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Peace Research
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? Journal of Peace Research, ISSN: 0022-3433 vol. 34, no. 1, 1997, pp. 23-36
This article offers an interpretation of the current international situation from the perspective of
theory. Previous efforts to understand what the end of the Cold War means for international
vided only part of the picture. Optimistic views tend to deny the possibility of the emergen
while pessimistic arguments generally fail to recognize that the prospects for major war have
reduced by the dramatic events of the last half decade. The interpretation offered here is poten
because it draws insights from a theory with a long record of empirical support. Power transi
sistent with the existence of a 'Long Peace' since World War II, with the Cold War's peaceful
vides confidence to those who would use it to interpret the prospects for the future. The concl
is that while the end of the Cold War offers reason for celebration, there is also cause for concern
1. Introduction
emerge. Similarly, it is also incorrect to suggest
For most of the years since World War II the that
in- we have entered into a period similar to
ternational system had been characterized by
that of Europe between the World Wars
(Mearsheimer, 1990), or that we face a situation
ideological rivalry, bipolarity, and a peace
among major powers supposedly imposed by
unprecedented in international relations (Singer
the tremendous destructive power of nuclear
& Wildavsky, 1993).
In this article I offer reasons for this 'mixed'
weapons. With the events of 1991 the ideologiview of current international reality, suggesting
cal rivalry officially ended, bipolarity was
that we should apply established theories of inweakened (if not replaced), and efforts were extended toward a less nuclear future. Analyststernational relations in order to provide a context that will allow us to understand why the
have offered contradictory explanations of these
momentous changes have occurred, as well as
changes, as well as a range of expectations
what they mean. The theory used here to proabout the future. Some suggest that the current
vide an interpretation of the current intercourse of international relations is strongly conducive to peace and tranquillity, while others national situation is power transition theory
(Kugler & Lemke, 1996; Kugler & Organski,
claim that an increasing frequency and severity
of war is to be expected. These two viewpoints1989; Organski, 1958; Organski & Kugler,
may be labelled 'optimists' and 'pessimists'.'1980). I compare the arguments and explanations offered by power transition theory with
Neither is more than half-right; rather, the end
of the Cold War has created reasons for celethose offered by the optimists and pessimists,
bration as well as concern. As the title of this
focusing specifically on the 'Long Peace' that
has characterized postwar Great Power international relations, the Cold War's peaceful end,
and the emerging post-Cold War world. I close
with expectations of what the future might hold.
states, and draws implications from their interactions for war, and for the maintenance of and
changes to the structure of the international system. It is similar to other 'systemic' theories of
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24 Douglas Lemke
international relations, such as long cycle or bal-fensive objectives of international military orance of power theory (Modelski & Thompson, ganizations such as NATO. As a democratic,
1989; Niou et al., 1989). However, unlike most market-oriented country, the United States (as
other systemic theories it is not a purely realistthe dominant state) established these patterns of
theory, because it is not exclusively concerned interaction in accord with its preferences.
with power (although power considerations do
Additionally, power transition theory holds
that the internal growth of a country determines
play a prominent role in it). In addition to
power, power transition theory considers eachits power. Since growth rates differ across councountry's satisfaction with the workings of thetries, relative power is constantly changing.
international system, or status quo. The status Occasionally one country grows so much that it
quo is a useful abbreviation for the general pat-achieves power parity (rough equality) with the
tern of diplomatic, economic, and military inter-international system's dominant state. If the
actions of members of the international system.newly rising country (also known as the chalIn introducing power transition theory,
lenger) is dissatisfied with the international
Organski (1958, pp. 315-316) describes the in- status quo, it will demand changes which will
ternational status quo as a stable international likely be resisted by the dominant state. The
order. Specifically:
combination of power parity between challenger and dominant state combined with the
A powerful nation tends to set up a system of relationschallenger's negative evaluation of the status
with lesser states which can be called an 'order' because
quo provides the necessary condition for war
the relations are stabilized. In time, everyone comes to
(according to power transition theory). This war
know what kind of behavior to expect from the others,
habits and patterns are established, and certain rules asis fought for control of the 'rules of the game',
to how these relations ought to be carried on grow to be
accepted by all parties . . . Certain nations are recognized as leaders... Trade is conducted along recognized
channels . . . Diplomatic relations also fall into recognized patterns. Certain nations are expected to support
other nations... There are rules of diplomacy; there are
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Continuation of History 25
transition theory enjoys a distinguished empiritinual period without a war among the Great
cal record. First of all, Organski & Kugler
Powers. It is important to understand why this
(1980) provide strong evidence that wars beperiod has been characterized by the absence of
tween contender great powers are fought when Great Power war, because identification of the
parity prevails between them. This finding has factors responsible for the Long Peace during
been extended to all great powers by Houweling the Cold War could provide important clues as
& Siccama (1988), and by Kim (1989).
to whether or not the Long Peace will persist
now that the Cold War has ended.
Additionally, a general relationship between
dyadic parity and war, or between dyadic preGaddis considers bipolarity to have strongly
ponderance and peace, has been reported by a contributed to the absence of Great Power war
wide range of scholars (Bremer, 1992; Bueno de during this period. He argues, paralleling
Mesquita, 1990; Garnham, 1976a, b; Geller,
Waltz's (1964) prior arguments, that bipolarity
1993; Gochman, 1990; Maoz, 1993, p. 37;
is easier to maintain than multipolarity, that it
leads to stability in alliance configurations, and
Weede, 1976).4 Recently, scholars have begun
to document a relationship between challenger
that it makes any alliance defections that do
dissatisfaction with the status quo and war.occur
Kim less worrisome. The overall effect is sta(1991) measures dissatisfaction by observing
bilizing. Finally (although this does not exhaust
the challenger's tau-b alliance score (Bueno de his list of contributing elements), Gaddis argues
Mesquita, 1975) for the dominant state, arguingthat Cold War decision-makers were generally
that when the challenger and the dominant staterisk-averse, with this unaccustomed caution
have sharply different alliance portfolios these arising from the devastating costs nuclear
differences are symptomatic of different viewsweapons can inflict upon countries that find
of the status quo. The results suggest that a
break down.
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26 Douglas Lemke
questions
of extended deterrence and of crises
systems at various time periods, and finds
that
pitting
whereas bipolarity is generally more stable
than nuclear against non-nuclear countries. If
multipolarity, although multipolarity is nuclear
associ- weapons make countries cautious, then
we should expect a notable role for nuclear
ated with fewer but longer wars. He suggests
weapons
that unipolarity is the most pacific type of
sys- in the peaceful resolution of extended
deterrence situations8 Similarly, in situations
tem. Hopf(1991) argues that consideration of
16th-century instances of bi- and multipolarity where a nuclear state finds itself in a conflict
in European history makes it difficult to suggest with a non-nuclear state, we should expect the
one is more stable and peaceful than the other. non-nuclear state to be more likely to concede
whatever is at dispute, because the potential
In more recent work, Kegley & Raymond
costs for it are higher than those facing the nu(1994) differentiate between types of multipoclear state. Contrary to these expectations, Huth
larity, drawing on detailed consideration of six
& Russett (1984) find little or no role for nuclear
modem time periods. They argue that some
types of multipolarity are more dangerous thanweapons in the resolution of extended deterothers.7 The logical and empirical evidence re- rence situations, and Kugler (1984) reports that
garding polarity and war suggests we should be nuclear states generally do not get their way in
cautious in accepting any argument that bipolar-crises with non-nuclear states. Based on these
indications, we should exercise some caution in
ity is a significant cause of the Long Peace.
accepting arguments that suggest nuclear
Have nuclear weapons contributed to the
weapons have been an important part of the
Long Peace? There has only been one time
stability of the Long Peace.
period in history in which two or more countries
Gaddis's argument about the Long Peace difhad nuclear weapons they could deliver to each
fers somewhat from the presentation offered
other's territory, and this period overlaps with
here. Specifically, Gaddis argues that it is the
the absence of Great Power war. As a result, it
is impossible to test propositions about whether unique joint occurrence of bipolarity and nuclear weapons that caused the postwar world to
nuclear weapons have prevented war during the
avoid Great Power war. Since my critique is
Long Peace, since there is no variation in either
about the independent effects of nuclear
the presence of nuclear weapons or the occurweapons or bipolarity I am not able to reject his
rence of war during this period. What we can
argument (although if the underlying logic of
do, however, is analyze the logical bases and
subsidiary propositions of those who argue thateach part of his argument is questionable, he has
to specify better how the interaction is pacifynuclear deterrence promotes peace. First, the
ing). Of course, it is not possible to offer any
logical bases. The core argument of the nuclear
evidence supporting his argument either. The
deterrence school is that the extreme costs nupostwar period is the source for his argument.
clear weapons can inflict make countries avoid
As such, this period cannot be used to confirm
going to war. Thus, we should logically expect
his argument. Such an attempted confirmation
a negative relationship between expected costs
would fail by tautology. At the same time, there
and the propensity of countries to engage in war
has never been another period in which the
if nuclear deterrence arguments are correct. If
this proposition is true, then we should observe unique joint occurrence of bipolarity and nuclear weapons has occurred. However, there
some evidence of continually declining propensity for war through history as advances in tech- have been previous periods of Great Power
nology created first the flaked-point projectile, peace. Any explanation of the Long Peace that
could also account for these previous periods of
the atalatl, the bow and arrow, rudimentary
peace would be superior on logical and philofirearms, machine guns, war-planes, and so on,
sophical grounds.9
thereby raising the costs of war. Whereas it is
Thus, if the two principal elements are sustrue that the frequency of Great Power war has
pect to such re-interpretation, and if the expladeclined over time (Levy, 1983, Ch. 6), the evination for the Long Peace is not relevant to
dence of the first half of this century should
analysis of any other eras of Great Power peace,
make us pause before blindly accepting the
perhaps we should reconsider the argument
proposition that high expected costs deter war.
altogether. If we question this explanation we
Related to this concern about costs are the
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Continuation of History 27
might do well to consider an altemrnative explanation; that of power transition theory. Recall
that power transition theory argues that Great
Power war is anticipated when there is power
parity between the dominant country and a dissatisfied challenger. Great Power war cannot
occur, according to this theory, unless these two
conditions are jointly present. Throughout the
Cold War the United States was the dominant
>o
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efe8W
0 200
::- :: :;l .: : :
1950 55 60
65 70 75 80 85 90
Years
-| USA
- USSR
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28 Douglas Lemke
ciliation. This is the power transition theory interpretation of the end of the Cold War. There is
no prediction of Soviet internal economic and
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Continuation of History 29
that used to fight one another - a model of how world
rather poor way of dealing with conflicts of
peace may be obtained without world government.
interest. War is now seen as so costly that it will
(1993, p. 30, emphasis added)16
go the way of other inefficient institutions, like
dueling and slavery. The result is that increas- Modem developed democracies have existed in
ingly we have a more and more peaceful world. increasing numbers over the past century, but
what is different now is that the main threat to
This process was greatly accelerated by the
World Wars of the 20th century. The peaceful these countries, the Soviet Union, has disapCold War and what is anticipated to be even lesspeared.'7 The advanced developed democracies
violent post-Cold War world are simply furtherare now able to rest content in their preponderstages in this process of decreasing frequency ofance, secure in their stable and prosperous
wars.
peace. The extraordinarily optimistic expectation about
future is that ultimately all states
Perhaps the most familiar expression
of the
this
will inevitably develop, liberalize, and join
viewpoint is Mueller's (1989) 'obsolescence of
major war' argument.'4 He argues that follow- the zones of peace. According to Singer &
ing World War I a dramatic change of opinion Wildavsky, this is joyous news. The days of war
about the value of war took place in the devel- are numbered. The future will not resemble the
past.
oped world. Where previously war had been
viewed as a necessary evil at worst or as an
heroic institution developing men's characters 5.2 The Pessimists
at best, by 1919 it was viewed pretty uniformlyPerhaps the most familiar pessimistic argument
as a barbaric, outdated and inefficient way of
is that of Mearsheimer (1990), who cautions us
type. Within the zones of peace, war is now impossible because democracies do not fight each
other. Further, developed states have a preponderance of power and thus need not fear attack
from the zones of turmoil. According to Singer
& Wildavsky:
What counts about the zones of peace is that they are
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30 Douglas Lemnke
does not see the end of the Cold War as the end
zation, liberalization and efforts to engage thealization, a member of the satisfied coalition of
states. Recent Chinese growth rates are very iminternational economy rather than foment interpressive, and suggest that a potential transition
national military tensions suggest that, even
to parity between the People's Republic and the
when Russia stabilizes and begins to grow, it is
United States within the next few decades is
likely to be a satisfied country. This has longpossible. As evidence, consider Figure 2, which
term consequences for expectations about war
extrapolates current GDP growth trend into the
between the United States and a resurgent
future. Should such a transition occur without
Russia. The combination of these immediate
and long-term factors suggests that a war be-any change in Chinese evaluations of the status
quo, war is expected based on power transition
tween the United States and Russia is very untheory.20 Thus, this pacific Great Power prediclikely. Further, this is consistent with how
tion of the future of the post-Cold War world is
peaceful the end of the Cold War was. The
on Chinese growth and attitudes toUnited States benefited in terms of security contingent
by
ward the international system's status quo.2'
the dissolution of the Soviet Empire, and could
Chinese growth represents only one potential
expect no gain by attacking since the Russian
threat to continued Great Power peace, although
political and economic system was becoming
arguably this is the most realistic threat. The remore like that favored by the USA. Consequently the Russians had no reason to fear theemergence of a centralized or authoritarian polUnited States would take advantage of Russianitical and economic system in the former Soviet
Union coupled with a resurgence of growth in
weakness and strike. This is contrary to the
the area could also present a threat; a re-emergpower maximization underpinnings of realist
and neorealist thought that expect the United ence of the antagonism associated with the Cold
War. It is also possible that other political units
States to have taken advantage of Soviet decould challenge the current international status
cline.19
quo. Although satisfied today a united Europe
The power transition theory expectation for
would possess the capacity to challenge the
the post-Cold War world is the continuation of
United States. Such a contingency assumes draGreat Power peace. Contrary to the arguments
matic changes in the international order,
of Mearsheimer and Huntington, a multipolar
changes for which no ready explanation comes
post-Cold War Europe is not one that should
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#XS l ;H 04 + e * *: w S 4 * k . * * # * b b 4 * + 4 F w * + w * l
Continuation of History 31
Figure 2. Trends in US and People's Republic of China
Gross Domestic Products (Trillions of Purchasing Power
Parity Dollars) 1980-2010
. . . . . . . . . ..60 0 i|j |||j||....l||||..l.|.|l..j||!.||i
:::::::::::::::::::::::
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: : ::: : : T:: .:::: i: - or. : : :
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:::::
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--
-f
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: iL::
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:t
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32 Douglas Lemke
countries now than it ever has in the past. But,far. This explanatory power, both historical and
the satisfied coalition of states/zone of peace contemporary, gives confidence to those who
of the immediate post-World War II period
would advance power transition theory predicenjoyed a greater preponderance of power
tions of what the future will likely hold.
(admittedly due to the destruction of the war We should be cautiously optimistic about the
itself and consequent US preponderance) than future. The end of the Cold War means the
the current satisfied condition of states/zone of
evaporation of the major challenge to the curpeace. Any claim that the modem zone of peacerent initial status quo. Russian efforts at liberalis different in kind because it need not fear
ization, democratization and privatization sugattack from without must address this point gest
if it that Russia has moved toward being a
member of the satisfied coalition of states. The
is to be accepted.
size of the satisfied coalition means that Great
Second, consider the argument that the developed countries, due to a learning process, have
Power war is not to be anticipated anytime soon.
turned away from war as a means of resolving
However, there are threats to this optimistic
disagreements. Whereas this may have some
scenario. These include Chinese growth unacvalidity for the post-World War II period, it is companied by a change in attitude toward the
only on this one specific 'peace' that it has any status quo,24 as well as the possibility of draclaims. Power transition theory can also account matic changes in powerful satisfied countries
for this Long Peace (power parity between the that could lead to a change in their evaluations
USA and USSR was absent). But, additionally,
of the status quo. In this regard the true threat of
power transition theory can account for other
portunity to learn, first-hand, the lessons thatization. The leading satisfied states should also
Europeans have learned. But the multiple hier-
peace.
NOTES
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Continuation ofHistonr 33
human rights, is charged to promote the principles of
justice and international law, and allows each member
an equal number of votes (if only in the General
Assembly). I am not suggesting that the Charter
'makes' the UN a democratic organization. Rather, I am
suggesting that the general tenor of the (arguably)
premier international body reflects the same political
principles that underlie democracies.
3. For an interpretation that places power transition theory
within the realist paradigm, see Lebow (1994, pp.
6.
249-277). Lebow writes: 'Power transition theories
margin.
data are made here. The figures that follow are based on
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34 Douglas Lemke
11. Recently, Volgy & Imwalle (1995) provide additional
evidence against the existence of sea-changes in international relations. They investigate the extent to which
bipolar or hegemonic characteristics of the postwar
period influenced the levels of conflict (variously defined). They find consistently that hegemonic character- 21.
istics were more important than bipolar influences. This
is certainly consistent with the argument advanced here,
but also highlights the importance of a recurring condition, hegemony, rather than a 'new' bipolarity. Not
surprisingly, Volgy and Imwalle argue that the past is 22.
potentially a good predictor of the future.
12. No less an authority than Mikhail Gorbachev writes:
'At some stage - this became particularly clear in the
latter half of the seventies - something happened that
was at first sight inexplicable. The country [Soviet
Union] began to lose momentum. Economic failures became more frequent. Difficulties began to accumulate
and deteriorate, and unresolved problems to multiply.
Elements of what we call stagnation... began to appear
. . . (1987, pp. 18-19). Additional Russian claims of
(1996).
was largely divorced from the West (or East for that
familiar.
370).
exist as well.
18. 'The end of the Cold War does not mean the end of pol-
creased instability, unpredictability, and violence in international affairs. It could mean the end of the Long
Peace' (Huntington, 1989, p. 6).
19. This point about realism's failure to incorporate the
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Continuation of History 35
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DOUGLAS LEMKE, b. 1967, PhD in Political Science (Vanderbilt University, 1993); Assistant Professor,
Florida State University (1993- ); co-editor (with Jacek Kugler) of Parity and War: Evaluations and
Extensions of 'The War Ledger', and author of articles on structural causes of war appearing in International
Interactions and International Studies Quarterly.
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