Philippine Blooming Mills Employment Organization

vs. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. and Court of

Industrial Relations (1973)

Facts :
1.Union officers of the Philippine Blooming Mills Co.
Inc. (PBM) were dismissed for allegedly violating the
no strike-no lockout provision of their collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) after staging a mass
demonstration at Malacaang. PBMEO was set to
stage a mass demonstration at Malacaang on March
4, 1969 against abuses of the Pasig police, where
employees on the first, regular, and third shifts will
participate. PBMEO informed company two days
before the said demonstration and asked to excuse all
the workers participating.

Held: VIOLATED. The rally was not against the

company and therefore there is no violation of the
no strike-no lockout provision of their CBA. To
charge PBMEO of bargaining in bad faith extends
the jurisdiction of the CBA and inhibits freedom of
speech. The company failed to protect its employees
from the Pasig polices abuse of power, went to the
extent of dismissing their employees, and instead
prioritized material losses. Moreover, CIR could
have easily accepted the motion for reconsideration.
Procedural rules do not supersede the Constitution
and may be overruled in a bid to achieve justice,
especially in cases of free speech.

2. But a day before the demonstration, PBM said the

rally should not prejudice normal office operations,
thus employees without prior filing of a leave of
absence who fail to report for the first and regular
shifts on March 4 shall be dismissed for violating
their CBA. However, union officers said there was no
violation because the demonstration was against the
Pasig police and not the company. They added that
the rally was an exercise of their freedom of speech.
In a decision penned by Judge Joaquin Salvador of
the Court of Industrial Relations, eight of the
Philippine Blooming Mills Employment Organization
(PBMEO) officers were found guilty of bargaining in
bad faith and were thus removed as employees of
PBM. PBMEO filed a motion for reconsideration,
which CIR dismissed the motion for passing two
days late from the 10-day deadline the court allowed.
Issue: Whether or not CIR and PBM Co. Inc.
violated PBMEOs freedom of expression and
assembly on the grounds that PBM Co. illegally
dismissed its employees for participating in a mass
demonstration.

4. The Petitioner filed a a petition for prohibition,

praying

for

restraining

order

and

preliminary injunction. Petitioner also prayed

to prohibit CHR from further hearing and
investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled
"Ferno,

et.al

vs.

Quimpo,

et.al".

SIMON, JR. vs COMMISSION ON HUMAN

RIGHTS
G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994

ISSUE: Is the issuance of an "order to desist"

FACTS:

of

within the extent of the authority and power

1. On July 23, 1990, the Commission on Human

Rights (CHR) issued and order, directing the
petitioners "to desist from demolishing the
stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending the
resolution of the vendors/squatters complaint
before the Commission" and ordering said
petitioners to appear before the CHR.

to

dismiss

questioning

CHR's

jurisdiction and supplemental motion to

dismiss was filed on September 18, 1990
stating that Commissioners' authority should
be understood as being confined only to the
investigation

of

violations

of

CRH?

HELD:
No, the issuance of an "order to desist" is not
within the extent of authority and power of
the CHR. Article XIII, Section 18(1), provides
the power and functions of the CHR to
"investigate, on its own or on complaint by
any part, all forms of human rights violation,

2. On September 10, 1990, petitioner filed a

motion

the

civil

and

political rights, and that "the rights allegedly

violated in this case were not civil and
political rights, but their privilege to engage in
business".

involving
The

"order

civil
to

and
desist"

political

rights".

however

is

not

investigatory in character but an adjudicative

power that the it does not possess. The
Constitutional provision directing the CHR to
provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the underprivileged whose human
rights have been violated or need protection
may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on
the Commission to issue an restraining order
or writ of injunction, for it were the intention,
the Constitution would have expressly said so.
Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has

3. On March 1, 1991, the CHR issued and Order

no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of

denying petitioners' motion and supplemental

preliminary injunction may only be issued by

motion to dismiss. And petitioners' motion for

the Judge in any court in which the action is

reconsideration was denied also in an Order,

pending or by a Justice of the CA or of the SC.

dated

The writ prayed for the petition is granted.

April

25,

1991.

The CHR is hereby prohibited from further

thereupon referred to Judge Francisco Mat.

proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580.

Riodique for investigation and report. At the

preliminary hearing on October 16, 1975, Taal
Mayor Corazon A. Caniza filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint but the motion was
denied by the Investigating Judge. After
formal investigation, he recommended the
exoneration of respondent.
ISSUE:

DOMINADOR C. BALDOZA, complainant,

vs. HON. JUDGE RODOLFO B. DIMAANO,
respondent. A.M. No. 1120-MJ May 5, 1976

September 9, 1975, the Municipal Secretary of

Taal, Batangas, charges Municipal Judge
Rodolfo B. Dimaano, of the same municipality,
with abuse of authority in refusing to allow
employees of the Municipal Mayor to examine
the criminal docket records of the Municipal
Court to secure data in connection with their
contemplated report on the peace and order
said

municipality.

Respondent answered that there has never

been an intention to refuse access to official
court records but that the same is always
subject to reasonable regulation as to who,
when, where and how they may be inspected.
He further asserted that a court has the power
to prevent an improper use or inspection of its
records and furnishing copies may be refuse
when the motivation is not serious and
legitimate interest, out of whim or fancy or
mere curiosity or to gratify private site or
promote

public

scandal.

The

case

the

rules

and

the right of individuals to information.

RULING: No. As found by the Investigating
Judge,

the

respondent

allowed

the

complainant to open and view the docket

books of respondent certain conditions and

FACTS: In a verified letter-complaint dated

the

not

inspection of the docket books infringe upon

Records)

of

or

conditions imposed by Judge Dimaano on the

Right to Information (Access to Public

conditions

Whether

under his control and supervision. It has not

been shown that the rules and conditions
imposed

by

the

respondent

were

unreasonable. The access to public records

predicated on the right of the people to
acquire information on matters of public
concern. The incorporation of this right in the
Constitution

is

fundamental

role

recognition
of

free

of

exchange

the
of

information in a democracy. Information is

needed to enable the members of society to
cope with the exigencies of the times. As has
been aptly observed: "Maintaining the flow of
such information depends on protection for
both its acquisition and its dissemination
since, if either process is interrupted, the flow
inevitably ceases. However, restrictions on
access to certain records may be imposed by
law. Thus, access restrictions imposed to
control civil insurrection have been permitted
upon a showing of immediate and impending

was
3

danger that renders ordinary means of control

University

inadequate to maintain order.

columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald

of

the

Philippines

and

newspaper

Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.

In the early morning of February 25, 2006,
operatives

of

the

Criminal

Investigation

and

Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of

PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune
offices in Manila and attempt to arrest was made
against representatives of ANAKPAWIS, GABRIELA
and BAYAN MUNA whom suspected of inciting to
sedition and rebellion. On March 3, 2006, President
Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of
national emergency has ceased to exist. Petitioners
RANDOLF DAVID, ET AL. VS. GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400,
171489 & 171424
May 3, 2006
Prepared By: Israel C. Sayao

filed seven (7) certiorari with the Supreme Court and

three (3) of those petitions impleaded President
Arroyo as respondent questioning the legality of the
proclamation,

alleging

that

it

encroaches

the

emergency powers of Congress and it violates the

constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of
speech and assembly.
Issue:
1.) Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No.

Facts:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated

1017 is unconstitutional?

the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I,

2.) Whether or not the warantless arrest of

President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of

Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas and the

national emergency and call upon the Armed Forces

dispersal of KMU and NAFLU-KMU members

of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National

during rallies were valid?

Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of

terrorism and lawless violence in the country. The
Office of the President announced the cancellation of
all programs and activities related to the 20th
anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and
revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by
the local governments and dispersal of the rallyists
along EDSA. The police arrested (without warrant)

3.) Whether or not proper to implead President

Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as respondent in the
petitions?
4.) Whether or not the petitioners have a legal
standing in questioning the constitutionality
of the proclamation?

petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the

4

5.) Whether or not the concurrence of Congress is

necessary whenever the alarming powers

that

incident to Martial Law are used?

constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion

petitioners

were

committing

acts

media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as

1.) The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017

is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the
President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence whenever becomes necessary as prescribe
under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.
However, there were extraneous provisions giving
the President express or implied power

peculiarly within the province of the Legislature.

Section 1, Article VI categorically states that "[t]he
legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of
the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives.")

all laws even those not related to lawless violence as

well as decrees promulgated by the President[The
absence of a law defining "acts of terrorism" may
result in abuse and oppression on the part of the
police or military]; and

of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and

unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under
Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the
President, in the absence of legislative legislation,
cannot take over privately-owned public utility and
affected
PP

and other materials, are declared unconstitutional

because there was no clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent.
3.) It is not proper to implead President
President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal
case, and there is no need to provide for it in the
Constitution or law.
4.) This Court adopted the direct injury test
person who impugns the validity of a statute must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct
injury as a result. Therefore, the court ruled that the
petitioners have a locus standi, for they suffered
direct injury resulting from illegal arrest and
unlawful search committed by police operatives

(C) To impose standards on media or any form

the

and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication

in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the

(B) To direct the AFP to enforce obedience to

business

well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices

Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the

(A) To issue decrees; (" Legislative power is

Therefore,

these

and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on

Ruling:

private

during their rallies are illegal, in the absence of proof

No.

with

public

1017

is

only

interest.
partly

unconstitutional.
2.) The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David
and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless

pursuant to PP 1017.
5.) Under Article XII Section 17 of the 1987
Philippine Constitution, in times of national
emergency, when the public interest so requires,
the President may temporarily take over a
privately owned public utility or business affected
with public interest only if there is congressional
authority or approval. There must enactment of
appropriate legislation prescribing the terms and
conditions under which the President may
exercise the powers that will serves as the best

arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members

5

assurance that due process of law would be

Secretary and National Security Adviser Norberto

observed.

Gonzales, Interior and Local Government Secretary

Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary Margarito
Teves as members. All the petitions, except that of the
IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and
Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar
Calderon.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should

prosper

HELD: No. Petitions Dismissed

POLITICAL LAW- A facial invalidation of a statute is
allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain
rules of constitutional litigation are rightly excepted
Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and
impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of
terrorism under RA 9372 in that terms like
"widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among
the populace" and "coerce the government to give in
to an unlawful demand" are nebulous, leaving law
SOUTHERN

HEMISPHERE

NETWORK,

ENGAGEMENT
vs.

INC

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

the
A

FACTS:

prohibited
statute

or

act

suffers

acts.
from

the

defect

ofvaguenesswhen it lacks comprehensible standards

Six petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed

challenging

enforcement agencies with no standard to measure

the

constitutionality

of

RA

9372,

otherwise known as the Human Security Act.

Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are
the Anti-Terrorism Council composed of, at the time
of the filing of the petitions, Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary
Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign
Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense

that men of common intelligence must necessarily

guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It
is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.The

overbreadth

doctrine,

meanwhile,

decrees that a governmental purpose to control or

6

prevent activities constitutionally subject to state

Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA

regulations may not be achieved by means which

9372, there must first be a predicate crime actually

sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the

committed to trigger the operation of the key

area

qualifying phrases in the other elements of the crime,

of

protected

freedoms.

including the coercion of the government to accede to

As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the

an "unlawful demand." Given the presence of the first

overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will

element, any attempt at singling out or highlighting

understand what a statute prohibits and will

the communicative component of the prohibition

accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though

cannot recategorize the unprotected conduct into a

some

protected

of

it

is

protected.

speech.

Distinguished from anas-applied challenge which

Petitioners notion on the transmission of message is

considers only extant facts affectingreallitigants,

entirely inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just one

afacial invalidation is an examination of the entire

particle of an element of the crime. Almost every

law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the

commission of a crime entails some mincing of words

basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on

on the part of the offender like in declaring to launch

the assumption or prediction that its very existence

overt criminal acts against a victim, in haggling on

may cause others not before the court to refrain from

the amount of ransom or conditions, or in negotiating

constitutionally

protected

speech

or

activities.

Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle in his

concurring
overbreadth

opinion

that

doctrines,as

the

vagueness

grounds

for

and
facial

challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant

cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge
against a criminal statute on either vagueness or
overbreadth grounds. Since a penal statute may only
be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners,
a limited vagueness analysis of the definition of
"terrorism" in RA 9372 is legally impermissible absent
an

actual

or

imminent

charge

against

them.

deceitful

transaction.

As earlier reflected, petitioners have established

neither an actual charge nor a credible threat of
prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited
vagueness analysis of the assailed definition of
"terrorism" is thus legally impermissible. The
Court reminds litigants that judicial power neither
contemplates speculative counseling on a
statutes future effect on hypothetical scenarios
nor allows the courts to be used as an extension
of a failed legislative lobbying in Congress.
Petitions Dismissed.

In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation

that the law penalizes speech, petitioners contend
that the element of "unlawful demand" in the
definition

of

terrorism

must

necessarily

be

transmitted through some form of expression

protected

by

the

free

speech

clause.
7

culprits.

L.FAY H. NEER AND PAULINE NEER (USA) V.

UNITED MEXICAN STATES
In a decision rendered on October 15, 1926, under the
Convention between the United
States of America and the United Mexican States of
1923, the Claims Commission
formulated a standard for denial of justice.
Neer v. United Mexican States, a three-page decision
rendered in 1926, is one of the most
cited precedents on denial of justice, fair and
equitable treatment, and minimum standard
of treatment in international law. Neer has been cited
in a number of investor-State
cases, including Pope & Talbot v. Canada, LG&E v.
Argentina, Thunderbird v. Mexico,
Waste Management II v. Mexico, GAMI v. Mexico,
Mondev v. United States, ADF v.
United States, Glamis Gold v. United States, and Merrill
& Ring Forestry v. Canada.
The continued vitality and evolution of the Neer
standard of treatment has been debated
by numerous arbitrators, counsel, and commentators.
Facts: In the evening of November 16, 1924, Paul
Neer, an American superintendent of a mine
in Guanacev, Mexico, was horseback riding to his
home with his wife. They were
stopped by a group of armed men, who shot and
killed Paul Neer. His wife escaped.
The United States espoused a claim against the
United Mexican States on behalf of
American citizens, L. Fay H. Neer, widow, and
Pauline E. Neer, daughter, who claimed
that they sustained damages in the amount of
$100,000.00. The United States alleged
that the Mexican authorities were liable as they
showed an unwarrantable lack of
diligence or an unwarrantable lack of intelligent
investigation in prosecuting the

Denial of Justice Standards:

The Commission, [w]ithout attempting to announce
a precise formula for denial of
justice, nonetheless went further than various
commentators and formulated an oft-quoted
standard: the treatment of an alien, in order to
constitute an international
delinquency, should amount to an outrage, to bad
faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or
to an insufficiency of governmental action so far
short of international standards
that every reasonable and impartial man would
readily recognize its insufficiency.2
According to the Commission, denial of justice could
result either from deficient
execution of a law that complies with international
standards, or from enacting a law
that falls short of international standards.3 The
Commission adopted a broad notion of
denial of justice, in stating that such offense could
arise out of the acts of the executive
and legislature, and not only the acts of the judiciary
In addition to setting a rigorous substantive standard,
the Commission imposed a heavy
evidentiary burden: convincing evidence.5 The
Commissions task was to inquire
whether there is convincing evidence either (1) that
the authorities administering the
Mexican law acted in an outrageous way, in bad faith,
in wilful neglect of their duties, or
in a pronounced degree of improper action, or (2)
that Mexican law rendered it
impossible for them properly to fulfil their task.
The Commission decided that the first prong
outrageous conduct, bad faith, wilful
neglect of duties, or a pronounced degree of
improper action was negated by the
8

record. The record showed that on the night of the

shooting, the local authorities went to
the crime scene and examined the corpse. The next
day, the judge proceeded to the
examination of witnesses, including Mrs. Neer. The
only eyewitness of the crime, Mrs.
Neer, was unable to provide any helpful information.
The investigation continued for
several days. Some suspects were arrested, but were
later released for want of evidence.7
In light of the record, the Commission was not
prepared to hold that the Mexican
authorities have shown such lack of diligence or such
lack of intelligent investigation in
apprehending and punishing the culprits as would
render Mexico liable.8
The Commission also noted that no attempt was
made to establish the second prong
Mexican law preventing the Mexican authorities from
living up to international
standards.9
Thus, the Commission dismissed the claim against
the United Mexican States
Concurring opinion:
The American Commissioner, Fred K. Nielsen,
concurred with the decision rejecting the
claim, but found himself unable to concur fully in
the statement of reasons upon which
the other two members of the Commission think the
award should be grounded.11
The four-page concurring opinion contains a more
detailed recitation of the facts and
analysis of the evidence, and a more elaborate
discussion of case-law and commentary.
The denial justice standard proffered by the
American Commissioner, however, is not
qualitatively different from that of the majority: a
denial of justice claim is justified when the
treatment of an alien reveals an obvious error in the
administration of
justice, or fraud, or a clear outrage.12 The American
Commissioner quoted the

Medina case between Costa Rica and the United

States, in which Commissioner
Bertinatti indicated that denial of justice by the
judiciary can be found only in limited
circumstances involving denial of free access to the
local tribunals, denial of equality
of treatment with the natives, dishonesty . . . of a
judge, denial of the means of
defense at the trial, or gross injustice.13
The American Commissioner likewise adopted the
same evidentiary standard as the
majority: convincing evidence.14 In denial of
justice cases, damages can be awarded
only on the basis of convincing evidence of a
pronounced degree of improper
governmental administration.15
With respect to the claim for the alleged neglect of
the authorities to take proper
measures to apprehend and punish the persons who
killed Neer,16 Mr. Nielsen opined
that better methods might have been used by the
Mexican authorities, and that the action
taken by them may well be adversely criticized.17 In
light of the record, however, Mr.
Nielsen was not prepared to decide that a charge of
a denial of justice can be maintained
against the Government of Mexico

PROSECUTOR
v.
ZDRAVKO MUCIC a/k/a PAVO
HAZIM DELIC
ESAD LANDO a/k/a ZENGA
On 11 April 2001 the President of the International
Tribunal remitted this case to the
Trial Chamber for review of the sentences passed on
Hazim Deli}, Zdravko Muci} and
9

Esad Lando.1 These sentences were passed after

their conviction by Trial Chamber II at
the conclusion of a trial on 16 November 1998.2 The
Appeals Chamber allowed appeals
against conviction and sentence on some of the
counts: it remitted the question of what
adjustment, if any, should be made to the original
sentences to a Trial Chamber to be
nominated by the President

The background was conveniently summarised by

the Appeals Chamber4 and this
account may be distilled as follows. The accused were
tried together with a fourth man,
Zejnil Delali}, who was acquitted. All four were
charged with numerous counts of grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 19495 under
Article 2 of the Statute of the
International Tribunal (Statute) and of violations of
the laws or customs of war under
Article 3. The charges arose from events which took
place in the ^elebi}i prison-camp in
Central Bosnia and Herzegovina. The roles of the
three accused were found to be as
follows:

Muci} was commander of the camp and was found

guilty, as a superior, for
crimes committed by his subordinates including
murder, torture and inhuman
treatment and as personally responsible for the
unlawful confinement of civilians.
(He was sentenced to a total of seven years
imprisonment.)
(b) Deli} was the deputy commander of the camp and
was found guilty as being
personally responsible for crimes including murder,
torture and inhuman treatment.
(He was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment.)
1

Lando was a guard at the camp and was found

guilty as being personally
responsible for crimes including murder, torture and
cruel treatment. (He was
sentenced to 15 years imprisonment.)
The Appeals Chamber upheld the convictions of all
three accused under Article 2
but held that where, as in the instant case, the
evidence establishes the guilt of an accused
based upon the same conduct under both Articles 2
and 3, a conviction should be entered
under Article 2 alone and the charges under Article 3
should be dismissed. As a result the
Appeals Chamber dismissed the cumulative
convictions against all three accused under
Article 3:6 the Chamber acknowledged that if the
Trial Chamber had not imposed double
convictions, a different outcome in terms of the
length and manner of sentencing might
have resulted7 and remitted the issue of sentencing
to a Trial Chamber to consider what
adjustment, if any, should be made to the original
sentence imposed on the accused to take
account of the dismissal of the cumulative counts.
The Appeals Chamber stressed that this
would involve not a complete rehearing on the matter
of sentence but for the Trial Chamber
to consider any adjustment after the parties have had
the opportunity to make relevant
submissions

The Appeals Chamber also quashed the convictions

of Deli} on two counts relating
to the killing of one detainee (counts 1 and 2),9 but
upheld the convictions of the same
accused on other counts relating to other incidents
(counts 3, 11, 18, 21, 42, 46).10 The
Chamber said that it would be convenient, when the
matter is remitted, for the new Trial
Chamber to consider what adjustments should be
made to the sentence of the accused as a
10

result of the reversal of his conviction on counts 1 and

2.11

The Appeals Chamber allowed the appeal by the

Office of the Prosecutor
(Prosecution) against the sentence of seven years
imprisonment concurrent passed on
Muci} on the grounds that the sentence did not have
sufficient regard to the gravity of the
offences and did not adequately reflect the totality of
Muci}s criminal conduct.12 The
Chamber also held that the Trial Chamber was in
error in its sentencing remarks in referring to Muci}s
failure to testify in such a way that the real possibility
was left open that it was
treated as an aggravating circumstance.13 The matter
of an appropriate, revised sentence
was referred to the new Trial Chamber with a
direction to consider the effect, if any, of the
error of the Trial Chamber on sentence and with an
indication that the Appeals Chamber
would have considered a sentence of around 10 years
imprisonment appropriate had it not
been for the adjustment of sentence necessary due to
the dismissal of the cumulative counts.

In an order relating to the briefs and hearing of this

remitted matter the Trial
Chamber directed that the parties should address
their arguments to the following issues:
(i) What adjustment, if any, should be made to the
sentence imposed on Deli} as
a result of the quashing of his convictions on counts 1
and 2;
(ii) What adjustment, if any, should be made to the
sentences imposed on Muci},
Deli} and Lando as a result of the Appeals
Chambers decision on
cumulative convictions;
(iii) What effect, if any, the original Trial Chambers
error in making adverse

reference to the failure of Muci} to give evidence had

on the sentence
imposed on him; and
(iv) What should be the appropriate sentence of
Muci} in the light of the
Appeals Chambers finding that the sentence
imposed on him was
manifestly inadequate.14

The Trial Chamber further ordered that the calling of

further evidence was
unnecessary since the Appeals Chamber had defined
the issues for determination as
involving an adjustment of sentence and not a rehearing, the parties having had the
opportunity of making relevant submissions.15

The relevant law relating to sentencing by Trial

Chambers is to be found in the
Statute and in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of
the International Tribunal (Rules).
The Statute provides that in determining terms of
imprisonment a Trial Chamber must take into
account factors such as the gravity of the offences and
the individual circumstances of
the convicted person and must have recourse to the
general practice regarding prison
sentences in the courts of the former Yugoslavia.16
The Rules provide that the Trial
Chamber must also take into account aggravating
and mitigating circumstances.17 The
Rules further provide that a Trial Chamber may
impose a single sentence for a number of
offences reflecting the totality of the criminal
conduct of the accused The practice of the
International Tribunal shows that the most important
consideration to which Trial Chambers must have
regard in sentencing is the gravity of the
offence.19 They must also have regard to the
individual circumstances of the accused and

11

any aggravating or mitigating factors and the

significance of retribution and deterrence in
sentences imposed by the International Tribunal.20
The fact that an accused held a position
of superior responsibility may be among the
aggravating factors.21

The Trial Chamber, in determining appropriate

sentences has taken account of these
matters of law and practice.
11. The Trial Chamber will now consider the matter
under the following headings:
(a) To impose an appropriate revised sentence on
Muci} and consider the effect
of the original Trial Chambers error in its sentencing
remarks.
(b) What adjustment, if any, should be made to the
sentence on Deli} as a result
of the quashing of his conviction on counts 1 and 2 of
the indictment?22
(c) What adjustment, if any, should be made to the
original sentences on all
three accused as a result of the dismissal of the
cumulative convictions under
Article 3?
16

ADJUSTMENT OF SENTENCES AS A RESULT OF

THE
DISMISSAL OF CUMULATIVE CONVICTIONS
34. It should be noted at the outset when dealing
with this topic that, prior to the instant
case, the practice of the International Tribunal had
been to allow accused to be convicted of
cumulative offences but to impose concurrent
sentences in order to avoid unfairness to the
accused: a practice confirmed by the Appeals
Chamber.64 The original Trial Chamber, in
passing sentence in this case, noted that it had earlier
decided that it would permit

cumulative charging, however, [it] is in this context

that the Trial Chamber orders that
each of the sentences be served concurrently.65
The Trial Chamber thus followed the
practice of entering cumulative convictions but
ordering that any resulting sentences be
served concurrently.

In remitting this case to a Trial Chamber the Appeals

Chamber noted that the final
sentence should reflect the totality of the culpable
conduct and overall culpability of the
offender which can be achieved either by the
imposition of one sentence or several
sentences (to run consecutively or concurrently), this
being a matter for the discretion of the
Trial Chamber The Prosecution submits that no
adjustment of sentence should be made under this
heading,67 relying on the fact that the convictions
which were upheld were based on the
same conduct as the convictions which have now
been quashed and that the original Trial
Chamber passed concurrent sentences on the
cumulative convictions.68 The Prosecution
further points out that the Appeals Chamber, when
stating that the sentencing consequences
of the dismissal of the cumulative convictions must
be considered by a reconstituted Trial
Chamber, commented that the latter would no
doubt consider whether the remarks of the
original Trial Chamber indicate that there should be
no adjustment downwards in the
sentence imposed.69 The Prosecution argued at the
hearing of 21 September 2001 that the
effect of the Appeals Chambers decision was to
remove the stigma of the cumulative convictions
and remove any potential prejudice in the timing of
ultimate release from prison
if such prejudice should, in fact, arise due to multiple
convictions, but that still the
underlying criminal conduct remains the same.70
37. In relation to the individual accused the
Prosecution submits as follows:71
12

(i) Given the gravity of his offences and the nature of

his conduct . . . no other
adjustment of Deli}s sentence is justified.72
(ii) No downward adjustment of Muci}s sentence is
justified in the light of its
upward revision in accordance with the Judgement of
the Appeals
Chamber.73
(iii) Lando remains convicted on nine counts under
Article 2 involving wilful
killing, torture and causing great suffering, and was
sentenced to a total of
15 years imprisonment, in which sentence the
Appeals Chamber found no
error: the convictions were for extremely serious
offences, his conduct was
described by the Trial Chamber as sadistic and no
adjustment is justified.

The facts underlying the convictions of Deli} and

Muci} having already been dealt
with, it remains to deal with those in relation to
Lando. The facts may be found
conveniently set out in the Judgement of the Appeals
Chamber74 and may be summarised as
follows. Lando was a guard in the ^elebi}i camp and
was convicted of nine counts of
grave breaches of the Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War of August 12, 194975 involving three sets
of offences. In each set there were
related charges involving violations of the laws or
customs of war (now dismissed). In the
first set of offences Lando was sentenced to 15 years
imprisonment on each of three
counts involving the wilful killing of three detainees
by beating them to death.76 These
detainees died as a result of brutal and severe
beatings, in one case accompanied by the act
of pinning a metal badge to the detainees head. The
next set of offences involved the torture of three other
detainees, inter alia, burning his victims on the hands
(in one case in

the mouth with heated pincers): for each of these

three offences he was sentenced to seven
years imprisonment.77 The third set of offences
involved the wilful causing of great
suffering or serious injury to two other detainees
whom he severely beat (pulling out the
tongue of one);78 and a similar offence in relation to
the other detainees in the camp who
were living in an atmosphere of terror due to their
being exposed to violent mistreatment
and the resultant fear of being killed or subjected to
physical abuse themselves.79 For these
three offences Lando was sentenced to five years
imprisonment. As noted, the sentences
were ordered to run concurrently, making a total of
15 years imprisonment. In sentencing
Lando, the original Trial Chamber referred to his
contribution to the atmosphere of terror
in the camp, his exhibiting of imaginative cruelty as
well as substantial ferocity, his
inflicting substantial pain, suffering and injury and
the savagery with which he beat to death
an elderly and defenceless man The Defence
submissions are as follows. Muci} submits that two
years should be
subtracted from his seven-year sentence in order to
reflect the dismissal of the Article 3
charges:81 the accused argues that it is incumbent
upon the Trial Chamber to remove the
prejudice of cumulative sentencing from this case82
and that the only reason for remitting
Muci}s case . . . was the Appeals Chambers belief
that the sentences imposed upon Muci}
for the Article 2 convictions should be reduced.83 [It
should be noted that the latter
submission is totally misconceived, first, in referring
to the belief of the Appeals Chamber
when such a belief is not manifest (and if it were it
would be irrelevant); and, secondly, if
it was the meaning of the Appeals Chambers
Judgement which was referred to, in misrepresenting
that meaning.]
40. Deli} submits that his sentence should be reduced
on the ground that the sentence
13

for one offence should be less severe than that for

two, even if the offences are
multiplicitous, i.e., the same for sentencing
purposes.84 He also submits that adjustment should
be made in order to reflect the violation of the rights
of the accused due to their
improper convictions of separate offences for the
same conduct and their thus being placed
in double jeopardy.85 In this connection, Deli} relies
on Aleksovski where the Appeal
Chamber, when increasing the sentence on the
accused, referred to the element of double
jeopardy in the process of appearing twice to be
sentenced for the same conduct, suffering
the consequent anxiety and distress and being
detained for a second time after a period of
release.86 [However, it must be noted that in
Aleksovski the Appeals Chamber was making
an allowance for the element of double jeopardy
when increasing a sentence and was not
contemplating a situation such as the present when
cumulative convictions have simply
been dismissed and no question of an accused being
detained for a second time or suffering
anxiety or distress arises.

Lando submits that it would be wrong to increase

the sentence and appropriate to
reduce it in order to reflect the Appeals Chambers
decision to dismiss the cumulative
convictions.87 He argues that since the Prosecution
did not appeal against the sentence and
no dissatisfaction with it was indicated by the
Appeals Chamber, the judgement of the latter
should be construed as indicating that to any extent
that any adjustment is made, it should
be made downwards.88 Further, that a reduction in
sentence would be appropriate because
(a) the accused stands convicted of fewer offences;
and (b) the accused was prejudiced by
what was, in effect, cumulative sentencing by the
original Trial Chamber.89 Finally, it is

submitted that the Trial Chamber should take into

account, in connection with the
possibility of rehabilitation, the progress made by the
accused since the original sentence
was passed.90 [In response to this submission the
Prosecution submits that Landos
personal circumstances have already been sufficiently
taken into account by the original
Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber.

The Trial Chamber finds that the argument that the

number of convictions is reduced
and, therefore, the sentence should be reduced, is not,
in the Trial Chambers view, realistic.
In the case of the three accused, the totality of their
criminal conduct has not been reduced
by reason of the quashing of the cumulative
convictions. The original Trial Chamber
specifically had this factor in mind in passing the
sentences which clearly would have been
the same without the cumulative convictions.
Accordingly, no adjustment to the original
sentences will be made on this account.

BELGIAN

Brief Fact Summary. Belgium (P) claimed Spain (D)

should be held accountable for the injury to a
Canadian corporation operating in Spain.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. A state assumes an

obligation concerning the treatment of foreign
investments based on general international law, once
the state admits foreign investments or foreign
nationals into its territory.
14

Facts. On behalf of Belgian nationals (P) who had

invested in a Canadian corporation, Belgium (P) sued
Spain (D) on the premise that Spain (D) was
responsible for acts in violation of international law
that had caused injury to the Canadian corporation
and its Belgian shareholders (P).

Issue. Does a state assumes an obligation concerning

the treatment of foreign investments based on general
international law, once the state admits foreign
investments or foreign nationals into its territory?
Held. Yes. A state assumes an obligation concerning
the treatment of foreign investments based on general
international law, once the state admits foreign
investments or foreign nationals into its territory. It is
highly imperative to draw a distinction between those
obligations of a state toward the international
community as a whole and those arising from the
field of diplomatic protection. It is only the party to
whom an international obligation is due can bring a
claim if a breach of an obligation that is the subject of
diplomatic protection occurs.

Discussion. The basic right of all human persons was

mentioned by the Court to be protected against
slavery and racial discrimination as deriving from
basic general international law. Such rights may
derive from international instruments of a universal
or quasi-universal character. Such obligations are
obligations erga omnes, that is, all states have a legal
interest in their protection.

FACTS:
August 14, 1957, the appellant and his common-law
wife, Sherly Reyes, went to the booth of the Manila
Packing and Export Forwarders carrying Four (4)
wrapped packages. The appellant informed Anita
Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend
in Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes asked if she
could examine and inspect the packages. She
refused and assures her that the packages simply
contained books, cigars, and gloves.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee

vs. ANDRE MARTI

Before the delivery of appellants box to the Bureau

of Customs and Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes
(Proprietor), following the standard operating
procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. A
peculiar odor emitted from the box and that the
gloves contain dried leaves. He prepared a letter
and reported to the NBI and requesting a
laboratory examinations. The dried marijuana
leaves were found to have contained inside the
cellophane wrappers.
15

members of the interview team, before the

commencement of the interview proper.
The accused appellant assigns the following
errors: The lower court erred in admitting in
evidence the illegality of search and seized objects
contained in the four (4) parcels.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the seizing of illegal objects is legal?

HELD:
Yes, appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

1. On the 18th, 19th and 20th March 1996, the second

accused in the present proceedings, Zdravko Mucic was
interviewed by investigators of the Office of the
Prosecutor (the "Prosecution") in Vienna, Austria. Ms.
Alexandra Pal who is an employee of the Conference
and Language Services Unit of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia Since 1991 (the "International
Tribunal") was present throughout the interviews. She
acted as an interpreter.
2. On 2 June 1997, a motion ex parte was filed on behalf
of Zdravko Mucic seeking an order to compel Ms.
Alexandra Pal to testify as a witness for his defence (the
"Defence"). The reason for this application is, according
to the Defence, that there was a contravention of the
provisions of Rules 42 and 43 of the International
Tribunals Rules of Procedure and Evidence (the
"Rules") during the interview of Mr. Mucic by the
Prosecution. The Defence allege that Mr. Mucic, having
earlier insisted on legal assistance at his interview,
suddenly changed his mind and agreed to be interviewed
without legal assistance. This change in his position is
alleged by the Defence to be suspicious and, they claim,
resulted from a conversation between Mr. Mucic and

3. At the commencement of the second interview on

19th March, Mr. Abribat, a member of the Prosecution
interviewing team (the other member of which was Mr.
DHooge), opened by referring to an earlier
conversation ("the Conversation") during which Mr.
Mucic had consented to being interviewed without legal
assistance. Mr. Abribat asked whether his position
remained the same. Mr. Mucic answered that he did not
need legal assistance. It is the Conversation, prior to the
actual interview that the Defence contends is suspicious.
4. The Defence states that Ms. Alexandra Pal was the
interpreter in all oral communications between Mr.
Mucic and the interview team. The record of the
Conversation between the interview team and Mr. Mucic
is not, however, contained in the record of the
proceedings of the interviews. Since Ms. Alexandra Pal
must have been present at the time of the Conversation,
when things might have been said which induced Mr.
Mucic to agree to being interviewed without legal
assistance, she is, in their view, a witness or potential
witness for the Defence as to what took place at that
time.
5. Concisely stated, the position of the Defence is that
where an omission is alleged in the record of
proceedings of an interview in which an interpreter has
participated, or where such record of proceedings of an
interview is alleged to be incomplete, the interpreter is a
witness or potential witness as to whether there was in
fact such omission or gap and as to what in fact occurred
during that time.
II. APPLICABLE PROVISIONS
6. A determination of the issues involved in this
application requires analysis of the relevant Articles of
the Statute of the International Tribunal (the "Statute")
and the relevant Rules. The following provisions of
these texts are applicable.
The Statute
Article 18
Investigation and preparation of indictment

16

3. If questioned, the suspect shall

be entitled to be assisted by
counsel of his own choice,
including the right to have legal
assistance assigned to him
without payment by him in any
such case if he does not have
sufficient means to pay for it, as
well as to necessary translation
into and from a language he
speaks and understands.
(Emphasis added.)

language he speaks
and understands:

....

(ii) the right to

have the free
assistance of an
interpreter if he
cannot understand
or speak the
language to be
used for
questioning;

(i) the right to be

assisted by counsel
of his choice or to
have legal
assistance assigned
to him without
payment if he does
not have sufficient
means to pay for it;

Article 21
Rights of the accused
4. In the determination of any
charge against the accused
pursuant to the present Statute,
the accused shall be entitled to the
following minimum guarantees,
in full equality:

....
Rule 62

...
Initial Appearance of Accused
(f) to have the free assistance of
an interpreter if he cannot
understand or speak the language
used in the International Tribunal;
....

Upon his transfer to the seat of

the Tribunal, the accused shall be
brought before a Trial Chamber
without delay, and shall be
formally charged. The Trial
Chamber shall:

The Rules
Rule 42
Rights of Suspects during Investigation
(A) A suspect who
is to be questioned
by the Prosecutor
shall have the
following rights, of
which he shall be
informed by the
Prosecutor prior to
questioning, in a

(i) satisfy itself

that the right of the
accused to counsel
is respected;
(ii) read or have
the indictment read
to the accused in a
language he speaks
and understands,
and satisfy itself
that the accused
understands the
indictment;
17

(iii) call upon the

accused to enter a
plea of guilty or
not guilty on each
count; should the
accused fail to do
so, enter a plea of
not guilty on his
behalf;

Rule 76
Solemn Declaration by Interpreters and Translators
Before performing any duties, an
interpreter or a translator shall
solemnly declare to do so
faithfully, independently,
impartially and with full respect
for the duty of confidentiality.

Rule 54
General Rule
At the request of either party or
proprio motu, a Judge or a Trial
Chamber may issue such orders,
summonses, subpoenas, warrants
and transfer orders as may be
necessary for the purposes of an
investigation or for the
preparation or conduct of the trial.

7. An examination of Article 18(3) of the Statute and the

Rules discloses the important position of the interpreter
in the administration of justice in the International
Tribunal. The interpreter, though nowhere defined,
fulfils a crucial role in the investigation and trial
process. The interpreter is an indispensable and
invaluable element in the investigation of a suspect and
an essential component of the trial process.
8. It is a fundamental right of a suspect or an accused
person to be informed promptly and in detail, in a

language which he understands of the nature and cause

of the charge against him. (See Article 21) It follows,
therefore, that where the suspect or accused cannot
speak or understand the language used in the
International Tribunal, the free assistance of an
interpreter shall be provided. (See Article 21(4)(f))
III. DEFINITION OF THE WORD
"INTERPRETER"
9. As the word "interpreter" is not defined in the Statute
or Rules, it is permissible to resort to the ordinary
dictionary meaning of the word within this context. The
Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (Seventh
Edition 1983) provides inter alia that an interpreter is
"one whose office it is to translate the words of persons
speaking different languages, [especiallyC orally in their
presence". On this basis, an interpreter may be defined
as one who interprets from either an official or unofficial language of the International Tribunal into the
official languages of the International Tribunal and vice
versa in judicial proceedings or proceedings related
thereto.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE STATUS AND DUTY OF
THE INTERPRETER
10. The interpreter is not one of the parties to the
proceedings. He or she is an officer of the International
Tribunal, and for the purposes of providing
interpretation before the Trial Chamber, an officer of the
Trial Chamber. Similarly, where the interpreter functions
in related judicial proceedings, he or she is an officer of
the International Tribunal. As such, the interpreter has
the status of an impartial third party in furtherance of the
administration of justice. By virtue of Rule 76, the
interpreter, before embarking on his or her duties, is
required to make a solemn declaration to interpret
faithfully, independently and impartially and with full
respect for the duty of confidentiality. Hence, the duties
of the interpreter in relation to the parties are
circumscribed by these obligations.
11. The interpreter would, therefore, seem to be in a
unique position and his or her services are available to
both parties. At the same time the interpreter, though
relied upon in order to constitute the record of all
proceedings, is not responsible for its authentication.
The interpreter is not required to keep a record of the
proceedings he interprets or translates. The function of
the interpreter is merely to pass on to the Trial Chamber,
18

for the benefit of the parties or to the parties directly,

whatever is said during the proceedings. He/she is
merely the means through which the parties and the Trial
Chamber are made to understand each other and to
follow the proceedings.
V. THE APPLICATION UNDER RULE 54
12. The application is brought under Rule 54, the
provisions of which have already been reproduced in
this decision. Implicit in Rule 54 are the conditions to be
satisfied before an application under the Rule can be
granted. The applicant should show that the order is
necessary for the purposes of investigation.
Alternatively, it must be shown that it is necessary for
the preparation or conduct of the trial. The satisfaction
of either of these conditions which are not cumulative,
will enable the grant of an application for an order under
Rule 54.
13. The test applied by Judge Antonio Cassese,
President of the International Tribunal, in Prosecutor v
Zejnil Delalic et al, Decision on the Prosecutors Motion
for the Production of Notes Exchanged Between Zejnil
Delalic and Zdravko Mucic, (IT-96-21-T), 11 November
1996, is as follows: (a) an order of the International
Tribunal must be necessary for the Prosecutor to obtain
such material; and (b) the material being sought must be
relevant to an investigation or prosecution being
conducted by the Prosecutor (in the instant case,
investigations being conducted by the defence). The
gravamen of the Rule according to the Presidents
Decision is whether it is necessary (not merely useful or
helpful) for the purpose of the investigation or for the
preparation or conduct of the trial. The applicant should
demonstrate that there is no other way to obtain the
evidence sought. The Trial Chamber considers this
interpretation useful in the present case.
14. The Defence contends that it is presently unable to
complete its investigation into what took place in Vienna
during the questioning of Mr. Mucic in March 1996. It is
only after investigating this issue that it contends it will
it be in a position to properly present its case and crossexamine witnesses Abribat, DHooge and Gschwendt (a
member of the Austrian Police Force). The complaint of
the Defence is posited essentially on the allegation of
completeness vel non of the record of the interrogation
of Mr. Mucic. Messrs. Abribat, DHooge and
Gschwendt, the Defence claims, were also present at the
alleged interrogation and it has not been denied that

these witnesses are capable of giving evidence as to

whether there was any unrecorded interrogation and as
to the nature of that interrogation. If the Defence
establishes that there was in fact an interrogation, but the
record of proceedings does not reflect what happened,
the Trial Chamber could draw the proper and legitimate
inference with regard to the omission.
15. The Trial Chamber is not persuaded by the
contention of defence counsel that the only way to fill
the gap created by any omissions in the proceedings is
through testimony of the interpreter. The suggestion
made to counsel during oral argument that the issue can
be ascertained and the omission rectified through proper
cross-examination of the other parties present during the
alleged questioning was rejected by him on the
presumption that, being witnesses for the prosecution,
they are not likely to be truthful against their interests.
16. The Trial Chamber is not satisfied that the Defence
has established that there is indeed an omission in the
record of proceedings of the interview of Mr. Mucic.
The Defence has alleged an unrecorded interrogation
and founded its allegation on suppositions of what might
have been said or done therein. This is clearly not a
satisfactory ground on which to base the application.
There is no undisputed evidence of the "previous
conversation" alleged to have taken place. In an ex parte
application, the facts relied upon should not be in
dispute. In the instant case we have only the ipse dixit of
the applicant, which could be rebutted. The Trial
Chamber is not satisfied that, on the evidence before it,
an order is necessary for investigation into the evidence
of whether there was a "previous conversation" and the
context of such a conversation.
VI. THE POSITION OF THE INTERPRETER
17. We have already defined the term "interpreter" and
examined their functions. There is no doubt that, if such
a "previous conversation" took place, Alexander Pal
acted as interpreter between the interview team and Mr.
Mucic and should be able to give evidence of the
incident. However, this would depend on one of the
following factors. First, there should be a legal duty on
Ms. Alexander Pal to make a record of the interpretation
between the parties; secondly, in the interest of justice,
there should be no other way of obtaining the evidence
sought other than through the testimony of the
interpreter; or thirdly, the determination of the issue
19

should depend entirely on the evidence to be given by

the interpreter.
18. The administration of justice is deliberately
transparent, to protect essential interests. Such
transparency is also intended to ensure public
confidence. Accordingly, the aphorism that justice
should be done and manifestly be seen to be done,
concerns the participation of all the functionaries
involved in the adjudicatory process. The considerations
of public policy which ensure confidentiality and protect
privileged situations such as dealings between counsel
and client and amongst jurors, is based on the principle
that the stream of justice should be kept pure and
undefiled from extraneous factors or fear or prejudice
arising from the transaction between the parties. It is on
the same hypothesis that judicial functionaries such as
clerks or registrars of courts should be protected from
matters arising from their official duties.
19. The interpreter, before embarking on his or her
duties in whatever capacity as translator, interpreter
before the Trial Chamber, or interpreter between the
investigators and suspects or accused, makes a
declaration under Rule 76, or similar undertaking upon
taking office. The essence of the declaration is to ensure
the maintenance of the position of impartiality owed to
the parties which is an essential prerequisite of the
interpreters function. The declaration emphasises the

independence of the interpreter from either party in the

proceedings and the confidentiality of the subject matter
interpreted. The interpreter or translator merely passes
information to either party of what the other has said in
the proceedings and the fact that he or she has no duty to
keep a record of what is said by either party makes
his/her position extremely difficult if invited to testify as
to what exactly was said.
20. It would not only be undesirable but also invidious
to compel an interpreter into the arena of conflict on
behalf of either party to the proceedings, for the
determination of an issue arising from such proceedings.
It should not be encouraged where other ways exist for
the determination of the issue. The interpreter cannot be
relied upon to testify on the evanescent words of his
interpretation in the proceedings between the parties. It
is also an important consideration in the administration
of justice to insulate the interpreter or other
functionaries of the International Tribunal from constant
apprehension of the possibility of being personally
involved in the arena of conflict, on either side, in
respect of matters arising from the discharge of their
duties. On both these grounds, the interests of justice
frowns upon any of the parties being able to call an
interpreter as a witness.

20