Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
11
Title
APPOINTMENT OF CONSERVATOR
14
15
Art. 1150. The time for prescription for all kinds of actions, when
there is no special provision which ordains otherwise, shall be
counted from the day they may be brought. (1969)
Art. 1151. The time for the prescription of actions which have for
their object the enforcement of obligations to pay principal with
interest or annuity runs from the last payment of the annuity or of
the interest. (1970a)
Art. 1152. The period for prescription of actions to demand the
fulfillment of obligation declared by a judgment commences from
the time the judgment became final. (1971)
Art. 1153. The period for prescription of actions to demand
accounting runs from the day the persons who should render the
same cease in their functions.
The period for the action arising from the result of the accounting
runs from the date when said result was recognized by agreement
of the interested parties. (1972)
Art. 1154. The period during which the obligee was prevented by a
fortuitous event from enforcing his right is not reckoned against
him. (n)
However, when the action arises from or out of any act, activity, or
conduct of any public officer involving the exercise of powers or
authority arising from Martial Law including the arrest, detention
and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one (1)
year. (As amended by PD No. 1755, Dec. 24, 1980.)
Art. 1147. The following actions must be filed within one year:
(1) For forcible entry and detainer;
(2) For defamation. (n)
Art. 1148. The limitations of action mentioned in Articles 1140 to
1142, and 1144 to 1147 are without prejudice to those specified in
other parts of this Code, in the Code of Commerce, and in special
laws. (n)
Art. 1149. All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code
or in other laws must be brought within five years from the time the
right of action accrues. (n)
The trial court did not distinguish between the private respondents
cause of action against the owner and the driver of the Lady Love
taxicab and his cause of action against petitioner. The former is
based on torts and quasi-delicts while the latter is based on
contract. Confusing these two sources of obligations as they arise
from the same act of the taxicab fatally hitting private respondents
mother, and in the face of overwhelming evidence of the reckless
imprudence of the driver of the Lady Love taxicab, the trial court
brushed aside its ignorance of the terms and conditions of the
insurance contract and forthwith found all three - the driver of the
taxicab, the owner of the taxicab, and the alleged insurer of the
taxicab - jointly and severally liable for actual, moral and exemplary
damages as well as attorneys fees and litigation expenses. This is
clearly a misapplication of the law by the trial court, and
respondent appellate court grievously erred in not having reversed
the trial court on this ground.
Facts:
Vicente Mendoza, Jr. as heir of his mother (Feliza Vineza de
Mendoza) who was killed in a vehicular accident, filed an action for
damages against the erring taxicab driver (Rodrigo Dumlao), the
owner (Armando Abellon) of the taxicab (Lady Love Taxi with Plate
No. 438-HA Pilipinas Taxi 1980) and the alleged insurer of the
vehicle which featured in the vehicular accident. The erring taxicab
was allegedly covered by a third-party liability insurance policy
issued by petitioner Travellers Insurance & Surety Corporation.
Petitioner was included in the complaint as the compulsory insurer
of the said taxicab under Certificate of Cover No. 1447785-3.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondent
and ordered Rodrigo Dumlao, Armando Abellon and petitioner to
pay private respondent death indemnity, moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorneys fees and other litigation expenses,
jointly and severally.
The decision was affirmed by the CA and the subsequent MR was
denied.
Hence this petition.
( 1 ) W O N t h e fi l i n g o f a m o t i o n f o r r e c o n s i
d e r a t i o n i n t e r r u p t s t h e 1 2 m o n t h s prescriptive
period to contest the denial of the insurance claim; and(2 ) W O N
t h e re j e c t i o n o f t h e c l a i m s h a l l b e d e e m e d fi n a l o n l y
o f i t c o n t a i n s w o rd s t o the effect that the denial is final;
HELD:
(1) No. In this case, Condition 27 of the Insurance Policy of the
parties reads:27.
Ac t i o n o r s u i t c l a u s e
- I f a c l a i m b e m a d e a n d r e j e c t e d a n d a n action or
suit be not commenced either in the Insurance Commission orin
any court of competent jurisdiction within twelve (12) months
fromreceipt of notice of such rejection, or in case of arbitration
taking placeas provided herein, within twelve (12) months after due
notice of theaward made by the arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire,
then the claims h a l l f o r a l l p u r p o s e s b e d e e m e d t o h a v e
b e e n a b a n d o n e d a n d s h a l l not thereafter be recoverable hereunder.As
the terms are very clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity
whatsoever, it mustbe taken and understood in its plain, ordinary
and popular sense. Tan, in his letter addressed to Sun Insurance
Office
dated
April
3,
1984,
admitted
thath e r e c e i v e d a c o p y o f t h e l e t t e r o f r e j e
ction on April 2, 1984. Thus, the 12m o n t h p re s c r i p t i v e p e r i o d s t a r t e d t o r u n f ro m t h e s a i d
d a t e o f A p r i l 2 , 1 9 8 4 , f o r s u c h i s t h e p l a i n meaning and
intention of Section 27 of the insurance policy. The condition
contained in an insurance policy that claims must be presented
withino n e ye a r a ft e r re j e c t i o n i s n o t m e re l y a p ro c e d u r a l
re q u i re m e n t b u t a n i m p o r t a n t m a t t e r essential to a prompt
settlement of claims against insurance companies as it demands
thatinsurance suits be brought by the insured while the evidence as
to the origin and cause of destruction have not yet disappeared.I t
i s a p p a re n t t h a t S e c t i o n 2 7 o f t h e i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y w a s
s t i p u l a t e d p u r s u a n t t o Section 63 of the Insurance Code, which
states
that:S e c . 6 3 . A c o n d i t i o n , s t i p u l a t i o n o r a g
r e e m e n t i n a n y p o l i c y o f insurance, limiting the
time for commencing an action there under to a
p e r i o d o f l e s s t h a n o n e y e a r f ro m t h e t i m e w h e n t h e
c a u s e o f a c t i o n accrues, is void. I t a l s o b e g s t o a s k , w he n
d o e s t h e c a u s e o f a c t i o n a c c r u e ? T h e i n s u re d s c a u s e
of a c t i o n o r h i s
right to
fi l e a c l a i m e i t h e r
in the
Insurance Commission or in
a court
o f competent jurisdiction commences from the time of the denial
of his claim by the Insurer ,e i t h e r ex p re s s l y o r i m p l i e d l y. B u t
t h e re j e c t i o n re f e rre d
to should be construed as
the
re j e c t i o n i n t h e fi r s t i n s t a n c e ( i . e . a t t h e fi r s t o c c a s i o n
o r f o r t h e fi r s t t i me ) , n o t re j e c t i o n c o n v e y e d i n a
resolution of a petition for reconsideration.
Thus,
to
allow
the
fi l i n g
of
a
motion for
re c o n s i d e r a t i o n
to suspend
the running of the
p re s c r i p t i v e p e r i o d o f t w e l ve months, a whole new body of
rules on the matter should be promulgated so as to avoid any
conflict that may be brought by it, such as:a . w h e t h e r t h e m e re
fi l i n g o f a p l e a f o r re c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f a d e n i a l i s
s u ffi c i e n t
o r must
it be
supported
by arguments/affidavits/material
evidence;b .
how
many
p e t i t i o n s f o r re c o n s i d e r a t i o n s h o u l d b e p e rm i t t e d ? (2) No.
The Eagle Star case cited by Tan to defend his theory that the
rejection of the claim shall be deemed final only of it contains
words
to
the
effect
that
the
denial
is
final
is
inapplicable in the
i n s t a n t c a s e . Fi n a l r e j e c t i o n o r d e n i a l c a n n o t b
e t a k e n t o m e a n t h e re j e c t i o n
of a petition
f o r re c o n s i d e r a t i o n . T h e I n s u r a n c e p o l i c y i n t h e
E a g l e S t a r case p ro v i d e s t h a t t h e i n s u re d s h o u l d fi l e h i s
c l a i m , fi r s t , w i t h t h e c a rr i e r a n d t h e n w i t h t h e insurer.
The final rejection being referred to in said case is the rejection by
the insurancecompany.
Art. 1236. The creditor is not bound to accept payment or
performance by a third person who has no interest in the
fulfillment of the obligation, unless there is a stipulation to
the contrary.
Whoever pays for another may demand from the debtor
what he has paid, except that if he paid without the
knowledge or against the will of the debtor, he can recover
only insofar as the payment has been beneficial to the
debtor. (1158a)
Art. 2207. If the plaintiff's property has been insured, and
he has received indemnity from the insurance company for
the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of
contract complained of, the insurance company shall be
subrogated to the rights of the insured against the
wrongdoer or the person who has violated the contract. If
the amount paid by the insurance company does not fully
cover the injury or loss, the aggrieved party shall be
Fireman v Jamila
April 7, 1976
FIREMAN'S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY and FIRESTONE TIRE AND RUBBER
COMPANY
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES
vs.
JAMILA & COMPANY, INC. and FIRST QUEZON CITY INSURANCE CO., INC
AQUINO, J.:
SUMMARY: Jamila supplies security guards to Firestone and assumes their
responsibility. When some properties of Firestone were lost due to connivance of
some security guards, Firemans Fund as insurer paid Firestone the value of such
and is now subrogated to Firestones right to reimbursement. They filed complaint to
recover money when Jamila failed to pay. CFI dismissed complaint as to Jamila citing
that there is no cause of action as the latter did not consent to subrogation and there
are no allegations in the complaint that Firestone investigated the loss. Subsequent
MRs, F&F argue that their cause of action is on the basis of legal subrogation. SC:
There was cause of action on the part of Firemans Fund pursuant to Art. 2207.
Payment by the assurer to the assured operates as an equitable assignment to the
assurer of all the remedies which the assured may have against the third party whose
negligence or wrongful act caused the loss.
DOCTRINE: Loss or injury for risk must be covered by the policy Under Article
2207, the cause of the loss or injury must be a risk covered by the policy to entitle the
insurer to the subrogation. Thus, where the insurer pays the insured for a loss which
is not a risk covered by the policy, thereby effecting voluntary payment, the insurer
has no right of subrogation against the third party liable for the loss. Nevertheless, the
insurer may recover from the third party responsible for the damage to the insured
property under Article 1236 of the Civil Code.
FACTS:
First Quezon City Insurance Co., Inc. executed a bond in the sum of P20k to
guarantee Jamila's obligations under that contract
May 18, 1963: Properties of Firestone valued at P11,925 were lost allegedly due
to the acts of its employees who connived with Jamila's security guard
Jamila and its surety, First Quezon City Insurance Co., Inc., failed to pay the
amount of the loss in spite of repeated demands.
Fireman's Fund and Firestone Tire and Rubber Co instituted this complaint
against Jamila for the recovery of the sum of P11,925.00 plus interest, damages
and attorney's fees
(1) complaint did not allege that Firestone, pursuant to the contractual
stipulation quoted in the complaint, had investigated the loss and that
Jamila was represented in the investigation and
CFI on F&Fs MR: Set aside its order of dismissal. No res judicata as to First
Quezon City Insurance Co., Inc. because civil case was dismissed without
prejudice
o
However, due to inadvertence, the lower court did not state in its order
of September 3, 1966 why it set aside its prior order dismissing the
complaint with respect to Jamila.
First Quezon City Insurance Co., Inc. filed its answer to the complaint.
Jamila, upon noticing that the order had obliterated its victory without any reason
therefor, filed MR reconsideration
o
Jamila moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action
o
CFI: Dismissed the complaint as to Jamila on the second ground that there was
no allegation that it had consented to the subrogation and, therefore,
Fireman's Fund had no cause of action against it.
o
Fireman's Fund, as insurer, paid to Firestone the amount of the loss and is now
subrogated to Firestone's right to get reimbursement from Jamila
CFI on Jamilas MR: Granted Jamila's MR. However, it completely ignored the
1st ground but reverted to the second ground (no consent to subrogation thus no
cause of action).
o
Invoked the first ground in its original motion to dismiss which had never
been passed upon by the lower court that complaint did not allege
that Firestone, pursuant to the contractual stipulation quoted in the
complaint, had investigated the loss and that Jamila was represented
in the investigation
Firestone and Fireman's Fund filed MR on the ground that Fireman's Fund
Insurance Company was suing on the basis of legal subrogation whereas CFI
erroneously predicated its dismissal order on the theory that there was no
conventional subrogation because the debtor's consent was lacking.
o
Cited NCC 2207 which provides that "if the plaintiff's property has been
insured, and he has received indemnity from the insurance company for
the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract
complained of, the insurance company shall be subrogated to the
rights of the insured against the wrongdoer or the person who has
violated the contract".
F&F filed 2nd MR and called CFI's attention to the fact that the issue of
subrogation was of no moment because Firestone, the subrogor (??), is a partyplaintiff and could sue directly Jamila in its own right.
Appeal to SC
F&F: CFIs dismissal of their complaint is contrary to Article 2207 which provides
for legal subrogation.
JAMILA: Legal subrogation under Art. 2207 requires the debtor's consent
o
Legal subrogation takes place in the cases mentioned in NCC 1302 and
the instant case is not among the 3 cases enumerated in that article
There could be no subrogation in this case because according to F&F,
the contract between Jamila and Firestone was entered into on June
1, 1965 but the loss complained of occurred on May 18, 1963.
HELD: CFI Decision's order of dismissal is legally untenable so SET ASIDE with
costs against Jamila & Co., Inc.
RATIO:
[F&Fs counsel gratuitously alleged in their brief that Firestone and Jamila entered
into a "contract of guard services" on June 1, 65. That allegationwas uncalled for
because it is not found in the complaint and so created confusion which did not exist.
No copy of the contract was annexed to the complaint. That confusing statement was
an obvious error since it was expressly alleged in the complaint that the loss occurred
on May 18, 63. The fact that such an error was committed is another instance
substantiating the observation that F&F's counsel had not exercised due care in the
presentation of his case.]
1) Firestone is really a nominal party in this case as it had already been indemnified
for the loss which it had sustained. It joined as a party-plaintiff in order to help
Fireman's Fund to recover the amount of the loss from Jamila and First Quezon City
Insurance Co., Inc. Firestone had tacitly assigned to Fireman's Fund its cause of
action against Jamila for breach of contract. Sufficient ultimate facts are alleged in the
complaint to sustain that cause of action.
CFI erred in applying to this case the rules on novation. F&F in alleging in their
complaint that Fireman's Fund "became a party in interest in this case by virtue
of a subrogation right given in its favor by" Firestone, were not relying on the
novation by change of creditors as contemplated in NCC 1291 and 1300 to
1303 but rather on NCC 2207.
ISSUES:
1) Whether the complaint of Firestone as subrogor (???) states a cause of action
against Jamila? (Not really)
2) Whether the complaint of Fireman's Fund as subrogee states a cause of action
against Jamila? (YES)
3) Whether Jamila should reimburse Firemans Fund? (Not decided here)
The right of subrogation is of the highest EQUITY. The LOSS IN THE FIRST
INSTANCE is that of the INSURED but AFTER reimbursement or compensation,
it becomes the LOSS OF THE INSURER (44 Am. Jur. 2d 746).
"Although many policies including policies in the standard form, now provide for
subrogation, and thus determine the rights of the insurer in this respect, the
equitable right of subrogation as the legal effect of payment inures to the
insurer without any formal assignment or any express stipulation to that
effect in the policy" (44 Am. Jur. 2nd 746).
Stated otherwise, when the insurance company pays for the loss, such payment
operates as an equitable assignment to the insurer of the property and all
remedies which the insured may have for the recovery thereof. That right is
not dependent upon, nor does it grow out of, any privity of contract, or upon
written assignment of claim, and payment to the insured makes the insurer an
assignee in equity (Shambley v. Jobe-Blackley Plumbing and Heating Co).
3) Whether the plaintiffs would be able to prove their cause of action against Jamila is
another question.
SULPICIO
LINES,
INC., petitioner,
vs. FIRST
LEPANTO-TAISHO
INSURANCE
CORPORATION, respondent.
RULING:
It cannot be denied that the shipment
sustained damage while in the custody of petitionercarrier. It is not disputed that one of the 3 crates did fall
from the cargo hatch to the pier apron while petitionercarrier was unloading the cargo from its vessel. Neither
is it impugned that upon inspection, it was found that 2
cartons were torn on the side and the top flaps were
open and that 2 cello bags, each of 50 pieces ferri
inductors, were missing from the cargo.