Republic of the Philippines

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

Third Judicial Region
Malolos, Bulacan
Branch 83
EDNA ELIZABETH ROXAS, ET. AL.,
Plaintiffs,
- VERSUS -

CIVIL CASE NO. 319-M-

FELICISIMA GALINDO, ET. AL.

Defendants.
x-------------------------------------------------x

DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
Defendants, through counsel, and to this Honorable Court
respectfully allege:
PREFATORY STATEMENT
The present Demurrer to Evidence is sanctioned by Rule 33 of
the Rules of Court that the defendant may move for dismissal on the
on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiffs has shown
no right to relief they prayed for in their complaint.

GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY THE

INSTANT DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
I. The documents marked Exhibits C & sub-markings (copy of
Decision of the Court of First Instance - Bulacan in Civil Case No.
1067 rendered on 12 August 1965) and Exhibits D & sub-markings
(copy of Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 37697-R
rendered on 5 February 1973) both attached to Plaintiffs (Heirs of
Marciano Roxas and their successors-in-interest) Formal Offer of
Evidence are not competent evidence that Plaintiffs are clothed with
dominical right of ownership over Lot 1048 of the Sta. Maria de Pandi
Estate; and
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II. The Decision of the Court of First Instance - Bulacan in Civil

Case No. 1067 rendered on 12 August 1965 and the Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 37697-R rendered on 5 February
1973 are bar to the prosecution of this subsequent action docketed as
Civil Case No. 319-M-2006.

DISCUSSION
I
THE DOCUMENTS MARKED EXHIBITS C & SUB-MARKINGS
(COPY OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE BULACAN IN CIVIL CASE NO. 1067 RENDERED ON 12
AUGUST 1965) AND EXHIBITS D & SUB-MARKINGS
(COPY OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN CAG.R. NO. 37697-R RENDERED ON 5 FEBRUARY 1973)
BOTH ATTACHED TO PLAINTIFFS FORMAL OFFER OF
EVIDENCE ARE NOT COMPETENT EVIDENCE THAT
PLAINTIFFS ARE CLOTHED WITH DOMINICAL RIGHT OF
OWNERSHIP OVER LOT 1048 OF THE STA. MARIA DE PANDI
ESTATE
1. On 5 February 1973, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
37697-R affirmed the decision rendered on 12 August 1965 by the
Court of First Instance - Bulacan in Civil Case No. 1067. The
dispositive portion of the aforesaid decision of the Court of Appeals
states as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiffs, ordering the defendants to execute in favor of the heirs of
Marciano A. Roxas a deed of absolute sale transferring to the latter
Lot 1018 of the Sta. Maria de Pandi Estate.

2. The Defendants (Heirs of Gregorio Galindo and their

successors-in-interest) pursued no further appeal. Consequently,
the abovementioned decision of the Court of Appeals became final
and executory. Astonishingly, the Plaintiffs (Heirs of Marciano
Roxas and their successors-in-interest) abandoned their cause and
without any plausible reason declined to take the appropriate legal
action to enforce above decision of the Court of Appeals. In fact,
Plaintiffs neither filed and registered with the Register of Deeds a
certified copy of the final judgment of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. No. 37697-R.

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3. Quite significantly, the Plaintiffs (Heirs of Marciano Roxas

and their successors-in-interest) declined as well to perform or cause
to be performed the mandatory acts prescribed under Section 80 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Amending and Codifying the Laws
Relative to Registration of Property and for Other Purposes) for
purposes of asserting their right derived from the abovementioned
favorable decision of the Court of Appeals. Reproduced below is the
pertinent section of PD No. 1529, to wit:
SECTION 80.

Execution of deed by virtue of judgment.

Every court rendering judgment in favor of the plaintiff affecting
registered land shall, upon petition of said plaintiff, order and
parties before it to execute for registration any deed or instrument
necessary to give effect to the judgment, and shall require the
registered owner to deliver his duplicate certificate to the plaintiff or
to the Register of Deeds to be cancelled or to have a memorandum
annotated upon it. In case the person required to execute any deed
or other instrument necessary to give effect to the judgment is
absent from the Philippines, or is a minor, or insane, or for any
reason not amenable to the process of the court rendering the
judgment, said court may appoint a suitable person as trustee to
execute such instrument which, when executed, shall be entitled to
registration.

4. In the light of the unreasonable and unexplained nonactions of the

Plaintiffs (Heirs of Marciano Roxas and their
successors-in-interest) stated in the immediately preceding
paragraphs 2 and 3 above, whatever rights and claims they
(Plaintiffs) have on Lot 1048 of the Sta. Maria de Pandi Estate
derived from and based on the decision of the Court of First
Instance - Bulacan in Civil Case No. 1067 rendered on 12 August
1965 and subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals on 5
February 1973 in CA-G.R. No. 37697-R are irretrievably lost
pursuant to Article 1144 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten
years from the time the right of action accrues:
xxxx
3. Upon judgment
5. It is now incontrovertible that whatever value that

former
judgment of the Court of First Instance Bulacan [subsequently
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affirmed by the Court of Appeals on 5 February 1973] may have been

and whatever relief the Plaintiffs (Heirs of Marciano Roxas and their
successors-in-interest)
herein are entitled to by virtue thereof is
forever gone when they abandoned or declined to assert it within the
period prescribed by law and prevailing jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court in Alejandro B. Ty vs. Queen's Row
Subdivision, Inc. (G.R. No. G.R. No. 173158, 4 December 2009) held
that:
The Court of Appeals based its finding of laches on the fact that
petitioners Ty and IRC failed to move for the execution of the
favorable ex parte judgments, which they obtained on 8 December
1980 and 20 December 1985, respectively. If we read Section 6,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court together with Article 1144 of the Civil
Code, we would see that the winning party in litigation has a period
of five years from the date of entry of judgment to execute said
judgment by motion, and another five years to execute it by action.
Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion for
the execution of a final judgment or order may be filed within five
years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and
before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be
enforced by action:
Section 6. Execution by motion or by independent action.
A final and executory judgment or order may be executed
on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry.
After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the
statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by
action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by
motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and
thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of
limitations.
The statute of limitations referred to in the above section is found in
Article 1144 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years
from the time the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
While indeed, the above provisions on extinctive prescription cannot
be the basis for depriving a registered owner of its title to a property,
they nevertheless prohibit petitioners from enforcing the ex parte
judgment in their favor, which can likewise be the basis of a
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pronouncement of laches. In Villegas v. Court of Appeals, we held

that:
But even if Fortune had validly acquired the subject property, it
would still be barred from asserting title because of laches. The
failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time to do that
which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done
earlier constitutes laches. It is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it has either abandoned it or declined to
assert it. While it is by express provision of law that no title to
registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession, it is likewise an
enshrined rule that even a registered owner may be barred from
recovering possession of property by virtue of laches.

6. It is worth stressing that based on the Decision of the Court

of Appeals dated 5 February 1973 in CA-G.R. No. 37697 (pp.6 7),
the type of relationship that governed the Defendants (Heirs of
Gregorio Galindo and their successors-in-interest) and the Plaintiffs
(Heirs of Marciano Roxas and their successors-in-interest)
is
constructive or implied trust.
Additionally, the period of
prescription governing implied trust was there definitely and squarely
settled as 10 years. The point of reference is, or the ten-year
prescriptive period commences to run from, the date of the issuance
of the certificate of title over the real property in 1948, to wit:
Having transferred all their rights and participation over lot
1048 to Marciano, and not having paid anything to the Bureau
of Lands, they became the trustee of Marciano Roxas by
reason of the issuance of the title in their favor, and they hold
the title in trust for Marciano Roxas and his successors.
xxxx
And even under the assumption that this was implied trust,
the action certainly has not prescribed, for the title was issued
only in 1948 and the complaint was filed in 1955. An action to
enforce an implied trust prescribes in 10 years [Gerona vs.
de Guzman, No. L-19060, May 29, 1964](underscoring and
boldfacing supplied)

7. The legal conclusion arrived at by the Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. No. 37697 on 5 February 1973 that the relationship
between the Defendants (Heirs of Gregorio Galindo and their
successors-in-interest) and the Plaintiffs (Heirs of Marciano Roxas
and their successors-in-interest) is premised on constructive trust
or implied trust, constitutes the law of the case and even if
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erroneous, it may no longer be disturbed or modified since it has

become final almost half a century ago. This is the indisputable legal
truth.
The Supreme Court in Development Bank of the Philippines vs.
Guaria Agricultural and Realty Development Corporation, G.R. No.
160758, 15 January 2014, held that
Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered
on a former appeal, and means, more specifically, that whatever is
once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision
between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law
of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as
the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the
facts of the case before the court.
xxxx
The doctrine of law of the case simply means, therefore, that when
an appellate court has once declared the law in a case, its
declaration continues to be the law of that case even on a
subsequent appeal, notwithstanding that the rule thus laid down
may have been reversed in other cases. For practical
considerations, indeed, once the appellate court has issued a
pronouncement on a point that was presented to it with full
opportunity to be heard having been accorded to the parties, the
pronouncement should be regarded as the law of the case and
should not be reopened on remand of the case to determine other
issues of the case, like damages. But the law of the case, as the
name implies, concerns only legal questions or issues thereby
adjudicated in the former appeal.

8. Corollary to the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of

Appeals dated 5 February 1973 in CA-G.R. No. 37697 that what
governs the relationship between the Defendants (Heirs of Gregorio
Galindo and their successors-in-interest) and the Plaintiffs (Heirs of
Marciano Roxas and their successors-in-interest) is constructive
trust or implied trust is now binding, conclusive, and immutable
between the parties herein.
The Supreme Court in One Shipping Corp. vs. Imelda C. Pe
afiel (G.R. No. 192406, 21 January 2015) held that:
A definitive final judgment, however erroneous, is no longer
subject to change or revision.

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A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and

unalterable. This quality of immutability precludes the modification
of a final judgment, even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact and law. And this postulate holds true
whether the modification is made by the court that rendered it or by
the highest court in the land. The orderly administration of justice
requires that, at the risk of occasional errors, the
judgments/resolutions of a court must reach a point of finality set by
the law. The noble purpose is to write finis to dispute once and for
all. This is a fundamental principle in our justice system, without
which there would be no end to litigations.

9. In Iglesia Filipina Independiente vs. Heirs of Bernardino

Taeza (G.R. No. 179597, 3 February 2014), the Supreme Court
elucidated the concept of implied or constructive trust and the
prescriptive period within which to bring an action for reconveyance of
real property arising from aforesaid relationship, to wit:
In Vda. de Esconde v. Court of Appeals, the Court affirmed
the trial court's ruling that the applicable provision of law in such
cases is Article 1456 of the Civil Code which states that "[i]f
property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining
it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the
benefit of the person from whom the property comes." Thus, in
Aznar Brothers Realty Company v. Aying, citing Vda. de Esconde,
the Court clarified the concept of trust involved in said provision, to
wit:
Construing this provision of the Civil Code, in Philippine National
Bank v. Court of Appeals, the Court stated:
A deeper analysis of Article 1456 reveals that it is not a trust in the
technical sense for in a typical trust, confidence is reposed in one
person who is named a trustee for the benefit of another who is
called the cestui que trust, respecting property which is held by the
trustee for the benefit of the cestui que trust. A constructive trust,
unlike an express trust, does not emanate from, or generate a
fiduciary relation. While in an express trust, a beneficiary and a
trustee are linked by confidential or fiduciary relations, in a
constructive trust, there is neither a promise nor any fiduciary
relation to speak of and the so-called trustee neither accepts any
trust nor intends holding the property for the beneficiary.
The concept of constructive trusts was further elucidated in the
same case, as follows:

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. . . implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are

deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent or
which are superinduced on the transaction by operation of law as
matters of equity, independently of the particular intention of the
parties. In turn, implied trusts are either resulting or constructive
trusts. These two are differentiated from each other as follows:
Resulting trusts are based on the equitable doctrine that valuable
consideration and not legal title determines the equitable title or
interest and are presumed always to have been contemplated by
the parties. They arise from the nature of circumstances of the
consideration involved in a transaction whereby one person
thereby becomes invested with legal title but is obligated in equity
to hold his legal title for the benefit of another. On the other hand,
constructive trusts are created by the construction of equity in order
to satisfy the demands of justice and prevent unjust enrichment.
They arise contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress
or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property
which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold.
A constructive trust having been constituted by law between
respondents as trustees and petitioner as beneficiary of the subject
property, may respondents acquire ownership over the said
property? The Court held in the same case of Aznar, that unlike in
express trusts and resulting implied trusts where a trustee cannot
acquire by prescription any property entrusted to him unless he
repudiates the trust, in constructive implied trusts, the trustee may
acquire the property through prescription even if he does not
repudiate the relationship. It is then incumbent upon the beneficiary
to bring an action for reconveyance before prescription bars the
same.
In Aznar, the Court explained the basis for the prescriptive period,
to wit:
x x x under the present Civil Code, we find that just as an implied or
constructive trust is an offspring of the law (Art. 1456, Civil Code),
so is the corresponding obligation to reconvey the property and the
title thereto in favor of the true owner. In this context, and vis--vis
prescription, Article 1144 of the Civil Code is applicable.
Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years
from the time the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
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xxx

xxx

xxx

An action for reconveyance based on an implied or

constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten years and not
otherwise. A long line of decisions of this Court, and of very
recent vintage at that, illustrates this rule. Undoubtedly, it is
now well-settled that an action for reconveyance based on an
implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the
issuance of the Torrens title over the property.
It has also been ruled that the ten-year prescriptive period
begins to run from the date of registration of the deed or the
date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property,
x x x. (boldfacing supplied)

10. It bears stressing that from the period covering 5 February

1973 (date of Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 37697R) up to the time Plaintiffs (Heirs of Marciano Roxas and their
successors-in-interest) interests over Lot 1048 of the Sta. Maria de
Pandi Estate was revived on 7 April 1999 by instituting another civil
case against the Defendants (Heirs of Gregorio Galindo and their
successors-in-interest)
with the Malolos Regional Trial Court
docketed as Civil Case No. 395-M-99, twenty-five (25) long years of
unexplained passivity and inaction by the Plaintiffs had already
elapsed. Clearly, this is way beyond the 10-year period prescribed
under Article 1144 of the Civil Code and prevailing jurisprudential
guidelines to file an action upon a judgment.
11. Plaintiffs Reginald Santos Roxas, Erasto Santos Roxas,
and Violeta R. De Perio Cario executed a Complaint Affidavit 1
subscribed and sworn to before the Assistant City Prosecutor of
Quezon City on 26 July 2013. Paragraph 7 of the said ComplaintAffidavit states as follows:
That by virtue of the said Decision of the then CFI- Bulacan dated
August 12, 19652 (Annex B), the heirs of Gregorio Galindo
entrusted to my late father, Eleazar N. Roxas, Sr. the owners copy
of the said TCT No. T-2145 for the purpose of transferring the same
in the name of the heirs of Marciano A. Roxas; and said owners
copy is still in our possession.

1
2

Copy attached herewith as Annex A

Civil Case No. 1067

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Notwithstanding the foregoing statement under oath that Plaintiffs

are keeping in their possession since 1965 the owners copy of the
transfer certificate of title for Lot 1048 of the Sta. Maria de Pandi
Estate, still an unreasonable and unexplained length of time was
consumed by Plaintiffs in asserting their rights within the period
prescribed under Article 1144 of the Civil Code and prevailing
jurisprudential guidelines.
This failure or neglect warrants a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it
or declined to assert it (Tijam, et al. vs. Sibonghanoy, et al., G.R. No.
L-21450, 25 April 1968 [cited in Sotto vs. Teves (1978]).
12. It must be underscored that the factual antecedents of the
17 January 2005 Decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 147969
clearly provide that Juanita Galindo Rivera has actual possession or
manifested acts of dominion over Lot 1048 of the Sta. Maria de Pandi
Estate. Pertinent portion of the said factual antecedents states as
follows, to wit:
xxxx they also waived their respective claims over the lot in favor of
Juanita Galindo Rivera. The latter, as one of the legal heirs of
Gregorio, undertook to preserve the property left by the said
deceased and, thereafter, executed an affidavit of loss of the
owners copy of TCT No. T-21456 and, on the basis thereof, secured
TCT No. 335593(M) over the property in her name on September 8,
1998.

13. In the light of the foregoing discussions, more particularly

on the matter of Statute of Limitations, which on all four squares finds
application in the case at bar, and given the fact that Defendants and
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, actual, exclusive,
notorious, uninterrupted and continuous possession over Lot 1048 of
the Sta. Maria de Pandi Estate, there is nary a doubt that Defendants
(Heirs of Gregorio Galindo and their successors-in-interest)
ownership of Lot 1048 of the Sta. Maria de Pandi Estate deserved not
any further disturbance by the Complainants herein.

II
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE BULACAN IN CIVIL CASE NO. 1067 RENDERED ON 12
AUGUST 1965 AND THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS IN CA-G.R. NO. 37697-R RENDERED ON 5
FEBRUARY 1973 ARE BAR TO THE PROSECUTION OF THIS
SUBSEQUENT ACTION DOCKETED AS
CIVIL CASE NO. 319-M-2006.

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14.
Section 47 (b) Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
institutionalizes the doctrine of res judicata in the concept of bar by
prior judgment, viz:
Section 47. Effect of judgments and final orders.The effect of a
judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as
follows:
xxxx
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the
matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have
been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and
their successors in interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the
same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity;

15. The Supreme Court in Emiliano S. Samson vs. Spouses

Jose and Guillermina Gabor (G.R. No. 182970, 23 July 2014) held
that in order for res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent
action the following requisites must concur:
(a) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;
(b) the decision must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(c) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the
merits; and
(d) there must be as between the first and second action,
identity of parties, subject matter, causes of action.
16. Res judicata must perforce operate in the instant case as
will be rationalized by the following discussion below on the elements
of res judicata:
16.1] The judgment sought to bar the new action
must be final.
There cannot be any dispute that the Decision rendered
on 5 February 1973 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. 37697-R, which affirmed the 12 August 1965 decision
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favorable to the Plaintiffs (Heirs of Marciano Roxas and

their successors-in-interest) rendered by the Court of
First Instance - Bulacan in Civil Case No. 1067, had
become final and executory.
The Heirs of Gregorio
Galindo (Defendants) no longer appealed the said
decision, while the Plaintiffs (Heirs of Marciano Roxas and
their successors-in-interest) never move for the execution
of the judgment.
16.2] The decision must have been rendered by a
court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties.
There is also no question that the Court of First Instance
of Bulacan had jurisdiction over the subject matter and
parties in Civil Case No. 1067. The contending parties
are the Plaintiffs (Heirs of Marciano Roxas and their
successors-in-interest) and the Defendants (Heirs of
Gregorio Galindo and their successors-in-interest).
16.3] The disposition of the case must be a judgment
on the merits.
Without any cloud of doubt, the 12 August 1965 Decision
rendered by the Court of First Instance - Bulacan in Civil
Case No. 1067 and subsequently affirmed by the Court of
Appeals on 5 February 1973 in CA-G.R. No. 37697-R
was judgment on the merits.
16.4] There must be as between the first and second
action, identity of parties, subject matter, causes of
action.
There is Identity of Parties
Civil Case No. 1067 and Civil Case No. 319-M-2006 were
both instituted by the Plaintiffs (Heirs of Marciano Roxas
and their successors-in-interest) against the Defendants
(Heirs of Gregorio Galindo and their successors-ininterest).
The inclusion of additional defendants in Civil Case No.
319-M-2006 will not remove the instant case from the
operation of res judicata as held by the Supreme Court in
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Philippine Farming Corporation vs. Alejandro Llanos, et

al. (G.R. No. L-21014, 14 August 1965), to wit:
As to the identities required, the parties here were defendants in
Civil Case No. 1209. The newly added defendants mortgagee
and purchasers of right of redemption are only successors-ininterest and purchasers by title subsequent to the filing of the first
action. Such parties are considered the same as their
predecessors-in-interest for purposes of res judicata. Since their
predecessors-in-interest were parties to the first case, the principle
of res judicata applies even with their inclusion, since they are after
all bound by the first judgment as the parties thereto.

In the same vein, the following decisions of the Supreme

Court are instructive:
a] Aladin Cruz vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 135101, 31
May 2000)
It must be stressed that absolute identity of parties is not a
condition sine qua non for res judicata to apply. A shared identity of
interest is sufficient to invoke the coverage of this principle.

b] Zenaida F. Dapar alias Zenaida D. Biascan vs. Gloria

Lozano Biascan and Mario Biascan (G.R. No. 141880 ,
27 September 2004)
However, absolute identity of parties is not required for the
principle of res judicata to apply. Mere substantial identity of
parties, or a community of interests between a party in the first
case and a party in the subsequent case, even if the latter was not
impleaded in the first case, is sufficient.

c] Heirs of Marcelo Sotto vs. Matilde S. Palicte (G.R. No.

159691, 13 June 2013)
There is substantial identity of parties considering that the present
case and the previous cases involve the heirs of Filemon. There is
identity of parties not only when the parties in the case are the
same, but also between those in privity with them, such as between
their successors-in-interest. Absolute identity of parties is not
required, and where a shared identity of interest is shown by the
identity of relief sought by one person in a prior case and the
second person in a subsequent case, such was deemed sufficient.
xxxx
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In all the five cases (Civil Case No. CEB-24293 included), an

identity of parties existed because the parties were the same, or
there was privity among them, or some of the parties were
successors-in-interest litigating for the same thing and under the
same title and in the same capacity. An absolute identity of the
parties was not necessary, because a shared identity of interest
sufficed for res judicata to apply. Moreover, mere substantial
identity of parties, or even community of interests between parties
in the prior and subsequent cases, even if the latter were not
impleaded in the first case, would be sufficient. As such, the fact
that a previous case was filed in the name of the Estate of Sotto
only was of no consequence.

There is Identity of Subject Matter

The subject matter of Civil Case No. 1067 and Civil Case
No. 319-M-2006 both involved Lot 1018 of the Sta. Maria
de Pandi Estate.
There is Identity of Causes of Action
There is identity of causes of action since the issues
raised in Civil Case No. 1067 and Civil Case No. 319-M2006 essentially involve the claim of ownership over Lot
1048 of the Sta. Maria de Pandi Estate.
The following jurisprudential guidelines laid down by the
Supreme Court are instructive:
a] Gregorio Pealosa vs. Demetrio Tuason, et al. (G.R.
No. L-6809, 22 March 1912)
The first contention is in direct conflict with the doctrine laid down
in our decision in the case of Tanguinlay vs. Quiros (G.R. No. L4085, March 12, 1098), wherein we pointed out that "courts of the
present day are not concerned so much with the form of actions as
with their substance," and held that despite the difference in the
form of the action, nevertheless the doctrine of res judicata would
be applied where it appeared that the parties in the two suits were
in truth "litigating for the same thing."
It is a well-settled rule, and one that is supported by a multitude of
authorities, that a party cannot, by varying the form of action, or
adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the
operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action
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shall not be twice litigated between the same parties or their

privies. (Black on Judgments, par. 729, and many cases cited.)

b] Albert Nabus vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 91670, 7

February 1991)
In determining whether causes of action are identical so as to
warrant application of the rule of res judicata, the test most
commonly stated is to ascertain whether the same evidence which
is necessary to sustain the second action would have been
sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first, even if the forms or
nature of the two actions be different. If the same facts or evidence
would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same within
the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent
action; otherwise it is not. It has been said that this method is the
best and most accurate test as to whether a former judgment is a
bar in subsequent proceedings between the same parties, and it
has even been designated as infallible.

c] Josefina M. Cruz and Ernestina M. Concepcion vs.

Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 164797, 13 February 2006)
We likewise rule that there is identity of causes of action.
Hornbook is the rule that identity of causes of action does not mean
absolute identity. Otherwise, a party could easily escape the
operation of res judicata by changing the form of the action or the
relief sought. The test to determine whether the causes of action
are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain
both actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to
the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence
would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same, and a
judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action.

d] Heirs of Marcelo Sotto vs. Matilde S. Palicte (G.R. No.

159691, 13 June 2013)
There is identity of causes of action since the issues raised in all
the cases essentially involve the claim of ownership over the
subject properties. Even if the forms or natures of the actions are
different, there is still identity of causes of action when the same
facts or evidence support and establish the causes of action in the
case at bar and in the previous cases.

17. Shorn of the thin disguise that there is a cloud on their title,
the real motive behind the complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 319M-2006 was exposed - that Plaintiffs (Heirs of Marciano Roxas and
their successors-in-interest)
wanted to accomplish through an
entirely new action what was already adjudicated in Civil Case No.
1067 by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan on 12 August 1965.
Subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
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37697-R on 5 February 1973 or 43 years earlier but which they

inexplicably failed to enforce.
It is worth emphasizing that Plaintiffs (Heirs of Marciano Roxas
and their successors-in-interest)
did not allege in their complaint
that they tried to execute the final and executory judgment of the
Court of Appeals either by motion or by action to revive judgment
within the prescriptive period.

PRAYER
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the undersigned
counsel prays that the Plaintiffs complaint be dismissed with costs
against the Plaintiffs.
Such other reliefs as may be deemed just or equitable under the

premises are prayed for.

Bocaue, Bulacan for the City of Malolos, Bulacan, ___
September 2016.

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