BEDA FOMM BY RONALD R. GREENMAN On 7 February, 1941, the remains of the Italian Tenth Army (initially comprising some 150,000 men) surrendered to British Commonwealth forces near the village of Beda Fomm in Italian Cyrenaica. This marked the end of the first leg of what was to become known as the ‘Benghazi handicap’, For the next two years the Allied and Axis forces would dash madly back and forth across the Western Desert, cach exploiting the temporary weaknesses of the other, searching for a decisive victory without adequate resources, until late 1942. By then, America’s entry into the war, and Hitler’s obsession with Russia, insured an Axis defeat in Africa, To grasp the significance of the Battle of Beda Fomm one must look back to the opening days of the Italian entry into World War II, On 10 June, 1940, Italy joined Germany in the war against Britain and France. She did poorly. Her army, invading France through the Alps, was stopped cold.! This was the first major setback to Italian arms and was to be indicative of most Italian action from then on, From the start, the Italians, unprepared for war on the. strategic level, were also immediately thrown off balance at the tactical level. In the Italian colony of Libya, on the first day of the war, before the border guards had even been notified about the commencement of hostilities, Italian troops came under fire from audacious, penetrating raids of the 11th Hussars (the armoured car regiment (battalion) of the 7th Armoured Division). Indeed, crossing the ‘wire’ from Egypt into Libya became the Hussars’ favourite sport. During the first few days of the war the British: captured an Italian general well within his own lines (and) cut. an important water pipeline . . . (they) captured a detachment of two Italian officers and fifty-nine other ranks . . . Small mobile forces .. . captured the Italian frontier forts of Capuzzo and Madda- lena along with about 220 prisoners.” Although the forts were subsequently recaptured, the Italian spirit was declining from the incessant British raiding. In September, when the Italians finally advanced into Egypt, it was with little enthusiasm,? But lack of enthusiasm shouldn’t be confused, as it so often is when Italians arms are being considered, with a lack of bravery. Individual Italians in North Africa (as well as everywhere the Italian Army fought) were at times brave to the point of foolhardiness. For instance, as the 437BEDA FOMM Italians swarmed into Egypt, they were led by motorcyclists, dashing about, making targets of themselves, trying to get the British to fire and expose their positions, As could be expected, Italian casualty figures were high.* The Italian advance came to rest at the village of Sidi Barrani, some sixty miles into Egyptian territory. The Italians suffered from a severe lack of trucks, and organic divisional transport had to be detached due to logistical considerations.’ Therefore, while supplies were being brought forward, the Italian army was stuck. Settling down for a lengthy wait at Sidi Barrani, the Italians constructed fortified camps, seven in all, stretching across about 25 miles of desert. But the camps were too far separated to provide each other with mutual support in case of attack. With that in mind, the British field commander, General Sir Richard N, O'Connor, planned an offensive, It was to be only a five-day raid in force, but became a major campaign, The British planned to penetrate the Italian front and turn the Italian positions individually. The object was to attack each camp separately, gaining local superiority and capitalizing on the isolation of each camp, while small holding forces foiled any Italian attempts at reinforce- ment.® The British timetable was very tight; troops were to attack Nibeiwa at dawn, reduce it, move about five miles north, re-group, and attack Tummar West by noon. The British pulled it off. Seventh Armoured Division and 4th Indian Division, with 7 Royal Tank Regiment (RTR) attached, penetrated the Enba Gap at dawn on 9 December, 1940. The Support Group of 7th Armoured splintered off to the south to screen the Italians in Rabia and Sofafi while the remainder of the division moved on towards BuqBuq to block Italian reinforcements from the west.” Fourth Indian and 7 RTR attacked Nibeiwa from the northwest. Meanwhile, Selby Force moved to engage and hold the Italians at Maktila. Nearly everything went better for the British than had been hoped for. Nibeiwa did fall by noon of the 9th, Tummar West by nightfall, and Tummar East and Point 90 the following morning. Although Selby Force had been unable to engage the 1st Libyan Division (it had pulled back into Sidi Barrani proper), it and the 4th Blackshirt Division were captured in toto by D+5. The totality of the Italian defeat surprised everyone.® ‘O’Connor took victory quietly, without demonstration, without memorable historical asides.’? The pursuit of the Italians was his aim, He asked permission and it was granted. He attacked and in short order, Libya was invaded, Bardia and Tobruk fell to Commonwealth forces (Italian losses being 70,000 troops with all equipment) and by late January 1941, O'Connor was poised to push into the Jebel Ahkdar, the heavily 438BEDA FOMM populated area of Libya. By now the British Matilda tanks had been reduced to eighteen. Supply and prisoner problems were also becoming acute, ‘Common- wealth forces had been living on captured enemy supplies — particularly petrol and oil. . .!° Even though a series of advanced field supply depots (FSD) had been established, these: . were just sufficient to keep the force going in essential require- ments ... it was a band-to-mouth existence, and . . . operations were often conditioned by the rate at which supplies... could be built ay up. All had been going well, but the armoured regiments of 7th Armoured were spoiling for a decisive tank battle, They learned that an Italian armoured formation of about 50 to 60 tanks was centred around Mechili.!? They sped off southwest and on the 23rd the 4th Armoured Brigade, preceded by the 11th Hussars, arrived at an area northeast of Mechili, By now the Division had been much reduced in strength, more by mechanical breakdowns than by battle losses.'® To reinforce other formations, the 8th Hussars of 7th Armoured Brigade and the 6th Royal Tank Regiment (RTR) from 4th Armoured Brigade were dis- mounted and their tanks redistributed. Between January 23rd and the 27th, probing, peppered by some short, violent encounters, had taken place, but the Italians refused to be drawn out, Late on the 27th, No.1 Troop, ‘A’ Squadron, 11th Hussars, spotted a column of tanks entering the foothills of the Jebel Akhdar, about 25 miles northwest of Mechili, The Italians had escaped; the British were sorely disappointed.“ O'Connor ordered 7th Armoured Division to occupy the now abandoned Mechili and prepare for an advance to Msus, then due west along the Sceleidima/Solluch/Ghemines track, thereby cutting the coast road once again, this time south of Benghazi, The Tenth Army (being pushed west and south by the 6th Australian Infantry Divison) would thereby be cut-off from its supply-head at Tripoli. Since the Italians seemed to be fighting a stiff delaying action against the Australians, time was not of the essence and it was believed that the Division would be able to amply resupply before jumping off. Plans to give the remaining serviceable tanks a little attention were initiated, and it was hoped that even a few of the abandoned derelicts could be resurrected. An FSD was to be established just south of Mechili and 100 cruiser tanks of the newly arrived 2nd Armoured Division were being hurriedly refitted for the desert, D-Day was to be the 10th of February. ‘The Italians had other plans, They were abandoning the whole of Cyrenaica. If they were to be stopped O’Connor would have to move 439BEDA FOMM fast. He ordered the 7th Armoured Division to be ready to go by the evening of February 2nd or, at the latest, the morning of the 3rd. But the Division’s administration was strained, Nevertheless an ad hoc group, designated Coombe Force (after Lt. Col. J.F.B, Coombe, commander of the 11th Hussars), was hastily organized and des. patched at dawn, February 4th, to capture the coast road’ near Ghemines and hold it until it could be reinforced by the remainder of the division.'* Air reconnaissance reported that Benghazi was being abandoned quicker than anticipated and, on Coombe’s recommenda- tion, O'Connor decided that Coombe Force should continue south- westerly from Msus to the Antelat/Beda Fomm/Sidi Saleh area, Poor reconnaissance slowed the British column, but, nonetheless, they managed to reach Msus by midday,!® Shortly after the departure of Coombe Force, 4th Armoured Brigade struck out. They carried ‘two days’ supply of food and water, just enough petrol to complete their journey and as much ammunition as they could find room for. Behind them came the artillery and the 2nd Battalion, Rifle Brigade — the only elements of the Support Group ready in time.’!” The going over the first 50 miles was incredibly rough. The tanks, highly subject to shedding tracks, picked their way along, slowing the wheeled vehicles of the infantry and artillery. The support Group elements were therefore detached and sent speeding after Coombe Force. On the morning of the Sth, after an all night drive, 4th Armoured Brigade reached Msus. The decision was then taken to follow Coombe Force and the Brigade struck out for Antelat, ‘C’ Squadron, 11th Hussars, had meanwhile reached the coast road at Sidi Saleh, about ten miles southwest of Beda Fomm, at midday. They reported only light Italian administrative traffic along the road. By mid-afternoon all elements of Coombe Force were at Sidi Saleh and deployed. The artillery was emplaced across the road with a company of infantry on cither flank; another infantry company straddled the road a few hundred yards north of the artillery and the armoured cars formed a screen to the east, Half an hour later, the leading elements of the Italian Tenth Army appeared. The Italians, unaware that the road was blocked, scattered in confusion when the British guns opened fire. The first round went to the British. About five that evening, a much larger Italian column approached the roadblock. The Italians still seemed unaware of the British presence and when the Royal Horse Artillery opened fire, there was initial Surprise. But the Italians soon regained their composure and began a serious attempt at a breakthrough, ‘The Italian infantry was skilfully 440BEDA FOMM deployed and an attempt was made to both un-jam the truck column and to bring forward artillery. The British gunners pumped round after round into the Italian vehicles, disrupting the Italians’ efforts to deploy their artillery. Colonel Callum Renton, commander of the Rifle Brigade, reinforced the left flank with two additional infantry companies when the Italians attempted to infiltrate through the beach dunes. About this time, the 4th Armoured Brigade appeared on the Italians’ left, near the tail of the column, They pivoted and fell upon the Italians from the rear.'® The appearance of the British tanks broke the Italians’ spirit and they began to throw down their arms. The prisoners, about 5,000, were the beginnings of a new problem for Colonel Renton.'? Before dark, another Italian column appeared. It was also rendered a mass of bullet-ridden, burning and abandoned vehicles. Both sides then settled down for a tense, watchful night. A light drizzle began to fall. By morning, the fuel situation for the British was critical, The dere- lict Italian vehicles were pilfered for their gas and the artillery quads were also siphoned-off for the armour.?? The RHA would have to hold their ground; without their vehicles they could not withdraw. The 4th Armoured Brigade reduced to 29 cruiser tanks, was waiting hull-down behind a ridge east of the road, Meanwhile, the remaining mounted battalion of the 7th Armoured Brigade (1st RTR, mostly light tanks) and parts of the Support Group had moved west upon reaching Msus and were poised for an attack on Sceleidima. It was now raining hard. ‘The first attempt at a breakthrough was rather ineptly mounted. The Italians threw a bit of infantry, some light tanks (L3-33/35s), and some soft transport against the road block. The Italians advanced, were thrown back, advanced again, were again thrown back, and the attack fizzled out. By now the Italian traffic jam was up past Ghemines, and, as far as could be determined, all the way to Benghazi. The Italian situation was becoming desperate and a concerted effort to break through was finally organized, Italian tanks began to pull out of the column, lumbering over the open desert, alongside the jammed men, trucks, and guns, towards Coombe Force. The first ten of these tanks (this time the more formidable M11/39 and M13/40 mediums) were abruptly confronted by the cruisers of 2nd RTR as they neared the ‘Pimple’. Eight of the Italian machines were immediately set ablaze and the other two crippled as they tried to reverse away.?! The British then re-deployed to Mosque Ridge, despatched another seven Italian tanks in that vicinity, and then returned to the ‘Pimple’. The cruisers were now low on ammunition as well as fuel, and two had been lost to Italian artillery fire before the RHA had been able to 441BEDA FOMM silence the guns with counter-battery fire. The 3rd and 7th Hussars, who had been sent north, nipping at the Italian column and looking for its tail, were ordered to step up the pressure in hopes of throwing more confusion into the Italian retreat. This was a touchy business, as shall later be seen, but it was hoped that the manoeuvre would cause the enemy to dilute his effort over the whole of the Ghemines/Agadabia road, The Hussars reported back that they had indeed found the end of the column and were already busy turning chaos into havoc. But the British turkey-shoot was short-lived. Coming down the road was another Italian column, preceded by an armoured car captured from the 11th Hussars. This was rammed by a light tank and immediately put out of action, but as the Hussars prepared to attack a group of twenty M13s appeared from the northeast. The machine guns of the Hussars’ light tanks were nearly useless against the Italian mediums and they were forced to withdraw. Down at the ‘Pimple’, the weather was becoming worse, visibility was making things increasingly difficult. The Italians, nervous, con- fused, hardly able to see through their tiny vision slits in the surround- ing murk, ‘. . . could no longer distinguish between one British tank and another and so reacted as though every one were a cruiser, and with- drew as quickly as possible.’?? Two more cruisers were lost to Italian artillery fire and three suffered mechanical failures. Those remaining were depleted both in ammunition and fuel, and the bluffing tactics of the Hussars, in their light tanks, were losing effectiveness, Continuation seemed futile when a resupply column appeared near the Mosque. The Hussars increased their efforts for the hour or so it took the cruisers to replenish and then, tank by tank, they themselves retired, topped off their tanks, filled their magazines, and returned to the fray.?° By 3 p.m., the crisis was nearing its peak. 7th Armoured Brigade, far to the north, had failed to acknowledge pleas for help. Although fully replenished, 4th Armoured was down to ten operational cruisers. Small groups of Italians were infiltrating past Coombe’s left flank.?* Italian artillery was in possession of the ‘Pimple’. Then the tanks of 7th Armoured appeared, Hearing the sounds of battle, the commander of Ist RTR (the brigade commander of the 7th was, at the time, in Antelat, conferring with the commander of the 4th, though he was there without a radio and was incapable of raising his own brigade) had taken it upon himself to swing south. The 7th slammed into the flank of fourteen or fifteen Italian mediums then bearing down on 2nd RTR's seven remaining cruisers, scattered the Italian tanks, and crashed through the Italian soft column, splitting it 442BEDA FOMM two. Not to be outdone, the British gunners on Mosque Ridge blanketed the Italian gun positions on the ‘Pimple’ with 25 pounder fire and annihilated the defenders. Four cruisers immediately re- occupied the hill. But the Italian tanks had only been scattered by the 7th’s assault. They reformed and counterattacked. At 6.00 p.m., the ‘Pimple’ was again in Italian hands. Night drew down the curtain on an extraordinary sight. For several miles round the ‘Pimple’ were knocked-out tanks, tanks abandoned or ditched, burning or burned-out lorries and cars, dead and dying Italians and all the flotsam and jetsam of modern war. Very large numbers of Italians were wandering about looking for somebody to whom to surrender... Including the tanks of the Ist Royal Tanks, the state of the Brigade that night was 39 tanks undamaged, 48 bit by gunfire, eight others knocked out, one unbit but burned out and eight out of action from unknown causes, a total of 101 tanks.?® During the night the men of Coombe Force could hear the sounds of approaching Italian tanks. It was obvious that a major attempt was to be mounted in the morning, As soon as it was light enough to see, Italian guns opened fire. Then the Italian tanks approached, some thirty M13s. The British infantry crouched in their slit trenches as the RHA gunners returned fire. The Italian tanks rumbled over the huddled troops as the British line was penetrated. Now that the Italian tanks were within their own lines, the British anti-tank gunners hesitated, but only for a moment, and soon tank after Italian tank was ‘brewed up’, But the British batteries were suffering too, And Italian infantry had moved up and was in a melee in the trenches. The entire area that Coombe Force occupied was now a battle- ground, The Italian tanks were reduced to five, but the last anti-tank gun had been silenced, its crew dead at their posts. But the gun was undamaged. Major Burton, the Battery commander, his batman, and the battery cook remanned the piece. Within the next few minutes, be and bis scratch crew accounted for the last five M13s in a fury of fire which blew one tank turret off its chassis, wrecked the bogey-wheels and tracks of three more and killed the driver of the fifth.?” The last tank stopped within yards of the mess-tent, the last thing British between it and Tripoli, And it was the last charge the Italians were to make, The Italian and Libyan infantry were scurrying pell- mell back towards their stalled column. ‘Then the Italians started to surrender. First, a few, a white flag here 443BIEDA FOMM and there, then a few more, tthen the entire column, It was the end of the Italian Tenth Army. Orly a battalion or so had escaped. The haul at Beda Fomm was 25,(000 men, over 100 tanks, and more than 100 guns, either captured or destroyed. And the end came none too soon for the British, by then reduced to 12 cruisers and 40 light tanks in serviceable condition.?* It was one of the most impressive victories in history, In a little over two months, O'Connor had destroyed an Italian army of 130,000 men, Marshal Rodolfo Graziami, the Military Governor of Libya, was so shaken he wrote to Mussolini: ‘Duce, these latest events have severely depressed my nerves and stremgth, so that I cannot continue to exercise command in full possession of my faculties. I, therefore, ask you to recall and replace me . . ."*° In Britain, Mr Churchill finally had a victory to present to the House of Commons. O'Connor was captured so@n after the Battle of Beda Fomm. Wavell was sacked as soon as Churchiill had good cause (Churchill and Wavell were not on the best of terms), and a brilliant German tactician was soon to provide, at least in Churchill’s mind, that cause, O’Connor and Wavell, excellent leaders in their own right, were soon obscured by the charismatic Rommel, Montgomery and Patton. Even the battle itself retreated into quiet history before the Battles of Alamein, Stalingrad, Normandy, Kursk, ino, and the Bulge, But the ‘Compass’ campaign terminating in the Battle of Beda Fomm was the first land victory for Britain in World War II, mounted solely with British and Common- wealth troops, without American aid (either in men or material), of any kind. REFERENCE 1, The Army of the Po contained 32 metropolitan divisions. It was stopped by six divisions of French border guards. Contributory factors from the Italian point of view are discussed, in English, in Pietro Badoglio, Italy in the Second World War, Memories and Documents, translated by Muriel Currey (London, Oxford University Press, 1948), A more balanced view is presented in John L, Snell, Illusion and Necessity: The Diplomacy of Global War, 1939-1945 (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963). 2, Ministry of Information, Destrtction of an Army (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, undated), pp, 16-19. This is a rather aged propaganda piece and should be read carefully. 3. The Italians sent five divisions (none metropolitan), with one regular army division in reserve across the Egyptian frot on 7 September 1940. Oppos- ing the advance were the Support Group (infantry and artillery) and the 11th Hussars. As per plan, the Support Group began a fighting withdrawal as the Hussars harassed the open Italisn southern flank. For a fast paced narrative, and fairly well-balanced account, from the British point of view, see Barric Pitt, The Crucible of War, Western Desert 1941 (London, Jonathon Cape, 1980). Nothing in English tells the Italian side of the story. Dry, but highly detailed and in Italian, is the official story: Stato Maggiore-Ufficio Storico, 444BEDA FOMM In Africa Settentrionale, La Preparazione al Conflitto, L'Avanzata su Sidi el Barrani (Rome, Ministro della Defisa, 1955). . Figures differ on Italian losses during the advance. The Italian official history places the count at: 84 dead, 250 wounded, and 7 missing (In Africa Setten- trionale, p. 142). Wilson states: ‘Our official casualties. .. were between 150 and 160, Over 700 prisoners had been taken, while the enemy (Italy) admitted 3,500 casualties . . ." Field-Marshal Lord Henry Maitland Wilson Eight Years Overseas (London, Hutchinson and Co. Ltd., undated), p. 44. Barclay agrees with Wilson, but lowers Italian casualties to 3,000, Brigadier C. N. Barclay, Against Great Odds (London, Sifton Praed and Co. Ltd., 1955), p. 17. Bar- clay’s book is based upon an unpublished history of the ‘Compass’ campaign written by General Sir R, N. O'Connor. General O'Connor died in June 1981 but Pitt, in Crucible of War used O'Connor's account extensively and includes details of British mistakes which Berclay omitted. . There were only 2,000 trucks available to the Italians in the whole of Libya. Without railroads, supplies, including all water, had to be transported by these few vehicles to two armies (the 5th and 10th), There were just not enough trucks for the job. See Heinz Heggenreiner, The Operations Under the Com- mand of Marshal Graziani Prior to the Arrival of German Troops (Garmisch, Germany, USAEURCOM, 1947), p. 12. The Italians lost 110 trucks in the advance to Sidi Barrani, thus straining their administration further. See In Africa Settentrionale, p. 143. The British, though officially fully motorized, faced a similar problem, but to a lesser degree. ‘An infantry division did not Possess enough motor vehicles to move all its men and equipment at the same time...’ Gavin Long, To Benghazi (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1952), p. 214. 6. Western Desert Force consisted of 30,000 to 36,000 men distributed between 7th Armoured Division, 4th Indian Division (less one brigade, but with the British 16th Infantry Brigade attached), SelbyForce (Corps troops) and the 7th Royal Tank Regiment (RTR). 7 RTR was a battalion of 50 Matilda ‘I’ tanks. This battalion was kept hidden from Italian reconnaissance until the opening of the campaign, The demoralization of the Italian defenders at Sidi Barrani caused by the sudden appearance of these heretofore unknown tanks was of significant value. Although nearly every history of the battle discusses the impact these vehicles had, the only detailed description of how they were kept secret is in Major Peter W. Rainier, Pipeline to Battle (New York, Ran- dom House, 1943), pp. 72-73. The Italians were fielding about 50,000 men, distributed between five divisions and one reinforced brigade, forward at Sidi Barrani, At Maktila was Ist Divisione Libiche (8,000 men), at Sidi Barrani itself was the 4th CCNN (Blackshirt) Divisione (8,000 men), at the two ‘Tummars and Point 90 was the 2nd Divisione Libiche (8,000 men), at Nibeiwa was the Raggruppamento Maletti (5,000-6,000 men), at Sofafi and Rabia was the 63rd Divisione (Cirene) (8,000-12,000 men), and in reserve at BuqBuq was the 64th Divisione (Catanzaro) (12,000 men). 7. 7th Armoured badly mauled the Catanzaro jon as it moved towards Sidi Barrani, but a supposed concentration of Italian tanks at Azziziya were not found. Indeed, they had never been there. 8. ‘We had achieved far more than we had ever dared hope for. 37,000 prisoners, nearly 200 guns, and a considerable number of tanks and lorries . . .’ R. N. O'Connor cited in Barclay, Against Great Odds, p. 39. 9. Correlli Barnett, The Desert Generals (New York, The Viking Press, 1961), p. 38. 10, Barclay, Against Great Odds, p. 51. 11. Ibid, p. 54. 12. Babini’s force has been estimated as high as 160 tanks, See Dudley Clarke, The Eleventh at War (London, Michael Joseph, 1952), p. 145. 13. The Division now had about 50 cruisers and 95 light tanks operational. See 445BEDA FOMM Major-General G. L. Verney, The Desert Rats, with a foreword by Field Marshal Sir John Harding (London, Hutchinson, 1954), p. 35. Clarke also puts the figure for the division at ‘145 tanks’, Clarke, The Eleventh at War, p. 145. 14, The 4th Armoured Brigade failed to interfere with the Italian retreat for two reasons: they were improperly deployed and, like the rest of the British Army, they did not fight at night. That attitude was soon to be changed. For the events at Mechili and O’Connor’s stinging reaction to them, see Pitt, Crucible of War, pp. 160-162. 15.Coombe Force was composed of Regimental Headquarters and ‘C’ Squadron, 11th Hussars, ‘B’ Squadron, 1st King's Dragoon Guards, ‘C’ Battery, 4th Royal Horse Artillery (RHA) (less two sections), 3 guns, 155th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment (Battalion), 8 guns, 106th Anti-Tank Regiment (Battalion), and 2nd Battalion, The Rifle Brigade. Barclay, Against Great Odds, p. 65. 16.1t had been decided before that probing in this direction might give away the original plan and so no reconnaissance had been done in the Mechili/Msus/ Antelat direction. 17.Pitt, Crucible of War, pp. 167-68. 18.4th Armoured, under the command of ‘Blood’ Caunter, had wheeled west- ward from Antelat (Coombe had suggested that the brigade might be more useful in the vicinity of Beda Fomm), and had made a 30 mile-per-hour advance across rough desert tracks, surprising the Italian column about 6 p.m. 19.A rear area for Coombe Force did not exist. Behind them was what could be considered still controlled Italian territory, although there were no Italians to control it. But even if Renton had had a rear to which to send his Italian charges, he lacked the means to do so. His trucks, and the Quads of the RHA were at that time, about to be drained of their fuel so that the tanks could continue to fight. He was also too short of men to adequately guard the prisoners (at least by training manual instructions), but he was fortunate in that the Italians had no desire to escape and were quite content to mill about the combination command/mess tent until conveyance to Cairo could be arranged. 20. The Quad was the British artillery prime mover. It was built in several models throughout the Commonwealth, 21. The M11/39 and its derivitive, the M13/40, were known as rolling coffins by their crews. Their frontal armour was so thin that any anti-tank weapon of the day could pierce it. Directly behind the glacis sat the transmission, and as the round passed through the armour, it would next penetrate the pot-metal transmission case, drawing molten metal along into the combustible trans- mission fluid. An Italian tankers life, to say the least, was a highly risky affair. 22. Pitt, Crucible of War, p. 180. 23. Hoping to mask the fact that the cruisers were gone during the resupply effort, they disengaged in shifts, always leaving two or three vehicles visible to the Italians. 24.The Italian tanks that had appeared before the 3rd and 7th Hussars late that morning (Feb. 6th) had been part of the garrison at Sceleidima which had been ordered to retreat the night before rather than face the 7th Armoured Brigade’s assault on the village. The 7th was, that afternoon, believed to be moving towards Soluch, having failed to make contact with the Italians, It was feared that the Brigade’s presence in the rear of the Italian column might cause a stampede towards Tripoli, an eventuality that would be unable to counter. If the Italians decided collectively upon a mass retreat, or rout, to what was now the front, their sheer mass (20,000 to 25,000 men) was sure to overrun the thin vencer of British opposition. Adding to the problem was the fall of Benghazi at 2.30 that afternoon, Spoiling after the Italians, the Austra~ lians were already probing south towards Ghemines, putting more pressure on the rear of the Italian column, The British had to maintain a delicate balance between containment and attack, See Pitt, Crucible of war, p. 181, 446BEDA FOMM and Long, To Benghazi, p. 273. -25.Although more concerned with escape than with turning a flank, the very presence of any Italians, no matter what their intent, or how few their numbers, was a threat to Coombe’s precarious position. 26, Verney, Desert Rats, p. 45. 27.Pitt, Crucible of War, p. 187. 28. Hafiz, ‘The Offensive in Libya: Dec. 1940-Feb. 1941", Royal United Services Journal for Defense Studies 101 (May 1956), 215. 29.Rodolfo Graziani, Africa Settentrionale (1940-1941) (Rome, Editore Danesi, 1948), p. 338,