A.C. No.

6273

March 15, 2010

ATTY. ILUMINADA M. VAFLOR-FABROA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. OSCAR PAGUINTO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
An Information for Estafa1 was filed on June 21, 2001 against Atty. Iluminada M. Vaflor-Fabroa (complainant) along with others based
on a joint affidavit-complaint which Atty. Oscar Paguinto (respondent) prepared and notarized. As the joint affidavit-complaint did not
indicate the involvement of complainant, complainant filed a Motion to Quash the Information which the trial court granted.2
Respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the quashal of the Information was denied3
Respondent also filed six other criminal complaints against complainant for violation of Article 31 of Republic Act No. 6938
(Cooperative Code of the Philippines) before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, but he eventually filed a Motion to Withdraw
them.4
On October 10, 2001, complainant, who was Chairperson of the General Mariano Alvarez Service Cooperative, Inc. (GEMASCO),
received a Notice of Special General Assembly of GEMASCO on October 14, 2001 to consider the removal of four members of the
Board of Directors (the Board), including her and the General Manager.5 The notice was signed by respondent.
At the October 14, 2001 Special General Assembly presided by respondent and PNP Sr. Supt. Angelito L. Gerangco (Gerangco), who
were not members of the then current Board,6 Gerango, complainants predecessor, as Chair of the GEMASCO board, declared
himself Chair, appointed others to replace the removed directors, and appointed respondent as Board Secretary.
On October 15, 2001, respondent and his group took over the GEMASCO office and its premises, the pumphouses, water facilities,
and operations. On even date, respondent sent letter-notices to complainant and the four removed directors informing them of their
removal from the Board and as members of GEMASCO, and advising them to cease and desist from further discharging the duties of
their positions.7
Complainant thus filed on October 16, 2001 with the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA)-Calamba a complaint for annulment
of the proceedings taken during the October 14, 2001 Special General Assembly.
The CDA Acting Regional Director (RD), by Resolution of February 21, 2002, declared the questioned general assembly null and void
for having been conducted in violation of GEMASCOs By-Laws and the Cooperative Code of the Philippines.8 The RDs Resolution of
February 21, 2002 was later vacated for lack of jurisdiction9 of CDA.
In her present complainant10 against respondent for disbarment, complainant alleged that respondent:
X X X PROMOTED OR SUED A GROUNDLESS, FALSE OR UNLAWFUL SUIT, AND GAVE AID AND CONSENT TO THE SAME11
X X X DISOBEYED LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE[D] DISRESPECT FOR LAW AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION12
X X X DID NOT CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUE AND
ENGAGED IN HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL13
X X VIOLATED CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW14
X X RUINED AND DAMAGED NOT ONLY THE GEN. MARIANO ALVAREZ SERVICES COOPERATIVE, INC. (GEMASCO, INC.) BUT THE ENTIRE
WATER-CONSUMING COMMUNITY AS WELL15
Despite the Courts grant,16 on respondents motion,17 of extension of time to file Comment, respondent never filed any comment.
The Court thus required him to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with,18 but just the same he failed to comply.19
The Court thus referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.20
It appears that during the mandatory conference before the IBP, complainant proposed the following issues:
1. Whether or not the acts of respondent constitute violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly the following:
1.1 Canon 1 A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal [processes].
1.2 Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
1.3 Canon 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
1.4 Canon 19 A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law.
1.5 Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse
without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
2. Whether or not the above acts of respondent constitute violations of his lawyers oath, particularly the following:

2.1 support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein
2.2 will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court
2.3 will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same
2.4 will delay no man for money or malice
3. Whether or not the above acts of [respondent] complained of are grounds for disbarment or suspension of attorneys by the
Supreme Court as provided for in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.21
Respondents counsel who represented him during the conference proposed the issue of whether, on the basis of the allegations of
the complaint, misconduct was committed by respondent.22
After the conclusion of the conference, both parties were ordered to submit position papers.23 Complainant filed hers,24 but
respondent, despite grant, on his motion, of extension of time, did not file any position paper.
In her Report and Recommendation,25 Investigating Commissioner Lolita A. Quisumbing found respondent guilty of violating the
Lawyers Oath as well as Canons 1, 8, 10, and Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Noting that respondent had
already been previously suspended for six months, the Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended for two years.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) Board of Governors opted for the dismissal of the complaint, however, for lack of
merit.261avvphi1
On Motion for Reconsideration,27 the IBP-CBD Board of Governors recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for six months.
The Court finds that by conniving with Gerangco in taking over the Board of Directors and the GEMASCO facilities, respondent
violated the provisions of the Cooperative Code of the Philippines and the GEMASCO By-Laws. He also violated the Lawyers Oath,
which provides that a lawyer shall support the Constitution and obey the laws.
When respondent caused the filing of baseless criminal complaints against complainant, he violated the Lawyers Oath that a lawyer
shall "not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid or consent to the same."
When, after obtaining an extension of time to file comment on the complaint, respondent failed to file any and ignored this Courts
subsequent show cause order, he violated Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that "A lawyer shall not,
after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering
an explanation for his failure to do so." Sebastian v. Bajar28 teaches:

x x x Respondents cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial
institution. Respondents conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. A Courts Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere
request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively". Respondents obstinate refusal to comply with the
Courts orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also underscores her disrespect of the Courts lawful orders
which is only too deserving of reproof.
Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and respondents deference is underscored by the fact that willful
disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only to punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver
responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to their processes.29
(Citations omitted).
The Court notes that respondent had previously been suspended from the practice of law for six months for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility,30 he having been found to have received an acceptance fee and misled the client into believing that he
had filed a case for her when he had not.31 It appears, however, that respondent has not reformed his ways. A more severe penalty
this time is thus called for.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Oscar P. Paguinto, is SUSPENDED for two years from the practice of law for violation of Canons 1, 8,
10, and Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyers Oath, effective immediately.
SO ORDERER

A.C. No. 7922

October 1, 2013

MARY ANN T.MATTUS, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ALBERT T. VILLASECA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Mary Ann T. Mattus against Atty. Albert T. Villaseca for gross and
inexcusable negligence in handling Criminal Case No. 10309-02.
Background Facts
The complainant, German Bernardo D. Mattus and Dexter Aligan were the accused in Criminal Case No. 10309-02 a case for estafa
thru falsification of public document filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Imus, Cavite. The complainant and her
husband, German, engaged the services of Atty. Villaseca to represent them in the proceedings. The complainant maintained that she
and German were convicted due to Atty. Villasecas gross and inexcusable negligence in performing his duties as their counsel.
In her complaint-affidavit,1 the complainant alleged, among others, that Atty. Villaseca: (1) was often absent during court hearings but
still collected appearance fees; (2) frequently sought the postponement of trial when he was present; (3) failed to ask the RTC to
direct a National Bureau of Investigation expert to examine the signatures of the spouses Leslie and Zuraida Porter 2 in the special
power of attorney (SPA); (4) failed to file a demurrer to evidence despite having been granted sufficient time by the RTC to submit
one; (5) failed to present evidence on behalf of the defense, and only filed a memorandum; (6) did not inform her and German of the
dates of the presentation of defense evidence and the promulgation of judgment; and (7) erroneously indicated the wrong case
number in the notice of appeal. According to the complainant, Atty. Villasecas negligence in handling the case resulted in her own
and her husbands conviction.
In the Courts Resolution3 of July 16, 2008, we required Atty. Villaseca to comment on the complaint.
On September 10, 2008, Atty. Villaseca filed his comment,4 refuting the allegations against him. Atty. Villaseca explained that he
made known to the complainant that the testimony of a handwriting expert was necessary only if the prosecution would be able to
produce the original copy of the SPA. Atty. Villaseca also claimed that his absences during the hearings, as well as his numerous
motions for postponement, were justified and were never intended for delay. He denied having collected appearance fees when he
did not attend the scheduled hearings, and maintained that the fees he received were intended to compensate him for his services in
the other cases filed by the complainant. Atty. Villaseca further claimed that he immediately corrected the case number in the notice
of appeal when he discovered this error.
In a Resolution5dated October 15, 2008, we referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
In his Report and Recommendation6 dated September 16, 2009,Investigating Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag recommended that
Atty. Villaseca be suspended for six (6) months from the practice of law.
Commissioner Hababag ruled that Atty. Villasecas reckless and gross negligence deprived his clients of due process; his actuations in
the criminal case showed utter disregard for his clients life and liberty. Commissioner Hababag explained that Atty. Villaseca failed to
file a demurrer to evidence despite the sufficient length of time that had been given to him by the RTC to submit this pleading, and
waived his right to present evidence for the defense, opting instead to file a memorandum only. Commissioner Hababag concluded
that Atty. Villasecas failure to properly attend to the interests of his clients led to their conviction.
In Resolution No. XIX-2011-2517 dated May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner, but increased Atty. Villasecas period of suspension from the practice of law from six (6) months to one
(1) year.
Our Ruling
After a careful review of the records, the Court finds the evidence on record sufficient to support the IBPs findings. We, however,
increase Atty. Villasecas period of suspension from the practice of law from one (1) year to five (5) years.

We stress at the outset that a lawyer "is expected to exert his best efforts and ability to preserve his client's cause, for the
unwavering loyalty displayed to his client likewise serves the ends of justice." 8 Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client,
the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He owes entire
devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in maintenance and defense of his clients rights, and the exertion of his utmost
learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. A lawyer
who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does
honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. 9
The records of the present case show that Atty. Villaseca had been grossly remiss in handling Criminal Case No. 10309-02. To recall,
Atty. Villaseca requested for time to file demurrer to evidence after the prosecution had rested its case. In its order 10 of July 1, 2004,
the RTC gave him 20 days from receipt of the transcript of stenographic notes within which to file a demurrer to evidence. Atty.
Villaseca, however, did not file a demurrer to evidence, without offering any explanation why he failed to do so. As a result, the RTC
issued an order 11 stating that Atty. Villaseca "is deemed to have waived his right to file the said pleading."
To our mind, Atty. Villasecas failure to submit a demurrer to evidence to explain such omission constitutes inexcusable negligence; it
showed his lack of devotion and zeal in preserving his clients cause. We point out that nine months had lapsed from the time the RTC
granted Atty. Villaseca 20 days to file the demurrer to the time it ruled that he was deemed to have waived his right to file this
pleading. Clearly, Atty. Villasecas actuations violated Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that "a lawyer
shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same
or offering an explanation for his failure to do so."
The records further disclosed that after Atty. Villasecas failure to file a demurrer to evidence, the RTC set the initial presentation of
defense evidence on May 9, 2005. However, this hearing was postponed thrice: the May 9, 2005 hearing was reset to August 8, 2005
due to Atty. Villasecas failure to appear;12 the August 8, 2005 hearing was reset to November 17, 2005 upon Atty. Villasecas
motion;13 and the November 17, 2005 hearing was reset to March 1, 2006 because of Atty. Villasecas manifestation that his intended
first witness was unavailable.14During the March 1, 2006hearing, the respondent manifested that the defense would no longer present
any evidence, and moved that he be given time to file a memorandum. 15
We point out that the prosecution rested its case on July 1, 2004; yet Atty. Villaseca waited until March 1, 2006 only to manifest that
he would no longer present any evidence. We are at a loss why Atty. Villaseca chose not to present any evidence for the defense,
considering that the accused wanted and were ready to take the witness stand. As a result, the testimony of the lone prosecution
witness remained uncontroverted. To make matters worse, Atty. Villaseca directed German to attend the hearing on June 6,
2007without informing him that it was already the date of the promulgation of judgment.1wphi1
The Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him."16 It further mandates that "a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence." 17 It
also states that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable."18
Atty. Villasecas failure to present any testimonial, object or documentary evidence for the defense reveals his lack of diligence in
performing his duties as an officer of the Court; it showed his indifference towards the cause of his clients. Considering that the liberty
and livelihood of his clients were at stake, Atty. Villaseca should have exerted efforts tore but the presented prosecution evidence. He
could have presented the complainant and/or her husband to the witness stand, instead of just opting to file a memorandum. Or, at
the very least, the reason for this move should have been fully explained to the clients, and later to the IBP and to this Court. But no
such explanation ever came. We are thus left with the stark reality that Atty. Villaseca failed to file, despite the promise made to the
lower court, a demurrer to evidence. After failing in this first line of defense for his clients, it should have been incumbent upon Atty.
Villaseca to present evidence for the defense, but again, he unexplainably failed to do this, leaving the lower court with no evidence
to appreciate except that of the prosecution, to the detriment of his clients cause.
We emphasize that while a lawyer has complete discretion on what legal strategy to employ in a case entrusted to him, he must
present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law to support his clients cause. A memorandum, no matter how
lengthy, should not be made a substitute for testimonial, object or documentary evidence, more so in a criminal case where a
conviction could lead to dire consequences. In saying so, we are not insinuating that the RTC decision would have tilted in favor of the
defense had Atty. Villaseca presented evidence; we simply stress that utmost fidelity and attention are demanded once counsel
agrees to take the cudgels for his client's cause.
We again remind members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms expected of the legal profession by upholding the ideals
and principles embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer engaged to represent a client bears the responsibility of
protecting the latter's interest with utmost diligence. It is his duty to serve his client with competence and diligence, and he should
exert his best efforts to protect, within the bounds of the law, the interests of his client. 19 A lawyers diligence and vigilance is more
imperative in criminal cases, where the life and liberty of an accused is at stake. Verily, the entrusted privilege to practice law carries
with it the corresponding duties, not only to the client, but also to the court, to the bar and to the public. As we explained in Spouses
Bautista v. Atty. Arturo Cefra:20
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess the legal qualifications for it. Lawyers
are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
They must perform their fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and
norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

"The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding
facts."21 Under the circumstances, we find that the IBPs recommended penalty of one years suspension from the practice of law is
not commensurate to Atty. Villasecas transgressions. His incompetence and appalling indifference to his duty to his client, the courts
and society indicate a high degree of irresponsibility that casts dishonor on the legal profession.
The present case finds a close forerunner in Santeco v. Atty. Avance, 22 where we suspended Atty. Luna B. Avance from the practice of
law for five(5) years for being grossly remiss in the performance of her duties as counsel. In this cited case, the civil case entrusted to
Atty. Avance was dismissed for failure to prosecute. During the pendency of her motion for reconsideration (which she had filed way
beyond the reglementary period), she told her client that she would file a petition for certiorari before the CA to assail the dismissal of
the civil case. She did not file this petition, but failed to inform her client of this omission. Moreover, Atty. Avance stopped appearing
as counsel for her client without notifying the latter.
Atty. Villasecas negligence in the present case had much graver implications, as the legal matter entrusted to him involved not
merely money or property, but the very liberty and livelihood of his clients. We stress that the moment Atty. Villaseca agreed to
handle the complainants criminal case, he became duty-bound to serve his clients with competence and diligence, and to champion
their cause with whole-hearted fidelity. By failing to afford his clients every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law, Atty.
Villaseca fell short of what is expected of him as an officer of the Court. We cannot overstress the duty of a lawyer to uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.
All told, Atty. Villaseca showed a wanton and utter disregard to his clients cause; his failure to exercise due diligence in attending to
their interest in the criminal case caused them grave prejudice. Under the circumstances, we find a five-year suspension from the
practice of law to be a sufficient and appropriate sanction against him. The increased penalty serves the purpose of protecting the
interest of the Court, the legal profession and the public.
WHEREFORE premises considered, we find Atty. Albert T. Villaseca guilty of negligence, in violation of Rules 12.03 and 18.03 and
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for five (5) years, effective
upon his receipt of this Decision, and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more
severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 133090

January 19, 2001

REXIE EFREN A. BUGARING AND ROYAL BECHTEL BUILDERS, INC., petitioners,

vs.
HON. DOLORES S. ESPAOL, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court Branch 90, Imus,
Cavite, respondent.
DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated March 6, 1998 of the Court of Appeals 1affirming the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite, declaring petitioner Rexie Efren A. Bugaring guilty in direct contempt of
court.1wphi1.nt
The incident subject of the petition occurred during a hearing held on December 5, 1996 of Civil Case NO. 1266-96 entitled "Royal
Becthel2 Builders, Inc. vs. Spouses Luis Alvaran and Beatriz Alvaran, et al.", for Annulment of Sale and Certificates of Title, Specific
Performance and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order in the sala of respondent judge
Dolores S. Espaol of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite.
Pursuant to a motion filed by the previous counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc., the trial court issued an order on February 27, 1996
directing the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite to annotate at the back of certain certificates of title a notice of lis pendens.
Before the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite could comply with said order, the defendant Spouses Alvaran on April 15, 1996,
filed a motion to cancel lis pendens. On July 19, 1996, petitioner, the newly appointed counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc., filed an
opposition to the motion to cancel lis pendens. On August 16, 1996, the motion to cancel lis pendens was granted by the court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was opposed by the defendants. On November 5, 1996, petitioner filed an Urgent
Motion to Resolve, and on November 6, 1996, filed a Rejoinder to Opposition and Motion for Contempt of Court. 3
During the hearing of the motion for contempt of court held on December 5, 1996, the following incident transpired:
ATTY. BUGARING:

For the plaintiff, your Honor, we are ready.

ATTY. CORDERO:

Same appearance for the defendant, your Honor.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Your Honor please, we are ready with respect to the prosecution of our motion for contempt,
your Honor. May we know from the record if the Register of Deeds is properly notified for
today's hearing.

COURT:

Will you call on the Register of Deeds.

INTERPRETER:

Atty. Diosdado Concepcion, He is here, your Honor.

ATTY. BUGARING:

We are ready, your Honor.

COURT:

There is a motion for contempt in connection with the order of this Court which directed your
office to register lis pendens of the complaint in connection with this case of Royal Becthel
Builder, Inc. versus spouses Luis Alvaran and Beatriz Alvaran, et al.

ATTY. CONCEPCION:

Your Honor, I just received this morning at ten o'clock [in the morning] the subpoena.

ATTY. BUGARING:

May we put in on record that as early as November 6, 1996, the Office of the Register of Deeds
was furnished with a copy of our motion, your Honor please, and the record will bear it out.
Until now they did not file any answer, opposition or pleadings or pleadings with respect to this
motion.

ATTY. CONCEPCION:

Well I was not informed because I am not the Register of Deeds. I am only the Deputy Register
of Deeds and I was not informed by the receiving clerk of our office regarding this case. As a
matter of fact I was surprised when I received this morning the subpoena, your Honor.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Your Honor please, may we put that on record that the manifestation of the respondent that he
was not informed.

COURT:

That is recorded. This is a Court of record and everything that you say here is recorded.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Yes your Honor please, we know that but we want to be specific because we will be [filing] a
case against this receiving clerk who did not [inform] him your Honor please, with this
manifestation of the Deputy of the Register of Deeds that is irregularity in the performance of
the official duty of the clerk not to inform the parties concerned.

COURT:

Counsel, the Court would like to find out who this fellow who is taking the video recording at
this proceedings. There is no permission from this Court that such proceedings should be taken.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Your Honor, my Assistant. I did not advise him to take a video he just accompanied me this
morning.

COURT:

Right, but the video recording is prepared process and you should secure the permission of this
Court.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Actually, I did not instruct him to take some video tape.

COURT:

Why would he be bringing camera if you did not give him the go signal that shots should be
done.

ATTY. BUGARING:

This Court should not presume that, your Honor please, we just came from an occasion last
night and I am not yet come home, your Honor please. I could prove your Honor please, that
the contents of that tape is other matters your Honor please. I was just surprised why he took
video tape your Honor please, that we ask the apology of this Court if that offend this Court
your Honor please.

COURT:

It is not offending because this is a public proceedings but the necessary authority or
permission should be secured.

ATTY. BUGARING:

In fact I instructed him to go out, your Honor.

COURT:

After the court have noticed that he is taking a video tape.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Yes, your Honor, in fact that is not my personal problem your Honor please, that is personal to
that guy your Honor please if this representation is being .

COURT:

That is very shallow, don't give that alibi.

ATTY. BUGARING:

At any rate, your Honor please, we are going to mark our documentary evidence as part of our
motion for contempt, your Honor please.

COURT:

What has the Register of Deeds got to say with this matter?

ATTY. CONCEPCION:

Well as I have said before, I have not received any motion regarding this contempt you are
talking. I am willing now to testify.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Your Honor I am still of the prosecution stage, it is not yet the defense. This is a criminal
proceedings, contempt proceedings is a criminal.

ATTY. CONCEPCION:

Your Honor please, may I ask for the assistance from the Fiscal.

COURT:

If this is going to proceed, we need the presence of a Fiscal or a counsel for the Register of
Deeds.

ATTY. CONCEPCION:

Can I appoint an outside lawyer not a Fiscal but a private counsel, your Honor.

COURT:

That is at your pleasure. The Court will consider that you should be amply represented.

ATTY. CONCEPCION:
4

As a matter of fact I have a lawyer here, Atty. Barzaga if he is willing.

ATTY. BARZAGA :

Yes, your Honor, I will just review the records.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Anyway your Honor please, I will not yet present my witness but I will just mark our
documentary exhibits which are part of the record of the case and thereafter your Honor
please.

COURT:

You wait for a minute counsel because there is a preparation being done by newly appointed
counsel of the respondent, Atty. Barzaga is considered as the privately hired counsel of the
register of deeds and the respondent of this contempt proceedings. How much time do you
need to go over the record of this case so that we can call the other case in the meanwhile.

ATTY. BARZAGA:

Second call, your Honor.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------COURT:

Are you ready Atty. Barzaga?

ATTY. BARZAGA:

Yes, your Honor. Well actually your Honor, after reviewing the record of the case your Honor, I
noticed that the motion for contempt of Court was filed on November 6, 1966 and in paragraph
6 thereof, your Honor it is stated that, 'the record of the case shows up to the filing of this
motion, the Register as well as the Deputy Register Diosdado Concepcion of the Office of the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite, did not comply with the Court Orders dated
February 27, 1996, March 29, 1996, respectively.' However, your Honor, Atty. Diosdado
Concepcion has shown to me a letter coming from Atty. Efren A. Bugaring dated September 18,
1996 addressed to the Register regarding this notice of Lis Pendens pertaining to TCT Nos. T519248, 519249 and 519250 and this letter request, your Honor for the annotation of the lis
pendens clearly shows that it has been already entered in the book of primary entry. We would
like also to invite the attention of the Hon. Court that the Motion for Contempt of Court was
filed on November 6, 1996. The letter for the annotation of the lis pendens was made by the
counsel for the plaintiff only on September 18, 1996, your Honor. However, your Honor, as
early as August 16, 1996 an Order has already been issued by the Hon. Court reading as
follows, 'Wherefore in view of the above, the motion of the defendant is GRANTED and the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite, is hereby directed to CANCEL the notice of lis
pendens annotated at the back of Certificate of Title Nos. 519248, 51949 (sic) and 51950 (sic).'

ATTY. BUGARING:

Your Honor please, may we proceed your Honor, will first mark our documentary evidence.

COURT:

You wait until the Court allows you to do what you want to do, okay. The counsel has just made
manifestation, he has not prayed for anything. So let us wait until he is finished and then wait
for the direction of this Court what to do to have an orderly proceedings in this case.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Considering your Honor, that the issues appear to be a little bit complicated your Honor,
considering that the order regarding the annotation of the lis pendens has already been
revoked by the Hon. Court your Honor, we just request that we be given a period of ten days
from today your Honor, within which to submit our formal written opposition your Honor.

COURT:

Counsel, will you direct your attention to the manifestation filed earlier by Atty. Tutaan in
connection with the refusal of the Register of Deeds to annotate the lis pendens because of
certain reasons. According to the manifestation of Atty. Tutaan and it is appearing in the earlier
part of the record of this case, the reason for that is because there was a pending subdivision
plan, it is so stated. I think it was dated March, 1996. May 1 have the record please.

ATTY. BARZAGA:

Yes, your Honor.

COURT:

This Court would like to be enlightened with respect to that matter.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Well, according to Atty. Diosdado Concepcion he could already explain this, your Honor.

COURT:

Have it properly addressed as part of the manifestation so that this court can be guided
accordingly. Because this Court believes that the root of the matter started from that. After the
submission of the . What are you suppose to submit?

ATTY. BUGARING:

Comment your Honor, on the motion to cite Atty. Diosdado Concepcion in contempt of Court.

COURT:

After the submission of the Comment and furnishing a copy of the comment to the counsel for
the plaintiff, this Court is going to give the counsel for the plaintiff an equal time within which
to submit his reply.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Your Honor please, it is the position of this representation your Honor please, that we will be
marking first our documentary evidence because this is set for hearing for today, your Honor
please.

COURT:

If you are going to mark your evidence and they do not have their comment yet what are we
going to receive as evidence.

ATTY. BUGARING:

If your Honor please

COURT:

Will you listen to the Court and just do whatever you have to do after the submission of the
comment.

ATTY. BUGARING:

I am listening, your Honor please, but the record will show that the motion for contempt was
copy furnished with the Register of Deeds and Diosdado Concepcion.

COURT:

Precisely, if you are listening then you will get what the Court would want to do. This should be
an orderly proceedings and considering that this is a Court of record the comment has to be in
first then in your reply you can submit your evidence to rebut the argument that is going to be
put up by the respondent and so we will be able to hear the case smoothly.

ATTY. BUGARING:

My point here your Honor please, is that the respondent had been long time furnished of this
contempt proceedings. With a copy of the motion they should have filed it in due time in
accordance with the rules and because it is scheduled for trial, we are ready to mark our
evidence and present to this Court, your Honor

COURT:

(Banging the gavel) Will you listen.

ATTY. BUGARING:

I am listening, your Honor.

COURT:

And this Court declares that you are out of order.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Well, if that is the contention of the Court your Honor please, we are all officers of the Court,
your Honor, please, we have also ---- and we know also our procedure, your Honor.

COURT:

If you know your procedure then you follow the procedure of the Court first and then do
whatever you want.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Yes, your Honor please, because we could feel the antagonistic approach of the Court of this
representation ever since I appeared your Honor please and I put on record that I will be filing
an inhibition to this Hon. Court.

COURT:

Do that right away. (Banging the gavel)

ATTY. BUGARING:

Because we could not find any sort of justice in town.

COURT:

Do that right away.

ATTY. BUGARING:

We are ready to present our witness and we are deprive to present our witness.

COURT:

You have presented a witness and it was an adverse witness that was presented.

ATTY. BUGARING:

I did not.

COURT:

With respect to this, the procedure of the Court is for the respondent to file his comment.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Well your Honor please, at this point in time I don't want to comment on anything but I reserve
my right to inhibit this Honorable Court before trying this case.

COURT:

You can do whatever you want.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Yes, your Honor, that is our prerogative your Honor.

COURT:

As far as this Court is concerned it is going to follow the rules.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Yes, your Honor, we know all the rules.

COURT:

Yes, you know your rules that's why you are putting the cart ahead of the horse.

ATTY. BUGARING:

No your Honor, I've been challenged by this Court that I know better than this Court. Modestly
(sic) aside your Honor please, I've been winning in many certiorari cases, your Honor.

COURT:

Okay, okay, do that, do that. I am going to cite you for contempt of Court. (Banging the gavel)
You call the police and I am going to send this lawyer in jail. (Turning to the Sheriff)

ATTY. BUGARING:

I am just manifesting and arguing in favor of my client your Honor please.

COURT:

You have been given enough time and you have been abusing the discretion of this Court.

ATTY. BUGARING:

I am very sorry your Honor, if that is the appreciation of the Court but this is one way I am
protecting my client, your Honor.

COURT:

That is not the way to protect your client that is an abuse of the discretion of this Court.
(Turning to the Sheriff) "Will you see to it that this guy is put in jail." (pp. 29-42. Rollo)

Hence, in an Order dated December 5, 1996, Judge Espaol cited petitioner in direct contempt of court, thus:
During the hearing of this case, plaintiffs and counsel were present together with one (1) operating a video camera who was
taking pictures of the proceedings of the case while counsel, Atty. Rexie Efren Bugaring was making manifestation to the
effect that he was ready to mark his documentary evidence pursuant to his Motion to cite (in contempt of court) the Deputy
Register of Deeds of Cavite, Diosdado Concepcion.
The Court called the attention of said counsel who explained that he did not cause the appearance of the cameraman to take
pictures, however, he admitted that they came from a function, and that was the reason why the said cameraman was in
tow with him and the plaintiffs. Notwithstanding the flimsy explanation given, the counsel sent out the cameraman after the
Court took exception to the fact that although the proceedings are open to the public and that it being a court of record, and
since its permission was not sought, such situation was an abuse of discretion of the Court.
When the respondent, Deputy Register of Deeds Concepcion manifested that he needed the services of counsel and right
then and there appointed Atty. Elpidio Barzaga to present him, the case was allowed to be called again. On the second call,
Atty. Burgaring started to insist that he be allowed to mark and present his documentary evidence in spite of the fact that
Atty. Barzaga was still manifesting that he be allowed to submit a written pleading for his client, considering that the Motion
has so many ramifications and the issues are complicated.
At this point, Atty. Bugaring was insisting that he be allowed to mark his documentary evidence and was raring to argue as in
fact he was already perorating despite the fact that Atty. Barzaga has not yet finished with his manifestation. As Atty.
Bugaring appears to disregard orderly procedure, the Court directed him to listen and wait for the ruling of the Court for an
orderly proceeding.
While claiming that he was listening, he would speak up anytime he felt like doing so. Thus, the Court declared him out of
order, at which point, Atty. Bugaring flared up the uttered words insulting the Court; such as: 'that he knows better than the
latter as he has won all his cases of certiorari in the appellate Courts, that he knows better the Rules of Court; that he was
going to move for the inhibition of the Presiding Judge for allegedly being antagonistic to his client,' and other invectives
were hurled to the discredit of the Court.
Thus, in open court, Atty. Bugaring was declared in direct contempt and order the Court's sheriff to arrest and place him
under detention.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and the fact that Atty. Rexie Efren Bugaring committed an open defiance, even
challenging the Court in a disrespectful, arrogant, and contumacious manner, he is declared in direct contempt of Court and
is sentenced to three (3) days imprisonment and payment of a fine of P3,000.00. His detention shall commence immediately
at the Municipal Jail of Imus, Cavite.5
Pursuant to said Order, the petitioner served his three (3) day sentence at the Imus Municipal Jail, and paid the fine of P3,000.00. 6
While serving the first day of his sentence on December 5, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order citing him
in direct contempt of court. The next day, December 6, 1996, petitioner filed another motion praying for the resolution of his motion
for reconsideration. Both motions were never resolved and petitioner was released on December 8, 1996. 7
To clear his name in the legal circle and the general public, petitioner filed a petition before the Court of Appeals praying for the
annulment of the Order dated December 5, 1996 citing him in direct contempt of court and the reimbursement of the fine of
P3,000.00 on grounds that respondent Judge Dolores S. Espaol had no factual and legal basis in citing him in direct contempt of
court, and that said Order was null and void for being in violation of the Constitution and other pertinent laws and jurisprudence. 8
The Court of Appeals found that from a thorough reading of the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing held on December 5,
1996, it was obvious that the petitioner was indeed arrogant, at times impertinent, too argumentative, to the extent of being
disrespectful, annoying and sarcastic towards the court.9 It affirmed the order of the respondent judge, but found that the fine of
P3,000.00 exceeded the limit of P2,000.00 prescribed by the Rules of Court, 10 and ordered the excess of P1,000.00 returned to
petitioner. On March 6, 1998, it rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed order dated December 5, 1996 issued by
the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the excess fine of P1,000.00 is ORDERED RETURNED to the
petitioner.
Before us, petitioner ascribes to the Court of Appeals this lone error:
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE ASSAILED ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH
TO PETITIONER'S SUBMISSIONS SMACKS OF OPPRESSION AND ABUSE OF AUTHORITY, HENCE IT COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR
OF LAW IN ITS QUESTIONED DECISION.11
Petitioner insists that a careful examination of the transcript of stenographic notes of the subject proceedings would reveal that the
contempt order issued by respondent judge had no factual and legal basis. It would also show that he was polite and respectful
towards the court as he always addressed the court with the phrase "your honor please."

We disagree.
Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as amended by Administrative Circular No. 22-95 provides:
Direct contempt punished summarily. A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to
obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court or judge, offensive personalities
toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully
required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court or judge and punished by a fine not exceeding two
thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a superior court, or a judge thereof, or by a
fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day, or both, if it be an inferior court.
We agree with the statement of the Court of Appeals that petitioner's alleged deference to the trial court in consistently addressing
the respondent judge as "your Honor please" throughout the proceedings is belied by his behavior therein:
1. the veiled threat to file a petition for certiorari against the trial court (pp. 14-15, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 41-42, Rollo)
is contrary to Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates that "a lawyer shall abstain
from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts".
2. the hurled uncalled for accusation that the respondent judge was partial in favor of the other party (pp. 13-14, tsn,
December 5, 1996; pp. 40-41, Rollo) is against Rule 11.04, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins
lawyers from attributing to a judge "motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case".
3. behaving without due regard to the trial court's order to maintain order in the proceedings (pp. 9-13, tsn, December 5,
1996; pp. 36-40, Rollo) I in utter disregard to Canon 1 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which makes it a lawyer's duty to
"maintain towards the courts (1) respectful attitude" in order to maintain its importance in the administration of justice, and
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers to "observe and maintain the respect due to the
Courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others".
4. behaving without due regard or deference to his fellow counsel who at the time he was making representations in behalf
of the other party, was rudely interrupted by the petitioner and was not allowed to further put a word in edgewise (pp. 7-13,
tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 34-39, Rollo) is violative of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Ethics which obliges a lawyer to
conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and
5. The refusal of the petitioner to allow the Registrar of Deeds of the Province of Cavite, through counsel, to exercise his right
to be heard (Ibid) is against Section 1 of Article III, 1997 Constitution on the right to due process of law, Canon 18 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics which mandates a lawyer to always treat an adverse witness "with fairness and due
consideration," and Canon 12 of Code of Professional Responsibility which insists on a lawyer to "exert every effort and
consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice."
The Court cannot therefore help but notice the sarcasm in the petitioner's use of the phrase "your honor please." For, after using said
phrase he manifested utter disrespect to the court in his subsequent utterances. Surely this behavior from an officer of the Court
cannot and should not be countenanced, if proper decorum is to be observed and maintained during court proceedings. 12
Indeed, the conduct of petitioner in persisting to have his documentary evidence marked to the extent of interrupting the opposing
counsel and the court showed disrespect to said counsel and the court, was defiant of the court's system for an orderly proceeding,
and obstructed the administration of justice. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and
consequently, to the due administrative of justice. 13 Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge, as in
the case at bar, and can be punished summarily without hearing.14 Hence, petitioner cannot claim that there was irregularity in the
actuation of respondent judge in issuing the contempt order inside her chamber without giving the petitioner the opportunity to
defend himself or make an immediate reconsideration. The records show that petitioner was cited in contempt of court during he
hearing in the sala of respondent judge, and he even filed a motion for reconsideration of the contempt order on the same day. 15
Petitioner argued that while it might appear that he was carried by his emotions in espousing the case of his client by persisting to
have his documentary evidence marked despite the respondent judge's contrary order he did so in the honest belief that he was
bound to protect the interest of his client to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence.
The Court of Appeals aptly stated:
But "a lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his client's cause" (Buenaseda v. Flavier, 226 SCRA 645, 656). He
should not forget that he is an officer of the court, bound to exert every effort and placed under duty, to assist in the speedy
and efficient administration of justice Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 15, Ozamis City, 249 SCRA 432, 439). He should not,
therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice per Rule 10.03. Canon 10 of the Canons of Professional
Responsibility, or unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes, in accordance with
Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the same Canons (Ibid).
"Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice. Any conduct
which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes such lawyer's duty."16

Although respondent judge was justified in citing petitioner in direct contempt of court, she erred in imposing a fine in the amount of
P3,000.00 which exceeded the ceiling of P2,000.00 under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 22-95 which took effect on
November 16, 1995. It was not established that the fine was imposed in bad faith. The Court of Appeals thus properly ordered the
return of the excess of P1,000.00. Aside from the fine, the three days imprisonment meted out to petitioner was justified and within
the 10-day limit prescribed in Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
It is our view and we hold, therefore, that the Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible error in its assailed decision.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated March 6, 1998 of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of
Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite is ordered to return to the petitioner, Rexie Efren A. Bugaring, the sum of P1,000.00 out of the original
fine of P3,000.00.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-27662

October 29, 1968

MANILA PEST CONTROL, INC., petitioner,

vs.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, ATANACIO A. MARDO, as Chief Hearing Officer of Regional Officer of the
Department of Labor, CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA and MARIO ABITRIA, respondents.
Manuel A. Corpuz for petitioner.
Pagano C. Villavieja and Cecilia E. Curso for public respondent Atanacio A. Mardo.
Hector C. Regino for private respondent.
FERNANDO, J.:
This Court, in a resolution of June 21, 1967, was persuaded, regrettably as it turned out, to give due course to acertiorari and
prohibition proceeding with a plea for preliminary injunction, a restraining order being issued, in view of the rather vehement and
earnest protestations of petitioner Manila Pest ControI, Inc. that it was denied procedural due process. As will be more fully explained,
such is not the case at all.
More specifically, it was alleged that on February 24, 1967, respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission, through its referee,
considered a complaint filed against it by the other respondent, Mario Abitria, for compensation submitted for decision after he and a
physician had testified, petitioner's counsel having failed to appear at the hearing of February 24, 1967. 1 Then came, according to the
petition, a motion for reconsideration dated March 7, 1967, petitioner praying that he be allowed to present evidence on his behalf. 2 It
was denied in an order of April 4, 1967, as a decision had already been rendered against petitioner, as employer, awarding
respondent Abitria P6,000.00 as his disability compensation benefit. It was also pointed out in such order that there was no plea in
such motion for reconsideration for such decision being set aside, as it was limited to seeking an opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses. It could not be granted as the matter was looked upon as "moot and academic." 3 It was then alleged in the petition that on
April 11, 1967, a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order was filed with the averment that petitioner was not aware of any
decision rendered in the case as no copy of the same had theretofore been furnished to its counsel. 4 After a denial of such motion for
reconsideration on April 24, 1967, and a plea for execution on behalf of respondent Abitria, which was granted on June 14, 1967, the
City Sheriff of Manila, likewise made a respondent, levied on petitioner's properties on June 14, 1967, by virtue of the above writ of
execution.5
It is petitioner's contention that in the light of the above alleged infringement of procedural due process, the actuation of respondent
Commission was either in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. That was the basis for the relief sought, seeking
a writ of preliminary injunction restraining City Sheriff of Manila, from proceeding with the sale at public auction of petitioner's
properties and after hearing, annulling the aforesaid writ of execution and likewise all the proceedings in RO4-WC Case No. 5503,
thereafter making the injunction permanent, and ordering respondent Abitria to pay petitioner the sum of P500.00 as attorney'sfees.
Thus was imparted more than just a semblance of plausibility to the petition, deceptive in character, as subsequent pleadings proved,
but nonetheless insufficient to call for its summary dismissal.
On June 21, 1967, this Court issued a resolution to this effect: "The respondents in L-27662 (Manila Pest Control, Inc. vs. Workmen's
Compensation Commission, et al.) are required to file, within 10 days from notice hereof, an answer (not a motion to dismiss) to the
petition for prohibition; let temporary restraining order issue, effective immediately and until further orders from this Court."
The answer of respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission of July 21, 1967 and the later pleadings, revealed quite a different
story. It is now quite clear that instead of being the offended party suffering from a legitimate grievance, its right to due process
having been summarily disregarded, petitioner was not above resorting to every technicality the law affords to evade the
performance of an obligation, which under the law it must fulfill, namely, to compensate for the serious and debilitating ailment of
tuberculosis acquired in the course of employment by respondent Abitria. Accordingly, the petition for certiorari and prohibition
should be, as it is hereby, denied.
The facts as found by respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission, which must be deemed conclusive, can yield no other
conclusion but the undeniable liability for compensation to respondent Abitria on the part of petitioner. Thus: "From the recorded

evidence, it appears that claimant was employed with the respondent since February 4, 1956, working six (6) days a week and
receiving an average monthly wage of P180.00 as laborer for the respondent. He was assigned in the Research Division which
conducted research on rat traps and other matters regarding extermination of pests, animals and insects. It was testified to by the
claimant and his witnesses that in the place of his employment he was made to inhale dangerous fumes as the atmosphere was
polluted with poisonous chemical dusts. The working condition of his place of work was also warm and humid in view of the products
being manufactured by the respondent. He was not extended any protective device and he was also made to lift heavy objects in the
painting and soldering. In his soldering work muriatic acid and soldering paste [were] used. Sometime in July, 1966 while the claimant
was soldering [he] began to experience symptoms of pulmonary tuberculosis. Because of his spitting of blood or hemoptysis, he went
to consult Dr. Felix Tuazon of the Quezon Institute whose diagnosis was pulmonary tuberculosis, chronic, active moderately advanced,
right: minimal, left. He was confined at the Quezon Institute under the care of Dr. Felix Tuazon. According to the attending physician,
he was admitted in the hospital ward as a hemoptic patient or one who is bleeding from the lungs. When he was admitted he was
prescribed Vita K. ampules, bronocal, ablocid, duestrep injections and other anti-TB drugs. His clinical history showed that the
claimant was diagnosed with severe coughing followed by expectoration of fresh blood amounting to two glassful [when] he was
brought to the Philippine General Hospital and given injection and was X-rayed. From that hospital he was transferred to the Quezon
Institute where he was subsequently admitted. The attending physician testified further that the right lung had bronchogenous
lesions in the upper lobe with honeycomb at 2nd and 3rd intercostal space, while the left lung had fibrotic lesion behind the anterior
rib II. ... He was discharged from the Quezon Institute on September 3, 1966, but the illness was not yet arrested although there was
stopping of the hemoptysis. The doctor testified on cross examination that the nature of work of the claimant involving strenuous
physical exertion and other factors of work such as the lowering of his resistance in view of the enormous inhalation of chemical
fumes also brought about the aggravation of the claimant's present condition. According to the claimant the respondent was duly
notified of his illness through the general manager and in view of the respondent's refusal to pay him disability compensation despite
repeated demands, claimant filed this instant claim." 6
The sole issue then, as accurately set forth in the above decision, was "to determine in this case ... whether ... there is sufficient or
substantial evidence in support of the claim for disability compensation benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Law. The
evidence on record is crystal clear that the claimant had already substantially proven his case and all indications point that the illness
of moderately advanced, pulmonary tuberculosis was service connected in view of his work as laborer involving strenuous physical
exertion which brought about the lowering of his resistance due to the massive inhalation of injurious chemical fumes to the extent
that he was made an easy prey to the contraction of TB bacilli. The fact that there was no evidence on record that claimant was sick
upon entrance to his employment, it is presumed that he was normal in every respect during the first period of his employment and
the disease of pulmonary tuberculosis showed only during the later part of his employment when he was assigned in the research
division of the respondent. The attending physician himself stated that claimant's exposure to his work aggravated the illness and we
believe that the respondent had failed to dispute the work connection as there is no showing that claimant's ailment was due to the
lowering of his resistance by causes other than the nature of his work as laborer of the respondent." 7
It must be a realization that no valid defenses could be interposed that prompted petitioner to rely on the alleged deprivation of due
process, a contention, which as will now be shown, is without basis.
The petition was so worded that the employer's right to be heard appeared to have been disregarded. No further attention should be
accorded such an alleged grievance. If it did not introduce any evidence, it had itself solely to blame. No fault could be attributed to
respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission. There must be such a realization on the part of petitioner for its four-page
memorandum submitted in lieu of oral argument did not bother to discuss such a matter at all. Accordingly, such a contention need
not detain us further as it ought never to have been raised in the first place.
Petitioner would make much however of the allegation that, as shown in the answer of respondent Workmen's Compensation
Commission,8 the decision was sent to a certain Attorney Manuel Camacho but care of petitioner's counsel, Attorney Manuel Corpuz.
Petitioner would emphasize that the one "officially furnished" with a copy of such decision was not its counsel, who was without any
connection with the aforesaid Attorney Camacho. It would conclude, therefore, that it had not received a copy of a decision which
could not thereafter reach the stage of finality calling for a writ of execution.
This contention was squarely met in the reply-memorandum of November 6, 1967 of the Workmen's Compensation Commission. Why
it happened thus was explained in an affidavit of one of its employees, a certain Gerardo Guzman, included therein. 9 As set forth in
such reply memorandum: "As stated in the affidavit of Mr. Guzman, he went to the office of Atty. Corpuz, on March 10, 1967 to deliver
a copy of the decision ..., but Atty. Corpuz refused to receive the said decision alleging that he was no longer handling the case. Atty.
Corpuz, instead instructed Mr. Guzman to deliver the said decision to Atty. Camacho since it was already Atty, Camacho who was
handling the case, and Atty. Camacho, according to Atty. Corpuz, even had the records of the case." 10In view of such instruction, it
was further noted, Guzman "went the office of Atty. Camacho, but since Atty. Camacho was not around he handed the copy of the
decision to the receiving clerk therein, who received it as evidenced by the stamp pad bearing the name of the Law Office of
Camacho, Zapa, Andaya & Associates on the attached true copy of the Notice of Decision, ..." 11
From which it could make the apt observation. "It is indeed sad to note that after the Counsel for Petitioner refused to receive the
copy of said decision, he is now impugning the delivery of said decision to Atty. Camacho and is denying knowledge of it when in fact
and truth the delivery of said decision to Atty. Camacho was made per his instruction to Mr. Guzman, as evidenced by the attached
affidavit of Mr. Guzman."12
In view of the rather persuasive character of such an affidavit and the understandable reflection on the actuation of counsel for
petitioner, there was, as could be expected submitted by petitioner's counsel a rejoinder, dated November 26, 1967. He would have
this Court believe that the reply-memorandum is contradicted by what appeared in respondents' answer, where it was stated that a

copy of the decision was received, not by him but by the law office of a certain Attorney Camacho. He would then ask why Guzman
did not serve a copy of the decision to him. He would even assume, for argument sake, that there was a refusal on his part to accept
a copy of this decision, but he would argue why did not Guzman, who could be expected to know the duties of a service officer, fail
"to state said refusal in his official return."
Which of the above conflicting versions is entitled to credence? That of respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission would
appear to be more in accordance with the realities of the situation. It is entitled to belief.
This would not be the first time, in the first place, where out of excess of zeal and out of a desire to rely on every conceivable defense
that could delay if not defeat the satisfaction of an obligation incumbent on one's client, counsel would attempt to put the most
favorable light on a course of conduct which certainly cannot be given the stamp of approval. Not that it would clear counsel of any
further responsibility. His conduct leaves much to be desired. His responsibility aside, it made evident why, to repeat the effort to
evade liability by petitioner by invoking the due process guaranty must not be rewarded with success.
Under the above circumstances, no due process question arose. What was done satisfied such a constitutional requirement. An effort
was made to serve petitioner with a copy of the decision; that such effort failed was attributable to the conduct of its own counsel.
True, there was a denial; it is far from persuasive, as already noted. It does not have the ring of truth. There is no reason why the
decision would have been served on some other counsel if there where no such misinformation, if there where no such attempt to
mislead.
No benefit would have accrued to respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission. It was merely performing its official function.
Certainly, it could be expected to see to it that the law's beneficiaries were not inconvenienced, much less frustrated, by its failure to
follow the regular procedure prescribed. It was unlikely that the employee entrusted with serving a copy of the decision, in this
particular case, and in this particular case alone, would depart so radically from what the law requires, if there were no such
intervening cause that resulted in his going astray. How could petitioner escape responsibility?
Petitioner, and petitioner alone, could be expected to furnish such a cause. Who would benefit thereby? The answer cannot be in
doubt. Through such circumstance, wether intended or otherwise, a basis was laid for at least a delay of the fulfillment of a just claim.
For it is to be noted that there is no, as there could not be any, valid ground for denying compensation to respondent Abitria on the
facts as found. Considering how great and pressing the laborer's need for the compensation due him was and the consequent
temptation to settle for less if in the meanwhile, the money he had the right to expect, was not forthcoming, petitioner, as the
employer liable, had everything to gain and nothing to lose by such a turn of events. Even if it were an honest mistake, the
consequences were still deplorable.
It is quite revealing that in not one of the pleadings filed by petitioner did it ever indicate how it could validly avoid its liability under
the Workmen's Compensation Commission which disclosed that the ailment suffered by respondent Abitria while in its employment
was indeed compensable. Neither in its memorandum submitted on October 19, 1967 nor rejoinder of November 21, 1967, did it ever
occur to petitioner to allege that if given the opportunity for hearing it could interpose a plausible, not to say a valid defense. It did
not do so because it could not do so. Our decisions as to the undeniable liability of an employer similarly situated are impressive for
their number and unanimity.13
It would thus be grimly ironic if the due process concept, in itself an assurance and a guaranty of justice and fairness, would be the
very vehicle to visit on a hapless and impoverished litigant injustice and unfairness. The law itself would stand in disrepute, if such a
gross perversion of its dictates were allowed. Any other view is unthinkable. Otherwise, there would be a stultification of all our efforts
to promote social justice14 and a mockery of the constitutional ideal of protection to labor.15
Considering the above, it is not enough that petitioner be required to pay forthwith the sum due respondent Abitria. The unseemly
conduct, under the above circumstances disclosed, of petitioner's counsel, Attorney Manuel A. Corpuz calls for words of reproof.
It is one thing to exert to the utmost one's ability to protect the interest of one's client. It is quite another thing, and this is to put it at
its mildest, to take advantage of any unforeseen turn of events, if not to create one, to delay if not to defeat the recovery of what is
justly due and demandable, especially so, when as in this case, the obligee is a necessitous and poverty-stricken man suffering from
a dreaded disease, that unfortunately afflicts so many of our countrymen and even more unfortunately requires an outlay far beyond
the means of our poverty stricken masses.
The ancient and learned profession of the law stresses fairness and honor; that must ever be kept in mind by everyone who is
enrolled in its ranks and who expects to remain a member in good standing. This Tribunal is rightfully entrusted with the serious
responsibility of seeing to it that no deviation from such a norm should be countenanced. If what occurred here would not be
characterized for the shocking thing it was, then it could be said that the law is less than fair and far from honorable. What happens
then to the ideal that only he is fit to belong to such a profession who remains a faithful votary at the altar of justice? Such an ideal
may be difficult to approximate. That is true, but let it not be said that when such a notorious breach of its lofty standard took place,
as unfortunately it did in this case, this Court exhibited magnificent unconcern.
WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction is denied. With treble costs against petitioner to be
paid by his counsel, Attorney Manuel A. Corpuz.

A.C. No. 7062

September 26, 2006
[Formerly CBD Case No. 04-1355]
RENERIO SAMBAJON, RONALD SAMBAJON, CRISANTO CONOS, and FREDILYN BACULBAS,complainants,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE A. SUING, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Complainants, via a complaint1 filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), have sought the disbarment of Atty. Jose A.
Suing (respondent) on the grounds of deceit, malpractice, violation of Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. 2
Herein complainants were among the complainants in NLRC Case No. 00-0403180-98, "Microplast, Inc. Workers Union, Represented
by its Union President Zoilo Ardan, et al. v. Microplast, Incorporated and/or Johnny Rodil and Manuel Rodil," for Unfair Labor Practice
(ULP) and Illegal Dismissal, while respondent was the counsel for the therein respondents. Said case was consolidated with NLRC Case
No. 00-04-03161-98, "Microplast Incorporated v. Vilma Ardan, et al.," for Illegal Strike.
By Decision of August 29, 2001,3 Labor Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos dismissed the Illegal Strike case, and declared the employerclients of respondent guilty of ULP. Thus, the Labor Arbiter disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint for illegal strike is dismissed for lack of merit.

Respondents Microplast, Inc., Johnny Rodil and Manuel Rodil are hereby declared guilty of Unfair Labor Practice for union
busting and that the dismissal of the nine (9) complainants are declared illegal. All the respondents in NLRC Case No. 00-0403161-98 for illegal dismissal are directed to reinstate all the complainants to their former position with full
backwages from date of dismissal until actual reinstatement computed as follows:

3. CRISANTO CONOS

Backwages:

Basic Wage:

2/21/98 10/30/99 = 20.30 mos.

P198.00 x 26 days x 20.30

P104, 504.40

10/31/99 - 10/31/00 = 12 mos.

P223.50 x 26 days x 12

69, 732.00

11/01/00 - 8/30/01 = 10 mos.

P250.00 x 26 days x 10

65,000.00

P239,236.40

13th Month Pay:

1/12 of P239,236.40

19,936.36

SILP

2/16/98 - 12/31/98 = 10.33 mos.

P198.00 x 5 days x 10.33/ 12

852.22

1/1/99 - 12/31/99 = 12mos.

P223.50 x 5 days x 12/12

1,117.50

1/1/00 - 10/30/01 = 20 mos.

P250.00 x 5 days x 20/12

2,083.33

4,053.05

P263,225.81

xxxx

7. RONALD SAMBAJON
(same as Conos)

263,225.81

8.FREDELYN BACULBAS
(same as Conos)

263,225.81

9. RENEIRO SAMBAJON
(same as Conos)

263,225.81

Total Backwages

P2,370,674.38

Respondents are jointly and severally liable to pay the above-mentioned backwages including the various monetary claims
stated in the Manifestation dated August 24, 1998 except payment of overtime pay and to pay 10% attorney's fees of all
sums owing to complainants.4 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Decision having become final and executory, the Labor Arbiter issued on September 2, 2003 a Writ of Execution. 5
In the meantime, on the basis of individual Release Waiver and Quitclaims dated February 27, 2004 purportedly signed and sworn to
by seven of the complainants in the ULP and Illegal Dismissal case before Labor Arbiter Santos in the presence of respondent, the
Labor Arbiter dismissed said case insofar as the seven complainants were concerned, by Order dated March 9, 2004. 6
Herein complainants, four of the seven who purportedly executed the Release Waiver and Quitclaims, denied having signed and
sworn to before the Labor Arbiter the said documents or having received the considerations therefor. Hence, spawned the
administrative complaint at bar, alleging that respondent, acting in collusion with his clients Johnny and Manuel Rodil, "frustrated" the
implementation of the Writ of Execution by presenting before the Labor Arbiter the spurious documents.
In a related move, complainants also filed a criminal complaint for Falsification against respondent, together with his clients Johnny
and Manuel Rodil, before the Prosecutor's Office of Quezon City where it was docketed as I.S. No. 04-5203. 7
In his Report and Recommendation8 dated September 27, 2005, IBP Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag, who conducted an
investigation of the administrative complaint at bar, recommended that respondent be faulted for negligence and that he be
reprimanded therefor with warning, in light of his following discussion:
The issue to be resolved is whether or not respondent can be disbarred for his alleged manipulation of four alleged RELEASE
WAIVER AND QUITCLAIM by herein complainants who subsequently disclaimed the same as bogus and falsified.
A lawyer takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar. By doing so he thereby becomes an Officer of the Court on whose
shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper, fair, speedy and efficient administration of
justice.
Mindful of the fact that the present proceedings involve, on the one hand, the right of a litigant to seek redress against a
member of the Bar who has, allegedly caused him damaged, either through malice or negligence, while in the performance
of his duties as his counsel, and, on the other, the right of that member of the Bar to protect and preserve his good name
and reputation, we have again gone over and considered [the] aspects of the case.
All the cases protesting and contesting the genuineness, veracity and due execution of the questioned RELEASE WAIVER
AND QUITCLAIM namely: Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Recall, Appeal and Falsification are PENDING resolution in their respective
venues. Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos, who was supposed to know the identities of the herein complainants is not impleaded
by the complainants when it was his solemn duty and obligation to ascertain true and real identities of person executing
Release Waiver with Quitclaim.
The old adage that in the performance of an official duty there is that presumption of regularity unless proven otherwise,
such was proven in the January 28, 2005 clarificatory questioning . . . :
xxxx
. . . In the case at bar, the question of whether or not respondent actually committed the despicable act would seem to be
fairly debatable under the circumstances.9 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Board of Governors of the IBP, by Resolution No. XVII-2005-226, approved and adopted the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner Hababag.
After the records of the case were forwarded to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), the Director for Bar Discipline of the
IBP10 transmitted additional records including a Motion to Amend the Resolution No. XVII-2005-22611 filed by respondent.
One of the complainants, Renerio Sambajon (Sambajon), by Petition 12 filed before the OBC, assailed the IBP Board Resolution. The
Petition was filed three days after the 15-day period to assail the IBP Resolution. Sambajon explains that while his counsel received
the Resolution on February 27, 2006, he only learned of it when he visited on March 16, 2006 his counsel who could not reach him, he
(Sambajon) having transferred from one residence to another.
Giving Sambajon the benefit of the doubt behind the reason for the 3-day delay in filing the present petition, in the interest of justice,
this Court gives his petition due course.
In respondent's Motion to Amend the IBP Board Resolution, he does not deny that those whom he met face to face before
Commissioner Hababag were not the same persons whom he saw before Labor Arbiter Santos on February 27, 2004. 13 He hastens to
add though that he was not familiar with the complainants as they were not attending the hearings before Arbiter
Santos.14 Complainants15 and their former counsel Atty. Rodolfo Capocyan16 claim otherwise, however. And the Minutes17 of the
proceedings before the National Conciliation Mediation Board in a related case, NCMB-NCR-NS-02-081-98, "Re: Microplast, Inc., Labor
Dispute," which minutes bear respondent's and complainants' signatures, belie respondent's claim that he had not met complainants
before.
Respondent, who declared that he went to the Office of the Labor Arbiter on February 27, 2004 on the request of his clients who "told
him that on February 27, 2004 the seven claimants w[ould] be at the office of Arbiter Santos [to] submit their respective quitclaims
and waivers," heaps on the Labor Arbiter the responsibility of ascertaining the identity of the parties who executed the Release
Waiver and Quitclaims. But respondent himself had the same responsibility. He was under obligation to protect his clients' interest,
especially given the amount allegedly given by them in consideration of the execution of the documents. His answers to the
clarificatory questions of Commissioner Hababag do not, however, show that he discharged such obligation.
COMM. HABABAG:
But is it not a fact [that it is] also your duty to ask.. that the money of your client would go to the deserving
employee?
ATTY. SUING:
I did not do that anymore, Your Honor, because there was already as you call it before a precedentin February of
1998 when my client directly made settlement to the nine or eight of the seventeen original complainants, Your
Honor, and I did not participate. Hindi po ako nakialam don sa kanilang usapan because it is my belief that the best
way, Your Honor, to have a dispute settled between the parties is that we let them do the discussion, we'll let them
do the settlement because sometimes you know, Your Honor, sad to say, when lawyers are involved in a matters
[sic] of settlement the dispute does not terminate as in this case, Your Honor.
xxxx
COMM. HABABAG:
Yes. What made you appear on said date and time before Arbiter Santos?
ATTY. SUING:
I was called by my client to go to the office of Arbiter Santos, number one, to witness the signing of the
documents of Quitclaim and Waiver; number 2, so that according to them someone as a lawyer will represent them
in that proceedings.
COMM. HABABAG:
My query, did it not surprise you that no money was given to you and yet there would be a signing of Quitclaim
Receipt and Release?
ATTY. SUING:
I am not, your Honor, because it happened before and there were no complaints, Your Honor.
COMM. HABABAG:

Just because it happened before you did not bother to see to it that there is a voucher so you just rely on your
precedent, is that what you mean?
ATTY. SUING:
Yes, Your Honor, because I always believe that the parties who are talking and it is my client who knows them better
than I do, Your Honor.
COMM. HABABAG:
So, you just followed the instruction of your client to be present at Arbiter Cadiente Santos office because there
would be signing of Quitclaim Receipt and Release, it that clear?
ATTY. SUING:
Yes, Your Honor.
COMM. HABABAG:
[You] [d]id not bother to ask your client where is the money intended for the payment of these
workers?
ATTY. SUING:
I did not ask.
COMM. HABABAG:
You did not asked [sic] your client who will prepare the documents?
ATTY. SUING:
As far as the documents are concerned, Your Honor.
COMM. HABABAG:
The Quitclaim Receipt and Release?
ATTY. SUING:
Yes, Your Honor, I remember this. They asked me before February of 1998.
COMM. HABABAG:
When you say they whom are you referring to?
ATTY. SUING:
I'm referring to my client, Your Honor.
COMM. HABABAG:
They asked me attorney can you please prepare us a document of Quitclaim and Waiver or give us a simple [sic] of
Quitclaim and Waiver. I do recall that I made one but this document, Your Honor, is only a single document where all
the signatories named are present because my purpose there really, Your Honor, is that so that each of them will be
there together and they will identify themselves, see each other para ho siguradong sila-sila yong magkakasama at
magkakakilanlan. x x x x And when the signing took place in February of 2004 it was made for any [ sic] individual,
Your Honor, no longer the document that I prepared when all of the seven will be signing in one
document.
COMM. HABABAG:
Okay. You did not inquire from your client whom [sic] made the changes?

ATTY. SUING:
I did not anymore because, Your Honor, at the time when I was there, there are already people there, the seven
complainants plus another woman.18 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
xxxx
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.
To be sure, respondent's client Manuel Rodil did not request him to go to the Office of Labor Arbiter Cadiente to be a mere passive
witness to the signing of the Release Waiver and Quitclaims. That he was requested to go there could only mean that he would exert
vigilance to protect his clients' interest. This he conceded when he acknowledged the purpose of his presence at the Office of Labor
Arbiter Santos, thus:
ATTY. SUING:
To go there, Your Honor, and represent them and see that these document[s] are properly signed and that these
people are properly identified and verified them in front of Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos.19 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
That there was an alleged precedent in 1998 when a group of complainants entered into a compromise agreement with his clients in
which he "did not participate" and from which no problem arose did not excuse him from carrying out the admitted purpose of going
to the Labor Arbiter's office "that [the complainants] are properly identified . . . in front of [the] Arbiter."
Besides, by respondent's own information, Labor Arbiter Santos was entertaining doubts on the true identity of those who executed
the Release Waiver and Quitclaims.20 That should have alerted him to especially exercise the diligence of a lawyer to protect his
clients' interest. But he was not and he did not.
Diligence is "the attention and care required of a person in a given situation and is the opposite of negligence." A lawyer
serves his client with diligence by adopting that norm of practice expected of men of good intentions. He thus owes entire
devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the defense and maintenance of his rights, and the exertion of his utmost
learning, skill, and ability to ensure that nothing shall be taken or withheld from him, save by the rules of law legally applied.
It is axiomatic in the practice of law that the price of success is eternal diligence to the cause of the client.
The practice of law does not require extraordinary diligence (exactissima diligentia) or that "extreme measure of care and
caution which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection use for securing and preserving their rights. All that is
required is ordinary diligence (diligentia) or that degree of vigilance expected of a bonus pater familias. x x x21 (Italics in the
original; underscoring supplied)
And this Court notes the attempt of respondent to influence the answers of his client Manuel Rodil when the latter testified before
Commissioner Manuel Hababag:
COMM. HABABAG:
May pinirmahan dito na Quitclaim Receipt and Release. Ito ho ba sinong may gawa nitong Receipt Waiver and
Quitclaim?
MR. RODIL:
Sila po.
COMM. HABABAG:
Ibig mong sabihin ibinigay sa yo to ng complainant o sinong nag-abot sa iyo nitong Receipt Waiver and Quitclaim?
MR. RODIL:
Si Atty. Suing po.

ATTY. SUING:
In fact, ang tanong sa iyo kung ibinigay daw sa iyo yong mga dokumentong ito or what?
COMM. HABABAG:
Okay, uulitin ko ha, tagalog na ang tanong ko sa iyo ha hindi na English. Ito bang Release Waiver and Quitclaim sino
ang may gawa nito, sino ang nagmakinilya nito?
MR. RODIL:
Kami yata ang gumawa niyan.
COMM. HABABAG:
Pag sinabi mong kami yata ang may gawa sino sa inyong mga officer, tauhan o abogado ang gumawa nito?
MR. RODIL:
Matagal na ho yan eh.
xxxx
COMM. HABABAG:
Okay. Pangalawang gusto kong itanong. Sino ang naghatid nito kay Ariel Cadiente Santos para pirmahan ni Ariel
Cadiente Santos?
MR. RODIL:
Si attorney po.
ATTY. SUING:
Wait. I did not bring the documents. The Commissioner is asking kung sino ang nagdala ng mga dokumento?
MR. RODIL:
Yong mga tao.
xxxx
COMM. HABABAG:
Simple ang tanong ko ha. Intindihin mo muna. Kanino mo inabot ang bayad sa nakalagay dito sa Release waiver
and Quitclaim?
MR. RODIL:
Kay attorney po.
COMM. HABABAG:
Pag sinabi mong kay attorney sinong tinutukoy mong attorney?
ATTY. SUING:
Yong ibinigay na pera pambayad saan, yon ang tanong.
COMM. HABABAG:
Sundan mo ang tanong ko ha. Ako ang nagtatanong hindi ang abogado mo.

MR. RODIL:
Opo.
COMM. HABABAG:
Huwag kang tatawa. I'm reminding you serious tayo dito.
MR. RODIL:
Opo serious po.
COMM. HABABAG:
Sabi mo may inabutan kang taong pera?
MR. RODIL:
Opo.
COMM. HABABAG:
Ang sagot mo kay attorney. Sinong attorney ang tinutukoy mo?
MR. RODIL:
Atty. Suing po.
COMM. HABABAG:
Okay.
ATTY. SUING:
Your Honor,
COMM. HABABAG:
Pabayaan mo muna. I'll come to that. Magkano kung iyong natatandaan ang perang inabot kay Atty. Suing?
MR. RODIL:
Yan ang hindi ko matandaan.
x x x x22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, not only did respondent try to coach his client or influence him to answer questions in an apparent attempt not to incriminate
him (respondent). His client contradicted respondent's claim that the Release Waiver and Quitclaim which he (respondent) prepared
was not the one presented at the Arbiter's Office, as well as his implied claim that he was not involved in releasing to the
complainants the money for and in consideration of the execution of the documents.
As an officer of the court, a lawyer is called upon to assist in the administration of justice. He is an instrument to advance its cause.
Any act on his part that tends to obstruct, perverts or impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct. 23 While the
Commission on Bar Discipline is not a court, the proceedings therein are nonetheless part of a judicial proceeding, a disciplinary
action being in reality an investigation by the Court into the misconduct of its officers or an examination into his character. 24
In Bantolo v. Castillon, Jr.25 the respondent lawyer was found guilty of gross misconduct for his attempts to delay and obstruct the
investigation being conducted by the IBP. Nonetheless, this Court found that a suspension of one month from the practice of law was
enough to give him "the opportunity to retrace his steps back to the virtuous path of the legal profession."
While the disbarment of respondent is, under the facts and circumstances attendant to the case, not reasonable, neither is reprimand
as recommended by the IBP. This Court finds that respondent's suspension from the practice of law for six months is in order.

WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Jose A. Suing, is found GUILTY of negligence and gross misconduct and isSUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of Six (6) Months, with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts
throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6289

December 16, 2004

JULIAN MALONSO, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. PETE PRINCIPE, respondent.

TINGA, J.:
The duty of courts is not alone to see that lawyers act in a proper and lawful manner; it is also their duty to see that lawyers are paid
their just and lawful fees. Certainly, no one, not even the Court can deny them that right; there is no law that authorizes them to do
so.1
In a Complaint2 for disbarment dated 6 June 2001 filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Julian Malonso claimed that
Atty. Pete Principe, without any authority entered his appearance as Malonsos counsel in the expropriation proceedings initiated by
the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR). In addition, he complained that Atty. Principe, after illegally representing him in the said
case, claimed forty (40%) of the selling price of his land to the NAPOCOR by way of attorneys fees and, further, in a Motion to
Intervene, claimed to be a co-owner of Malonsos property. 3
In his Answer,4 respondent replied that the services of his law office, Principe Villano Villacorta and Clemente Law Offices, was
engaged by Samahan ng mga Dadaanan at Maapektuhan ng NAPOCOR, Inc. (SANDAMA), through its President, Danilo Elfa, as
embodied in the Contract of Legal Services executed on 01 April 1997.5 The Contract states in part:
The parties mutually agree one with the other as follows:
I. SECOND PARTY engages the services of the FIRST PARTY as their lawyer of the collection, claim, and/ or payment of just
compensation of its members with the NAPOCOR;
II. FIRST PARTY accepts the engagement; both parties further agree on the following conditions:

A. Scope of Work - negotiation, legal documentation, attendance to court proceedings and other related activities;
B. Payment of Fees is on contingent basis. No acceptance fees, appearance and liaison fees;
C. The legal fees or payment to FIRST PARTY:
1. Forty (40%) Percent of the selling price between NAPOCOR and the SANDAMA members; this forty (40%)
[percent] is the maximum rate and may be negotiated depending on the volume of work involved;
2. Legal Fees as stated above shall cover:
i.) Attorneys Fees of FIRST PARTY;
ii.) His representation expenses and commitment expenses;
iii.) Miscellaneous Expenses, etc.
D. Both parties agree to exert their best efforts to increase or secure the best price from NAPOCOR.
Respondent claimed that complainant Malonso is a member of SANDAMA and that said member executed a special power of
attorney6 in favor of Elfa, which served as the latters authority to act in behalf of Malonso. In the document, Malonso authorized Elfa
in the following manner:
Ako, si JULIAN M. MALONSO, nasa hustong gulang, may asawa, Pilipino at naninirahan sa 92 New York St. Cubao, Q.C., sa
pamamagitan nito ay ITINATALAGA at BINIBIGYANG KAPANGYARIHAN si G. DANILO V. ELFA, nasa hustong gulang, may asawa,
Pilipino at naninirahan sa 038 Dulong Bayan, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, upang gumanap at umakda para sa akin/amin
upang gumawa tulad ng mga sumusunod:
1. PANGASIWAAN, ISAAYOS at MAKIPAGKASUNDO (negotiate) para sa pagbebenta ng akin/aming lupa, sa National
Power Corp. (NAPOCOR), na may Titulo Bilang T-229122, na nasasakupan ng Dulong Bayan, San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan;
2. TUMAYONG KINATAWAN O REPRESENTANTE ko/naming saan man at ano man maging sa hukuman o alin man sa
mga opisinang may kinalaman hinggil sa aming nabanggit na pagbebenta ng akin/aming lupa;
3. TUMANGGAP AT MAGSUMITE ng mga papeles na nauukol sa lupang nabanggit sa Bilang 1;
4. GUMANAP ng ano man sa inaakala ni G. DANILO V. ELFA na nararapat, matuwid at makabubuti para sa nabanggit
sa Bilang 1;
5. NA sa pamamagitan ng kasunduan at kapasyahang ito ay binibigyan ng karapatan at kapangyarihang lumagda
sa lahat ng papeles/dokumento si G. Danilo V. Elfa, ngunit sa isang pasubali na HINDI KAILAN MAN SIYA DAPAT AT
WALA SIYANG KARAPATANG LUMAGDA S GANAP NA BENTAHAN (ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE).
DITOY AKING IGINAGAWAD sa naturan naming kinatawan ang lahat ng karapatang kumilos at magsagawa upang
isakatuparan ang kapangyarihang magbili sa bisa ng karapatang dito ay iginagawad sa kanya nang kahalintulad nang kung
kami, sa ganang aming sarili ang mismong nagsasagawa, at ditoy AMING PINAGTITIBAY ang lahat ng kanyang gawin na
nasa aming naman ang lubos na karapatang siya ay palitan o bawiin ang Gawad na Karapatang ito.
In his Reply,7 Malonso reiterated that he did not authorize Elfa to act in his behalf, considering that while theContract of Legal
Services entered into by Atty. Principe and Elfa was dated 01 April 1997, the special power of attorney he executed bore a much later
date, 27 November 1997. Moreover, he could not have authorized Elfa to hire a lawyer in his behalf since he already had his own
lawyer in the person of Atty. Benjamin Mendoza.
To counter this argument, Atty. Principe commented that the agreement entered into by SANDAMA and his law firm is a continuing
one and hence, Malonso was within the coverage of the contract even if he executed the special power of attorney on a later date.
Likewise, as a member of SANDAMA, Malonso is bound to honor the organizations commitments. 8
The Court adopts the chronological order of events as found by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, Julio C. Elamparo:
In the early part of 1997, National Power Corp. (NPC for brevity) instituted expropriation proceedings against several lot
owners in Bulacan including the complainant in this case.
On April 1, 1997, a "Contract of Legal Services" was entered into between the law firm "Principe Villano and Clemente Law
Offices" and SANDAMA, Inc. (Samahan ng mga Dadaanan at Maapektuhan ng National Power Corporation) represented by its

President Danilo V. Elfa. SANDAMA is the organization of lot owners affected by the expropriation proceedings. Complainant
is a member of this organization.
On November 27, 1997, complainant executed a "Kasulatan ng Pagbibigay Kapangyarihan" in favor of Danilo Elfa appointing
the latter as the attorney-in-fact of the complainant on the matter of negotiation with the NPC.
On December 21, 1999, NPCs Board of Directors approved the amicable settlement of the expropriation cases by paying all
the lot owners the total of One Hundred Three Million Four Hundred Thirteen Thousand Two Hundred
Pesos (P103,413,200.00).
More that two (2) years after the expropriation cases were instituted and while complainant was represented therein by Atty.
Benjamin Mendoza, or on January 18, 2000, respondent filed an "Ex-Parte Motion to Separate Legal Fees From Selling Price
Between Plaintiffs and Defendants."
About ten days after respondent filed his motion to separate legal fees, respondent filed his "Notice of Entry of Appearance"
(dated January 28, 2000) claiming that respondent is the legal counsel of the complainant, a defendant in said case.
On February 12, 2000, Sixty Nine (69) lot owners including the complainant wrote a letter to NPC informing the latter that
they have never authorized Mr. Danilo Elfa to hire the services of the respondents law firm to represent them in the
expropriation cases.
On February 17, 2000, complainant filed an "Opposition" to respondents entry of appearance and motion to separate legal
fees.
On March 7, 2000, respondent filed a "Notice of Attorneys Lien" claiming 40% of the selling price of the properties being
expropriated by NPC.
On April 10, 2000, respondent filed a "Notice of Adverse Claim" before the Register of Deeds of Bulacan claiming 40% of the
rights, title and interest of the lot owners over their lots being expropriated including that of complainant.
On November 20, 2000, respondent herein filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene in the expropriation case claiming to be a
co-owner of the property being expropriated.
On February 26, 2001, respondent filed an Opposition to the Compromise Agreement submitted by the lot owners and NPC
for court approval.
Because of the actions taken by the respondent, the execution of the decision approving the compromise agreement
between the lot owners and the NPC was delayed. 9
The Report found that the Contract of Legal Services is between SANDAMA, a corporate being, and respondents law firm. SANDAMA
is not a party in all of the expropriation proceedings instituted by NAPOCOR, neither does it claim co-ownership of the properties
being expropriated. Furthermore, the power of attorney was executed by Malonso in favor of Elfa and not SANDAMA, and that said
power of attorney was executed after SANDAMA entered into the Contract of Legal Services. Thus, the Report concluded that the right
of co-ownership could not be derived from the said documents. 10
Likewise, the Report noted that the right of legal representation could not be derived from the above-mentioned documents. A
contract for legal services between a lawyer and his client is personal in nature and cannot be performed through intermediaries.
Even Elfa, the attorney-in-fact of Malonso, was never authorized to engage legal counsels to represent the former in the expropriation
proceedings. Moreover, SANDAMA is not a party litigant in the expropriation proceedings and thus Atty. Principe has no basis to
interfere in the court proceeding involving its members.
The Investigating Commissioner concluded that from the evidence presented by both parties, Atty. Principe was guilty of
misrepresentation. Atty. Principe was found to have violated Canon 3, Rule 3.01, Canon 10, Rule 10.01 and Rule 12.04. 11 In
representing himself as Malonsos and the other lot owners legal counsel in the face of the latters opposition, Atty. Principe was
found to be guilty of gross or serious misconduct. Likewise, his act of falsely claiming to be the co-owner of properties being
expropriated and his filing of several actions to frustrate the implementation of the decision approving the compromise agreement
make his conduct constitutive of malpractice. The Report recommended the penalty of two (2) years suspension from the practice of
law. 12
In its Resolution13 dated 25 October 2003, the IBP Board of Governors ordained:
RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2003-241
CBD Case No. 01-848
Julian Malonso v. Atty. Pete Principe
RESOLVED to ADOPT AND APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with

modification, and considering respondents violation of Rule 3.01 of Canon 3, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 and Rule 12.04 of
Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Pedro Principe is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
one (1) year.
In his Appeal Memorandum,14 respondent claims that the Resolution No. XVI-2003-241 has no factual and legal basis, the complaint
having been motivated by pure selfishness and greed, and the Resolution itself invalid for having failed to comply with Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court.15 According to the respondent, the Investigating Commissioner continued to investigate the instant case despite
the lapse of three months provided under Section 8 of Rule 139-B, without any extension granted by the Supreme Court. 16 Moreover,
in the subsequent review made by the IBP Board of Governors, no actual voting took place but a mere consensus, and the required
number of votes provided by the Rules was not secured considering that there were only five (5) governors present. 17 Respondent
opines that the actions of the IBP Board were aimed at preventing him from pursuing his known intention to run for IBP National
President.18
We find for the respondent.
It is the duty of the Supreme Court to see to it that a lawyer accounts for his behavior towards the court, his client, his peers in the
profession and the public. However, the duty of the Court is not limited to disciplining those guilty of misconduct, but also to
protecting the reputation of those wrongfully charged, much more, those wrongfully found guilty.
On the other hand, the IBP is aimed towards the elevation of the standards of the law profession, the improvement of the
administration of justice, and the enabling of the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively. 19 Despite its duty to police
the ranks, the IBP is not exempt from the duty to "promote respect for the law and legal processes" and "to abstain from activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system." 20 Respect for law is gravely eroded when lawyers
themselves, who are supposed to be minions of the law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules
formulated for their observance.21 For the very same reasons, the Court cannot accept the explanation 22 of Atty. Carlos L. Valdez, Jr. on
the non-holding of a formal voting for respondents case that:
Eventually, the Board reached a consensus to reduce the recommended penalty from two years to one year suspension.
Since there was already a consensus, the Board did not hold a formal voting. A formal voting became unnecessary inasmuch
as it was obvious that the decision of the Board became unanimous.
I assure the Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court that due process was observed and the Rules governing the
Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys were faithfully observed and complied with by the IBP Board of Governors.
The procedures outlined by the Rules are meant to ensure that the innocents are spared from the wrongful condemnation and that
only the guilty are meted out their just due. These rules cannot be taken lightly. 23
This Court underscores the procedural transgression incurred by the IBP Board when it issued Resolution No. XVI-2003-241 which was
reached through a mere consensus, and not through a formal voting, with the required number of votes not secured. As to the issue
of the protracted investigation without the requisite permission from the Supreme Court to extend the investigation period, we agree
with respondent that no such request was made to this Court.
The pertinent provisions of Rule 139-B read:
Sec. 8. Investigation. Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of the respondent to answer, the Investigator shall, with
deliberate speed, proceed with the investigation of the case. He shall have the power to issue subpoenas and administer
oaths. The respondent shall be given full opportunity to defend himself, to present witnesses on his behalf, and be heard by
himself and counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice, the respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex
parte.
The Investigator shall terminate the investigation within three (3) months from the date of its commencement, unless
extended for good cause by the Board of Governors upon prior application.
...
Sec. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. (a)
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should be suspended from
the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together
with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.
Relevantly, Sec. 6, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court provides in part:
Sec. 6. Board of Governors. the Integrated Bar shall be governed by a Board of Governors. Nine Governors shall be elected
by the House of Delegates from the nine Regions on the representation basis of one Governor from each Region.

The Board shall meet regularly once every three months, on such date and at such time and place as it shall designate. A
majority of all the members of the Board shall constitute a quorum to do business.
From these provisions, it is clear that before a lawyer may be suspended from the practice of law by the IBP, there should be (1) a
review of the investigators report; (2) a formal voting; and (3) a vote of at least five (5) members of the Board. The rationale for this
rule is simple: a decision reached by the Board in compliance with the procedure is the official decision of the Board as a body and
not merely as the collective view of the individual members thereof. This is in keeping with the very nature of a collegial body which
arrives at its decisions only after deliberation, the exchange of views and ideas, and the concurrence of the required majority
vote.24 Thus, the vote of the majority would be necessary for the validity of the Boards resolution. Without a vote having been taken,
Resolution No. XVI-2003-241 (CBD Case No. 01-848) is void and has no effect.
The Court views with disapproval the fashion by which the IBP Board of Governors, with a fellow lawyer and fellow governors
reputation and good name at stake, cavalierly brushed aside the procedural rules outlined no less by this Court for the discipline and
protection of its members. The IBP, more than anyone, knows that the success of a lawyer in his profession depends almost entirely
on his reputation. Anything, which will harm his good name, is to be deplored. 25 And yet the IBP Board of Governors, despite clear
evidence to the contrary, and without any remorse, even asserted that "due process was observed and the Rules governing the
Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys were faithfully observed and complied."
Normally, non-compliance with the procedural rules would result in the remand of the case. 26 However, on many occasions, the Court,
in the public interest and the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of remanding them for
further proceedings, such as where the ends of justice would not be subserved by the remand of the case, or when public interest
demands an early disposition of the case, or where the trial court had already received all the evidence of the parties. 27 In view of the
delay in resolving the instant complaint against the respondent, and in the interest of justice and speedy disposition of cases, the
Court opts to resolve the same based on the records before it. 28
Before delving at length on the merits of the other aspect of the present proceedings, there is need to dwell first on a dimension of
expropriation proceedings which is uniquely its own.
There are two stages in every action for expropriation. The first is concerned with the determination by the courts of the authority of
the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit.
The second phase is concerned with the determination by the court, with the assistance of commissioners, of the just compensation
for the property sought to be taken which relates to the valuation thereof. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the
evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final and would dispose of the second stage of the suit, leaving nothing
more to be done by the Court regarding the issue.29 During this stage, the main bone of contention is the valuation of the property
concerned.
The second stage which involves the issue of just compensation is as important, if not more, than the first stage which refers to the
issue of "public purpose." But as it frequently happens, as in this case, the public purpose dimension is not as fiercely contested.
Moreover, in their quest to secure what they believe to be the fair compensation of their property, the owners seek inroads to the
leverages of executive power where compensation compromises are commenced and given imprimatur. In this dimension, the
services of lawyers different from the ordinary litigator may prove to be handy or even necessary. Negotiations are mostly out of court
and relies, for most part, on the sagacity, persuasion, patience, persistence and resourcefulness of the negotiator.
In the instant case, the trial court had already ruled on the valuation of the properties subject of the expropriation, the same order
which is subject of the appeal filed by the NAPOCOR. Aware that it might take a long time before the said appeal is finally resolved,
and in view of the delay in the adjudication of the case, the landowners and NAPOCOR negotiated for a compromise agreement. To
assist them, the landowners, through SANDAMA and its president, Danilo Elfa, engaged the services of a lawyer in the person of
respondent. It is clear that respondent was hired precisely for the negotiation phase of the case.
Now, on to the merits.
As a legal entity, a corporation has a personality distinct and separate from its individual stockholders or members and from that of
its officers who manage and run its affairs.30 The rule is that obligations incurred by the corporation, acting through its directors,
officers and employees, are its sole liabilities. 31 Thus, property belonging to a corporation cannot be attached to satisfy the debt of a
stockholder and vice versa, the latter having only an indirect interest in the assets and business of the former. 32 Thus, as summed by
the IBP investigator, respondent is the lawyer of SANDAMA, but SANDAMA is not a party litigant in all of the expropriation cases; thus
respondent had no basis to interfere in the court proceedings involving the members. But things are not as simple as that.
A review of the records reveals that respondent had grounds to believe that he can intervene and claim from the individual
landowners. For one, the incorporation of the landowners into SANDAMA was made and initiated by respondents firm so as to make
negotiations with NAPOCOR easier and more organized. SANDAMA was a non-stock, non-profit corporation aimed towards the
promotion of the landowners common interest. It presented a unified front which was far easier to manage and represent than the
individual owners. In effect, respondent still dealt with the members, albeit in a collective manner.
Second, respondent relied on the representation of Danilo Elfa, former SANDAMA president and attorney-in-fact of the members, with
whom he entered into a contract for legal services. Respondent could not have doubted the authority of Elfa to contract his firms
services. After all, Elfa was armed with a Board Resolution from SANDAMA, and more importantly, individual grants of authority from
the SANDAMA members, including Malonso.
Third, the contract for legal services clearly indicated a contingent fee of forty percent (40%) of the selling price of the lands to be
expropriated, the same amount which was reflected in the deed of assignment made by the individual members of SANDAMA.

Respondent could have easily and naturally assumed that the same figure assigned to SANDAMA was the same amount earmarked
for its legal services as indicated in their service contract. Being a non-stock, non-profit corporation, where else would SANDAMA get
the funds to pay for the legal fees due to respondent and his firm but from the contribution of its members.
Lastly, respondents legal services were disengaged by SANDAMAs new President Yolanda Bautista around the same time when the
SANDAMA members abandoned and disauthorized former SANDAMA president Elfa, just when the negotiations bore fruit. With all
these circumstances, respondent, rightly or wrongly, perceived that he was also about to be deprived of his lawful compensation for
the services he and his firm rendered to SANDAMA and its members. With the prevailing attitude of the SANDAMA officers and
members, respondent saw the immediate need to protect his interests in the individual properties of the landowners. The hairline
distinction between SANDAMA and its individual members interests and properties, flowing as it does from a legal fiction which has
evolved as a mechanism to promote business intercourse but not as an instrument of injustice, is simply too tenuous, impractical and
even unfair in view of the circumstances.
Thus, the Court cannot hold respondent guilty of censurable conduct or practice justifying the penalty recommended. While filing the
claim for attorneys fees against the individual members may not be the proper remedy for respondent, the Court believes that he
instituted the same out of his honest belief that it was the best way to protect his interests. After all, SANDAMA procured his firms
services and was led to believe that he would be paid for the same. There is evidence which tend to show that respondent and his
firm rendered legal and even extra-legal services in order to assist the landowners get a favorable valuation of their properties. They
facilitated the incorporation of the landowners to expedite the negotiations between the owners, the appraisers, and NAPOCOR. They
sought the assistance of several political personalities to get some leverage in their bargaining with NAPOCOR. Suddenly, just after
concluding the compromise price with NAPOCOR and before the presentation of the compromise agreement for the courts approval,
SANDAMA disengaged the services of respondents law firm.
With the validity of its contract for services and its authority disputed, and having rendered legal service for years without having
received anything in return, and with the prospect of not getting any compensation for all the services it has rendered to SANDAMA
and its members, respondent and his law firm auspiciously moved to protect their interests. They may have been mistaken in the
remedy they sought, but the mistake was made in good faith. Indeed, while the practice of law is not a business venture, a lawyer
nevertheless is entitled to be duly compensated for professional services rendered. 33 It is but natural that he protect his interest, most
especially when his fee is on a contingent basis.34
Respondent was disengaged by SANDAMA after a compromise agreement was entered into by the lot owners and NAPOCOR. 35 Its
motions for separate legal fees as well as for intervention were dismissed by the trial court. Prescinding from the ultimate outcome of
an independent action to recover attorneys fees, the Court does not see any obstacle to respondent filing such action against
SANDAMA or any of its members. Any counsel, worthy of his hire, is entitled to be fully recompensed for his services. 36 Such
independent action may be the proper venue to show entitlement to the attorneys fees he is claiming, and for his client to refute the
same. 37 If respondent could resort to such separate action which obviously is more cumbersome and portends to be more protracted,
there is similarly no rhyme or reason to preclude him from filing mere motions such as the ones he resorted to for the purpose of
providing what he perceives to be his legitimate claim. The bottom line is that respondent is not proscribed from seeking recovery of
attorneys fees for the services he and his firm rendered to SANDAMA and its members. As to whether he would succeed in the quest,
that is another story which obviously does not have to be resolved in this case.
The fact that the contract stipulates a maximum of forty percent (40%) contingent fees does not make the contract illegal or
unacceptable. Contingent fees are not per se prohibited by law. Its validity depends, in large measure, upon the reasonableness of
the amount fixed as contingent fee under the circumstances of the case. 38Nevertheless, when it is shown that a contract for a
contingent fee was obtained by undue influence exercised by the attorney upon his client or by any fraud or imposition, or that the
compensation is clearly excessive, the Court must, and will protect the aggrieved party. 39
WHEREFORE, this case is DISMISSED and considered CLOSED. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines is enjoined to comply with the
procedure outlined in Rule 139-B in all cases involving the disbarment and discipline of attorneys.

G.R. No. 75209 September 30, 1987

NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and THE UNION OF FILIPRO
EMPLOYEES, respondents.
No. 78791 September 30, 1987
KIMBERLY INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION FOR SOLIDARITY, ACTIVISM AND NATIONALISM-OLALIA,petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MANUEL AGUILAR, MA. ESTRELLA ALDAS, CAPT. REY L. LANADA, COL.
VIVENCIO MANAIG and KIMBERLY-CLARK PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents.
RESOLUTION
During the period July 8-10. 1987, respondent in G.R. No. 75029, Union of Filipro Employees, and petitioner in G.R. No. 78791,
Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia intensified the intermittent pickets they had been
conducting since June 17, 1987 in front of the Padre Faura gate of the Supreme Court building. They set up pickets' quarters on the
pavement in front of the Supreme Court building, at times obstructing access to and egress from the Court's premises and offices of
justices, officials and employees. They constructed provisional shelters along the sidewalks, set up a kitchen and littered the place
with food containers and trash in utter disregard of proper hygiene and sanitation. They waved their red streamers and placards with
slogans, and took turns haranguing the court all day long with the use of loud speakers.
These acts were done even after their leaders had been received by Justices Pedro L. Yap and Marcelo B. Fernan as Chairmen of the
Divisions where their cases are pending, and Atty. Jose C. Espinas, counsel of the Union of Filipro Employees, had been called in order
that the pickets might be informed that the demonstration must cease immediately for the same constitutes direct contempt of court
and that the Court would not entertain their petitions for as long as the pickets were maintained. Thus, on July 10, 1987, the Court en
banc issued a resolution giving the said unions the opportunity to withdraw graciously and requiring Messrs. Tony Avelino. Lito
Payabyab, Eugene San Pedro, Dante Escasura, Emil Sayao and Nelson Centeno, union leaders of respondent Union of Filipro
Employees in the Nestle case and their counsel of record, Atty. Jose C. Espinas; and Messrs. Ernesto Facundo, Fausto Gapuz, Jr. and
Antonio Gonzales, union leaders of petitioner Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia in the
Kimberly case to appear before the Court on July 14, 1987 at 10:30 A.M. and then and there to SHOW CAUSE why they should not be
held in contempt of court. Atty. Jose C. Espinas was further required to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be administratively dealt
with.
On the appointed date and time, the above-named individuals appeared before the Court, represented by Atty. Jose C. Espinas, in the
absence of Atty. Potenciano Flores, counsel of record of petitioner in G.R. No. 78791, who was still recuperating from an operation.
Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf of the union leaders concerned, apologized to the Court for the above-described acts, together
with an assurance that they will not be repeated. He likewise manifested to the Court that he had experienced to the picketers why
their actions were wrong and that the cited persons were willing to suffer such penalty as may be warranted under the
circumstances. 1 He, however, prayed for the Court's leniency considering that the picket was actually spearheaded by the leaders of
the "Pagkakaisa ng Mangagawa sa Timog Katagalogan" (PAMANTIK), an unregistered loose alliance of about seventy-five (75) unions
in the Southern Tagalog area, and not by either the Union of Filipro Employees or the Kimberly Independent Labor Union. 2
Atty. Espinas further stated that he had explained to the picketers that any delay in the resolution of their cases is usually for causes
beyond the control of the Court and that the Supreme Court has always remained steadfast in its role as the guardian of the
Constitution.
To confirm for the record that the person cited for contempt fully understood the reason for the citation and that they wig abide by
their promise that said incident will not be repeated, the Court required the respondents to submit a written manifestation to this
effect, which respondents complied with on July 17, 1987.
We accept the apologies offered by the respondents and at this time, forego the imposition of the sanction warranted by the
contemptuous acts described earlier. The liberal stance taken by this Court in these cases as well as in the earlier case
of AHS/PHILIPPINES EMPLOYEES UNION vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al., G.R. No. 73721, March 30, 1987, should
not, however, be considered in any other light than an acknowledgment of the euphoria apparently resulting from the rediscovery of
a long-repressed freedom. The Court will not hesitate in future similar situations to apply the full force of the law and punish for
contempt those who attempt to pressure the Court into acting one way or the other in any case pending before it. Grievances, if any,
must be ventilated through the proper channels, i.e., through appropriate petitions, motions or other pleadings in keeping with the
respect due to the Courts as impartial administrators of justice entitled to "proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly
manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice." 3

The right of petition is conceded to be an inherent right of the citizen under all free governments. However, such right, natural and
inherent though it may be, has never been invoked to shatter the standards of propriety entertained for the conduct of courts. For "it
is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be
immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination
of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies." 4
Moreover, "parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in court by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by
publication or public clamor. Every citizen has a profound personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have
justice administered by the courts, under the protection and forms of law free from outside coercion or interference." 5 The aforecited
acts of the respondents are therefore not only an affront to the dignity of this Court, but equality a violation of the above-stated right
of the adverse parties and the citizenry at large.
We realize that the individuals herein cited who are non-lawyers are not knowledgeable in her intricacies of substantive and adjective
laws. They are not aware that even as the rights of free speech and of assembly are protected by the Constitution, any attempt to
pressure or influence courts of justice through the exercise of either right amounts to an abuse thereof, is no longer within the ambit
of constitutional protection, nor did they realize that any such efforts to influence the course of justice constitutes contempt of
court. 6 The duty and responsibility of advising them, therefore, rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their counsel of
record. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, when his attention was called by this Court, did his best to demonstrate to the pickets the untenability of
their acts and posture. Let this incident therefore serve as a reminder to all members of the legal profession that it is their duty as
officers of the court to properly apprise their clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice, and to labor
leaders of the importance of a continuing educational program for their members.
WHEREFORE, the contempt charges against herein respondents are DISMISSED. Henceforth, no demonstrations or pickets intended to
pressure or influence courts of justice into acting one way or the other on pending cases shall be allowed in the vicinity and/or within
the premises of any and all courts.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6052

December 11, 2003

IN RE: PETITION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA, ON LEGAL AND MORAL GROUNDS, FROM BEING ELECTED IBP
GOVERNOR FOR EASTERN MINDANAO IN THE MAY 31, IBP ELECTIONS
OLIVER OWEN L. GARCIA, EMMANUEL RAVANERA and TONY VELEZ, petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA And IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS, respondents.
DECISION
TlNGA, J.:
This is a Petition1 filed by Attys. Oliver Owen L. Garcia, Emmanuel Ravanera and Tony Velez, mainly seeking the disqualification of
respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera "from being elected Governor of Eastern Mindanao" in the 16th Intergrated Bar of the Philippines
("IBP") Regional Governors elections. Petitioner Garcia is the Vice-President of the Bukidnon IBP Chapter, while petitioners Ravanera
and Velez are the past President and the incumbent President, respectively, of the Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter.
The facts as culled from the pleadings of the parties follow.
The election for the 16th IBP Board of Governors ("IBP Board") was set on April 26, 2003, a month prior to the IBP National Convention
scheduled on May 22-24, 2003. The election was so set in compliance with Section 39, Article VI of the IBP By Laws, which reads:
SECTION 39. Nomination and election of the Governors. At least one month before the national convention, the delegates from each
region shall elect the governor of their region, the choice of which shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in the
region.
Later on, the outgoing IBP Board, in its Resolution2 No. XV-2003-99 dated April 16, 2003, reset the elections to May 31, 2003, or after
the IBP National Convention.
Respondent De Vera, a member of the Board of Directors of the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter in Eastern Mindanao, along with Atty. P.
Angelica Y. Santiago, President of the IBP Rizal Chapter, sent a letter 3 dated 28 March 2003, requesting the IBP Board to reconsider its
Resolution of April 6, 2003. Their Motion was anchored on two grounds viz. (1) adhering to the mandate of Section 39 of the IBP By
Laws to hold the election of Regional Governors at least one month prior to the national convention of the IBP will prevent it from
being politicized since post-convention elections may otherwise lure the candidates into engaging in unacceptable political practices,

and; (2) holding the election on May 31, 2003 will render it impossible for the outgoing IBP Board from resolving protests in the
election for governors not later than May 31, 2003, as expressed in Section 40 of the IBP By Laws, to wit:
SECTION 40. Election contests. - Any nominee desiring to contest an election shall, within two days after the announcement of the
results of the elections, file with the President of the Integrated Bar a written protest setting forth the grounds therefor. Upon receipt
of such petition, the President shall forthwith call a special meeting of the outgoing Board of Governors to consider and hear the
protest, with due notice to the contending parties. The decision of the Board shall be announced not later than the following May 31,
and shall be final and conclusive.
On April 26, 2003, the IBP Board denied the request for reconsideration in its Resolution No. XV-2003-162.4
On May 26, 2003, after the IBP national convention had been adjourned in the afternoon of May 24, 2003, the petitioners filed
a Petition5 dated 23 May 2003 before the IBP Board seeking (1) the postponement of the election for Regional Governors to the
second or third week of June 2003; and (2) the disqualification of respondent De Vera "from being elected Regional Governor for
Eastern Mindanao Region."
The IBP Board denied the Petition in a Resolution issued on May 29, 2003. The pertinent portions of theResolution read:
WHEREAS, two specific reliefs are being sought, to wit, first, the postponement of the elections for regional governors and, second,
the disqualification of Atty. Leonard de Vera.
WHEREAS, anent the first relief sought, the Board finds no compelling justification for the postponement of the elections especially
considering that preparations and notices had already been completed.
WHEREAS, with respect to the disqualifications of Atty. Leonard de Vera, this Board finds the petition to be premature considering that
no nomination has yet been made for the election of IBP regional governor.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Board hereby resolves, as it hereby resolves, to deny the petition. 6
Probably thinking that the IBP Board had not yet acted on their Petition, on the same date, May 29, 2003, the petitioners filed the
present Petition before this Court, seeking the same reliefs as those sought in their Petitionbefore the IBP.
On the following day, May 30, 2003, acting upon the petitioners application, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO),
directing the IBP Board, its agents, representatives or persons acting in their place and stead to cease and desist from proceeding
with the election for the IBP Regional Governor in Eastern Mindanao. 7
Citing the IBP By-Laws, the petitioners expound on the mechanics for the selection of the IBP officers from the Chapter Officers up to
the Regional Governors constituting the IBP Board which is its highest policy-making body, as well as the underlying dynamics, to wit:
IBP Chapter Officers headed by the President are elected for a term of two years. The IBP Chapter Presidents in turn, elect their
respective Regional Governors following the rotation rule. The IBP has nine (9) regions, viz:Northern Luzon, Central Luzon, Greater
Manila, Southern Luzon, Bicolandia, Eastern Visayas, Western Visayas, Eastern Mindanao and Western Mindanao. The governors serve
for a term of two (2) years beginning on the 1st of July of the first year and ending on the 30th of June of the second year.
From the members of the newly constituted IBP Board, an Executive Vice President (EVP) shall be chosen, also on rotation basis. The
rationale for the rotation rule in the election of both the Regional Governors and the Vice President is to give everybody a chance to
serve the IBP, to avoid politicking and to democratize the selection process.
Finally, the National President is not elected. Under the By-Laws, whoever is the incumbent EVP will automatically be the National
President for the following term.
Petitioners elucidate that at present, all the IBP regions, except Eastern Mindanao, have had two (2) National Presidents each.
Following the rotation rule, whoever will be elected Regional Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region in the 16th Regional Governors
elections will automatically become the EVP for the term July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2005. For the next term in turn, i.e., from July 1,
2005 to June 20, 2007, the EVP immediately before then will automatically assume the post of IBP National President.
Petitioners asseverate that it is in this light that respondent De Vera had transferred his IBP membership from the Pasay, Paranaque,
Las Pinas and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to Agusan del Sur Chapter, stressing that he indeed covets the IBP presidency. 8 The transfer
of IBP membership to Agusan del Sur, the petitioners went on, is a brazen abuse and misuse of the rotation rule, a mockery of the
domicile rule and a great insult to lawyers from Eastern Mindanao for it implies that there is no lawyer from the region qualified and
willing to serve the IBP.9
Adverting to the moral fitness required of a candidate for the offices of regional governor, executive vice-president and national
president, the petitioners submit that respondent De Vera lacks the requisite moral aptitude. According to them, respondent De Vera
was sanctioned by the Supreme Court for irresponsibly attacking the integrity of the SC Justices during the deliberations on the

constitutionality of the plunder law. They add that he could have been disbarred in the United States for misappropriating his clients
funds had he not surrendered his California license to practice law. Finally, they accuse him of having actively campaigned for the
position of Eastern Mindanao Governor during the IBP National Convention held on May 22-24, 2003, a prohibited act under the IBP
By-Laws.10
After seeking leave of court, respondent De Vera filed on June 9, 2003 a Respectful Comment

11

on the Petition.

In his defense, respondent De Vera raises new issues. He argues that this Court has no jurisdiction over the present controversy,
contending that the election of the Officers of the IBP, including the determination of the qualification of those who want to serve the
organization, is purely an internal matter, governed as it is by the IBP By-Laws and exclusively regulated and administered by the IBP.
Respondent De Vera also assails the petitioners legal standing, pointing out that the IBP By-Laws does not have a provision for the
disqualification of IBP members aspiring for the position of Regional governors, for instead all that it provides for is only an election
protest under Article IV, Section 40, pursuant to which only a qualified nominee can validly lodge an election protest which is to be
made after, not before, the election. He posits further that following the rotation rule, only members from the Surigao del Norte and
Agusan del Sur IBP chapters are qualified to run for Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region for the term 2003-2005, and the
petitioners who are from Bukidnon and Misamis Oriental are not thus qualified to be nominees. 12
Meeting the petitioners contention head on, respondent De Vera avers that an IBP member is entitled to select, change or transfer
his chapter membership.13 He cites the last paragraph of Section 19, Article II and Section 29-2, Article IV of the IBP By-Laws, thus:
Article II, Section 19. Registration. - xxx Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall be
considered a member of the Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or area where his office or, in the absence thereof, his
residence is located. In no case shall any lawyer be a member of more than one Chapter.
Article IV, Section 29-2. Membership- The Chapter comprises all members registered in its membership roll. Each member shall
maintain his membership until the same is terminated on any of the grounds set forth in the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or he
transfers his membership to another Chapter as certified by the Secretary of the latter, provided that the transfer is made not less
than three months immediately preceding any Chapter election.
The right to transfer membership, respondent De Vera stresses, is also recognized in Section 4, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court which
is exactly the same as the first of the above-quoted provisions of the IBP By-Laws, thus:
Rule 139-A, Section 4. xxx Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered a
member of the Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or area where his office, or, in the absence thereof, his residence is
located. In no case shall any lawyer be a member of more than one Chapter.
Clarifying that it was upon the invitation of the officers and members of the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter that he transferred his IBP
membership, respondent De Vera submits that it is unfair and unkind for the petitioners to state that his membership transfer was
done for convenience and as a mere subterfuge to qualify him for the Eastern Mindanao governorship. 14
On the moral integrity question, respondent De Vera denies that he exhibited disrespect to the Court or to any of its members during
its deliberations on the constitutionality of the plunder law. As for the administrative complaint filed against him by one of his clients
when he was practicing law in California, which in turn compelled him to surrender his California license to practice law, he maintains
that it cannot serve as basis for determining his moral qualification (or lack of it) to run for the position he is aspiring for. He explains
that there is as yet no final judgment finding him guilty of the administrative charge, as the records relied upon by the petitioners are
mere preliminary findings of a hearing referee which are recommendatory in character similar to the recommendatory findings of an
IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline which are subject to the review of and the final decision of the Supreme Court. He also stresses
that the complainant in the California administrative case has retracted the accusation that he misappropriated the complainants
money, but unfortunately the retraction was not considered by the investigating officer. Finally, on the alleged politicking he
committed during the IBP National Convention held on May 22-24, 2003, he states that it is baseless to assume that he was
campaigning simply because he declared that he had 10 votes to support his candidacy for governorship in the Eastern Mindanao
Region and that the petitioners did not present any evidence to substantiate their claim that he or his handlers had billeted the
delegates from his region at the Century Park Hotel.15
On July 7, 2003, the petitioners filed their Reply16 to the Respectful Comment of respondent De Vera who, on July 15, 2003, filed
an Answer and Rejoinder.17
In a Resolution18 dated 5 August 2003, the Court directed the other respondent in this case, the IBP Board, to file its comment on
the Petition. The IBP Board, through its General Counsel, filed a Manifestation19 dated 29 August 2003, reiterating the position stated
in its Resolution dated 29 May 2003 that "it finds the petition to be premature considering that no nomination has as yet been made
for the election of IBP Regional Governors."20
Based on the arguments of the parties, the following are the main issues, to wit:
(1) whether this Court has jurisdiction over the present controversy;

(2) whether petitioners have a cause of action against respondent De Vera, the determination of which in turn requires the resolution
of two sub-issues, namely:
(a) whether the petition to disqualify respondent De Vera is the proper remedy under the IBP By-Laws; and
(b) whether the petitioners are the proper parties to bring this suit;
(3) whether the present Petition is premature;
(4) assuming that petitioners have a cause of action and that the present petition is not premature, whether respondent De Vera is
qualified to run for Governor of the IBP Eastern Mindanao Region;
Anent the first issue, in his Respectful Comment respondent De Vera contends that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction on the
present controversy. As noted earlier, respondent De Vera submits that the election of the Officers of the IBP, including the
determination of the qualification of those who want to serve the IBP, is purely an internal matter and exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the IBP.
The contention is untenable. Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution confers on the Supreme Court the power to promulgate
rules affecting the IBP, thus:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
....
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and the legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade,
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied)
Implicit in this constitutional grant is the power to supervise all the activities of the IBP, including the election of its officers.
The authority of the Supreme Court over the IBP has its origins in the 1935 Constitution. Section 13, Art. VIII thereof granted the
Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law. It reads:
SECTION 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase,
or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are
declared Rules of Courts, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power
to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines.
The above-quoted sections in both the 1987 and 1935 Constitution and the similarly worded provision in the intervening 1973
Constitution21 through all the years have been the sources of this Courts authority to supervise individual members of the Bar. The
term "Bar" refers to the "collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys." 22 Pursuant to this power of
supervision, the Court initiated the integration of the Philippine Bar by creating on October 5, 1970 the Commission on Bar
Integration, which was tasked to ascertain the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar. 23 Not long after, Republic Act No. 639724 was
enacted and it confirmed the power of the Supreme Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar. Finally, on January 1, 1973, in
the per curiamResolution of this Court captioned "In the Matter of the Integration of the Bar to the Philippines," we ordained the
Integration of the Philippine Bar in accordance with Rule 139-A, of the Rules of Court, which we promulgated pursuant to our rulemaking power under the 1935 Constitution.
The IBP By-Laws, the document invoked by respondent De Vera in asserting IBP independence from the Supreme Court, ironically
recognizes the full range of the power of supervision of the Supreme Court over the IBP. For one, Section 77 25 of the IBP By-Laws vests
on the Court the power to amend, modify or repeal the IBP By-Laws, either motu propio or upon recommendation of the Board of
Governors of the IBP. Also in Section 15,26the Court is authorized to send observers in IBP elections, whether local or national. Section
4427 empowers the Court to have the final decision on the removal of the members of the Board of Governors.
On the basis of its power of supervision over the IBP, the Supreme Court looked into the irregularities which attended the 1989
elections of the IBP National Officers. In Bar Matter No. 491 entitled "In the Matter of the Inquiry into the 1989 Elections of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines" the Court formed a committee to make an inquiry into the 1989 elections. The results of the
investigation showed that the elections were marred by irregularities, with the principal candidates for election committing acts in
violation of Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws.28 The Court invalidated the elections and directed the conduct of special elections, as well
as explicitly disqualified from running thereat the IBP members who were found involved in the irregularities in the elections, in order
to "impress upon the participants, in that electoral exercise the seriousness of the misconduct which attended it and the stern

disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court, and to restore the non-political character of the IBP and reduce, if not entirely
eliminate, expensive electioneering."
The Court likewise amended several provisions of the IBP By-Laws. First, it removed direct election by the House of Delegates of the
(a) officers of the House of Delegates; (b) IBP President; and (c) Executive Vice-President (EVP). Second, it restored the former system
of the IBP Board choosing the IBP President and the Executive Vice President (EVP) from among themselves on a rotation basis
(Section 47 of the By-Laws, as amended) and the automatic succession by the EVP to the position of the President upon the
expiration of their common two-year term. Third, it amended Sections 37 and 39 by providing that the Regional Governors shall be
elected by the members of their respective House of Delegates and that the position of Regional Governor shall be rotated among the
different chapters in the region.
The foregoing considerations demonstrate the power of the Supreme Court over the IBP and establish without doubt its jurisdiction to
hear and decide the present controversy.
In support of its stance on the second issue that the petitioners have no cause of action against him, respondent De Vera argues that
the IBP By-Laws does not allow petitions to disqualify candidates for Regional Governors since what it authorizes are election protests
or post-election cases under Section 40 thereof which reads:
SECTION 40. Election contests. - Any nominee desiring to contest an election shall, within two days after the announcement of the
results of the elections, file with the President of the Integrated Bar a written protest setting forth the grounds therefor. Upon receipt
of such petition, the President shall forthwith call a special meeting of the outgoing Board of Governors to consider and hear the
protest, with due notice to the contending parties. The decision of the Board shall be announced not later than the following May 31,
and shall be final and conclusive.
Indeed, there is nothing in the present IBP By-Laws which sanctions the disqualification of candidates for IBP governors. The remedy it
provides for questioning the elections is the election protest. But this remedy, as will be shown later, is not available to just anybody.
Before its amendment in 1989, the IBP By-Laws allowed the disqualification of nominees for the position of regional governor. This
was carefully detailed in the former Section 39(4) of the IBP By-Laws, to wit:
SECTION 39 (4) Disqualification proceedings. - Any question relating to the eligibility of a candidate must be raised prior to the
casting of ballots, and shall be immediately decided by the Chairman. An appeal from such decision may be taken to the Delegates in
attendance who shall forthwith resolve the appeal by plurality vote. Voting shall be by raising of hands. The decision of the Delegates
shall be final, and the elections shall thereafter proceed. Recourse to the Board of Governors may be had in accordance with Section
40.
The above-quoted sub-section was part of the provisions on nomination and election of the Board of Governors. Before, members of
the Board were directly elected by the members of the House of Delegates at its annual convention held every other year. 29 The
election was a two-tiered process. First, the Delegates from each region chose by secret plurality vote, not less than two nor more
than five nominees for the position of Governor for their Region. The names of all the nominees, arranged by region and in
alphabetical order, were written on the board within the full view of the House, unless complete mimeographed copies of the lists
were distributed to all the Delegates.30 Thereafter, each Delegate, or, in his absence, his alternate voted for only one nominee for
Governor for each Region.31 The nominee from every Region receiving the highest number of votes was declared and certified elected
by the Chairman.32
In the aftermath of the controversy which arose during the 1989 IBP elections, this Court deemed it best to amend the nomination
and election processes for Regional Governors. The Court localized the elections, i.e, each Regional Governor is nominated and
elected by the delegates of the concerned region, and adopted the rotation process through the following provisions, to wit:
SECTION 37: Composition of the Board. - The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall be governed by a Board of Governors consisting
of nine (9) Governors from the nine (9) regions as delineated in Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the representation basis of one
Governor for each region to be elected by the members of the House of Delegates from that region only. The position of Governor
should be rotated among the different chapters in the region.
SECTION 39: Nomination and election of the Governors. - At least one (1) month before the national convention the delegates from
each region shall elect the governor for their region, the choice of which shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in
the region.
The changes adopted by the Court simplified the election process and thus made it less controversial. The grounds for disqualification
were reduced, if not totally eradicated, for the pool from which the Delegates may choose their nominees is diminished as the
rotation process operates.
The simplification of the process was in line with this Courts vision of an Integrated Bar which is non-political 33and effective in the
discharge of its role in elevating the standards of the legal profession, improving the administration of justice and contributing to the
growth and progress of the Philippine society. 34

The effect of the new election process convinced this Court to remove the provision on disqualification proceedings. Consequently,
under the present IBP By-Laws, the instant petition has no firm ground to stand on.
Respondent De Vera likewise asseverates that under the aforequoted Section 40 of the IBP By-Laws, petitioners are not the proper
persons to bring the suit for they are not qualified to be nominated in the elections of regional governor for Eastern Mindanao. He
argues that following the rotation rule under Section 39 of the IBP By-Laws as amended, only IBP members from Agusan del Sur and
Surigao del Norte are qualified to be nominated.
Truly, with the applicability of Section 40 of the IBP By-Laws to the present petition, petitioners are not the proper parties to bring the
suit. As provided in the aforesaid section, only nominees can file with the President of the IBP a written protest setting forth the
grounds therefor. As claimed by respondent De Vera, and not disputed by petitioners, only IBP members from Agusan del Sur and
Surigao del Norte are qualified to be nominated and elected at the election for the 16th Regional Governor of Eastern Mindanao. This
is pursuant to the rotation rule enunciated in the aforequoted Sections 37 and 38 of the IBP By-Laws. Petitioner Garcia is from
Bukidnon IBP Chapter while the other petitioners, Ravanera and Velez, are from the Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter. Consequently, the
petitioners are not even qualified to be nominated at the forthcoming election.
On the third issue relating to the ripeness or prematurity of the present petition.
This Court is one with the IBP Board in its position that it is premature for the petitioners to seek the disqualification of respondent De
Vera from being elected IBP Governor for the Eastern Mindanao Region. Before a member is elected governor, he has to be nominated
first for the post. In this case, respondent De Vera has not been nominated for the post. In fact, no nomination of candidates has been
made yet by the members of the House of Delegates from Eastern Mindanao. Conceivably too, assuming that respondent De Vera
gets nominated, he can always opt to decline the nomination.
Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post because he is not really from Eastern Mindanao. His place of
residence is in Paraaque and he was originally a member of the PPLM IBP Chapter. He only changed his IBP Chapter membership to
pave the way for his ultimate goal of attaining the highest IBP post, which is the national presidency. Petitioners aver that in changing
his IBP membership, respondent De Vera violated the domicile rule.
The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19 Article II, a lawyer included in the Roll of Attorneys of the
Supreme Court can register with the particular IBP Chapter of his preference or choice, thus:
Section 19. Registration. ....
Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered a member of the Chapter of the
province, city, political subdivision or area where his office or, in the absence thereof, his residence is located. In no case shall any
lawyer be a member of more than one Chapter. (Underscoring supplied)
It is clearly stated in the afore-quoted section of the By-Laws that it is not automatic that a lawyer will become a member of the
chapter where his place of residence or work is located. He has the discretion to choose the particular chapter where he wishes to
gain membership. Only when he does not register his preference that he will become a member of the Chapter of the place where he
resides or maintains his office. The only proscription in registering ones preference is that a lawyer cannot be a member of more than
one chapter at the same time.
The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. In fact, under this Section, transfer of IBP membership is allowed as long as
the lawyer complies with the conditions set forth therein, thus:
SECTION 29-2. Membership - The Chapter comprises all members registered in its membership roll. Each member shall maintain his
membership until the same is terminated on any of the grounds set forth in the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or he transfers his
membership to another Chapter as certified by the Secretary of the latter, provided that the transfer is made not less than three
months immediately preceding any Chapter election.
The only condition required under the foregoing rule is that the transfer must be made not less than three months prior to the
election of officers in the chapter to which the lawyer wishes to transfer.
In the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the transfer of his IBP membership to Agusan del Sur on 1 August 2001. One month
thereafter, IBP National Secretary Jaime M. Vibar wrote a letter 35 addressed to Atty. Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr., Secretary of IBP PPLM
Chapter and Atty. Lyndon J. Romero, Secretary of IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter, informing them of respondent De Veras transfer and
advising them to make the necessary notation in their respective records. This letter is a substantial compliance with the certification
mentioned in Section 29-2 as aforequoted. Note that De Veras transfer was made effective sometime between August 1, 2001 and
September 3, 2001. On February 27, 2003, the elections of the IBP Chapter Officers were simultaneously held all over the Philippines,
as mandated by Section 29-12.a of the IBP By-Laws which provides that elections of Chapter Officers and Directors shall be held on
the last Saturday of February of every other year. 36 Between September 3, 2001 and February 27, 2003, seventeen months had

elapsed. This makes respondent De Veras transfer valid as it was done more than three months ahead of the chapter elections held
on February 27, 2003.
Petitioners likewise claim that respondent De Vera is disqualified because he is not morally fit to occupy the position of governor of
Eastern Mindanao.
We are not convinced. As long as an aspiring member meets the basic requirements provided in the IBP By-Laws, he cannot be
barred. The basic qualifications for one who wishes to be elected governor for a particular region are: (1) he is a member in good
standing of the IBP;37 2) he is included in the voters list of his chapter or he is not disqualified by the Integration Rule, by the By-Laws
of the Integrated Bar, or by the By-Laws of the Chapter to which he belongs; 38 (3) he does not belong to a chapter from which a
regional governor has already been elected, unless the election is the start of a new season or cycle; 39 and (4) he is not in the
government service.40
There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit before he can run for IBP governorship. For one,
this is so because the determination of moral fitness of a candidates lies in the individual judgment of the members of the House of
Delegates. Indeed, based on each members standard of morality, he is free to nominate and elect any member, so long as the latter
possesses the basic requirements under the law. For another, basically the disqualification of a candidate involving lack of moral
fitness should emanate from his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law by this Court, or conviction by final judgment of an
offense which involves moral turpitude.
Petitioners, in assailing the morality of respondent De Vera on the basis of the alleged sanction imposed by the Supreme Court during
the deliberation on the constitutionality of the plunder law, is apparently referring to this Courts Decision dated 29 July 2002 in In Re:
Published Alleged Threats Against Members of the Court in the Plunder Law Case Hurled by Atty. Leonard De Vera.41 In this case,
respondent De Vera was found guilty of indirect contempt of court and was imposed a fine in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) for his remarks contained in two newspaper articles published in the Inquirer. Quoted hereunder are the pertinent
portions of the report, with De Veras statements written in italics.
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER
Tuesday, November 6, 2001
Erap camp blamed for oust-Badoy maneuvers
Plunder Law
De Vera asked the Supreme Court to dispel rumors that it would vote in favor of a petition filed by Estradas lawyers to declare the
plunder law unconstitutional for its supposed vagueness.
De Vera said he and his group were "greatly disturbed" by the rumors from Supreme Court insiders.
Reports said that Supreme Court justices were tied 6-6 over the constitutionality of the Plunder Law, with two other justices still
undecided and uttered most likely to inhibit, said Plunder Watch, a coalition formed by civil society and militant groups to monitor the
prosecution of Estrada.
"We are afraid that the Estrada camps effort to coerce, bribe, or influence the justices- considering that it has a P500 million slush
fund from the aborted power grab that May-will most likely result in a pro-Estrada decision declaring the Plunder Law either
unconstitutional or vague," the group said.42
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER
Monday, November 19, 2001
SC under pressure from Erap pals, foes
Xxx
"People are getting dangerously, passionate.. .emotionally charged." said lawyer Leonard De Vera of the Equal Justice for All
Movement and a leading member of the Estrada Resign movement.
He voiced his concern that a decision by the high tribunal rendering the plunder law unconstitutional would trigger mass actions,
probably more massive than those that led to People Power II.
Xxx

De Vera warned of a crisis far worse than the "jueteng" scandal that led to People Power II if the rumor turned out to be true.
"People wouldnt just swallow any Supreme Court decision that is basically wrong. Sovereignty must prevail. " 43
In his Explanation submitted to the Court, respondent De Vera admitted to have made said statements but denied to have uttered the
same "to degrade the Court, to destroy public confidence in it and to bring it into disrepute." 44He explained that he was merely
exercising his constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of speech.
The Court found the explanation unsatisfactory and held that the statements were aimed at influencing and threatening the Court to
decide in favor of the constitutionality of the Plunder Law.45
The ruling cannot serve as a basis to consider respondent De Vera immoral. The act for which he was found guilty of indirect
contempt does not involve moral turpitude.
In Tak Ng v. Republic of the Philippines46 cited in Villaber v. Commission on Elections,47 the Court defines moral turpitude as "an act of
baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to
the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good
morals."48 The determination of whether an act involves moral turpitude is a factual issue and frequently depends on the
circumstances attending the violation of the statute. 49
In this case, it cannot be said that the act of expressing ones opinion on a public interest issue can be considered as an act of
baseness, vileness or depravity.1wphi1 Respondent De Vera did not bring suffering nor cause undue injury or harm to the public
when he voiced his views on the Plunder Law.50 Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner to invoke the administrative case as
evidence of respondent De Veras alleged immorality.
On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera while he was still practicing law in California, he explained
that no final judgment was rendered by the California Supreme Court finding him guilty of the charge. He surrendered his license to
protest the discrimination he suffered at the hands of the investigator and he found it impractical to pursue the case to the end. We
find these explanations satisfactory in the absence of contrary proof. It is a basic rule on evidence that he who alleges a fact has the
burden to prove the same.51 In this case, the petitioners have not shown how the administrative complaint affects respondent De
Veras moral fitness to run for governor.
Finally, on the allegation that respondent de Vera or his handlers had housed the delegates from Eastern Mindanao in the Century
Park Hotel to get their support for his candidacy, again petitioners did not present any proof to substantiate the same. It must be
emphasized that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof under our Rules of Court. 52
WHEREFORE, the Petition to disqualify respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera to run for the position of IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao
in the 16th election of the IBP Board of Governors is hereby DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 30
May 2003 which enjoined the conduct of the election for the IBP Regional Governor in Eastern Mindanao is hereby LIFTED.
Accordingly, the IBP Board of Governors is hereby ordered to hold said election with proper notice and with deliberate speed.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-12871

July 25, 1959

TIMOTEO V. CRUZ, petitioner,

vs.
FRANCISCO G. H. SALVA, respondent.
Baizas and Balderrama for petitioner.
City Attorney Francisco G. H. Salva in his own behalf.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by Timoteo V. Cruz against Francisco G. H. Salva, in his
capacity as City Fiscal of Pasay City, to restrain him from continuing with the preliminary investigation he was conducting in
September, 1957 in connection with the killing of Manuel Monroy which took place on June 15, 1953 in Pasay City. To better
understand the present case and its implications, the following facts gathered from the pleadings and the memoranda filed by the
parties, may be stated.
Following the killing of Manuel Monroy in 1953 a number of persons were accused as involved and implicated in said crime. After a
long trial, the Court of First Instance of Pasay City found Oscar Castelo, Jose de Jesus, Hipolito Bonifacio, Bienvenido Mendoza, Francis
Berdugo and others guilty of the crime of murder and sentenced them to death. They all appealed the sentence although without said

appeal, in view of the imposition of the extreme penalty, the case would have to be reviewed automatically by this Court. Oscar
Castelo sought a new trial which was granted and upon retrial, he was again found guilty and his former conviction of sentence was
affirmed and reiterated by the same trial court.
It seems that pending appeal, the late President Magsaysay ordered a reinvestigation of the case. The purpose of said reinvestigation
does not appear in the record. Anyway, intelligence agents of the Philippine Constabulary and investigators of Malacaang conducted
the investigation for the Chief Executive, questioned a number of people and obtained what would appear to be confession, pointing
to persons, other than those convicted and sentenced by the trial court, as the real killers of Manuel Monroy.
Counsel for Oscar Castelo and his co-defendants wrote to respondent Fiscal Salva to conduct a reinvestigation of the case presumably
on the basis of the affidavits and confessions obtained by those who had investigated the case at the instance of Malacaang. Fiscal
Salva conferred with the Solicitor General as to what steps he should take. A conference was held with the Secretary of Justice who
decided to have the results of the investigation by the Philippine Constabulary and Malacaang investigators made available to
counsel for the appellants.
Taking advantage of this opportunity, counsel for the appellants filed a motion for new trial with this Tribunal supporting the same
with the so-called affidavits and confessions of some of those persons investigated, such as the confessions of Sergio Eduardo y de
Guzman, Oscar Caymo, Pablo Canlas, and written statements of several others. By resolution of this Tribunal, action on said motion
for new trial was deferred until the case was studied and determined on the merits. In the meantime, the Chief, Philippine
Constabulary, head sent to the Office of Fiscal Salva copies of the same affidavits and confessions and written statements, of which
the motion for new trial was based, and respondent Salva proceeded to conduct a reinvestigation designating for said purposes a
committee of three composed of himself as chairman and Assistant City Attorneys Herminio A. Avendaio and Ernesto A. Bernabe.
In connection with said preliminary investigation being conducted by the committee, petitioner Timoteo Cruz was subpoenaed by
respondent to appear at his office on September 21, 1957, to testify "upon oath before me in a certain criminal investigation to be
conducted at the time and place by this office against you and Sergio Eduardo, et al., for murder." On September 19, 1957, petitioner
Timoteo Cruz wrote to respondent Salva asking for the transfer of the preliminary investigation from September 21, due to the fact
that this counsel, Atty. Crispin Baizas, would attend a hearing on that same day in Naga City. Acting upon said request for
postponement, Fiscal Salva set the preliminary investigation on September 24. On that day, Atty. Baizas appeared for petitioner Cruz,
questioned the jurisdiction of the committee, particularly respondent Salva, to conduct the preliminary investigation in view of the
fact that the same case involving the killing of Manuel Monroy was pending appeal in this Court, and on the same day filed the
present petition for certiorari and prohibition. This Tribunal gave due course to the petition for certiorari and prohibition and upon the
filing of a cash bond of P200.00 issued a writ of preliminary injunction thereby stopping the preliminary investigation being conducted
by respondent Salva.
The connection, if any, that petitioner Cruz had with the preliminary investigation being conducted by respondent Salva and his
committee was that affidavits and confessions sent to Salva by the Chief, Philippine Constabulary, and which were being investigated,
implicated petitioner Cruz, even picturing him as the instigator and mastermind in the killing of Manuel Monroy.
The position taken by petitioner Cruz in this case is that inasmuch as the principal case of People vs. Oscar Castelo, et al., G.R. No. L10794, is pending appeal and consideration before us, no court, much less a prosecuting attorney like respondent Salva, had any
right or authority to conduct a preliminary investigation or reinvestigation of the case for that would be obstructing the administration
of justice and interferring with the consideration on appeal of the main case wherein appellants had been found guilty and convicted
and sentenced; neither had respondent authority to cite him to appear and testify at said investigation.
Respondent Salva, however, contends that if he subpoenaed petitioner Cruz at all, it was because of the latter's oral and personal
request to allow him to appear at the investigation with his witnesses for his own protection, possibly, to controvert and rebut any
evidence therein presented against him. Salva claims that were it not for this request and if, on the contrary, Timoteo Cruz had
expressed any objection to being cited to appear in the investigation he (Salva) would never have subpoenaed him.
Although petitioner Cruz now stoutly denies having made such request that he be allowed to appear at the investigation, we are
inclined to agree with Fiscal Salva that such a request had been made. Inasmuch as he, Timoteo Cruz, was deeply implicated in the
killing of Manuel Monroy by the affidavits and confessions of several persons who were being investigated by Salva and his
committee, it was but natural that petitioner should have been interested, even desirous of being present at that investigation so that
he could face and cross examine said witnesses and affiants when they testified in connection with their affidavits or confessions,
either repudiating, modifying or ratifying the same. Moreover, in the communication, addressed to respondent Salva asking that the
investigation, scheduled for September 21, 1957, be postponed because his attorney would be unable to attend, Timoteo Cruz
expressed no opposition to the subpoena, not even a hint that he was objecting to his being cited to appear at the investigation.
As to the right of respondent Salva to conduct the preliminary investigation which he and his committee began ordinarily, when a
criminal case in which a fiscal intervened though nominally, for according to respondent, two government attorneys had been
designed by the Secretary of Justice to handle the prosecution in the trial of the case in the court below, is tried and decided and it is
appealed to a higher court such as this Tribunal, the functions and actuations of said fiscal have terminated; usually, the appeal is
handled for the government by the Office of the Solicitor General. Consequently, there would be no reason or occasion for said fiscal
to conduct a reinvestigation to determine criminal responsibility for the crime involved in the appeal.

However, in the present case, respondent has, in our opinion, established a justification for his reinvestigation because according to
him, in the original criminal case against Castelo, et al., one of the defendants named Salvador Realista y de Guzman was not
included for the reason that he was arrested and was placed within the jurisdiction of the trial court only after the trial against the
other accused had commenced, even after the prosecution had rested its case and the defense had begun to present its evidence.
Naturally, Realista remained to stand trial. The trial court, according to respondent, at the instance of Realista, had scheduled the
hearing at an early date, that is in August, 1957. Respondent claims that before he would go to trial in the prosecution of Realista he
had to chart his course and plan of action, whether to present the same evidence, oral and documentary, presented in the original
case and trial, or, in view of the new evidence consisting of the affidavits and confessions sent to him by the Philippine Constabulary,
he should first assess and determine the value of said evidence by conducting an investigation and that should he be convinced that
the persons criminally responsible for the killing of Manuel Monroy were other than those already tried and convicted, like Oscar
Castelo and his co-accused and co-appellants, including Salvador Realista, then he might act accordingly and even recommend the
dismissal of the case against Realista.
In this, we are inclined to agree with respondent Salva. For, as contended by him and as suggested by authorities, the duty and role
of prosecuting attorney is not only to prosecute and secure the conviction of the guilty but also to protect the innocent.
We cannot overemphasize the necessity of close scrutiny and investigation of the prosecuting officers of all cases handled by
them, but whilst this court is averse to any form of vacillation by such officers in the prosecution of public offenses, it is
unquestionable that they may, in appropriate cases, in order to do justice and avoid injustice, reinvestigate cases in which
they have already filed the corresponding informations. In the language of Justice Sutherland of the Supreme Court of the
United States, theprosecuting officer "is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite
sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape nor innocent suffer. He may prosecute
with earnestness and vigor indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike had blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul
ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use
every legitimate means to bring about a just one. (69 United States law Review, June, 1935, No. 6, p. 309, cited in the case
of Suarezvs. Platon, 69 Phil., 556)
With respect to the right of respondent Salva to cite petitioner to appear and testify before him at the scheduled preliminary
investigation, under the law, petitioner had a right to be present at that investigation since as was already stated, he was more or
less deeply involved and implicated in the killing of Monroy according to the affiants whose confessions, affidavits and testimonies
respondent Salva was considering or was to consider at said preliminary investigation. But he need not be present at said
investigation because his presence there implies, and was more of a right rather than a duty or legal obligation. Consequently, even
if, as claimed by respondent Salva, petitioner expressed the desire to be given an opportunity to be present at the said investigation,
if he latter changed his mind and renounced his right, and even strenuously objected to being made to appear at said investigation,
he could not be compelled to do so.
Now we come to the manner in which said investigation was conducted by the respondent. If, as contended by him, the purpose of
said investigation was only to acquaint himself with and evaluate the evidence involved in the affidavits and confessions of Sergio
Eduardo, Cosme Camo and others by questioning them, then he, respondent, could well have conducted the investigation in his
office, quietly, unobtrusively and without much fanfare, much less publicity.
However, according to the petitioner and not denied by the respondent, the investigation was conducted not in respondent's office
but in the session hall of the Municipal Court of Pasay City evidently, to accommodate the big crowd that wanted to witness the
proceeding, including members of the press. A number of microphones were installed. Reporters were everywhere and photographers
were busy taking pictures. In other words, apparently with the permission of, if not the encouragement by the respondent, news
photographers and newsmen had a filed day. Not only this, but in the course of the investigation, as shown by the transcript of the
stenographic notes taken during said investigation, on two occasions, the first, after Oscar Caymo had concluded his testimony
respondent Salva, addressing the newspapermen said, "Gentlemen of the press, if you want to ask questions I am willing to let you do
so and the question asked will be reproduced as my own"; and the second, after Jose Maratella y de Guzman had finished testifying
and respondent Salva, addressing the newsmen, again said, "Gentlemen of the press is free to ask questions as ours." Why
respondent was willing to abdicate and renounce his right and prerogative to make and address the questions to the witnesses under
investigation, in favor of the members of the press, is difficult for us to understand, unless he, respondent, wanted to curry favor with
the press and publicize his investigation as much as possible. Fortunately, the gentlemen of the press to whom he accorded such
unusual privilege and favor appeared to have wisely and prudently declined the offer and did not ask questions, this according to the
transcript now before us.
But, the newspapers certainly played up and gave wide publicity to what took place during the investigation, and this involved
headlines and extensive recitals, narrations of and comments on the testimonies given by the witnesses as well as vivid descriptions
of the incidents that took place during the investigation. It seemed as though the criminal responsibility for the killing of Manuel
Monroy which had already been tried and finally determined by the lower court and which was under appeal and advisement by this
Tribunal, was being retried and redetermined in the press, and all with the apparent place and complaisance of respondent.
Frankly, the members of this Court were greatly disturbed and annoyed by such publicity and sensationalism, all of which may
properly be laid at the door of respondent Salva. In this, he committed what was regard a grievous error and poor judgment for which
we fail to find any excuse or satisfactory explanation. His actuations in this regard went well beyond the bounds of prudence,
discretion and good taste. It is bad enough to have such undue publicity when a criminal case is being investigated by the authorities,

even when it being tried in court; but when said publicity and sensationalism is allowed, even encouraged, when the case is on
appeal and is pending consideration by this Tribunal, the whole thing becomes inexcusable, even abhorrent, and this Court, in the
interest of justice, is constrained and called upon to put an end to it and a deterrent against its repetition by meting an appropriate
disciplinary measure, even a penalty to the one liable.
Some of the members of the Court who appeared to feel more strongly than the others favored the imposition of a more or less
severe penal sanction. After mature deliberation, we have finally agreed that a public censure would, for the present, be sufficient.
In conclusion, we find and hold that respondent Salva was warranted in holding the preliminary investigation involved in this case,
insofar as Salvador Realista is concerned, for which reason the writ of preliminary injunction issued stopping said preliminary
investigation, is dissolved; that in view of petitioner's objection to appear and testify at the said investigation, respondent may not
compel him to attend said investigation, for which reason, the subpoena issued by respondent against petitioner is hereby set aside.
In view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted in part and denied in part. Considering the conclusion
arrived at by us, respondent Francisco G. H. Salva is hereby publicly reprehended and censured for the uncalled for and wide publicity
and sensationalism that he had given to and allowed in connection with his investigation, which we consider and find to be contempt
of court; and, furthermore, he is warned that a repetition of the same would meet with a more severe disciplinary action and penalty.
No costs.

G.R. No. L-30894 March 25, 1970

EDUARDO L. MARTELINO, CIRILO OROPESA, TEODORO FACELO, RUPERTO AMISOTO, ALBERTO SOTECO, SOLFERINO
TITONG, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
JOSE ALEJANDRO, RUBEN S. MONTOYA, SIXTO R. ALHAMBRA, AVELINO C. MENEZ, EFRAIN S. MACLANG, ET
AL., respondents.
Amelito R. Mutuc for petitioners.
Colonel Manuel V. Reyes (Judge Advocate General, GSC), Major Samuel M. Soriano (JAGS), Major Higinio E. Dacanay, Jr. (JAGS, PC) and
Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Crispin V. Bautista, Solicitor Jaime M. Lantin and Guillermo Nakar, Jr. for
respondents.

CASTRO, J.:
This case presents another aspect of the court-martial proceedings against the petitioner, Major Eduardo Martelino, alias Abdul Latif
Martelino, of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and the officers and men under him, for violation of the 94th and 97th Articles of
War, as a result of the alleged shooting on March 18, 1968 of some Muslim recruits then undergoing commando training on the island
of Corregidor. Once before the question was raised before this Court whether the general court-martial, convened on April 6, 1968 to
try the case against the petitioners, acquired jurisdiction over the case despite the fact that earlier, on March 23, a complaint for
frustrated murder had been filed in the fiscal's office of Cavite City by Jibin Arula (who claimed to have been wounded in the incident)
against some of the herein petitioners. The proceedings had to be suspended until the jurisdiction issue could be decided. On June 23,
1969 this Court ruled in favor of the jurisdiction of the military court. 1
The jurisdiction question thus settled, attention once again shifted to the general court-martial, but no sooner had the proceedings
resumed than another hitch developed. This came about as the petitioners, the accused in the court-martial proceedings, in turn
came to this Court, seeking relief against certain orders of the general court-martial.
It appears that at the hearing on August 12, 1969 the petitioner Martelino sought the disqualification of the President of the general
court-martial, following the latter's admission that he read newspaper stories of the Corregidor incident. The petitioner contended
that the case had received such an amount of publicity in the press and other news media and in fact was being exploited for political
purposes in connection with the presidential election on November 11, 1969 as to imperil his right to a fair trial. After deliberating,
the military court denied the challenge.
Thereafter the petitioners raised peremptory challenges against Col. Alejandro, as president of the court-martial, and Col. Olfindo, Lt.
Col. Camagay, Lt. Col. Valones, Lt. Col. Blanco and Col. Malig, as members. With regard to peremptory challenges it was the

petitioners' position that for each specification each accused was entitled to one such challenge. They later changed their stand and
adopted that of the trial judge advocate that "for each specification jointly tried, all of the accused are entitled to only 1 peremptory
challenge; and that with respect to the specifications tried commonly, each one of the accused is entitled to one peremptory
challenge." They there contended that they were entitled to a total of eleven peremptory challenges. On the other hand the courtmartial ruled that the accused were entitled to only one peremptory challenge as the specifications were being jointly tried.
The petitioners therefore filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, to nullify the orders of the court-martial denying their
challenges, both peremptory and for cause. They allege that the adverse publicity given in the mass media to the Corregidor incident,
coupled with the fact that it became an issue against the administration in the 1969 elections, was such as to unduly influence the
members of the court-martial. With respect to peremptory challenges, they contend that they are entitled to eleven such challenges,
one for each specification.
On August 29, 1969 this Court gave due course to the petition, required the respondents as members of the general court-martial to
answer and, in the meantime, restrained them from proceeding with the case.
In their answer the respondents assert that despite the publicity which the case had received, no proof has been presented showing
that the court-martial's president's fairness and impartiality have been impaired. On the contrary, they claim, the petitioner's own
counsel expressed confidence in the "integrity, experience and background" of the members of the court. As a preliminary
consideration, the respondents urge this Court to throw out the petition on the ground that it has no power to review the proceedings
of the court-martial, "except for the purpose of ascertaining whether the military court had jurisdiction of the person and subject
matter, and whether, though having such jurisdiction, it had exceeded its powers in the sentence pronounced," and that at any rate
the petitioners failed to exhaust remedies available to them within the military justice system.
I
It is true that civil courts as a rule exercise no supervision or correcting power over the proceedings of courts-martial, and that mere
errors in their proceedings are not open to consideration. "The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction." 2 But it is equally true that in the
exercise of their undoubted discretion, courts-martial may commit such an abuse of discretion what in the language of Rule 65 is
referred to as "grave abuse of discretion" as to give rise to a defect in their jurisdiction. 3 This is precisely the point at issue in this
action suggested by its nature as one for certiorari and prohibition, namely, whether in overruling the petitioners' challenges, the
general court-martial committed such an abuse of discretion as to call for the exercise of the corrective powers of this Court. It is thus
obvious that no other way is open to this Court by which it may avoid passing upon the constitutional issue thrust upon it. Nor will the
fact that there may be available remedies within the system of military justice bar review considering that the questions raised are
questions of law.4
And so the threshold question is whether the publicity given to the case against the petitioners was such as to prejudice their right to
a fair trial. As already stated, the petitioner Martelino challenged the court-martial president on the ground that newspaper accounts
of what had come to be referred to as the "Corregidor massacre" might unduly influence the trial of their case. The petitioner's
counsel referred to a news item appearing in the July 29, 1969 issue of the Daily Mirror and cited other news reports to the effect that
"coffins are being prepared for the President (of the Philippines) in Jolo," that according to Senator Aquino "massacre victims were
given sea burial," and that Senator Magsaysay, opposition Vice President candidate, had gone to Corregidor and "found bullet shells."
In addition the petitioners cite in this Court a Manila Times editorial of August 26, 1969 which states that "The Jabidah [code name of
the training operations] issue was bound to come up in the course of the election campaign. The opposition could not possibly ignore
an issue that is heavily loaded against the administration." The petitioners argue that under the circumstances they could not expect
a just and fair trial and that, in overruling their challenge for cause based on this ground, the general court-martial committed a grave
abuse of discretion. In support of their contention they invoke the rulings of the United States Supreme Court in Irvin v.
Dowd,5 Rideau vs. Louisiana,6 Estes v. Texas,7 and Shepard v. Maxwell.8
An examination of the cases cited, however, will show that they are widely disparate from this case in a fundamental sense. In Irvin,
for instance, the Supreme Court found that shortly after the petitioner's arrest in connection with six murders committed in
Vanderburgh County, Indiana, the prosecutor and police officials issued press releases stating that the petitioner had confessed to the
six murders and that "a barrage of newspaper headlines articles, cartoons and pictures was unleashed against him during the six or
seven months preceding his trial." In reversing his conviction, the Court said:
Here the "pattern of deep and bitter prejudice' shown to be present throughout the community, ... was clearly
reflected in the sum total of the voir dire examination of a majority of the jurors finally placed in the jury box. Eight
out of the 12 thought petitioner was guilty. With such an opinion permeating their minds, it would be difficult to say
that each could exclude this preconception of guilt from his deliberations. The influence that lurks in an opinion
once formed is so persistent that it unconsciously fights detachment from the processes of the average man. ...
Where one's life is at stake and accounting for the frailties of human nature we can only say that in the light of
the circumstances here the finding of impartiality does not meet the constitutional standard. 9
Irvin marks the first time a state conviction was struck down solely on the ground of prejudicial publicity. 10 In the earlier case
of Shepherd v. Florida, 11 which involved elements of publicity, the reversal of the conviction was based solely on racial
discrimination in the selection of the jury, although to concurring Justice Jackson, who was joined by Justice Frankfurter, "It is hard to
imagine a more prejudicial influence than a press release by the officer of the court charged with defendants' custody stating that
they had confessed, and here just such a statement unsworn to, unseen, uncross-examined and uncontradicted, was conveyed by the
press to the jury. 12

In Rideau, the petitioner, suspect in the robbery of a bank in Lake Charles, Louisiana and in the kidnapping of three of its employees,
and in the killing of one of them, was similarly given "trial by publicity." Thus, the day after his arrest, a moving picture film was taken
of him in an "interview" with the sheriff. The "interview," which lasted approximately 20 minutes, consisted of interrogation by the
sheriff and admission by Rideau that he had perpetrated the bank robbery, kidnapping and murder. The interview was seen and heard
on television by 24,000 people. Two weeks later he was arraigned. His lawyers promptly moved for a change of venue but their
motion was denied and Rideau was convicted and sentenced to death. Rideau's counsel had requested that jurors be excused for
cause, having exhausted all of their peremptory challenges, but these challenges for cause had been denied by the trial judge. In
reversing his conviction, the Court said:
[W]e hold that it was a denial of due process of law to refuse the request for a change of venue, after the people of
Calcasieu Parish had been exposed repeatedly and in depth to the spectacle of Rideau personally confessing in
detail to the crimes with which he was later to be charged. For anyone who has ever watched television the
conclusion cannot be avoided that this spectacle, to the tens of thousands of people who saw and heard it, in a very
real sense was Rideau's trial at which he pleaded guilty to murder. Any subsequent court proceedings in a
community so pervasively exposed to such a spectacle could be but a hollow formality. 13
In the third case, Estes, the Court voided a televised criminal trial for being inherently a denial of due process.
The state ... says that the use of television in the instant case was "without injustice to the person immediately
concerned," basing its position on the fact that the petitioner has established no isolate prejudice and that this must
be shown in order to invalidate a conviction in these circumstances. The State paints too broadly in this contention,
for this Court itself has found instances in which a showing of actual prejudice is not a prerequisite to reversal. This
is such a case. It is true that in most cases involving claims of due process deprivations we require a showing of
identifiable prejudice to the accused. Nevertheless, at times a procedure employed by the State involves such a
probability that prejudice will result that it is inherently lacking in due process. 14
In Sheppard, the celebrated murder case of Sam Sheppard, who was accused of the murder of his wife Marilyn, the Supreme Court
observed a "carnival atmosphere" in which "bedlam reigned at the courthouse ... and newsmen took over practically the entire
courtroom, hounding most of the participants in the trial, especially Sheppard." It observed that "despite the extent and nature of the
publicity to which the jury was exposed during the trial, the judge refused defense counsel's other requests that the jury be asked
whether they had read or heard specific prejudicial comment about the case. ... In these circumstances, we assume that some of this
material reached members of the jury." The Court held:
From the cases coming here we note that unfair and prejudicial news comment on pending trials has become
increasingly prevalent. Due process requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free from outside
influences. Given the pervasiveness of modern communications and the difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity
from the minds of the jurors, the trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that the balance is never
weighed against the accused. And appellate tribunals have the duty to make an independent evaluation of the
circumstances. Of course, there is nothing that proscribes the press from reporting events that transpire in the
courtroom. But where there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial will prevent a fair trial, the
judge should continue the case until the threat abates, or transfer it to another county not so permeated with
publicity. In addition sequestration of the jury was something the judge should have sua sponte with counsel. If
publicity during the proceeding threatens the fairness of the trial, a new trial should be ordered. But we must
remember that reversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in those remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice
at its inception. The courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that will protect their processes from
prejudicial outside interference. Neither prosecutors, counsel for defense, the accused, witnesses, court staff nor
enforcement officers coming under the jurisdiction of the court should be permitted to frustrate its function.
Collaboration between counsel and the press as to information affecting the fairness of a criminal trial is not only
subject to regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary measure. 15
In contrast the spate of publicity in this case before us did not focus on the guilt of the petitioners but rather on the responsibility of
the Government for what was claimed to be a "massacre" of Muslim trainees. If there was a "trial by newspaper" at all, it was not of
the petitioners but of the Government. Absent here is a showing of failure of the court-martial to protect the accused from massive
publicity encouraged by those connected with the conduct of the trial 16 either by a failure to control the release of information or to
remove the trial to another venue or to postpone it until the deluge of prejudicial publicity shall have subsided. Indeed we cannot say
that the trial of the petitioners was being held under circumstances which did not permit the observance of those imperative
decencies of procedure which have come to be identified with due process.
At all events, even granting the existence of "massive" and "prejudicial" publicity, since the petitioners here do not contend that the
respondents have been unduly influenced but simply that they might be by the "barrage" of publicity, we think that the suspension of
the court-martial proceedings has accomplished the purpose sought by the petitioners' challenge for cause, by postponing the trial of
the petitioner until calmer times have returned. The atmosphere has since been cleared and the publicity surrounding the Corregidor
incident has so far abated that we believe the trial may now be resumed in tranquility.
II
Article of War 18 provides that "Each side shall be entitled to one peremptory challenge, but the law member of the court shall not be
challenged except for cause." The general court-martial originally interpreted this provision to mean that the entire defense was

entitled to only one peremptory challenge. Subsequently, on August 27, 1969, it changed its ruling and held that the defense was
entitled to eight peremptory challenges, but the petitioners declined to exercise their right to challenge on the ground that this Court
had earlier restrained further proceedings in the court-martial.
It is the submission of the petitioners that "for every charge, each side may exercise one peremptory challenge," and therefore
because there are eleven charges they are entitled to eleven separate peremptory challenges. The respondents, upon the other
hand, argue that "for each specification jointly tried, all of the accused are entitled to only one peremptory challenge and that with
respect to specifications tried commonly each of the accused is entitled to one peremptory challenge." Although there are actually a
total of eleven specifications against the petitioners, three of these should be considered as merged with two other specifications,
"since in fact they allege the same offenses committed in conspiracy, thus leaving a balance of eight specifications." The general
court-martial thereof takes the position that all the 23 petitioners are entitled to a total of only eight peremptory challenges.
We thus inescapably confront, and therefore now address, the issue here posed.
We are of the view that both the petitioners and the general court-martial misapprehend the true meaning, intent and scope of Article
of War 18. As will hereinafter be demonstrated, each of the petitioners is entitled as a matter of right to one peremptory challenge.
The number of specifications and/or charges, and whether the accused are being jointly tried or undergoing a common trial, are of no
moment.
In the early formative years of the infant Philippine Army, after the passage in 1935 of Commonwealth Act No. 1 (otherwise known as
the National Defense Act), except for a handful of Philippine Scout officers and graduates of the United States military and naval
academies who were on duty with the Philippine Army, there was a complete dearth of officers learned in military law, this aside from
the fact that the officer corps of the developing army was numerically inadequate for the demands of the strictly military aspects of
the national defense program. Because of these considerations it was then felt that peremptory challenges should not in the
meanwhile be permitted and that only challenges for cause, in any number, would be allowed. Thus Article 18 of the Articles of War
(Commonwealth Act No. 408), as worded on September 14, 1938, the date of the approval of the Act, made no mention or reference
to any peremptory challenge by either the trial judge advocate of a court-martial or by the accused. After December 17, 1958, when
the Manual for Courts-Martial 17 of the Philippine Army became effective, the Judge Advocate General's Service of the Philippine
Army conducted a continuing and intensive program of training and education in military law, encompassing the length and breadth
of the Philippines. This program was pursued until the outbreak of World War II in the Pacific on December 7, 1941. After the formal
surrender of Japan to the allies in 1945, the officer corps of the Armed Forces of the Philippines had expanded to a very large number,
and a great many of the officers had been indoctrinated in military law. It was in these environmental circumstances that Article of
War 18 was amended on June 12, 1948 to entitle "each side" to one peremptory challenge, with the sole proviso that "the law
member of court shall not be challenged except for cause."
By its very inherent nature a peremptory challenge does not require any reason or ground therefor to exist or to be stated. It may be
used before, during, or after challenges for cause, or against a member of the court-martial unsuccessfully challenged for cause, or
against a new member if not previously utilized in the trial. A member challenged peremptorily is forthwith excused from duty with
the court-martial.
The right of challenge comes from the common law with the trial by jury itself, and has always been held essential to the fairness of
trial by jury. 18
As was said by Blackstone, and repeated by Mr. Justice Story: 'In criminal cases, or at least in capital ones, there is
in favorem vitae, allowed to the prisoner an arbitrary and capricious species of challenge to a certain number of
jurors, without showing any cause at all, which is called a peremptory challenge; a provision full of that tenderness
and humanity to prisoners, for which our English laws are justly famous. This is grounded on two reasons: 1) As
every one must be sensible, what sudden impression and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to conceive upon
the bare looks and gestures of another; and how necessary it is that a prisoner (when put to defend his life) should
have a good opinion of his jury, the want of which might totally disconcert him; the law has conceived a prejudice
even without being able to assign a reason for his dislike. 2) Because, upon challenges for cause shown, if the
reason assigned prove insufficient to set aside the juror, perhaps the bare questioning his indifference may
sometimes provoke a resentment, to prevent all ill consequences from which, the prisoner is still at liberty, if he
pleases, peremptorily to set him aside.' 19
The right to challenge is in quintessence the right to reject, not to select. If from the officers who remain an impartial military court is
obtained, the constitutional right of the accused to a fair trial is maintained. ... 20
As we have hereinbefore stated, each of the 23 petitioners (accused before the general court-martial) is entitled to one peremptory
challenge, 21 irrespective of the number of specifications and/or charges and regardless of whether they are tried jointly or in
common. Three overriding reasons compel us to this conclusion.
First, a peremptory challenge is afforded to an accused who, whether rightly or wrongly, honestly feels that the member of the court
peremptorily challenged by him cannot sit in judgment over him, impartially. Every accused person is entitled to a fair trial. It is not
enough that objectively the members of the court may be fair and impartial. It is likewise necessary that subjectively the accused
must feel that he is being tried by a fair and impartial body of officers. Because the petitioners may entertain grave doubts as to the

fairness or impartiality of distinct, separate and different individual members of the court-martial, it follows necessarily that each of
the accused is entitled to one peremptory challenge.
Second, Article of War 18 does not distinguish between common trials and joint trials, nor does it make the nature or number of
specifications and/or charges a determinant. Reference is made by the respondents here to US military law, in support of their
argument that for each specification jointly tried all of the accused are entitled to only one peremptory challenge and with respect to
all specifications tried in common each of the accused is entitled to one peremptory challenge. We have carefully scrutinized U.S.
military law, and it is unmistakable from our reading thereof that each accused person, whether in a joint or common trial,
unquestionably enjoys the right to one peremptory challenge. 22
Third, a perceptive analysis of the companion articles 23 to Article 18 convinces us that the word, "each side," as used in the said
article in reference to the defense, should be construed to mean each accused person. Thus, Articles of War 17 (Trial Judge Advocate
to Prosecute; Counsel to Defend), 19 (Oath), 21 (Refusal or Failure to Plead), 28 (Court to Announce Action), 29 (Closed Sessions), 30
(Method of Voting), and 36 (Irregularities Effect of), unequivocally speak of and refer to the "accused" in the singular.
ACCORDINGLY, subject to our pronouncement that each of the 23 petitioners is entitled to one separate peremptory challenge, the
present petition is denied. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on August 29, 1969 is hereby lifted. No
pronouncement as to costs. .

A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC September 13, 2001

RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST
FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS, CESAR SARINO, RENATO
CAYETANO, and ATTY. RICARDO ROMULO, petitioners,
vs.
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES,oppositors.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision denying petitioners' request for permission to televise and broadcast live the trial
of former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. The motion was filed by the Secretary of Justice, as one of the petitioners, who
argues that there is really no conflict between the right of the people to public information and the freedom of the press, on the one
hand, and, on the other, the right of the accused to a fair trial; that if there is a clash between these rights, it must be resolved in
favor of the right of the people and the press because the people, as the repository of sovereignty, are entitled to information; and
that live media coverage is a safeguard against attempts by any party to use the courts as instruments for the pursuit of selfish
interests.
On the other hand, former President Joseph E. Estrada reiterates his objection to the live TV and radio coverage of his trial on the
ground that its allowance will violate the sub judice rule and that, based on his experience with the impeachment trial, live media
coverage will only pave the way for so-called "expert commentary" which can trigger massive demonstrations aimed at pressuring
the Sandiganbayan to render a decision one way or the other. Mr. Estrada contends that the right of the people to information may be
served through other means less distracting, degrading, and prejudicial than live TV and radio coverage.1wphi1.nt
The Court has considered the arguments of the parties on this important issue and, after due deliberation, finds no reason to alter or
in any way modify its decision prohibiting live or real time broadcast by radio or television of the trial of the former president. By a
vote of nine (9) to six (6) of its members, 1 the Court denies the motion for reconsideration of the Secretary of Justice.
In lieu of live TV and radio coverage of the trial, the Court, by the vote of eight (8) Justices, 2 has resolved to order the audio-visual
recording of the trial.
What follows is the opinion of the majority.lawphil.net
Considering the significance of the trial before the Sandiganbayan of former President Estrada and the importance of preserving the
records thereof, the Court believes that there should be an audio-visual recording of the proceedings. The recordings will not be for
live or real time broadcast but for documentary purposes. Only later will they be available for public showing, after the

Sandiganbayan shall have promulgated its decision in every case to which the recording pertains. The master film shall be deposited
in the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for historical preservation and exhibition pursuant to law. 4
For the purpose of recording the proceedings, cameras will be inconspicuously installed in the courtroom and the movement of TV
crews will be regulated, consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings. The trial shall be recorded in its entirety, except
such portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan may decide should not be held public pursuant to Rule 119, 21 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. No comment shall be included in the documentary except annotations which may be necessary to explain certain
scenes which are depicted. The audio-visual recordings shall be made under the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or its
Division as the case may be.
There are several reasons for such televised recording.1awphil.net First, the hearings are of historic significance. They are an
affirmation of our commitment to the rule that "the King is under no man, but he is under God and the law." (Quod Rex non debet
esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et Lege.) Second, the Estrada cases involve matters of vital concern to our people who have a
fundamental right to know how their government is conducted. This right can be enhanced by audio visual presentation. Third, audiovisual presentation is essential for the education and civic training of the people.
Above all, there is the need to keep audio-visual records of the hearings for documentary purposes. The recordings will be useful in
preserving the essence of the proceedings in a way that the cold print cannot quite do because it cannot capture the sights and
sounds of events. They will be primarily for the use of appellate courts in the event a review of the proceedings, rulings, or decisions
of the Sandiganbayan is sought or becomes necessary. The accuracy of the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial
can be checked by reference to the tapes.
On the other hand, by delaying the release of the tapes for broadcast, concerns that those taking part in the proceedings will be
playing to the cameras and will thus be distracted from the proper performance of their roles -- whether as counsel, witnesses, court
personnel, or judges -- will be allayed. The possibility that parallel trials before the bar of justice and the bar of public opinion may
jeopardize, or even prevent, the just determination of the cases can be minimized. The possibility that judgment will be rendered by
the popular tribunal before the court of justice can render its own will be avoided.
At the same time, concerns about the regularity and fairness of the trial -- which, it may be assumed, is the concern of those opposed
to, as much as of those in favor of, televised trials - will be addressed since the tapes will not be released for public showing until
after the decision of the cases by the Sandiganbayan. By delaying the release of the tapes, much of the problem posed by real time
TV and radio broadcast will be avoided.
Thus, many important purposes for preserving the record of the trial can be served by audio-visual recordings without impairing the
right of the accused to a fair trial.
Nor is the right of privacy of the accused a bar to the production of such documentary. In Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. V. Capulong,5 this
Court set aside a lower court's injunction restraining the filming of "Four Day Revolution," a documentary film depicting, among other
things, the role of then Minister of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile in the 1986 EDSA people power. This Court held: "A limited
intrusion into a person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a public figure and the information
sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him constitute matters of a public character." 6
No one can prevent the making of a movie based on the trial. But, at least, if a documentary record is made of the proceedings, any
movie that may later be produced can be checked for its accuracy against such documentary and any attempt to distort the truth can
thus be averted.
Indeed, a somewhat similar proposal for documentary recording of celebrated cases or causes clbres was made was made way
back in 1971 by Paul Freund of the Harvard Law School. As he explained:
In fairness let me refer to an American experience many of my lay friends found similarly moving. An educational television
network filmed a trial in Denver of a Black Panther leader on charges of resisting arrest, and broadcast the document in full,
in four installments, several months after the case was concluded -- concluded incidentally, with a verdict of acquittal.
No one could witness the trial without a feeling of profound respect for the painstaking way in which the truth was searched
for, for the ways whereby law copes with uncertainties and ambiguities through presumptions and burden of proof, and the
sense of gravity with which judge and jury carried out their responsibilities.
I agree in general with the exclusion of television from the courtroom, for the familiar good reasons. And yet the use of
television at a trial for documentary purposes, not for the broadcast of live news, and with the safeguards of completeness
and consent, is an educational experiment that I would be prepared to welcome. Properly safeguarded and with suitable
commentary, the depiction of an actual trial is an agency of enlightenment that could have few equals in its impact on the
public understanding.
Understanding of our legal process, so rarely provided by our educational system, is now a desperate need. 7

Professor Freund's observation is as valid today as when it was made thirty years ago. It is perceptive for its recognition of the serious
risks posed to the fair administration of justice by live TV and radio broadcasts, especially when emotions are running high on the
issues stirred by a case, while at the same time acknowledging the necessity of keeping audio-visual recordings of the proceedings of
celebrated cases, for public information and exhibition, after passions have subsided.
WHEREFORE, an audio-visual recording of the trial of former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to be
made, for the account of the Sandiganbayan, under the following conditions: (a) the trial shall be recorded in its entirety, excepting
such portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan may determine should not be held public under Rule 119, 21 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure; (b) cameras shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom and the movement of TV crews shall be regulated
consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings; (c) the audio-visual recordings shall be made for documentary purposes
only and shall be made without comment except such annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be necessary to explain them;
(d) the live broadcast of the recordings before the Sandiganbayan shall have rendered its decision in all the cases against the former
President shall be prohibited under pain of contempt of court and other sanctions in case of violations of the prohibition; (e) to ensure
that the conditions are observed, the audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall be made under the supervision and control of
the Sandiganbayan or its Division concerned and shall be made pursuant to rules promulgated by it; and (f) simultaneously with the
release of the audio-visual recordings for public broadcast, the original thereof shall be deposited in the National Museum and the
Records Management and Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 7199

July 22, 2009
[Formerly CBD 04-1386]
FOODSPHERE, INC., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MELANIO L. MAURICIO, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Foodsphere, Inc. (complainant), a corporation engaged in the business of meat processing and manufacture and distribution of
canned goods and grocery products under the brand name "CDO," filed a Verified Complaint 1 for disbarment before the Commission
on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Melanio L. Mauricio, Jr., popularly known as "Batas
Mauricio" (respondent), a writer/columnist of tabloids including Balitang Patas BATAS, Bagong TIKTIK, TORO and HATAW!, and a host
of a television program KAKAMPI MO ANG BATAS telecast over UNTV and of a radio program Double B-BATAS NG BAYAN aired over
DZBB, for (1) grossly immoral conduct; (2) violation of lawyers oath and (3) disrespect to the courts and to investigating
prosecutors.
The facts that spawned the filing of the complaint are as follows:
On June 22, 2004, a certain Alberto Cordero (Cordero) purportedly bought from a grocery in Valenzuela City canned goods including
a can of CDO Liver spread. On June 27, 2004, as Cordero and his relatives were eating bread with the CDO Liver spread, they found
the spread to be sour and soon discovered a colony of worms inside the can.
Corderos wife thus filed a complaint with the Bureau of Food and Drug Administration (BFAD). Laboratory examination confirmed
the presence of parasites in the Liver spread.
Pursuant to Joint DTI-DOH-DA Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993, the BFAD conducted a conciliation hearing on July 27,
2004 during which the spouses Cordero demanded P150,000 as damages from complainant. Complainant refused to heed the
demand, however, as being in contravention of company policy and, in any event, "outrageous."
Complainant instead offered to return actual medical and incidental expenses incurred by the Corderos as long as they were
supported by receipts, but the offer was turned down. And the Corderos threatened to bring the matter to the attention of the
media.
Complainant was later required by the BFAD to file its Answer to the complaint. In the meantime or on August 6, 2004, respondent

sent complainant via fax a copy of the front page of the would-be August 10-16, 2004 issue of the tabloid Balitang Patas BATAS, Vol.
1, No. 122 which complainant found to contain articles maligning, discrediting and imputing vices and defects to it and its products.
Respondent threatened to publish the articles unless complainant gave in to the P150,000 demand of the Corderos. Complainant
thereupon reiterated its counter-offer earlier conveyed to the Corderos, but respondent turned it down.
Respondent later proposed to settle the matter for P50,000, P15,000 of which would go to the Corderos andP35,000 to his Batas
Foundation. And respondent directed complainant to place paid advertisements in the tabloids and television program.
The Corderos eventually forged a KASUNDUAN3 seeking the withdrawal of their complaint before the BFAD. The BFAD thus
dismissed the complaint.4 Respondent, who affixed his signature to the KASUNDUAN as a witness, later wrote in one of his
articles/columns in a tabloid that he prepared the document.
On August 11, 2004, respondent sent complainant an Advertising Contract 5 asking complainant to advertise in the tabloid Balitang
Patas BATAS for its next 24 weekly issues at P15,000 per issue or a total amount ofP360,000, and a Program Profile6 of the
television program KAKAMPI MO ANG BATAS also asking complainant to place spot advertisements with the following rate cards: (a)
spot buy 15-second TVC at P4,000; (b) spot buy 30-second TVC at P7,700; and (c) season buy [13 episodes, 26 spots] of 30-second
TVC for P130,000.
As a sign of goodwill, complainant offered to buy three full-page advertisements in the tabloid amounting toP45,000 at P15,000 per
advertisement, and three spots of 30-second TVC in the television program at P7,700 each or a total of P23,100. Acting on
complainants offer, respondent relayed to it that he and his Executive Producer were disappointed with the offer and threatened to
proceed with the publication of the articles/columns.7
On August 28, 2004, respondent, in his radio program Double B- Batas ng Bayan at radio station DZBB, announced the holding of a
supposed contest sponsored by said program, which announcement was transcribed as follows:
"OK, at meron akong pa-contest, total magpapasko na o ha, meron pa-contest si Batas Mauricio ang Batas ng Bayan. Ito yung ating
pa-contest, hulaan ninyo, tatawag kayo sa telepono, 433-7549 at 433-7553. Ang mga premyo babanggitin po natin sa susunod
pero ito muna ang contest, o, aling liver spread ang may uod? Yan kita ninyo yan, ayan malalaman ninyo yan. Pagka-nahulaan
yan ah, at sasagot kayo sa akin, aling liver spread ang may uod at anong companya ang gumagawa nyan? Itawag po ninyo
sa 433-7549 st 433-7553. Open po an[g] contest na ito sa lahat ng ating tagapakinig. Pipiliin natin ang mananalo, kung tama ang
inyong sagot. Ang tanong, aling liver spread sa Pilipinas an[g] may uod? 8 (Emphasis and italics in the original; underscoring
supplied)
And respondent wrote in his columns in the tabloids articles which put complainant in bad light. Thus, in the August 31- September
6, 2004 issue of Balitang Patas BATAS, he wrote an article captioned "KADIRI ANG CDO LIVER SPREAD!" In another article, he wrote
"IBA PANG PRODUKTO NG CDO SILIPIN!"9 which appeared in the same publication in its September 7-13, 2004 issue. And still in the
same publication, its September 14-20, 2004 issue, he wrote another article entitled "DAPAT BANG PIGILIN ANG CDO." 10
Respondent continued his tirade against complainant in his column LAGING HANDA published in another tabloid, BAGONG TIKTIK,
with the following articles:11 (a) "Uod sa liver spread," Setyembre 6, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.276); 12(b) "Uod, itinanggi ng CDO,"
Setyembre 7, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.277);13 (c) "Pagpapatigil sa CDO," Setyembre 8, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.278); 14 (d) "Uod sa liver spread
kumpirmado," Setyembre 9, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.279);15 (e) "Salaysay ng nakakain ng uod," Setyembre 10, 2004 (Taon 7,
Blg.280);16 (f) "Kaso VS. CDO itinuloy," Setyembre 11, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.281); 17 (g) "Kasong Kidnapping laban sa CDO guards,"
Setyembre 14, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.284);18 (h) "Brutalidad ng CDO guards," Setyembre 15, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.285); 19 (i) "CDO guards
pinababanatan sa PNP," Setyembre 17, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.287); 20 (j) "May uod na CDO liver spread sa Puregold binili," Setyembre
18, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.288);21 (k) "Desperado na ang CDO," Setyembre 20, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.290); 22 (l) "Atty. Rufus Rodriguez
pumadrino sa CDO," Setyembre 21, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 291); 23 (m) "Kasunduan ng CDO at Pamilya Cordero," Setyembre 22, 2004
(Taon 7,Blg. 292);24 (n) "Bakit nagbayad ng P50 libo ang CDO," Setyembre 23, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 293). 25
In his September 8, 2004 column "Anggulo ng Batas" published in Hataw!, respondent wrote an article "Reaksyon pa sa uod ng
CDO Liver Spread."26
And respondent, in several episodes in September 2004 of his television program Kakampi Mo ang Batas aired over UNTV,
repeatedly complained of what complainant claimed to be the "same baseless and malicious allegations/issues" against it. 27
Complainant thus filed criminal complaints against respondent and several others for Libel and Threatening to Publish Libel under
Articles 353 and 356 of the Revised Penal Code before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and Valenzuela City. The
complaints were pending at he time of the filing of the present administrative complaint. 28
In the criminal complaints pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, docketed as I.S. Nos. V-04-2917-2933,
respondent filed his Entry of Appearance with Highly Urgent Motion to Elevate These Cases to the Department of Justice, 29 alleging:
xxxx
2.N. The question here is this: What gives, Honorable (???) Prosecutors of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City?

xxxx
2.R. Can an ordinary person like Villarez simply be tossed around, waiting for miracles to happen?
2.S. Why? How much miracle is needed to happen here before this Office would ever act on his complaint?
xxxx
8. With a City Prosecutor acting the way he did in the case filed by Villarez, and with an investigating prosecutor virtually kowtowing
to the wishes of his boss, the Chief Prosecutor, can Respondents expect justice to be meted to them?
9. With utmost due respect, Respondents have reason to believe that justice would elude them in this Office of the City Prosecutor
of Valenzuela City, not because of the injustice of their cause, but, more importantly, because of the injustice of the system;
10. Couple all of these with reports that many a government office in Valenzuela City had been the willing recipient of too many
generosities in the past of the Complainant, and also with reports that a top official of the City had campaigned for his much
coveted position in the past distributing products of the Complainant, what would one expect the Respondents to think?
11. Of course, not to be lost sight of here is the attitude and behavior displayed even by mere staff and underlings of this Office to
people who dare complain against the Complainant in their respective turfs. Perhaps, top officials of this Office should investigate
and ask their associates and relatives incognito to file, even if on a pakunwari basis only, complaints against the Complainant, and
they would surely be given the same rough and insulting treatment that Respondent Villarez got when he filed his kidnapping
charge here;30
And in a Motion to Dismiss [the case] for Lack of Jurisdiction 31 which respondent filed, as counsel for his therein co-respondentsstaffers of the newspaper Hataw!, before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, respondent alleged:
xxxx
5. If the Complainant or its lawyer merely used even a little of whatever is inside their thick skulls, they would have clearly
deduced that this Office has no jurisdiction over this action.32 (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Meanwhile, on October 26, 2004, complainant filed a civil case against respondent and several others, docketed as Civil Case No.
249-V-04,33 before the Regional Trial Court, Valenzuela City and raffled to Branch 75 thereof.
The pending cases against him and the issuance of a status quo order notwithstanding, respondent continued to publish articles
against complainant34 and to malign complainant through his television shows.
Acting on the present administrative complaint, the Investigating Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) came
up with the following findings in his October 5, 2005 Report and Recommendation: 35
I.
xxxx
In Civil Case No. 249-V-04 entitled "Foodsphere, Inc. vs. Atty. [Melanio] Mauricio, et al.", the Order dated 10 December 2004 (Annex
O of the Complaint) was issued by Presiding Judge Dionisio C. Sison which in part reads:
"Anent the plaintiffs prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order included in the instant plaintiffs motion, this Court,
inasmuch as the defendants failed to appear in court or file an opposition thereto, is constrained to GRANT the said plaintiffs
prater, as it is GRANTED, in order to maintain STATUS QUO, and that all the defendants, their agents, representatives or any person
acting for and in behalf are hereby restrained/enjoined from further publishing, televising and/or broadcasting any matter subject of
the Complaint in the instant case more specifically the imputation of vices and/or defects on plaintiff and its products."
Complainant alleged that the above-quoted Order was served on respondent by the Branch Sheriff on 13 December 2004.
Respondent has not denied the issuance of the Order dated 10 December 2004 or his receipt of a copy thereof on 13 December
2004.
Despite his receipt of the Order dated 10 December 2004, and the clear directive therein addressed to him to desists [sic] from
"further publishing, televising and/or broadcasting any matter subject of the Complaint in the instant case more specifically the
imputation of vices and/or defects on plaintiff and its products", respondent in clear defiance of this Order came out with articles on
the prohibited subject matter in his column "Atty. Batas", 2004 in the December 16 and 17, 2004 issues of the tabloid "Balitang

Bayan Toro" (Annexes Q and Q-1 of the Complaint).

The above actuations of respondent are also in violation of Rule 13.03 of the Canon of Professional Responsibilitywhich reads: "A
lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a
party."
II.
xxxx
In I.S. No. V.04-2917-2933, then pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, respondent filed his "Entry of
Appearance with Highly Urgent Motion to Elevate These Cases To the Department of Justice". In said pleading, respondent made the
following statements:
xxxx
The above language employed by respondent undoubtedly casts aspersions on the integrity of the Office of the City Prosecutor and
all the Prosecutors connected with said Office. Respondent clearly assailed the impartiality and fairness of the said Office in
handling cases filed before it and did not even design to submit any evidence to substantiate said wild allegations. The use by
respondent of the above-quoted language in his pleadings is manifestly violative of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides: "A lawyer [s]hall [o]bserve and [m]aintain [t]he [re]spect [d]ue [t]o [t]he [c]ourts [a]nd [t]o [j]udicial
[o]fficers [a]nd [s]hould [i]nsist [o]n [s]imilar [c]onduct [b]y [o]thers."
III.
The "Kasunduan" entered into by the Spouses Cordero and herein complainant (Annex C of the Complaint) was admittedly
prepared, witnessed and signed by herein respondent.
xxxx
In its Order dated 16 August 2004, the Bureau of Food and Drugs recognized that the said "Kasunduan" was not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order and policy, and this accordingly dismissed the complaint filed by the Spouses Cordero against
herein complainant.
However, even after the execution of the "Kasunduan" and the consequent dismissal of the complaint of his clients against herein
complainant, respondent inexplicably launched a media offensive intended to disparage and put to ridicule herein complainant. On
record are the numerous articles of respondent published in 3 tabloids commencing from 31 August to 17 December 2004 (Annexes
G to Q-1). As already above-stated, respondent continued to come out with these articles against complainant in his tabloid
columns despite a temporary restraining order issued against him expressly prohibiting such actions. Respondent did not deny that
he indeed wrote said articles and submitted them for publication in the tabloids.
Respondent claims that he was prompted by his sense of public service, that is, to expose the defects of complainants products to
the consuming public. Complainant claims that there is a baser motive to the actions of respondent. Complainant avers that
respondent retaliated for complainants failure to give in to respondents "request" that complainant advertise in the tabloids and
television programs of respondent. Complainants explanation is more credible. Nevertheless, whatever the true motive of
respondent for his barrage of articles against complainant does not detract from the fact that respondent consciously violated the
spirit behind the "Kasunduan" which he himself prepared and signed and submitted to the BFAD for approval. Respondent was less
than forthright when he prepared said "Kasunduan" and then turned around and proceeded to lambaste complainant for what was
supposedly already settled in said agreement. Complainant would have been better of with the BFAD case proceeding as it could
have defended itself against the charges of the Spouses Cordero. Complainant was helpless against the attacks of respondent, a
media personality. The actuations of respondent constituted, to say the least, deceitful conduct contemplated under Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.36 (Underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors, by Resolution No. XVIII-2006-114 dated March 20, 2006, adopted the findings and recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner to suspend respondent from the practice of law for two years.
The Court finds the findings/evaluation of the IBP well-taken.
The Court, once again, takes this occasion to emphasize the necessity for every lawyer to act and comport himself in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession,37 which confidence may be eroded by the irresponsible and
improper conduct of a member of the bar.
By the above-recited acts, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers to
refrain from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. For, as the IBP found, he engaged in deceitful conduct
by, inter alia, taking advantage of the complaint against CDO to advance his interest to obtain funds for his Batas Foundation and
seek sponsorships and advertisements for the tabloids and his television program.

He also violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates:
A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a
party.
For despite the pendency of the civil case against him and the issuance of a status quo order restraining/enjoining further
publishing, televising and broadcasting of any matter relative to the complaint of CDO, respondent continued with his attacks
against complainant and its products. At the same time, respondent violated Canon 1 also of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which mandates lawyers to "uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and
legal processes." For he defied said status quo order, despite his (respondents) oath as a member of the legal profession to "obey
the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities."
Further, respondent violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandate, viz:
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper, by
using intemperate language.
Apropos is the following reminder in Saberon v. Larong:38
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong language in pursuit of their
duty to advance the interests of their clients.
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of
offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing
but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.1awphi1
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact
prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In
keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyers language even in his pleadings must be dignified.39 (Underscoring
supplied)
By failing to live up to his oath and to comply with the exacting standards of the legal profession, respondent alsoviolated Canon 7
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which directs a lawyer to "at all times uphold the integrity and the dignity of the legal
profession."401avvph!1
The power of the media to form or influence public opinion cannot be underestimated. In Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr.,41 the therein
complainant engaged therein-herein respondents services as "she was impressed by the pro-poor and pro-justice advocacy of
respondent, a media personality,"42 only to later find out that after he demanded and the therein complainant paid an exorbitant
fee, no action was taken nor any pleadings prepared by him. Respondent was suspended for six months.
On reading the articles respondent published, not to mention listening to him over the radio and watching him on television, it
cannot be gainsaid that the same could, to a certain extent, have affected the sales of complainant.
Back to Dalisay, this Court, in denying therein-herein respondents motion for reconsideration, took note of the fact that respondent
was motivated by vindictiveness when he filed falsification charges against the therein complainant. 43
To the Court, suspension of respondent from the practice of law for three years is, in the premises, sufficient.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Melanio Mauricio is, for violation of the lawyers oath and breach of ethics of the legal profession as embodied
in the Code of Professional Responsibility, SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three years effective upon his receipt of this
Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to his personal record and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 90083 October 4, 1990

KHALYXTO PEREZ MAGLASANG, accused-petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Presiding Judge ERNESTO B. TEMPLADO (San Carlos City Court), Negros
Occidental, respondents.
Marceliano L. Castellano for petitioner.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On June 22, 1989, a petition for certiorari 1 entitled "Khalyxto Perez Maglasang vs. People of the Philippines, Presiding Judge, Ernesto
B. Templado (San Carlos City Court) Negros Occidental," was filed by registered mail with the Court. Due to non-compliance with the
requirements of Circular No. 1-88 of the Court, specifically the non- payment of P316.50 for the legal fees and the non-attachment of
the duplicate originals or duly certified true copies of the questioned decision and orders of the respondent judge denying the motion
for reconsideration, the Court dismissed the petition on July 26, 1989. 2
On September 9, 1989, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano, as counsel of the petitioner, moved for a reconsideration of the resolution
dismissing the petition. 3 This time, the amount of P316.50 was remitted and the Court was furnished with a duplicate copy of the
respondent judge's decision, and also the IBP O.R. No. and the date of the payment of his membership dues. The motion for
reconsideration did not contain the duplicate original or certified true copies of the assailed orders. Thus, in a Resolution dated
October 18, 1989, the motion for reconsideration was denied "with FINALITY." 4
Three months later, or on January 22, 1990 to be exact, the Court received from Atty. Castellano a copy of a complaint dated
December 19, 1989, filed with the Office of the President of the Philippines whereby Khalyxto Perez Maglasang, through his lawyer,
Atty. Castellano, as complainant, accused all the five Justices of the Court's Second Division with "biases and/or ignorance of the law
or knowingly rendering unjust judgments or resolution." 5The complaint was signed by Atty. Castellano "for the complainant" with the
conformity of one Calixto B. Maglasang, allegedly the father of accused-complainant Khalyxto. 6 By reason of the strong and
intemperate language of the complaint and its improper filing with the Office of the President, which, as he should know as a lawyer,
has no jurisdiction to discipline, much more, remove, Justices of the Supreme Court, on February 7, 1990, Atty. Castellano was
required to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt or administratively dealt with for improper conduct. 7 On March
21, 1990, Atty. Castellano filed by registered mail his "Opposition To Cite For Contempt Or Administratively Dealt With For An Improper
Conduct (sic)." 8
In his "Opposition", Atty. Castellano claimed that the complaint "was a constructive criticism intended to correct in good faith the
erroneous and very strict practices of the Justices concerned, as Respondents (sic). 9 Atty. Castellano further disputed the authority
and jurisdiction of the Court in issuing the Resolution requiring him to show cause inasmuch as "they are Respondents in this
particular case and no longer as Justices and as such they have no more jurisdiction to give such order." 10 Thus, according to him,
"the most they (Justices) can do by the mandate of the law and procedure (sic) is to answer the complaint satisfactorily so that they
will not be punished in accordance with the law just like a common tao." 11
Notwithstanding his claim that the complaint was a "constructive criticism," the Court finds the various statements made by Atty.
Castellano in the complaint he lodged with the Office of the President of the Philippines and in his "Opposition" filed with the Court
portions of which read as follows:
VI
That with all these injustices of the 2nd Division, as assigned to that most Honorable Supreme Court, the
complainant was legally constrained to file this Administrative Complaint to our Motherly President who is firm and
determined to phase-out all the scalawags (Marcos Appointees and Loyalists) still in your administration without
bloodshed but by honest and just investigations, which the accused-complainant concurs to such procedure and
principle, or otherwise, he could have by now a rebel with the undersigned with a cause for being maliciously
deprived or unjustly denied of Equal Justice to be heard by our Justices designated to the Highest and most
Honorable Court of the Land (Supreme Court); 12 (Emphasis ours.)

VII
That the Honorable Supreme Court as a Court has no fault at all for being Constitutionally created, but the Justices
assigned therein are fallables (sic), being bias (sic), playing ignorance of the law and knowingly rendering unjust
Resolutions the reason observed by the undersigned and believed by him in good faith, is that they are may be
Marcos-appointees, whose common intention is to sabotage the Aquino Administration and to rob from innocent
Filipino people the genuine Justice and Democracy, so that they will be left in confusion and turmoil to their
advantage and to the prejudice of our beloved President's honest, firm and determined Decision to bring back the
real Justice in all our Courts, for the happiness, contentment and progress of your people and the only country
which God has given us. PHILIPPINES. 13 (Emphasis ours.)
VIII
That all respondents know the law and the pure and simple meaning of Justice, yet they refused to grant to the poor
and innocent accused-complainant, so to save their brethren in rank and office (Judiciary) Judge Ernesto B.
Templado, . . . 14
IX
. . . If such circulars were not known to the undersigned, it's the fault of the Justices of the Honorable Supreme
Court, the dismissal of the petition was based more of money reasons. . . . This is so for said Equal Justice is our
very Breath of Life to every Filipino, who is brave to face the malicious acts of the Justices of the Second Division,
Supreme Court. By reason of fear for the truth Respondents ignore the equal right of the poor and innocent-accused
(complainant) to be heard against the rich and high-ranking person in our Judiciary to be heard in equal justice in
our Honorable Court, for the respondents is too expensive and can't be reached by an ordinary man for the Justices
therein areinconsiderate, extremely strict and meticulous to the common tao and hereby grossly violate their Oath
of Office and our Constitution "to give all possible help and means to give equal Justice to any man, regardless of
ranks and status in life" 15 (Emphasis ours.)
xxx xxx xxx
5. That the undersigned had instantly without delay filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the Resolution which
carries with it a final denial of his appeal by complying (sic) all the requirements needed for a valid appeal yet the
respondents denied just the same which legally hurt the undersigned in the name of Justice, for the RespondentsJustices, were so strict or inhumane and soinconsiderate that there despensation (sic) of genuine justice was too far
and beyond the reach of the Accused-Appellant, as a common tao, as proved by records of both cases mentioned
above. 16
xxx xxx xxx
D. That by nature a contempt order is a one sided weapon commonly abused by Judges and Justices, against
practicing lawyers, party-litigants and all Filipino people in general for no Judges or Justices since the beginning of
our Court Records were cited for contempt by any presiding Judge. That this weapon if maliciously applied is a cruel
means to silence a righteous and innocent complainant and to favor any person with close relation. 17
scurrilous and contumacious. His allegations that the Court in dismissing his petition did so "to save their brethren in rank
and office (Judiciary) Judge Ernesto B. Templado," and that the dismissal was "based more for (sic) money reasons;" and his
insinuation that the Court maintains a double standard in dispensing justice one set for the rich and another for the poor
went beyond the bounds of "constructive criticism." They are not relevant to the cause of his client. On the contrary, they
cast aspersion on the Court's integrity as a neutral and final arbiter of all justiciable controversies brought before it. Atty.
Castellano should know that the Court in resolving complaints yields only to the records before it and not to any extraneous
influence as he disparagingly intimates.
It bears stress that the petition was dismissed initially by the Court for the counsel's failure to fully comply with the requirements laid
down in Circular No. 1-88, a circular on expeditious disposition of cases, adopted by the Court on November 8, 1988, but effective
January 1, 1989, after due publication. It is true that Atty. Castellano later filed on behalf of his client a motion for reconsideration and
remitted the necessary legal fees, 18 furnished the Court with a duplicate original copy of the assailed trial court's decision, 19 and
indicated his IBP O.R. No. and the date he paid his dues. 20 But he still fell short in complying fully with the requirements of Circular
No. 1-88. He failed to furnish the Court with duplicate original or duty certified true copies of the other questioned orders issued by
the respondent trial court judge. At any rate, the explanation given by Atty. Castellano did not render his earlier negligence
excusable. Thus, as indicated in our Resolution dated October 18, 1989 which denied with finality his motion for reconsideration, "no
valid or compelling reason (having been) adduced to warrant the reconsideration sought." Precisely, under paragraph 5 of Circular No.
1-88 it is provided that "(S)ubsequent compliance with the above requirements will not warrant reconsideration of the order of
dismissal unless it be shown that such non-compliance was due to compelling reasons."

It is clear that the case was lost not by the alleged injustices Atty. Castellano irresponsibly ascribed to the members of the Court's
Second Division, but simply because of his inexcusable negligence and incompetence. Atty. Castellano, however, seeks to pass on the
blame for his deficiencies to the Court, in the hope of salvaging his reputation before his client. Unfortunately, the means by which
Atty. Castellano hoped to pass the buck so to speak, are grossly improper. As an officer of the Court, he should have known better
than to smear the honor and integrity of the Court just to keep the confidence of his client. Time and again we have emphasized that
a "lawyer's duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate; and his
conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics." 21 Thus, "while a lawyer must advocate his client's
cause in utmost earnest and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at liberty to resort to arrogance, intimidation, and
innuendo." 22
To be sure, the Court does not pretend to be immune from criticisms. After all, it is through the criticism of its actions that the Court,
composed of fallible mortals, hopes to correct whatever mistake it may have unwittingly committed. But then again, "[i]t is the
cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide
chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other.
Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts." 23 In this regard, it is precisely provided under
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility that:
CANON 11-A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL
OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
xxx xxx xxx
RULE 11.03 A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menancing language or behavior before the
courts.
RULE 11.04 A lawyer should not attribute to a judge motives not supported by the record or have materiality to
the case.
xxx xxx xxx
We further note that in filing the "complaint" against the justices of the Court's Second Division, even the most basic tenet of our
government system the separation of powers between the judiciary, the executive, and the legislative branches has been lost on
Atty. Castellano. We therefore take this occasion to once again remind all and sundry that "the Supreme Court is supreme the third
great department of government entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public
and private. No other department or agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them 'unjust.'" 24 Consequently, and owing to
the foregoing, not even the President of the Philippines as Chief Executive may pass judgment on any of the Court's acts.
Finally, Atty. Castellano's assertion that the complaint "was a constructive criticism intended to correct in good faith the erroneous
and very strict practices of the Justices, concerned as Respondents (sic)" is but a last minute effort to sanitize his clearly unfounded
and irresponsible accusation. The arrogance displayed by counsel in insisting that the Court has no jurisdiction to question his act of
having complained before the Office of the President, and in claiming that a contempt order is used as a weapon by judges and
justices against practicing lawyers, however, reveals all too plainly that he was not honestly motivated in his criticism. Rather, Atty.
Castellano's complaint is a vilification of the honor and integrity of the Justices of the Second Division of the Court and an
impeachment of their capacity to render justice according to law.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano is found guilty of CONTEMPT OF COURT and IMPROPER CONDUCT as a member of the Bar
and an officer of the Court, and is hereby ordered to PAY within fifteen (15) days from and after the finality of this Resolution a fine of
One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos, or SUFFER ten (10) days imprisonment in the municipal jail of Calatrava, Negros Occidental in case
he fails to pay the fine seasonably, and SUSPENDED from the practice of law throughout the Philippines for six (6) months as soon as
this Resolution becomes final, with a WARNING that a repetition of any misconduct on his part will be dealt with more severely. Let
notice of this Resolution be entered in Atty. Castellano's record, and be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Court of
Appeals, and the Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Courts and other Courts of the country, for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6155

March 14, 2006

MA. GINA L. FRANCISCO, JOSEPHINE S. TAN and CARLOS M. JOAQUIN, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. JAIME JUANITO P. PORTUGAL, Respondent.
DECISION

TINGA, J.:
Complainants filed before this Court an affidavit-complaint1 on 15 August 2003 against Atty. Jaime Juanito P. Portugal (respondent) for
violation of the Lawyers Oath, gross misconduct, and gross negligence. Complainants are related to petitioners in G.R. No. 152621-23
entitled SPO1 Ernest C. Francisco, SPO1 Donato F. Tan and PO3 Rolando M. Joaquin v. People of the Philippines, in whose behalf
respondent filed the Petition for Review on Certiorari (Ad Cautelam) in the case.
The complaint against respondent originated from his alleged mishandling of the above-mentioned petition which eventually led to its
denial with finality by this Court to the prejudice of petitioners therein.
The facts are as follows:
On 21 March 1994, SPO1 Ernesto C. Francisco, SPO1 Donato F. Tan and PO3 Rolando M. Joaquin (eventually petitioners in G.R. No.
152621-23, collectively referred to herein as the accused) were involved in a shooting incident which resulted in the death of two
individuals and the serious injury of another. As a result, Informations were filed against them before the Sandiganbayan for murder
and frustrated murder. The accused pleaded not guilty and trial ensued. After due trial, the Sandiganbayan 2 found the accused guilty
of two counts of homicide and one count of attempted homicide.
At that juncture, complainants engaged the services of herein respondent for the accused. Respondent then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with the Sandiganbayan but it was denied in a Resolution dated 21 August 2001. Unfazed by the denial, respondent
filed an Urgent Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration, with the attached Second Motion for
Reconsideration.3 Pending resolution by the Sandiganbayan, respondent also filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari
(Ad Cautelam) on 3 May 2002.
Thereafter, complainants never heard from respondent again despite the frequent telephone calls they made to his office. When
respondent did not return their phone inquiries, complainants went to respondents last known address only to find out that he had
moved out without any forwarding address.
More than a year after the petition was filed, complainants were constrained to personally verify the status of thead cautelam petition
as they had neither news from respondent about the case nor knowledge of his whereabouts. They were shocked to discover that the
Court had already issued a Resolution4 dated 3 July 2002, denying the petition for late filing and non-payment of docket fees.
Complainants also learned that the said Resolution had attained finality and warrants of arrest 5 had already been issued against the
accused because respondent, whose whereabouts remained unknown, did nothing to prevent the reglementary period for seeking
reconsideration from lapsing.
In his Comment,6 respondent states that it is of vital significance that the Court notes that he was not the original counsel of the
accused. He only met the accused during the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision convicting the accused of two counts of
homicide and one count of attempted homicide. He was merely requested by the original counsel to be on hand, assist the accused,
and be present at the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision.
Respondent claims that there was no formal engagement undertaken by the parties. But only because of his sincere effort and in true
spirit of the Lawyers Oath did he file the Motion for Reconsideration. Though admitting its highly irregular character, respondent also
made informal but urgent and personal representation with the members of the Division of the Sandiganbayan who promulgated the
decision of conviction. He asserts that because of all the efforts he put into the case of the accused, his other professional obligations
were neglected and that all these were done without proper and adequate remuneration.
As to the ad cautelam petition, respondent maintains that it was filed on time. He stresses that the last day of filing of the petition
was on 3 April 2002 and on that very day, he filed with this Court a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review, 7 seeking
an additional thirty (30) days to file the petition. Subsequently, on 3 May 2002, he filed the petition by registered mail and paid the
corresponding docket fees. Hence, so he concludes, it was filed within the reglementary period.
Soon thereafter, respondent recounted all the "herculean" efforts he made in assisting the accused for almost a year after the
promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision. He considered the fact that it was a case he had just inherited from the original counsel;
the effect of his handling the case on his other equally important professional obligations; the lack of adequate financial consideration
for handling the case; and his plans to travel to the United States to explore further professional opportunities. He then decided to
formally withdraw as counsel for the accused. He wrote a letter to PO3 Rolando Joaquin (PO3 Joaquin), who served as the contact
person between respondent and complainants, explaining his decision to withdraw as their counsel, and attaching the Notice to
Withdraw which respondent instructed the accused to sign and file with the Court. He sent the letter through registered mail but
unfortunately, he could not locate the registry receipt issued for the letter.
Respondent states that he has asked the accused that he be discharged from the case and endorsed the Notice of Withdrawal to PO3
Joaquin for the latter to file with the Court. Unfortunately, PO3 Joaquin did not do so, as he was keenly aware that it would be difficult
to find a new counsel who would be as equally accommodating as respondent. Respondent suggests this might have been the reason
for the several calls complainants made to his office.

On 9 February 2004, the Court resolved to refer the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.1awph!l.net
The case was assigned to Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. (Commissioner Villadolid) who sent notices of hearing to
the parties but of the three complainants, only complainant Carlos Joaquin appeared. Thus, in the mandatory conference held, the
other two complainants were declared as having waived their rights to further participate in the IBP proceedings. 8
The parties were directed to file their respective position papers and on 27 May 2005, Commissioner Villadolid submitted his Report
and Recommendation finding respondent guilty of violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility 9 and recommended the
imposition of penalty ranging from reprimand to suspension of six (6) months.1awph!l.net10 On 12 November 2005, the Board of
Directors of the IBP resolved to adopt and approve Commissioner Villadolids recommendation to find respondent guilty and
specifically to recommend his suspension for six (6) months as penalty.
The only issue to be resolved in the case at bar is, considering all the facts presented, whether respondent committed gross
negligence or misconduct in handling G.R. No. 152621-23, which eventually led to the ad cautelam petitions dismissal with finality.
After careful consideration of the records of the case, the Court finds the suspension recommended by the IBP proper.
In a criminal case like that handled by respondent in behalf of the accused, respondent has a higher duty to be circumspect in
defending the accused for it is not only the property of the accused which stands to be lost but more importantly, their right to their
life and liberty. As held in Regala v. Sandiganbayan:11
Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that breathe life into it, among those, the
fiduciary duty to his client which is of very delicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and
good faith, that is required by reason of necessity and public interest x x x .
It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his client that distinguishes him from any other profession in society. x x x 12
At the onset, the Court takes notice that the ad cautelam petition was actually filed out of time. Though respondent filed with the
Sandiganbayan an Urgent Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration with the attached Second Motion for
Reconsideration, he should have known that a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading 13 and it rests on the sound
discretion of the Sandiganbayan to admit it or not. Thus, in effect, the motion did not toll the reglementary period to appeal. Having
failed to do so, the accused had already lost their right to appeal long before respondent filed his motion for extension. Therefore,
respondent cannot now say he filed the ad cautelam petition on time. Also important to note is the allegation of complainants that
the Sandiganbayan denied the second motion for reconsideration in its Resolution dated 7 February 2002. This respondent does not
dispute.
As to respondents conduct in dealing with the accused and complainants, he definitely fell short of the high standard of
assiduousness that a counsel must perform to safeguard the rights of his clients. As aptly observed by Commissioner Villadolid,
respondent had not been quite candid in his dealings with the accused or complainants. The Court notes that though respondent
represented to the accused that he had changed his office address, still, from the examination of the pleadings 14 he filed, it can be
gleaned that all of the pleadings have the same mailing address as that known to complainants. Presumably, at some point,
respondents office would have received the Courts Resolution dismissing the petition. Of course, the prudent step to take in that
situation was to at least inform the client of the adverse resolution since they had constantly called respondents office to check the
status of the case. Even when he knew that complainants had been calling his office, he opted not to return their calls.
Respondent professed an inkling that the several phone calls of complainants may have been about the letter he sent PO3 Joaquin
regarding his desire to be discharged as counsel of the case. However, though aware of such likelihood, respondent still did not return
their calls. Had he done so, he and complainants could have threshed out all unresolved matters between them.
Had respondent truly intended to withdraw his appearance for the accused, he as a lawyer who is presumably steeped in court
procedures and practices, should have filed the notice of withdrawal himself instead of the accused. At the very least, he should have
informed this Court through the appropriate manifestation that he had already given instructions to his clients on the proper way to
go about the filing of the Notice of Withdrawal, as suggested by Commissioner Villadolid. In not so doing, he was negligent in handling
the case of the accused.
Certainly, respondent ought to know that he was the one who should have filed the Notice to Withdraw and not the accused. His tale
that he sent a registered letter to the accused and gave them instructions on how to go about respondents withdrawal from the case
defies credulity. It should have been respondent who undertook the appropriate measures for the proper withdrawal of his
representation. He should not have relied on his client to do it for him if such was truly the case. Without the presentation of the
alleged registry receipt (or the return card, which confirms the receipt of the mail by the recipient) of the letter he allegedly sent to
PO3 Joaquin, the Court cannot lend credence to respondents naked claim, especially so that complainants have been resolute in their
stand that they did not hear from respondent after the latter had filed the ad cautelam petition. He could relieve himself of his
responsibility as counsel only first by securing the written conformity of the accused and filing it with the court pursuant to Rule 138,
Section 26 of the Rules of Court.15

The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relation at anytime with or without
cause. The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is, however, considerably
restricted. Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly
stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause. A lawyers right to withdraw from a
case before its final adjudication arises only from the clients written consent or from a good cause. 16
We agree with Commissioner Villadolid that the dismissal of the ad cautelam petition was primarily due to the gross negligence of
respondent. The Court has stressed in Aromin v. Boncavil 17 that:
Once he agrees to take up the cause of the client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latters cause with
wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his clients rights, and the exertion of the his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be
taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of
any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such
remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the
correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with
diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps
maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. 18
Respondent has time and again stated that he did all the endeavors he enumerated without adequate or proper remuneration.
However, complainants have sufficiently disputed such claim when they attached in their position paper filed before the IBP a
machine validated deposit slip in the amount of P15,500.00 for the Metro Bank savings account of one Jaime Portugal with account
number 7186509273.19 Respondent has neither admitted nor denied having claimed the deposited amount.
The Court also rejects respondents claim that there was no formal engagement between the parties and that he made all his efforts
for the case without adequate and proper consideration. In the words of then Justice Panganiban (presently Chief Justice) in Burbe v.
Atty. Magulta:20
After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client, even if the client never paid any fee for
the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which duty of public service, not money, is the
primary consideration.21
Also to the point is another case where this Court ruled, thus:
A written contract is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish
the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his
profession. x x x 22
Hence, even if respondent felt under-compensated in the case he undertook to defend, his obligation embodied in the Lawyers Oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility still remains unwavering. The zeal and the degree of fervor in handling the case should
neither diminish nor cease just because of his perceived insufficiency of remuneration.
Lastly, the Court does not appreciate the offensive appellation respondent called the shooting incident that the accused was engaged
in. He described the incident, thus: "the accused police officers who had been convicted of [h]omicide for the salvage of Froilan G.
Cabiling and Jose M. Chua and [a]ttempted [h]omicide of Mario C. Macato." 23 Rule 14.0124 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
clearly directs lawyers not to discriminate clients as to their belief of the guilt of the latter. It is ironic that it is the defense counsel
that actually branded his own clients as being the culprits that "salvaged" the victims. Though he might think of his clients as that,
still it is unprofessional to be labeling an event as such when even the Sandiganbayan had not done so.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended the suspension of respondent for six (6) months, the most severe penalty recommended
by Commissioner Villadolid, but did not explain why such penalty was justified. In a fairly recent case where the lawyer failed to file
an appeal brief which resulted to the dismissal of the appeal of his client in the Court of Appeals, the Court imposed upon the erring
lawyer the penalty of three (3) months suspension.25The Court finds it fit to impose the same in the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months. Let a copy of the
Resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant for appropriate annotation in the record of respondent.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-26868

February 27, 1969

IN THE MATTER OF ATTORNEY LOPE E. ADRIANO Member of the Philippine Bar. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee,
vs.
REMIGIO ESTEBIA, accused-appellant.
SANCHEZ, J.:

Once again, this Court is confronted with the unwanted task of ascertaining whether certain acts and conduct of a member of the Bar
deserve disciplinary action.
The problem arose because of facts that follow:
One Remigio Estebia was convicted of rape by the Court of First Instance of Samar, 1 and sentenced to suffer the capital punishment.
His case came up before this Court on review.
On December 14, 1966, Lope E. Adriano, a member of the Bar, was appointed by this Court as Estebia's counselde oficio. In the
notice of his appointment, Adriano was required to prepare and file his brief within thirty days from notice. He was advised that to
enable him to examine the case, the record would be at his disposal. Adriano received this notice on December 20, 1966. On January
19, 1967, Adriano sought for a 30-day extension to file appellant's brief in mimeographed form. On February 18, Adriano again moved
for a 20-day extension (his second). This was followed by a third filed on March 8, for fifteen days. And a fourth on March 27, also for
fifteen days. He moved for a "last" extension of ten days on April 11. On April 21, he even sought a special extension of five days. All
these motions for extension were granted. The brief was due on April 26, 1967. But no brief was filed.
On September 25, 1967, Adriano was ordered to show cause within ten days from notice thereof why disciplinary action should not be
taken against him for failure to file appellant's brief despite the lapse of the time therefor. Adriano did not bother to give any
explanation.
For failing to comply with the September 25, 1967 resolution, this Court, on October 3, 1968, resolved to impose upon him a fine of
P500 payable to this Court within fifteen days from notice with a warning that upon further non-compliance with the said resolution of
September 25, 1967 within the same period of fifteen days, "more drastic disciplinary action will be taken against him." Still, counsel
paid no heed.
Finally, on December 5, 1968, this Court ordered Adriano to show cause within ten days from notice thereof why he should not be
suspended from the practice of law "for gross misconduct and violation of his oath of office as attorney." By express order of this
Court, the resolution was personally served upon him on December 18, 1968. He ignored the resolution.
Upon the facts just narrated, we now pass judgment.
1. By specific authority, this Court may assign an attorney to render professional aid to a destitute appellant in a criminal case who is
unable to employ an attorney. Correspondingly, a duty is imposed upon the lawyer so assigned "to render the required service." 2 A
lawyer so appointed "as counsel for an indigent prisoner", our Canons of Professional Ethics demand, "should always exert his best
efforts" in the indigent's behalf. 3
No excuse at all has been offered for non-presentation of appellant's brief. And yet, between December 20, 1966, when he received
notice of his appointment, and December 5, 1968, when the last show cause order was issued by this Court, more than sufficient time
was afforded counsel to prepare and file his brief de oficio. The death sentence below imposed was upon a plea of guilty. The record
of the proceedings leading to the lower court's sentence consists of but 31 pages. Counsel had the record since January 19, 1967. In
fact, in his third motion for extension of time, he manifested that the drafting of apellant's brief "is more than half-way through" and
that "additional time is needed to review, effectuate the necessary corrections, put in final form and print the said brief." In his motion
for fourth extension, he intimated that the preparation of the brief "is almost through" and that "additional time is needed to redraft
and rehash some significant portions of said brief and have the same stencilled and mimeographed upon completion of a definitive
text." His motion for last (fifth) extension of time came with the excuse that he "suddenly got sick (influenza) in the course of
redrafting and rehashing some significant portions of said brief, which ailment hampered and interrupted his work thereon for
sometime." Finally, in his "Special Extension of Time" to file brief, he claimed that he needed only five days from April 21, 1967 to put
said brief in final form and have the same stencilled and mimeographed.lawphi1.nt
In the face of the fact that no brief has ever been filed, counsel's statements in his motions for extension have gone down to the level
of empty and meaningless words; at best, have dubious claim to veracity.
It is true that he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do say that as such counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty to the accused as
one employed and paid by defendant himself. Because, as in the case of the latter, he must exercise his best efforts and professional
ability in behalf of the person assigned to his care. His is to render effective assistance. The accused defendant expects of him due
diligence, not mere perfunctory representation. We do not accept the paradox that responsibility is less where the defended party is
poor. It has been said that courts should "have no hesitancy in demanding high standards of duty of attorneys appointed to defend
indigent persons charged with crime." 4 For, indeed, a lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of justice is expected to have a bigger
dose of social conscience and a little less of self interest. Because of this, a lawyer should remain ever conscious of his duties to the
indigent he defends.
Worth remembering is the 1905 case of In the matter of Jose Robles Lahesa. 5 He was counsel de oficio before the Supreme Court in
two cases: one for robo en cuadrilla and the other for homicide. He failed to take any action in behalf of the defendants in both eases.
This Court imposed upon him a fine of P200. Significant is the pronouncement we there made that: "This court should exact from its
officers and subordinates the most scrupulous performance of their official duties, especially when negligence in the performance of

those duties necessarily result in delays in the prosecution of criminal cases and the detention of accused persons pending appeal."
The validity of the foregoing observation remains to the present day. 6 It applies to the present case.
Here, appellant was without brief since December 20, 1966. The effect of this long delay need not be essayed. We, therefore, find
that Attorney Lope E. Adriano has violated his oath that he will conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his "knowledge
and discretion".
2. An attorney's duty of prime importance is "[t]o observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.
The first Canon of the Code of Ethics enjoins a lawyer "to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." By the oath of office, the lawyer
undertook to "obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities." In People vs. Carillo, 8 this Court's pointed
observation was that as an officer of the court, it is a lawyer's "sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that
high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice."
Here, we have a clear case of an attorney whose acts exhibit willful dis-obedience of lawful orders of this Court. A cause sufficient is
thus present for suspension or disbarment. 9 Counsel has received no less than three resolutions of this Court requiring compliance of
its orders. To be recalled is that on September 25, 1967, this Court directed him, in ten days from notice, to show cause why
disciplinary action should not be taken against him for his failure to file appellant's brief despite the lapse of the time therefor.
Nothing was done by counsel for over a year. To impress upon counsel the gravity of his repeated failure to obey this Court's orders,
on October 3,1968, a fine of P500 was clamped upon him. He was directed to pay that fine in ten days. He was in that order also
required to file his brief in fifteen days. He was warned that more drastic disciplinary action would be taken upon his failure to do
either. Still he remained unmoved. Then, this Court issued the peremptory order of December 5, 1968 commanding him to show
cause within ten days from notice thereof why he should not be suspended from the practice of law for gross misconduct and
violation of his oath of office. The Court made it certain that this order would reach him. He personally acknowledged receipt thereof.
He has not paid the fine. He has done nothing.
This is 1969. No brief has as yet been filed. And this, inspite of the fact that as early as March 27, 1967, when he moved for a fourth
extension of time to file his brief de oficio, he represented to this Court that all that was needed was to redraft and to rehash some
significant portions of the brief which was almost through and to have the same stencilled and mimeographed upon completion of a
definitive text.
Disrespect is here present. Contumacy is as patent. Disciplinary action is in order.
Controlling here is the 1961 decision In the Matter of Atty. Filoteo Dianala Jo. 10 There, as here, counsel failed to file appellant's brief
(in a criminal case) despite extensions of time granted him by this Court. Likewise, this Court issued a show-cause order why
disciplinary action should not be taken against him. The explanation was considered unsatisfactory. This Court imposed a fine of P50
payable in ten days from notice. Attorney Dianala Jo did not pay that fine. Came the subsequent resolution of this Court advising him
to pay the fine, otherwise, he would be arrested and confined to jam. This warning was not heeded. On November 18, 1960, the Court
resolved to give him ten days from notice within which to explain why he should not be suspended from the practice of law. Despite
receipt of this notice, he did not care to explain his behaviour which this Court considered as "consumacy and unwillingness to
comply with the lawful orders of this Court of which he is an officer or to conduct himself as a lawyer should, in violation of his oath of
office." He was suspended from the practice of law for three months.
In the present case, counsel's pattern of conduct, it would seem to us, reveals a propensity on the part of counsel to benumb
appreciation of his obligation as counsel de oficio and of the courtesy and respect that should be accorded this Court.
For the reasons given, we vote to suspend Attorney Lope E. Adriano from the practice of law throughout the Philippines for a period of
one (1) year.
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal record, in this Court, of Lope E. Adriano as member of the Bar. So ordered.

A.C. No. 6160

March 30, 2006

NESTOR PEREZ , Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. DANILO DE LA TORRE, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In a letter-complaint1 dated July 30, 2003 addressed to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., complainant Nestor Perez charged
respondent Atty. Danilo de la Torre with misconduct or conduct unbecoming of a lawyer for representing conflicting interests.

Perez alleged that he is the barangay captain of Binanuaanan, Calabanga, Camarines Sur; that in December 2001, several suspects
for murder and kidnapping for ransom, among them Sonny Boy Ilo and Diego Avila, were apprehended and jailed by the police
authorities; that respondent went to the municipal building of Calabanga where Ilo and Avila were being detained and made
representations that he could secure their freedom if they sign the prepared extrajudicial confessions; that unknown to the two
accused, respondent was representing the heirs of the murder victim; that on the strength of the extrajudicial confessions, cases
were filed against them, including herein complainant who was implicated in the extrajudicial confessions as the mastermind in the
criminal activities for which they were being charged.
Respondent denied the accusations against him. He explained that while being detained at the Calabanga Municipal Police Jail, Avila
sought his assistance in drafting an extrajudicial confession regarding his involvement in the crimes of kidnapping for ransom, murder
and robbery. He advised Avila to inform his parents about his decision to make an extrajudicial confession, apprised him of his
constitutional rights and of the possibility that he might be utilized as a state-witness.
Respondent claimed that when Ilo sought his assistance in executing his extrajudicial confession, he conferred with Ilo in the presence
of his parents; and only after he was convinced that Ilo was not under undue compulsion did he assist the accused in executing the
extrajudicial confession.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. 2 On August
16, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner submitted his report with the following recommendation:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Danilo de la Torre be suspended for one (1) year from the practice of the legal
profession for violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
The Board of Governors of the IBP modified the recommendation by increasing the period of suspension to two years.
In finding the respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests, the Investigating Commissioner opined that:
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in his complaint.
The complainant was able to prove by substantial evidence his charge against Atty. de la Tor[r]e. The respondent admitted that his
services as a lawyer were retained by both Avila and Ilo. Perez was able to show that at the time that Atty. de la Torre was
representing the said two accused, he was also representing the interest of the victims family. This was declared by the victims
daughter, Vicky de Chavez, who testified before Branch 63 of the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Sur that her family retained the
services of Atty. Danilo de la Torre to prosecute the case against her fathers killers. She even admitted that she was present when
Atty. de la Torre met with and advised Avila and Ilo on one occasion. This is proof that the respondent consciously offered his services
to Avila and Ilo despite the fact that he was already representing the family of the two accuseds victim. It may not even be
improbable that respondent purposely offered to help the accused in order to further his other clients interest. The respondent failed
to deny these facts or offer competent evidence to refute the said facts despite the ample opportunity given him.
Under Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Respondent is therefore duty bound to refrain from representing two
parties having conflicting interests in a controversy. By doing precisely the foregoing, and without any proof that he secured the
written consent of both parties after explaining to them the existing conflict of interest, respondent should be sanctioned.
We agree with the findings of the IBP except for the recommended penalty.
There is conflict of interests when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is "whether or
not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In
brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only
cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be
used.3
There is a representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to do anything which
will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new
relation, to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. 4
The prohibition against representing conflicting interest is founded on principles of public policy and good taste. In the course of a
lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the clients case, including the weak and strong points of the
case. The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. It behooves lawyers not only to
keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of impropriety and double-dealing for only then can litigants
be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. 5
To negate any culpability, respondent explained that he did not offer his legal services to accused Avila and Ilo but it was the two
accused who sought his assistance in executing their extrajudicial confessions. Nonetheless, he acceded to their request to act as

counsel after apprising them of their constitutional rights and after being convinced that the accused were under no compulsion to
give their confession.
The excuse proferred by the respondent does not exonerate him from the clear violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which prohibits a lawyer from representing conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a
full disclosure of the facts.
As found by the IBP, at the time respondent was representing Avila and Ilo, two of the accused in the murder of the victim
Resurreccion Barrios, he was representing the family of the murder victim. Clearly, his representation of opposing clients in the
murder case invites suspicion of double-dealing and infidelity to his clients.
What is unsettling is that respondent assisted in the execution by the two accused of their confessions whereby they admitted their
participation in various serious criminal offenses knowing fully well that he was retained previously by the heirs of one of the victims.
Respondent, who presumably knows the intricacies of the law, should have exercised his better judgment before conceding to
accuseds choice of counsel. It did not cross his mind to inhibit himself from acting as their counsel and instead, he even assisted
them in executing the extrajudicial confession.
Considering that this is respondents first infraction, disbarment as sought by the complaint is deemed to be too severe. Under the
present circumstances, we find that a suspension from the practice of law for three years is warranted.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Danilo de la Torre is found GUILTY of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
representing conflicting interests. He is SUSPENDED for THREE YEARS from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this
Decision. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent and served on the IBP, as well as on the Court Administrator who
shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5485

March 16, 2005

ELMER CANOY, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOSE MAX ORTIZ, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
There are no good reasons that would justify a lawyer virtually abandoning the cause of the client in the midst of litigation without
even informing the client of the fact or cause of desertion. That the lawyer forsook his legal practice on account of what might be
perceived as a higher calling, election to public office, does not mitigate the dereliction of professional duty. Suspension from the
practice is the usual penalty, and there is no reason to deviate from the norm in this case.
A Complaint1 dated 10 April 2001 was filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant by Elmer Canoy (Canoy) accusing Atty. Jose Max Ortiz
(Atty. Ortiz) of misconduct and malpractice. It was alleged that Canoy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against his former
employer, Coca Cola Bottlers Philippines. The complaint was filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Regional
Arbitration Board VI in Bacolod City.2 Atty. Ortiz appeared as counsel for Canoy in this proceeding. In 1998, the labor arbiter hearing
the complaint ordered the parties to submit their respective position papers. Canoy submitted all the necessary documents and
records to Atty. Ortiz for the preparation of the position paper. Thereafter, he made several unfruitful visits to the office of Atty. Ortiz
to follow-up the progress of the case. After a final visit at the office of Atty. Ortiz in April of 2000, during which Canoy was told to come
back as his lawyer was not present, Canoy decided to follow-up the case himself with the NLRC. He was shocked to learn that his
complaint was actually dismissed way back in 1998, for failure to prosecute, the parties not having submitted their position
papers.3 The dismissal was without prejudice. Canoy alleged that Atty. Ortiz had never communicated to him about the status of the
case, much less the fact that he failed to submit the position paper.
The Comment4 filed by Atty. Ortiz is the epitome of self-hagiography. He informs the Court that since commencing his law practice in
1987, he has mostly catered to indigent and low-income clients, at considerable financial sacrifice to himself. Atty. Ortiz claims that
for more than ten years, his law office was a virtual adjunct of the Public Attorney's Office with its steady stream of non-paying clients
in the "hundreds or thousands."5 At the same time, he hosted a legal assistance show on the radio, catering to far-flung municipalities
and reaching "the people who need legal advice and assistance." 6 Atty. Ortiz pursued on with this lifestyle until his election as

Councilor of Bacolod City, a victory which he generously attributes to the help "of the same people whom he had helped by way of
legal assistance before."7
Canoy was among those low-income clients whom Atty. Ortiz deigned to represent. The lawyer was apparently confident that the
illegal dismissal case would eventually be resolved by way of compromise. He claims having prepared the position paper of Canoy,
but before he could submit the same, the Labor Arbiter had already issued the order dismissing the case. 8 Atty. Ortiz admits though
that the period within which to file the position paper had already lapsed. He attributes this failure to timely file the position paper to
the fact that after his election as Councilor of Bacolod City, "he was frankly preoccupied with both his functions as a local government
official and as a practicing lawyer." Eventually, "his desire to help was beyond physical limitations," and he withdrew from his other
cases and his "free legal services." 9
According to Atty. Ortiz, "Mr. Canoy should have at least understood that during all that time, he was free to visit or call the office and
be entertained by the secretary as [he] would normally report to the office in the afternoon as he had to attend to court trials and
report to the Sanggunian office." 10 He states that it was his policy to inform clients that they should be the ones to follow-up their
cases with his office, as it would be "too difficult and a financial burden to attend making follow-ups with hundreds of clients, mostly
indigents" with only two office personnel.11
Nonetheless, Atty. Ortiz notes that the dismissal of Canoy's complaint was without prejudice, thus the prescriptive period had been
tolled. He claims not being able to remember whether he immediately informed Canoy of the dismissal of the case, though as far as
he could recall, Canoy had conveyed a message to him that he had a lawyer to handle the case, thus his office did not insist on
refiling the same.12
The matter was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. 13 Canoy
eventually submitted a motion withdrawing the complaint, but this was not favorably acted upon by the IBP in view of the rule that
the investigation of a case shall not be interrupted or terminated by reason of withdrawal of the charges. 14 Eventually, the
investigating commissioner concluded that "clearly, the records show that [Atty. Ortiz] failed to exercise that degree of competence
and diligence required of him in prosecuting his clients' (sic) claim," and recommended that Atty. Ortiz be reprimanded. 15 The IBP
Commission on Discipline adopted the recommendation, with the slight modification that Atty. Ortiz be likewise warned that a
repetition of the same negligence shall be dealt with more severely in the future.
The Court is sensitive to the difficulties in obtaining legal representation for indigent or low-income litigants. Apart from the heroic
efforts of government entities such as the Public Attorney's Office, groups such as the IBP National Committee on Legal Aid and the
Office of Legal Aid of the UP College of Law have likewise been at the forefront in the quest to provide legal representation for those
who could not otherwise afford the services of lawyers. The efforts of private practitioners who assist in this goal are especially
commendable, owing to their sacrifice in time and resources beyond the call of duty and without expectation of pecuniary reward.
Yet, the problem of under-representation of indigent or low-income clients is just as grievous as that of non-representation. Admirable
as the apparent focus of Atty. Ortiz's legal practice may have been, his particular representation of Canoy in the latter's illegal
dismissal case leaves much to be desired.
Several of the canons and rules in the Code of Professional Responsibility guard against the sort of conduct displayed by Atty. Ortiz
with respect to the handling of Canoy's case.
CANON 17A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
...
Rule 18.03A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.
Rule 18.04A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the
client's request for information.
...
CANON 22A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE
CIRCUMSTANCES.
...

Rule 22.02 A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a retainer lien, immediately turn over all papers and
property to which the client is entitled, and shall cooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter, including
all information necessary for the proper handling of the matter.
Atty. Ortiz should have filed the position paper on time, owing to his duty as counsel of Canoy to attend to this legal matter entrusted
to him. His failure to do so constitutes a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence and champion the latter's cause
with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm
zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that
nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is
entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his
lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege
to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar and to the public. A
lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of
justice, does honor to the bar and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. 16
If indeed Atty. Ortiz's schedule, workload, or physical condition was such that he would not be able to make a timely filing, he should
have informed Canoy of such fact. The relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is ever present the need for the
client to be adequately and fully informed of the developments of the case and should not be left in the dark as to the mode and
manner in which his/her interests are being defended. 17
There could have been remedies undertaken to this inability of Atty. Ortiz to file on time the position paper had Canoy been told of
such fact, such as a request for more time to file the position paper, or maybe even the hiring of collaborating counsel or substitution
of Atty. Ortiz as counsel. Since Atty. Ortiz did not exercise the necessary degree of care by either filing the position paper on time or
informing Canoy that the paper could not be submitted seasonably, the ignominy of having the complaint dismissed for failure to
prosecute could not be avoided.
That the case was dismissed without prejudice, thus allowing Canoy to refile the case, hardly serves to mitigate the liability of Atty.
Ortiz, as the failure to file the position paper is per se a violation of Rule 18.03.18
Neither is the Court mollified by the circumstance of Atty. Ortiz's election as a City Councilor of Bacolod City, as his adoption of these
additional duties does not exonerate him of his negligent behavior. The Code of Professional Responsibility does allow a lawyer to
withdraw his legal services if the lawyer is elected or appointed to a public office. 19 Statutes expressly prohibit the occupant of
particular public offices from engaging in the practice of law, such as governors and mayors, 20 and in such instance, the attorneyclient relationship is terminated.21 However, city councilors are allowed to practice their profession or engage in any occupation
except during session hours, and in the case of lawyers such as Atty. Ortiz, subject to certain prohibitions which are not relevant to
this case.22 In such case, the lawyer nevertheless has the choice to withdraw his/her services. 23 Still, the severance of the relation of
attorney-client is not effective until a notice of discharge by the client or a manifestation clearly indicating that purpose is filed with
the court or tribunal, and a copy thereof served upon the adverse party, and until then, the lawyer continues to be counsel in the
case.24
Assuming that Atty. Ortiz was justified in terminating his services, he, however, cannot just do so and leave complainant in the cold
unprotected.25 Indeed, Rule 22.02 requires that a lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a lien, immediately turn over
all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and shall cooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter.
Atty. Ortiz claims that the reason why he took no further action on the case was that he was informed that Canoy had acquired the
services of another counsel. Assuming that were true, there was no apparent coordination between Atty. Ortiz and this new counsel.
In fact, it took nearly two years before Canoy had learned that the position paper had not been filed and that the case had been
dismissed. This was highly irresponsible of Atty. Ortiz, much more so considering that Canoy was one of the indigent clients whom
Atty. Ortiz proudly claims as his favored clientele. It does not escape the Court's attention that Atty. Ortiz faults Canoy for not
adequately following up the case with his office.26 He cannot now shift the blame to complainant for failing to inquire about the status
of the case, since, as stated above, it was his duty as lawyer to inform his clients of the status of cases entrusted to him. 27
The appropriate sanction is within the sound discretion of this Court. In cases of similar nature, the penalty imposed by the Court
consisted of either a reprimand, a fine of five hundred pesos with warning, suspension of three months, six months, and even
disbarment in aggravated cases.28 Given the circumstances, the Court finds the penalty recommended by the IBP too lenient and
instead suspends Atty. Ortiz from the practice of law for one (1) month. The graver penalty of suspension is warranted in lieu of an
admonition or a reprimand considering that Atty. Ortiz's undisputed negligence in failing to timely file the position paper was
compounded by his failure to inform Canoy of such fact, and the successive dismissal of the complaint.
Lawyers who devote their professional practice in representing litigants who could ill afford legal services deserve commendation.
However, this mantle of public service will not deliver the lawyer, no matter how well-meaning, from the consequences of negligent
acts. It is not enough to say that all pauper litigants should be assured of legal representation. They deserve quality representation as
well.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jose Max S. Ortiz is ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month from notice, with
the warning that a repetition of the same negligence will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this decision be attached to
respondent's personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and to all the courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.