceabilityindicatesthesimultaneouscloseness
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anddistanceofthegreatOther.TheChristianGodthen,theauthorofthemorallawathiswillsuspendsthelawanddemands
his unlawful wish be obeyed. Jacques Derrida notes that the temptation is now for Abraham the ethical law itself (Derrida
1998:162): he must resist ethics, this is the mad logic of God. The story naturally raises many problems. Is not such a
subjectivistmodeloftruthandreligionplainlydangerous?Whatifsomeonewastosupporthisactsofviolenceasacommand
of God? Kierkegaards response would be to suggest that it is only because Abraham loved Isaac with all his heart that the
sacrifice could take place. He must love Isaac with his whole soul....only then can he sacrifice him (Kierkegaard 1983:74).
Abrahamsfaithisprovedbythestrengthofhisloveforhisson.However,thisdoesntfullyanswerthequestionoflegitimacy,
even if we agree that Abraham believed that God loved him so that he would somehow spare him. Kierkegaard also
differentiates between the act of Abraham and the act of a tragic hero (like Agamemnon sacrificing his daughter Iphigenia).
Thetragicherosactisaproductofcalculation.Whatisbettertodo?Whatwouldbemorebeneficial?Abrahamstandsaway
fromallsortsofcalculations,hestandsalone,thatis,freeinfrontofthehorrorreligiosus,thepriceandtherewardoffaith.
b.FriedrichNietzsche(18441900)asanExistentialistPhilosopher
Iknowmylot.Somedaymynamewillbelinkedtothememoryofsomethingmonstrous,ofacrisisasyetunprecedentedon
earth...(Nietzsche2007:88).Remarkably,whatin1888soundedlikemegalomaniacamesomeyearslatertoberealized.The
nameNietzsche has been linkedwith anarray of historical events, philosophicalconceptsandwidespread popularlegends.
Aboveall,Nietzschehasmanagedsomehowtoassociatehisnamewiththeturmoilofacrisis.Forawhilethiscrisiswaslinked
to the events of WWII. The exploitation of his teaching by the Nazi ideologues (notably Alfred Rosenberg and Alfred
Baeumler),althoughutterlymisdirected,arguablyhaditssourceinNietzschesownaristocraticradicalism.Moregenerally,
thecrisisreferstotheprospectofafuturelackingofanymeaning.Thisisacommonthemeforalltheexistentialiststobesure.
The prospect of millennia of nihilism (the devaluation of the highest values) inaugurates for Nietzsche the era in which the
human itself, for the first time in its history, is called to give meaning both to its own existence and to the existence of the
world. This is an event of a cataclysmic magnitude, from now on there are neither guidelines to be followed, lighthouses to
directus,andnorightanswersbutonlyexperimentstobeconductedwithunknownresults.
Manyexistentialists,intheirattempttodifferentiatethevalueofindividualexistencefromthealienatingeffectsofthemasses,
formedanuneasyrelationwiththevalueoftheeverydayman.Thecommonmanwasthoughttobelackinginwill,tastein
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matterofaesthetics,andindividualityinthesensethattheassertionofhisexistencecomesexclusivelyfromhisparticipation
inlargergroupsandfromtheherdmentalitywithwhichthesegroupsinfusetheirmembers.Nietzschebelievedthatmenin
society are divided and ordered according to their willingness and capacity to participate in a life of spiritual and cultural
transformation.CertainlynoteveryonewishesthisparticipationandNietzschescondemnationofthoseunwillingtochallenge
theirfundamentalbeliefsisharshhoweveritwouldbeamistaketosuggestthatNietzschethoughttheirpresencedispensable.
Invariousaphorismshestressestheimportanceofthecommonasanecessaryprerequisiteforboththegrowthandthevalue
of the exceptional. Such an idea clashes with our modern sensitivities (themselves a product of a particular training).
However,onehastorecognizethattherearenophilosopherswithoutpresuppositions,andthatNietzschesinsistenceonthe
valueoftheexceptionalmarkshisownbeginningandhisownunderstandingofthemissionofthought.
Despitethedubiouspoliticsthatthecrisisofmeaninggaveriseto,thecrisisitselfisonlyanaftereffectofalargeranddeeper
challengethatNietzschesworkidentifiesandposes.ForNietzschethecrisisofmeaningisinextricablylinkedtothecrisisof
religious consciousness in the West. Whereas for Kierkegaard the problem of meaning was to be resolved through the
individualsrelationtotheDivine,forNietzschethemilitantlyantiChristian,theproblemofmeaningisrenderedpossibleat
allbecauseofthedemiseoftheDivine.AsheexplainsinTheGenealogyofMorality,itisonlyafterthecultivationoftruthasa
valuebythepriestthattruthcomestoquestionitsownvalueandfunction.Whattruthdiscoversisthatatthegroundofall
truthliesanunquestionablefaithinthevalueoftruth.Christianityisdestroyedwhenitispushedtotellthetruthaboutitself,
whentheillusionsoftheoldidealsarerevealed.WhatiscalledThedeathofGodisalsothenthedeathoftruth(thoughnotof
thevalueoftruthfulness)thisisaneventofimmenseconsequencesforthefuture.
Butonehastobecarefulhere.Generationsofreaders,byconcentratingontheeventoftheactualannouncementofthe'death
ofGod',havecompletelymissedmadmanswoefulmourningwhichfollowstheannouncement.WhereisGod?hecriedIll
tellyou!WehavekilledhimyouandI!Weareallhismurderers.Buthowdidwedothis?Howwereweabletodrinkupthe
sea?Whogaveusthespongetowipeawaytheentirehorizon?Whatwerewedoingwhenweunchainedthisearthfromitssun?
Where is itmoving? Where are wemoving to? Away from all suns?(Nietzsche 2001:125). Theabovesentencesarevery far
fromconstitutingacheerfuldeclaration:nooneishappyhere!Nietzschesatheismhasnothingtodowiththenaiveatheismof
others(forexampleSartre)whorushtoaffirmtheirfreedomasiftheirpettyindividualitywereabletofillthevastemptyspace
leftbytheabsenceofGod.Nietzscheisnotnaiveandbecauseheisnotnaiveheisratherpessimistic.WhatthedeathofGod
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really announces is the demise of the human as we know it. One has to think of this break in the history of the human in
Kantian terms. Kant famously described Enlightenment as mans emergence from his selfincurred immaturity (Kant
1991:54).SimilarlyNietzschebelievesthatthedemiseofthedivinecouldbetheopportunityfortheemergenceofabeingwhich
derivesthemeaningofitsexistencefromwithinitselfandnotfromsomeauthorityexternaltoit.Ifthemeaningofthehuman
derivedfromGodthen,withtheuniverseempty,mancannottaketheplaceoftheabsentGod.Thisemptyspacecanonlybe
filledbysomethinggreaterandfuller,whichintheNietzscheanjargonmeansthegreatestunityofcontradictoryforces.Thatis
the bermensch (Overhuman) which for Nietzsche signifies the attempt towards the cultural production of a human being
whichwillbeawareofhisdualdescentfromanimalityandfromrationalitywithoutprioritizingeitherone,butkeeping
theminanagonisticbalancesothatthroughstrugglenewandexcitingformsofhumanexistencecanbeborn.
NietzschewasbytrainingaKlassischePhilologe(theroughequivalentAnglosaxonwouldbeanexpertinclassicsthetextsof
the ancient Greek and Roman authors). Perhaps because of his close acquaintance with the ancient writers, he became
sensitive to a quite different understanding of philosophical thinking to that of his contemporaries. For the Greeks,
philosophical questioning takes place within the perspective of a certain choice of life. There is no life and then quite
separatelythetheoretical(theoria:fromtheaview,andhoran tosee) or'froma distance' contemplation ofphenomena.
Philosophical speculation is the result of a certain way of life and the attempted justification of this life. Interestingly Kant
encapsulatesthisattitudeinthefollowingpassage:Whenwillyoufinallybegintolivevirtuously?saidPlatotoanoldman
who told him he was attending classes on virtue. The point is not always to speculate, but also ultimately to think about
applying our knowledge. Today, however, he who lives in conformity with what he teaches is taken for a dreamer (Kant in
Hadot2002:xiii).WehavetounderstandNietzschesrelationtophilosophywithinthiscontextnotonlybecauseitillustratesa
stylistically different contemplation but because it demonstrates an altogether different way of philosophizing. Thus in
Twilight of the Idols Nietzsche accuses philosophers for their Egyptism, the fact that they turn everything into a concept
underevaluation.Allthatphilosophershavebeenhandlingforthousandsofyearsisconceptualmummiesnothingrealhas
everlefttheirhandsalive(Nietzsche1998:16).Philosophicalconceptsarevaluableinsofarastheyserveaflourishinglife,not
asacademicexercises.Underthenewmodelofphilosophytheoldmetaphysicalandmoralquestionsaretobereplacedbynew
questions concerning history, genealogy, environmental conditions and so forth. Let us take a characteristic passage from
1888:Iaminterestedinaquestiononwhichthesalvationofhumanitydependsmorethanonanycurioofthetheologians:
thequestionofnutrition.Foreaseofuse,onecanputitinthefollowingterms:howdoyoupersonallyhavetonourishyourself
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inordertoattainyourmaximumofstrength,ofvirtintheRenaissancestyle,ofmoralinefreevirtue?(Nietzsche2007:19).
What is Nietzsche telling us here? Two things: firstly that, following the tradition of Spinoza, the movement from
transcendence to immanence passes through the rehabilitation of the body. To say that, however, does not imply a simple
mindedmaterialism.WhenSpinozatellsnobodyasyethasdeterminedthelimitsofthebodyscapabilities(Spinoza2002:
280)heisnotwritingaboutsomethinglikebodilystrengthbuttothepossibilityofanemergenceofabodyliberatedfromthe
sedimentation of culture and memory. This archetypical body is indeed as yet unknown and we stand in ignorance of its
abilities.ThesecondthingthatNietzscheistellingusintheabovepassageisthatthisnewimmanentphilosophynecessarily
requires a new ethics. One has to be clear here because of the many misunderstandings of Nietzschean ethics. Nietzsche is
primarily a philosopher of ethics but ethics here refers to the possible justification of a way of life, which way of life in turn
justifieshumanexistenceonearth.ForNietzsche,ethicsdoesnotrefertomoralcodesandguidelinesonhowtoliveoneslife.
Morality,whichNietzscherejects,referstotheobsessiveneed(aneedoraninstinctcanalsobelearnedaccordingtoNietzsche)
of the human to preserve its own species and to regard its species as higher than the other animals. In short morality is
arrogant.ANietzscheanethicsisanethicsofmodesty.Itplacesthehumanbackwhereitbelongs,amongtheotheranimals.
Howevertosaythatisnottoequatethehumanwiththeanimal.Unlikenonhumananimalsmenareproductsofhistorythatis
tosayproductsofmemory.Thatistheirburdenandtheirresponsibility.
IntheGenealogyofMoralityNietzscheexplainsmoralityasasystemaimingatthetamingofthehumananimal.Moralitys
aimistheeliminationofthecreativepowerofanimalinstinctsandtheestablishmentofalifeprotectedwithinthecocoonof
asceticideals.These'ideals'areallthosevaluesandideologiesmadetoprotectmanagainstthedangerofnihilism,thestatein
whichmanfindsnoanswertothequestionofhisexistence.Moralityclingstothepreservationofthespeciesmanmorality
stubbornlydeniestheverypossibilityofanopenendedfutureforhumans.IfwecouldsummarizeNietzschesphilosophical
anthropologyinafewwords,wewouldsaythatforNietzscheitisnecessarytoattempt(therearenoguaranteeshere)tothink
of the human not as an endinitself but only as a means to something ...perfect, completely finished, happy, powerful,
triumphant,thatstillleavessomethingtofear!(Nietzsche2007:25).
c.MartinHeidegger(18891976)asanExistentialistPhilosopher
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Heidegger exercised an unparalleled influence on modern thought. Without knowledge of his work recent developments in
modern European philosophy (Sartre, Gadamer, Arendt, Marcuse, Derrida, Foucault et al.) simply do not make sense. He
remainsnotoriousforhisinvolvementwithNationalSocialisminthe1930s.OutsideEuropeanphilosophy,Heideggerisonly
occasionally taken seriously, and is sometimes actually ridiculed (famously the Oxford philosopher A.J. Ayer called him a
charlatan).
In 1945 in Paris JeanPaul Sartre gave a public lecture with the title Existentialism is a Humanism where he defended the
priority of action and the position that it is a mans actions which define his humanity. In 1946, Jean Beaufret in a letter to
Heideggerposesanumberofquestionsconcerningthelinkbetweenhumanismandtherecentdevelopmentsofexistentialist
philosophy in France. Heideggers response is a letter to Beaufret which in 1947 is published in a book form with the title
Letter on Humanism. There he repudiates any possible connection of his philosophy with the existentialism of Sartre. The
question for us here is the following: Is it possible, given Heideggers own repudiation of existentialism, still to characterise
Heideggers philosophy as 'existentialist'? The answer here is that Heidegger can be classified as an existentialist thinker
despiteallhisdifferencesfromSartre.OurstrategyistostressHeideggersconnectionwithsomekeyexistentialistconcerns,
whichweintroducedaboveunderthelabelsExistence,AnxietyandtheCrowd.
Wehaveseenabovethataprincipleconcernofallexistentialistswastoaffirmthepriorityofindividualexistenceandtostress
thathumanexistenceistobeinvestigatedwithmethodsotherthanthoseofthenaturalsciences.ThisisalsooneofHeideggers
principleconcerns.HismagnumopusBeing and Time isaninvestigationintothemeaningofBeing as that manifests itself
throughthehumanbeing,Dasein.ThescienceshaverepeatedlyaskedWhatisaman?Whatisacar?Whatisanemotion?
theyhaveneverthelessfailedandbecauseofthenatureofscience,hadtofailtoaskthequestionwhichgroundsallthose
otherquestions.Thisquestioniswhatisthemeaningof(that)Beingwhichisnotanentity(likeotherbeings,forexamplea
chair, a car, a rock) and yet through it entities have meaning at all? Investigating the question of the meaning of Being we
discoverthatitarisesonlybecauseitismadepossiblebythehumanbeingwhichposesthequestion.Daseinhasalreadya(pre
conceptual)understandingofBeingbecauseitistheplacewhereBeingmanifestsitself.Unlikethetraditionalunderstandingof
thehumanasahypokeimenon(Aristotle)whatthroughthefilteringofGreekthoughtbytheRomansbecomessubstantia,
thatwhichsupportsallentitiesandqualitiesastheirbaseandtheirgroundDaseinreferstothewaywhichhumanbeings
are.TheessenceofDaseinliesinitsexistence(Heidegger1962:67)andtheexistenceofDaseinisnotfixedliketheexistence
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ofasubstanceis.Thisiswhyhumanbeingslocateaplacewhichneverthelessremainsunstableandunfixed.Thevirtualplace
thatDaseinoccupiesisnotempty.ItisfilledwithbeingswhichontologicallystructuretheverypossibilityofDasein.Dasein
exists as intheworld. World is not something separate from Dasein rather, Dasein cannot be understood outside the
referential totality which constitutes it. Heidegger repeats here a familiar existentialist pattern regarding the situatednessof
experience.
Sartre,bycontrast,comesfromthetraditionofDescartesandtothistraditionremainsfaithful.FromHeidegger'sperspective,
SartresstrategyofaffirmingthepriorityofexistenceoveressenceisabyproductofthetraditionofRenaissancehumanism
whichwishestoasserttheimportanceofmanasthehighestandmostsplendidoffinitebeings.Sartreanexistencereferstothe
factthatahumaniswhereasHeideggerseksistencereferstothewaywithwhichDaseinisthrownintoaworldofreferential
relations and as such Dasein is claimed by Being to guard its truth. Sartre, following Descartes, thinks of the human as a
substanceproducingorsustainingentities,Heideggeronthecontrarythinksofthehumanasapassivitywhichacceptsthecall
ofBeing.Manisnotthelordofbeings.ManistheshepherdofBeing(Heidegger1993:245).TheHeideggerianprioritythenis
Being,andDaseinsimportanceliesinitsreceptivenesstothecallofBeing.
For Kierkegaard anxiety defines the possibility of responsibility, the exodus of man from the innocence of Eden and his
participation to history. But the birthplace of anxiety is the experience of nothingness, the state in which every entity is
experiencedaswithdrawnfromitsfunctionality.Nothing...givesbirthtoanxiety(Kierkegaard1980:41).Inanxietywedo
not fear something in particular but we experience the terror of a vacuum in which is existence is thrown. Existentialist
thinkersareinterestedinanxietybecauseanxietyindividualizesone(itiswhenIfeelAngstmorethaneverythingthatIcome
facetofacewithmyownindividualexistenceasdistinctfromallotherentitiesaroundme).Heideggerthinksthatoneofthe
fundamentalwayswithwhichDaseinunderstandsitselfintheworldisthroughanarrayofmoods.Daseinalwaysfindsitself
(befindensich)inacertainmood.Manisnotathinkingthingdeassociatedfromtheworld,asinCartesianmetaphysics,buta
beingwhichfindsitselfinvariousmoodssuchasanxietyorboredom.FortheExistentialists,primarilyandforthemostpartI
dontexistbecauseIthink(recallDescartesfamousformula)butbecausemymoodsrevealtomefundamentaltruthsofmy
existence.LikeKierkegaard,Heideggeralsobelievesthatanxietyisbornoutoftheterrorofnothingness.Theobstinacyofthe
nothingandnowherewithintheworldmeansasaphenomenonthattheworldassuchisthatinthefaceofwhichonehas
anxiety(Heidegger1962:231).ForKierkegaardthepossibilityofanxietyrevealsmansdualnatureandbecauseofthisduality
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mancanbesaved.Ifahumanbeingwereabeastoranangel,hecouldnotbeinanxiety.Becauseheisasynthesis,hecanbein
anxiety and the more profoundly he is in anxiety, the greater is the man (Kierkegaard 1980:155). Equally for Heidegger
anxietymanifestsDaseinspossibilitytoliveanauthenticexistencesinceitrealizesthatthecrowdofothers(whatHeidegger
callstheThey)cannotofferanyconsolationtothedramaofexistence.
In this article we have discussed the ambiguous or at times downright critical attitude of many existentialists toward the
uncriticalandunreflectingmassesofpeoplewho,inawhollyantiKantianandthusalsoantiEnlightenmentmove,locatethe
meaning of their existence in an external authority. They thus give up their (purported) autonomy as rational beings. For
Heidegger,DaseinforthemostpartlivesinauthenticallyinthatDaseinisabsorbedinawayoflifeproducedbyothers,notby
Daseinitself.Wetakepleasureandenjoyourselvesasthey[man]takepleasureweread,seeandjudgeaboutliteratureand
art as they see and judge... (Heidegger 1962:164). To be sure this mode of existence, the They (Das Man) is one of the
existentialia,itisanaprioriconditionofpossibilityoftheDaseinwhichmeansthatinauthenticityisinscribedintothemodeof
being of Dasein, it does not come from the outside as a bad influence which could be erased. Heideggers language is
ambiguousontheproblemofinauthenticityandthereaderhastomakehismindonthestatusoftheThey.Alothasbeensaid
onthepossibleconnectionsofHeideggersphilosophywithhispoliticalengagements.Althoughitisalwaysariskybusinessto
readtheworksofgreatphilosophersaspoliticalmanifestos,itseemsprimafacieevidentthatHeideggersthoughtinthisarea
deservesthecloseinvestigationithasreceived.
Heideggerwasahighlyoriginalthinker.HisprojectwasnothinglessthantheovercomingofWesternmetaphysicsthroughthe
positingoftheforgottenquestionofbeing.Hestandsinacriticalrelationtopastphilosophersbutsimultaneouslyheisheavily
indebtedtothem,muchmorethanhewouldliketoadmit.Thisisnottoquestionhisoriginality,itistorecognizethatthought
isnotanexnihiloproductionitcomesasaresponsetothingspast,andaimstowardswhatismadepossiblethroughthatpast.
d.JeanPaulSartre(19051980)asanExistentialistPhilosopher
In the public consciousness, at least, Sartre must surely be the central figure of existentialism. All the themes that we
introduced above come together in his work. With the possible exception of Nietzsche, his writings are the most widely
anthologised(especiallythelovely,ifoversimplifying,lecture'ExistentialismandHumanism')andhisliteraryworksarewidely
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read(especiallythenovelNausea)orperformed.Althoughuncomfortableinthelimelight,hewasneverthelesstheverymodel
ofapublicintellectual,writinghundredsofshortpiecesforpublicdisseminationandtakingresolutelyindependentandoften
controversialstandsonmajorpoliticalevents.HiswritingsthataremostclearlyexistentialistincharacterdatefromSartre's
earlyandmiddleperiod,primarilythe1930sand1940s.Fromthe1950sonwards,Sartremovedhisexistentialismtowardsa
philosophythepurposeofwhichwastounderstandthepossibilityofagenuinelyrevolutionarypolitics.
Sartrewasinhislate20swhenhefirstencounteredphenomenology,specificallythephilosophicalideasofEdmundHusserl.
(WeshouldpointoutthatHeideggerwasalsodeeplyinfluencedbyHusserl,butitislessobviousinthelanguageheemploys
becausehedropsthelanguageofconsciousnessandacts.)Ofparticularimportance,Sartrethought,wasHusserl'snotionof
intentionality.InSartre'sinterpretationofthisidea,consciousnessisnottobeidentifiedwithathing(forexampleamind,soul
or brain), that is to say some kind of a repository of ideas and images of things. Rather, consciousness is nothing but a
directedness towards things. Sartre found a nice way to sum up the notion of the intentional object: If I love her, I love her
becausesheislovable(Sartre1970:45).Withinmyexperience,herlovablenessisnotanaspectofmyimageofher,ratheritis
afeatureofher(andultimatelyapartoftheworld)towardswhichmyconsciousnessdirectsitself.ThethingsInoticeabouther
(her smile, her laugh) are not originally neutral, and then I interpret the idea of them as 'lovely', they are aspects of her as
lovable.ThenotionthatconsciousnessisnotathingisvitaltoSartre.Indeed,consciousnessisprimarilytobecharacterisedas
nothing:itisfirstandforemostnotthatwhichitisconsciousof.(Sartrecallshumanexistencethe'foritself',andthebeingof
things the 'initself'.) Because it is not a thing, it is not subject to the laws of things specifically, it is not part of a chain of
causesanditsidentityisnotakintothatofasubstance.Abovewesuggestedthataconcernwiththenatureofexistence,and
moreparticularlyaconcernwiththedistinctivenatureofhumanexistence,aredefiningexistentialistthemes.
Moreover,quaconsciousness,andnotathingthatispartofthecausalchain,Iamfree.Frommomenttomoment,myevery
action is mine alone to choose. I will of course have a past 'me' that cannot be dispensed with this is part of my 'situation'.
However, again, I am first and foremost not my situation. Thus, at every moment I choose whether to continue on that life
path, or to be something else. Thus, my existence (the mere fact that I am) is prior to my essence (what I make of myself
throughmyfreechoices).Iamthusutterlyresponsibleformyself.Ifmyactisnotsimplywhateverhappenstocometomind,
thenmyactionmayembodyamoregeneralprincipleofaction.ThisprincipletooisonethatImusthavefreelychosenand
committedmyselfto.ItisanimageofthetypeoflifethatIbelievehasvalue.(Intheseways,Sartreintersectswiththebroadly
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Kantianaccountoffreedomwhichweintroducedaboveinourthematicsection.)Assituated,Ialsofindmyselfsurroundedby
such images from religion, culture, politics or morality but none compels my freedom. (All these forces that seek to
appropriate my freedom by objectifying me form Sartre's version of the crowd theme.) I exist as freedom, primarily
characterised as not determined, so my continuing existence requires the ever renewed exercise of freedom (thus, in our
thematic discussion above, the notion from Spinoza and Leibniz of existence as a strivingtoexist). Thus also, my non
existence,andthenonexistenceofeverythingIbelievein,isonlyafreechoiceaway.I(inthesenseofanauthentichuman
existence)amnotwhatI'am'(thepastIhaveaccumulated,thethingsthatsurroundme,orthewaythatothersviewme).Iam
aloneinmyresponsibilitymyexistence,relativetoeverythingexternalthatmightgiveitmeaning,isabsurd.Facetofacewith
such responsibility, I feel 'anxiety'. Notice that although Sartre's account of situatedness owes much to Nietzsche and
Heidegger,heseesitprimarilyintermsofwhatgiveshumanfreedomitsmeaninganditsburden.NietzscheandHeidegger,in
contrast,viewsuchaconceptionoffreedomasnaivelymetaphysical.
Suppose,however,thatatsomepointIamconsciousofmyselfinathinglikeway.Forexample,Isay'Iamastudent'(treating
myself as having a fixed, thinglike identity) or 'I had no choice' (treating myself as belonging to the causal chain). I am
ascribingafixedidentityorsetofqualitiestomyself,muchasIwouldsay'thatisapieceofgranite'.InthatcaseIamexisting
indenialofmydistinctivelyhumanmodeofexistenceIamfleeingfrommyfreedom.Thisisinauthenticityor'badfaith'.As
we shall see, inauthenticity is not just an occasional pitfall of human life, but essential to it. Human existence is a constant
fallingawayfromanauthenticrecognitionofitsfreedom.SartreherethusechoesthenotioninHeideggerthaninauthenticity
isaconditionofpossibilityofhumanexistence.
Intentionalitymanifestsitselfinanotherimportantway.RarelyifeveramIsimplyobservingtheworldinsteadIaminvolved
in wanting to do something, I have a goal or purpose. Here, intentional consciousness is not a static directedness towards
things,butisratheranactiveprojectiontowardsthefuture.SupposethatIundertakeasmyprojectmarryingmybeloved.This
isanintentionalrelationtoafuturestateofaffairs.Asfree,Icommitmyselftothisprojectandmustreaffirmthatcommitment
ateverymoment.Itispartofmylifeproject,theimageofhumanlifethatIoffertomyselfandtoothersassomethingofvalue.
Notice,however,thatmyprojectinvolvesinauthenticity.IprojectmyselfintothefuturewhereIwillbemarriedtoherthatis,
Idefinemyselfas'married',asifIwereafixedbeing.Thusthereisanessentialtensiontoallprojection.Ontheonehand,the
mere fact that I project myself into the future is emblematic of my freedom only a radically free consciousness can project
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itself.Iexistasprojectingtowardsthefuturewhich,again,Iamnot.Thus,Iam(inthesenseofanauthenticself)whatIam
not(becausemyprojectingisalwaysunderwaytowardsthefuture).Ontheotherhand,inprojectingIamprojectingmyselfas
something, that is, as a thing that no longer projects, has no future, is not free. Every action, then, is both an expression of
freedomandalsoasnareoffreedom.Projectionisabsurd:Iseektobecometheimpossibleobject,foritselfinitself,athing
thatisbothfreeandamerething.Bornofthistensionisarecognitionoffreedom,whatitentails,anditsessentialfragility.
Thus,onceagain,weencounterexistentialanxiety.(Inthisarticle,wehavenotstressedtheimportanceoftheconceptoftime
forexistentialism,butitshouldnotbeoverlooked:witnessoneofNietzsche'smostfamousconcepts(eternalrecurrence)and
thetitleofHeidegger'smajorearlywork(BeingandTime).)
In my intentional directedness towards my beloved I find her 'loveable'. This too, though, is an objectification. Within my
intentionalgaze,sheisloveableinmuchthesamewaythatgraniteishardorheavy.InsofarasIaminlove,then,Iseektodeny
herfreedom.Insofar,however,asIwishtobelovedbyher,thenshemustbefreetochoosemeasherbeloved.Ifsheisfree,
she escapes my love if not, she cannot love. It is in these terms that Sartre analyses love in Part Three of Being and
Nothingness. Love here is a case study in the basic forms of social relation. Sartre is thus moving from an entirely
individualistic frame of reference (my self, my freedom and my projects) towards a consideration of the self in concrete
relationswithothers.Sartreisworkingthroughinawayhewouldshortlyseeasbeinginadequatetheissuespresentedby
the Hegelian dialectic of recognition, which we mentioned above. This 'hell' of endlessly circling acts of freedom and
objectificationisbrilliantlydramatisedinSartre'splayNoExit.
Afewyearslaterattheendofthe1940s,SartrewrotewhathasbeenpublishedasNotebooksforanEthics.Sartre(influenced
inthemeantimebythecriticismsofMerleauPontyanddeBeauvoir,andbyhisincreasingcommitmenttocollectivistpolitics)
elaborated greatly his existentialist account of relations with others, taking the Hegelian idea more seriously. He no longer
thinksofconcreterelationssopessimistically.WhileNietzscheandHeideggerbothsuggestthepossibilityofanauthenticbeing
withothers,bothleaveitseriouslyunderdeveloped.Forourpurposes,therearetwokeyideasintheNotebooks. The first is
thatmyprojectscanberealisedonlywiththecooperationofothershowever,thatcooperationpresupposestheirfreedom(I
cannotmakeherloveme),andtheirjudgementsaboutmemustconcernme.Thereforepermittingandnurturingthefreedom
ofothersmustbeacentralpartofallmyprojects.Sartrethuscommitshimselfagainstanypolitical,socialoreconomicforms
ofsubjugation.Second,thereisthepossibilityofaformofsocialorganisationandactioninwhicheachindividualfreelygives
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himorherselfovertoajointproject:a'cityofends'(thisisareworkingofKant'sideaofthe'kingdomofends',foundinthe
Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals). An authentic existence, for Sartre, therefore means two things. First, it is
something like a 'style' of existing one that at every moment is anxious, and that means fully aware of the absurdity and
fragility of its freedom. Second, though, there is some minimal level of content to any authentic project: whatever else my
projectis,itmustalsobeaprojectoffreedom,formyselfandforothers.
e.SimonedeBeauvoir(19081986)asanExistentialistPhilosopher
Simone de Beauvoir was the youngest student ever to pass the demanding agrgation at the prestigious cole Normale
Suprieure. Subsequently a star Normalienne, she was a writer, philosopher, feminist, lifelong partner of JeanPaul Sartre,
notoriousforherantibourgeoiswayoflivingandherfreesexualrelationshipswhichincludedamongothersapassionateaffair
withtheAmericanwriterNelsonAlgren.MuchinkhasbeenspilleddebatingwhetherdeBeauvoirsworkconstitutesabodyof
independent philosophical work, or is a reformulation of Sartres work. The debate rests of course upon the fundamental
misconception that wants a body of work to exist and develop independently of (or uninfluenced by) its intellectual
environment.Suchobjectivityisnotonlyimpossiblebutalsoundesirable:suchabodyofworkwouldbeultimatelyirrelevant
sinceitwouldbenoncommunicable.SothequestionofdeBeauvoirsindependencecouldbedismissedhereasirrelevantto
thephilosophicalquestionsthatherworkraises.
In1943BeingandNothingness,thegroundworkoftheExistentialistmovementinFrancewaspublished.ThereSartregavean
account of freedom as ontological constitutive of the subject. One cannot but be free: this is the kernel of the Sartrean
conceptionoffreedom.In1945MerleauPontysPhenomenologyofPerceptionispublished.There,aswellasinanessayfrom
the same year titled 'The war has taken place', MerleauPonty heavily criticizes the Sartrean stand, criticising it as a
reformulation of basic Stoic tenets. One cannot assume freedom in isolation from the freedom of others. Action is
participatory: my freedom is interwoven with that of others by way of the world (MerleauPonty in Stewart 1995:315).
Moreover action takes place within a certain historical context. For MerleauPonty the subjective freewill is always in a
dialecticalrelationshipwithitshistoricalcontext.In1947SimonedeBeauvoirsEthicsofAmbiguityispublished.Thebookis
an introduction to existentialism but also a subtle critique of Sartres position on freedom, and a partial extension of
existentialism towards the social. Although de Beauvoir will echo MerleauPontys criticism regarding the essential
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interrelation of the subjects, nevertheless she will leave unstressed the importance that the social context plays in the
explicationofmoralproblems.LikeSartreitisonlylaterinherlifethatthiswillbeacknowledged.Inanycase,deBeauvoirs
bookprecipitatesinturnamajorrethinkonSartrespart,andtheresultistheNotebooksforanEthics.
In Ethics of Ambiguity de Beauvoir offers a picture of the human subject as constantly oscillating between facticity and
transcendence. Whereas the human is always already restricted by the brute facts of his existence, nevertheless it always
aspirestoovercomeitssituation,tochooseitsfreedomandthustocreateitself.Thistensionmustbeconsideredpositive,and
notrestrictiveofaction.Itisexactlybecausetheontologyofthehumanisabattlegroundofantitheticalmovements(aview
consistent with de Beauvoirs Hegelianism) that the subject must produce an ethics which will be continuous with its
ontological core. The term for this tension is ambiguity. Ambiguity is not a quality of the human as substance, but a
characterisation of human existence. We are ambiguous beings destined to throw ourselves into the future while
simultaneouslyitisourveryownexistencethatthrowsusbackintofacticity.Thatistosay,backtothebrutefactthatwearein
asensealwaysalreadydestinedtofailnotinthisorthatparticularprojectbuttofailaspureandsustainedtranscendence.It
isexactlybecauseof(andthrough)thisfundamentalfailurethatwerealizethatourethicalrelationtotheworldcannotbeself
referentialbutmustpassthroughtherealizationofthecommondestinyofthehumanasafailedandinterrelatedbeing.
De Beauvoir, unlike Sartre, was a scholarly reader of Hegel. Her position on an existential ethics is thus more heavily
influenced by Hegels view in the Phenomenology of Spirit concerning the moment of recognition (Hegel 1977:111). There
Hegeldescribesthemovementinwhichselfconsciousnessproducesitselfbypositinganotherwouldbeselfconsciousness,not
asamuteobject(Gegenstand)butasitselfselfconsciousness.TheHegelianmovementremainsoneofthemostfascinating
moments in the history of philosophy since it is for the first time that the constitution of the self does not take place from
within the self (as happens with Descartes, for whom the only truth is the truth of my existence or Leibniz, for whom the
monadsarewindowlessorFichte,forwhomtheIisabsolutelyselfconstitutive)butfromtheoutside.Itis,Hegeltellsus,
only because someone else recognizes me as a subject that I can be constituted as such. Outside the moment of recognition
thereisnoselfconsciousness.DeBeauvoirtakestohearttheHegelianlessonandtriestoformulateanethicsfromit.
What would this ethics be? As in Nietzsche, ethics refers to a way of life (a ), as opposed to morality which concerns
approved or condemned behaviour. Thus there are no recipes for ethics. Drawn from Hegels moment of recognition, de
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Beauvoir acknowledges that the possibility of human flourishing is based firstly upon the recognition of the existence of the
other (Man can find a justification of his own existence only in the existence of the other men (Beauvoir 1976:72) and
secondlyontherecognitionthatmyownflourishing(ormyabilitytoposeprojects,inthelanguageofexistentialists)passes
through the possibility of a common flourishing. Only the freedom of others keeps each one of us from hardening in the
absurdityoffacticity,(Beauvoir1976:71)deBeauvoirwritesoragainTowilloneselffreeisalsotowillothersfree(Beauvoir
1976:73).TheEthicsofAmbiguityendsbydeclaringthenecessityofassumingonesfreedomandtheassertionthatitisonly
throughactionthatfreedommakesitselfpossible.Thisisnotapointtobetakenlightheartedly.Itconstitutesamovementof
oppositionagainstalongtraditionofphilosophyunderstandingitselfastheoria:thedisinterestedcontemplationonthenature
of the human and the world. De Beauvoir, in common with most existentialists, understands philosophy as praxis: involved
actionintheworldandparticipationinthecourseofhistory.ItisoutofthisunderstandingthatTheSecondSexisborn.
In1949LeDeuximeSexeispublishedinFrance.InEnglishin1953itappearedasTheSecondSexinanabridgedtranslation.
ThebookimmediatelybecameabestsellerandlaterafoundingtextofSecondWaveFeminism(thefeministmovementfrom
theearly60stothe70sinspiredbythecivilrightsmovementandfocusingatthetheoreticalexaminationoftheconceptsof
equality,inequality,theroleoffamily,justiceandsoforth).Morethananything,TheSecondSexconstitutesastudyinapplied
existentialism where the abstract concept Woman gives way to the examination of the lives of everyday persons struggling
againstoppressionandhumiliation.WhendeBeauvoirsaysthatthereisnosuchthingasaWomanwehavetoheartheecho
of the Kierkegaardian assertion of the single individual against the abstractions of Hegelian philosophy, or similarly Sartres
insistence on the necessity of the prioritization of the personal lives of selfcreating people (what Sartre calls existence) as
opposedtoapreestablishedidealofwhathumansshouldbelike(whatSartrecallsessence).TheSecondSexisanexemplary
textshowinghowaphilosophicalmovementcanhavereal,tangibleeffectsonthelivesofmanypeople,andisamagnificent
exerciseinwhatphilosophycouldbe.
Ihesitatedalongtimebeforewritingabookonwoman.Thesubjectisirritating,especiallyforwomen...(Beauvoir2009:3).
TheSecondSexbeginswiththemostobvious(butrarelyposed)question:Whatiswoman?DeBeauvoirfindsthatatpresent
thereisnoanswertothatquestion.Thereasonisthattraditionhasalwaysthoughtofwomanastheotherofman.Itisonly
manthatconstituteshimselfasasubject(astheAbsolutedeBeauvoirsays),andwomandefinesherselfonlythroughhim.She
determinesanddifferentiatesherselfinrelationtoman,andhedoesnotinrelationtohersheistheinessentialinfrontofthe
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essential...(Beauvoir2009:6).Butwhyisitthatwomanhasinitiallyacceptedortoleratedthisprocesswherebyshebecomes
theother of man? De Beauvoir does not give a consoling answer on the contrary, by turning to Sartres notion of bad faith
(whichreferstothehumanbeingsanxietyinfrontoftheresponsibilityentailedbytherealizationofitsradicalfreedom)she
thinks that women attimes are complicit to their situation. It is indeed easier for one anyone to assume the role of an
object(forexampleahousewife'kept'byherhusband)thantotakeresponsibilityforcreatinghimorherselfandcreatingthe
possibilitiesoffreedomforothers.Naturallytheconditionofbadfaithisnotalwaysthecase.Oftenwomenfoundthemselves
in a sociocultural environment which denied them the very possibility of personal flourishing (as happens with most of the
majorreligiouscommunities).Afurtherproblemthatwomenfaceisthatofunderstandingthemselvesasaunitywhichwould
enablethemtoassumetheroleoftheirchoosing.Proletarianssaywe.Sodoblacks(Beauvoir2009:8).Bysayingwethey
assume the role of the subject and turn everyone else into other. Women are unable to utter this we. They live dispersed
among men, tied by homes, work, economic interests and social conditions to certain men fathers or husbands more
closelythantootherwomen.Asbourgeoiswomen,theyareinsolidaritywithbourgeoismenandnotwithwomenproletarians
aswhitewomen,theyareinsolidaritywithwhitemenandnotwithblackwomen(Beauvoir2009:9).Womenprimarilyalign
themselvestotheirclassorraceandnottootherwomen.Thefemaleidentityisverymuchboundupwiththeidentityofthe
menaroundthem...(Reynolds2006:145).
One of the most celebrated moments in The Second Sex is the much quoted phrase: One is not born, but rather becomes,
woman (Beauvoir 2009:293). She explains: No biological, physical or economic destiny defines the figure that the human
female takes on in society it is civilization as a whole that elaborates this intermediary product between the male and the
eunuchthatiscalledfeminine(Beauvoir2009:293).Forsomefeministsthisclearlyinauguratestheproblematicofthesex
genderdistinction(wheresexdenotesthebiologicalidentityofthepersonandgendertheculturalattributionofpropertiesto
thesexedbody).Simplyput,thereisabsolutelynothingthatdeterminestheassumedfemininityofthewoman(howawoman
acts,feels,behaves)everythingthatwehavecometothinkasfeminineisasocialconstructionnotanaturalgiven.Later
feministslikeMoniqueWittigandJudithButlerwillarguethatsexisalreadygenderinthesensethatasexedbodyexists
alwaysalreadywithinaculturalnexusthatdefinesit.Thusthesexassignment(adoctorpronouncingthesexofthebaby)isa
naturalized(butnotatallnatural)normativeclaimwhichdeliversthehumanintoaworldofpowerrelations.
f.AlbertCamus(19131960)asanExistentialistPhilosopher
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AlbertCamuswasaFrenchintellectual,writerandjournalist.Hismultifacetedworkaswellashisambivalentrelationtoboth
philosophyandexistentialismmakeseveryattempttoclassifyhimaratherriskyoperation.Arecipientofthe1957NobelPrize
for Literature primarily for his novels, he is also known as a philosopher due to his nonliterary work and his relation with
JeanPaulSartre.Andyethisresponsewasclear:Iamnotaphilosopher,becauseIdontbelieveinreasonenoughtobelieve
inasystem.Whatinterestsmeisknowinghowwemustbehave,andmoreprecisely,howtobehavewhenonedoesnotbelieve
inGodorreason(CamusinSherman2009:1).Theissueisnotjustaboutthelabel'existentialist'.Itratherpointstoadeep
tensionwithinthecurrentofthoughtofallthinkersassociatedwithexistentialism.Thequestionis:Withhowmanyvoicescan
thoughtspeak?Aswehavealreadyseen,thethinkersofexistentialismoftendeployedmorethanone.Almostallofthemshare
adeepsuspiciontoaphilosophyoperatingwithinreasonasconceivedofbytheEnlightenment.Camussharesthissuspicion
andhissocalledphilosophyoftheabsurdintendstosetlimitstotheoverambitionsofWesternrationality.Reasonisabsurdin
thatitbelievesthatitcanexplainthetotalityofthehumanexperiencewhereasitisexactlyitsinabilityforexplanationthat,for
example, a moment of fall designates. Thus in his novel The Fall the protagonists tumultuous narrative reveals the
overtakingofalifeofsuperficialregularitybytheforcesofdarknessandirrationality.Abourgeoishell,inhabitedofcourseby
baddreams(Camus2006:10).InasimilarfashionCamushasalsorepudiatedhisconnectionwithexistentialism.Non,jene
suispasexistentialististhetitleofafamousinterviewthathegaveforthemagazineLesNouvellesLittrairesonthe15of
November,1945.ThetruthofthematteristhatCamusrejectionofexistentialismisdirectedmoretowardSartresversionofit
ratherthantowardadismissalofthemainproblemsthattheexistentialthinkersfaced.Particularly,Camuswasworriedthat
Sartresdeificationofhistory(SartresproclaimedMarxism)wouldbeincompatiblewiththeaffirmationofpersonalfreedom.
CamusaccusesHegel(subsequentlyMarxhimself)ofreducingmantohistoryandthusdenyingmanthepossibilityofcreating
hisownhistory,thatis,affirminghisfreedom.
Philosophically,Camusisknownforhisconceptionoftheabsurd.Perhapsweshouldclarifyfromtheverybeginningwhatthe
absurd is not. The absurd is not nihilism. For Camus the acceptance of the absurd does not lead to nihilism (according to
Nietzschenihilismdenotesthestateinwhichthehighestvaluesdevaluethemselves)ortoinertia,butrathertotheiropposite:
toactionandparticipation.Thenotionoftheabsurdsignifiesthespacewhichopensupbetween,ontheonehand,mansneed
forintelligibilityand,ontheotherhand,'theunreasonablesilenceoftheworld'ashebeautifullyputsit.Inaworlddevoidof
God, eternal truths or any other guiding principle, how could man bear the responsibility of a meaninggiving activity? The
absurdman,likeanastronautlookingattheearthfromabove,wonderswhetheraphilosophicalsystem,areligionorapolitical
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ideologyisabletomaketheworldrespondtothequestioningofman,orratherwhetherallhumanconstructionsarenothing
buttheexcessivefacepaintofaclownwhichistheretocoverhissadness.Thisterriblesuspicionhauntstheabsurdman.In
oneofthemostmemorableopeningsofanonfictionalbookhestates:Thereisbutonetrulyseriousphilosophicalproblem
andthatissuicide.Judgingwhetherlifeisorisnotworthlivingamountstoansweringthefundamentalquestionofphilosophy.
All the rest whether or not the world has three dimensions, whether the mind has nine or twelve categories comes
afterwards. These are games one must first answer (Camus 2000:11). The problem of suicide (a deeply personal problem)
manifeststheexigencyofameaninggivingresponse.IndeedforCamusasuicidalresponsetotheproblemofmeaningwould
betheconfirmationthattheabsurdhastakenovermansinnerlife.Itwouldmeanthatmanisnotanymoreananimalgoing
afteranswers,inaccordancewithsomeinnerdrivethatleadshimtoactinordertoendowtheworldwithmeaning.Thesuicide
hasbecomebutapassiverecipientofthemutenessoftheworld....Theabsurd...issimultaneouslyawarenessandrejectionof
death(Camus2000:54).Onehastobeawareofdeathbecauseitispreciselytherealizationofmansmortalitythatpushes
someone to strive for answers and one has ultimately to reject death that is, reject suicide as well as the living death of
inertiaandinaction.Attheendonehastokeeptheabsurdalive,asCamussays.Butwhatdoesitthatmean?
InTheMythofSisyphusCamustellsthestoryofthemythicalSisyphuswhowascondemnedbytheGodstoceaselesslyrolla
rock to the top of a mountain and then have to let it fall back again of its own weight. Sisyphus, proletarian of the gods,
powerless and rebellious, knows the whole extent of his wretched condition: it is what he thinks of during his descent. The
luciditythatwastoconstitutehistortureatthesametimecrownshisvictory.Thereisnofatethatcannotbesurmountedby
scorn (Camus 2000:109). One must imagine then Sisyphus victorious: fate and absurdity have been overcome by a joyful
contempt.Scornistheappropriateresponseinthefaceoftheabsurdanothernameforthis'scorn'thoughwouldbeartistic
creation.WhenCamussays:Onedoesnotdiscovertheabsurdwithoutbeingtemptedtowriteamanualofhappiness(Camus
2000:110)hewritesaboutamomentofexhilaratedmadness,whichisthemomentofthegenesisoftheartisticwork.Madness,
butneverthelessprofoundthinkofthefunctionoftheFoolinShakespearesKingLearastheonewhorevealstothekingthe
most profound truths through play, mimicry and songs. Such madness can overcome the absurd without cancelling it
altogether.
Almost ten years after the publication of The Myth of Sisyphus Camus publishes his second major philosophical work, The
Rebel(1951).CamuscontinuestheproblematicwhichhadbegunwithTheMythofSisyphus.Previously,revoltorcreationhad
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beenconsideredthenecessaryresponsetotheabsurdityofexistence.Here,Camusgoesontoexaminethenatureofrebellion
anditsmultiplemanifestationsinhistory.InTheMythofSisyphus,intrulyNietzscheanfashion,Camushadsaid:Thereis
butoneusefulaction,thatofremakingmanandtheearth(Camus2000:31).However,inTheRebel,reminiscentofOrwells
AnimalFarm,oneofthefirstpointshemakesisthefollowing:Theslavestartsbybeggingforjusticeandendsbywantingto
wear a crown. He too wants to dominate (Camus 2000b:31). The problem is that while man genuinely rebels against both
unfairsocialconditionsand,asCamussays,againstthewholeofcreation,neverthelessinthepracticaladministrationofsuch
revolution,mancomestodenythehumanityoftheotherinanattempttoimposehisownindividuality.Takeforexamplethe
caseoftheinfamousMarquisdeSadewhichCamusexplores.InSade,contradictoryforcesareatwork(seeThe120Daysof
Sodom).Ontheonehand,Sadewishestheestablishmentofa(certainlymad)communitywithdesireastheultimatemaster,
andontheotherhandthisverydesireconsumesitselfandallthesubjectswhostandinitsway.
Camusgoesontoexaminehistoricalmanifestationsofrebellion,themostprominentcasebeingthatoftheFrenchRevolution.
Camus argues that the revolution ended up taking the place of the transcendent values which it sought to abolish. An all
powerfulnotionofjusticenowtakestheplaceformerlyinhabitedbyGod.Rousseausinfamoussuggestionthatundertherule
ofgeneralwilleveryonewouldbe'forcedtobefree'(RousseauinFoley2008:61)opensthewaytothecrimescommittedafter
the revolution. Camus fears that all revolutions end with the reestablishment of the State. ...Seventeen eightynine brings
Napoleon 1848 Napoleon III 1917 Stalin the Italian disturbances of the twenties, Mussolini the Weimar Republic, Hitler
(Camus2000b:146).CamusisledtoexaminetheMarxistviewofhistoryasapossibleresponsetothefailedattemptsatthe
establishment of a true revolutionary regime. Camus examines the similarities between the Christian and the Marxist
conceptionofhistory.Theybothexhibitabourgeoispreoccupationwithprogress.Inthenameofthefutureeverythingcanbe
justified:thefutureistheonlykindofpropertythatthemasterswillinglyconcedetotheslaves(Camus2000b:162).History
accordingtobothviewsisthelinearprogressfromasetbeginningtoadefiniteend(themetaphysicalsalvationofmanorthe
materialisticsalvationofhiminthefutureCommunistsociety).InfluencedbyKojvesreadingofHegel,Camusinterpretsthis
future,classlesssocietyastheendofhistory.Theendofhistorysuggeststhatwhenallcontradictionsceasethenhistoryitself
willcometoanend.Thisis,Camusargues,essentiallynihilistic:history,ineffect,acceptsthatmeaningcreationisnolonger
possibleandcommitssuicide.Becausehistoricalrevolutionsareforthemostpartnihilisticmovements,Camussuggeststhatit
is the makingabsolute of the values of the revolution that necessarily lead to their negation. On the contrary a relative
conceptionofthesevalueswillbeabletosustainacommunityoffreeindividualswhohavenotforgottenthateveryhistorical
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rebellionhasbegunbyaffirmingaprotovalue(thatofhumansolidarity)uponwhicheveryothervaluecanbebased.
3.TheInfluenceofExistentialism
a.TheArtsandPsychology
Inthefieldofvisualartsexistentialismexercisedanenormousinfluence,mostobviouslyonthemovementofExpressionism.
ExpressionismbeganinGermanyatthebeginningofthe20thcentury.Withitsemphasisonsubjectiveexperience,Angstand
intense emotionality, German expressionism sought to go beyond the naivet of realist representation and to deal with the
anguish of the modern man (exemplified in the terrible experiences of WWI). Many of the artists of Expressionism read
Nietzsche intensively and following Nietzsches suggestion for a transvaluation of values experimented with alternative
lifestyles. Erich Heckels woodcut Friedrich Nietzsche from 1905 is a powerful reminder of the movements connection to
Existentialistthought.Abstractexpressionism(whichincludedartistssuchasdeKooningandPollock,andtheoristssuchas
Rosenberg)continuedwithsomeofthesamethemesintheUnitedStatesfromthe1940sandtendedtoembraceexistentialism
asoneofitsintellectualguides,especiallyafterSartre'sUSlecturetourin1946andaproductionofNoExitinNewYork.
German Expressionism was particularly important during the birth of the new art of cinema. Perhaps the closest cinematic
worktoExistentialistconcernsremainsF.W.MurnausTheLastLaugh(1924)inwhichtheconstantlymovingcamera(which
prefigurestheruleofthehandheldcameraoftheDanishDogma95)attemptstoarrestthespiritualanguishofamanwho
suddenly finds himself in a meaningless world. Expressionism became a worldwide style within cinema, especially as film
directors like Lang fled Germany and ended up in Hollywood. Jean Genet's Un chant d'amour (1950) is a moving poetic
explorationofdesire.Inthesordid,claustrophobiccellsofaprisontheinmatescravingforintimacytakesplaceagainstthe
background of an unavoidable despair for existence itself. European directors such as Bergman and Godard are often
associatedwithexistentialistthemes.Godard'sVivresavie(MyLifetoLive,1962)isexplicitinitsexplorationofthenatureof
freedomunderconditionsofextremesocialandpersonalpressure.Inthelate20thandearly21stcenturiesexistentialistideas
becamecommoninmainstreamcinema,pervadingtheworkofwritersanddirectorssuchasWoodyAllen,RichardLinklater,
CharlieKaufmanandChristopherNolan.
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GiventhatSartreandCamuswerebothprominentnovelistsandplaywrights,theinfluenceofexistentialismonliteratureisnot
surprising. However, the influence was also the other way. Novelists such as Dostoevsky or Kafka, and the dramatist Ibsen,
were often cited by midcentury existentialists as important precedents, right along with Kierkegaard and Nietzsche.
DostoevskycreatesacharacterIvanKaramazov(inTheBrothersKaramazov,1880)whoholdstheviewthatifGodisdead,
theneverythingispermittedbothNietzscheandSartrediscussDostoevskywithenthusiasm.Withindrama,thetheatreofthe
absurdandmostobviouslyBeckettwereinfluencedbyexistentialistideaslaterplaywrightssuchasAlbee,PinterandStoppard
continuethistradition.
Oneofthekeyfiguresof20thcenturypsychology,SigmundFreud,wasindebtedtoNietzscheespeciallyforhisanalysisofthe
role of psychology within culture and history, and for his view of cultural artefacts such as drama or music as 'unconscious'
documentations of psychological tensions. But a more explicit taking up of existentialist themes is found in the broad
'existentialistpsychotherapy'movement.Acommonthemewithinthisotherwiseverydiversegroupisthatpreviouspsychology
misunderstoodthefundamentalnatureofthehumanandespeciallyitsrelationtoothersandtoactsofmeaninggivingthus
also,previouspsychologyhadmisunderstoodwhata'healthy'attitudetoself,othersandmeaningmightbe.Keyfigureshere
includeSwisspsychologistsLudwigBinswangerandlaterMenardBoss,bothofwhowereenthusiasticreadersofHeidegger
theAustrianFrankl,whoinventedthemethodoflogotherapyinEngland,LaingandCooper,whowereexplicitlyinfluencedby
SartreandintheUnitedStates,RolloMay,whostressestheineradicableimportanceofanxiety.
b.Philosophy
As a whole, existentialism has had relatively little direct influence within philosophy. In Germany, existentialism (and
especiallyHeidegger)wascriticisedforbeingobscure,abstractorevenmysticalinnature.Thiscriticismwasmadeespecially
by Adorno in The Jargon of Authenticity, and in Dog Years, novelist Gunter Grass gives a Voltairelike, savage satire of
Heidegger.Thecriticismwasechoedbymanyintheanalytictradition.Heideggerandtheexistentialistwerealsotakentotask
forpayinginsufficientattentiontosocialandpoliticalstructuresorvalues,withdangerousresults.InFrance,philosopherslike
Sartre were criticised by those newly under the influence of structuralism for paying insufficient attention to the nature of
language and to impersonal structures of meaning. In short, philosophy moved on, and in different directions. Individual
philosophersremaininfluential,however:NietzscheandHeideggerinparticularareverymuch'live'topicsinphilosophy,even
st
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inthe21stcentury.
However,therearesomelessdirectinfluencesthatremainimportant.Letusraisethreeexamples.Boththeissueoffreedomin
relation to situation, and that of the philosophical significance of what otherwise might appear to be extraneous contextual
factors,remainkey,albeitindramaticallyalteredformulation,withintheworkofMichelFoucaultorAlainBadiou,twofigures
central to late 20th century European thought. Likewise, the philosophical importance that the existentialists placed upon
emotionhasbeeninfluential,legitimisingawholedomainofphilosophicalresearchevenbyphilosopherswhohavenointerest
inexistentialism.Similarly,existentialismwasaphilosophythatinsistedphilosophycouldandshoulddealverydirectlywith
'real world' topics such as sex, death or crime, topics that had most frequently been approached abstractly within the
philosophical tradition. Mary Warnock wrote on existentialism and especially Sartre, for example, while also having an
incrediblyimportantandpublicrolewithinrecentappliedethics.
4.ReferencesandFurtherReading
a.GeneralIntroductions
WarnockMary.Existentialism(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1970)
BarrettWilliam.IrrationalMan:AStudyinExistentialPhilosophy(NewYork:AnchorHouse,1990)
CooperE.David.Existentialism(Oxford:WileyBlackwell,1999)
ReynoldsJack.UnderstandingExistentialism(Stocksfield:Acumen,2006)
EarnshawSteven.Existentialism:AGuideforthePerplexed(London:Continuum,2006)
b.Anthologies
KauffmanWalter.ExistentialismfromDostoevskytoSartre(NewYork:Penguin,1975)
PaulS.MacDonald.TheExistentialistReaderAnAnthologyofKeyTexts(Edinburgh:EdinburgUniversityPress,2000)
SolomonC.Robert.Existentialism(USA:OxfordUniversityPress,2004)
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c.PrimaryBibliography
BeauvoirdeSimone.TheEthicsofAmbiguity(NewYork:CitadelPress,1976)
BeauvoirdeSimone.TheSecondSex(London:JonathanCape,2009)
CamusAlbert.TheMythofSisyphus(London:Penguin,2000)
CamusAlbert.TheRebel(London:Penguin,2000b)
CamusAlbert.TheFall,(London:Penguin,2006)
HeideggerMartin,IntroductiontoMetaphysics(NewHeaven&London:YaleUniversityPress,2000)
HeideggerMartin.LetteronHumanism:inHeideggerMartin.BasicWritings,(London:Routledge,1993)
HeideggerMartin.BeingandTime(Oxford:Blackwell,1962)
HeideggerMartin.IdentityandDifference(Chicago:ChicagoUniversityPress,2002)
KierkegaardSren.TheConceptofAnxiety(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1980)
KierkegaardSren.FearandTrembling(NewJersey:PrincetonUniversityPress,1983)
KierkegaardSren.PapersandJournals:ASelection,(London:PenguinBook,1996)
NietzscheFriedrich.EcceHomo(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2007)
NietzscheFriedrich.TheGayScience(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2001)
NietzscheFriedrich.TwilightoftheIdols(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2008)
NietzscheFriedrich.OntheGenealogyofMorality(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2007)
SartreJeanPaul.BeingandNothingness(LondonandNewYork:Routledge,2003)
SartreJeanPaul,"Intentionality:AfundamentalideaofHusserl'sPhenomenology."Trans.byJosephP.Fell,JournaloftheBritishSocietyfor
Phenomenology,1970,Vol.1,No.2
d.SecondaryBibliography
Camus
ToddOliver.AlbertCamusALife(London:Vintage,1998)
ShermanDavid.Camus(Oxford:Blackwell,2009)
FoleyJohn.AlbertCamusFromtheAbsurdtoRevolt(Stocksfield:Accumen,2009)
Sartre
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CoxGary.SartreAguideforthePerplexed(London:Continuum,2006)
GardnerSebastian.SartresBeingandNothingness(London:Continuum,2009)
StewartJohn,MerleauPontyscriticismsofSartrestheoryoffreedom.PhilosophyToday,39:3(1995:Fall)
Heidegger
BeisteguideMiguel.TheNewHeidegger(London&NewYork:Continuum,2005)
MarxWerner.HeideggerandtheTradition(Evanson:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1971)
PoltRichard.HeideggerAnInroduction(London:UCLPress,1999)
SafranskiRdiger.MartinHeidegger:BetweenGoodandEvil(Cambridge,Massachusetts:HarvardUniversityPress,1999)
WattsMichael.ThephilosophyofHeidegger(Durham:Acumen,2011)
Nietzsche
AnsellPearsonKeith.AnIntroductiontoNietzscheasPoliticalThinker(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1994)
BurnhamDouglas.ReadingNietzscheAnAnalysisofBeyondGoodanEvil(Stocksfield:Accumen,2007)
BurnhamDouglasandJesinghausenMartin.NietzschesThusSpokeZarathustra(Edinburgh:EdinburghUniversityPress,2010)
BurnhamDouglasandJesinghausenMartin.NietzschesTheBirthofTragedy(London:Continuum,2010)
SafranskiRdiger.NietzscheAPhilosophicalBiography(London:GrantaBooks,2002)
Kierkegaard
PattisonGeorge.ThePhilosophyofKierkegaard(Chesham:Acumen,2005)
WestonMichael.KierkegaardandModernContinentalPhilosophy:AnIntroduction(London:Routledge,1994)
e.OtherWorksCited
HegelG.W.F.PhenomenologyofSpirit,(OxfordandNewYork,OxfordUniversityPress,1977)
SpinozaBaruchEthicsin:SpinozaBaruchCompleteWorks,(Indianapolis,HackettPublishing,2002)
KantImmanuelAnAnswertotheQuestion:WhatisEnlightenment?inKantImmanuelPoliticalWritings,(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
Press,1991)
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AuthorInformation
DouglasBurnham
Email:h.d.burnham@staffs.ac.uk
StaffordshireUniversity
UnitedKingdom
and
GeorgePapandreopoulos
Email:g.papandreopoulos@staffs.ac.uk
StaffordshireUniversity
UnitedKingdom
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Existentialism - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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12/22/2014

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