G.R. No.

92013 July 25, 1990

SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner, vs. RAMON GARCIA, as head of the Asset Privatization Trust, RAUL MANGLAPUS,
as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and CATALINO MACARAIG, as Executive Secretary, respondents.
G.R. No. 92047 July 25, 1990
DIONISIO S. OJEDA, petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY MACARAIG, JR., ASSETS PRIVATIZATION TRUST
CHAIRMAN RAMON T. GARCIA, AMBASSADOR RAMON DEL ROSARIO, et al., as members of the PRINCIPAL AND
BIDDING COMMITTEES ON THE UTILIZATION/DISPOSITION PETITION OF PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT
PROPERTIES IN JAPAN,respondents.
FACTS:
This is a consolidated case involving two petitions seeking to prohibit the respondents and their agents from proceeding with the
bidding for the sale of the Roppongi property. It is one of the four properties in Japan acquired by the Philippines under the
Reparations Agreement w/ Japan. These would serve as indemnification to the Filipino people for theis losses in life & property &
their suffering during WWII:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Roppongi property - original site of the Philippine Embassy Chancery

Nampeidai property - PEC was transferred here when Roppongi bldg. needed major repairs
Kobe Commercial property - warehouse & parking lot for the consulate staff
Kobe Residential property - vacant

Due to govts failure to provide necessary funds, Roppongi property has remained undeveloped. There was a proposal to Pres.
Cory by the former Phil. Ambassador to Japan that it be leased to Kajima Corporation w/c will construct bldgs & renovate the
Chancery in Nampeidai, but Phils shall retain ownership. But such was ignore, instead, Pres Cory issued EO 296 entitling non-Filipino
citizens or entities to avail of separations' capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition. The 4 properties were
specified in the Whereas clauses. Despite oppositions, govt is eager to sell the properties, starting with Roppongi.
Laurel objects to its alientaion to anyone. He contends that Roppongi property is of public dominion (intended for public service),
hence, no ownership by anyone can attach to it, even by the State.
Ojeda objects to the alleged unjustfied bias to non-Filipinos, saying it was discriminatory as Filipinos were not informed about the
bidding reqts.
Respondents used lex situs as a defense - Japanes law, and not Civil Code, governs the property. They further averred that it has
become a patrimonial property because it has not been used for public service/for diplomatic purposes for over 13 years. And that
Executive & Congress manifested (thru overt acts) the intention to convert it to private use:
(1) the transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai
(2) the issuance of administrative orders for the possibility of alienating the four government properties in Japan;
(3) the issuance of Executive Order No. 296;
(4) the enactment by the Congress of Rep. Act No. 6657 [the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law] on June 10, 1988
which contains a provision stating that funds may be taken from the sale of Philippine properties in foreign
countries;
(5) the holding of the public bidding of the Roppongi property but which failed;
(6) the deferment by the Senate in Resolution No. 55 of the bidding to a future date; thus an acknowledgment by the
Senate of the government's intention to remove the Roppongi property from the public service purpose; and
(7) the resolution of this Court dismissing the petition in Ojeda v. Bidding Committee, et al., G.R. No. 87478 which
sought to enjoin the second bidding of the Roppongi property scheduled on March 30, 1989.
ISSUE: W/N THE ROPPONGI PROPERTY WAS CONVERTED INTO A PRIVATE ONE, THEREFORE, ALIENABLE
RULING: NO.
The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is expressly spelled out. It is dictated by the terms of the Reparations
Agreement and the corresponding contract of procurement which bind both the Philippine government and the Japanese government.
There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial.
This, the respondents have failed to do.
As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a
special collective ownership for general use and enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the
social group. The purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the citizens; it is intended for the common and public
welfare and cannot be the object of appropration.
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service does not automatically convert it to
patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use. A property continues to be part
of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the
government to withdraw it from being such.
Abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use alone specially if the non-use was attributable not to the government's own

deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of financial support to repair and improve the property. Abandonment must be a certain
and positive act based on correct legal premises.
A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai in 1976 is not relinquishment of the Roppongi property's original
purpose. Even the failure by the government to repair the building in Roppongi is not abandonment since as earlier stated, there simply
was a shortage of government funds.
Executive Order No. 296, though its title declares an "authority to sell", does not have a provision in its text expressly
authorizing the sale of the four properties procured from Japan for the government sector. The executive order does not declare that the
properties lost their public character. It merely intends to make the properties available to foreigners and not to Filipinos alone in case
of a sale, lease or other disposition.
AS TO LEX SITUS: (ELEMENTS ARE NOT PRESENT)
1) There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable
2) A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same matters
Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that the Roppongi property is no longer of public dominion, there is another
obstacle to its sale by the respondents: THERE IS NO LAW AUTHORIZING ITS CONVEYANCE. - It must be authorized &
approved by a law enacted by Congress. *EXECUTIVE & LEGISLATIVE CONCURRENCE
The applicable provisions of the Civil Code are:
ART. 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.
ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,
banks shores roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth.
ART. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial
property.

G.R. No. L-32266 February 27, 1989

THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, petitioner vs. RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL, respondent.

FACTS:
In 1949, Ruperto Villareal applied for the registration of a land consisting of mangrove swamps (MANGLARES) in Sapian,
Capiz. He alleged that he & his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than 40 years. He was opposed by
several persons, including Director of Forestry (on behalf of Republic). Application was granted by CFI & was affirmed by CA.
DoF filed a petition for certiorari w/ SC, claiming that the land was forestal in nature, hence not subject to appropriation. He asks
that the regn be reversed. Villareal insisted that it is alienable as agricultural land. He invoked the survey plan approved by the
Director of Lands to prove that the land is registerable. He also showed tax declarations to support his claim of possession over the
land in question.
ISSUE: W/N THE MANGLARES ARE PUBLIC FOREST LANDS OR AGRICULTURAL LAND
IF FOREST LAND - INALIENABLE
IF AGRI LAND - ALIENABLE
RULING: PUBLIC FOREST LAND, HENCE, INALIENABLE
MANGROVES
- mud flats, alternately washed and exposed by the tide, in which grows various kindred plants which will not live except
when watered by the sea, extending their roots deep into the mud and casting their seeds, which also germinate there. mud flats,
alternately washed and exposed by the tide, in which grows various kindred plants which will not live except when watered by the
sea, extending their roots deep into the mud and casting their seeds, which also germinate there.
In the leading case of Montano v. Insular Government (promulgated in 1909) mangrove swamps or manglares were considered
agricultural lands and so susceptible of private ownership. Despite such ruling, the Philippine Legislature categorically declared in
Administrative Code of 1917 that mangrove swamps form part of the public forests of this country:
Section 1820. Words and phrase defined. - For the purpose of this chapter 'public forest' includes, except as otherwise
specially indicated, all unreserved public land, including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever
character.
Notwithstanding this definition, the Court maintained the doctrine in the Montano case in deiciding some subsequent cases. But
the problem is not all that simple. As it happens, there is also a line of decisions holding the contrary view.
The determination of this question is a function initially belonging to the legislature, which has the authority to implement the
constitutional provision classifying the lands of the public domain (and is now even permitted to provide for more categories of public
lands).
Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised within the public forests of the Philippines as defined in the
aforecited Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917. The legislature having so determined, we have no authority to ignore or
modify its decision, and in effect veto it, in the exercise of our own discretion. The statutory definition remains unchanged to date and,
no less noteworthy, is accepted and invoked by the executive department. More importantly, the said provision has not been challenged
as arbitrary or unrealistic or unconstitutional assuming the requisite conditions, to justify our judicial intervention and scrutiny. The
law is thus presumed valid and so must be respected.
Our previous description of the term in question as pertaining to our agricultural lands should be understood as covering only
those lands over which ownership had already vested before the Administrative Code of 1917 became effective. Such lands could not
be retroactively legislated as forest lands because this would be violative of a duly acquired property right protected by the due process
clause.
Mangroves could therefore not be the subject of the adverse possession and consequent ownership claimed by the private
respondent in support of his application for registration. To be so, it had first to be released as forest land and reclassified as
agricultural land pursuant to the certification the Director of Forestry may issue under Section 1827 of the Revised Administrative
Code.
Mere existence of such a survey plan would not have the effect of converting the mangrove swamps, as forest land, into
agricultural land. Such approval is ineffectual because it is clearly in officious. The Director of Lands was not authorized to act in the
premises. Under the aforecited law, it is the Director of Forestry who has the authority to determine whether forest land is more
valuable for agricultural rather than forestry uses, as a basis for its declaration as agricultural land and release for private
ownership.
Tax declarations are, of course, not sufficient to prove possession and much less vest ownership in favor of the declarant, as we
have held in countless cases.
Villareal has not established his right to the registration of the subject land in his name. Accordingly, the petition must be
granted.
G.R. No. 69138
May 19, 1992
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Bureau of Forest Development), petitioner,
COURT (First Civil Cases Division) and HILARIO P. RAMA, respondents.

vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE

FACTS:
In 1974, Anselmo Logronio is the OIC of Bohol Resforestation Project of Bureau of Forest Devt. In such capacity, he bulldozed
portions of 2 parcels of land w/c he believed to be forest lands in Talibon, Bohol, occupied the same & planted mulberry & other trees.
Thereafter, Hilario Rama filed a complaint w/ CFI for recovery of possession, ownership & damages against Logronio. He
alleged that he is the absolute owner & possessor of the 2 parcels. He obtained a cert of title based on a patent.
Logronio answered that such were forest lands & the questioned acts were performed by him in the regular & lawful performance
of his duties as OIC of BRP of BFD. He prayed for the dismissal of the complaint. Rep filed a motion for leave to intervene. It
supported the claims of Lorgonio. It further stated that the said lands were never released by govt as alienable & disposable lands,
hence, are no susceptible of disposition/private appropriation under Public Land Act (CA 41), nor registered under Land Regn Law
(Act No. 496). It prayed that the free patent covering the forest portion of 1 st lot be declared bull & void, OCT be canceled, both lands
be reverted back to the public domain & complaint v. Logronio be dismissed. - MOTION GRANTED.
Rama alleged that Rep has no cause of action & is guilty of estoppel for having caused the issuance of cert of title. He should be
paid by Rep for all improvements plus expenses he incurred.
In the meantime, in 1967, Hipolito Amihan, Forester in Charge of the Project, addressed a letter to the Administrator,
Reforestation Administration, Diliman, Quezon City, stating that upon verification, portions of the questioned lots are within the
bounds of the Project & are timber lands, hence, part of public domain. CFI ordered Rama to vacate. Complaint v. Logronio was
dismissed. Rep was ordered to pay the necessary expenses to Rama.
Rep appealed to CA in so far as it was ordered to pay Rama. CA affirmed & declared that Rama has right of retention until the
necessary expenses awarded to him are paid by petitioner Republic. MR denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N THE SUBJECT LANDS MAYBE SUBJECTED TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP
W/N RAMA IS A POSSESSOR IN GF
RULING: NO. (DIZON CAS NOT APPLICABLE)
The fact that he applied for a patent title shows a recognition on his part that the parcel is part of the public domain. True,
government officials caused the issuance of the patent title and the original torrens title covering the land in Rama's name. However,
the well-entrenched principle is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents.
Considering that the subject parcel of land is forest land, the patent and original certificate of title covering the subject parcel
issued to Rama did not confer any validity to his possession or claim of ownership. The titles are void ab initio. The titles issued cannot
ripen into private ownership. In effect, Rama's possession of the parcel from the beginning was fraudulent and illegal. He was merely a
squatter on the parcel. Under these circumstances, we cannot see any reason why Rama should be considered a possessor in good faith
as defined in Article 526 of the Civil Code.
- HE WAS THE ONE WHO MADE REPRESENTATIONS TO OBTAIN TITLE (NOT IN GF)
- DIZONS RELIED ON THE TITLE
Art. 526. . . .
Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith.

G.R. No. 134209

January 24, 2006

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. CELESTINA NAGUIAT, Respondent.

FACTS:
In 1989, Celestina Naguiat filed w/ RTC Zambales, an app for regn of 4 parcels of land in Panan, Botolan, Zambales. She alleged
that she is the owner of the said parcels of land having acquired them by purchase from the LID Corporation which likewise acquired

the same from Demetria Calderon, Josefina Moraga and Fausto Monje and their predecessors-in-interest who have been in possession
thereof for more than thirty (30) years.
To the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person having any
interest, legal or equitable, or in possession thereof.
In 1990, Rep interposed objection on the ground that there was no OCENPO since June 12, 1945 or prior it. Title & tax receipts
do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona-fide acquisition of the lands. Naguiats claim of ownership in fee simple
on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of. The parcels of land applied for are part of the public domain
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.
RTC ruled in favor of Naguiat. MR denied. CA affirmed. Hence, this present recourse.
ISSUE: W/N THE LANDS HAVE CEASED TO BE FOREST/INALIENABLE LANDS OF PUBLIC DOMAIN
RULING: NO.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution classifying lands of the public domain into "agricultural,
forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks," do not necessarily refer to a large tract of wooded land or an expanse covered by
dense growth of trees and underbrush.
"Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. xxx. The classification is merely descriptive of its legal
nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
Under Section 6 of the Public Land Act, the prerogative of classifying or reclassifying lands of the public domain, i.e., from forest
or mineral to agricultural and vice versa, belongs to the Executive Branch of the government and not the court. Needless to stress, the
onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable or
disposable rests with the applicant.
Naguiat never presented the required certification from the proper government agency or official proclamation reclassifying the
land applied for as alienable and disposable. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. It calls for proof. She
submitted tax receipts, the survey map and technical descriptions of the lands, which, needless to state, provided no information
respecting the classification of the property. As the Court has held, however, these documents are not sufficient to overcome the
presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.
It cannot be overemphasized that unwarranted appropriation of public lands has been a notorious practice resorted to in land
registration cases. For this reason, the Court has made it a point to stress, when appropriate, that declassification of forest and mineral
lands, as the case may be, and their conversion into alienable and disposable lands need an express and positive act from the
government.

SEC OF DENR V. MAYOR JOSE YAP

FACTS:
This is a consolidated case which concerns the right of the present occupants of Boracay Island to secure titles over their occupied
lands.
GR 167707 (OCCUPANTS)

In 1976, DENR approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay Island w/c identified several lots as being occupied &
claimed by named persons. In 1978, Marcos issued Proc. 1801, declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in
thePhilippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). PTA Circular
3-82 was approved to implement the Proclamation.
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC
in Kalibo, Aklan. They averred that Proc & Circ precluded them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
or survey of land for titling purposes. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay sinceJune 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They
declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them.
Accdg to them, such Proc & Circ did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist
zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise known as the
Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.
OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified
as public forest, which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised
Forestry Code. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. Since Boracay Island had
not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.
STIPULATED FACTS:
(1) respondents-claimants were presently in possession of parcels of land in Boracay Island;
(2) these parcels of land were planted with coconut trees and other natural growing trees;
(3) the coconut trees had heights of more or less twenty (20) meters and were planted more or less fifty (50) years ago;
and
(4) respondents-claimants declared the land they were occupying for tax purposes.
RTC ruled in favor of Yap, et al. It ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in
Boracay were inalienable or could not be the subject of disposition. OSG MR denied. Rep appealed to CA, w/c affirmed RTC. OSG
MR denied. Hence, this petition.
GR 173775 (AGAINST RECLASSIFICATION)
In 2006, during the pendency of the 1 st case, Pres GMA issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island into four
hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of
agricultural land (alienable and disposable).
Dr. Orlando Sacay, Wilfredo Gelito, and other landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition,
mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their prior vested rights over
portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have
also invested billions of pesos in developing their lands and building internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots.
They contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified as neither
mineral nor timber land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first
Public Land Act. Thus, their possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled them to judicial confirmation of
imperfect title.
OSG opposed, saying they have no vested rights. Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No.
705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of
imperfect title.
ISSUE: W/N YAP, ET AL HAVE THE RIGHT TO SECURE TITLE OVER THEIR OCCUPIED LANDS IN BORACAY
The twin petitions pertain to their right, if any, to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do
not involve their right to secure title under other pertinent laws.

RULING: NONE
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive
act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigative reports of the
Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of state ownership, the
Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation,
declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted
right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.

The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD No. 705 may seem to be out of touch with the present
realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the way for commercial developments. As
a premier tourist destination for local and foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a commercial island resort, rather than a forest
land.
Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach resorts on the island; that the island has already
been stripped of its forest cover; or that the implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the islands tourism industry, do not
negate its character as public forest.
At any rate, the Court is tasked to determine the legal status of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical layout. Hence, even
if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has not been automatically
converted from public forest to alienable agricultural land.
Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If
President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific
limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801. Simply put, the
proclamation is aimed at administering the islands for tourism and ecological purposes. It does not address the areas alienability.
It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay as alienable and opened the same to private
ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141 provide that it is only the President, upon the recommendation of the proper department
head, who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first element of possession. We note that the
earliest of the tax declarations in the name of private claimants were issued in 1993. - NO OCENPO
The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not automatically give them a vested right in
Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply for a title to the land they are presently occupying. This Court is constitutionally
bound to decide cases based on the evidence presented and the laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants
are ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their occupied portions in Boracay even with their continued possession
and considerable investment in the island.
While the Court commiserates with private claimants plight, We are bound to apply the law strictly and judiciously. This is the
law and it should prevail. Ito ang batas at ito ang dapat umiral.
Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess. For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith
as builders of improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For another, they may look into other modes
of applying for original registration of title, such as by homestead or sales patent, subject to the conditions imposed by law.

G. R. No. 130871
FIL-ESTATE MANAGEMENT INC., MEGATOP REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC., PEAKSUN ENTERPRISES AND
EXPORT CORP., ARTURO DY, AND ELENA DY JAO, Petitioners, - versus - GEORGE H. TRONO, MA. TERESA TRONO,
MA. VIRGINIA TRONO, JESSE TRONO, MA. CRISTINA TRONO, PATRICIA TRONO, MA. DIVINA TRONO,
INOCENCIO TRONO, JR., CARMEN TRONO, AND ZENAIDA TRONO, Respondents.
FACTS:
In 1994, the Tronos filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 255, Las Pias City, an application for registration of a parcel of
land in Las Pias, MM. Fil-Estate, et al opposed, alleging that as per Survey Plan, Tronos property partly overlaps their lot. As early as
1989, this lot was previously regd in their names. Ayala Land opposed on the same grounds.
During the hearing, Tronos presented SP showing that the land they sought to register overlaps the property already regd in the
names of Fil-Estate et al.

Fil-Estate, et al & Ayala filed MD alleging that RTC has no jurisn since the property was previously Torrens regd. DENIED.
RTC held that it has exclusive jurisn over all apps for orig regn of title to lands. Fil-Estate, et al appealed to CA, w/c granted petition
for certiorari. It ruled that:
The incontrovertibility of a title prevents a land registration court from acquiring jurisdiction over a land
that is applied for registration if that land is already decreed and registered under the Torrens System.
& directed the RTC judge to dismiss the case w/o prejudice. FE filed a motion for partial recon, praying that the case be
dismissed w/ prejudice & and to declare that the right of respondents to file any action for reconveyance of the property has
prescribed.
Meanwhile, in 1997, Ayala Land & Tronos had a compromise agreement, making the case as between them MOOT &
ACADEMIC.
CA denied MPR. Hence, this petrev on certiorari.
(TRONOS admit in their comment on the instant petition that what they should have filed was a complaint for nullity of
petitioners titles.)
ISSUE: W/N TRONOS HAVE THE RIGHT TO CLAIM TITLE OVER A PREVIOUSLY REGD PROPERTY
RULING: NONE
Significantly, even respondents themselves admit in their comment on the instant petition that what they should have filed was a
complaint for nullity of petitioners titles.
Section 48 of PD 1529 provides:
Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It
cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
Respondents application for registration of a parcel of land already covered by a Torrens title is actually a collateral attack against
petitioners title not permitted under the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title. It is well settled that a Torrens title cannot be
collaterally attacked.
Hence, whether or not respondents have the right to claim title over the property in question is beyond the province of the instant
proceeding. That should be threshed out in a proper action. It has been invariably stated that the real purpose of the Torrens System is
to quiet title to land and to stop forever any question as to its legality. Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the
necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the mirador su casa to avoid the possibility of losing his land.
Sec. 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value. The decree of registration shall not be
reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any
proceeding in any court for reversing judgment, subject, however, to the right of any person, including the government and
the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained
by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and review of the decree of
registration not later than one year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of registration , but in no case
shall such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest
therein whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase innocent purchaser for value or an equivalent phrase occurs in
this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.
Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued shall
become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action
for damages against the applicant or any other person responsible for the fraud. (underscoring ours)
Based on RD records, the land was regd 5 years earlier. TOO LATE.
G.R. No. 159310 February 24, 2009
CAMILO F. BORROMEO, Petitioner, v. ANTONIETTA O. DESCALLAR, Respondent.
FACTS:
In 1983, Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, was assigned in Mindoro to work for a project. In 1984, he transferred to Cebu and
worked at the Naga II Project of the National Power Corporation. There, he met Descallar. a separated mother of two boys who was
working as a waitress at St. Moritz Hotel. Jambrich befriended respondent and asked her to tutor him in English. In dire need of
additional income to support her children, Descallar agreed.
Eventually, the fell for each other & decided to live in a rented house in Hernan Cortes, Mandaue City. They later on transferred
to their own house at Agro-Macro Subdivision, Cabancalan, Mandaue City. In a Contract to Sell, their names were written as buyers.
A deed of absolute sale was likewise issued in their favor. After it was refused for regn as Jambrich was an alien, his name was erased
but his signature remained on its margin. TCTs were issued in Descallars name alone. Jambrich also formally adopted Descallars two

sons.
However, Descallar had a new bf in 1999, while Jambrich began to live with another woman in Danao City. He supported his
adopted sons for only 2 months after their break up.
In 1986, Jambrich met Borromeo who is engaged in the business of real estate & built & repair speedboats as hobby. In 1989,
Jambrich purchased an engine and some accessories for his boat from Borromeo, for w/c he was indebted for P150k. To pay for his
debt, he sold his rights and interests in the Agro-Macro properties to Borromeo. In 1991, when Borromeo sought to register the Deed
of Assignment/Sale, he found out that titles to the three lots have been transferred in the name of Descallar, and that the subject
property has already been mortgaged.
In 1991, Borromeo filed a complaint for recovery of real property v. Descallar. He alleged that the Contracts to Sell nd the Deed
of Absolute Sale over the properties which identified both Jambrich and respondent as buyers do not reflect the true agreement of the
parties since respondent did not pay a single centavo of the purchase price and was not in fact a buyer. It was all Jambrich who paid
using his exclusive funds. Jambrich was the real and absolute owner of the properties & that Borromeo acquired absolute ownership
by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment executed by Jambrich.
Descallar contended that she paid for the property & Jambrich, being an alien, was prohibited to acquire or own real property in
the Philippines. During the trial, she tried to prove her financial capacity to buy the disputed property with money from a supposed
copra business. Borromeo, in turn, presented Jambrich as his witness and documentary evidence showing the substantial salaries
which Jambrich received while still employed by the Austrian company, Simmering-Graz Panker A.G.
RTC ruled that it is highly improbable for Descallar to buy such property of a considerable value while she was working as a
mere waitress. She being a scheming and exploitive woman, has taken advantage of the goodness of Jambrich who at that time was
still bewitched by her beauty, sweetness, and good attitude. IN FAVOR OF BORROMEO
Descallar appeled to CA, w/c reversed RTC: In the case at bar, the title of the subject property is not in the name of Jambrich but
in the name of defendant-appellant. Thus, Jambrich could not have transferred a property he has no title thereto.
MR DENIED. HENCE, THIS PETITION.
ISSUE:
W/N JAMBRICH HAS TITLE TO THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION AND MAY THEREFORE TRANSFER AND
ASSIGN ANY RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN FAVOR OF BORROMEO
RULING: YES
Having proven that he is financially capacitated to purchase the properties, pieces of evidence lead to the fact that his exclusive
funds were used to buy such, hence, Jambrich has all authority to transfer all his rights, interests and participation over the subject
properties to petitioner by virtue of the Deed of Assignment he executed on July 11, 1991.
Further, the fact that the disputed properties were acquired during the couples cohabitation also does not help respondent. The
rule that co-ownership applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage, but are otherwise capacitated to marry each other, does not apply. In the instant case, respondent was still legally married to
another when she and Jambrich lived together. In such an adulterous relationship, no co-ownership exists between the parties.It is
necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim
to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply.
Having found that the true buyer of the disputed house and lots was the Austrian Wilhelm Jambrich, what now is the effect of
registration of the properties in the name of respondent?
It is settled that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a means of confirming the fact of its existence
with notice to the world at large.Certificates of title are not a source of right. The mere possession of a title does not make one the true
owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in her name does not necessarily,
conclusively and absolutely make her the owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does not apply to respondent. A certificate
of title implies that the title is quiet,and that it is perfect, absolute and indefeasible.[24] However, there are well-defined exceptions to
this rule, as when the transferee is not a holder in good faith and did not acquire the subject properties for a valuable consideration.
This is the situation in the instant case. Respondent did not contribute a single centavo in the acquisition of the properties. She had no
income of her own at that time, nor did she have any savings. She and her two sons were then fully supported by Jambrich.
LTD:
Private land may be transferred only to individuals or entities qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Only
Filipino citizens or corporations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos are qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain. Thus, as the rule now stands, the fundamental law explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to
private lands, except only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was made by a former natural-born citizen.
Therefore, in the instant case, the transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to Jambrich, who is an
Austrian, would have been declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the properties to petitioner who is a Filipino
citizen.
In United Church Board for World Ministries v. Sebastian, the Court reiterated the consistent ruling in a number of cases[31]

that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in
the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.
Since the ban on aliens is intended to preserve the nations land for future generations of Filipinos, that aim is achieved by
making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization or those transfers made by aliens
to Filipino citizens. As the property in dispute is already in the hands of a qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there would be no more
public policy to be protected. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.

G.R. No. L-31606 March 28, 1983

DONATO REYES YAP and MELITONA MARAVILLAS, petitioners, vs. HON. EZEKIEL S. GRAGEDA, as Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Albay and JOSE A. RICO,respondents.
FACTS:
In 1939, Maximo Rico executed a deed of absolute sale over parcels of land in favor of Yap, who was then a Chinese national.
TCTs were issued in Yaps name. After the lapse of nearly 15 years from and after the execution of the deed of absolute sale, Donato
Reyes Yap was admitted as a Filipino citizen and allowed to take his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. He was,
thereafter, issued Certificate of Naturalization.
In 1967, Yap ceded the lots under a deed of sale in favor of his engineer son, Felix Yap, who was also a Filipino citizen because
of the Filipino citizenship of his mother and the naturalization of his father Donato Reyes Yap. The other portions were subsequently
sold to Yap. He has been in possession of the lots in question since 1939, openly, publicly, continuously, and adversely in the concept
of owner until the present time. He has one surviving son by his first marriage to a Filipino wife. He has five children by his second
marriage also to a Filipina and has a total of 23 grandchildren all of whom are Filipino citizens.
After 30 years of the sale, the heirs of the vendors sought revonceyance - GRANTED BY RTC:
Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution that "no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to

individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines" to be an
absolute and unqualified prohibition and, therefore, ruled that a conveyance contrary to it would not be validated nor its void
nature altered by the subsequent naturalization of the vendee.
ISSUE: W/N THE SALE TO YAP IS VALID IN VIEW OF HIS NATURALIZATION
RULING: YES
The litigated property is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no longer owned by a disqualified vendee. Yap, as a
naturalized citizen, was constitutionally qualified to own the subject property. There would be no more public policy to be served in
allowing the heirs of the vendor to recover the land as it is already in the hands of a qualified person.

... if the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands, as construed by this Court in the Krivenko case, is
to preserve the nation's lands for future generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by
making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization.

G.R. No. 74833

January 21, 1991

THOMAS C. CHEESMAN, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ESTELITA PADILLA, respondents.
FACTS:
Thomas Cheesman and Criselda P. Cheesman were married in 1970 but have been separated since 1981.
A "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights" was executed by Armando Altares conveying a parcel of unregistered land
and the house thereon (at No. 7 Neptune Street, Gordon Heights, Olongapo City) in favor of "Criselda P. Cheesman, of legal age,
Filipino citizen, married to Thomas Cheesman, and residing at Lot No. 1, Blk. 8, Filtration Road, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City . . ."
Thomas Cheesman, although aware of the deed, did not object to the transfer being made only to his wife. Tax declarations were
issued, in the name of Criselda only. Criselda assumed exclusive mgmt & admin of the property, leasing it to tenants.
In 1981, w/o Cheesmans knwoledge & consent, Criselda sold it to Estelita M. Padilla. 30 days later, Cheesman filed a compalint
against Criselda & Padilla, praying for annulment of the sale on the ground that the transaction had been executed without his
knowledge and consent. The two defended that the property was paraphernal; Cheesman, being an alien, was disqualified to have any
interest or right of ownership in the land & that Estelita is a buyer in GF.
RTC declared the sale void ab inition & ordered the delivery of the property to Thomas Cheesman as administrator of the
conjugal partnership property, and the payment to him of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. SUch ruling was set
aside as Padilla filed a petition for relief. Subsequently, RTC rendered a summary judgt that the sale was valid.

Cheesman appealed to IAC. AFFIRMED SUMMARY JUDGT. Hence, this recourse.

ISSUE: W/N CHEESMAN HAS A RIGHT OVER THE PROPERTY, DESPITE BEING AN AMERICAN
RULING: NONE.
The fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution ordains that,
"Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of course, charged with
knowledge of this prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he
acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land,
vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; the sale as to him was null and void.
In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on the
theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory
would permit indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord
to the alien husband a not insubstantial interest and right over land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or
disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.

G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS, Administratrix, petitioner-appellee, vs.
MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO RAMIREZ, legatees, oppositorsappellants.
The main issue in this appeal is the manner of partitioning the testate estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez among the principal
beneficiaries, namely: his widow Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez; his two grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez; and his
companion Wanda de Wrobleski.
The task is not trouble-free because the widow Marcelle is a French who lives in Paris, while the companion Wanda is an Austrian
who lives in Spain. Moreover, the testator provided for substitutions.
FACTS:
In 1964, Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain, with only his widow Marcelle as compulsory heir. His will was
admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed
administratrix of the estate.
In 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the property of the deceased is to be divided into two parts.
One part shall go to the widow 'en pleno dominio" in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or "free portion" shall go to Jorge and
Roberto Ramirez "en nuda propriedad." Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged with the widow's usufruct and the
remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.

Jorge & Roberto opposed the substitutions. They alleged, among others, that the grant of a usufruct over real property in the
Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski, who is an alien, violates Section 5, Article III of the Philippine Constitution:
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. (Art.
XIII.)
RTC upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on the ground that the Constitution covers not only succession by
operation of law but also testamentary succession.
ISSUE: W/N THE GRANT OF USUFRUCT TO WANDA VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTION
RULING: NO.
The Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does not extend to testamentary succession for
otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any alien would be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying money
to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece of land.
This opinion notwithstanding, We uphold the usufruct in favor of Wanda because a usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest title
to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.

[G.R. No. 142913. August 9, 2005]

ESTATE OF SALVADOR SERRA SERRA (SPEC. PROC. NO. 242) AND ESTATE OF GREGORIO SERRA SERRA (SPEC.
PROC. NO. 240), BOTH REPRESENTED BY THE JUDICIAL CO-ADMINISTRATOR LUIS ISASI, MARGARITA SERRA
SERRA, FRANCISCA TERESA SERRA SERRA and FRANCISCO JOSE SERRA SERRA, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF
PRIMITIVO HERNAEZ, REPRESENTED BY PRESENTACION HERNAEZ BELBAR, HEIRS OF LUISA HERNAEZ,
REPRESENTED BY WILFREDO GAYARES, LOLITA GAYARES, JULIETA FORTALEZA AND ROSAURO
FORTALEZA, HEIRS OF ROGACIANA HERNAEZ, REPRESENTED BY LOURDES MONCERA, respondents.
FACTS: SS - SPANISH
In 1967, successors-in-interest of Hernaez filed a petition for reconstitution of alleged lost original certificates of title (OCT) and
owners duplicate copies covering Lot No. 1316 of Kabankalan Cadastre and Lot Nos. 2685 and 717 of Ilog Cadastre, in the Province
of Negros Occidental. In 1968, CFI granted. Accordingly, compliance with this ruling was made. TCTs were issued in the names of
the heirs.
Upon learning of the existence of these TCTs, Salvador Serra Serra, for and in behalf of his co-heirs, registered their adverse
claim and moved for the cancellation of the reconstituted titles. They averred that they are holders of valid and existing certificates of
title over the subject properties and have been in continuous and actual possession thereof.
CFI denied SSs motion to cancel reconstituted titles & instead granted Hernaezs prayer that they be placed in possession of the
property. SS appealed to CA, but they failed to have a favorable judgt. They elevated the matter to SC w/c ordered remand of the
records to CFI for hearing of motion to cancel - DENIED. STILL RULED IN FAVOR OF HERNAEZ.
SS elevated to CA w/c dismissed petition for certiorari. MR denied, hence, this recourse.

ISSUE: W/N SERRA SERRA, BEING SPANISH, HAS THE RIGHT TO HAVE THE RECONSTITUTED TITLES CANCELED
RULING: NONE.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioners are Spanish citizens and as such, disqualified from acquiring
lands in the Philippines. As a rule, only a Filipino citizen can acquire private lands in the Philippines and the only instances when a
foreigner can own private lands are by hereditary succession and if he was formerly a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his
Philippine citizenship. The records are bereft of any showing that petitioners derived their title by any mode which would qualify them
to acquire private lands in the country. Petitioners bare allegation that they acquired the subject lots from Salvador Serra Serra has no
probative value lacking sufficient proof that the latter is not disqualified to own or hold private property and was able to legally
transmit to petitioners title thereto.
It is undisputed that petitioners are all Spanish citizens. Under Philippine law, foreigners can acquire private lands only by
hereditary succession or when they were formerly natural-born Filipinos who lost their Philippine citizenship. In this case, petitioners
did not present proof that they acquired the properties by inheritance. Neither did they claim to be former natural-born Filipinos. On
the contrary, they declare in this petition that they are all Spanish citizens residing in Mallorca, Spain.
It is axiomatic that factual findings of trial courts, when adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding and
conclusive and will not be disturbed on appeal. This Court is not a trier of facts.

G.R. No. 91189 November 27, 1992

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. SAMUEL BUYCO and EDGAR BUYCO, represented by their attorney-in-fact,
RIEVEN H. BUYCO and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS:
Charles Hankins, an American who was married to Laura Crescini and who resided in Canduyong, Odiongan, Romblon, died in
1937, leaving a will. He was survived by his widow; his son Alexander and William; and his grandchildren Ismael Samuel and Edgar,
all surnamed Buyco, who are the legitimate issues of his deceased daughter Lilia and her husband Marcelino Buyco.
The will was submitted for probate & Alexander was appointed as the administrator. Laura Crescini died in 1941. It appears that
in a project of partition 1947, one of the properties of Charles Hankins described as "a parcel of pastureland, riceland and coconut land
was partitioned among the heirs. IN 1948, Laura's share in the estate of her husband Charles was partitioned among her children.
William sold his hereditary shares in the estate of his parents to Marcelino Buyco who then donated to his children the property
acquired from William together with other properties. In 1970, the Buyco brothers partitioned among themselves the properties
acquired by inheritance from their grandparents and by donation from their father. However, Ismael waived his right to his share
therein in favor of Samuel, one of the private respondents in this case.
Edgar and Samuel Buyco became naturalized American citizens on 29 January 1972 and 12 September 1975, respectively. In
1967, through their attorney-in-fact, Rieven H. Buyco, they filed before the then CFI of Romblon an application for the registration of
a parcel of land, which they claim to own in fee simple as they acquired the same by inheritance and donation inter vivos. Director of
Lands opposed. APPLICATION GRANTED. DIR APPEALED TO CA. DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT.
The land in question has been primarily devoted to cattle grazing (sic) and to the cultivation of rice and coconut and it was (sic)
the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest have (sic) been reaping the fruits thereof.

ISSUE:
W/N BUYCOs WERE BARRED BY CONSTI FROM APPLYING FOR REGN BECAUSE THEY ARE AMERICAN
CITIZENS & THUS DISQUALIFIED FROM ACQUIRING LANDS IN THE PHILS.
RULING: YES.
They did not present any proof that they or their predecessors-in-interest derived title from an old Spanish grant. The land
registration court and the public respondent are of the opinion, and so held, that the private respondents had this in their favor. Thus,
both courts declared that the land applied for had been segregated from the public domain and had become private land.
Charles Hankins was an American citizen. There is no evidence to show the date of his birth, his arrival in the Philippines
particularly in Odiongan, Romblon or his acquisition of the big tract of land; neither is there any evidence to prove the manner of
his acquisition thereof. Thus, there does not even exist a reasonable basis for the finding that the private respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest possessed the land for more than eighty (80) years, much less since time immemorial. In Oh Cho vs. Director
of Lands, 36 possession which began in1880 was not considered as possession "since time immemorial."
IF OCENPO PROPERLY PROVEN: Even if he were an American citizen at that time, he would have had the same civil rights as
Filipino citizens pursuant to the original ordinance appended to the 1935 Constitution. the pertinent portion of said ordinance reads:
(17) Citizens and corporations of the United States shall enjoy in the Commonwealth of the Philippines all the civil rights
of the citizens and corporations, respectively, thereof.
Considering that the private respondents became American citizens before such filing, it goes without saying that they had acquired no
vested right, consisting of an imperfect title over to property before they lost their Philippine citizenship.