Regina v.

Prince
Brief Fact Summary. Defendant was convicted under a statute making it unlawful to take any
unmarried girl under the age of sixteen out of the possession and without the consent of her
parents. Although the girl taken by Defendant was actually 14 years old, she had told the
Defendant, and the defendant reasonably believed that the girl was 18.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Where a statute is silent as to the mens rea required to make the act
a crime, the court is not bound to read a requirement of mens rea into the statute.
Facts. Defendant was convicted for taking a 14-year-old unmarried girl out of the possession and
without the consent of her parents. At trial, the jury found that although the girl was 14 at the
time, she had told Defendant and he had reasonably believed that she was 18. The statute he
was convicted under was silent as to the mental state required to make the act a crime.
Defendant appeals.
Issue. Is the court required to read a mens rea requirement into a statute that is silent with
regard to the mental state required to make the act a crime?
Held. No. Conviction affirmed.
Mistake of fact does not stand as a defense to a crime where the statute making the act a crime
contains no requirement of knowledge of that fact to begin with. In this case the forbidden act is
wrong in itself and the legislature has enacted that if anyone does this act, he does so at his own
risk.
Dissent. The dissent believes that there can be no conviction of a crime without a finding of
criminal intent mens rea. A reasonable mistake of fact, where the mistaken belief, if true, would
not have resulted in the defendant committing a criminal act, should be an excuse that is implied
in all criminal charges.
Discussion. This case introduces the mistake of fact defense in the context of a criminal act for
which the statutory language making the act a crime has no requirement of mens rea.
***
B (A Minor) v. Director of Public Prosecutions
Brief Fact Summary. A common law presumption of an objective standard no longer governs
the mental state requirement for criminal statutes in a situation where Parliament fails to specify
a mens rea requirement.
Facts. A common law presumption of an objective standard no longer governs the mental state
requirement for criminal statutes in a situation where Parliament fails to specify a mens rea
requirement.15 years old B (D) was constantly pestering a 13 year old girl for oral sex. He was
charged to court for inciting a child under the age of 14 to commit gross indecency after the girl
refused his demands. An intention to commit the act with a child under the age of 14 as an
element of crime was not expressly provided for in the statute under which he was prosecuted.
Bs (D) honest belief that the girl was over 14 years of age was the defense he had during trial
but this was rejected by the judges. B (D) pled guilty for the allegation while preserving his right
to appeal the judgment. He later appealed the courts rejection of his honest belief defense to
the House of Lords.
Issue. does a common law presumption of an objective standard govern the mental state
requirement for criminal statutes in a situation where Parliament fails to specify a mens rea
requirement?

Held. (Nicholls, L.) No. A common law presumption of an objective standard no longer governs
the mental state requirement for criminal statutes in a situation where Parliament fails to specify
a mens rea requirement. In this case, the requisite mental state in the statute at issue has not
being defined by Parliament. The current common-law standard being used today is determining
whether the defendant holds an honest belief of the pertinent facts in his defense. The
appropriate presumption to apply in this case is the honest belief standard, although a
common-law presumption on mens rea can also be applied. The ruling was reversed.
Concurrence. (Steyn, L.) Defendants should henceforth be tried based on their honest belief of
the facts because the old rule is no longer applicable.
Discussion. It is important to note that the ruling by the House of Lords in B (A Minor) has not in
any way watered down the traditional rule in the United States. This case therefore reflects a
recent trend not in the U.S. law but in English law.
***
People v. Navarro
Brief Fact Summary. The Defendant was convicted of petty theft for taking lumber he believed
to belong to him. The Defendant appealed the conviction on the ground that the jury was
improperly instructed.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. If a person has a good faith belief that he has a right to certain
property, he is not guilty of larceny, even if the belief is unreasonable.
Facts. The Defendant was charged with stealing four wooden beams from a construction site. At
trial, the Defendant requested jury instructions stating that if the Defendant believed the beams
to be abandoned or that he had permission to take them, he must be acquitted, even if such
belief was unreasonable. The trial court rejected the instructions and gave its own instructions
stating that the good faith belief must be reasonable.
Issue. Is a good faith, but unreasonable, belief that one has a right to property a defense to
larceny?
Held. Yes. In order to be convicted of larceny, the Defendant must take anothers property with
the intent to permanently deprive him of the property. Where one sincerely believes that he has
a right to property, he cannot possibly intend to steal the property.
Therefore, so long as the belief is in good faith, the reasonableness of the belief does not matter
since one cannot negligently steal property. Even though the Defendants belief of entitlement to
the lumber may have been unreasonable, he cannot be guilty of larceny.
Discussion. Good faith mistake of fact-regardless of whether reasonable or unreasonable-is a
defense to specific intent crimes.
***
People v. Marrero
Brief Fact Summary. Defendant Marrero was arrested for unlicensed possession of a loaded
pistol in violation of a provision of a statute that made such possession a crime but which also
exempted peace officers. Defendant raised a mistake of law defense but was convicted
nonetheless. Defendant contended that he had reasonably believed that the statutory exemption
applied to him given the fact that he was a Federal Corrections Officer.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Mistake of law regarding a statutory definition is not a valid defense
unless the mistaken belief is based on an official statement of the law contained in a statute or
issued by a public servant.
Facts. Defendant, a Federal Corrections Officer, was arrested for unlicensed possession of a
loaded pistol in violation of a statute that made such possession a crime but which also
exempted peace officers. Peace officers were defined in the Statute in question as correction
officers of any state correctional facility or of any penal correctional institution. Defendant
advanced a mistake of law defense. Specifically, he argued that he had reasonably believed
himself to have been included in the exemption for peace officers. Defendant was convicted and
timely appealed.
Issue. Does a defendants subjective mistake of fact with regard to his/her understanding of a
statutory prohibition excuse the criminal conduct?