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1.
2.

7. The limits of the power under Section 482 were clearly

defined by this Court in Raj Kapoor v. State (1980) 1 SCC 43
where Krishna Iyer, J. observed as follows: [SCC para 10, p. 47:
SCC (Cri) p. 76]
Even so, a general principle pervades this branch of law when a
specific provision is made: easy resort to inherent power is not
right except under compelling circumstances. Not that there is
absence of jurisdiction but that inherent power should not
invade areas set apart for specific power under the same Code.
8. Another important consideration which is to be kept in mind is
as to when the High Court acting under the provisions of Section
482 should exercise the inherent power insofar as quashing of
criminal proceedings are concerned. This matter was gone into
in greater detail in Smt Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa
Konjalgi (1976) 3 SCC 736 where the scope of Sections 202 and
204 of the present Code was considered and while laying down
the guidelines and the grounds on which proceedings could be
quashed this Court observed as follows: [SCC para 5, p. 741 :
SCC (Cri) pp. 511-12]
Thus it may be safely held that in the following cases an order
of the Magistrate issuing process against the accused can be
quashed or set aside:
(1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the
statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same
taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against
the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential
ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused;
(2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently
absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can
ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused;
(3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing
process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on
no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or
inadmissible; and
(4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects,
such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally
competent authority and the like.

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The cases mentioned by us are purely illustrative and provide

sufficient guidelines to indicate contingencies where the High
Court can quash proceedings.
9. Same view was taken in a later decision of this Court in
Sharda Prasad Sinha v. State of Bihar (1977) 1 SCC 505 where
Bhagwati, J. speaking for the Court observed as follows: [SCC
para 2, p. 506 : SCC (Cri) p. 133]
It is now settled law that where the allegations set out in the
complaint or the charge-sheet do not constitute any offence, it is
competent to the High Court exercising its inherent jurisdiction
under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash
the order passed by the Magistrate taking cognizance of the
offence.
10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings against an
accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if on the face
of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same, no
offence is constituted. In other words, the test is that taking the
allegations and the complaint as they are, without adding or
subtracting anything, if no offence is made out then the High
Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of
its powers under Section 482 of the present Code.
MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, (1983) 1 SCC 1
3.

4. It is now a well-settled principle of law that if the allegations

made in the FIR are taken at their face value and accepted in
their entirety do not constitute an offence, the criminal
proceedings instituted on the basis of such FIR should be
quashed.............................................

4.

State of U.P. v. R.K. Srivastava, (1989) 4 SCC 59

6. Having regard to the fact that the offences, for which chargesheet was submitted in the instant case and cognizance taken,
were triable as a warrant case the Magistrate was to proceed in
accordance with Sections 239 and 240 of the Code at the time of
framing

of

the

charges.

Under

the

above

sections,

the

Magistrate is first required to consider the police report and the

documents sent with it under Section 173 CrPC and examine the
accused, if he thinks necessary, and give an opportunity to the
prosecution and the accused of being heard. If on such
consideration, examination and hearing the Magistrate finds the

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charge groundless he has to discharge the accused in terms of

Section 239 CrPC; conversely, if he finds that there is ground for
presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable by
him he has to frame a charge in terms of Section 240 CrPC.
7. If charges are framed in accordance with Section 240 CrPC on
a finding that a prima facie case has been made out as has
been done in the instant case the person arraigned may, if he
feels aggrieved, invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High
Court or the Sessions Judge to contend that the charge-sheet
submitted under Section 173 CrPC and documents sent with it
did not disclose any ground to presume that he had committed
any offence for which he is charged and the revisional court if so
satisfied can quash the charges framed against him. To put it
differently, once charges are framed under Section 240 CrPC the
High Court in its revisional jurisdiction would not be justified in
relying upon documents other than those referred to in Sections
239 and 240 CrPC; nor would it be justified in invoking its
inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the same
except in those rare cases where forensic exigencies and
formidable compulsions justify such a course. We hasten to add
even in such exceptional cases the High Court can look into only
those documents which are unimpeachable and can be legally
translated into relevant evidence.
8. Apart from the infirmity in the approach of the High Court in
dealing with the matter which we have already noticed, we
further find that instead of adverting to and confining its
attention to the documents referred to in Sections 239 and 240
CrPC the High Court has dealt with the rival contentions of the
parties raised through their respective affidavits at length and
on a threadbare discussion thereof passed the impugned order.
The course so adopted cannot be supported; firstly, because
finding regarding commission of an offence cannot be recorded
on the basis of affidavit evidence and secondly, because at the
stage of framing of charge the Court cannot usurp the functions
of a trial court to delve into and decide upon the respective
merits of the case.

5.

Minakshi Bala v. Sudhir Kumar, (1994) 4 SCC 142

9. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [AIR 1960 SC 866] this Court

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summarised some categories of cases where inherent power can

and should be exercised to quash the proceedings:
(i) Where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against
the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or
complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no
legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or
manifestly fails to prove the charge. (SCR p. 393)
10. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in
mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal
evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent
with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal
evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the
accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482
CrPC, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an
enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or
whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not
be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial
process should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless
harassment. The court should be circumspect and judicious in
exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and
circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it
would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to
unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same
time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused
to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death.
The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC and the
categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its power
under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of
process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice
were set out in some detail by this Court in State of Haryana v.
Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335]. A note of caution was,
however, added that the power should be exercised sparingly
and that too in the rarest of rare cases. The illustrative
categories indicated by this Court are as follows: (SCC pp. 37879, para 102)
102. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information

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report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value
and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any
offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and
other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers
under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a
Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do
not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case
against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence,
no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order
of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the
Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so
absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no
prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a
criminal

proceeding

is

instituted)

to

the

institution

and

continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific

provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious
redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with
mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted
with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused
and with a view to spite him due to private and personal
grudge.
11. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court
under Section 482 CrPC are very wide and the very plenitude of
the power requires great caution in its exercise. The court must
be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is
based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be
exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being
the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a

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prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are

incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been
collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved,
whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in
their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no
hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which
the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of
quashing the proceeding at any stage. [See Janata Dal v. H.S.
Chowdhary (1992) 4 SCC 305 and Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State
of Bihar [AIR 1964 SC 1]. It would not be proper for the High
Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all
probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would
be sustainable and on such premises arrive at a conclusion that
the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to
assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint
cannot be proceeded with. When an information is lodged at the
police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of
the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the
material collected during the investigation and evidence led in
the court which decides the fate of the accused person. The
allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no
consequence and cannot by themselves be the basis for
quashing the proceedings. [See Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna
Kumar 1990 Supp SCC 686, State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma 1992
Supp (1) SCC 222, Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill
(1995) 6 SCC 194, State of Kerala v. O.C. Kuttan (1999) 2 SCC
651, State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma (1996) 7 SCC 705, Rashmi
Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada (1997) 2 SCC 397, Satvinder
Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (1999) 8 SCC 728 and
Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi (1999) 3 SCC 259.]
12. The above position was again reiterated in State of
Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa (2002) 3 SCC 89 and State of M.P.
v. Awadh Kishore Gupta (2004) 1 SCC 691.
13. In Jehan Singh v. Delhi Admn. (1974) 4 SCC 522 while
considering a case under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898 (in short the Old Code) corresponding to
Section 482 CrPC, it was observed as follows: (AIR p. 1146)
Where at the date of filing the petition under Section 561-A, no
charge-sheet or a complaint has been laid down in court and the

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matter is only at the stage of investigation by police, the court

cannot, in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 561A, interfere with the statutory powers of the police to investigate
into the alleged offence, and quash the proceedings. Even
assuming that the allegations in the FIR are correct and
constitute an offence so as to remove the legal bar to institute
proceedings in court, the court cannot at that stage appraise the
evidence collected by the police in their investigation. Any
petition under Section 561-A at such a stage is, therefore,
premature and incompetent. (SCC p. 526, paras 16-18)
14. It is to be noted that the investigation was not complete and
at that stage it was impermissible for the High Court to look into
materials, the acceptability of which is essentially a matter for
trial. While exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, it is
not permissible for the Court to act as if it was a trial court. Even
when charge is framed at that stage, the Court has to only prima
facie be satisfied about the existence of sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused. For that limited purpose, the
Court can evaluate material and documents on records but it
cannot appreciate evidence. The Court is not required to
appreciate

evidence

to

conclude

whether

the

materials

produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused. In

Chand Dhawan v. Jawahar Lal (1992) 3 SCC 317, it was observed
that when the materials relied upon by a party are required to be
proved, no inference can be drawn on the basis of those
materials to conclude the complaint to be unacceptable. The
Court should not act on annexures to the petitions under Section
482 CrPC, which cannot be termed as evidence without being
tested and proved.

6.

State of Orissa v. Saroj Kumar Sahoo, (2005) 13 SCC 540

19. The section does not confer any new power on the High
Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court
possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three
circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be
exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code,
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to
otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor
desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the

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exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment

dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may
possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart
from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper
discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law.
That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which
merely recognises and preserves inherent powers of the High
Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal, possess, in the
absence

of

any

express

provision,

as

inherent

in

their

constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right

and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the
principle quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur id
sine quo res ipsa esse non potest (when the law gives a person
anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While
exercising powers under the section, the Court does not function
as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the
section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and
with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests
specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex
debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the
administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court
exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to
abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has
power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the
court to allow any action which would result in injustice and
prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court
would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that
initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of
court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve
the ends of justice.
20. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court
under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very
plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise.
Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this
power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should
not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High
Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain
from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire
facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has

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not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues
involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot
be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of
course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases
in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction
of quashing the proceeding at any stage. [See Janata Dal v. H.S.
Chowdhary6 and Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar7.]
Minu Kumari v. State of Bihar, (2006) 4 SCC 359
7.

Scope and ambit of courts powers under Section 482

CrPC
23. This Court in a number of cases has laid down the scope and
ambit of courts powers under Section 482 CrPC. Every High
Court has inherent power to act ex debito justitiae to do real and
substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it exists,
or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. Inherent power
under Section 482 CrPC can be exercised:
(i) to give effect to an order under the Code;
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and
(iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice.
24. Inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC though wide have
to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and
only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid
down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the
advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to
injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the court
would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent
powers in absence of specific provisions in the statute.
Discussion of decided cases
25. Reference to the following cases would reveal that the
courts have consistently taken the view that they must use this
extraordinary power to prevent injustice and secure the ends of
justice. The English courts have also used inherent power to
achieve the same objective. It is generally agreed that the
Crown Court has inherent power to protect its process from
abuse. In Connelly v. DPP1 Lord Devlin stated that where
particular criminal proceedings constitute an abuse of process,

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the court is empowered to refuse to allow the indictment to

proceed to trial. Lord Salmon in DPP v. Humphrys2 stressed the
importance of the inherent power when he observed that it is
only if the prosecution amounts to an abuse of the process of
the court and is oppressive and vexatious that the judge has the
power to intervene. He further mentioned that the courts power
to prevent such abuse is of great constitutional importance and
should be jealously preserved.
26. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab3 this Court summarised
some categories of cases where inherent power can and should
be exercised to quash the proceedings:
(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against
the institution or continuance of the proceedings;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or
complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no
legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or
manifestly fails to prove the charge.
27. The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482
of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power
requires great caution in its exercise. The Court must be careful
to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on
sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to
stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court should normally
refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where all the
facts are incomplete and hazy, more so, when the evidence has
not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues
involved, whether factual or legal, are of such magnitude that
they cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient
material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in
regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its
extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceedings at any
stage.
28. This Court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy4 observed
that the wholesome power under Section 482 CrPC entitles the
High Court to quash a proceeding when it comes to the

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conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an

abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice
require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The High
Courts have been invested with inherent powers, both in civil
and criminal matters, to achieve a salutary public purpose. A
court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a
weapon of harassment or persecution. The Court observed in
this case that ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere
law though justice must be administered according to laws made
by the legislature. This case has been followed in a large number
of subsequent cases of this Court and other courts.
29. In Chandrapal Singh v. Maharaj Singh5 in a landlord and
tenant matter where criminal proceedings had been initiated,
this Court observed in para 1 at SCC p. 467 as under:
A frustrated landlord after having met his waterloo in the
hierarchy of civil courts, has further enmeshed the tenant in a
frivolous criminal prosecution which prima facie appears to be
an abuse of the process of law. The facts when stated are so
telling

that

the

further

discussion

may

appear

to

be

superfluous.
30. The Court noticed that the tendency of perjury is very much
on the increase. Unless the courts come down heavily upon such
persons, the whole judicial process would come to ridicule. The
Court also observed that chagrined and frustrated litigants
should not be permitted to give vent to their frustration by
cheaply invoking jurisdiction of the criminal court.
31. This Court in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao
Chandrojirao Angre6 observed in para 7 as under: (SCC p. 695)
7. The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at
the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by
the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as
made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to
take into consideration any special features which appear in a
particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the
interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so
on the basis that the court cannot be utilised for any oblique
purpose and where in the opinion of the court chances of an

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ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose

is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to
continue, the court may while taking into consideration the
special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it
may be at a preliminary stage.
32. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal7 this Court in the backdrop
of interpretation of various relevant provisions of CrPC under
Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court
in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the
extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India or the inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC gave the
following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such
power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process
of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Thus, this
Court made it clear that it may not be possible to lay down any
precise,

clearly

defined

and

sufficiently

channelised

and

inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive

list to myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised: (SCC pp. 378-79, para 102)
102. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value
and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any
offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and
other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers
under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a
Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do
not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case
against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence,
no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order
of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the
Code.

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(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so

absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no
prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a
criminal

proceeding

is

instituted)

to

the

institution

and

continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific

provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious
redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with
mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted
with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused
and with a view to spite him due to private and personal
grudge.
33. This Court in Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary8 observed thus:
(SCC p. 355, para 132)
132. The criminal courts are clothed with inherent power to
make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice.
Such power though unrestricted and undefined should not be
capriciously or arbitrarily exercised, but should be exercised in
appropriate cases, ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial
justice for the administration of which alone the courts exist. The
powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the
Code are very wide and the very plentitude of the power
requires great caution in its exercise. Courts must be careful to
see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound
principles.
34. In G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P.9 this Court observed that it is
the duty and obligation of the criminal court to exercise a great
deal of caution in issuing the process, particularly when matters
are essentially of civil nature.
35. This Court in Roy V.D. v. State of Kerala10 observed thus:
(SCC p. 597, para 18)
18. It is well settled that the power under Section 482 CrPC has
to be exercised by the High Court, inter alia, to prevent the
abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the

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ends of justice. Where criminal proceedings are initiated based

on illicit material collected on search and arrest which are per se
illegal and vitiate not only a conviction and sentence based on
such material but also the trial itself, the proceedings cannot be
allowed to go on as it cannot but amount to abuse of the process
of the court; in such a case not quashing the proceedings would
perpetuate abuse of the process of the court resulting in great
hardship and injustice to the accused. In our opinion, exercise of
power under Section 482 CrPC to quash proceedings in a case
like the one on hand, would indeed secure the ends of justice.
36. This Court in Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd.
Sharaful Haque11 observed thus: (SCC p. 128, para 8)
8. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any
action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of
justice. In exercise of the powers, court would be justified to
quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it
amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these
proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no
offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine
the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed,
it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the
complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out
even if the allegations are accepted in toto.
37. In Indian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India Ltd.12 this Court again
cautioned about a growing tendency in business circles to
convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases. The Court
noticed the prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time
consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of
lenders/creditors. The Court further observed that: (SCC p. 749,
para 13)
13. Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do
not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure through
criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged.
46. The court must ensure that criminal prosecution is not used
as an instrument of harassment or for seeking private vendetta
or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the accused. On analysis
of the aforementioned cases, we are of the opinion that it is

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neither possible nor desirable to lay down an inflexible rule that

would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Inherent
jurisdiction of the High Courts under Section 482 CrPC though
wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution
and only when it is justified by the tests specifically laid down in
the statute itself and in the aforementioned cases. In view of the
settled legal position, the impugned judgment cannot be
sustained.

Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal, (2007) 12

8.

SCC 1
14. While saying so, we are not unmindful of the limitations of
the Court's power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure which is primarily for one either to prevent abuse of
the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice. The Court at that stage would not embark upon
appreciation of evidence. The Court shall moreover consider the
materials on record as a whole. In Kamaladevi Agarwal v. State
of W.B. [(2002) 1 SCC 555] this Court opined: (SCC pp. 559-60,
para 7)
7. This Court has consistently held that the revisional or
inherent powers of quashing the proceedings at the initial stage
should be exercised sparingly and only where the allegations
made in the complaint or the FIR, even if taken at their face
value and accepted in entirety, do not prima facie disclose the
commission of an offence. Disputed and controversial facts
cannot be made the basis for the exercise of the jurisdiction.
It was furthermore observed that the High Court should be slow
in interfering with the proceedings at the initial stage and that
merely because the nature of the dispute is primarily of a civil
nature, the criminal prosecution cannot be quashed because in
cases of forgery and fraud there would always be some element
of civil nature.
15. This Court in B. Suresh Yadav v. Sharifa Bee [(2007) 13 SCC
107] opined as under: (SCC p. 110, para 13)
13. For the purpose of establishing the offence of cheating, the
complainant is required to show that the accused had fraudulent
or dishonest intention at the time of making promise or

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representation. In a case of this nature, it is permissible in law to

consider the stand taken by a party in a pending civil litigation.
We do not, however, mean to lay down a law that the liability of
a person cannot be both civil and criminal at the same time. But
when a stand has been taken in a complaint petition which is
contrary to or inconsistent with the stand taken by him in a civil
suit, it assumes significance. Had the fact as purported to have
been represented before us that the appellant herein got the
said two rooms demolished and concealed the said fact at the
time of execution of the deed of sale, the matter might have
been different. As the deed of sale was executed on 30-9-2005
and the purported demolition took place on 29-9-2005, it was
expected that the complainant/first respondent would come out
with her real grievance in the written statement filed by her in
the aforementioned suit. She, for reasons best known to her, did
not choose to do so.
16. Recently in R. Kalyani v. Janak C. Mehta [(2009) 1 SCC 516]
this Court laid down the law in the following terms: (SCC p. 523,
paras 15-16)
15. Propositions of law which emerge from the said decisions
are:
(1) The High Court ordinarily would not exercise its inherent
jurisdiction to quash a criminal proceeding and, in particular, a
first information report unless the allegations contained therein,
even if given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety,
disclosed no cognizable offence.
(2) For the said purpose, the Court, save and except in very
exceptional circumstances, would not look to any document
relied upon by the defence.
(3) Such a power should be exercised very sparingly. If the
allegations made in the FIR disclose commission of an offence,
the Court shall not go beyond the same and pass an order in
favour of the accused to hold absence of any mens rea or actus
reus.
(4) If the allegation discloses a civil dispute, the same by itself
may not be a ground to hold that the criminal proceedings
should not be allowed to continue.
16. It is furthermore well known that no hard-and-fast rule can
be laid down. Each case has to be considered on its own merits.

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The Court, while exercising its inherent jurisdiction, although

would not interfere with a genuine complaint keeping in view the
purport and object for which the provisions of Sections 482 and
483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had been introduced by
Parliament but would not hesitate to exercise its jurisdiction in
appropriate cases. One of the paramount duties of the superior
courts is to see that a person who is apparently innocent is not
subjected to persecution and humiliation on the basis of a false
and wholly untenable complaint.
Mahesh Chaudhary v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 4 SCC
9.

439
21. It may be somewhat necessary to have a comparative
examination of the powers exercisable by the court under these
two provisions. There may be some overlapping between these
two powers because both are aimed at securing the ends of
justice and both have an element of discretion. But, at the same
time, inherent power under Section 482 of the Code being an
extraordinary and residuary power, it is inapplicable in regard to
matters

which

are

specifically

provided

for

under

other

provisions of the Code. To put it simply, normally the court may

not invoke its power under Section 482 of the Code where a
party could have availed of the remedy available under Section
397 of the Code itself. The inherent powers under Section 482 of
the Code are of a wide magnitude and are not as limited as the
power under Section 397. Section 482 can be invoked where the
order in question is neither an interlocutory order within the
meaning of Section 397(2) nor a final order in the strict sense.
Reference in this regard can be made to Raj Kapoor v. State7. In
that very case, this Court has observed that inherent power
under Section 482 may not be exercised if the bar under
Sections 397(2) and 397(3) applies, except in extraordinary
situations, to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. This
itself shows the fine distinction between the powers exercisable
by the Court under these two provisions. In that very case, the
Court also considered as to whether the inherent powers of the
High Court under Section 482 stand repelled when the revisional
power under Section 397 overlaps. Rejecting the argument, the
Court said that the opening words of Section 482 contradict this

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contention because nothing in the Code, not even Section 397,

can affect the amplitude of the inherent powers preserved in so
many terms by the language of Section 482. There is no total
ban on the exercise of inherent powers where abuse of the
process of the court or any other extraordinary situation invites
the courts jurisdiction. The limitation is self-restraint, nothing
more. The distinction between a final and interlocutory order is
well known in law. The orders which will be free from the bar of
Section 397(2) would be the orders which are not purely
interlocutory but, at the same time, are less than a final
disposal. They should be the orders which do determine some
right and still are not finally rendering the court functus officio of
the lis. The provisions of Section 482 are pervasive. It should not
subvert legal interdicts written into the same Code but, however,
inherent powers of the Court unquestionably have to be read
and construed as free of restriction.
22. In Dinesh Dutt Joshi v. State of Rajasthan8 the Court held
that: (SCC p.

573, para 6)

6. [Section 482] does not confer any new power, but only
declares that the High Court possesses inherent powers for the
purposes specified in the section. As lacunae are sometimes
found in procedural law, the section has been embodied to cover
such lacunae wherever they are discovered. The use of
extraordinary powers conferred upon the High Court under this
section are however required to be reserved, as far as possible,
for extraordinary cases.
23. In Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary9 the Court, while referring
to the inherent powers to make orders as may be necessary for
the ends of justice, clarified that such power has to be exercised
in appropriate cases ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and
substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts
exist. The powers possessed by the High Court under Section
482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the
powers requires a great caution in its exercise. The High Court,
as the highest court exercising criminal jurisdiction in a State,
has inherent powers to make any order for the purposes of
securing the ends of justice. Being an extraordinary power, it
will, however, not be pressed in aid except for remedying a
flagrant abuse by a subordinate court of its powers.

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24. If one looks at the development of law in relation to exercise

of inherent powers under the Code, it will be useful to refer to
the following details: as far back as in 1926, a Division Bench of
the Bombay High Court in Llewelyn Evans, In re10, took the view
that the provisions of Section

561-A (equivalent to present

Section 482) extend to cases not only of a person accused of an

offence in a criminal court, but to the cases of any person
against whom proceedings are instituted under the Code in any
court. Explaining the word process, the Court said that it was a
general word, meaning in effect anything done by the court.
Explaining the limitations and scope of Section 561-A, the Court
referred to inherent jurisdiction, to prevent abuse of process
and to secure the ends of justice which are terms incapable of
having a precise definition or enumeration, and capable, at the
most, of test, according to well-established principles of criminal
jurisprudence. The ends of justice are to be understood by
ascertainment of the truth as to the facts on balance of evidence
on each side. With reference to the facts of the case, the Court
held that in the absence of any other method, it has no choice
left in the application of the section except, such tests subject to
the caution to be exercised in the use of inherent jurisdiction and
the avoidance of interference in details and directed providing of
a legal practitioner.
25. Having examined the interrelationship of these two very
significant provisions of the Code, let us now examine the scope
of interference under any of these provisions in relation to
quashing the charge. We have already indicated above that
framing of charge is the first major step in a criminal trial where
the court is expected to apply its mind to the entire record and
documents placed therewith before the court. Taking cognizance
of an offence has been stated to necessitate an application of
mind by the court but framing of charge is a major event where
the court considers the possibility of discharging the accused of
the offence with which he is charged or requiring the accused to
face trial. There are different categories of cases where the court
may not proceed with the trial and may discharge the accused
or pass such other orders as may be necessary keeping in view
the facts of a given case. In a case where, upon considering the
record of the case and documents submitted before it, the court

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finds that no offence is made out or there is a legal bar to such

prosecution under the provisions of the Code or any other law
for the time being in force and there is a bar and there exists no
ground to proceed against the accused, the court may discharge
the accused. There can be cases where such record reveals the
matter to be so predominantly of a civil nature that it neither
leaves any scope for an element of criminality nor does it satisfy
the ingredients of a criminal offence with which the accused is
charged. In such cases, the court may discharge him or quash
the proceedings in exercise of its powers under these two
provisions.
26. This further raises a question as to the wrongs which
become actionable in accordance with law. It may be purely a
civil wrong or purely a criminal offence or a civil wrong as also a
criminal offence constituting both on the same set of facts. But if
the records disclose commission of a criminal offence and the
ingredients of the offence are satisfied, then such criminal
proceedings cannot be quashed merely because a civil wrong
has also been committed. The power cannot be invoked to stifle
or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The factual foundation and
ingredients of an offence being satisfied, the court will not either
dismiss a complaint or quash such proceedings in exercise of its
inherent or original jurisdiction. In Indian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India
Ltd.11 this Court took the similar view and upheld the order of
the High Court declining to quash the criminal proceedings
because a civil contract between the parties was pending.
27. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under these two
provisions i.e. Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code and the
fine line of jurisdictional distinction, now it will be appropriate for
us to enlist the principles with reference to which the courts
should exercise such jurisdiction. However, it is not only difficult
but is inherently impossible to state with precision such
principles. At best and upon objective analysis of various
judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of the
principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction,
particularly, with regard to quashing of charge either in exercise
of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or
together, as the case may be:
27.1. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court

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under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more
due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these
powers.

The

power

of

quashing

criminal

proceedings,

particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the

Code

should

be

exercised

very

sparingly

and

with

circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases.

27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the
uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case
and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish
the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and
inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach
such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal
offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere.
27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous
examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether
the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing
of charge or quashing of charge.
27.4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential
to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some
grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts
even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere,
at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its
inherent powers.
27.5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the
provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very
initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal
proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific
protection to an accused.
27.6. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person
and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate
and prosecute the offender.
27.7. The process of the court cannot be permitted to be used
for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose.
27.8. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from
the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly
give rise and constitute a civil wrong with no element of
criminality and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a
criminal offence, the court may be justified in quashing the
charge. Even in such cases, the court would not embark upon

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the critical analysis of the evidence.

27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to
observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and
materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient
material on the basis of which the case would end in a
conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations
taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if
so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice.
27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to
hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by
the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of
acquittal or conviction.
27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also
amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is
maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot
be maintained.
27.12. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or
under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration
external materials given by an accused for reaching the
conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was
possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record
and documents annexed therewith by the prosecution.
27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of
continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly
satisfied,

the

Court

should

be

more

inclined

to

permit

continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that

initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records
with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the
documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie.
27.14. Where the charge-sheet, report under Section 173(2) of
the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may
be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge.
27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court
finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or
that the interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the
charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do
real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the
courts exist.
[Ref. State of W.B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha4; Madhavrao Jiwajirao

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Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre12; Janata Dal v. H.S.

Chowdhary9; Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill13; G.
Sagar Suri v. State of U.P.14; Ajay Mitra v. State of M.P.15; Pepsi
Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate16; State of U.P. v. O.P.
Sharma17; Ganesh

Narayan Hegde v. S. Bangarappa18;

Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque19;

Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd.20;
Shakson Belthissor v. State of Kerala21; V.V.S. Rama Sharma v.
State of U.P.22; Chunduru Siva Ram Krishna v. Peddi Ravindra
Babu23; Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar24; State of Bihar
v. P.P. Sharma25; Lalmuni Devi v. State of Bihar26; M. Krishnan v.
Vijay Singh27; Savita v. State of Rajasthan28 and S.M. Datta v.
State of Gujarat29.]
27.16.

These

preferably

are

the

cumulatively

principles

which

individually

and

(one

more)

be

into

or

taken

consideration as precepts to exercise of extraordinary and wide

plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the
High Court. Where the factual foundation for an offence has
been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not
hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one
or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be
satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements
of the offence.
28. At this stage, we may also notice that the principle stated by
this Court in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia212 was reconsidered
and explained in two subsequent judgments of this Court in
State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma25 and M.N. Damani v. S.K. Sinha30.
In the subsequent judgment, the Court held that, that judgment
did not declare a law of universal application and what was the
principle relating to disputes involving cases of a predominantly
civil nature with or without criminal intent.
10.

Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander,(2012) 9 SCC 460

It was improper for the High Court to go beyond the scope of the
prayers made by Respondent 1 and quash even the charges
framed against all the other accused.
Ashish Chadha v. Asha Kumari,(2012) 1 SCC 680

11.
12.
13.
14.

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CIVIL DISPUTE
1. Leave granted. Whether a pure civil dispute can be a subjectmatter of a criminal proceeding under Sections 420, 467, 468
and 469 of the Penal Code, 1860 is the question involved herein.
12. In Shanti Kumar Panda v. Shakuntala Devi2 this Court held:
(SCC p. 452, para 23)
23. (3) A decision by a criminal court does not bind the civil
court while a decision by the civil court binds the criminal court.
An order passed by the Executive Magistrate in proceedings
under Sections 145/146 of the Code is an order by a criminal
court and that too based on a summary enquiry. The order is
entitled to respect and wait before the competent court at the
interlocutory stage. At the stage of final adjudication of rights,
which would be on the evidence adduced before the court, the
order of the Magistrate is only one out of several pieces of
evidence.
13. There cannot, however, be any doubt or dispute whatsoever
that in a given case a civil suit as also a criminal proceeding
would be maintainable. They can run simultaneously. Result in
one proceeding would not be binding on the court determining
the issue before it in another proceeding. In P. Swaroopa Rani v.
M. Hari Narayana3 the law was stated, thus: (SCC p. 769, para
11)
11. It is, however, well settled that in a given case, civil
proceedings
simultaneously.

and

criminal

Whether

civil

proceedings
proceedings

can

proceed

or

criminal

proceedings shall be stayed depends upon the fact and

circumstances of each case.
(See also Seth Ramdayal Jat v. Laxmi Prasad4.

16.

Devendra v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2009) 7 SCC 495

17. In our opinion, the matter appears to be purely civil in
nature. There appears to be no cheating or a dishonest
inducement for the delivery of property or breach of trust by the
appellant. The present FIR is an abuse of process of law. The
purely civil dispute, is sought to be given a colour of a criminal
offence to wreak vengeance against the appellant. It does not
meet the strict standard of proof required to sustain a criminal
accusation. In such type of cases, it is necessary to draw a

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distinction between civil wrong and criminal wrong as has been

succinctly held by this Court in Devendra v. State of U.P.1,
relevant part thereof is reproduced hereinbelow: (SCC p. 505,
para 27)
27. A distinction must be made between a civil wrong and a
criminal wrong. When dispute between the parties constitute
only a civil wrong and not a criminal wrong, the courts would not
permit a person to be harassed although no case for taking
cognizance of the offence has been made out.
18. In fact, all these questions have been elaborately discussed
by this Court in the most oftquoted judgment in State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal2 where seven cardinal principles have
been carved out before cognizance of offences, said to have
been committed by the accused, is taken. The case in hand
unfortunately does not fall in that category where cognizance of
the offence could have been taken by the court, at least after
having gone through the FIR, which discloses only a civil dispute.
19. The appellant cannot be allowed to go through the rigmarole
of a criminal prosecution for long number of years, even when
admittedly a civil suit has already been filed against the
appellant and Respondent 4 complainant, and is still sub judice.
In the said suit, the appellant is at liberty to contest the same on
grounds available to him in accordance with law as per the leave
granted by the trial court. It may also be pertinent to mention
here that the complainant has not been able to show that at any
material point of time there was any contract, much less any
privity of contract between the appellant and Respondent 4
complainant. There was no cause of action to even lodge an FIR
against the appellant as neither the complainant had to receive
the money nor was he in any way instrumental to telecast GOD
TV in certain areas of Ahmedabad. He appears to be totally a
stranger to the same. The appellants prosecution would only
lead to his harassment and humiliation, which cannot be
permitted in accordance with the principles of law.

17.

Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59

28. So far as the inherent power of the High Court as contained
in Section 482 CrPC is concerned, the law in this regard is set at
rest by this Court in a catena of decisions. However, we would

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like to reiterate that when an order, not interlocutory in nature,

can be assailed in the High Court in revisional jurisdiction, then
there should be a bar in invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the
High Court. In other words, inherent power of the Court can be
exercised when there is no remedy provided in the Code of
Criminal Procedure for redressal of the grievance. It is well
settled that the inherent power of the Court can ordinarily be
exercised when there is no express provision in the Code under
which order impugned can be challenged.

18.

Mohit v. State of U.P.,(2013) 7 SCC 789

33. The doctrine of abuse of process of court and the remedy of
refusal to allow the trial to proceed is well-established and
recognised doctrine both by the English courts and courts in
India. There are some established principles of law which bar the
trial when there appears to be abuse of process of court.
34. Lord Morris in Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions9,
observed: (AC pp. 1301-02)
There can be no doubt that a court which is endowed with a
particular jurisdiction has powers which are necessary to enable
it to act effectively within such jurisdiction. A court must enjoy
such powers in order to enforce its rules of practice and to
suppress any abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted
thwarting of its process.
*

The power (which is inherent in a courts jurisdiction) to prevent

abuses of its process and to control its own procedure must in a
criminal court include a power to safeguard an accused person
from oppression or prejudice.
In his separate pronouncement, Lord Delvin in the same case
observed that where particular criminal proceedings constitute
an abuse of process, the court is empowered to refuse to allow
the indictment to proceed to trial.
35. In Hui Chi-ming v. R.10, the Privy Council defined the word
abuse of process as something so unfair and wrong with the
prosecution that the court should not allow a prosecutor to
proceed with what is, in all other respects, a perfectly
supportable case.
36. In the leading case of R. v. Horseferry Road Magistrates

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Court, ex p Bennett11, on the application of abuse of process,

the court confirms that an abuse of process justifying the stay of
prosecution could arise in the following circumstances:
(i) where it would be impossible to give the accused a fair trial;
or
(ii) where it would amount to misuse/manipulation of process
because it offends the courts sense of justice and propriety to
be asked to try the accused in the circumstances of the
particular case.
37. In R. v. Derby Crown Court, ex p Brooks12, Lord Chief Justice
Ormrod stated:
It may be an abuse of process if either (a) the prosecution has
manipulated or misused the process of the court so as to deprive
the defendant of a protection provided by law or to take unfair
advantage of a technicality, or (b) on the balance of probability
the defendant has been, or will be, prejudiced in the preparation
of conduct of his defence by delay on the part of the prosecution
which is unjustifiable.
38. Neill, L.J. in R. v. Beckford (Anthony)13, observed that:
The jurisdiction to stay can be exercised in many different
circumstances. Nevertheless two main strands can be detected
in the authorities: (a) cases where the court concludes that the
defendant cannot receive a fair trial; (b) cases where the court
concludes that it would be unfair for the defendant to be tried.
What is unfair and wrong will be for the court to determine on
the individual facts of each case.
39. This Court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy14,
observed that the wholesome power under Section 482 CrPC
entitles the High Court to quash a proceeding when it comes to
the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would
be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of
justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The
High Courts have been invested with inherent powers, both in
civil and criminal matters, to achieve a salutary public purpose.
A court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into
a weapon of harassment or persecution. The Court observed in
this case that ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere
law though justice must be administered according to laws made
by the legislature. It was held in this case: (SCC p. 703, para 7)

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7. In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is

entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that
allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the
process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the
proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Courts
inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed
to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court
proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a
weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the
veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the
material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the
like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in
the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the
ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered
according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling
necessity for making these observations is that without a proper
realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which
seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do
justice, between the State and its subjects, it would be
impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient
jurisdiction.
This case has been followed in a large number of subsequent
cases of this Court and other courts.
40. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal15, this Court in the
backdrop of interpretation of various relevant provisions of CrPC
under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this
Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the
extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India or the inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC gave the
following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such
power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process
of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Thus, this
Court made it clear that it may not be possible to lay down any
precise,

clearly

defined

and

sufficiently

channelised

and

inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive

list to myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised: (SCC p. 379, para 102)
102. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously

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instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the

accused and with a view to spite him due to private and
personal grudge.
41. This Court in Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd.
Sharaful Haque16 observed thus: (SCC p. 128, para 8)
8. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any
action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of
justice. In exercise of the powers, court would be justified to
quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it
amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these
proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no
offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine
the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed,
it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the
complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out
even if the allegations are accepted in toto.
42. In Indian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India Ltd.17 this Court again
cautioned about a growing tendency in business circles to
convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases. The Court
noticed the prevalent impression that civil law remedies are
time-consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of
lenders/creditors. The Court further observed that: (SCC p. 749,
para 13)
13. Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do
not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure through
criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged.
43. In Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal18 this Court
after considering series of decisions observed: (SCC pp. 16-17,
paras 46 & 50-52)
46. The court must ensure that criminal prosecution is not used
as an instrument of harassment or for seeking private vendetta
or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the accused. On analysis
of the aforementioned cases, we are of the opinion that it is
neither possible nor desirable to lay down an inflexible rule that
would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Inherent
jurisdiction of the High Courts under Section 482 CrPC though
wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution
and only when it is justified by the tests specifically laid down in
the statute itself and in the aforementioned cases. In view of the

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settled legal position, the impugned judgment cannot be

sustained.
*

50. Civilised countries have recognised that liberty is the most

precious of all the human rights. The American Declaration of
Independence, 1776, French Declaration of the Rights of Men
and the Citizen, 1789, Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, 1966
all speak with one voiceliberty is the natural and inalienable
right of every human being. Similarly, Article 21 of our
Constitution proclaims that no one shall be deprived of his
liberty except in accordance with procedure prescribed by law.
51. The issuance of non-bailable warrants involves interference
with

personal

liberty.

Arrest

and

deprivation of the most precious

imprisonment
right

means

of an individual.

Therefore, the courts have to be extremely careful before issuing

non-bailable warrants.
52. Just as liberty is precious for an individual so is the interest
of the society in maintaining law and order. Both are extremely
important for the survival of a civilised society. Sometimes in the
larger interest of the public and the State it becomes absolutely
imperative to curtail freedom of an individual for a certain
period, only then the non-bailable warrants should be issued.
44. In G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P.19, this Court observed that it
is the duty and obligation of the criminal court to exercise a
great deal of caution in issuing the process, particularly when
matters are essentially of civil nature.
45. In S.N. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari20, AIR at p. 789, para
7, this Court has stated thus: (SCC pp. 658-59, para 11)
11. It appears to us that, though the Code of Criminal
Procedure gives to the police unfettered power to investigate all
cases where they suspect that a cognizable offence has been
committed, in appropriate cases an aggrieved person can
always seek a remedy by invoking the power of the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution under which, if the High
Court could be convinced that the power of investigation has
been exercised by a police officer mala fide, the High Court can
always issue a writ of mandamus restraining the police officer
from misusing his legal powers. The fact that the Code does not

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contain any other provision giving power to a Magistrate to stop

investigation by the police cannot be a ground for holding that
such a power must be read in Section 159 of the Code.
46. In State of W.B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha21 while examining
the power of a police officer in the field of investigation of a
cognizable offence, Chandrachud, C.J. has affirmed the view
expressed by Mathew, J. and observed as follows: (SCC p. 577,
para 22 : AIR p. 958)
22. There is no such thing like unfettered discretion in the realm
of powers defined by statutes and indeed, unlimited discretion in
that sphere can become a ruthless destroyer of personal
freedom. The power to investigate into cognizable offences
must, therefore, be exercised strictly on the condition on which it
is granted by the Code.
47. In Uma Shankar Gopalika v. State of Bihar22 this Court has
held as under: (SCC pp. 338-39, paras 6-7)
6. Now the question to be examined by us is as to whether on
the facts disclosed in the petition of complaint any criminal
offence whatsoever is made out much less offences under
Sections 420/120-B IPC. The only allegation in the complaint
petition against the accused persons is that they assured the
complainant that when they receive the insurance claim
amounting to Rs 4,20,000, they would pay a sum of Rs 2,60,000
to the complainant out of that but the same has never been
paid. Apart from that there is no other allegation in the petition
of complaint. It was pointed out on behalf of the complainant
that the accused fraudulently persuaded the complainant to
agree so that the accused persons may take steps for moving
the Consumer Forum in relation to the claim of Rs 4,20,000. It is
well settled that every breach of contract would not give rise to
an offence of cheating and only in those cases breach of
contract would amount to cheating where there was any
deception played at the very inception. If the intention to cheat
has developed later on, the same cannot amount to cheating. In
the present case it has nowhere been stated that at the very
inception there was any intention on behalf of the accused
persons to cheat which is a condition precedent for an offence
under Section 420 IPC.
7. In our view petition of complaint does not disclose any

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criminal offence at all much less any offence either under

Section 420 or Section 120-B IPC and the present case is a case
of purely civil dispute between the parties for which remedy lies
before a civil court by filing a properly constituted suit. In our
opinion, in view of these facts allowing the police investigation
to continue would amount to an abuse of the process of court
and to prevent the same it was just and expedient for the High
Court to quash the same by exercising the powers under Section
482 CrPC which it has erroneously refused.
Chandran Ratnaswami v. K.C. Palanisamy, (2013) 6 SCC
740
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

LIST OF JUDGMENTS
1. Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander

(2012) 9 SCC
460

2.
3. Chandran Ratnaswami v. K.C. Palanisamy

(2013) 6 SCC
740

4. Devendra v. State of Uttar Pradesh

(2009) 7 SCC
495

5. Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of

Uttaranchal

(2007) 12
SCC 1

6. Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat

(2011) 7 SCC
59

7. Mahesh Chaudhary v. State of Rajasthan

(2009) 4 SCC
439

8. MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi

(1983) 1 SCC
1

9. Minu Kumari v. State of Bihar

(2006) 4 SCC
359

10.Minakshi Bala v. Sudhir Kumar

(1994) 4 SCC
142
(2013) 7 SCC

11.Mohit v. State of U.P.

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789
12.
13.State of Orissa v. Saroj Kumar Sahoo
14.State of U.P. v. R.K. Srivastava

(2005) 13
SCC 540
(1989) 4 SCC
59

15.
GROUNDS PREVIOUSLY TAKEN BY LITIGANTS

REPLY TO GROUNDS PREVIOUSLY TAKEN BY LITIGANTS