Ahmed-Adhiem B.

Kamlian
LLB II-A, AgSoc
WMSU College of Law
Heirs of Pedro Pinote vs. Dulay
198 SCRA 12 (1990)
FACTS:
This

special civil action of certiorari and mandamus was filed by the heirs of Pedro Pinote to
compel respondent Judge Ceferino E. Dulay of the Court of First Instance of Cebu at Lapu-Lapu City
give due course to their appeal from his order dated June 7, 1979, granting the private respondent's
petition for reconstitution of the title of Lot 2381 of the Opon Cadastre.
On September 30, 1978, Francisco P. Otto, representing his mother Petra Pinote, filed in the
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Cebu, Branch XVI, at Lapu-Lapu City, a verified
petition for reconstitution of the original certificate of title to Lot 2381 of the Opon Cadastre, which, as
shown by a certified copy of the Municipal Index of Decrees (Annex A of the petition), was supposedly
adjudicated to Saturnino, Juana, Irineo,Pedro, and Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote, under Decree No.
230607 dated May 7, 1934 in Cadastral Case No. 20, LRC Rec. No. 1004. The petition alleged that the
original, as well as owner's duplicate certificate of title, were burned in the Opon municipal building
during World War II, and the same could not be located despite diligent search; that there were no
annotations or liens and encumbrances on the title affecting the same; that no deed or instrument affecting
the property had been presented for registration.
By an order dated November 6, 1978, the court set the case for hearing on February 22, 1979 at
8:30 A.M. A copy of the notice of hearing was ordered to be published in the Official Gazette, furnished
to all the adjoining owners, and posted by the Sheriff at the main entrances of the Provincial Capitol
Building, the City Hall, and the Public Market of Lapu-Lapu City, at least 30 days prior to the date of
hearing. The court also ordered copies of the notice and order to be sent to the Registers of Deeds of
Lapu-Lapu City and Cebu, the Director of Lands, and the Commissioner of Land Registration, directing
them to show cause, if any, why the petition may not be granted.
the Court issued an order on June 7, 1979, directing the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City to
reconstitute the original certificate of title of Lot 2381 of the Opon Cadastre, upon payment of the
corresponding fees, in the names of SATURNINO PINOTE, married to Maria Igot, JUANA,
IRINEO, PETRA(not Pedro) and PETRONILO, all surnamed Pinote (p.11, Rollo). The court relied on the
supposed abstract of the decision of the cadastral court (Exh. E), the technical descriptions, plan and
report of the Land Registration Commission (Exhs. F and G) which are not found in the records before us.
On October 1, 1979, Atty. Porfirio Ellescas, as alleged counsel for the heirs of Pedro, Juana and
Saturnino Pinote, supposedly all deceased, filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's order, and
sought the re-opening of the proceedings and the rectification of the June 7, 1979 order, for, while Otto's
main petition for reconstitution based on the Municipal Index of Decrees, alleged that Lot 2381 was
decreed in the names of Irineo, Juana, Saturnino,Pedro, and Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote, the court's
order of June 7, 1979 ordered the reconstitution of the title in the names of Saturnino, Juana,

Irineo, Petra (instead of Pedro) and Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote. The heirs of Pedro Pinote claimed that
they "learned of the error" only on September 27, 1979 through their counsel, who made the inquiry and
obtained a copy of the court order.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the actual publication of the notice of the petition in the Official Gazette fortyseven (47) days after the hearing, instead of at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of hearing was
sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the court to hear and determine the petition for reconstitution.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that it did not. The purpose of the publication of the notice of the
petition for reconstitution in the Official Gazette is to apprise the whole world that such a petition has
been filed and that whoever is minded to oppose it for good cause may do so within thirty (30) days
before the date set by the court for hearing the petition. It is the publication of such notice that brings in
the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. In
Director of Lands vs. The Court of Appeals and Demetria Sta. Maria de Bernal, Greenfield Development
Corporation, Alabang Development Corporation and Ramon Bagatsing, 102 SCRA 370, the Supreme
Court ruled that in all cases where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a statute and
when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, it must be strictly complied with, or the
proceedings will be utterly void. Where there is a defect in the publication of the petition, such defect
deprives the court of jurisdiction (citing Po vs. Republic, 40 SCRA 37). And when the court a quo lacks
jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case, it lacks authority over the whole case.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The orders dated June 27, 1979, December
2, 1979 and May 10, 1980 in Cad. Case No. 20, LRC Rec. No. 1004, Lot No. 2381, Opon Cadastre, are
hereby annulled and set aside for having been issued without jurisdiction. The respondent court is ordered
to reopen the proceeding for reconstitution of the title of Lot 2381, with due notice to each of the
registered co-owners, the adjoining property owners, and others who are required by law to be notified.
They should be separately furnished by respondent Francisco P. Otto, at their respective residential
addresses, with copies of the petition and its annexes. The petitioners herein should be allowed to
intervene in the proceeding in order that their or their predecessors' interest, if any, may be heard.

G.R. No. 75042 November 29, 1988 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF LUCENA, represented by
Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez, and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH LIII, LUCENA CITY, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner. Gilbert D. Camaligan for private respondent
FACTS:
Background: CFI and IAC: ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP of Lucena, represented by Msgr. Jose
T. Sanchez, applicant vs. the Director of Lands and the Director, Bureau of Forest Development Granted
to Roman Catholic Bishop of Lucena - Evaluating the applicant's submitted proofs, the court a quo
concluded, on the basis of acquisitive prescription at the very least, that the former had adequately shown
title to the parcels of land being claimed.
LOCATION: Barrio Masin, Municipality of Candelaria, Quezon Province and Barrio Bucal
(Taguan), same municipality and province
LAND AREA: Lots 1, 2 and 3 of plan PSD-65686 and its technical descriptions, and the parcel of
land described in plan PSU-112592 and its technical description, together with whatever improvements
existing thereon, in the name of the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP of Lucena, Lot 4 - PSU-112592
PARTIES: 1. ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF Lucena, represented by Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez,
applicant-appellee 2. Republic of the Philippines Oppositors-appellants
ON WHAT GROUNDS: 3. the applicant claimed title to the various properties through either
purchase or donation dating as far back as 1928 4. Oppositor: that the applicant did not have an imperfect
title or title in fee simple to the parcel of land being applied for. The issue raised in this case involves the
question of whether the Roman Catholic Bishop of Lucena, as a corporation sole is qualified to apply for
confirmation of its title to the four (4) parcels of land subject of this case, that the Roman Catholic
Church, as a corporation, is disqualified from owning properties from the public domain based on Art.
XIV, Sec. 11 of the 1973 Constitution and that the registration was applied after the effectivity of the 1973
constitution.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a corporation sole should be treated as an ordinary private corporation, for
purpose of the application of Art. XIV, Sec. 11 of the 1973 Constitution.
2. W/N the lots are part of the public domain.
HELD:
In 1980, which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive and
undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction
whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or
other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes' private property. DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. IAC,
supra, p. 518).

No proof being admissable to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings

would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession
claimed is of the required character and length of time, and registration thereunder would not confer title,
but simply recognize a title already vested.
We can say the following: A corporation sole is a special form of corporation usually associated
with the clergy. A corporation sole consists of one person only, and his successors (who will always be
one at a time), Pertinent to this case is the provision of Sec. 113 Batas Pambansa Blg. 68 which reads as
follows:
Sec. 113. Acquisition and alienation of property. Any corporation sole may purchase
and hold real estate and personal property for its church, charitable, benevolent or educational purposes,
and may receive bequests or gifts for such purposes.