Cynthia S. Bolos vs Danilo T. Bolos G.R. 186400 October 20.

2010 Facts:
On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under
Article 36 of the Family Code. Later, the RTC granted the petition for annulment.
Later, a copy of said decision was received by Danilo and he timely appealed an
appeal. RTC subsequently denied due course to the appeal for Danilos failure to file
the required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages. His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied and the RTC issued
the order declaring the decision which granted the annulment as final and
executory. This lead to Danilo filing with the CA a petition for certiorari to annul the
orders of the RTC. The CA granted the petition and reversed the assailed orders of
the RTC. The appellate court stated that the requirement of a motion for
reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not
apply in this case as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on
February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took effect.
Issue: W/N the phraseUnder the Family Code in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC pertains to
the word petitions rather than to the word marriage Petitioner s Contention:
Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages
solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code. Respondents Contention:
Danilo, in his Comment, counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable
because his marriage with Cynthia was solemnized on February 14, 1980, years
before its effectivity.
Held:
Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this case. Her stance is
unavailing. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the
Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule,
in fact, reads: Section 1. Scope

This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages
and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines. The
categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The
coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the
Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.7 The rule sets a demarcation line
between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the
Civil Code.
BOLOS V. BOLOS
634 SCRA 429, [October 20, 2010]
DOCTRINE:

Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of

Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-1110-SC, which the Court promulgated on 15 March 2003, extends only to those
marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on
3 August 1988.
FACTS:
Petitioner Cynthia Bolos(Cynthia)filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage to Respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code.
After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment. A copy of said
decision was received by respondent Danilo and he thereafter timely filed the
Notice of Appeal.
The RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilos failure to file the required
motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages. Thereafter, the RTC issued the order declaring its decision declaring the
marriage null and void as final and executory and granting the Motion for Entry of
Judgment filed by Cynthia. Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition
forcertiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders of the RTC as they were
rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction. Danilo also prayed that he be declared psychologically capacitated to
render the essential marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of
abandoning him, the family home and their children.
The CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the
RTC declaring the nullity of marriage as final and executory. The appellate court
stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to
appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage
between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the
Family Code took effect.
Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages
solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code. According to petitioner, the
phrase under the Family Code in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word
petitions rather than to the word marriages. Such that petitions filed after the
effectivity of the Family Code are governed by the A.M. No. even if the marriage was
solemnized before the same. Danilo, in his Comment, counters that A.M. No. 02-1110-SC is not applicable because his marriage with Cynthia was solemnized on
February 14, 1980, years before its effectivity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, is applicable to the
case at bench.

HELD:
No, it does not.
RATIO:
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court
promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in
fact, reads:
Section 1. Scope.This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family
Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The
coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the
Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.7 The rule sets a demarcation line
between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the
Civil Code.8 The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioners interpretation
that the phrase under the Family Code in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word
petitions rather than to the word marriages.
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC decision which
denied due course to respondents appeal and denying petitioners motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration.

JMM Promotions v. NLRC

Case No. 136G.R. No. 109835 (November 22, 1993)Chapter VI, Page 251, Footnote
No. 21
FACTS:
JMM Promotions paid license fee amounting to P30, 000 and posted a cashbond of
P100, 000 and a surety bond of P50,000, as required by the POEA Rules.When JMM
Promotions appealed to NLRC regarding a decision rendered by POEA,the NLRC
dismissed the petition for failure to post the required appeal bond asrequired by Art.
223 of the Labor Code.
ISSUE:
Is JMM Promotions still required to post the required appeal bond, as requiredby Art.
223 of the Labor Code, considering it has already posted a cash bond andsurety
bond, as required by the POEA?
HELD:
Yes. The POEA Rules regarding monetary appeals are clear. A reading of thePOEA
Rules shows that, in addition to the cash and surety bonds and the escrowmoney,

an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award is requiredto

perfect an appeal from a decision of the POEA.Basbacio v. Office of the Secretary,
Dept. of Justice
Case No.G.R. No. 109445 (November 7, 1994)
FACTS:
RA 7309, among other things, provides for compensation of persons
unjustlyaccused, convicted, and imprisoned. Petitioner and his son-in-law
Balderrama werecharged with murder and frustrated murder for killing Boyon and
wounding his wifeand son, due to a land dispute and thus imprisoned. However, on
appeal to the CA,Petitioner was acquitted on the ground that conspiracy between
him and his son-inlawwas not proven. What was proven was that he was at the
scene of the crimewith Petitioner when the shooting happened and left the place
with his son-in-law.Petitioner claims he was unjustly accused and is entitled to
compensation.
ISSUE:
W/N Petitioner is entitled to compensation pursuant to RA 7309.
HELD:
No, he is not. For one to be unjustly accused one must be wrongly accusedfrom
the very beginning, unjustly convicted (when a judge knowingly anddeliberately
rendered an unjust judgment, whimsical and capricious devoid of anybasis for
judgment) and imprisoned. In the case at bar, Petitioner was acquittedbecause the
prosecution was unable to prove beyond reasonable doubt thatPetitioner was guilty.
Thus, he does not fall under RA 7309.

Radiola Toshiba Philippines Inc. vs. The Intermediate Apellate Court

G.R. No. 75222, July 18, 1991
Facts:
The petitioner obtained a levy on the attachment against the properties of
Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan un Civil case o. 35946 for collection of
sum of money before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Metro
Manila. A few months later three creditors filed another petition against Gatmaytan
and Teresita Gatmaytan for involuntary insolvency, docketed as special proceedings
No. 1548 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga and Angeles city.
A favorable judgment was obtained of by the petitioner in Civil case No.
35946. The court ordered for the consolidation of ownership of petitioner over said
property but respondent sheriff of Angeles City refused to issue a final ceritificate of
sale because of the pending insolvency proceedings.
Court of First Instance of Angeles City and Intermediate Appellate Court
rules against petitioner
Issue:

Whether or not the levy on attachment in favor of petitioner in dissolved by

the insolvency proceedings against respondents commenced for months after the
said attachment.
Held:
Section 32 (of the Insolvency Law). As soon as an assignee is elected or
appointed and qualified, the clerk of court shall, by an instrument under his hand
and seal of the court, assign and convey to the assignee all the real and personal
property, estate and effects of the debtor with all his deeds, books and papers
relating thereto, and such assignment shall relate back to the commencement of
the proceedings in insolvency, and shall relate back to the acts upon the
adjudication was founded, and by operation of law shall vest the title to all such
property, estate and effects in the assignee, although the same is then attached in
mesne process, as the property of debtor. Such assignment shall operate to vest in
the assignee all of the estate of the insolvent debtor not exempt by law from
execution. It shall dissolved any attachment levied within one month next preceding
the commencement of the insolvency proceedings and vacate and set aside any
judgment entered in any action commenced within thirty days immediately prior to
the commencement of insolvency proceedings and shall set aside any judgment
entered by default or consent of the debtor within thirty days immediately prior to
the commencement of insolvency proceedings.
Section 79. When an attachment has been made and is not dissolved before
the commencement of proceedings in insolvency, or is dissolved by an undertaking
given by the defendant, if the claim upon which attachment suit was commenced is
proved against the estate of the debtor, the plaintiff may prove the legal costs and
disbursements of the suit, and in keeping of the property, and the amount thereof
shall be a preferred debt.
There is no conflicts between the two provisions.
Statutory Construction; where a statute is susceptible of more than one
interpretation, court should adopt such reasonable and beneficial construction as
will render the provision thereof operative and effective and harmonious with each
other. but even granting that such conflicts exists, it may be stated that in
construing a statute, courts should adopt a construction that will give effect to
every part of the statute, if at all possible. This rule is expressed in the maxim, ut
magis valeat quam pereat or that construction is to be sought which gives effect to
the whole of the statute its every word, hence when a statute is susceptible of
more than one interpretation, the court should adopt such reasonable and beneficial
construction as will render the provision thereof operative and effective and
harmonious with each other.

Case No. 9Radiola Toshiba Philippines vs Intermediate Appellate CourtGR No. 75222,
July 18, 1991Statutory rule: In interpreting a statute, care should be taken that
every part begiven effect.Facts:The levy on attachment against the subject
properties of spouses Carlosand Teresita Gatmaytan was issued on March 4, 1980
by the Court of FirstInstance of Pasig. However, an insolvency proceeding in the
Court of FirstInstance of Angeles City was commenced four months after the
issuance of thesaid attachment. Petitioner contends that its lien on the subject
propertiesoverrode the insolvency proceeding and was not dissolved thereby.
Issue: W/N the levy on attachment dissolved the insolvency proceedings againstthe
respondent spouses even though it commenced four months after saidattachment.
Held:No. Sec. 32 of the Insolvency Law is clear that there is a cut off period -one
month in attachment cases and thirty days in judgments entered in
actionscommenced prior to the insolvency proceedings. Also, there is no
conflictbetween Sec. 32 and Sec. 79. Where a statute is susceptible to more than
oneinterpretation, the court should adopt such reasonable and
beneficialconstruction that will render the provision thereof operative and effective
andharmonious with each other

STATCOND. STATUTE AS A WHOLE2.

JMM PROMOTIONS AND MANAGEMENT, INC. V. NLRC, GR NO. 109835, NOV. 22,
1993ISSUE: Is JMM Promotions still required to post the required appeal bond, as
required?FACTS:JMM Promotions paid license fee amounting to P30,000.00 and
posted a cash bond ofP100,000.00 and a surety bond of P50,000.00 as required by
the POEA Rules.When JMM Promotions appealed to NLRC regarding a decision
rendered by POEA, theNLRC dismissed the petition for failure to post the required
appeal bond as required by Art. 223of the Labor Code.HELD:Yes. The POEA Rules
regarding monetary appeals are clear. A reading of the POEARules show that, in
addition to the cash and surety bonds and the escrow money, an appealbond in an
amount equivalent to the monetary award is required to perfect an appeal from
adecision of the POEA.3. RADIOLA TOSHIBA PHILIPPINES, INC. V. IAC, GR NO. 75222,
JULY 18, 1991ISSUE:WON the levy on attachment dissolved the insolvency
proceedings against respondentspouses even though it commenced four months
after and attachmentFACTS:The levy on attachment against the subject properties
of spouses Carlos and TeresitaGatmaytan was issued on March 4, 1980 by
the CFI of Pasig.
However, the insolvencyproceedings in the CFI of
Angeles City was commenced more than four months after theissuance of
the said attachment. Under the circumstances, petitioner contended that its lien
onthe subject properties overrode the insolvency proceeding and was not dissolved
thereby.HELD:No. Sec. 32 of the Insolvency Law is clear that there is a cut off
period one month inattachment cases and thirty days in judgments entered
in actions commenced prior to theinsolvency proceedings. Also, there is no
conflict between Sec. 32 and Sec. 79.Where a statute is susceptible to more than
one interpretation, the court should adoptsuch reasonable and beneficial

construction as will render the provision thereof operative andeffective and

harmonious with each other.

4. ALPHA INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY AGENCY v. NLRC, GR No. 111722, MAY

27,1997ISSUE:FACTSHELD:The interpretation is not acceptable. It is a cardinal rule
in statutory construction that ininterpreting the meaning and scope of a term used
in the law, a careful review of the whole lawinvolved as well as the intendment of
the law, must be made. In fact, legislative intent must beascertained from a
consideration of the statute as a whole, and not of an isolated part or aparticular
provision alone.

B/GEN. JOSE COMMENDADOR ET.AL. V. B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMERA, GR NO.

96948,AUGUST 2, 1991ISSUE:WON the right to peremptory challenge provide by
Art. 18 of CA No. 408 has beencontinued under PD 39.FACTSPetitioners are
members of the AFP and were charged with violations of Articles of Warin relation
with their alleged participation in a failed coup detat. Their case was referred
toGeneral Court Martial No. 14. At a hearing, petitioners manifested their desire to
exercise theirright to raise peremptory challenges against the President and the
members of the general courtmartial invoking Art. 18 of CA No. 408, GCM No. 14
ruled that peremptory challenges had beendiscontinued under PD 39.HELD:NO.
Although PD 39 disallowed peremptory (challenged allowed under CA No. 408, PD39
however was issued to implement General Order No. 8 issued during martial law to
createmilitary tribunals. With the lifting of Martial Law, General Order No. 8 was
revoked and militarytribunals were dissolved. As such, the reason for the existence
of PD 39 ceased automatically.When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself
ceases. Cessante rationale legis,cessat ipsa lex