Bryce Paulson

PHIl 770
Azadpur
5/27/2016

How Accepting The Ordinary is The Key to Saving Your Shovels

I. Introduction
In his paper, The Argument of The Ordinary1, Stanley Cavell argues
against Saul Kripkes skeptical solution to the rulefollowing paradox
presented in Wittgensteins Philosophical Investigations2, by charging
Kripke with wrongly grasping onto the need for rules and public licensing.3 He
argues that this issue stems from Kripkes severe underestimation of what
Cavell calls the ordinary.4 John McDowell in his paper, Non-Cognitivism and
Rule-Following5, argues against Cavells ordinary solution by claiming that it
is a form of non-cognitivism that lacks solid grounding, that results in a sense
of vertigo. McDowell argues that there is nothing keeping human practices,
language, and morals in line, except for the false assumption that the

1 Cavell, S. (n.d.). The Argument of the Ordinary. Retrieved May 23, 2016, from
https://ilearn.sfsu.edu/ay1516/mod/resource/view.php?id=226646

2 Wittgenstein, L. (2009). Philosophical Investigations (4th ed.). West Sussex, UK: Wiley Backwell.
3

Cavell, S. The Argument of the Ordinary. (P. 70)

4 Ibid (P. 65)

5 McDowell, J. (n.d.). Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following. Retrieved May 23, 2016, from
https://ilearn.sfsu.edu/ay1516/mod/resource/view.php?id=224432

reactions and responses we learn in learning them can somehow serve this
purpose.6
I will argue against both, Kripke and McDowell, by putting my faith into
Cavells argument of the ordinary. In order to do this, I must rst lay out
Kripkes motivation and reasoning behind his rule based skeptical solution. I
will then show why Kripkes take on Wittgenstein is flawed and explain how
Cavells appeal to the ordinary can quell all of Kripkes concerns,
while also being a superior understanding of Wittgenstein. With this
argument outlined, I will summarize McDowells argument against Cavells,
apparently ungrounded interpretation of Wittgensteins unspoken answer to
the rule-following paradox. A counter argument will follow this in defense of
Cavell, by explaining why McDowell misses the mark of what Wittgenstein
intended to bring to light in his, Philosophical Investigations. He misses the
mark due to wrongly attempting to give a solution to a problem that is
merely illusionary. I will conclude with my own interpretation and
explanation of how the ordinary is grounded in its own way, even if we are
not able to fully understand the aspects and make-up of the soil it rests
upon.

II. Kripke's Skeptical Solution

Briefly, Kripkes take on the purpose of the skeptical paradox is, The
entire point of the skeptical argument is ultimately that we reach a level
6 Ibid (P.149)
2

where we act without any reason in terms of which we can justify our action.
We act unhesitatingly but blindly.7 In these situations he believes that due to
our blindness, the only way to determine if an action is right or wrong is by
appeal to someone elses judgment or inclination for conrmation. He claims
that there are, justication conditions for attributing correct or incorrect rule
following to the subject, and these will not be simply that the subjects own
authority is to be accepted.8 In order to fully expose Kripkes understanding
and use of inclination, I will use Kripkes example of the student and the
teachers interaction to deconstruct his fundamental argument,
Now, what do I mean when I say that the teacher judges that, for certain
cases, the pupil must give the right answer? I mean that the teacher judges
that the child has given the same answer that he himself would give.
Similarly, when I said that the teacher, in order to judge that the child is
adding, must judge that, for a problem with larger numbers, he is applying
the right procedure even if he came out with a mistaken result, I mean that
he judges that the child is applying the procedure he himself is inclined to
apply.9
This highlights the heart of Kripke's attempt to convince us that our
inclinations are devoid of justicatory grounding in cases that we dont have
someone present to judge our actions, to conrm that they would have the
7 Kripke, S. A. (1982). Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press. (P. 87)

8 Ibid (P.89)
9 Ibid (P.90)
3

same inclination in the same situation. Kripke is drawing from Wittgensteins

use of the word inclination in 21710, and takes it to be showing that in the
absence of justication, all we have to turn to are inclinations of others in
order to ensure that the right answer is reached. It seems that Kripke is
asserting that a person's inclination is really not their own to independently
choose, it's not their property in a sense, it depends on the conrmation of
and agreement with another person's inclination in order for it to be carried
out or enacte. This brief explanation of Kripkes argument highlights his main
points, and while it is brief, it will prove to be a sufficient starting point to
move onto Cavells objection against him.

III. Cavel Objection to The Skeptical Solution

Cavell objects Kripkes interpretation of inclination and the need for
strict conformity and the need to reach public agreement, with a thought
experiment. He points out that just because he (Cavell in this example) is
struck with an inclination to say something it is not something, I necessarily
go on to say: I may be inclined to say yes to an invitation, but there are
considerations against it, and I hesitate to give an answer on the spot.11 The

10

Once I have exhausted the justications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned.
Then I am inclined to say: This is simply what I do. (PI 91)

11 Cavell, S. The Argument of the Ordinary. (P. 71)

4

ability to hesitate to act or not act at all, when struck with a blind
inclination(or any inclination for that matter), allows him to still exercise his
power over inclinations, by highlighting his ability to choose. Cavell argues
that Wittgenstein takes blind obedience to be, how things strike him.it
might further strike us that it is we who are yet more powerful than rules
since we can pick and choose among themBlindness expresses the rules
power as our power to subject ourselves to it.

12

The above passage is an

example of how Cavell is starting to shed light onto the importance of our
power to choose. He shows why he is motivated to move away from the
somewhat worrisome and passive observational picture that Kripke offers.
Kripke would strongly disagree with the above passage on the grounds
that if two people were both blindly struck with the same inclination, then
they would have no other option or justication for acting otherwise; they
must achieve agreement in our criteria13 Kripke believes that we cannot
substitute a blind inclination for another on a whim. Cavell objects to this
interpretation of agreement in criteria and explains that it wrongly
contractualizes and conventionalizes agreement. He goes on to say that
achieving agreement in our criteria depends upon lies in our natural
reactions. We may laugh and cry at the same things, or not; some
experience may throw us out of, or into, agreement here, but the idea of

12 Ibid (My emphasis added)

13 Kripke, S. A. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. (P. 105)
5

achieving agreement in our senses of comedy or tragedy seems out of

place.14 I will argue that this conception of differing inclinations and reactions
proves to be a much more natural and realistic picture of how things strike
us, allowing us to steer our own actions without doubt. Kripke seems to give
us no wiggle room for choice or to license us to act on inclinations that
naturally strike, yet are vastly different from others reactions and actions. In
cases where our natural reactions or choices differ vastly from others, we
often are immediately aware of this difference, and can choose to either:
change our reactions accordingly, or take note for similar future situations if
we judge that we were in the wrong.
Imagine instances of disagreement between you and another person in
regards to the right thing to do in a certain situation. You may choose to take
one course of action and while the other person disagrees, you then have the
power to judge if you were wrong and should apologize and take up their
viewpoint or you have the power to object if you chose to, and then attempt
to convince them to adopt your choice. I bring to light the notion of our
power because it is a capacity that we all have the ability to exercise. Even in
the most of grave of situations, although we often choose the life preserving
rout, we still have the power to choose.
Cavell further stresses the importance of capacities and his argument
against Kripke with this example, This use of the word to know, [namely]
Now I know!-- and similarly Now I can do it! and Now I understand!
14 Cavell, S. The Argument of the Ordinary. (P. 94)
6

[and] Now I can go on! are cases of a capacity that makes its appearance
in a moment as contrasted with cases in which one says that knowing is
a state or disposition15 Note his use of the word capacity, Kripkes skeptical
solution seems devoid of this capacity for power and is more akin to the
relationship between an obsessive controlling mother who has struck so
much fear into her child that their only inclinations can be those of their
mothers: they must necessarily follow the rules. If we are not bound by the
type of communal based conformational rules that Kripke envisages, then we
might ask what is the guiding justicatory backbone of our everyday speech
and activity? Cavell appeals to the ordinary, by taking a step back from
Kripkes description of a strict structure based on rules and instead argues
that we should focus on a much more natural and often imperfect or limited
ordinary explanation of human activity and morals.16 The next section will
begin to sketch what Cavell and I both take the ordinary to be.

IV. A Snapshot of The Ordinary

Cavell offers us a different take on what actually serves the role of
Kripkes insistence of rules and communal agreement. He draws from his
own earlier work on this subject. He vividly sketches the naturalistic system
that we are born into, grow accustomed to, and reinforce in our ordinary
everyday lives. The following passage is one of the most important and
15 Ibid (P.74) (My emphasis added)
16 Ibid (P. 81)
7

debated section of his paper and I will be referring back to it throughout the
paper. He quotes himself,
We learn and teach words in certain contexts, and then we are
expected, and expect others, to be able to project them into further contexts.
Nothing insures that this projection will take place (in particular, not the
grasping of universals nor the grasping of books of rules), just as nothing
insures that we will make, and understand, the same projections. That on the
whole we do is a matter of sharing routes of interest and feeling, modes of
response, senses of humor and of signicance and of fulllment, of what is
outrageous, of what is similar to what else, what a rebuke, what forgiveness,
of when an utterance is an assertion, when an appeal, when an explanation
all the whirl of organism Wittgenstein calls forms of life. Human speech and
activity, sanity and community, rest upon nothing more, but nothing less,
than this.17
After properly ruminating on this explanation, this passage strikes me (
and hopefully you as well) as a much more realistic description of the story
and source of human learning, language, and knowledge. His appeal to the
ordinary does not rest on, or appeal to, something greater than us; rather, it
allows for the all too familiar imperfections and disagreements that come
from and are reinforced by us. The ordinary is a holistic description of a
learned capacity and form of life that we constantly draw from and give
input back into, by attempting to understand each other and use as a guide
17 Cavell, S. The Argument of the Ordinary. (P. 81)
8

for our actions as well as reflections in life. Language and acceptable actions
are constantly changing and every person has a slightly different take on
what is right or what makes something right. But these differing views, taken
together make up our form of life and it seems to work somehow even
though, It is a vision as simple as it is difficult, and as difficult as it is
(because it is) terrifying.18 This may seem to be a rather obscure
description, but I assure you that it will gradually be fleshed out in each of
the following pages. Now that I have presented Cavells argument against
Kripke and introduced an light overview of the ordinary, I will move on to
McDowells concerns and argument against Cavell. Following this, I will
expand on and defend Cavells argument against McDowell by showing that
his argument is misguided.

V. Mcdowells Objection to Cavell's Ordinary Argument

McDowell begins his paper by stating that, Non-cognitivists hold that
ascriptions of value should not be conceived as propositions of the sort
whose correctness, or acceptability, consists in their being true descriptions
of the world;, and correlatively, that values are not found in the world, as
genuine properties of things are.19 McDowell argues that Cavells appeal to
the ordinary is completely ungrounded because it amounts to nothing more

18 Cavell, S. The Argument of the Ordinary. (P. 81)

19 McDowell, J. Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following. (P.141)
9

that an appeal to a congruence of subjectivities.20 He argues that when the

ordinary is properly deconstructed we will nd it to be hopelessly detached
from any sort of objectivity McDowell claims is needed to ensure that we will
go on to follow rules correctly in future instances. He outlines the two views
mentioned in his title, non-cognitivism and rule following to argue that we
are in the grips of a false dilemma. He believes that there is an intermediary
position that preserves the pros of both positions without retaining their
faults. His solution is a what has been called Naturalized Platonism; while I
will not directly pick apart his argument for this solution, I will show why it
is merely an answer to a misguided and flawed question birthed from the
mind of overly inquisitive philosophers.
McDowell claims that Cavells appeal to the ordinary (that I previously
quoted a summary of at great length) results in a sort of vertigo. This vertigo
comes from the realization that language is solely grounded in a learned
communal capacity which is as simple as it is difficult, and as difficult as it is
terrifying.21 McDowell claims this vertigo comes from the fact that, there is
nothing that keeps our practices in line except the reactions and responses
we learn in learning them.22 He argues that this line of thinking and the
solution that comes with it does not provide enough grounding (if any) to

20 McDowell, J. Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following. (P.149)

21 Cavell, S. The Argument of the Ordinary. (P. 81)
22 McDowell, J. Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following. (P.149)
10

ensure that we can actually consistently follow a rule in the same way.
Because of this, he claims that we are naturally inclined to turn to the illusion
of rules as rails. Which leads to the unfortunate and unwanted result of
committing ourselves to an untenable form of platonism. He explains this
issue as having, two interlocking components: the idea of the psychological
mechanism correlates with the idea that the tracks we follow are objectively
there to be followed, in a way that transcends the reactions and responses of
participants in our practices. If the rst component is suspect, the second
component should be suspect too. And it is.23 He points out an objective or
sideways-on perspective is needed for what he claims is Cavells only way
of saving his argument from being ungrounded, forces the unwanted result
of being dependent on platonism. This result is also flawed due to the
impossibility of accessing the sideways on standpoint. IN other words, we are
unable to get outside of ourselves to objectively check that we are going on
in the right way. Now that McDowells motherly warning against endorsing the
ordinary has been put forth, I can now defend Cavell and provide reasons
why the ordinary is the best conclusion we can reach.

VI. My Response to McDowell in Defence of Cavell

To put things simply, I disagree with McDowells argument because I
believe his demands overstep his and our human bounds of understanding.
He is in essence, bringing more confusion to the issue than he is providing
23 McDowell, J. Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following. (PP.149-50)
11

any sense of clarity or answers. While he does bring up interesting points

and can slickly instill a sense of fear to a curious educated reader, I believe
that he is simply leading us down into a self-imposed pit of despair. I side
with Cavell and refuse to dig any deeper because, as I will show, the ground
that we stand on is just as rm as the bedrock that McDowells fabled buried
linguistic treasure rests upon. What I mean by this will benet from Cavells
point about how we can be lead to feel it is of paramount importance to get
to the bottom of every single question philosophy can conjure up; thus
driving us into an frenzied, insatiable desire for answers (that often are
beyond our abilities to answer). In essence, the following passage
encourages us to become at peace with our human situation (and the limits
that come with it) rather than making them our enemies,
The idea is not: Do not seek an explanation for animals' not talking,
any more than for our (we humans') talking, because you will not nd one.
The idea is rather: See how philosophical explanations will seek to distract
you from your interests (ordinary, scientic, aesthetic); how they counterfeit
necessity. That the advice is all but impossible to take is Wittgenstein's
subject: we do seek, and therewith we demand a nding, and therein comes
the skeptical conclusion, or solution: the demand for a philosophical solution
is the skepticism.24
This counterfeit of necessity is the mistaken ground on which I believe
McDowells dissatisfaction with the ordinary and his claim of that we need a
24 Cavell, S. The Argument of the Ordinary. (PP. 96-7) (My emphasis added)
12

remedy to free ourselves from the vertigo. While I do see where his
dissatisfaction stems from, this does not mean that I agree with his claims or
the validity of his use of vertigo as a scare tactic. As a up and coming
philosopher, I undoubtedly know what it's like to be in the grips of the desire
for understanding, even when others warn me that I am going down the
wrong path. In these cases I often shun them away and discredit their
sincere warnings against my hopeless endeavors. If you think about it we
(McDowell and myself) are both attempting to warn each other that what the
other is investing their beliefs in, is fundamentally flawed. I am certain that
some things are out of our reach for understanding and I strongly believe
and am arguing that language is one of these things. In these type of cases,
by conceding to our human limits for understanding we are closer to the
truth than we would be if we fail to admit defeat. We must unatually come to
peace with our natural limits. This conclusion does not sit well with many,
and I am sympathetic to McDowells worry, yet I am not convinced he offers
sufficient reason or a way to overcome these limits.
Wittgenstein points out the issue ineptness and our limits about things
that are so close, yet so far from us in 129, The aspects of things that are
most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity.
(One is unable to notice something because it is always before ones eyes.)
The real foundations of their inquiry do not strike people at all. Unless that
fact has at some time struck them. And this means: we fail to be struck by

13

what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful.25 Wittgenstein clearly
notes the source of this frustration and how we must realize that we will
come to a dead end when pursuing non-ordinary questions about language. I
take this to be a liberating point, due to the fact that while we may not be
able to explain how exactly the fundamentals of some things work, we are
able to know that they do work. The trouble comes when attempting to
accept that this is enough, in order to allow us to come to peace with our
limits.
I am aware that I have not taken a directly attacked all of McDowells
specic points of why the ordinary induces vertigo as of yet. So far, I have
focused on showing how and why his argument and worries, in general, are
flawed. I will now hone in on why the ordinary does not induce the sort of
vertigo as he envisions. I will rst give a general overview of Cavells and
Wittgensteins main points in order to build a foundation in order to dispel his
worries. I will then, at the risk of contradicting myself and overstepping the
boundaries of the saying showing distinction, offer the most complete and
satisfying description of the complexities in language and its source, all
while doing my best to not overstep my natural limits marked by the realm of
the ordinary. I may be motivated to do this because I am in the grips of
counterfeiting necessity, but I feel that it is important to offer my best shot
at how I believe the ordinary is sufficient and that while it may appear
groundless, it is surely not based on nothing. If I have been lead on by a
25 Wittgenstein, L.

Philosophical Investigations. (P. 56)

14

counterfeiting of necessity, it will surely not be my rst or last time, yet I

accept the risk in order to bring light to the subject and learn from my
possible mistakes.

VII. What Really Underlies Language

SImply put, I believe that what underlies language is us, this is the
reason why we have so much trouble deducing the underlying features and
aspects which allow us to use and understand language in a reliable fashion.
It is as simple as it is frightening, which makes it difficult to accept due to the
demand for us to go against our normal strategy of searching outside of
ourselves for the source and fundamental aspects of things. Wittgenstein
explicitly explain our limits when it comes to understanding language in
124,
Philosophy must not interfere in any way with the actual use of
language, so it can in the end only describe it.
For it cannot justify it either.
It leaves everything as it is.26
I believe that bringing up the saying/showing distinction will be helpful
at this point. If we look at this quote and ruminate specically on the
saying/showing distinction, we can see that Wittgenstein is asserting that we
cannot say how language works in the way McDowell yearns for; but what we
can do is describe instances or patterns it is able to cover and remind
26 Wittgenstein, L.

Philosophical Investigations. (P. 55)

15

ourselves that it does reliably convey meaning, even if we cant say exactly
how it does it.
Wittgenstein points out in 304 that, Its not a something, but its not
a nothing either.27 It is not something we can explain with words, but this
isn't sufficient reason to claim it is grounded on nothing. This should be
obvious as we can see that it clearly works and does this because of some
reason. Cavell touches on this point, coming close to as good as a
description as one can hope for, There is nothing I can say in general about
why I write as I do, speak the way I speak. At this stage, or at any other, it
may reduce for you to a matter of my whim, or say inclination. Yet to say why
I write is in a sense what I explain all day, or show, in every word I write, so
that it may clarify itself at any moment.28 While it is clear that we cannot
give an answer to (or a satisfactory one for many) what we are hopelessly
looking for in our investigation of language, we can realize that by giving
descriptions, we are able to convey and show its power in every instance of
its use. This is what I take Wittgensteins point to be, to make us become
aware of its power, not prove how it achieves it; concluding that, while the
ground it stands on may seem shaky, it is nonetheless solidly there.
McDowell argues for what he calls naturalized platonism and as I have
already pointed out his motivation for this is understandable, yet misguided.
This is not to say that he does not bring to light some useful points during his
27 Wittgenstein, L.

Philosophical Investigations. (P. 109)

28 Cavell, S. The Argument of the Ordinary. (PP. 97-8)

16

argument. His argument is actually what lead me to the following description

of the ordinary, in which I am careful to not overstep my limits of
understanding. I must clarify that I am only attempting to offer a description
of what I take to be the ordinary and give a deeper insight into the power
that underlies the form of life that we inhabit and are constantly adding to. A
quote from Cavell that is sympathetic to McDowells misguided cause for
worry, also proves to be a perfect jumping off point for my take on the
ordinary,
We understandably do not like our concepts to be based on what matters to
us (something Wittgenstein once put by saying "Concepts ... are the
expression of our interest" (570)); it makes our language seem unstable and
the instability seems to mean what I have expressed as my being responsible
for whatever stability our criteria may have, and I do not want this
responsibility; it mars my wish for sublimity. The human capacity-and the
drive-both to affirm and to deny our criteria constitutes the argument of the
ordinary. And to trace the disappointment with criteria is to trace the
aspiration to the sublime-the image of the skeptics progress. I am the
instrument of this argument, I mean no one occupies its positions if each of
us does not. So it is nowhere more than in each of us, as we stand, poor
things, that the power of the ordinary will or will not manifest itself.29
By taking a careful look at the above quote, I hope that my reader is
starting to see what I meant when I said that we underlie language. We are
29 Cavell, S. The Argument of the Ordinary. (PP. 92-3) (My emphasis added)
17

at front and center of this argument and because of this, if we truly want to
give the best answer/description of language, we need to change our inquiry
tactics and move to a more psychologically based type of inquiry, rather than
a metaphysically driven inquiry. Cavell notes the perils that can come with a
metaphysical approach, Since the metaphysician (in us and especially
McDowell) contests the (ordinary) conditions of assertibility, the (re)assertion
of those conditions is no "solution" to his problem.30 This predicament along
with other issues that I have covered justies my shift to a description of
language that draws from psychology, rather than metaphysics. The next
section is my take on what allows for us to gain traction as well as direction
in McDowells fabled void.

VIII. Gaining Traction and Direction in The Void

I want to emphasise that at this section of the paper I am making a
somewhat drastic change in my methods and specic subject matter that I
will be looking at. In short, I am attempting to paint a picture, in the form of a
description, of how we as humans function and use language in the ordinary.
Once again I am doing this with the hopes of persuading not only McDowell
but any reader that the way we as humans speak, function, decide, learn,
disagree, and argue will yield much more fruitful results by incorporating
psychology than the types of obscure results of metaphysical squabbles that
I have tried to distance myself and the readers opinion away from. I ask you
30 Cavell, S. The Argument of the Ordinary. (P. 99) (I added McDowell)
18

to take this with a grain of salt and remember that this section is my best
attempt to show how we can and do have not only traction but also direction
in our ordinary form of life.
A point that I believe all of us can agree on, is that language is a sum
and or product of humans individual and group historical evolution. As we
became more complex and intelligent our words necessarily needed to follow
suit in order to convey the complex concepts that we take as givens as
adults, yet are unintelligible to children who have not complied enough
linguistic or mental abilities. Within each language, there are different types
of concepts and different understanding of these concepts depending on the
community one has been exposed to in their lifetime. We all have different
beliefs in general and this is a direct result of our different experiences and
memories. However, our beliefs tend to share more similarities when they
are focused on groups or communities. What I mean is, our agreement on
what we take to be good or just in terms of actions or rules that have an
effect on others, especially a large number of people, tend to be agreeable
and more similar to others than they are different. When we speak about our
own personal beliefs that influence our actions that only have to do with and
affect ourselves we often nd there is less agreement with others on what is
right or just.31 This is not to say that everyone shouldnt be good to
themselves and others, it is meant to point out that what we take to be
instances of being good to others tend to share the same agreeable actions
31 It is arguable that there are no actions that only affect oneself and do not extend, yet I dont feel
this is too large of an issue for the point Im trying to make.

19

on a whole, vs. the agreeable actions that one may believe are good for
themselves.
The guiding motivation for choices and morals are based upon the sum
of our experiences within communities along with their differing takes on
concepts and use of language. We embody a specic individualized form
within the greater form of life, that has been taught by and reinforced by
other specic individualizes as well as group forms of life. To take McDowells
line of thinking, the platonic forms are unreachable and not a valid response
to what keeps us on track and consistent. When looked at through the lense
of the ordinary we might claim that they exist within every person to an
extent. Unlike Platos denition of metaphysical forms that are constant and
unchanging, the forms32 that underlie ordinary language are always
changing and not universal. We are born into a specic time in history and
surrounded by and influenced by a large amount of people with their own
histories. Anything objective about language necessarily has to be
experienced and thus becomes subjective or at least retains a subjective
essence. This also goes for communally agreed upon things, they are merely
sums or averages of the majority of subjective evaluations, which rarely are
universally agreed upon. These aspects do not independently extend into
space or anything spooky like that, they live within us and while we can use
them, we are unable to grasp onto them in a way that would allow us to fully
analyze and understand them in order to clearly say what they are.
32 Once again I mean this in a very loose sense. Think of them as semi-stable subjective
constants.

20

I must remind the reader that, as I have argued, each person is not
bound to these beliefs or inclinations to act a certain way due to the need to
conform. At any time a person may and can choose to go off the beaten
path, but in doing so they are more often than not aware that they are doing,
so knowing that they may meet opposition that will demand them to either
admit that they are wrong or attempt to argue that they are in the right. Let
me expand on this note a bit further, we are able to perceive someone's
approval or disapproval of our actions or statements often just from their
facial expression, allowing us to come to a conclusion on our own about their
agreement or disagreement without the use of language.33
Ordinary actions and ways of speaking simply work, not perfectly,
because we are far from perfect and often mistakes allow us to realize things
about ourselves and others which can even lead to new discoveries. I do not
see the possibility of everyone ever reaching a full agreement in every
aspect about anything!We often lie in order to avoid issues that stem from
this very issue, knowing that our inclinations or opinions about things vary so
drastically from others that it isnt even worth it to try and persuade them.
I nd this often happening in my own life when I am having conversations
with friends about a variety of subjects. I believe that this happens to me
more often than others strictly because of my noble philosophical endeavors,
and while I'm not completely passive towards this issue, I often interject and

33 I want to also point out that due to our instincts we are lead to believe that we truly understand
and agree with others, these are often cases of psychologism.

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rile when I feel that I have a ghting chance of being able to convey my
ideas; but I more often keep these thoughts to myself.
Why is this? Is it because I am completely ungrounded and know that I
am merely dismissing the vertigo, that I could plainly see by terminating the
stream of lies i feed myself for breakfast with skim milk? No! It is because
much like a particle physicist having dinner with a group of highschoolers
having a casual chat about science. Much of what I have learned about
philosophy in general and especially about language from my research in
preparation for this paper are very difficult to share these ideas and
conclusions with others. To do this we often need to be within a subcommunity of philosophers where we use and have established our own
versions of words and mean much different things when we speak about
what might seem like simple things like the word action. Wittgenstein
backs up my argument of the difficulty that comes with what seems like a
endless amount of ways of using and understanding language in 23, There
are countless kinds: countless different kinds of the use of what we call
symbols34, words, sentences. This point may seem trivial, yet It is
worth bringing to light to once again, to show the power that language has
by remembering that it just simply works more often than it does not.

XI. Final Thoughts

To conclude, I will once again repeat the fearful, yet as I have argued
34
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true and grounded statement from Cavell about what it is that allows
language to work and keeps us consistent in our moral actions and
judgements, It is a vision as simple as it is difficult, and as difficult as it is
(because it is) terrifying. I truly hope that the paper on a whole and the
preceding section has proven to be fruitful for the reader and allowed them
to get a small taste of what I can only show but not say. I know that I have
taken a risk in going so far off the beaten path, but I did so not in order to
help you discover some hidden thing, but rather to show you that the ground
we stand on, linguistically speaking, is sound. I feel that many philosophers
look at language as something that will remain broken or unstable until they
are able to fully understand its innermost secrets, but as I have done my
best to argue, this is far from true. What is broken or unstable are many of
our philosophical undertakings including but not limited to language
The point of this paper has been to shed light on some of the brightest
philosophical minds attempts at unearthing what is in reality already rmly
under their feet and in their minds. Kripke and McDowells attempt to distill
the often cryptic work of Wittgenstein have not been in vain. A saying that I
hold close to my heart, that has helped me through many difficult academic
and life challenges is this, You dont know what is right, until you know
what is wrong. I have argued that Stanley Cavells argument for the
ordinary is superior to Kripke's take on what Wittgenstein intended to convey
without the use of words. While McDowell, in his trademark cryptic grace,
stirred up a whirlwind of doubt in regards to the ordinary. I have not taken his
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claims lightly and hope that I have shown that this hurricane force
McDowellian wind of doubting the ordinary has done nothing detrimental to
the validity of the ordinary I have also attempted to provide a remedy for
those struck with the fear of vertigo, by offering consoling descriptions to
release them from the grip of this illusion. Cavell can put this issue far more
eloquently than I, When the entire idea of meaning vanishes into thin air
what vanishes was already air, revealing no scene of destruction35
While certain parts of this paper deserve further treatment or defense
against possible objections, I feel condent that I have presented a moving
argument against Kripke and McDowell in order to convince my readers to
take time to reassess some of their pursuits and that the ordinary provides
sufficient form ground for language to keep on working without having to
worry about it veering off course to the point we don't know what the +
symbol means.

35 Cavell, S. The Argument of the Ordinary. (P. 80)

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