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RULES OF COURT RULE 138

Attorneys and Admission to Bar


Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the
bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.
Section 34. By whom litigation conducted. In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct
his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for the purpose, or with the aid
an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and
his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Section 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. No judge or other official or employee of the superior
courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or
give professional advice to clients.
RULES OF COURT OF RULE 138-A
Law student practice rule
Section 1. Conditions for student practice. A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year
of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical
legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil,
criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients
accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.
Section 2. Appearance. The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the
direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the
law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed
by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.
RULE 116
Arraignment and Plea
Section 7. Appointment of counsel de oficio. The court, considering the gravity of the offense and the
difficulty of the questions that may arise, shall appoint as counsel de oficio only such members of the bar
in good standing who, by reason of their experience and ability, can competently defend the accused. But
in localities where such members of the bar are not available, the court may appoint any person, resident
of the province and of good repute for probity and ability, to defend the accused. (7a)
RULE 139-A
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Section 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default
in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated
Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19450

May 27, 1965

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant.
PAREDES, J.:
On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with
the Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said
accused was represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The
complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City,
having entered his appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary
of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would appear at the trial
of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any
payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was
questioned by the counsel for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al.,
L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to the
position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he
ceased to engage in private law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP Court in entertaining the
appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above ruling. On December 17,
1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City Attorney Fule.
Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule
from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35,
Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing. Counsel claims that
City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right
of Fule to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually enagaged in private law practice.
This Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which
rendered judgment on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of which read:
The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the offended
party of the civil liability, the civil action was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal
action. The offended party had, therefore, the right to intervene in the case and be
represented by a legal counsel because of her interest in the civil liability of the accused.
Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a
party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him

for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the
Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended party. It does not appear that
he was being paid for his services or that his appearance was in a professional capacity. As
Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the
prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the
prosecution of criminal cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attornev of San Pablo. There could be no possible
conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo
and as private prosecutor in this criminal case. On the other hand, as already pointed out,
the offended party in this criminal case had a right to be represented by an agent or a friend
to protect her rights in the civil action which was impliedly instituted together with the criminal
action.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear
before the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this
criminal case as an agent or a friend of the offended party.
WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos,
Laguna, allowing the apprearance of Ariston D. Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed,
without costs.
The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding.
The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits.1wph1.t
Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore reproduced, and which
we consider plausible, the fallacy of the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused interpretation
of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides that "no judge or
other official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage
in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients." He claims that City
Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. We
believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within
the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it
consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of
law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding
one's self out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for such services (State vs.
Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive
as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The following observation of the
Solicitor General is noteworthy:
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to
be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services.
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his
immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is
a relative.

CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is
hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against appellant..
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and
Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.

FIRST DIVISION
WILFREDO M. CATU, A.C. No. 5738
Complainant,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA,
Respondent. Promulgated:
February 19, 2008
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RE S O LUTI ON
CORONA, J.:
Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot [1] and the building erected thereon located
at 959 San Andres Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio
Catu, contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu[2] and Antonio Pastor[3] of one of the
units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a
complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of
the 5th District of Manila[4] where the parties reside.
Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation
meetings.[5] When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a
certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.
Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as
counsel for the defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant filed the instant
administrative complaint,[6] claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer
and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he
presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.

In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear
complaints referred to the barangays Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint of
Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head of the Lupon, he performed his task
with utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality towards any of the parties. The parties,
however, were not able to amicably settle their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the
ejectment case. It was then that Elizabeth sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request.
He handled her case for free because she was financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the
commission of a patent injustice against her.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh out, the IBPs Commission on
Bar Discipline (CBD) required the parties to submit their respective position papers. After
evaluating the contentions of the parties, the IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline
respondent.[7]
According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he presided
over the conciliation proceedings and heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against
Elizabeth and Pastor. Subsequently, however, he represented Elizabeth and Pastor in the
ejectment case filed against them by Regina and Antonio. In the course thereof, he prepared and
signed pleadings including the answer with counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and
notice of appeal. By so doing, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he
intervened while in said service.
Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section
7(b)(2) of RA 6713:[8]
SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and
omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution
and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions
of any public official ands employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by
the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or
tend to conflict with their official functions; xxx (emphasis supplied)

According to the IBP-CBD, respondents violation of this prohibition constituted a breach


of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY
THE LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND
LEGAL PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied)
For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondents suspension from the
practice of law for one month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act
will be dealt with more severely.[9] This was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of
Governors.[10]
We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the
recommendation on the imposable penalty.
RULE 6.03 OF THE CODE
OF
PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY
APPLIES
ONLY
TO
FORMER
GOVERNMENT LAWYERS
Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left government
service and in connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said service. In PCGG
v. Sandiganbayan,[11] we ruled that Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from
accepting engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had
intervened while in said service.
Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act
complained of. Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.

SECTION 90 OF RA 7160, NOT SECTION 7(B)


(2) OF RA 6713, GOVERNS THE PRACTICE
OF PROFESSION OF ELECTIVE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their
incumbency, from engaging in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their
official functions. This is the general law which applies to all public officials and employees.
For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 7160[12] governs:

SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. (a) All governors, city and municipal
mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any
occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any
occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours: Provided,
That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a
local government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the
government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or
employee of the national or local government is accused of an offense
committed in relation to his office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative
proceedings involving the local government unit of which he is an
official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when
the sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the
Government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official
hours of work only on occasions of emergency: Provided, That the
officials concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.
This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by
elective local officials. As a special law with a definite scope (that is, the practice of profession
by elective local officials), it constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, the general
law on engaging in the private practice of profession by public officials and employees. Lex
specialibus derogat generalibus.[13]
Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays
are the following: the governor, the vice governor and members of thesangguniang
panlalawigan for provinces; the city mayor, the city vice mayor and the members of
the sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor, the municipal vice mayor and the
members of the sangguniang bayan for municipalities and the punong barangay, the members of
the sangguniang barangay and the members of the sangguniang kabataan for barangays.
Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are
prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise
of their functions as local chief executives. This is because they are required to render full time
service. They should therefore devote all their time and attention to the performance of their
official duties.
On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or
teach in schools except during session hours. In other words, they may practice their professions,

engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside their session hours. Unlike governors, city
mayors and municipal mayors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are required to hold regular sessions only at least once a
week.[14] Since the law itself grants them the authority to practice their professions, engage in any
occupation or teach in schools outside session hours, there is no longer any need for them to
secure prior permission or authorization from any other person or office for any of these
purposes.
While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors,
provincial board members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial
proscription to practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is
made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay.Expressio unius
est exclusio alterius.[15] Since they are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that
they are allowed to practice their profession. And this stands to reason because they are not
mandated to serve full time. In fact, the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular
sessions only twice a month.[16]
Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his
profession. However, he should have procured prior permission or authorization from the head of
his Department, as required by civil service regulations.
A LAWYER IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE
WHO IS NOT PROHIBITED TO PRACTICE
LAW MUST SECURE PRIOR AUTHORITY
FROM THE HEAD OF HIS DEPARTMENT
A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at
the disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written
permission of the head of the department concerned. [17] Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised
Civil Service Rules provides:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private
business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit,
agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the
head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the
case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require
that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided, further,
That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so
devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it
will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee:
And provided, finally, that no permission is necessary in the case of investments,
made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict
between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in
the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the
enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors. (emphasis supplied)

As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written
permission of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance
as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.
The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service
Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of
the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty to society is to obey the law and
promote respect for it. To underscore the primacy and importance of this duty, it is enshrined as
the first canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent
not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is
a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. (emphasis supplied)
For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of
the legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE
INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis
supplied)
Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal
ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.
Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and
improper conduct of a member of the bar.[18] Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a
manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.[19]
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for
violation of the lawyers oath[20] and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional
misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of six months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any
repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into the
records of respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa. The Office of the Court Administrator shall
furnish copies to all the courts of the land for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. P-220 December 20, 1978
JULIO ZETA, complainant,
vs.
FELICISIMO MALINAO, respondent.

BARREDO, J.:
Administrative complaint against Felicisimo Malinao court interpreter of the Court of First
Instance of Catbalogan, Samar charging as follows:
l ILLEGALLY APPEARING IN COURT. MR. Malinao has been appearing in
the municipal court of this town for parties like attorney when he is not an
attorney. Reliable information also says he has been appearing in the municipal
courts of Daram, Zumarraga, Talalora and even Sta. Rita. He is not authorized to
do so we believe. He makes it his means of livelihood as he collects fees from
his clients. He competes with attorneys but does not pay anything. We believe
that his doing so should be stopped for a good government. These facts can be
checked with records of those municipal courts.
2 GRAVE MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE. Being employed in the Court of First
Instance he would instigate persons, especially in his barrio to grab land rob or
coerce. In fact he has cases in the municipal court in this town involving himself
and his men. He incite them telling them not to be afraid as he is a court
employee and has influence over the judges. Those persons being ignorant
would believe him and so would commit crimes. This act of Mr. Malinao is
contrary to good order and peace as he is using his supposed influences to urge
persons to commit crimes.
3 CRIME OF FALSIFICATION. Information has it that he is unfaithfully filing
his time record in the CFI. Even he has been out practicing in the municipal

courts sometimes he would fill his time record as present. He receives salary for
those absent days. This can be checked with time record he has submitted and if
he has any application for leave. He may try to cure it by submitting application
for leave but this should not be allowed as he has already committed crime.
4 VIOLATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER AND CIVIL SERVICE LAW.-WE have
reliable information it is prohibited for a civil service employee to engage in
private practice any profession or business without permission from the
Department Head. Mr. Malinao we are sure has not secured that permission
because he should not be allowed to practice as he is not an attorney. If that
were so, he violated that Executive Order and Civil Service Law and we are
urgently and earnestly requesting the Commissioner of Civil Service to
investigate him on this. If warranted he should be given the corresponding
penalty as dismissal because we believe he deserve it. (Page 2, Record.)
After respondent filed the following 3rd indorsement relative to the above complaint:
Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, Manila, thru the
Honorable District Judge, Court of First Instance, Branch I, Catbalogan, Samar,
and thru the Honorable Judicial Superintendent, Department of Justice, Manila,
the undersigned's reply to the preceding endorsements, to wit: That the alleged
letter-complaint of one Julio Zeta is not inclosed in the first indorsement, which
absence has also been noticed and noted on the right hand corner of the said
first indorsement by the Clerk of Court, of this Court; that despite this absence,
and without waiving, however, his right to any pertinent provision of law, but for
respect and courtesy to a Superior, he hereby states that he has not violated any
rule or law, much less Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules; that his
participation for defendants' cause was gratuitous as they could not engage the
services of counsel by reason of poverty and the absence of one in the locality,
said assistance has also checked the miscarriage of justice by the Presiding
Municipal Judge, now resigned; that he is attaching herewith a carbon-original of
a pleading submitted by Atty. Simeon Quiachon the attorney of record for the
defendants in Civil Case No. 24, entitled 'Jose Kiskisan versus Fidel Pacate, et
al. for Forcible Entry, in the Municipal Court of Talalora, Samar, which is a 'Motion
To Withdraw Exhibits', as Annex 'A', as part of this reply. (Page 5, Rec.)
the Department of Justice that had jurisdiction over the matter then, referred the said complaint
and answer to District Judge Segundo Zosa, Court of First Instance, Catbalogan, Western
Samar, for investigation, report and recommendation, and after due hearing, Judge Zosa
submitted his report pertinent parts of which read thus:
Inspite of diligent efforts exerted by the Court to subpoena the complainant, Julio
Zeta, who is said to be a resident of Zumarraga, Samar the same had failed
because the said Julio Zeta appears to be a fictitious person
Inspite of the failure of the complainant to appear in the investigation in
connection with his complaint against Felicisimo Malinao, the Court nevertheless

proceeded to investigate the case against him by calling Judge Restituto Duran
of Sta. Rita, Samar, Judge Juanito Reyes of Zumarraga, Samar and Judge
Miguel Avestruz of Daram, Samar.
Judge Restituto Duran of Sta. Rita, Samar, declared that according to his docket
books the respondent appeared as counsel for Vicente Baculanlan in criminal
case No. 1247 in the Municipal Court of Sta. Rita, Samar, for grave threats and in
criminal case No. 1249 for the same accused and Romulo Villagracia for illegal
possession of firearm on August 5, 1960 and on September 17, 1970.
Judge Miguel Avestruz of Daram, Samar, declared that the respondent appeared
as counsel in civil case No. 39 in the Municipal Court of Daram, Samar,
entitled Felix Versoza versus Victor Payao, et al., for forcible entry on December
15, 1962, January 26, 1963, February 18, 1963 and on March 1, 1963.
Judge Juanito Reyes declared that on March 27, 1969, the respondent appeared
as counsel for the defendant in civil case No. 318 of the Municipal Court of
Zumarraga entitled Restituto Centino versus Jesus Tizon for forcible entry and
again on June 17, 1970 in the same case.
From the certification of the Clerk of this Court, it appears that the respondent
had the following entries in his daily time record:
1. Was on leave from office on August 5, 1960 and September 17, 1960;
2. Was present in office on December l5, 1962;
3. Was present in office on January 26, 1963, and present also on February 18,
1963 but undertime by 1 hour;
4. Was on leave from office on March 1, 1963;
5. Was on leave from office on March 27, 1969; and
6. Was present in office on June 17, 1970 but undertime by 5 hours.
Comparing the dates when the respondent appeared before the aforementioned
Municipal Courts with his daily time records, he made it appear that on
December 15, 1962 and February 18, 1963 he was present in his office although
according to the testimony of Judge Miguel Avestruz he was before his Court on
December 15, 1962 as well as on February 18, 1963. Again according to Judge
Juanito Reyes the respondent appeared in his Court on June 17, 1970. The
respondent again made it appear in his daily time record that he was present with
an undertime of five hours. The respondent did not offer any plausible
explanation for this irregularity.
xxx xxx xxx

With respect to the crime of falsification of his daily time record as shown by the
evidence, he had made it appear that he was present in his office on December
15, 1962, February 18, 1963 and June 17, 1970 when as a matter of fact he was
in the Municipal Court of Daram attending to a case entitledFelix Versoza versus
Victor Payao, et al., for forcible entry as well as in the Municipal Court of
Zumarraga attending to Civil Case No. 318 entitled Restituto Centino versus
Jesus Tizon for forcible entry. The Inquest Judge respectfully recommends that
he be given stern warning and severe reprimand for this irregularity.
With respect to the fourth charge, for violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII, Republic
Act 2260, as amended, again the evidence shows that respondent had been
appearing as counsel in the municipal courts of Sta. Rita, Daram and Zumarraga
in violation of the rules of the Civil Service Law. (Pp. 28-31, Record.)
We have carefully reviewed the record, and We find the conclusions of fact of the Investigator to
be amply supported by the evidence, particularly the documents consisting of public records
and the declarations of the judges before whom respondent had appeared. It is clear to Us that
respondent, apart from appearing as counsel in various municipal courts without prior
permission of his superiors in violation of civil service rules and regulations, falsified his time
record of service by making it appear therein that he was present in his office on occasions
when in fact he was in the municipal courts appearing as counsel, without being a member of
the bar, which, furthermore, constitutes illegal practice of law. We, therefore, adopt the above
findings of fact of the Investigator.
The defense of respondent that "his participation (sic) for defendants' cause was gratuitous as
they could not engage the services of counsel by reason of poverty and the absence of one in
the locality" cannot, even if true, carry the day for him, considering that in appearing as counsel
in court, he did so without permission from his superiors and, worse, he falsified his time record
of service to conceal his absence from his office on the dates in question. Indeed, the number of
times that respondent acted as counsel under the above circumstances would indicate that he
was doing it as a regular practice obviously for considerations other than pure love of justice.
In the premises, it is quite obvious that the offense committed by respondent is grave, hence it
warrants a more drastic sanction than that of reprimand recommended by Judge Zosa. We find
no alternative than to separate him from the service, with the admonition that he desist from
appearing in any court or investigative body wherein Only members of the bar are allowed to
practice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Felicisimo Malinao is hereby ordered dismissed from his position as
interpreter in the Court of First Instance, CFI, Zumarraga, Western Samar with prejudice to
reemployment in the judicial branch of the government.
Castro, C.J., Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos,
Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
JUAN DULALIA, JR.,
Complainant,

A.C. No. 6854 [Formerly CBD Case No.


04-1380]
Present:

- versus -

ATTY. PABLO C. CRUZ,


Respondent.

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,


CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
April 27, 2007

x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Atty. Pablo C. Cruz, Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, Bulacan (respondent), is charged
by Juan Dulalia, Jr. (complainant) of violation Rules 1.01, [1] 6.02,[2] and 7.03[3] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The facts which gave rise to the filing of the present complaint are as follows:
Complainants wife Susan Soriano Dulalia filed an application for building permit for the
construction of a warehouse. Despite compliance with all the requirements for the purpose, she failed to
secure a permit, she attributing the same to the opposition of respondents who wrote a September 13,
2004 letter to Carlos J. Abacan, Municipal Engineer and concurrent Building Official of Meycauayan,
reading as follows, quoted verbatim:

xxxx
This is in behalf of the undersigned himself and his family, Gregoria F.
Soriano, Spouses David Perez and Minerva Soriano-Perez and Family and Mr. and
Mrs. Jessie de Leon and family, his relatives and neighbors.
It has been more than a month ago already that the construction of the
building of the abovenamed person has started and that the undersigned and his
family, and those other families mentioned above are respective owners of the
residential houses adjoining that of the high-rise building under construction of the
said Mrs. Soriano-Dulalia. There is no need to mention theunbearable nuisances that it
creates and its adverse effects to the undersigned and his above referred to clients
particularly the imminent danger and damage to their properties, health and safety.
It was represented that the intended construction of the building would only
be a regular and with standard height building and not a high rise one but an
inspection of the same would show otherwise. Note that its accessory foundation
already occupies portion of the vacant airspace of the undersigneds residential house
in particular, which readily poses danger to their residential house and life.
To avert the occurrence of the above danger and damage to property, loss of
life and for the protection of the safety of all the people concerned, they are
immediately requesting for your appropriate action on the matter please at your
earliest opportune time.
Being your co-municipal official in the Municipal Government of
Meycauayan who is the Chief Legal Counsel of its Legal Department, and by virtue of
Sub par. (4), Paragraph (b), Section 481 of the Local Government Code of 1991, he is
inquiring if there was already full compliance on the part of the owner of the
Building under construction with therequirements provided for in Sections 301, 302
and 308 of the National Building Code and on the part of your good office, your
compliance with the provisions of Sections 303 and 304 of the same foregoing cited
Building Code.
Please be reminded of the adverse and unfavorable legal effect of the noncompliance with said Sections 301, 302, 303 and 304 of the National Building Code
by all the parties concerned. (Which are not confined only to penalties provided in
Sections 211 and 212 thereof.)
x x x x[4] (Emphasis and underscoring partly in the original, partly supplied)
By complainants claim, respondent opposed the application for building permit because of a
personal grudge against his wife Susan who objected to respondents marrying her first cousin Imelda
Soriano, respondents marriage with Carolina Agaton being still subsisting. [5]
To the complaint, complainant attached a copy of his Complaint Affidavit [6] he filed against respondent
before the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of Section 3 (e) [7] of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and Section 4 (a) and (c) [8] of Republic Act No. 6713
(Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). [9]

By Report and Recommendation dated May 6, 2005,[10] the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, through
Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, recommended the dismissal of the complaint in light of the
following findings:
The complaint dealt with mainly on the issue that respondent allegedly opposes the
application of his wife for a building permit for the construction of their commercial
building. One of the reason[s] stated by the complainant was that his wife was not in
favor of Imeldas relationship with respondent who is a married man. And the other reason
is that respondent was not authorized to represent his neighbors in opposing the
construction of his building.
From the facts and evidence presented, we find respondent to have satisfactorily
answered all the charges and accusations of complainant. We find no clear, convincing
and strong evidence to warrant the disbarment or suspension of respondent. An attorney
enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges preferred against him until
the contrary is proved. The burden of proof rests upon the complainant to overcome the
presumption and establish his charges by a clear preponderance of evidence. In the
absence of the required evidence, the presumption of innocence on the part of the lawyer
continues and the complaint against him should be dismissed (In re De Guzman, 55
SCRA 1239; Balduman vs. Luspo, 64 SCRA 74; Agbayani vs. Agtang, 73 SCRA 283).
x x x x.[11] (Underscoring supplied)
By Resolution of June 25, 2005,[12] the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the
Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Villanueva-Maala.
Hence, the present Petition for Review[13] filed by complainant.
Complainant maintains that respondent violated Rule 1.01 when he contracted a second marriage
with Imelda Soriano on September 17, 1989 while his marriage with Carolina Agaton, which was
solemnized on December 17, 1967, is still subsisting.
Complainant further maintains that respondent used his influence as the Municipal Legal Officer of
Meycauayan to oppose his wifes application for building permit, in violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
And for engaging in the practice of law while serving as the Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan,
complainant maintains that respondent violated Rule 7.03.
To his Comment,[14] respondent attached the July 29, 2005[15]Joint Resolution of the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon dismissing complainants complaint for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019
and Section 4 (a) and (c) of RA 6713, the pertinent portion of which joint resolution reads:
x x x A perusal of the questioned letter dated September 13, 2004 of herein respondent
Atty. Pablo Cruz addressed to the Building official appears to be not an opposition for the
issuance of complainants building permit, but rather to redress a wrong and an inquiry as
to whether compliance with the requirements for the construction of an edifice has been
met. In fact, the Office of the Building Official after conducting an investigation found
out that there was [a] violation of the Building Code for constructing without a building
permit committed by herein complainants wife Susan Dulalia. Hence, a Work Stoppage
Order was issued. Records disclose fu[r]ther [that] it was only after the said violation had
been committed that Susan Dulalia applied for a building permit. As correctly pointed out
by respondent, the same is being processed pending approval by the Building Official and
not of the Municipal Zoning Administrator as alleged by complainant. Anent the

allegation that respondent was engaged in the private practice of his law profession
despite being employed in the government as Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan,
Bulacan, the undersigned has taken into consideration the explanation and clarification
made by the respondent to be justifiable and meritorious. Aside from the bare allegations
of herein complainant, there is no sufficient evidence to substantiate the complaints
against the respondent.[16] (Underscoring supplied)
After a review of the record of the case, this Court finds the dismissal of the charges of violating
Rules 6.02 and 7.03 in order.
Indeed, complaint failed to prove that respondent used his position as Municipal Legal Officer to
advance his own personal interest against complainant and his wife.
As for respondents September 13, 2004 letter, there is nothing to show that he opposed the
application for building permit. He just inquired whether complainants wife fully complied with the
requirements provided for by the National Building Code, on top of expressing his concerns about the
danger and damages to their properties, health and safety occasioned by the construction of the building.
Besides, as reflected above, the application for building permit was filed on September 28, 2004,
whereas the questioned letter of respondent was priorly written and received on September 13, 2004 by
the Municipal Engineer/ Building Official, who on the same day, ordered an inspection and issued a
Cease and Desist Order/Notice stating that [f]ailure to comply with th[e] notice shall cause this office to
instate proper legal action against you.[18]
[17]

Furthermore, as the Certification dated April 4, 2005[19] from the Office of the Municipal
Engineer showed, complainants wife eventually withdrew the application as she had not yet secured
clearances from the Municipal Zoning Administrator and from the barangay where the building was to be
constructed.
Respecting complainants charge that respondent engaged in an unauthorized private practice of
law while he was the Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, a position coterminous to that of the
appointing authority, suffice it to state that respondent proffered proof that his private practice is not
prohibited.[20]
It is, however, with respect to respondents admitted contracting of a second marriage while his
first marriage is still subsisting that this Court finds respondent liable, for violation of Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent married Imelda Soriano on September 17, 1989 at the Clark County, Nevada, USA,
when the Family Code of the Philippines had already taken effect.[22]He invokes good faith, however,
he claiming to have had the impression that the applicable provision at the time was Article 83 of the
Civil Code.[23] For while Article 256 of the Family Code provides that the Code shall have retroactive
application, there is a qualification thereunder that it should not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
[21]

Immoral conduct which is proscribed under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as
opposed to grossly immoral conduct, connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral
norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. [24] Gross
immoral conduct on the other hand must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or
so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree. [25]

In St. Louis University Laboratory High School v. De la Cruz, [26] this Court declared that the therein
respondents act of contracting a second marriage while the first marriage was still subsisting constituted
immoral conduct, for which he was suspended for two years after the mitigating following circumstances
were considered:
a.
After his first failed marriage and prior to his second marriage or for a
period of almost seven (7) years, he has not been romantically involved with any
woman;
b.
His second marriage was a show of his noble intentions and total love
for his wife, whom he described to be very intelligent person;
c.
He never absconded from his obligations to support his wife and child;
d.
He never disclaimed paternity over the child and husbandry (sic) with
relation to his wife;
e.
After the annulment of his second marriage, they have parted ways
when the mother and child went to Australia;
f.
Since then up to now, respondent remained celibate. [27]
In respondents case, he being out of the country since 1986, he can be given the benefit of the
doubt on his claim that Article 83 of the Civil Code was the applicable provision when he contracted the
second marriage abroad. From 1985 when allegedly his first wife abandoned him, an allegation which
was not refuted, until his marriage in 1989 with Imelda Soriano, there is no showing that he was
romantically involved with any woman. And, it is undisputed that his first wife has remained an absentee
even during the pendency of this case.
As noted above, respondent did not deny he contracted marriage with Imelda Soriano. The
community in which they have been living in fact elected him and served as President of the IBP-Bulacan
Chapter from 1997-1999 and has been handling free legal aid cases.
Respondents misimpression that it was the Civil Code provisions which applied at the time he
contracted his second marriage and the seemingly unmindful attitude of his residential community
towards his second marriage notwithstanding, respondent may not go scotfree.
As early as 1957, this Court has frowned on the act of contracting a second marriage while the
first marriage was still in place as being contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.[28]
In another vein, respondent violated Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides:
CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in
continuing legal education programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law
schools as well as in the practical training of law students and assist in disseminating
information regarding the law and jurisprudence.
Respondents claim that he was not aware that the Family Code already took effect on August 3,
1988 as he was in the United States from 1986 and stayed there until he came back to the Philippines
together with his second wife on October 9, 1990 does not lie, as ignorance of the law excuses no one
from compliance therewith.
Apropos is this Courts pronouncement in Santiago v. Rafanan:[29]
It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. They are expected to be in the
forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it

the obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal
developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be
conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty,
they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as
members of the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes.
[30]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Pablo C. Cruz is guilty of violating Rule 1.01 and Canon 5 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year. He
is WARNED that a similar infraction will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.

R.A 7160 SEC.90


Section 90. Practice of Profession. (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or
engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief
executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach
in schools except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are also
members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government
unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the
national or local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his
office.
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the
local government unit of which he is an official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the government except when the sanggunian
member concerned is defending the interest of the government.

(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only
on occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary
compensation therefrom.

R.A 910 SEC 1


Section 1. When a Justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals who has
rendered at least twenty years' service either in the judiciary or in any other branch of the
Government, or in both, (a) retires for having attained the age of seventy years, or (b)
resigns by reason of his incapacity to discharge the duties of his office, he shall receive
during the residue of his natural life, in the manner hereinafter provided, the salary which he
was receiving at the time of his retirement or resignation. And when a Justice of the Supreme
Court or of the Court of Appeals has attained the age of fifty-seven years and has rendered
at least twenty-years' service in the Government, ten or more of which have been
continuously rendered as such Justice or as judge of a court of record, he shall be likewise
entitled to retire and receive during the residue of his natural life, in the manner also
hereinafter prescribed, the salary which he was then receiving. It is a condition of the
pension provided for herein that no retiring Justice during the time that he is receiving said
pension shall appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein the Government
or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party, or in any criminal case
wherein and officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in
relation to his office, or collect any fee for his appearance in any administrative proceedings
to maintain an interest adverse to the Government, insular, provincial or municipal, or to any
of its legally constituted officers.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
B.M. No. 1922

June 3, 2008

RE. NUMBER AND DATE OF MCLE CERTIFICATE OF


COMPLETION/EXEMPTION REQUIRED IN ALL PLEADINGS/MOTIONS.
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information is a resolution of the Court En Banc
dated June 3, 2008
"Bar Matter No. 1922. Re: Recommendation of the Mandatory Continuing
Legal Education (MCLE) Board to Indicate in All Pleadings Filed with the
Courts the Counsels MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of
Exemption. The Court Resolved to NOTE the Letter, dated May 2, 2008, of
Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Chairperson, Committee on

Legal Education and Bar Matters, informing the Court of the diminishing
interest of the members of the Bar in the MCLE requirement program.
The Court further Resolved, upon the recommendation of the Committee on
Legal Education and Bar Matters, to REQUIRE practicing members of the bar
to INDICATE in all pleadings filed before the courts or quasi-judicial bodies, the
number and date of issue of their MCLE Certificate of Compliance or
Certificate of Exemption, as may be applicable, for the immediately preceding
compliance period. Failure to disclose the required information would
cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from
the records.
The New Rule shall take effect sixty (60) days after its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation." Caprio-Morales Velasco, Jr., Nachura, JJ.,
on official leave. (adv216a)

Very truly yours,


MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA(sgd)
Clerk of Court

ARTICLE
IX IX
Article

Constitutional Commissions
A. COMMON PROVISIONS
Section 2. No member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any
other office or employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or
in the active management or control of any business which, in any way, may be affected
by the functions of his office, nor shall he be financially interested, directly or indirectly,
in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of
its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

EN BANC
[B.M. 850. October 2, 2001]
MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
RESOLUTION
ADOPTING THE REVISED RULES ON THE CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION FOR
MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
Considering the Rules on the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) for members
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), recommended by the IBP, endorsed by the
Philippine Judicial Academy, and reviewed and passed upon by the Supreme Court Committee
on Legal Education, the Court hereby resolves to approve, as it hereby approves, the following
Revised Rules for proper implementation:
Rule 1. PURPOSE

SECTION 1. Purpose of the MCLE. Continuing legal education is required of members of


the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) to ensure that throughout their career, they keep
abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the
standards of the practice of law.
Rule 2. MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION

SECTION 1. Commencement of the MCLE. Within two (2) months from the approval of
these Rules by the Supreme Court En Banc, the MCLE Committee shall be constituted
and shall commence the implementation of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)
program in accordance with these Rules.
SEC. 2. Requirements of completion of MCLE. Members of the IBP not exempt under Rule
7 shall complete every three (3) years at least thirty-six (36) hours of continuing legal education
activities approved by the MCLE Committee. Of the 36 hours:
(a) At least six (6) hours shall be devoted to legal ethics equivalent to six (6) credit
units.
(b) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to trial and pretrial skills equivalent to four
(4) credit units.
(c) At least five (5) hours shall be devoted to alternative dispute resolution equivalent
to five (5) credit units.

(d) At least nine (9) hours shall be devoted to updates on substantive and procedural
laws, and jurisprudence equivalent to nine (9) credit units.
(e) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted
advocacy equivalent to four (4) credit units.

to

legal

writing

and

oral

(f) At least two (2) hours shall be devoted to international law and international
conventions equivalent to two (2) credit units.
(g) The remaining six (6) hours shall be devoted to such subjects as may be prescribed
by the MCLE Committee equivalent to six (6) credit units.
Rule 3. COMPLIANCE PERIOD

SECTION 1. Initial compliance period. -- The initial compliance period shall begin not later
than three (3) months from the adoption of these Rules. Except for the initial compliance period
for members admitted or readmitted after the establishment of the program, all compliance
periods shall be for thirty-six (36) months and shall begin the day after the end of the previous
compliance period.
SEC. 2. Compliance Groups. -- Members of the IBP not exempt from the MCLE
requirement shall be divided into three (3) compliance groups, namely:
(a) Compliance group 1. -- Members in the National Capital Region (NCR) or Metro
Manila are assigned to Compliance Group 1.
(b) Compliance group 2. -- Members in Luzon outside NCR are assigned to
Compliance Group 2.
(c) Compliance group 3. -- Members in Visayas and Mindanao are assigned to
Compliance Group 3.
Nevertheless, members may participate in any legal education activity wherever it
may be available to earn credit unit toward compliance with the MCLE requirement.
SEC. 3. Compliance period of members admitted or readmitted after establishment of the
program. Members admitted or readmitted to the Bar after the establishment of the program
shall be assigned to the appropriate Compliance Group based on their Chapter membership on
the date of admission or readmission.
The initial compliance period after admission or readmission shall begin on the first day of
the month of admission or readmission and shall end on the same day as that of all other
members in the same Compliance Group.
(a) Where four (4) months or less remain of the initial compliance period after
admission or readmission, the member is not required to comply with the program
requirement for the initial compliance.

(b) Where more than four (4) months remain of the initial compliance period after
admission or readmission, the member shall be required to complete a number of
hours of approved continuing legal education activities equal to the number of
months remaining in the compliance period in which the member is admitted or
readmitted. Such member shall be required to complete a number of hours of
education in legal ethics in proportion to the number of months remaining in the
compliance period. Fractions of hours shall be rounded up to the next whole
number.
Rule 4. COMPUTATION OF CREDIT UNITS(CU)

SECTION
1. Guidelines.
CREDIT UNITS ARE EQUIVALENT TO CREDIT
HOURS. CREDIT UNITS measure compliance with the MCLE requirement under the
Rules, based on the category of the lawyers participation in the MCLE activity. The
following are the guidelines for computing credit units and the supporting documents
required therefor:
PROGRAMS/ACTIVITY CREDIT UNITS SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
1. SEMINARS, CONVENTIONS, CONFERENCES, SYMPOSIA, IN-HOUSE EDUCATION
PROGRAMS, WORKSHOPS, DIALOGUES, ROUND TABLE DISCUSSIONS BY APPROVED
PROVIDERS UNDER RULE 7 AND OTHER RELATED RULES
1.1 PARTICIPANT/ 1 CU PER HOUR OF CERTIFICATE OF
ATTENDEE ATTENDANCE ATTENDANCE WITH
NUMBER OF HOURS
1.2 LECTURER FULL CU FOR THE PHOTOCOPY OF
RESOURCE SUBJECT PER PLAQUE OR
SPEAKER COMPLIANCE PERIOD SPONSORS
CERTIFICATION
1.3 PANELIST/REACTOR 1/2 OF CU FOR THE CERTIFICATION
COMMENTATOR/ SUBJECT PER FROM
MODERATOR/ COMPLIANCE PERIOD SPONSORING
COORDINATOR/ ORGANIZATION
FACILITATOR
2. AUTHORSHIP, EDITING AND REVIEW

2.1 LAW BOOK OF NOT FULL CU FOR THE PUBLISHED BOOK


LESS THAN 100 PAGES SUBJECT PER
COMPLIANCE PERIOD
2.2 BOOK EDITOR 1/2 OF THE CU OF PUBLISHED BOOK
AUTHORSHIP CATEGORY WITH PROOF AS
EDITOR
2.3 RESEARCH PAPER 1/2 OF CU FOR THE DULY
INNOVATIVE PROGRAM/ SUBJECT PER CERTIFIED/
CREATIVE PROJECT COMPLIANCE PERIOD PUBLISHED
TECHNICAL
REPORT/PAPER
2.4 LEGAL ARTICLE OF AT 1/2 OF CU FOR THE PUBLISHED ARTICLE
LEAST TEN (10) PAGES SUBJECT PER
COMPLIANCE PERIOD
2.5 LEGAL NEWSLETTER/ 1 CU PER ISSUE PUBLISHED
LAW JOURNAL EDITOR NEWSLETTER/JOURNAL
2.6 PROFESSORIAL CHAIR/ FULL CU FOR THE CERTIFICATION OF
BAR REVIEW LECTURE SUBJECT PER LAW DEAN OR
LAW TEACHING/ COMPLIANCE PERIOD BAR REVIEW
DIRECTOR
Rule 5. CATEGORIES OF CREDIT UNITS

SECTION 1. Classes of Credit units. -- Credit units are either participatory or nonparticipatory.
SEC. 2. Claim for participatory credit units. -- Participatory credit units may be claimed for:

(a) Attending approved education activities like seminars, conferences, conventions,


symposia, in-house education programs, workshops, dialogues or round table
discussion.
(b) Speaking or lecturing, or acting as assigned panelist, reactor, commentator,
resource speaker, moderator, coordinator or facilitator in approved education
activities.
(c) Teaching in a law school or lecturing in a bar review class.
SEC. 3. Claim for non-participatory credit units. Non-participatory credit units may be
claimed per compliance period for:
(a) Preparing, as an author or co-author, written materials published or accepted for
publication, e.g., in the form of an article, chapter, book, or book review which
contribute to the legal education of the author member, which were not prepared in
the ordinary course of the members practice or employment.
(b) Editing a law book, law journal or legal newsletter.
Rule 6. COMPUTATION OF CREDIT HOURS (CH)

SECTION 1. Computation of credit hours. -- Credit hours are computed based on actual
time spent in an education activity in hours to the nearest one-quarter hour reported in decimals.
Rule 7. EXEMPTIONS

SECTION 1. Parties exempted from the MCLE. -- The following members of the Bar are
exempt from the MCLE requirement:
(a) The President and the Vice President of the Philippines, and the Secretaries and
Undersecretaries of Executive Departments;
(b) Senators and Members of the House of Representatives;
(c) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, incumbent and
retired members of the judiciary, incumbent members of the Judicial and Bar
Council and incumbent court lawyers covered by the Philippine Judicial Academy
program of continuing judicial education;
(d) The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor and Assistant Secretaries of the
Department of Justice;
(e) The Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitors General;
(f) The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant Government Corporate
Counsel;

(g) The Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions;


(h) The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, the Deputy Ombudsman and
the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman;
(i) Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions;
(j) Incumbent deans, bar reviewers and professors of law who have teaching
experience for at least ten (10) years in accredited law schools;
(k) The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps of Professors and
Professorial Lecturers of the Philippine Judicial Academy; and
(l) Governors and Mayors.
SEC. 2. Other parties exempted from the MCLE. The following Members of the Bar are
likewise exempt:
(a) Those who are not in law practice, private or public.
(b) Those who have retired from law practice with the approval of the IBP Board of
Governors.
SEC. 3. Good cause for exemption from or modification of requirement A member may file
a verified request setting forth good cause for exemption (such as physical disability, illness,
post graduate study abroad, proven expertise in law, etc.) from compliance with or modification
of any of the requirements, including an extension of time for compliance, in accordance with a
procedure to be established by the MCLE Committee.
SEC. 4. Change of status. The compliance period shall begin on the first day of the month
in which a member ceases to be exempt under Sections 1, 2, or 3 of this Rule and shall end on
the same day as that of all other members in the same Compliance Group.
SEC. 5. Proof of exemption. Applications for exemption from or modification of the MCLE
requirement shall be under oath and supported by documents.
Rule 8. STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF

EDUCATION ACTIVITIES

SECTION 1. Approval of MCLE program. Subject to the implementing regulations that


may be adopted by the MCLE Committee, continuing legal education program may be granted
approval in either of two (2) ways: (1) the provider of the activity is an accredited provider and
certifies that the activity meets the criteria of Section 2 of this Rule; and (2) the provider is
specifically mandated by law to provide continuing legal education.

SEC. 2. Standards for all education activities. All continuing legal education activities must
meet the following standards:
(a) The activity shall have significant current intellectual or practical content.
(b) The activity shall constitute an organized program of learning related to legal
subjects and the legal profession, including cross profession activities (e.g.,
accounting-tax or medical-legal) that enhance legal skills or the ability to practice
law, as well as subjects in legal writing and oral advocacy.
(c) The activity shall be conducted by a provider with adequate professional
experience.
(d) Where the activity is more than one (1) hour in length, substantive written materials
must be distributed to all participants. Such materials must be distributed at or
before the time the activity is offered.
(e) In-house education activities must be scheduled at a time and location so as to be
free from interruption like telephone calls and other distractions.
Rule 9. ACCREDITATION OF PROVIDERS

SECTION 1. Accreditation of providers. -- Accreditation of providers shall be done by the


MCLE Committee.
SEC. 2. Requirements for accreditation of providers. Any person or group may
be accredited as a provider for a term of two (2) years, which may be renewed, upon written
application. All providers of continuing legal education activities, including in-house providers,
are eligible to be accredited providers. Application for accreditation shall:
(a) Be submitted on a form provided by the MCLE Committee;
(b) Contain all information requested in the form;
(c) Be accompanied by the appropriate approval fee.
SEC. 3. Requirements of all providers. -- All approved accredited providers shall agree to
the following:
(a) An official record verifying the attendance at the activity shall be maintained by the
provider for at least four (4) years after the completion date. The provider shall
include the member on the official record of attendance only if the members
signature was obtained at the time of attendance at the activity. The official record of
attendance shall contain the members name and number in the Roll of Attorneys
and shall identify the time, date, location, subject matter, and length of the education
activity. A copy of such record shall be furnished the MCLE COMMITTEE.

(b) The provider shall certify that:


(1) This activity has been approved BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE in the amount of ________
hours of which ______ hours will apply in (legal ethics, etc.), as appropriate to the content of the
activity;
(2) The activity conforms to the standards for approved education activities prescribed by these
Rules and such regulations as may be prescribed by the MCLE COMMITTEE.
(c) The provider shall issue a record or certificate to all participants identifying the time,
date, location, subject matter and length of the activity.
(d) The provider shall allow in-person observation of all approved continuing legal education
activity by THE MCLE COMMITTEE, members of the IBP Board of Governors, or
designees of the Committee and IBP staff Board for purposes of monitoring compliance
with these Rules.
(e) The provider shall indicate in promotional materials, the nature of the activity, the time
devoted to each topic and identity of the instructors. The provider shall make available to
each participant a copy of THE MCLE COMMITTEE-approved Education Activity
Evaluation Form.
(f) The provider shall maintain the completed Education Activity Evaluation Forms for a
period of not less than one (1) year after the activity, copy furnished the MCLE
COMMITTEE.
(g) Any person or group who conducts an unauthorized activity under this program or
issues a spurious certificate in violation of these Rules shall be subject to appropriate
sanctions.
SEC. 4. Renewal of provider accreditation. The accreditation of a provider may be
renewed every two (2) years. It may be denied if the provider fails to comply with any of the
requirements of these Rules or fails to provide satisfactory education activities for the preceding
period.
SEC. 5. Revocation of provider accreditation. -- the accreditation of any provider referred
to in Rule 9 may be revoked by a majority vote of the MCLE Committee, after notice and
hearing and for good cause.
Rule 10. FEE FOR APPROVAL OF ACTIVITY AND ACCREDITATION OF PROVIDER

SECTION 1. Payment of fees. Application for approval of an education activity or


accreditation as a provider requires payment of the appropriate fee as provided in the Schedule
of MCLE Fees.
Rule 11. GENERAL COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES

SECTION 1. Compliance card. -- Each member shall secure from the MCLE Committee a
Compliance Card before the end of his compliance period. He shall complete the card by
attesting under oath that he has complied with the education requirement or that he is exempt,
specifying the nature of the exemption. Such Compliance Card must be returned to
the Committee not later than the day after the end of the members compliance period.
SEC. 2. Member record keeping requirement. -- Each member shall maintain sufficient
record of compliance or exemption, copy furnished the MCLE Committee. The record required
to be provided to the members by the provider pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 9 should be a
sufficient record of attendance at a participatory activity. A record of non-participatory activity
shall also be maintained by the member, as referred to in Section 3 of Rule 5.
Rule 12. NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES

SECTION 1. What constitutes non-compliance. The following shall constitute noncompliance:


(a) Failure to complete the education requirement within the compliance period;
(b) Failure to provide attestation of compliance or exemption;
(c) Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of compliance (including evidence of
exempt status) within the prescribed period;
(d) Failure to satisfy the education requirement and furnish evidence of such
compliance within sixty (60) days from receipt of non-compliance notice;
(e) Failure to pay non-compliance fee within the prescribed period;
(f) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or intended to
circumvent or evade compliance with the MCLE requirements.
SEC. 2. Non-compliance notice and 60-day period to attain compliance. -Members failing to
comply will receive a Non-Compliance Notice stating the specific deficiency and will be given
sixty (60) days from the date of notification to file a response clarifying the deficiency or
otherwise showing compliance with the requirements. Such notice shall contain the following
language near the beginning of the notice in capital letters:
IF YOU FAIL TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE
REQUIREMENT BY (INSERT DATE 60 DAYS FROM DATE OF NOTICE), YOU SHALL BE
LISTED AS A DELINQUENT MEMBER AND SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED TO PRACTICE
LAW UNTIL SUCH TIME AS ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED BY
THE MCLE COMMITTEE.
Members given sixty (60) days to respond to a Non-Compliance Notice may use this period
to attain the adequate number of credit units for compliance. Credit units earned during
this period may only be counted toward compliance with the prior compliance period

requirement unless units in excess of the requirement are earned, in which case the
excess may be counted toward meeting the current compliance period requirement.
Rule 13. CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE

SECTION 1. Non-compliance fee. -- A member who, for whatever reason, is in noncompliance at the end of the compliance period shall pay a non-compliance fee.
SEC. 2. Listing as delinquent member. -- A member who fails to comply with the
requirements after the sixty (60) day period for compliance has expired, shall be listed as a
delinquent member of the IBP upon the recommendation of the MCLE Committee. The
investigation of a member for non-compliance shall be conducted by the IBPs Commission on
Bar Discipline as a fact-finding arm of the MCLE Committee.
SEC. 3. Accrual of membership fee. -- Membership fees shall continue to accrue at the
active rate against a member during the period he/she is listed as a delinquent member.
Rule 14. REINSTATEMENT

SECTION 1. Process. -- The involuntary listing as a delinquent member shall be terminated


when the member provides proof of compliance with the MCLE requirement, including payment
of non-compliance fee. A member may attain the necessary credit units to meet the
requirement for the period of non-compliance during the period the member is on inactive
status. These credit units may not be counted toward meeting the current compliance period
requirement. Credit units earned during the period of non-compliance in excess of the number
needed to satisfy the prior compliance period requirement may be counted toward meeting the
current compliance period requirement.
SEC. 2. Termination of delinquent listing is an administrative process. The termination of
listing as a delinquent member is administrative in nature AND it shall be made by the MCLE
Committee.
Rule. 15. COMMITTEE ON MANDATORY CONTINUING

LEGAL EDUCATION

SECTION 1. Composition. The MCLE Committee shall be composed of five (5) members,
namely, a retired Justice of the Supreme Court as Chair, and four (4) members respectively
nominated by the IBP, the Philippine Judicial Academy, a law center designated by the Supreme
Court and associations of law schools and/or law professors.
The members of the Committee shall be of proven probity and integrity. They shall be
appointed by the Supreme Court for a term of three (3) years and shall receive such
compensation as may be determined by the Court.
SEC. 2. Duty of committee. The MCLE Committee shall administer and adopt such
implementing rules as may be necessary subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. It shall,

in consultation with the IBP Board of Governors, prescribe a schedule of MCLE fees with the
approval of the Supreme Court.
SEC. 3. Staff of the MCLE Committee. Subject to approval by the Supreme Court, the
MCLE Committee shall employ such staff as may be necessary to perform the record-keeping,
auditing, reporting, approval and other necessary functions.
SEC. 4. Submission of annual budget. The MCLE Committee shall submit to the Supreme
Court for approval, an annual budget [for a subsidy] to establish, operate and maintain the
MCLE Program.
This resolution shall take effect on the fifteenth of September 2000, following its publication
in two (2) newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.
Adopted this 22nd day of August, 2000, as amended on 02 October 2001.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo,
Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Kapunan, J., on official leave.

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