III.

Marriage (Articles 1-54, Family Code)

A. Marriage (Article 1)
B. Requisites of Marriage (Articles 2-25)

20 hrs.

NAVARRO vs. DOMAGTOY

1. Navarro v.
Domagtoy,
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1309, 19 July 1996
259 SCRA 129 FACTS:
Rodolfo Navarro lodged a complaint against Judge Hernando Domagtoy for two acts:
For solemnizing the wedding between Gaspar Tabadan and Arlyn Borga. The groom is
merely separated from his wife. The judge relied on the affidavit by the MTC Judge of
Basy that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years,
thus the presumption that she is already dead.
For solemnizing a wedding between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma Del Rosario
outside his courts jurisdiction
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Domagtoy can be held liable of the above acts.
HELD:
Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of the first
wifes presumptive death. In the absence of which, he remains married to the first wife
thus, legally incapacitated to contract a subsequent marriage. It was an error to have
accepted a joint affidavit. The judges negligence resulted to solemnizing a bigamous
marriage.
The justification that the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario was solemnized in his
home on the basis of an affidavit submitted by Gemma alone is erroneous. According to
the Family Code, marriage can be solemnized outside of the Courts jurisdiction upon
request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect.
Judge Domagtoy was suspended for six months and given a stern warning that repetition
of similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
2. Republic v. FACTS:
Court of
Angelina M. Castro file a petition for judicial decree of nullity of marriage with Edwin
Appeals, G.R. Cardenas on the ground that no Marriage License was ever issued to them prior to the
No. 103047,
solemnization of the marriage. Edwin failed to file an answer and was declared in default.
02 September Angelina and Edwin had a civil wedding with Judge Pablo Malvar in Pasay City without
2004
the knowledge of Castros parents. Cardenas procured the requirements including the
marriage license in Pasig MM. They cohabited for four months and bore a child. They
parted and the child was adopted by Castros brother with the consent of Cardenas.
SCRO of Pasay issued a certification that marriage license of the spouses does not appear
from their registry. Castro also testified that she did not apply for marriage license and did
not sign anything until the marriage certificate.
The lower court denied the petition stating that the certification is inadequate to establish
non-issuance of the marriage license. The inability to locate the marriage license is not
conclusive to show that there was none issued.
ISSUE:
Would the documentary and testimonial evidence presented be sufficient to grant a decree
of nullity?
HELD:
At the time of their marriage the governing law was the New Civil code which states that
the absence of a marriage license would render the marriage void ab initio.
The fact that only Castro testified cannot be held against her. Her husbands default after
duly served with notice cannot be faulted on Castro.
The documentary and testimonial evidence presented by Castro which was undisputed by
any party, sufficiently established the absence of the marriage license. Thus, marriage was
null and void ab initio.

3. Morigo v.
People, G.R.
No. 145226,
06 February
2004

4. Republic of
the Philippines
v. Olaybar,
G.R. No.
189538, 10
February
2014.

FACTS:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates for 4 years, after which they
lost contact with each other. They reconnected again in 1984 and became sweethearts
when Lucia was in Singapore until she went to Canada in 1986.
They got married in Aug.1990, the following month Lucia went back to Canada leaving
Lucio behind. Lucia filed for divorce in Canada which was granted by the court to take
effect on Feb 17, 1992. On Oct. 4, 1992, Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago.
September 21, 1993, Lucio filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage
with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. Lucio was
charged with Bigamy in information filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City, with
the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.
Lucio filed a petition for certiorari seeking a reversal of his conviction. He should not be
faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce decree of the Ontario court. The OSG
counters that petitioners contention that he was in good faith in relying on the divorce
decree is negated by his act of filing a petition for a judicial declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Lucia.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense of good faith
is valid.
HELD:
The elements of bigamy are: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the first
marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead; (3) he contracts a subsequent
marriage; and (4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the
existence of the first.
The trial court held that the marriage of Lucio and Lucia is void ab initio, in accordance
with the Family Code. What transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the
two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally
married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia
Barrete.
Petitioner has not committed bigamy. His defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent
is now moot and academic.
FACTS:
Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of
No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her
boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already
married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the
Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of Justice. She
denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the
alleged husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the
signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers. She filed a Petition
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage
Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion thereof. Respondent impleaded
the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as parties
to the case.
During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not
have appeared before Judge Mamerto Califlores, the supposed solemnizing
officer, at the time the marriage was allegedly celebrated, because she was then in
Makati working as a medical distributor in Hansao Pharma. She completely
denied having known the supposed husband, but she revealed that she recognized
the named witnesses to the marriage as she had met them while she was working
as a receptionist in Tadels Pension House. She believed that her name was used by
a certain Johnny Singh, who owned a travel agency, whom she gave her personal
circumstances in order for her to obtain a passport. Respondent also presented as
witness a certain Eufrocina Natinga, an employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who
confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed celebrated in their office,
but claimed that the alleged wife who appeared was definitely not respondent.
Lastly, a document examiner testified that the signature appearing in the marriage
contract was forged.
On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision in favor of respondent
and directed the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City to cancel all the entries in the
WIFE portion of the alleged marriage contract of the petitioner and respondent Ye
Son Sune. Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage contract
was not that of respondent, the court found basis in granting the latter's prayer to
straighten her record and rectify the terrible mistake.

ISSUES:
2. is the cancellation of all entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage
contract in effect a declaration that the marriage is void ab initio?
RULING:
2. NO. The SC maintained that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the
validity of marriage, the SC ruled that it cannot nullify the proceedings before the
trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the
allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of
the parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought,
not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the
correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the
evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of
marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way,
declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.
In Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil
Registrar of Quezon City, and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of
the National Statistics Office, the SC ruled that a "petition for correction or
cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to
invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the
requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage,
support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses and the investigation of the public
prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the
jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic
Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil
registry is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage
by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry."
In this case, however, the SC found that aside from the certificate of marriage, no
such evidence was presented to show the existence of marriage. Rather,
respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into
and that she was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and
documentary evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of marriage
which is the marriage certificate was a forgery.
C.Recognition of Foreign Divorce Decree (Article 26)
1. Cases of
Orbecido, Iyoy
and Pilapil
(previously
assigned)

REPUBLIC vs. ORBECINDO

G.R. No. 154380, 5 October 2005
FACTS:
Cipriano Orbecindo and Lady Myros Villanueva got married in May 24, 1981. Both are
Filipino citizens. They cohabited and had two children. Villanueva went to the U.S. in
1986 with one son.
Villanueva became a naturalized American citizen and sometime in the year 2000,
Orbecindo learned that his wife obtained a divorce decree and remarried. Orbecindo then
filed a petition for authority to remarry. The court granted the petition since there was no
opposition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code
HELD:
Petition for authority to remarry constituted a petition for the declaratory relief. The
following are the requisites:
Justiciable controversy
Controversy must be between persons whose interest are adverse
That the party seeking relief has a legal interest
The issue is ripe for judicial determination
ARTICLE 26 Paragraph 2 of the Family Code should be interpreted to allow a Filipino
citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who acquired foreign citizenship and remarried
can also be allowed to remarry.
However, the present petition of Orbecindo has no sufficient evidence submitted and on
record and are only based on bare allegations that his wife was a naturalized American
citizen, had obtained divorce decree and had remarried an American. Such declaration
could only be made properly upon submission of evidence in his favor.
PILAPIL vs. IBAY-SOMERA
FACTS:
Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married in Germany to private respondent, Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980
and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling initiated a
divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany on January 1983.The divorce decree
was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses.
The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.
Six months after the divorce was granted private respondent filed 2 complaints for

adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter
had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua
sometime in 1983.
ISSUE:
Whether a person could still be prosecuted of bigamy after a divorce decree was already
issued?
HELD:
The law specifically provides that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person
who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else.
Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter
obtained a valid divorce in his country and said divorce and its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines.
In the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture
that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
2. Corpuz v.
Sto. Tomas,
G.R. No.
186571, 11
August 2010.

3. Quita v.
Court of
Appeals, G.R.
No. 124862,
22 December
1998

Facts:
Petitioner was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship
through naturalization. He was married to the respondent but was shocked of the infidelity
on the part of his wife. He went back to Canada and filed a petition for divorce and was
granted. Desirous to marry another woman he now loved, he registered the divorce decree
in the Civil Registry Office and was informed that the foreign decree must first be
judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court. Petitioner filed for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of marriage as dissolved with the RTC
where respondent failed to submit any response. The RTC denied the petition on the basis
that the petitioner lacked locus standi. Thus, this case was filed before the Court.
Issues: WON the second paragraph of Art 26 of the FC extends to aliens the right to
petition a court of this jurisdiction fro the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
Decision:
The alien spouse cannot claim under the second paragraph of Art 26 of the
Family Code because the substantive right it establishes is in favour of the Filipino spouse.
Only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second par of Art 26 of the Family Code.
The unavailability of the second paragraph of Art 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip the petitioner of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of
his foreign divorce decree. The petitioner, being a naturalized Canadian citizen now, is
clothed by the presumptive evidence of the authenticity of foreign divorce decree with
conformity to aliens national law.
The Pasig City Civil Registry acted out of line when it registered the foreign decree of
divorce on the petitioner and respondents marriage certificate without judicial order
recognizing the said decree. The registration of the foreign divorce decree without the
requisite judicial recognition is void.
The petition for review on certiorari is granted, the RTC decision is reversed and Court
ordered t6he remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in light of the
ruling.
Fact of the Case:
Fe D. Quita, the petitioner, and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the
Philippines on May 18, 1941. They got divorce in San Francisco on July 23, 1954. Both of
them remarried another person. Arturo remarried Bladina Dandan, the respondent
herewith. They were blessed with six children. On April 16, 1972, when Arturo died, the
trial court was set to declared as to who will be the intestate heirs. The trial court invoking
Tenchavez vs Escano case held that the divorce acquired by the petitioner is not
recognized in our country. Private respondent stressed that the citizenship of petitioner
was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Rommillo Jr that aliens who obtain
divorce abroad are recognized in the Philippnes provided they are valid according to their
national law. The petitioner herself answered that she was an American citizen since 1954.
Through the hearing she also stated that Arturo was a Filipino at the time she obtained the
divorce. Implying the she was no longer a Filipino citizen. The Trial court disregarded the
respondents statement. The net hereditary estate was ordered in favor the Fe D. Quita and
Ruperto, the brother of Arturo. Blandina and the Padlan children moved for
reconsideration. On February 15, 1988 partial reconsideration was granted declaring the
Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one- half of the estate to the
exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and the other half to Fe Quita. Private respondent was not
declared an heir for her marriage to Arturo was declared void since it was celebrated

during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner. Blandina and her children
appeal to the Court of Appeals thatthe case was decided without a hearing in violation of
the Rules of Court.
Issue: (1) Whether or not Blandinas marriage to Arturo void ab initio.
(2) Whether or not Fe D. Quita be declared the primary beneficiary as surviving spouse of
Arturo.
Held:
No. The marriage of Blandina and Arturo is not void. The citizenship of Fe D. Quita at the
time of their divorce is relevant to this case. The divorce is valid here since she was
already an alien at the time she obtained divorce, and such is valid in their countrys
national law. Thus, Fe D. Quita is no longer recognized as a wife of Arturo. She cannot be
the primary beneficiary or will be recognized as surviving spouse of Arturo
D. Marriages Exempt from the License Requirement (Articles 27-34)
1 Manzano v.
FACTS:
Sanchez, A.M.
No. MTJ-00Herminia Borja Manzano avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano,
1329, 08
having been married to him on 21 May 1966. They had 4 children. On 22 March 1993,
March 2001
however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before
Judge Sanchez. The Judge knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous,
as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were separated.
In his comment, at the time he officiated the marriage the two had been living together as
husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in
their joint affidavit. Had he known that Manzano was married he would have refused to
solemnize the marriage
David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to
Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their respective
marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and had
never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore
ISSUE:
Is the judge guilty of solemnizing a bigamous marriage?
HELD:
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a legal
impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a
long time is immaterial. Legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less
authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is
merely de facto, as in the case at bar.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a
void and bigamous marriage.
Recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with the

2. De Castro v.
De Castro,
G.R. No.
160172, 13
February 2008

3. Republic v.
Dayot, G.R.
No. 175581,
28 March
2008

MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque
Sanchez is increased to P20, 000.
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get
married, thus they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October
1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the
Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to
push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated
13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for at least
five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe,
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites.
Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their respective
homes and did not live together as husband and wife.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid.
HELD:
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall
render the marriage voidable. In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented
that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage license when they contracted their
marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for
more than five years. However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the
affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination. The falsity of the affidavit cannot
be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law
dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived
together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and
unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to
avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every
applicants name for a marriage license. In the instant case, there was no "scandalous
cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which
petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has no
value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage
license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their
marriage void ab initio.
ose was introduced to Felisa in 1986. He later came to live as a boarder in Felisas house,
the latter being his landlady. Later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to the Pasay
City Hall, so she could claim a package sent to her by her brother from Saudi. At the
PCH, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper
approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that the package
could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him,
and told him that his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who had learned
about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the
man who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had
contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of
the table at the sala of Felisas house. When he perused the same, he discovered that it
was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, she said she
does not know of such. Felisa denied Joses allegations and defended the validity of their
marriage. She declared that they had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent
the legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting
marriage with him on account of their age difference. In her pre-trial brief, Felisa
expounded that while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage
with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed
an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint
against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both
employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. The Ombudsman found Jose
administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted out to him the
penalty of suspension from service for one year without emolument. The RTC ruled
against Jose claiming that his story is impossible and that his action of fraud has already
prescribed. It cited Article 87 of the New Civil Code which requires that the action for
annulment of marriage must be commenced by the injured party within four years after the

discovery of the fraud.

ISSUE: Whether or not the action to file an action to nullify a marriage due to fraud is
subject to prescription.

4. Cosca v.
Palaypayon,
A.M. No. MTJ
92-721, 30
September
1994

5. Ninal v.
Bayadog, G.R.
No. 133778,
14 March
2000

HELD: The OSG avers that Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his
marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived
together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Joses subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual
on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of
nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is
imprescriptible. Jose and Felisas marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No
other conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to
impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any time
FACTS:
Complainants work in MTC-Tinambak, Camarines Sur. They alleged that Judge
Palaypayon solemnized marriages even without the requisite of a marriage license.
Hence, couples were able to get married just by paying the marriage fees to respondent.
As a consequence, the marriage contracts of the couples did not reflect any marriage
license number. In addition, Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts and did not
indicate the date of solemnization reasoning out that he had to wait for the marriage
license to be submitted by the parties which happens usually several days after the
marriage ceremony.
An illegal solemnization of marriage was charged against the respondent. Palaypayon
contends that marriage between Abellano & Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil
Code thus exempted from the marriage license requirement. According to him, he gave
strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple copy of the marriage
contract and to file the same with the civil registrar but the latter failed to do so. The
spouses subsequently formalized the marriage by securing a marriage license and
executing their marriage contract, a copy of which was then filed with the civil registrar.
The other five marriages were not illegally solemnized because Palaypayon did not sign
their marriage contracts and the date and place of marriage are not included. The marriage
of Bocaya & Bismonte was celebrated even without the requisite license due to the
insistence of the parties to avoid embarrassment with the guests which he again did not
sign the marriage contract.
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage solemnized by Judge Palaypayon were valid.
HELD:
Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that in the absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio whereas an
irregularity in the formal requisite shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party
or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally, and administratively
liable. He was found guilty of solemnizing marriages without a marriage license
His claim that Abellano and Edralin executed a joint affidavit that they have been living
together as husband and wife for almost 6 years already would show that Abellano is less
than 13 years old when they started living together which. He is found to be negligent in
his duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who might have executed a
false joint affidavit in order to avoid the marriage license requirement.
FACTS:
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their
marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death
on April 24, 1985. Almst two years thereafter Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got
married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an
affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license.
On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. Petitioners filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging for lack of a marriage

license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the
second marriage would affect petitioners successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action
since they are not among the persons who could file an action for annulment of marriage
under Article 47 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage after his death?
Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs deceased father with defendant is valid
HELD:
The two marriages involved herein is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the
time of their celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article
53 of the Civil Code the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio.
The 5-year cohabitation period should be the years immediately preceding the marriage
and it should be characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any
time within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. In the case at bar Pepito had a
subsisting marriage at the time he cohabited with another.
It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed.
Void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party. For other purposes,
such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the
court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.
E. Void and Voidable Marriages
A.M. No. 0211-10-SC
Article 35
1. Araes v.
FACTS:
Occiano, A.M.
No. MTJ-02Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent judge
1390, 11 April solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite
2002.
marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
Araes and Orobia as husband and wife until her husband passed away. Since the marriage
was a nullity, she was deprived to inherit the vast properties left by Orobia and to
receive the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.
Respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo to solemnize the
marriage of the parties having been assured that all the documents to the marriage were
complete. He agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at MTC Balatan, Camarines
Sur. However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo requested if respondent judge could
solemnize the marriage in Nabua because Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not
stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan.
He discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license so he
suggested resetting it. Due to the earnest pleas of the parties, he proceeded to solemnize
the marriage out of human compassion. He reiterated the necessity for the marriage license
and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void.
Respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same

reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to his sala which never
materialized.
Petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001 with the Office of the
Court Administrator. That after reading the Comment filed by respondent judge, she
realized her own shortcomings and is now bothered by her conscience.
ISSUES:
Can the judge be liable for solemnizing a marriage outside of his jurisdiction and without
the requisite of marriage license given his reason of human compassion and given the fact
that the petitioner already desisted from her complaint?
HELD:
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the regional
trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their
territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court. Where a judge solemnizes a
marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal
requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage,
may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. The respondent judge
exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly
prejudiced the status of married persons.
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the
municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur, solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia
in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative
liability.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite
marriage license. It is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority
to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he
solemnized the marriage of petitioner.
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by
petitioner. Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the
discipline of court personnel, would be undermined.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5, 000.00 pesos with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with
more severely.
2. Geronimo v.
CA, G.R. No.
105540, 5 July
1993

Facts:
This is an appeal of certiorari from the decision of CA which affirmed the judgment of
RTC declaring valid the marriage between Graciana Geronimo and Antonio Esman
appointing the latter as the administrator of the estate of the deceased Graciana Geronimo.
the decedent died on June 2, 1987 without leaving will no descendants nor scendants.
She was survived by her 2 brothers Tomas and Ireneo (petitioner), her nephew Salvador
and her husband-oppositor Antonio Esman.
However the husband capacity to inherit the property is now being questioned in view
of the discovery by the petitioner that the marriage between the oppositor and decedent
was celebrated without marriage license.
the petitioner contend that the a certification issued by Local Civil Registrar of Pateros
shows that the marriage license number is not indicated in the contract and marriage
license was issued.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between Graciana Geronimo and Antonio A. Esman was
valid?
Held:
Yes.
Judgment of the trial court by public respondent stated that the non-indication of the
number could only serve to prove that the number was not recorded. It could not be
accepted as convincing proof of non issuance of the required marriage license. The issue
of validity of the marriage in question because there is nothing in the law requires that the
marriage license number would be indicated in the marriage contract itself.
Article 36
1. Halili v.
Halili, G.R.
No. 165424, 9
June 2009.

2. Baccay v.
Baccay, G.R.
No. 173138, 1
December
2010

FACTS:
Petitioner Lester Halili filed a petition to declare his marriage to respondent Chona
Santos-Halili null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity to perform the
essential obligations of marriage. He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites thinking
that it was a joke. After the ceremonies, they never lived together as husband and wife.
However, they started fighting constantly a year later, at which point petitioner decided to
stop seeing respondent and started dating other women. It was only upon making an
inquiry that he found out that the marriage was not "fake."
ISSUE:
Whether or not his marriage to respondent ought to be declared null and void on the basis
of his psychological incapacity.
RULINGS:
In the recent case of Te v. Yu-Te and the Republic of the Philippines, this Court reiterated
that courts should interpret the provision on psychological incapacity on a case-to-case
basis - guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines and by decisions of church tribunals.
In Te, this Court defined dependent personality disorder characterized by a pattern of
dependent and submissive behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and
frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by others'
comments.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have
this disorder may be unable to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance
from others, may allow others to make most of their important decisions (such as where to
live), tend to agree with people even when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty
starting projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in
order to get approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and
are often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.
It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a psychological condition that was
grave and incurable and had a deeply rooted cause. Based on the foregoing, it has been
shown that petitioner is indeed suffering from psychological incapacity that effectively
renders him unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage and thus the Court
declared the marriage null and void.
FACTS:
Noel and Maribel were sweethearts. He found Maribel's snobbish and hard-to get traits
attractive.
Around 1997, he decided to break up with Maribel because he was already involved with
another woman. They agreed to see each other on a friendly basis but the two had several
romantic episodes.
In November 1998, Maribel informed Noel that she was pregnant with his child. Upon
advice of his mother, Noel grudgingly married Maribel. The two lived on Noel's family.
Maribel remained aloof and didn't contribute to his family's coffer. She refused to have sex
with him.
Sometime in 1999, Noel and Maribel had an intense quarrel about Maribel's alleged
miscarriage causing the latter to leave the house and never came back.
Noel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC of Manila. RTC
declared the marriage null and void on the ground of Maribel's alleged psychological
incapacity. Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist who presented as Noel's witness, found
Maribel unable to perform the essential marital obligations of marriage due to a
Narcissistic Personality Disorder.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between Noel and Maribel null and void under Article 36 of
the Family Code.
RULING:
No. Noel failed to provide sufficient evidence to sustain a finding that Maribel was
psychologically incapacitated. Noel's evidence merely established that Maribel refused to
have sexual intercourse with him after their marriage, and that she left him after their
quarrel when he confronted her about her alleged miscarriage.
The psychologist failed
to establish that Maribel's alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder incapacitated her from
validly assuming the essential obligations of the marriage. The same psychologist even
testified that Maribel was capable of entering into marriage except that it would be
difficult for her to sustain one. Mere difficulty, it must be stressed, is not the incapacity
contemplated under the Article 36 of the Family Code.

3. Chi Ming
Tsoi v. Court
of Appeals,
G.R. No.
119190, 16
January 1997

4. Republic v.
Molina, 268
SCRA 198

Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal," or a "neglect"

in the performance of some marital obligations. An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null
and void marriage.
FACTS:
GINA LAO-TSOI and Chi Ming Tsoi got married on May 22, 1988. Distraught, Gina
filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity premised
on the following reasons:
There was no sexual intercourse between them on the first night or on the succeeding
nights until they separated in March of 1989;
That the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual;
Results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin,
while that of her husbands examination was kept confidential up to this time.
Chi Ming Tsoi married her, to maintain his residency status here in the country and to
publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.
Chi Ming Tsoi does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several reasons:
That there is no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable;
If there are any differences between them, it can still be reconciled and that if either has
some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be cured.
He admitted that since their marriage until their separation they had no sexual contact
between them. He reasoned was that every time he wants to have sexual intercourse, his
wife always avoided him. He forced his wife to have sex with him only once but he did
not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital
obligation.
HELD:
Both defendant and appellant admitted that they did not have sexual relations after almost
ten months of cohabitation, when both are not suffering from any physical disability. Such
abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of
a serious personality disorder.
To procreate is based on the universal principle that procreation of children through
sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage. Constant non-fulfillment of this
obligation destroys the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. The senseless and
protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent
to psychological incapacity, since he was not physically impotent, but he refrained from
sexual intercourse during the entire time.
FACTS:
Respondent Roridel O. Molina filed of a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage
to Reynaldo Molina. They were married on April 14, 1985 and begot a son, Andre O.
Molina was born. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and
irresponsibility. He preferred to spend time with his peers and friends on whom he
squandered his money. He depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never

honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels.
Reynaldo was relieved of his job and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner. In
October 1986 the couple had a very intense fight, which resulted to their estrangement
until Reynaldo finally abandoned them. Roridel desires to have the marriage declared null
and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from
the start.
Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife,
but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to Roridels
strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage,
Roridels refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and
Roridels failure to run the household and handle their finances.
The parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years. The petitioner is not asking
support or for damages. Their common child is in the custody of the petitioner.
ISSUES:
Are opposing and conflicting personalities equivalent to psychological incapacity?
HELD:
The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity
to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.
The present case, does not show that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity.
It appears to be more of a difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the
performance of some marital obligations.
Here is the guideline for psychological incapacity to be established:
(The Molina Doctrine)
Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision.
The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.
Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic

5. Marcos v.
Marcos, G.R.
No. 136490,
19 October
2000

6. Ferraris v.
Ferraris, G.R.
No. 162368,
17 July 2006

Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts.
The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
FACTS: Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they had five children.
Alleging that the husband failed to provide material support to the family and have
resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the
marriage on the ground that Wilson Marcos has psychological incapacity. The RTC
declared the marriage null and void under Article 36 which was however reversed by the
Court of Appeals
ISSUES: 1. Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the respondent by
a physician is a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.
2. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological
incapacity.
HELD: Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may
be established by the totality of evidencepresented. There is no requirement, however that
the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditionsince
qua non for such declaration.Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent
failed to provide material support to the family and may haveresorted to physical abuse
and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological
incapacity on hispart. There is absolutely no showing that his defects were already
present at the inception of the marriage or that they areincurable.Verily, the behavior of
respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully
employed for aperiod of more than six years. It was during this period that he became
intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support,and even left the family
home.Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the
inception of the marriage. Equallyimportant, there is no evidence showing that his
condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.In
sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to
show that the alleged psychologicalincapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines outlined
inMolina.
Armida and Brix are a showbiz couple. The couples relationship before the marriage and
even during their brief union (for well about a year or so) was not all bad. During that
relatively short period of time, Armida was happy and contented with her life in the
company of Brix. Armida even admits that Brix was a responsible and loving husband.
Their problems began when Armida started doubting Brix fidelity. It was only when they
started fighting about the calls from women that Brix began to withdraw into his shell and
corner, and failed to perform his so-called marital obligations. Brix could not understand
Armidas lack of trust in him and her constant naggings. He thought her suspicions
irrational. Brix could not relate to her anger, temper and jealousy. Armida presented a
psychological expert (Dr. Dayan) who finds Brix to be a schizoid and a dependent and
avoidant type. This is evidenced by Brixs
leaving-the-house attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during
epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his
preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family.
ISSUE: Whether or not PI is attendant in the case at bar.
HELD: The SC upheld the decision of the lower courts. The alleged mixed personality
disorder, the leaving-the-house attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies
during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and
his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on
some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume
the essential obligations of marriage and these do not constitute PI. Further, the expert was
not able to prove her findings. Notably, when asked as to the root cause of respondents
alleged psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayans answer was vague, evasive and

inconclusive. She replied that such disorder can be part of his family upbringing She
stated that there was a history of Brixs parents having difficulties in their relationshipthis is of course inconclusive for such has no direct bearing to the case at bar.
What is psychological incapacity?

7. Antonio v.
Reyes, G.R.
No. 155800,
10 March
2006

8. Dedel v.
Court of
Appeals, G.R.
No. 151867,
29 January
2004.

The term psychological incapacity to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party
even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as
to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one
is about to assume. As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated
characteristics associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity
to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It is for this
reason that the Courts rely heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the
human personality. However, the root cause must be identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature must be fully explained in court.
FACTS:
Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of age met in 1989.
Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married at Manila City Hall and then a
subsequent church wedding at Pasig in December 1990. A child was born but died 5
months later. Reyes persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation,
income, educational attainment and other events or things. She even did not conceal
bearing an illegitimate child, which she represented to her husband as adopted child of
their family. They were separated in August 1991 and after attempt for reconciliation, he
finally left her for good in November 1991. Petitioner then filed in 1993 a petition to have
his marriage with Reyes declared null and void anchored in Article 36 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as basis for declaring
their marriage null and void.
HELD:
Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage
as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them. The petitioner, aside from his own
testimony presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who attested that constant
lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and corroborated his
allegations on his wifes behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity.
Respondents fantastic ability to invent, fabricate stories and letters of fictitious characters
enabled her to live in a world of make-believe that made her psychologically incapacitated
as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. The root
causes of Reyes psychological incapacity have been medically or clinically identified that
was sufficiently proven by experts. The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity
was considered so grave that a restrictive clause was appended to the sentence of nullity
prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting marriage
without their consent. It would be difficult for an inveterate pathological liar to commit
the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect.
Furthermore, Reyes case is incurable considering that petitioner tried to reconcile with
her but her behavior remain unchanged.
Hence, the court conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration
of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
FACTS:
Petitioner David B. Dedel married respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel wedding on May
20, 1967. The union produced four children. The conjugal partnership, nonetheless,
acquired neither property nor debt.
Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature wife and mother and had extramarital affairs with several men. Sharon once underwent treatment with a clinical
psychologist but it did not stop Sharon in her illicit affairs where she even had two
children out of wedlock.

Sharon returned to petitioner bringing along her two children. Petitioner accepted her back
and even considered the two illegitimate children as his own. December 9, 1995, Sharon
abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two children.
Petitioner filed a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity. Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from AntiSocial Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity and had no
capacity for remorse. Her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are
indications of Anti-Social Personality Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to
perform the essential obligations of marriage.
ISSUES:
Does the totality of the evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated?
Does the aberrant sexual behavior of respondent adverted to by petitioner fall within the
term psychological incapacity?
HELD:
Respondents sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or psychically ill to
such an extent that she could not have known the obligations she was assuming. Neither
could her emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and abandonment constitute
psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a
disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to discharge the
essential marital obligations. The manifestations presented refers only to grounds for legal
separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
The grief, frustration and even desperation of petitioner in his present situation cannot be
denied. While sympathy is warranted in the petitioners marital predicament, the law must
be applied no matter how harsh it may be.
Article 40
1. Terre v.
Terre, 211
SCRA 6

FACTS:
Dorothy Terre was then married to a certain Merlito Bercenillo, her first cousin. Atty.
Jordan Terre successfully convinced Dorothy that her marriage was void ab initio for the
reason of public policy and that they are free to contract marriage. They got married in
1977 where he wrote single under Dorothys status. After getting Dorothy pregnant, Atty.
Terre abandoned them and subsequently contracted another marriage to Helina Malicdem
in 1986. Atty. Terre was charged with abandonment of minor and bigamy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Terres marriage with Dorothy is null and void.
HELD:
Dorothys first marriage is indeed void ab initio considering that Merlito is her first cousin
thereby against public policy. However, she did not file any declaration for the nullity of
their marriage before she contracted her marriage with Atty. Terre thus, her second
marriage is void. Article 40 states that the absolute nullity of a former marriage may be

invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void.
FACTS:
2. Wiegel v.
Sempio-Diy,
Karl Heinz Weigel asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage celebrated on July,
with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Weigel on the g round that Lilia has previous
143 SCRA 499 1978
existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion performed on June 25, 1972
Lilia admitted the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage
was null and void. She asked the respondent court for an opportunity to present evidence
that:
The first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first husband; and
The first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married to someone else.
Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the existence of force
exerted on both parties of the first marriage had already been agreed upon.
Lilia assailed the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties were compelled to
submit the case for resolution based on agreed facts; and the Order dated April 14, 1980,
denying petitioners motion to allow her to present evidence in her favor.
ISSUE:
Could the resolution of the facts of the first marriage change the result of the annulment
case filed by Weigel?
HELD:
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force
committed against both parties because assuming as such, the marriage will not be void
but merely voidable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no
annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married the respondent she was still
validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID
(Art. 80, Civil Code).
A marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal
intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she
contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel. The marriage of Lilia and
Karl would be regarded VOID under the law.
3. Cario v.
In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Cario married Susan Nicdao Cario. He had 2 children with her.
Cario, 351
In 1992, SPO4 contracted a second marriage, this time with Susan Yee Cario. In 1988,
SCRA 127
prior to his second marriage, SPO4 is already bedridden and he was under the care of Yee.
In 1992, he died 13 days after his marriage with Yee. Thereafter, the spouses went on to
claim the benefits of SPO4. Nicdao was able to claim a total of P140,000.00 while Yee
was able to collect a total of P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an action for collection of sum
of money against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of the P140k. Yee admitted that her
marriage with SPO4 was solemnized during the subsistence of the marriage b/n SPO4 and
Nicdao but the said marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to the
absence of a valid marriage license as certified by the local civil registrar. Yee also
claimed that she only found out about the previous marriage on SPO4s funeral.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to claim
presumptive legitimes.
HELD: The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence of a
valid marriage license. The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for
the same has been solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the
marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage,
the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity,
is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For

other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal
case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death
of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of
said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such instances,
evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds
rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely
to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.

4. Atienza v.
Brillantes, 243
SCRA 32

5. Tenebro v.
Court of
Appeals, G.R.
No. 150758,
18 February
2004

The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a policeman for their
marriage is void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money etc owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Wages and salaries earned
by each party shall belong to him or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to
the full benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop even if their marriage is likewise void. This is
because the two were capacitated to marry each other for there were no impediments but
their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license; in their situation, their
property relations is governed by Art 147 of the FC which provides that everything they
earned during their cohabitation is presumed to have been equally contributed by each
party this includes salaries and wages earned by each party notwithstanding the fact that
the other may not have contributed at all
FACTS:
This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of
Impropriety against Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr.
Complainant alleged that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro with whom
respondent Judge was cohabiting with. Complainant claimed that respondent is married to
one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has 5 children. Respondent alleges that while he and
Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony (1965) before a Nueva Ecija town Mayor, the
same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon request of the parents
of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila.
Again, neither party applied for a marriage license. Respondent claims that when he
married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California in 1991, he believed in all good
faith and for all legal intents and purposes that he was single because his first marriage
was solemnized without a license. Respondent also argues that the provision of Article 40
of the Family Code does not apply to him considering that his first marriage took place in
1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage
took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.
ISSUE:
WON Article 40 of the Family Code is applicable to the case at bar.
HELD:
Yes. Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article
256 of the Family Code, said Article is given retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws. This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent
has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his
case.
Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas in 1990. The two lived
together continuously and without interruption until the later part of 1991, when Tenebro
informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes in
1986. Petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating
that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. In 1993, petitioner contracted yet another
marriage with a certain Nilda Villegas. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy
against petitioner. Villegas countered that his marriage with Villareyes cannot be proven as
a fact there being no record of such. He further argued that his second marriage, with
Ancajas, has been declared void ab initio due to psychological incapacity. Hence he
cannot be charged for bigamy.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy.

6. Mercado v.
Tan, 337
SCRA 122

Article 41
1. Republic v.
Nolasco, 220
SCRA 20

HELD: The prosecution was able to establish the validity of the first marriage. As a
second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioners valid
marriage to Villareyes, petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio
completely regardless of petitioners psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the
nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal
liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes any
person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead
by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. A plain reading of the law,
therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second
or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
FACTS:
Dr. Vicent Mercado was previously married with Thelma Oliva in 1976 before he
contracted marriage with Consuelo Tan in 1991 which the latter claims she did not know.
Tan filed bigamy against Mercado and after a month the latter filed an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage against Oliva. The decision in 1993 declared marriage
between Mercado and Oliva null and void.
ISSUE: Whether Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the declaration of nullity of
the former marriage.
HELD:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent
one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first
obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the
earlier union is characterized by statute as void.
In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Oliva
right after Tan filed bigamy case. Hence, by then, the crime had already been
consummated. He contracted second marriage without the judicial declaration of the
nullity. The fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a
bigamy charge.
FACTS:
Nolasco was a seaman and met Janet Monica Parker, a British in a bar in England. 15
January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique. After
marriage celebration, he obtained another contract and left his wife with his parents.
In January 1983 his mother informed him that Janet Monica had given birth to his son and
that Janet Monica had left Antique. He then immediately asked permission to leave his
ship to return home. He arrived in Antique in November 1983 (after 11 mos)
His efforts to look for her proved fruitless, respondent stated that he had lived with and
later married Janet Monica Parker not knowing her background. He did not report the
matter of Janet Monicas disappearance to the Philippine government authorities.
5 August 1988, Nolasco filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his
wife Janet Monica Parker or that the marriage be declared null and void.
ISSUE:
Does the circumstances of Jessicas disappearance constitute a presumptive death?
HELD:
There are four (4) requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of
the Family Code: (1) That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years,
or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death
under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code; (2)That the present spouse
wishes to remarry; (3)That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee
is dead; and (4) That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee.

Respondent failed to prove a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead
by failing to conduct a search for his missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to a
well-founded belief
Inquiring from friends instead of reporting to the proper authorities among the other
superficial testimonies given by the respondent does not constitute a diligent search

Article 45
1. Menciano v.
Jose, 89 Phil
63

2. Jimenez v.
Canizares, 109
Phil 273

FACTS:
Matilde Menciano filed a motion for declaration of heirs, alleging that she is the widow of
the deceased Faustino Neri San Jose, to whom she was married on September 28, 1944.
Before the marriage they lived together as husband and wife, there having been no
impediment to their marriage. As a result of their cohabitation the child Carlo Magno Neri
was born, baptized and was legitimized by the subsequent matrimony of his parents. The
second child Faustino Neri, Jr., was born on April 24, 1945 is a legitimate child.
Paz Neri San Jose, then executrix of the estate of the deceased Faustino Neri San Jose, and
Rodolfo Pelaez, designated universal heir in the will of the deceased filed a motion to
question the declaration of heirs.
They alleged that marriage between said deceased and Matilde Menciano was in violation
of the legal provisions and requisites, because he was deprived of free will due to his age
and sickness. Accordingly, Matilde Menciano took advantage of his condition, by intrigue,
deceit and threat of abandoning him, forced Neri to marry her. The deceased was impotent
and congenitally sterile, the same as his brothers and sister Conchita, who had no children
therefore it would have been impossible for him to have fathered the children
Defendants also filed a counterclaim for the sum of P286, 000 in cash, and for jewels and
certain properties, which, as alleged, were retained and illegally disposed of by Matilde
Menciano.
ISSUE:
Was the marriage between the deceased Faustino Neri San Jose and Matilde Menciano
valid?
Are, the children Faustino Neri, Jr. and Carlo Magno Neri the legitimate children of the
deceased Faustino Neri San Jose and Matilde Menciano?
Did Matilde Menciano have illegally disposed of the cash, jewels, and certain properties
above mentioned?
HELD:
The marriage of Matilde and Faustino was evidenced by a valid Marriage License and
Marriage Certificate both of which were signed by the parties and properly recorded at the
Office of the Civil Registrar. Being official and public documents, their validity can be
successfully assailed only by strong, clear, and convincing oral testimony.
Faustinos meticulous signature cannot be signed by one who is not of sound mind and of
fair physical condition. He may have been sick at that time, but not to such a degree as to
render him unconscious of what he was doing.
Impotency is the physical inability to have sexual intercourse. The presumption is in favor
of potency. The fact that the deceased was able to produce the specimen as what was
instructed by his doctor shows that he was potent. The necessary conclusion is that the
child Faustino Neri, Jr., is conclusively presumed to be the legitimate son of the deceased
Faustino Neri with Matilde Menciano in lawful wedlock.
The trial court, after a careful and exhaustive review of the evidence, correctly reached the
conclusion that allegation of illegally disposing money and jewelry has not been
substantiated.
FACTS:
Joel Jimenez filed a petition for a decree annulling his marriage to the defendant
Remedios Caizares contracted on 3 August 1950 upon the ground that the condition of
her genitals is incapable of copulation and it existed at the time of marriage and continues
to exist. For that reason he left the conjugal home two nights and one day after they had
been married.
On 14 June 1955 the wife was summoned and served a copy of the complaint. She did not

file an answer so the court directed the city attorney of Zamboanga to inquire whether
there was collusion.
On 17 December 1956 the Court entered an order requiring the defendant to submit to a
physical exam to determine her physical capacity for copulation and to submit, in ten days
a medical certificate on the result which she did not comply with. The Court entered a
decree annulling the marriage which prompted the city attorney to file a motion for
reconsideration upon the ground that the defendants impotency has not been satisfactorily
established as required by law; because the wife refused to be examined.
Instead of annulling the marriage the Court should have punished her for contempt of
court and compelled her to undergo a physical examination and submit a medical
certificate. The decree sought to be reconsidered would open the door to married couples,
who want to end their marriage to collude or connive with each other by just alleging
impotency of one of them.
ISSUE:
May the marriage in question be annulled on the strength of the lone testimony of
thhusband?
HELD:
The annulment cannot be decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was
expected to give testimony which is aimed at securing the annulment he seeks. Whether
the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established,
because from the commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she had
abstained from taking part therein. Her refusal to be examined and failure to appear in
court show indifference on her part, yet presumption arising out of the suppression of
evidence could not be inferred because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful
and shy and would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by competent
authority.
3. Buccat v.
Buccat, 72
Phil 19

Impotency should not be presumed. The presumption is always in favor of potency.

FACTS:
This issue has been raised to this superiority by the Court of First Instance of Baguio, as
only raises a question purely of law.
The plaintiff met the defendant in March 1938, committed on Sept and got married on 26
November the same year. After living together for 99 days ,Luisa gave birth to a child of
nine months, in February 23, 1939. Godofredo abandoned Luisa and did not return.
In March 29, 1939 GODOFREDO requests the annulment of marriage with Luisa Buccat
Mangonon on the ground that he was defrauded in consenting to the marriage with Luisa.
She had assured him that she was virgin but the circumstances of the birth of the child
after only 99 days of cohabitation speaks otherwise.
Luisa failed to appear despite having been summoned which allowed Godofredo to present
evidence. The lower court decided in favor of Luisa in upholding the marriage. Godofredo
appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Godofredos ground is valid to be granted an annulment.
HELD:
The plaintiffs allegation of fraud is impossible after it has been proven that Luisa is in
advanced pregnant condition by the time they were married. It seems childish considering
that the applicant was a freshman in law.

4. Aquino v.
Delizo, 109
Phil 21

Article 48
1. Macias v.
Ochotorena,
A.M. No. RTJ04-1861, 30
July 2004

Article 50
1. Yu v. Yu,
G.R. No.
164915, 10
March 2006

Marriage is a most sacred institution. It is the foundation on which society rests. In this
case no evidence has satisfied the court to merit an annulment. All the intendment of the
law leans towards the validity of marriage.
Facts: Conchita Delizo, herein petitioner, at the date of her marriage to petitioner Fernando
Aquino, concealed from the latter the fact that she was pregnant by another man, and
sometime in April 1955, or about four months after their marriage, gave birth to a child.
The defendant, in her answer that the child was conceived out of lawful wedlock between
her and the petitioner. The petitioner's complaint for annulment of his marriage to Delizo
was dismissed by the CFI of Rizal. It held that no birth certificate was presented to show
that the child was born within 180 days after the marriage between the parties and held
that the concealment of pregnancy as alleged by the plaintiff does not constitute such fraud
as would annul a marriage. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.
Issue: Whether or not concealment of pregnancy as alleged by Aquino constitutes fraud as
would annul a marriage
Held: Yes. The concealment by the wife of the fact at the time of marriage, she was
pregnant by another man than her husband constitutes fraud and is a ground for
annulment. Delizo was allegedly more than four months pregnant at the time of their
marriage, At such stage, it was gard to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent
especially since she was naturally plump. It is only on the sixth month of pregnancy that
the enlargement of the woman's abdomen reaches a heigh above the umbilicus, maiking
the roundness of the abdoment apparent. The Supreme Court remanded the case for new
trial and the decision complained of is set aside.
Facts: A verified complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage was filed by Mariano
Joaquin Macias, incumbent presiding judge of RTC Branch 11, Liloy, Zambaoanga del
Norte against Margie Corpus Macias. The respondent immediately issued summons to the
petitioner however such were not received by the latter because her whereabouts were
unknown. Respondent consequently filed a motion toserve summons by publication with
the directive that Mrs. Macias should file her answer withing thirty days after notice. The
latter filed a motion to dismiss however the former denied such motion and re-set the
hearing the hearing on merits and after such terminated the proceedings and declared the
case submitted for decision. Petitioner asserts that the respondent deprived her of the
fundamental right to due process.
Issue: Whether or not respondent was authorized to conduct a hearing of the case on its
merits
Held: No. Section 3. Rule 9 of th 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that "If the
defending party in an action for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage or for
legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to
investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists and if there is no
collusion, to intervene for the state in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not
fabricated." Thus, the report of the Public Prosecutor is a condition sine qua non for
further proceedings to go on in the case. He is not authorized to conduct a hearing of the
merits of such case. Considering the foregoing, the Court rules that the respondent judge
violated Mrs. Macias' right to due process when he completely ignored the pertinent rules.