This is an Authors Accepted Manuscript of an article published in The Journal of Iberian

and Latin American Research published December 2012 and available online at:
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13260219.2013.853358#.U14nOF7qqsM

Mistaking Brazil for a Middle Power

Sean Burges
School of Politics and International Relations and the
Australian National Centre for Latin American Studies,
The Australian National University
Sean.burges@anu.edu.au

Abstract:
This paper argues that Brazil can only be classified as a middle power by
engaging in what Sartori criticized as the process of conceptual stretching.
Moreover, it is argued that Brazil neither sees itself as a middle power, nor
deports itself as one despite superficial appearances. After the context is set
with a survey of thinking on middle power theory, attention is turned to
explaining how Brazil might be mistaken for a middle power before
explaining in more detail why the country is not one. Evidence is drawn from
Brazils multilateral engagement in institutions such as the WTO, the interAmerican system, the NPT, and the wider context of global development.
Ultimately the paper advises policy-makers and academics against using the
concept of middle power as a conceptual guide or shortcut to understanding
Brazil.

One of the questions repeatedly asked by policy-makers in the established middle power
countries such as Australia and Canada is how to constructively engage Brazil and, in

effect, bring it onside to maintain the integrity of global governance frameworks. While
the areas of assimilation probed by these officials range across trade relations, education,
development cooperation, security, the environment, and global financial governance, the
underlying argument is often the same. Although bigger in terms of population, Brazil is
pushed into a frame that presents it as being not that different from Australia or Canada in
terms of its material capabilities, economic composition, or emerging geographic and
policy challenges. Discussions with foreign policy officials in the established middle
powers quickly reveals a perception that as a newly arrived middle power Brazil
intrinsically shares the same sets of ambitions and interests across the panoply of global
governance issues. To the frustration of the existing middle powers bent on incorporating
a new voice into their fold, Brazil does not seem to realize that it should happily (and
quietly) join the liberal West club constructed by the US and used to set up the current
framework of global governance rules and institutions. As Hurrell explains, the
international context has moved beyond the focus on inter-state conflict prevention
embedded in the US-run model. For a country like Brazil, which has largely existed
outside the closely integrated US alliance, this implies a need to rethink global order and
to push for approaches that challenge, change or block the ambitions of the existing
hegemonic decision makers.1 The result is a foreign policy behaviour, intention and
capability markedly different from that in traditional middle powers such as Australia and
Canada.
Academic discussion of middle powers is not helping policy makers trying to
grapple with Brazils rising role in world affairs. Scholars either focus on the material
characteristics of Brazil to suggest it should be considered a middle power, or they stretch

behavioural approaches to the concept to include characteristics exhibited by potential

new entrants such as Brazil.2 Sartori neatly summarizes the methodological problem: the
net result of conceptual straining is that our gain in extensional coverage tends to be
matched by losses in connotative precision.3 This aspect of connotative precision is
central because the term middle power is indelibly bound up with the foreign policy
practices and traditions of countries such as Australia and Canada, not least because the
concept was elaborated by diplomats in these countries as a foreign policy strategy and
then further developed by academics focusing on these two cases.
Avoiding conceptual straining is also particularly important on the identity level
of foreign policy. How a country identifies itself and sees itself in the global arena has an
impact on the sort of foreign policy it constructs and pursues.4 This is particularly
problematic for attempts to identify Brazil as a middle power. The closest the country has
come to seriously identifying itself as a middle power was during Jnio Quadros
presidency in the 1960s when Brazil was perceived as being between the East and the
West and thus somewhat apart from the tensions between these contending blocs and
between developed and developing countries.5 Indeed, a central precept of Brazilian
foreign policy beyond being a major power or major power-to-be is that the country is
not part of the dominant North-Atlantic bloc set up and managed by the United States.
The Brazilian view of how international society should be structured and operate deviates
from the US-led blocs turn towards strengthened international regimes and institutions,
remaining instead fixated on the preservation of sovereignty and maintenance of the
principle of non-intervention.6 As will be discussed below, this results in major

disjunctures from the behavioural requisites associated with a middle power thanks to the
traditions established by countries such as Australia and Canada.
The purpose of this paper is to explain why policy practioners and scholars should
stop referring to Brazil as a middle power. Plainly put, Brazil might look like a middle
power at first glance, but a deeper probing makes it clear that the country is something
different. As Jordaan ably demonstrates,7 the only way we can keep Brazil in the category
is to engage in some serious conceptual stretching that effectively results in a middle
power with adjectives approach that only muddies our understanding of foreign policy
and international relations. Like Jordaan, this paper argues that the Australian and
Canadian ambitions to maintain the structures of the current international system are
shared by Brazil, but more in the sense of broad outlines predicated on reform than by
codifying and entrenching past patterns of relational power. Also like Jordaan, this paper
argues that unlike Australia and Canada Brazil is broadly antagonistic to the current
configuration of relative power relationships in the international system. Where this paper
breaks substantially from Jordaan is in his stretching of the middle power concept to
create a traditional and an emerging sub-category. The proposition underlying this
paper is that this sort of conceptual stretching creates needless confusion and
complication for an already muddled category. Matters are exacerbated in the policy
arena when we turn our attention to how far Brazils international behaviour drifts from
what we intuitively and conceptually expect from a middle power.
Although the policy worlds applied definition of you know a middle power
when you see one lacks scientific rigor, it does retain a certain resonance for the practice
of foreign affairs. Where the middle powers we know well, Australia and Canada, have

adopted a strategy of supporting and advancing the Western liberal project launched by
the US, albeit in a manner that frequently pushes the US on issues it finds uncomfortable
and inconvenient (i.e., Cuba, landmines, human rights in the 1970s and 1980s,
strengthening of global governance regimes), Brazil is seeking to reform international
institutions with a view to substantially realigning the relative power configuration in the
international system and retarding the sort of active, interventionist international
institutions sought by the North Atlantic countries. In short, Brazilians do not identify
their country as a middle power, but as a rising power or great power; the country of the
future is the title Brazil has long claimed for itself. This article will not contest the
Brazilian position, arguing instead that a quick analysis might lead to an erroneous
classification of it as a middle power. The focus of this paper is on excluding Brazil from
a theoretical construct of increasingly questionable utility.
To explain this argument, the article will first briefly survey the dominant
understandings of middle powers before setting out why we might be tempted to include
Brazil in this grouping. Attention will then be turned to Brazils system supporting, but
agency-combating approach to the sorts of global governance questions central to middle
power foreign policy, highlighting why Brazil is not a middle power. The focus here will
be on world trade talks, nuclear non-proliferation, and global financial governance.
Finally, the article concludes with the implications for Northern capitals engaging Brazil.

The Middle Power Context

Holbraad attributes an almost literal definition to the term middle power, describing these
states as being centrally located in geographic terms.8 Over time this literal definition
shifted to an orientation on power capabilities, with middle powers being described as
weaker than the principal members of the international system, but stronger than minor
states.9 This contains a vagueness that Holbraad tries to address by elaborating criteria for
differentiating between the weak and the strong through a focus on gross national
product, not military strength.10 While useful for determining which states might have the
material capabilities necessary to be assertive internationally, there is still the question of
capacity versus actual activity. For Holmes, this issue with the modern usage of the term
middle power is grounded in the League of Nations treatment of second rank powers: it
is hard to say now precisely what a middle power is; the emphasis shifts the term has
no meaning in international law; it is an expression of convenience.11
All of these criteria become immediately problematic for the Brazilian case.
Brazil is located in the South Atlantic, far from the main arteries of the North Atlantic
and contest between the North and South. Moreover, war remains very much the
exception in Brazilian and South American diplomatic history. Apart from the short and
nasty War of the Chaco in the 1930s and a half-hearted border war between Ecuador and
Peru,12 for over a century security questions in South America have been in the realm of
criminality and not inter-state wars. This historical reality has had a noticeable impact on
Brazils hard power resources. Despite having the fifth largest landmass and population
as well as the sixth largest economy in the world in 2012, Brazil has not developed a
military capacity to match. The latent capacity is certainly there: Brazil has mastered the
nuclear fuel cycle, has a large export-oriented small arms industry, extensive naval

shipyards, a space program, and major international aerospace firms. Thus while Brazil
satisfies some of the capacity requisites for a middle power, in the post-Cold War ear,
and certainly the post-2004 period, this is more due to a lack of pressure to militarize than
an inability to do so.
From these size and capacity requisites we get a shift towards a behavioural
characterization of what makes a middle power. It is autonomously powerless to bring
major change and able to act effectively only with acquiescence from great powers and
the active cooperation of other middle powers. Preservation of relative peace and stability
in the international system is the name of the game, with middle powers acting
autonomously as brokers and managers of the international institutions that maintain this
stability. For Cox this means hegemony preservation, with the middle powers acting as
the agents of the extant or declining great powers to maintain the existing system by
entrenching its rules and practices.13 Middle powers are particularly effective as
defensive forerunners for the great powers systemic desires because they are not
perceived as harbouring ambitions for domination and are free of the historical baggage
that comes with having held colonial possessions.
This points to a managerial approach to defining a middle power: they are the
actors that manage the day-to-day operation of the international system, using
institutions as instruments to engage in three forms of mediation, namely communication,
formulation, and manipulation.14 The first two aspects involve the clarification of
misunderstandings and the offering of alternative approaches to issues and crises as is
necessary. This creates a great deal of space to quietly insert middle power agendas into
wider discussions because the middle power is perceived more as a good Samaritan than

interest-driven state. The manipulation aspect becomes more problematic and requires
greater diplomatic skill in the management and presentation of competing agendas.
Existence of the space to do this returns us to Holmes point that middle powers are able
to pursue this managerial role because their goals are consonant with those of the great
powers, or at least receive tacit acquiescence.
As Jordaan points out, traditional approaches to the behaviour and activities of
middle powers focus on maintaining the status quo.15 In this vein Cooper, Higgott, and
Nossal argue that middle powers can be identified by explicit support of the US-designed
world order in the 1950s and 1960s, pursuing a diplomatic strategy that sought to
combine good international citizenship with what might best be termed an enlightened
approach to the national interest.16 The middle power became distinctive for its technical
flare and creative diplomacy, using these skills to marshal other smaller states around
projects needed to ensure the relatively smooth running of the international system and
avoidance of blunt intervention by the great powers.17 It was a mix of what they termed
leadership and followership that allowed diplomatic flare and policy entrepreneurship to
fill a perceived global leadership gap. A middle power became a state with an ability and
consistent willingness to frame potential solutions to international conundrums in terms
that privileged a broadly humanitarian, legalistic agenda encapsulated in international
regimes and institutions, but in a manner that was able to draw consensus from
competing national interests of other middle powers and assent from major powers.18 The
key component here was adherence to the normative agenda advanced by the major
powers so that even ostensibly oppositional middle power initiatives ultimately served to
reinforce the systemic precepts advanced by the dominant state.

In theoretical terms the stated goal of Cooper, Higgott and Nossal is to provide an
agency-centred alternative to understanding how the complex interdependence of the
post-1990 era is managed and evolves.19 Their argument is that non-hegemonic states can
impact the shape and nature of the international system, just not in as decisive a manner
as a dominant state. Finlayson and Weston make a similar point, suggesting that the
increasingly economic nature of international relations opened more space for second tier
states to band together in small groups to try and influence the rules of the game.20 But
within this context the abiding assumption remained that the core interests of the
dominant actors, the US, was not substantively challenged.
As Huelsz points out, while these approaches focus on behavioural characteristics
and offer another way of identifying a middle power, the definitional solidity of the term,
let alone its utility is left hanging.21 Cooper addresses the margins of this conceptual drift
and points to the core of the problem when he notes that, in terms of ends, the foreign
policy goals of the self-identified middle powers have remained firmly in place.
Traditionally, middle powers have acted as supporters of the international system.22
Indeed, we might turn here to variants of regime theory or cooperative hegemony to
further explain how the multilateralist impulse attributed to middle powers by Cooper,
Higgott, and Nossal was designed by relatively weaker states to constrain the actions and
limit the unilateralism of the most powerful states by seizing a seat at decision-making
tables.23 Order, Stairs points out, is something middle powers obviously want to preserve
because they benefit directly from it, especially in an environment of complex
interdependence where a hegemonic state has the capacity to impose changes in the
rules.24

Although this desire for order and predictability is shared by Brazil, the

normative basis is questioned and a realignment of transnational power relations is

sought.25
The primary device that the middle power has for getting things done is not
grounded in large amounts of material power, but in ideas, in the concept of policy
entrepreneurship expressed in a willingness to use limited material capacity to organize
others behind common projects within the bounds of the existing system. Jordaan builds
on this idea with his discussion of traditional middle powers, presented as countries such
as Australia and Canada, and emerging middle powers like the very different cases of
Argentina, Brazil, Nigeria, Malaysia, South Africa and Turkey. He throws in the quirk
that the emerging middle powers might have their own ideas that differ from those of
existing international players. Like traditional middle powers, emerging middle powers
work to legitimize the structure of the international system and build coalitions to support
its advancement, but in a reformist direction that calls into question entrenched patterns
of relational power and the implicit institutional priorities.26 This fits neatly with the
framework suggested by Ravenhill, which focuses on five attributes of middle power
diplomacy: capacity, concentration, creativity, coalition-building, and credibility.27
While all of these characteristics certainly fit the Brazilian case, and Brazils
diplomatic activism can be reasonably accounted for by Ravenhills three indicators of
when a middle power will act, there remains the question of why these characteristics are
particularly unique to a middle power and could not be exhibited by a country that in
quantitative power terms would appear small. This is the problem that Malamud
identifies in his definitional survey before returning us to the identity questions raised
above by suggesting that we might instead understand middle powers as a social category

10

that depends on recognition by others.28 Such a proposition is consistent with Hurrells

argument that where a country fits in a hierarchy of powers is partly driven by the
perception of other countries. This external labelling power is not, though, set as the only
criteria with significant importance being given to how a country views and deports itself,
as in the cases of De Gaulles France and Nehrus India.29 Thus, while we might then
claim that Brazil is a middle power because others call it one, the argument runs into an
immediate contradiction because Brazilians themselves and, more particularly, their
diplomats see their country as a major power. Indeed, Brazilian officials explicitly and
directly reject the moniker middle power irrespective of how it is applied or
interpreted.30

How to Mistake Brazil as One of Us

One issue for policy makers is that initial impressions make it easy to mistake Brazil as a
traditional middle power due the countrys tradition of negotiation over conflict and its
absence of force projection capabilities. The underpinning reality is markedly different
and built around Brazilian aspirations to be a global power even if clear ideas of purpose
and project are absent.31 Brazils foreign policy remains predicated on the protection of
national sovereignty and autonomy at the expense of almost all other pluralist
considerations. This is consistent with maintaining the current international system, but
only when existing arrangements favour Brazils particular interests. As will be set out
below, the result is an element of confusion, with Brazil seeming to display middle power

11

characteristics based on size and capacity, but acting in a manner at odds with traditional
understandings of what a middle power does.

Non-dominance
One criteria used in quantitative approaches to defining a middle power is a countrys
material power to project force and impose its will on others. This is married to a more
behaviouralist approach that considers a countrys willingness to exert dominance over
another state, helping to explain why countries such as France and the UK have remained
major powers in the eyes of many. Brazil has lacked the material power base to position
itself as a great power, but also has not needed it. With all of its borders settled over a
century ago without armed conflict, Brazilian military exploits have instead been focused
on supporting larger strategic ambitions in much the same way we see with traditional
middle powers. Participation in both World Wars was part assertion of the countrys
global importance and part national industrialization strategy. Similarly, participation in
the 1965 Dominican Republic crisis, and leadership of the MOMEP peace-keeping
mission separating Ecuador and Peru as well as the Minustah forces in Haiti and observer
missions in Angola and Mozambique all played into attempts to demonstrate Brazil as
capable of providing security in a non-domineering manner. Although Brazil has one of
the largest standing armed forces and military budgets in the region, the decades-long
process of re-equipping the military set out in the 2008 National Defence Policy is
predicated on a Brazilian-led collectivized approach to maintaining security in the
Americas and revivification of Brazils military-industrial complex.

12

Similarities this has with middle power behaviour fade into irrelevance if we
consider the fundamentally pacific nature of inter-state relations in Latin America. Brazil
also stumbles on the idea of enlightened self-interest. As was seen in the drive for a
UNSC seat and the resultant Minustah leadership, substantive participation in
peacekeeping ventures links tightly to the countrys foreign policy objectives. The other
issue, which Malamud highlights is that the rest of the region is not particularly inclined
to follow Brazils lead on security matters,32 with countries such as Colombia and
Venezuela taking decidedly independent paths and Argentina still expressing doubts
about its Portuguese-speaking neighbours intentions.
The economic story is similar. Although still facing its own poverty challenges,
Brazil is increasingly engaging in development cooperation activities,33 the export of
capital through the state-supported internationalization of its major firms,34 and selective
trade diversion to address imbalances with Southern partners. All of this is predicated on
an approach to international trade consistent with World Trade Organization (WTO)
norms. Indeed, within the WTO Brazil became part of the new Quad, working to build
Southern support to conclude the Doha Round. Regionally, Brazil has led formation of
economic groupings such as Mercosur and the nascent South American bloc Unasur.
These ostensibly liberal trade initiatives do seek to encourage the internationalization of
developing economies in the Americas and the global South, but unlike similar efforts
seen from the North, the ambition is to focus attention on the possibilities of a new
economic geography built around intra-Southern trade with Brazil in an important
leadership position. Although Brazil cannot buy or bully its way to the fore as the US and
EU have in the past, the intent is the same: privilege Brazilian interests and ambitions in

13

the construction of new systems that open opportunities by exploiting a normative

approach privileging South-South interactions mediated through Brazil.

Free of imperial baggage

Despite once being seat of the Portuguese empire, Brazil, like the self-perception of a
middle power, lacks the sort of colonial baggage found in Europe or the tradition of blunt
imperial domination often attributed to the US. Although there is lingering distrust
throughout the Americas over Brazils period as an Empire in the early nineteenth
century, the country never engaged in the sort of direct or by association Empire
construction and maintenance found in Europe and the Anglo-Saxon world. Brazil is able
to gain further credibility by pointing to its own experience under the Northerndominated economic system, using this to position itself as a natural North-South
intermediary and South-South focal point. Indeed, during the Lula presidency an
enormous amount of effort was devoted to drawing out and highlighting the
commonalities between Brazil and Africa and the rest of South.35 The appearance was
one of a prototypical middle power tasked with delivering agreement of the global South
to Northern proposals.
Despite the rhetoric of solidarity and fraternity surrounding Brazils South-South
relations, the reality is very different. Malamud points to rising charges of Brazil as
imperialist,36 a charge loosely supported by Bolivias former president Carlos Mesa.37
This charge is consistent with Brazils behaviour: battering Bolivia into line through a
manipulation of diesel supplies after Morales 2006 May Day nationalization of the gas

14

industry, targeting the application of countervailing tariffs and quotas to discipline

Argentina trade and industrial policy, selectively enforcing the borders with Paraguay to
ensure behaviour from elicit elites in Asuncin, manipulating BNDES financing to retain
market access in Africa and Latin America, and a gradual slanting of consensual
positions away from the consensus towards the Brazilian view in forums such as the
WTO. The result is not an outright rejection of Brazil as malign imperialist, but a definite
tendency across South America towards caution and reticence each time Brazil attempts
to lead a new initiative, prompting countries such as Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay to
counterbalance Braslia with a mix of Caracas and Washington.

Act only with the acquiescence of great powers

The most obvious example is Brazilian leadership of the Minustah mission in Haiti,
which took on a stabilization role that the US and its traditional middle power ally
Canada wished to avoid. This required Brazil to set aside questions it usually raises about
extra-electoral regime change in the Americas and anti-US rumblings within Lulas
Workers Party. The justification offered in Brazil was not middle power approximation
with the US, but the great power aspiration of obtaining a UNSC permanent seat and
pushing the US and Canada out of the southern reaches of the hemisphere. While the
extent to which Brazil has been able to lead the process in Haiti is dependent on US
acquiescence, the pattern before and after the 2010 earthquake has been to put Brazil
first, preferably at the head of a Latin-dominated multinational force such as that seen
separating Ecuador and Peru from 1995 to 1998.

15

Attempts to push the act only with acquiescence logic further into key areas of
Brazilian foreign policy such as the engagement with South America and Africa quickly
start to collapse when set in the context of the general trend in Washington to ignore
these regions. More to the point, when US attention was turned South, more often than
not Brazilian acts that appeared to support US positions had more to do with advancing
Brazils regional interests, as has been the case in work to contain the excesses of
Venezuelas Hugo Chavez, Bolivias Evo Morales, and Ecuadors Rafael Correa. Other
activities in the vacant spaces of Northern policy such as formation of the India-BrazilSouth Africa Dialogue Forum do carry a disciplining aspect of encouraging and
underwriting internationalization across the South, but with an intra-South, not
Northward gaze that has prompted officials at the IMF to muse that South-South is
increasingly supplanting South-North exchange.38 More to the point, the US ability to
constrain and delimit what can be pursued is being directly challenged as highlighted by
Brazils increased activity in the Middle East, particularly with respect to the Iranian
nuclear deal in 2010 and attempts by the IBSA group to broker a stability deal with Syria
in 2011.39

Technical flair and policy entrepreneurship

The hallmark of Brazilian foreign policy is its technical flair and policy entrepreneurship.
Brazilian diplomats consistently arrive at bilateral and multilateral negotiations with
tiered negotiating positions and prepared alternate texts for a host of contingencies. This
is precisely the sort of preparation that traditional middle powers such as Australia and

16

Canada have traditionally demonstrated, providing the consensus-generating or conflict

defusing alternate proposals necessary to continue building and strengthening the rulesbased multilateral system. Like these traditional middle powers, Brazilian diplomats are
clear that they are committed to a rules-based multilateral system. The quirk that causes
confusion interpreting this otherwise typical middle power behaviour is that the approach
Brazil takes to multilateralism sometimes appears contrary to the spirit of the game due to
their different normative interpretations and emphasis on sovereignty and preservation of
national autonomy over collectivization. For example, protestations that the Organization
of American States is an important regional governance institution were paralleled by
vigorous efforts to launch the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
(CELAC), which some refer to as the OAS minus two, plus one for its exclusion of
Canada and the US and inclusion of Cuba. Significantly, while political capital is being
invested in CELAC, pulling focus and attention away from the OAS, Brazil is quite
assiduously not institutionalizing the arrangements. The same technical flare was seen
through the Free Trade Areas of the Americas process where Brazil never explicitly
rejected the deal, but through a careful negotiating strategy succeeded in killing it and
distributing the blame for its failure across the hemisphere. For Northern capitals the
frustration is one of sorting out what exactly Brazil is trying to accomplish. Although
Brazil never seems to say no, it nevertheless manages to block ideas being pushed by
the old core countries without ever being seen to fundamentally challenge the existing
international system.

17

Self-identity as a middle power

There is a long-standing joke in Brazil: Brazil is the country of the future, and always
will be. Married to this is the eternal foreign policy ambition of Brasil Grandeza, or a
Grand Brazil that has a rightful seat at the head table in international councils. Part of the
issue for the traditional middle powers is that the joke is seen as just that, a statement that
however much Brazil might dream, the most it can hope to attain is the sort of middle
power influence enjoyed by Australia and Canada. As Lula repeatedly made clear, Brazil
is looking for something more.40 Where the Cardoso presidency stayed closer to the
middle power role of trying to run the region, Lula looked beyond and sought to establish
a plausible sense in the North that he was leading both South America and the wider
group of developing countries. Actual success on this level proved to be rather imperfect,
which in turn fed Northern perceptions that despite claims to major powers status, Brazil
was falling short of the mark in terms of performance and outcome delivery. But the
persistent practice of Brazilian foreign policy and the continual involvement in high
profile international issues with an independent take clearly indicates that Brazil does not
see itself as a middle power and outright refuses to act as one. Brazilian treatment of the
issues discussed below WTO negotiations, nuclear non-proliferation, and global
financial governance clearly points to a self-perception that heads somewhat beyond the
auto-estima of Lula towards an intrinsic belief that Brazil is considerably more than a
middle power.

Working the system

18

As Soares de Lima and Hirst point out, Brazil is committed to multilateralism.41 But, for
Brazil this commitment to multilateralism appears thin,42 taking a decidedly selfinterested direction that is closer to the realpolitik of the US or France than the notion of
enlightened self-interest attributed to the actions of Australia and Canada within the
normative boundaries of the US-vision for global governance frameworks. Indeed,
policy-makers in Northern capitals have often expressed some frustration with Brazils
apparent foot-dragging in multilateral forum as a form of passive obstructionism. United
States Trade Representative Robert Zoellick blasted Brazil for this very type of behaviour
after the 2003 Cancun WTO ministerial. A more regionalized set of concerns came in the
wake of the 2009 coup in Honduras, with Brazil holding out against an OAS consensus
on how to normalize the situation.43
It is not that Brazil is rebelling against the international system and trying to
overturn it; quite the opposite. Brazil does very well within the existing system. Rather
than rebelling, Brazil is attempting to prioritize the place of its interests within that
system by advancing the different normative agenda identified by Hurrell. Viewed
another way, there is a natural affinity between middle powers such as Australia and
Canada with the US that sees an almost irresistible gravitation towards US-friendly
positions in foreign policy even if masked in a questioning rhetoric and strong principled
differences on politically-charged foreign policy issues such as Cuba and the Second Gulf
War.44 This same affinity is seen at times in Brazilian foreign policy, but only because
Brazil sees gains for itself in maintaining the structure of the system, which is very
different from the traditional middle power idea of working within the normative frames
set by the US in the post-World War Two period. A different track has been followed by

19

Brazil, which questions key assumptions about the predominant normative frame for
global governance and directly questions the Brazilian position within it. Brazil has
increasingly turned towards a policy of autonomy that privileges concepts such as
sovereignty in order to maximize the policy space and independence from global
marginalization that Braslia feels it critical for advancing national development
projects.45
If we are to attribute a middle power-ness to Brazilian foreign policy behaviour,
it is through a decidedly non-middle power proclivity for maintaining structures in the
global system and improving Brazils relative agency and power within the constituent
multilateral instruments. Three examples serve to highlight Brazils sustained efforts to
improve its relative agency within the existing multilateral system. During the WTO
Doha Round Brazil worked to advance its relative position by advocating an orthodox
liberal economic approach to the global trade regime which actively questioned US and
EU attempts to manipulate the system. Moreover, we see a clear break between the
traditional middle powers and Brazil in the WTO case. Questions about nuclear nonproliferation serve as an example of Brazil attempting to maintain the pre-eminence of
existing sovereignty norms in order to isolate itself from potential pressure from core
countries such as the US. Finally, the issue of financial global governance stands as an
example where almost no questions are asked about the overarching structure of the
existing multilateral system, only about Brazils place within it.

The WTO Doha Round

20

Brazil played an active role in creating coalitions within the WTO to advance its position
and push the trade talks in a direction away from that preferred by the US and EU.46 This
highlighted a direct rift with existing middle powers and their approach to global trade
talks with Brazil effectively abandoning the North-South Cairns Group to form the
South-South G-20 coalition of developing countries. The view in Braslia was that the
leaders of the Cairns group, middle powers Australia and Canada, were excessively
beholden to the US view and would not advance anti-subsidy positions that might erode
American relative power in the global economy or impact their own domestic interests.
The vituperative reaction of US and EU trade officials to Brazils role in the
collapse of the 2003 Cancun WTO ministerial meeting pointed directly at a concern that
Brazil intended to kill the entire process in a pique of protectionism. As tempers cooled, a
more nuanced story emerged. The first clear element was that Brazil was quite forcefully
advocating elements of a global free trade regime. As a newly emerged agricultural
superpower, Brazil was simply advancing its own commercial interests within the WTO
framework by pushing for a more sweeping set of liberalization measures. A second, less
obvious aspect was the work Brazil was undertaking to keep a large group of
disenchanted developing countries at the table. By 2004 it was becoming increasingly
apparent that these countries were having serious second thoughts about the entire WTO
process and might try to derail the institution. In the interest of preserving an institution
that was serving Brazilian interests, particularly through the dispute settlement system,
Brazilian foreign minister Celso Amorim addressed a meeting of G-90 ministers and
sought their acquiescence to his lead.47 Amorims success at this meeting helped to vault
Brazil into the inner circle of WTO talks where he continued to push for greater

21

liberalization on the agricultural front until the surge in global commodity prices made
many Brazilian products competitive exports despite the trade distorting subsidy practices
in the US and EU.
By 2007 the Brazilian position began to moderate on issues such as nonagricultural market access and some ground was surrendered on the agricultural front
despite the concerns of other G-20 Trade and G90 members. Significantly, the rationale
was not appeasement of the US or EU, but rather a shift in the underlying economics of
Brazils position as global commodity prices rose and a perceived need to keep the WTO
alive as a useful institution in which Brazilian interests could be advanced. Away from
the Doha Round talks Brazil had been busy in the WTOs Dispute Settlement
Understanding mechanism, bringing a succession of cases against the US and EU that
achieved revisions of trade policies that were proving elusive at the negotiating table.
Concerns from other members of the G-20 Trade coalition about Brazils softening
negotiating stance, most notably the blocs Latin American members, were given space
for discussion at weekly group strategy sessions in Geneva, but somehow faded from the
radar when Brazil met with the other major countries to negotiate the specifics of a
possible Doha Round agreement.
Priority was placed on maintaining the WTO as a credible institution that could be
used to advance Brazilian interests and prevent a return to the sort of tit-for-tat trade
retaliations that would be inimical to increasingly internationalized segments of Brazils
economy. Brazil thus exhibited many of the characteristics associated with middle
powers, namely coalition formation, policy entrepreneurship, support of the multilateral
structure. Unlike a traditional middle power, the Brazilian approach questioned the

22

central normative assumptions underlying the WTO by taking a stance that asked why
development and the encouragement of South-South interaction should not be a priority.
The result was an implicit question not of the need for the WTO, but of how it should
conceptualize its agenda and go about advancing a liberal global economic model. In
terms redolent of Jordaans argument, middle power service, if it is to be called that, was
rendered to the structure itself (albeit in a paralysing manner) and not to the agents who
originally erected and still sought to control the multilateral framework or the relative
power relations they sought to entrench in global governance frameworks.

Nuclear non-proliferation
Brazils core position is that nuclear weapons proliferation is a bad thing. As Brazils
former representative to the UN Conference on Disarmament explains, Brazil and Latin
America will not develop nuclear weapons and will remain active and constructive
partners in the establishment of a world safe from weapons of mass destruction.48 Such
forceful statements from former government officials as well as constitutional provisions
banning the development and use of nuclear weapons would appear to make Brazil a
natural ally of US policies to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Yet
Brazil has emerged as one of the more difficult partners in the fight against proliferation
due to its repeatedly expressed position that the existing anti-nuclear regime is more of an
entrenchment of unequal military power relations and technological dependencies than
something dedicated towards global piece and security.49 Concerns that governments of
the P5 five declared nuclear powers might harbour about Brazils intentions are not

23

helped by Braslias efforts to maintain relations with Iran and the tenor of joint
statements with countries distrusted by the West.50
The issue starts with the legal framework around the non-proliferation regime.
While Brazil did eventually sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1998, it has vehemently
and repeatedly refused to accede to the additional protocol that allows the International
Atomic Energy Agency sweeping inspection rights.51 Principles of sovereignty and
commercial secrecy have been continually held up by Brazil as a justification for its
position. On a more pragmatic level Brazil claims a need to protect future commercial
prerogatives. With some of the worlds largest uranium reserves, the country is seeking to
master the atomic fuel cycle on an industrial scale so that it can position itself as a key
energy broker in the future. Setting aside the sovereignty considerations, the issue for
Brazil is one of predatory commercial practices from the established nuclear powers and
their potential efforts to keep new entrants from the atomic energy industry.52
Of course, commercial considerations are not placed to the fore in Brazils
international stance. Emphasis is instead on the right of all nations to make pacific use of
atomic energy. In particular, Brazil frequently draws attention to provisions in the NPT
that require the established nuclear powers to disarm. The result is a very difficult
international stance from Brazil on the nuclear question. Efforts in May 2010 by Brazil
and Turkey to broker a deal with Iran that would maintain the countrys right to develop
enriched-fuel energy systems while simultaneously assuaging the proliferation concerns
of the P5 created a massive clash with the US and a near breakdown in bilateral relations
highlighting a fundamentally different view of how the non-proliferation regime worked.
From the Brazilian point of view the idea was to provide assurances to both sides. To the

24

P5 the priority was that nuclear materials were not being weaponised. Conversely the
assurance for Iran was that the nuclear materials would in fact be processed and returned,
not seized by the US and other P5 countries.53 An approach to the Iranian challenge
through the IAEA was not rejected by Brazil,54 but a question was asked about who was
making the decisions: was it the US, or the multilateral organization running the NPT
regime at the IAEA? The answer matters to the relational power calculations at Itamaraty.
Ceding a measure of sovereignty to the IAEA would be difficult, but nevertheless easier
than surrendering it to another country. This in turn points back to the argument in this
paper that while we might be add adjectives to the phrase middle power to include
Brazil in the category, the substance of Brazilian behaviour and attitudes rules it out of
the category.

Global financial governance

As Almeida points out, Brazil has been a solid user of global financial institutions.55
Funds from the World Bank Group and the Inter-American Development Bank played an
important role in Brazils internal development as well as in new programs by financing
the Brazilian firms working on regional infrastructure schemes like IIRSA.56 For Brazil
the issue has never been that institutions such as the IMF and World Bank are
unnecessary. Rather, the point that has been made with increasing force since the
Cardoso presidency is not just that global financial institutions are fundamentally nondemocratic, but also that they often engage in spurious programming and analysis.

25

Lula reiterated the importance of these institutions shortly after the 2008 Global
Financial Crisis, calling for a new approach to global financial governance that was more
open, participative, and explicitly aware that the supposed experts in the G-7 did not have
the answers and lacked the necessary conditions to keep the world from economic
disaster.57 Significantly, Lula did not call for dissolution of the global financial
architectures or a fundamental redesign of the existing institutional structures. Instead, he
sought to embed a series of principles representation and legitimacy, collective action,
good domestic governance, responsibility, transparency, and prevention as avenues for
broadening participation in global decision making.
In 2011, President Dilma Rousseffs central bank head, Alexandre Tombini
explained that Brazils involvement in setting the Basel III regulatory framework in the
Bank of International Settlements meant that the country was directly contributing to the
evolving shape of the global financial governance structure.58 More significantly, Brazil
was successfully pushing for an approach with more stringent reserve and reporting rules
for the banking sector, something that was normal for Brazilian banks, but a significant
challenge for countries such as the US. Additional pressure along these lines came as the
G20 turned its collective attention to dealing with the financial crises sweeping Europe.
Working in conjunction with the other BRIC countries, Brazil floated the idea that it was
possible to provide a financial rescue package for Europe, but not as a blank cheque.
One economist speaking to the Brazilian newspaper Valor Econmico wondered
if the IMF would impose the sorts of austerity programs experienced in Latin America on
countries like Spain and Italy, making the point that Europe must follow the same rules of
the game as other countries in the global financial system.59 Responding to the

26

Portuguese financial crisis, Brazilian reaction was a mix of caution and promise of
assistance. Shortly after arriving in Portugal for her first visit to Europe as president,
Dilma indicated that Brazil would be willing to help its fellow Lusophone country with
some of its financial challenges as part of the Brazilian Central Banks plan to diversify
its reserve holdings.60 The twist thrown into this proposition by Brazilian monetary
authorities was that such assistance would not be provided if it amounted to a
Brazilian/BRIC bail out of French and German banks that had engaged in foolish lending
practices.61 Brazilian coordinated assistance from the BRICs would require substantive
indications that Europe was sorting out its financial house in much the same way that the
South had in the 1990s. The clear message was that while the global financial system
should be maintained and protected, this did not extend to protecting the privileged
position of the existing actors.

Conclusion and implications

Brazils diplomat-scholar Paulo Roberto de Almeida captures the crux of the issue
discussed in this paper with his observation that although the international organizations
underpinning contemporary global governance are nearly universal in their membership,
they are far from guaranteeing universal access to decision-making processes.62 As this
paper has argued, Brazils problem is not with the existence and institutional structure of
the organizations and regimes that perpetuate the global system. Brazils problem is with
the distribution of authority within these institutions. The result is a foreign policy that in
many ways looks like that of a middle power because Brazil, like Australia and Canada in

27

years past, does work to prevent a collapse of both international order and multilateral
institutions. These institutions are important for Brazil because, despite its ambitions, the
country is far from being a regionally or globally dominant economic, military or
political force. Consequently, the obvious assumption for many not well-versed in the
details of the Brazils international approach is to assume that the country is slowly
working its way around to a middle power role like that seen in Australia and Canada.
Indeed, this is precisely the role that the EU and US sought to enforce in the WTO when
they effectively charged Brazil with delivering acquiescence of the global South to the
proposed Doha round texts in the mid 2000s. The argument presented here is that such an
assumption is erroneous, confusing the relational focus of traditional middle powers with
Brazil structural preoccupation.
Brazil rejects the sort of middle power role taken by Australia and Canada
because it implies acceptance of a subservient role that is not consistent with Brazilian
ambitions to be a great power that has major influence over the governance of a
multipolar world. This carries important implications for Brazilian relations with the
traditional middle and major powers in the North. The regimes and institutions that are
critical for the existing international order will be protected by Brazil, but in a manner
that brings a realignment of relational power within these bodies. From Braslias point of
view, the emphasis is on realigning decision-making centres with the emerging loci of
power, not faded imperial seats and their satellites. This in turn implies a direct
contestation of the very relational power systems that are seen as being explicitly
accepted by middle powers like Australia and Canada.

28

For middle power countries such as Australia and Canada this implies a great deal
of space to engage in productive discussion about how to reform and strengthen global
governance institutions, but with the proviso that there is recognition that Brazil is not a
developing country needing tutelary guidance as it emerges into the international system,
but a new great power that must be courted. Brazils carriage of itself as a global power
means that attempts to include it in existing middle power councils will really only be
accepted as a matter of curiosity and courtesy as more senior figures in Itamaraty and the
Planalto presidential palace conduct the real decision-making negotiations with their
counterparts in Washington, Berlin, Delhi and Beijing.
In other words, Brazil is increasingly viewing and positioning itself as the major
power that the middle powers should court in their efforts to influence global governance
processes. This returns us to the main point of the paper, namely that labelling Brazil as a
middle power creates a series of behavioural and attitudinal expectations that will not be
met and feed poor policy-making. While theoretical innovations such as that offered by
Jordaan do allow us to shoehorn Brazil into the middle power category, the necessary
stretching of core aspects of the concept make such an effort counterproductive. Viewing
Brazil as a middle power does not allow the scholar or policy analyst to accurately
understand what Brazil is attempting to do with its foreign policy or how it might react to
new developments in the international arena. As Brazils role in both South-South and
South-North relations grows such analytical acuity will become increasingly important
across a wide range of regional and international issues.

Notes

29

Andrew Hurrell, Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would-be
Great Powers? International Affairs 82:1, 2006, p. 3.
2
Eduard Jordaan, The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relations:
Distinguishing Between Emerging and Traditional Middle Powers, Politikon, 30:2,
November 2003, pp. 165-181; Daniel Flemes, Emerging Middle Powers Soft
Balancing Strategy: State and Perspectives of the IBSA Dialogue Forum, GIGA Working
Papers, 57, August 2007; Janis van der Westhuizen, Class Compromise as Middle
Power Activism? Comparing Brazil and South Africa, Government and Opposition,
48:1, January 2013, pp. 80-100; Walter Russell Mead, Terrible Twins: Turkey, Brazil
and the Future of American Foreign Policy, Walter Russell Meads Blog, The American
Interest, 5 June 2010: http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2010/06/05/terribletwins-turkey-brazil-and-the-future-of-american-foreign-policy/ , 8 February 2013.
3
Giovanni Sartori, Concept Misinformation in Comparative Politics, The American
Political Science Review, 64:4, December 1970, p. 1035.
4
Celso Lafer, A Identidade Internacional do Brasil e a Poltica Externa Brasileira:
Pasado, Presente e Futuro, So Paulo, Editora Perspectiva, 2001.
5
Gelson Fonseca, Jr., A Legitimidade e Outras Questes Internacionais: Poder e tica
Entre as Naes 2nd ed., So Paulo, Editora Paz e Terra, 2004.
6
Tullo Vigevani and Gabriel Cepaluni, Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times: The
Quest for Autonomy from Sarney to Lula, Lanham, MD, Lexington Books, 2009.
7
Jordaan, The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relations.
8
Carsten Holbraad, The Role of Middle Powers, School of International Affairs,
Carleton University Occasional Papers Series, no. 18, March 1972, p. 4.
9
Ibid. pp. 4-5; Carsten Holbraad, Middle Powers in International Politics, London,
Macmillan, 1984, pp. 11-14; John W. Holmes, Is There a Future or
Middlepowermanship? in John W. Holmes (ed.), The Better Part of Valour: Essays on
Canadian Diplomacy, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1970.
10
Holbraad, Middle Powers in International Politics, chapter 3.
11
Holmes, Is There a Future for Middlepowermanship? pp. 17-18.
12
Monica Herz and Joo Pontes Nogueira, Ecuador vs. Peru: Peacemaking amid Rivalry,
Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner, 2002; Bruce W Farcau, The Chaco War: Bolivia and
Paraguay, 1932-1935, London, Praeger, 1996.
13
Robert W. Cox, Middlepowermanship, Japan, and Future World Order, in Robert W.
Cox with Timothy Sinclair (eds), Approaches to World Order, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1996, pp. 241-243.
14
Alan K. Henrikson, Middle Powers as Managers: International Mediation Within,
Across, and Outside Institutions, in Andrew F. Cooper (ed.), Niche Diplomacy: Middle
Powers After the Cold War, New York, St. Martins Press, 1997, pp. 46-47.
15
Jordaan, The Concept of a Middle Power, pp. 167-169.

30

16

Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal, Relocating Middle
Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order, Vancouver, UBC Press,
1993.
17
Andrew F. Cooper and Richard A. Higgott, Middle Power Leadership in the
International Order: An Issue-Specific Model for the 1990s, The Centre for International
Trade and Investment Policy Studies Work Paper Series 92-01, no date, pp. 13-14.
18
Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers.
19
Ibid., pp. 5-13.
20
Jock A. Finlayson and Ann Weston, The GATT, Middle Powers and the Uruguay
Round, No. 5 in the Middle Powers in the International System Series, Ottawa, NorthSouth Institute, 1990.
21
Cornelia Huelsz, Middle Power Theories and Emerging Powers in International
Political Economy: A Case Study of Brazil, PhD Diss., University of Manchester, 2009,
Chapter 1.
22
Andrew F. Cooper, Nice Diplomacy: A Conceptual Overview, in Andrew F. Cooper,
(ed.), Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers After the Cold War, New York, St. Martins
Press, 1997, p. 8.
23
Andreas, Andreas, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International
Regimes, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997; Thomas Pedersen, Cooperative
Hegemony: Power, Ideas, and Institutions in Regional Integration, Review of
International Studies, 28, 2002, pp. 677-696.
24
Denis Stairs, Of Medium Powers and Middling Roles, in Ken Booth (ed.), Statecraft
and Security: The Cold War and Beyond, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998.
25
This is an underlying theme in Celso Amorim, Conversas com Jovens Diplomatas, So
Paulo, Editora Benvir, 2011, chapter three, O perigo de ficarmos s voltados para o
ideal a ireelevncia. E o de estarmos totalmente voltados para o realismo a inao.
26
Jordaan, The Concept of a Middle Power, p. 176.
27
John Ravenhill, Cycles of Middle Power Activism: Constraint and Choice in
Australian and Canadian Foreign Policies Australian Journal of International Affairs
52:3, 1998, pp. 309-327
28
Andrs Malamud, A Leader Without Followers? The Growing Divergence Between
the Regional and Global Performance of Brazilian Foreign Policy, Latin American
Politics and Society, 53:3, Fall 2011, pp. 1-24.
29
Andrew Hurrell, Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would-be
Great Powers?, International Affairs, 82:1, 2006, pp. 1-19.
30
When the first version of this paper was presented at the 2011 Latin America and the
Shifting Sands of Global Power conference the ranking Brazilian diplomat in the room
directly and explicitly told the author We are not a middle power.
31
Hurrell, Hegemony, p. 2.
32
Malamud, A Leader Without Followers?
33
Cristina Yumie Aoki Inoue and Alcides Costa Vaz, Brazil as Southern donor:
Beyond hierarchy and national interests in development cooperation? Cambridge Review
of International Affairs 25:4, 2012, pp. 507-534
34
Ben Ross Schneider, Big Business in Brazil: Leveraging Natural Endowments and
State Support for International Expansion, in Lael Brainard and Leonardo Martinez-

31

Diaz, (eds), Brazil as an Economic Superpower? Understanding Brazils Changing Role

in the Global Economy, Washington DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2009.
35
Paulo Fagundes Visentini, Prestige Diplomacy, Southern Solidarity or Soft
Imperialism? Lulas Brazil-Africa Relations (2003 onwards), in Denis Rolland and
Antnio Carlos Lessa, (eds), Relations Internationales du Brsil: Les Chemins de la
Puissance vol. 2, Aspects Rgionaux et Thmatiques, Paris, LHarmattan, 2010; Jerry
Dvila, Hotel Trpico: Brazil and the Challenge of African Decolonization, 19501980,
Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 2010; Jos Flvio Sombra Saraiva, frica parceira
do Brasil atlntico: Relaes internacionais do Brasil e da frica no incio do sculo
XXI, Belo Horizonte, Brazil, Fino Trao Editora, 2012.
36
Malamud, A Leader Without Followers?, p. 14.
37
Carlos Mesa, Bolvia e Brasil: Os Meandros do Caminho, Poltica Externa, 20:2,
September-November 2011, pp. 23-42.
38
James Lamont, BRIC Euro rescue: a rush job?, 14 September 2011, Financial Times,
http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2011/09/14/bric-euro-rescue-a-rush-job/, accessed 31
January 2013.
39
Diego Santos Vieira de Jesus, Building Trust and Flexibility: A Brazilian View of the
Fuel Swap with Iran, The Washington Quarterly, 34:2, 2011, pp. 61-75; Demtrio
Magnoli, Ateno, Dilma, ele assina em teu nome, O Estado de So Paulo, 18 August
2011.
40
For example, see Luiz Incio Lula da Silva, Discurso do Presidente da Repblica,
Luiz Incio Lula da Silva, durante reunio plenria dos Ministros da Fazenda do G-20
Financeiro, So Paulo, 8 November 2008, www.fazenda.gov.br, accessed 12 September
2011
41
Maria Regina Soares de Lima and Mnica Hirst, Brazil as an Intermediate State and
Regional Power: Action, Choice and Responsibilities, International Affairs, 82:1, 2006,
pp. 21-40.
42
Jean Daudelin and Sean Burges, Moving In, Carving Out, Proliferating: The Many
Faces of Brazils Multilateralism Since 1990, Pensamiento Proprio 33, January-June
2011, pp. 35-64.
43
Luiz Felipe Lampreia, Brasil comete erro de avaliao em Honduras, Poltica
Externa, 18:3, Dez/Jan/Fev 2009/2010, pp. 117-122; Marco Aurelio Garcia, O que est
em jogo em Honduras, Poltica Externa 18:3, Dez/Jan/Fev 2009/2010, pp. 123-130.
44
Sean Burges, Canadas Postcolonial Problem: the United States and Canadas
International Policy Review, Canadian Foreign Policy, 13:1, 2006, pp. 97-112.
45
Vigevani and Cepaluni, Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times; Sean Burges,
Brazilian Foreign Policy After the Cold War, Gainnesville, FL, University Press of
Florida, chapter 3.
46
Amrita Narlikar, The Ministerial Process and Power Dynamics in the World Trade
Organization: Understanding Failure from Seattle to Cancun, New Political Economy,
9:3, September 2004, pp. 413-428; Amrita Narlikar and Diana Tussie, The G20 and the
Cancun Ministerial: Developing Countries and their Evolving Coalitions in the WTO,
The World Economy, 27:7, 2004, pp. 947-966.
47
Celso Amorim, Statement by Minister Celso Amorim at the G-90 Meeting,
Georgetown, Guyana, 3 June 2004.

32

48

Marcos C. de Azambuja, A Brazilian Perspective on Nuclear Disarmament, in Barry

M Blechman (ed.), Brazil, Japan, and Turkey, New York, The Henry Stimson Center,
2009, p. 14.
49
Luiz Felipe Lampreia, Diplomacia Brasileira: Palavras, Contextos e Razes, Rio de
Janeiro, Lacerda Editores, 1999, pp. 383-389.
50
Amorim, Coversas com jovem diplomatas, pp. 279-310.
51
Jamil Chade, Brasil recusar acordo com a AIEA, diz Jobim, O Estado de So Paulo,
12 March 2010.
52
Carlo Patti, Brazil and the Nuclear Issues in the Years of the Luiz Incio Lula da Silva
Government (2003-2010), Revista Brasileira de Poltica Internacional, 53:2, 2010, pp.
178-197.
53
Santos, Building Trust and Flexibility.
54
Denise Chrispim Marin and Lisandra Paraguassu, Ir seque tema incmodo no dilogo
Brasil-EUA, O Estado de So Paulo, 18 March 2011.
55
Paulo Roberto de Almeida, O Brasil no Contexto da Governana Global, Cadernos
Adenauer, 9:3, 2009, pp. 199-219.
56
Ricardo Carciofi, Cooperation for the Provision of Regional Public Goods: The IIRSA
Case, in Pa Riggirozzi and Diana Tussie, (eds) The Rise of Post-Hegemonic
Regionalism: The Case of Latin America, London, Spinger, 2012.
57
Luiz Incio Lula da Silva, Discurso do Presidente da Repblica, Luiz Incioa Lula da
Silva, durante reunio plenria dos ministros de fazenda do G-20 Financeiro, So Paulo,
8 November 2008, www.fazenda.gov.br, accessed 12 September 2011.
58
Alexandre Antonio Tombini, Discurso do Presidente do Banco Central do Brasil,
Senhor Alexandre Antonio Tombini, Cerimnia de Posse do Presidente do Conselho
Diretor da Federao Brasileira de Bancos, Senhor Fbio Colletti Barboso e do novo
Presidente Executivo de Febraban, Senhor Muilo Portugal, So Paulo, 17 March 2011.
59
Eduardo Campos, Ser que os Brics podem salvar o mundo?, Valor Econmico (So
Paulo), 14 September 2011.
60
Tnia Monteiro, Dilma sinaliza, em Coimbra, ajuda a Portugal, O Estado de So
Paulo, 29 March 2011.
61
Assiss Moreira, China decidir ajuda de Brics a europeus Valor Econmico (So
Paulo), 14 September 2011.
62
Almeida, O Brasil no Contexto da Governana Global.

33