MANOTOC VS CA

Facts: Petitioner was charged with estafa. He posted bail. Petitioner filed before each of the
trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for permission to leave the country," stating as
ground therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his business transactions
and opportunities." The prosecution opposed said motion and after due hearing, both trial
judges denied the same. Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before
the then Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders dated March 9 and 26, 1982, of
Judges Camilon and Pronove, respectively, as well as the communication-request of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, denying his leave to travel abroad. He likewise prayed
for the issuance of the appropriate writ commanding the Immigration Commissioner and the
Chief of the Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM) to clear him for departure. The Court of
Appeals denied the petition.
Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts
which granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no
jurisdiction over his liberty could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to
travel.

Issue: Whether or Not his constitutional right to travel has been violated.

Held: A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the
Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The
condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court
requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. Indeed, if the
accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed
beyond the reach of the courts. Petitioner has not shown the necessity for his travel abroad.
There is no indication that the business transactions cannot be undertaken by any other
person in his behalf.

Chavez vs PEA and AMari

The Public Estates Authority is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects
nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR insofar as reclaimed or about to be
reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned.
PEA sought the transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the
Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to
AMARI.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.

HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private
lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom
Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain.
The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public
domain. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34
hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of
290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than
agricultural lands of the public domain.

OCCENA VS. COMELEC

SAMUEL OCCENA VS. COMELEC
G.R. NO. L-34150
APRIL 2, 1981
FACTS: Petitioner Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gozales instituted a prohibiting proceedings against
the validity of three batasang pambansa resolutions (Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for
residential purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency,
the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention;
and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to
2 with 1 abstention.) The petitioners contends that such resolution is against the constitutions in
proposing amendments:
ISSUE: Whether the resolutions are unconstitutional?
HELD: In dismissing the petition for lack of merit, the court ruled the following:
1. The power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose its amendments and how it may be exercised
was validly obtained. When, therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the President
and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body it acted by virtue of such impotence.
2. Petitioners assailed that the resolutions where so extensive in character as to amount to a revision
rather than amendments. To dispose this contention, the court held that whether the Constitutional
Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution
and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of no
moment, because the same will be submitted to the people for ratification.
3. The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose amendments. In that
capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the threefourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when it has been convened as the
agency through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far as a
constitutional convention is concerned.
People vs Judge Ayson

Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned at its
Baguio City station. It was alleged that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane
tickets, the PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted. That
investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and
the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees'
Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter was sent by Ramos stating his
willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The findings of the Audit team were given to
him, and he refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets also stating that he was prevented
from settling said amounts. He proffered a compromise however this did not ensue. Two
months after a crime of estafa was charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty.
Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos written admission and statement, to which
defendants argued that the confession was taken without the accused being represented by
a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit those stating that accused was not reminded of
his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A motion for reconsideration
filed
by
the
prosecutors
was
denied.
Hence
this
appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as evidence the
admission
and
statement
of
accused.
Held: No. Section 20 of the 1987 constitution provides that the right against selfincrimination (only to witnesses other than accused, unless what is asked is relating to a
different
crime
chargednot
present
in
case
at
bar).
This is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under
compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is not
to "be compelled to be a witness against himself. It prescribes an "option of refusal to
answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." the right can be claimed
only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It
cannot be claimed at any other time.
Ladiana vs. People,
FACTS: The accused, a public officer, being then a member of the Integrated National Police (INP now
PNP) assigned at the Lumban Police Station, Lumban, Laguna, acting in relation to his duty which is
primarily to enforce peace and order within his jurisdiction, taking advantage of his official position
confronted Francisco San Juan why the latter was removing the steel pipes which were previously placed
to serve as barricade to prevent the entry of vehicles along P. Jacinto Street, Barangay Salac, Lumban,
Laguna, purposely to insure the safety of persons passing along the said street and when Francisco San
Juan told the accused that the latter has no business in stopping him, said accused who was armed with a
firearm, attacked and shot Francisco San Juan with the firearm hitting Francisco San Juan at his head
and neck inflicting upon him fatal wounds thereby causing the death of Francisco San Juan.
Petitioner admitted that he shot the victim while the latter was attacking him. Kaya itong si Kapitan San
Juan ay sumugod at hinawakan ako sa may leeg ng aking suot na T-shirt upang ako ay muling saksakin;
sa dahilang hindi ako makatakbo o makaiwas sa kabila ng aking pananalag hanggang magpaputok ako ng
pasumala sa kanya; sa bilis ng pangyayari ay hindi ko alam na siya ay tinamaan
ISSUE: whether he acted in self-defense is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Held:
Through the above statement, petitioner admits shooting the victim -- which eventually led to the latters

death -- but denies having done it with any criminal intent. In fact, he claims he did it in self-defense.
Nevertheless, whether categorized as a confession or as an admission, it is admissible in evidence against
him.
In general, admissions may be rebutted by confessing their untruth or by showing they were made by
mistake. The party may also establish that the response that formed the admission was made in a jocular,
not a serious, manner; or that the admission was made in ignorance of the true state of facts. Yet,
petitioner never offered any rationalization why such admissions had been made, thus, leaving them
unrebutted.
There is no showing that he was not actually arrested; or that when he went to the police station, he
surrendered himself to a person in authority. Neither is there any finding that he has evinced a desire to
own
to
any
complicity
in
the
killing.
Thus, he could not be deemed to have voluntarily surrendered. In the absence of sufficient and convincing
proof showing the existence of indispensable circumstances, we cannot appreciate voluntary surrender to
mitigate
petitioners
penalty.
Petition is DENIED
People vs Mahinay
Facts: Accused was convicted for rape and homicide of a 12 year old girl. He assailed the court decisions
contending that his conviction was based on circumstantial evidence that fails to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and that an extrajudicial confession was taken from him in violation of his constitutional
rights on custodial interrogation.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused merely on ground of circumstantial
evidence and not beyond reasonable ground and WON his rights to lawful custodial investigation was
violated.
Held: The court held that absence of direct proof does not necessarily absolve him from any liability
because under the Rules on evidence and pursuant to settled jurisprudence, conviction may be had on
circumstantial evidence provided that the following requisites concur: (1) there is more than one
circumstance; (2). the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3). the combination of
all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstantial
evidence to be sufficient to support conviction must be consistent with each other which were proven in
the case.The extrajudicial confession taken from the accused was within the requirement of Miranda
rights and within lawful means where his confession was taken in the presence of his lawyer.
Enrile vs salazar
Facts:
In February 1990, Sen Enrile was arrested. He was charged together with Mr. & Mrs. Panlilio, and
Honasan for the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder which allegedly occurred
during their failed coup attempt. Enrile was then brought to Camp Karingal. Enrile later filed for the
habeas corpus alleging that the crime being charged against him is nonexistent. That he was charged
with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was initially filed or preliminary
investigation was conducted, hence was denied due process; denied his right to bail; and arrested and
detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who issued it first having personally
determined the existence of probable cause.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court should affirm the Hernandez ruling.
HELD: Enrile filed for habeas corpus because he was denied bail although ordinarily a charge of rebellion
would entitle one for bail. The crime of rebellion charged against him however is complexed with murder
and multiple frustrated murders the intention of the prosecution was to make rebellion in its most
serious form so as to make the penalty thereof in the maximum. The SC ruled that there is no such crime
as Rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. What Enrile et al can be charged of would be
Simple Rebellion because other crimes such as murder or all those that may be necessary to the
commission of rebellion is absorbed hence he should be entitiled for bail. The SC however noted that a
petition for habeas corpus was not the proper remedy so as to avail of bail. The proper step that should
have been taken was for Enrile to file a petition to be admitted for bail. He should have exhausted all
other efforts before petitioning for habeas corpus. The Hernandez ruling is still valid. All other crimes
committed in carrying out rebellion are deemed absorbed. The SC noted, however, that there may be a
need to modify the rebellion law. Considering that the essence of rebellion has been lost and that it is
being used by a lo t of opportunists to attempt to grab power.

Comendador vs De Villa
Facts: The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 who are officers of the AFP were
directed to appear in person before the Pre-Trial Investigating Officers for the alleged
participation the failed coup on December 1 to 9, 1989. Petitioners now claim that there was
no pre-trial investigation of the charges as mandated by Article of War 71. A motion for
dismissal was denied. Now, their motion for reconsideration. Alleging denial of due process.
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was
denied by GCM No.14. He filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari and mandamus with
prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. Judge of GCM then granted
the provisional liberty. However he was not released immediately. The RTC now declared
that even military men facing court martial proceedings can avail the right to bail.
The private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition for habeas corpus on the
ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges. The petition was
referred to RTC. Finding after hearing that no formal charges had been filed against the
petitioners after more than a year after their arrest, the trial court ordered their release.

Issues:
(1) Whether or Not there was a denial of due process.
(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the accused right to bail.

Held: NO denial of due process. Petitioners were given several opportunities to present their
side at the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990, and
then again after the denial of their motion of February 21, 1990, when they were given until

March 7, 1990, to submit their counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal
motion for reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in writing. They had been
expressly warned in the subpoena that "failure to submit counter-affidavits on the date
specified shall be deemed a waiver of their right to submit controverting evidence."
Petitioners have a right to pre-emptory challenge. (Right to challenge validity of members of
G/SCM)

The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not been recognized
and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill
of Rights. The right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right
to bail does not exist.
The orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private respondents are hereby
reversed and set aside. No costs.
ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYANG.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001
Facts:
Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder,
wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it
crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His
contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice
of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions;
and it abolishes the element of mensrea in crimes already punishable under The Revised
Penal Code saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused. The focal point of
the case is the alleged vagueness of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly, these terms
are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial
challenge on the validity of the mentioned law.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity of the law
using the facial challenge.
Held:
The petitioners contention that it would not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what
the law seeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued. Void-for-vagueness doctrine is
manifestly misplaced under petitioners reliance, since ordinary intelligence can understand
what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of
legislation that is utterly vague on its face, wherein clarification by a saving clause or
construction cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may not be invoked in this case since the
statute is clear and free from ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable
degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld, not absolute precision or mathematical
exactitude.
On the other hand, overbeadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedom.
It is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more imagined than real.
The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been resolve in the Congress
decision to include it among the heinous crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.

Supreme Court holds the plunder law constitutional and petition is dismissed for lacking
merit.
People vs Webb

fACTS: Webb, an accused in the crime of Rape with Homicide, filed a Motion to Take Testimony by Oral
Deposition, to take the testimonies of some vital witnesses residing in the U.S., before the proper
Philippine consular authorities since the Philippine court had no jurisdiction over them and may not
therefore be compelled by subpoena to testify.
Respondent further alleged that the taking of the oral depositions of the aforementioned individuals whose
testimonies are allegedly material and indispensable to establish his innocence of the crime charged is
sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 24 of the Revised Rules of Court. The prosecution thereafter filed an
opposition to the said motion averring that Rule 24, Section 4 of the Rules of Court has no application in
criminal cases. The trial court denied the motion but was thereafter reversed by the COA on appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not COA committed reversible error in reversing the trial courts ruling.
HELD: YES. It need not be overemphasized that the factual circumstances only serves to underscore the
immutable fact that the depositions proposed to be taken from the five U.S. based witnesses would be
merely corroborative or cumulative in nature and in denying respondents motion to take them, the trial
court was but exercising its judgment on what it perceived to be a superfluous exercise on the belief that
the introduction thereof will not reasonably add to the persuasiveness of the evidence already on record.
It is pointed out that the defense has already presented at least fifty-seven (57) witnesses and four
hundred sixty-four (464) documentary exhibits, many of them of the exact nature as those to be produced
or testified to by the proposed foreign deponents. Under the circumstances, We sustain the proposition
that the trial judge commits no grave abuse of discretion if she decides that the evidence on the matter
sought to be proved in the United States could not possibly add anything substantial to the defense
evidence involved.

Ong

vs

.Sandiganbayan

Facts: This Petition for Certiorari,[1] dated December 13, 1996 seeks the nullification of the Resolutions
of the Sandiganbayan dated August 18, 1994[2] and October 22, 1996.[3] The first assailed Resolution
denied petitioners motion to dismiss the petition for forfeiture filed against them, while the second
questioned
Resolution
denied
their
motion
for
reconsideration.
Congressman Bonifacio H. Gillego executed a Complaint-Affidavit[4] on February 4, 1992, claiming that
petitioner Jose U. Ong, then Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), has amassed
properties
worth
disproportionately
more
than
his
lawful
income.
Issue:
Is
the
respondent
in
forfeiture
proceeding
entitled
of
due
process?
Ruling: no, it is clarified therein that the doctrine laid down in Almeda v. Perez[32] that forfeiture
proceedings are civil in nature applies purely to the procedural aspect of such proceedings and has no
bearing on the substantial rights of the respondents therein
Caunca vs Salazar
Facts: This is an action for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his
cousin Estelita Flores who was employed by the Far Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by

Julia Salazar, respondent herein. An advanced payment has already been given to Estelita
by the employment agency, for her to work as a maid. However, Estelita wanted to transfer
to another residence, which was disallowed by the employment agency. Further she was
detained and her liberty was restrained. The employment agency wanted that the advance
payment, which was applied to her transportation expense from the province should be paid
by
Estelita
before
she
could
be
allowed
to
leave.
Issue: Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid
without
returning
the
advance
payment
it
gave?
Held: An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective
employee or maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact
that no physical force has been exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does not
make less real the deprivation of her personal freedom of movement, freedom to transfer
from one place to another, freedom to choose ones residence. Freedom may be lost due to
external moral compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the
existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any
other psychological element that may curtail the mental faculty of choice or the unhampered
exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a person at the
mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much as the
individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or physical coercion.

.Chavez vs CA

Facts: Judgment of conviction was for qualified theft of a motor vehicle(thunderbird car together with
accessories). An information was filed against the accused together with other accused,that they
conspired, with intent to gain and abuse of confidence without theconsent of owner Dy Lim, took the
vehicle.All the accused plead not guilty. During the trial, the fiscal grecia (prosecution) asked roger
Chavez to be thefirst witness. Counsel of the accused opposed. Fiscal Grecia contends that the accused
(Chavez) will only be an ordinary witness not an state witness. Counsel of accused answer that it will only
incriminate his client. But the jugde ruled in favor of the fiscal.
Petitioner was convicted.
ISSUE: Whether or not constitutional right of Chavez against self incrimination had been violated to
warrant writ of HC?
HELD: YES. Petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of his constitutional right
to remain silent. It cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take the stand
and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness;

Juxtaposed with the circumstances of the case heretofore adverted to, make waiver a shaky defense. It
cannot stand. If, by his own admission, defendant proved his guilt, still, his original claim remains valid.
For the privilege, we say again, is a rampart that gives protection even to the guilty
Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to
release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accuseds constitutional
rights are disregarded. Such defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore
invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was violated.
That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the
function of habeas corpus. This writ may issue even if another remedy which is less effective may be
availed of by the defendant. Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of Appeals
does not preclude a recourse to the writ.

Harden vs Director of Prisons

Facts: Fred Harden is being confined in prison for contempt of court. This arose when the plaintiff was
restrained from transferringmoneys, shares of stock, and other properties and assets involving the
administration of conjugal partnership that he had with Mrs. Harden. Mr. Harden, however, transferred
cash to various banks in Hongkong and California, as well as to an unknown person. He was ordered by
the court to redeposit the money and the Balatoc Mining Co. shares belonging to the conjugal
partnership, which he had in Hongkong to the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China (Manila
Branch). He was not able to fulfill these orders, and so was put to jail.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner, Fred Harden, can warrant a writ of habeas corpus
Held: No. The petition is denied with costs.
The grounds for relief by habeas corpus are only (1) deprivation of any fundamental or constitutional
rights (2) lack of jurisdiction of the court to impose the sentence or (3) excessive penalty. It was held that
the court has jurisdiction to impose the sentence simply because the person charged is in the state and
he is still within the jurisdiction of its courts. Moreover, the penalty imposed on the petitioner is not
excessive because under Section 7, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, when the contempt consists in the
omission to do an act which is yet in the power of the accused to perform, he may be imprisoned byorder
of a superior court until he performs it. This justifies the penalty imposed on Fred Harden, thereby not
making it excessive. Moreover, the courts findings are supported by sufficient evidence and it is a matter
of fact which cannot be reviewed by habeas corpus. The writ of

Echegaray vs Secretary of Justice

FACTS:
On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray
scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance
of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment
but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) on the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has
already been rendered that by granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted
reprieve which is an executive function.
HELD:
No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of power of the
President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures
after conviction by final judgment. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying
the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality.
The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death
convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the
right to life.
For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right
to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and
coordinate powers of the three branches of our government.
People vs Judge Villarama

FACTS: Jaime Manuel y Ohide was charged with violation of Section 16, Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended.
During the arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. After the
prosecution rested its case, counsel for private respondent verbally manifested in open court that private
respondent was willing to change his former plea of not guilty to that of guilty to the lesser offense of
violation of Section 17, R.A. No. 6425.

Respondent Judge issued an order directing private respondent to secure the consent of the prosecutor to
the change of plea.
The prosecutor filed his Opposition to the Request to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense.
Accused filed his Reply to Opposition with Leave of Court to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense, alleging
that the Rules on Criminal Procedure does not fix a specific period within which an accused is allowed to
plead guilty to a lesser offense. Respondent judge granted accuseds motion and convicted him guilty
beyond reasonable-doubt of the crime of violation of Section 17, Republic Act No. 6425 thus this instant
petition for review.
Counsel for the private respondent maintains that the private respondents change of plea and his
conviction to the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, RA No. 6425 as amended is no longer open to
review otherwise his constitutional right against double jeopardy will be violated.
ISSUE: W/N accused can invoke double jeopardy?
HELD: NO. The right against double jeopardy given to the accused in Section 2, Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court applies in cases where both the fiscal and the offended party consent to the private
respondents change of plea. Since this is not the situation here, the private respondent cannot claim
this privilege. Instead, the more pertinent and applicable provision is that found in Section 7, Rule 117
which states:

Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy.

However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which
necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint when the plea of guilty to the lesser
offense was made without the consent of the Fiscal and of the offended party;
Under this rule, the private respondent could still be prosecuted under the original charge of violation of
Section 16 of RA 6425 as amended because of the lack of consent of the Fiscal who also represents the
offended party, i.e., the state. More importantly, the trial courts approval of his change of plea was
irregular and improper.