Statutory Construction Case Brief on People of the Philippines v. Buenviaje

1
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
ROUND 1
2
People of the Philippines v. Hon. Judge Palma and Romulo Intia y Morada
Case No. 219 G.R. No. L-44113 (March 31, 1977) Chapter I, Page 2, Footnote No.3
Primicias v. Municipality of Urdaneta
Case No. 244 G.R. No. L-26702 (October 18, 1979) Chapter I, Page 4, Footnote No.
14
FACTS: Private Respondent Romulo, 17 years of age, was charged with vagrancy. Re
spondent Judge dismissed the case on the ground that her court has no jurisdictio
n to take further cognizance of this case without prejudice to the re-filing ther
eof in the Juvenile Court, because he believed that jurisdiction over 16 years o
lds up to under 21 was transferred to the Juvenile Court by the issuance of PD 6
03 or the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which defines youthful offenders as thos
e over 9 years of age but under 21 at the time of the commission of the offense.
ISSUE: W/N the issuance of PD 603 transferred the case of the accused from the
regular courts to the Juvenile Court. HELD: The Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court expressly confers upon it a special and limited jurisdiction over criminal
cases wherein the accused is under 16 years of age at the time of the filing of
the case. The subsequent issuance of PD 603 known as the Child and Youth Welfare
Code and defines a youth offender as one who is over 9 years of age but under 21
at the time of the commission of the offense did not by such definition transfer
jurisdiction over criminal cases involving accused who are 16 and under 21 years
of age from the regular courts to the Juvenile Court. LATIN MAXIM: 35
FACTS: Petitioner, while driving his car in the jurisdiction of Urdaneta, was ch
arged with violation of Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, particularly, for overta
king a truck. Petitioner initiated an action for annulment of said ordinance and
prayed for the issuance of preliminary injunction for restraining Respondent fro
m enforcing the said ordinance. ISSUE: W/N Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, by t
he Municipality of Urdaneta, Pangasinan is valid. HELD: No. Ordinance No. 3 is s
aid to be patterned after and based on Section 53 of Act No. 3992. However, Act
No. 3992 has been explicitly repealed by RA No. 4136 (The Land and Transportatio
n Code). By this express repeal, the general rule is that a later law prevails o
ver an earlier law. Also, an essential requisite for a valid ordinance is that i
t must not contravene the statute for it is fundamental principle that municipal o
rdinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state. LATIN
MAXIM: 4, 6c, 49
3 Casco Philippine Chemical Co. Inc., v. Hon. Pedro Gimenez

Case No. 48 G.R. No. L-17931 (February 28, 1963) Chapter I, Page 9, Footnote No.
31
Astorga v. Villegas
Case No. 23 G.R. No. L-23475 (April 30, 1974) Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.37
FACTS: Petitioner was engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues. It so
ught the refund of the margin fees relying on RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin F
ee Law) stating that the Central Bank of the Philippines fixed a uniform margin
fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. However, the Auditor of the Bank re
fused to pass in audit and approved the said refunds upon the ground that Petiti
oners separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the pr
ovisions of Sec. 2, par. 18 of RA 2609. The pertinent portion of this statute re
ads: The margin established by the Monetary Board shall be imposed upon the sale
of foreign exchange for the importation of the following: XVIII. Urea formaldehyd
e for the manufacture of plywood and hardwood when imported by and for the exclu
sive use of end-users. ISSUE: W/N urea and formaldehyde are exempt by law from the pa
yment of the margin fee.
FACTS: House Bill No. 9266 was passed from the House of Representatives to the S
enate. Senator Arturo Tolentino made substantial amendments which were approved
by the Senate. The House, without notice of said amendments, thereafter signed i
ts approval until all the presiding officers of both houses certified and attest
ed to the bill. The President also signed it and thereupon became RA 4065. Senat
or Tolentino made a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 926
6 was a wrong version of the bill because it did not embody the amendments intro
duced by him and approved by the Senate. Both the Senate President and the Presi
dent withdrew their signatures and denounced RA 4065 as invalid. Petitioner argu
ed that the authentication of the presiding officers of the Congress is conclusi
ve proof of a bills due enactment. ISSUE: W/N House Bill No. 9266 is considered e
nacted and valid. HELD: Since both the Senate President and the Chief Executive
withdrew their signatures therein, the court declared that the bill was not duly
enacted and therefore did not become a law. The Constitution requires that each
House shall keep a journal. An importance of having a journal is that in the ab
sence of attestation or evidence of the bills due enactment, the court may resort
to the journals of the Congress to verify such. Where the journal discloses that
substantial amendment were introduced and approved and were not incorporated in
the printed text sent to the President for signature, the court can declare tha
t the bill has not been duly enacted and did not become a law. LATIN MAXIM: b2
HELD: The term urea formaldehyde used in Sec. 2 of RA 2609 refers to the finished
product as expressed by the National Institute of Science and Technology, and is
distinct and separate from urea and formaldehyde which are separate chemicals use
d in the manufacture of synthetic resin. The one mentioned in the law is a finis
hed product, while the ones imported by the Petitioner are raw materials. Hence,
the importation of urea and formaldehyde is not exempt from the imposition of the m
argin fee. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 6c, 25a
4 Ichong, etc., et al. v. Hernandez, etc., and Sarmiento

Case No. 133 G.R. No. L-7995 (May 31, 1957) Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.42
Municipality of Jose Panganiban v. Shell Co. of the Philippines
Case No. 181 G.R. No. L-25716 (July 28, 1966) Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.42
FACTS: Petitioner is a Chinese merchant who questions the constitutionality of R
A 1180 An Act to Regulate the Retail Business on the following grounds: a) It is a
violation of the Equal Protection of the Law Clause, denies them of their liber
ty, property and due process of law 2) It is a violation of the constitutional r
equirement that a bills title must reflect the subject matter of the same because
regulate does not really mean nationalize and prohibit 3) the Act violates Internatio
nal treaties and Laws ISSUE: W/N RA 1180 is constitutional. HELD: RA 1180 is con
stitutional. In the abovementioned case, what has been pointed out is the consti
tutional requirement that A bill shall embrace only one subject as expressed in i
ts title. This is to prohibit duplicity in legislation because the title must be
able to apprise legislators and the public about the nature, scope, and conseque
nces of that particular law. Constitution precludes the encroaching of one depar
tment to the responsibilities of the other departments. The legislature is prima
rily the judge of necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness, and expediency of
the law, and the courts have no jurisdiction to question this. LATIN MAXIM: 9a,
24a, d
FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Man
ila dismissing the Plaintiffs complaint for the collection of sales taxes from De
fendant on the ground that the law which authorizes collection of the same is un
constitutional. Defendant Company refused to pay taxes accruing from its sales b
ecause according to them the taxable sites of the property sought to be taxed is
not the said Municipality. According to the Defendant, RA 1435 or Act to Provid
e Means for Increasing Highway Special Fund is unconstitutional because it embra
ces two subjects which are 1)amendment of the tax code, and 2) grant of taxing p
ower to the local government, and makes reference to Road and Bridge Fund. ISSUE
: W/N RA 1435 is constitutional. HELD: RA 1435 is constitutional because it embr
aces only one subject reflected by its title Road and Bridge Fund. Statutory defin
ition prevails over ordinary usage of the term. The constitutional requirement a
s to the title of the bill must be liberally construed. It should not be technic
ally or narrowly construed as to impede the power of legislation. When there is
doubt as to its validity, it must be resolved against the doubt and in favor of
its validity. In the abovementioned cases, what is pointed out is the constituti
onal requirement that A bill shall embrace only one subject, expressed in its tit
le. This is to prohibit duplicity in legislation because the title must be able t
o apprise legislators and the public about the nature, scope, and consequences o
f that particular law. LATIN MAXIM: 12a, 37, d
5 People of the Philippines v. Buenviaje

Case No. 203 G.R. No. L-22945 (March 3, 1925) Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No.46
Alalayan v. National Power Corporation
FACTS: Defendant appeals the ruling of the trial court finding her guilty for th
e violation of illegal practice of medicine and illegally advertising oneself as a
doctor. Defendant practices chiropractic although she has not secured a certifica
te to practice medicine. She treated and manipulated the head and body of Regino N
oble. She also contends that practice of chiropractic has nothing to do with med
icine and that unauthorized use of title of doctor should be understood to refer t
o doctor of medicine and not to doctors of chiropractic, and lastly, that Act 3111
is unconstitutional as it does not express its subject. ISSUE: W/N chiropractic i
s included in the term practice of medicine under Medical laws provided in the Rev
ised Administrative Code. HELD: Act 3111 is constitutional as the title An Act to
Amend (enumeration of sections to be amended) is sufficient and it need not incl
ude the subject matter of each section. Chiropractic is included in the practice of
medicine. Statutory definition prevails over ordinary usage of the term. The con
stitutional requirement as to the title of the bill must be liberally construed.
It should not be technically or narrowly construed as to impede the power of le
gislation. When there is doubt as to its validity, it must be resolved against t
he doubt and in favor of its validity. A bill shall embrace only one subject, exp
ressed in its title, to prohibit duplicity in legislation by apprising legislator
s and the public about the nature, scope, and consequences of the law. LATIN MAX
IM: 2a, 7a, 25c, 37, d
FACTS: Republic Act No. 3043 is entitled An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth Act
No. 121. In Section 3 of the same act, Respondent is empowered, in any franchise
contract for the supply of electric power constituting 50% of the electric powe
r and energy of that franchisee, to realize a net profit of not more than 12% an
nually of its investments plus 2-month operating expenses; and NPC is allowed to
renew all existing franchise contracts so that the provisions of the act could
be given effect. ISSUE: W/N Section 3 is a subject which the bill title An Act to
Further Amend Commonwealth Act No. 121 does not embrace, thus making it a rider
because it is violative of the constitutional provision requiring that a bill, wh
ich may be enacted into law, cannot embrace more than one subject, which shall b
e expressed in its title. HELD: Section 3 is constitutional. Republic Act 3043 is
an amendatory act. It is sufficient that the title makes reference to the legis
lation to be amended (in this case Commonwealth Act 121). Constitutional provisi
on is satisfied if title is comprehensive enough to include the general object w
hich the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and every ends and mean
s necessary for its accomplishment. Title doesnt need to be a complete index of t
he contents of the act. LATIN MAXIM: 24a, 37, d
6 Cordero v. Hon. Cabatuando

Case No. 81 G.R. No. L-14542 (October 31, 1962) Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No.
47
Tobias v. Abalos
Case No. 291 G.R. No. L-114783 (December 8, 1994) Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote N
o.47
FACTS: Republic Act No. 1199 is the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines.
Section 54 of this act expressed that indigent tenants should be represented by
Public Defendant of Department of Labor. Congress then amended this in Republic
Act No. 2263: An Act Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act No. 1199. Section
19 of the amendatory act says that mediation of tenancy disputes falls under aut
hority of Secretary of Justice. Section 20 also provides that indigent tenants s
hall be represented by trial attorney of the Tenancy Mediation Commission. ISSUE
: W/N Sections 19 and 20 of Rep. Act No. 2263 is unconstitutional because of the
constitutional provision that No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrac
e more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. HELD:
Sections 19 and 20 are constitutional. The constitutional requirement is complie
d with as long the law has a single general subject, which is the Agricultural T
enancy Act, and the amendatory provisions no matter how diverse they may be, so
long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, will b
e regarded as valid. Constitutional provisions relating to subject matter and ti
tles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede pro
per legislation. LATIN MAXIM: 24a, 37, d
FACTS: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherw
ise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Ur
banized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong because Article VIII, Section
49 of this act provided that the congressional district of San Juan/ Mandaluyon
g shall be split into two separate districts. ISSUE: W/N the aforestated subject
is germane to the subject matter of R.A. No. 7675. HELD: RA 7675 is constitutio
nal. Contrary to Petitioners assertion, the creation of a separate congressiona
l district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subje
ct of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical c
onsequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city Moreover, a liberal co
nstruction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by th
is court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. The Constitution does not r
equire Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precisi
on as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute detail
s therein. LATIN MAXIM: 20a, d
7 Ayson and Ignacio v. Provincial Board of Rizal

Case No. 11 G.R. No. 14019 (July 26, 1919)
Lidasan v. Commission on Elections
Case No. 148 G.R. No. L-28089 (October 25, 1967) Chapter I, Page 13, Footnote No
.51
FACTS: The municipal council of Navotas, Rizal adopted its Ordinance No. 13, sec
tion 2 of which provided that all owners and proprietors of the industry known as
fishing, with nets denominated cuakit and pantukos, before engaging in fishing in t
he bay of this jurisdiction within three leagues from the shore-line of this mun
icipality, are obliged to provide themselves with a license issued by this munic
ipal government, after payment of a fee of P50 annually, payable every three mon
ths. The authority for the enactment of the ordinance was from section 2270 of th
e Administrative Code. ISSUE: W/N Section 2270 of the Administrative Code of 191
6, now Section 2324 of the Administrative Code of 1917, is invalid. HELD: Sectio
n 2270 of the Administrative Code of 1916, now section 2323 of the Administrativ
e Code of 1917 is valid. It does not violate Paragraph 17, section 5 of the Phil
ippine Bill which provided that no private or local bill which may be enacted int
o law shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed i
n the title of the bill because the Administrative Code is neither a private nor
a local bill. The Administrative Code of 1917 has for its title, An Act amending
the Administrative Code. It does not violate Paragraph 17, section 3 of the Jones
Law, which provided that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace mor
e than one subject and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill,
because it was merely a revision of the provisions of the Administrative Code en
acted for the purpose of adapting it to the Jones Law and the Reorganization Act
. LATIN MAXIM: 37
FACTS: Petitioner challenged Republic Act 4790, which is entitled An Act Creating
the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur as unconstitutiona
l on the ground that it includes barrios located in another province, which is C
otabato, violating the constitutional mandate that No bill which may be enacted i
nto law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the titl
e of the bill. This question was initially presented to the Respondents, which ad
opted a resolution in favor of RA 4790, prompted by the upcoming elections. ISSU
E: W/N Republic Act 4790 is constitutional. HELD: Republic Act 4790 is null and
void. The title An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of
Lanao del Sur projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur i
s affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there th
at communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new
Lanao del Sur town. The phrase in the Province of Lanao del Sur makes the title m
isleading and deceptive. The title did not inform the members of the Congress as
to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Co
tabato that were affected by the law, and the province of Cotabato itself that p
art of their territory is being taken away from their towns and provinces and ad
ded to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as
to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. These are the p
ressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic Act 4790.
LATIN MAXIM: d
8 Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Reyes

Case No. 169 G.R. No. 43263 (October 31, 1935) Chapter I, Page 13, Footnote No.
53
People of the Philippines v. Ferrer
Case No. 208 G.R. No. L-32613-14 (December 27, 1972) Chapter I, Page 13, Footnot
e No.50
FACTS: Respondent executed a chattel mortgage in favor of Petitioner. He failed
to pay some of the installments. Petitioner proceeded to foreclose its chattel m
ortgage. The mortgaged property was sold at a public auction by the sheriff of t
he City of Manila. After applying this sum, with interest, costs, and liquidated
damages to Respondents indebtedness, the latter owed the company a balance of P2
75.47 with interest. The company instituted an action for recovery when he faile
d to pay the deficiency of the debt. He pleaded as a defense that the company, h
aving chosen to foreclose its chattel mortgage, had no further action against hi
m for the recovery of the unpaid balance owed by him, as provided by Act No. 412
2. ISSUE: W/N Act No. 4122, entitled An Act to amend the Civil Code by inserting
between Sections fourteen hundred and fifty-four and fourteen hundred and fiftyfive thereof a new section, to be known as section fourteen hundred and fifty-fo
ur-A, is valid. HELD: Act No. 4122 is valid and enforceable. The controlling purp
ose of Act No. 4122 is revealed to be to close the door to abuses committed in c
onnection with the foreclosure of chattel mortgages when sales were payable in i
nstallments. The general rule is adopted in this jurisdiction to the effect that
a title which declares a statute to be an act to amend a specified code is suff
icient and the precise nature of the amendatory act need not be further stated.
The proper approach in cases of this character should be to resolve all presumpt
ions in favor of the validity of an act in the absence of a clear conflict betwe
en it and the Constitution. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 37
FACTS: Private Respondents were respectively charged with a violation of Republi
c Act No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Act. RA 1700 outlaws the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and other subversive associations and pun
ishes any person who knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself wi
th, becomes or remains a member of the CPP or any other organization subversive in
nature. Tayag filed a motion challenging the validity of the statute due to its
constitutional violations. The lower court declared the statute void on the grou
nds that it was a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overbroad. The case
s were dismissed, to which the Government appealed. ISSUE: W/N the title of the
act satisfies the constitutional provision on bill titles. HELD: Yes. The title
of the bill need not be a catalogue or an index of its contents, and need not re
cite the details of the Act. It is a valid title if it indicates in clear terms
the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. A narr
ow and technical construction is to be avoided, and the statute will be read fai
rly and reasonably in order not to thwart the legislative intent. The Anti-Subve
rsion act fully satisfies these requirements. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9d, 51d
9 Del Rosario v. Carbonell, et al.

Case No. 33 G.R. No. L-32476 (October 20, 1970)
People of the Philippines v. Valeriano Valensoy y Masa
Case No. 230 G.R. No. L-9659 (May 29, 1957) Chapter I, Page 14, Footnote No. 55
FACTS: Petitioner questions the constitutionality of RA 6132. The said Act purpo
rtedly encompasses more than one subject for the title of the Act allegedly fail
s to include the phrase TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPI
NES. The statute plainly reads: An Act Implementing Resolution to Both Houses Numb
ered Two as Amended by Resolution of Both Houses Numbered Four of the Congress o
f the Philippines Calling for a Constitutional Convention, Providing for Proport
ional Representation Therein and Other Details Relating to the Election of Deleg
ates to and the Holding of the Constitutional Convention, Repealing for the Purp
ose Republic Act Four Thousand Nine Hundred Fourteen, and for Other Purposes. ISS
UE: W/N RA 6132 is unconstitutional for embracing more than one subject. HELD: N
o. The inclusion of the title is superfluous and therefore unnecessary because t
he title expressly indicates that the act implements Resolutions on both Houses
Nos. 2 and 4 respectively of 1967 and 1969, and both Resolutions No. 2 and 4 lik
ewise categorically state in their titles that the Constitutional Convention cal
led for therein is to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines, w
hich phrase is reiterated in Sec. 1 of both Resolutions. The power to propose am
endments to the Constitution is implied in the call for the convention itself, w
hose raison detre is to revise the present Constitution. It is not required that
the title of the bill be an index to the body of the act or be comprehensive in
matters of detail. It is enough that it fairly indicates the general subject and
reasonably covers all the provisions of the act so as not to mislead Congress o
r the people. All the details provided for in RA 6132 are germane to and are com
prehended by its title. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9d, 51d
FACTS: Defendant was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila for violat
ion of Section 26 of Act No. 1780 by concealment of a bolo. The defendant moved
to quash the information on the ground that the title of the act, which was an Ac
t to regulate the importation, acquisition, possession, use, and transfer of fir
earms, and to prohibit the possession of same except in compliance with the prov
isions of this Act, did not include weapons other than firearms, and that Section
26 violated the constitutional provision that no bill which may be enacted into
law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of
the bill. ISSUES: 1. W/N Act No. 1780 violated the one subject-one title rule 2.
W/N it was inconsistent with the Constitution. HELD: No. At the time of the ena
ctment of Act No. 1780 on October 12, 1907, the one subject-one title rule refer
red to private and local bills only, and to bills to be enacted into a law and n
ot to law that was already in force and existing at the time the 1935 Constituti
on took effect. The provision of Section 26 germane to the subject expressed in
the title of the Act remained operative because it was not inconsistent with the
Constitution, pursuant to Section 2 of Article XVI of the 1935 Constitution. LA
TIN MAXIM: 30a, 36a, 46a, 50
10 People of the Philippines v. Apolonio Carlos

Case No. 204 G.R. No. L-239 (June 30, 1947) Chapter I, Page 16, Footnote No.63
People of the Philippines v. Leoncio Lim
FACTS: The Peoples Court found the Appellant, guilty of treason. Appellant attack
ed the constitutionality of the Peoples Court Act on the ground that it contained
provisions which deal on matters entirely foreign to the subject matter express
ed in its title, such as: (1) a provision which retains the jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance; (2) a provision which adds to the disqualification of J
ustices of the Supreme Court and provides a procedure for their substitution; (3
) a provision which changed the existing Rules of Court on the subject of bail,
and (4) a provision which suspends Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. ISSUE:
W/N the Peoples Court Act was unconstitutional. HELD: No. The Peoples Court was i
ntended to be a full and complete scheme with its own machinery for the indictme
nt, trial and judgment of treason cases. The provisions mentioned were allied an
d germane to the subject matter and purposes of the Peoples Court Act. The Congre
ss is not expected to make the title of an enactment a complete index of its con
tents. The constitutional rule is satisfied if all parts of a law relate to the
subject expressed in its title. LATIN MAXIM: 9a
FACTS: In March 1954, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources pursuan
t to the authority granted him by Sections 3 and 4 of Act No. 4003 (Fisheries Ac
t) issued Fisheries Administrative Order No. 37. Section 2 of said order prohibi
ts trawl fishing in certain areas in Samar. FAO No. 37 was subsequently amended
with FAO No. 371. Leoncio Lim, the accused in violation of said order, challenged
its legality on the ground that FAO No. 371 was contrary to Act No. 4003, the fo
rmer having no fixed period and thus establishing a ban for all time while the l
atter stating that prohibition was for any single period of time not exceeding fi
ve years duration. ISSUE: W/N Section 2 of FAO No. 371 was invalid. HELD: Section 2
of FAO No. 371 was valid. Although FAO No. 371 was defective because it failed to
specify a period for the ban, it was ruled that in case of discrepancy between
a basic law and a rule issued to implement it, the basic law prevails because th
e rule cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the law. FAO No. 371 would be
inoperative in so far as it exceeded the period of five years for any single pe
riod of time, but it was not necessarily rendered void by the omission. LATIN MA
XIM: 37, 38a
11 KMU Labor Center v. Garcia Jr.

Case No. 68 G.R. No. 115381 (December 23, 1994)
Hijo Plantation, Inc. v. Central Bank
Case No. 57 G.R. No. L-34526 (August 9, 1988)
FACTS: DOTC Memorandum Order No. 90-395 was filed asking the LTFRB to allow prov
incial bus operators to charge passengers rates within a range of 15% above and
below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one year. LTFRB issued Memorandum
Circular No.92-009 allowing for a range of plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescri
bed fares. PBOAP, without a public hearing and permission from LTFRB, availed of
the deregulatory policy and announced 20% increase in existing fares. Petitione
r filed a petition opposing the increase in fares. SC issued a temporary restrai
ning order to prevent PBOAP from implementing fare increase. ISSUES: 1. W/N auth
ority given by LTFRB to PBOAP to increase prices at 20% instead of 15% is uncons
titutional on the ground that there was no filing for a petition of purpose in t
he said increase. 2. W/N PBOAP proved that there was a public necessity for the
increase thus violating the Public Service Act and Rules of the Court. HELD: 1.
LTFRB did not have authority to delegate its powers to PBOAP. 2. PBOAP was not a
ble to prove and provide such public necessity as reason for the fare increase.
LATIN MAXIM: None
FACTS: Congress approved RA No. 6125 entitled An act imposing STABILIZATION TAX O
N CONSIGNMENTS ABROAD TO ACCELERATE THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
FOR OTHER PURPOSES Petitioners expected to pay 4% of the aggregate value from Jul
y 1, 1972- June 30, 1973, as provided in the Act. The Central bank released Mone
tary Resolution No. 1995 which states that: For exports of bananas shipped durin
g the period from January 1, 1972- June 30, 1972; the stabilization tax shall be
at the rate of 6%. For exports of bananas shipped during the period from July 1
, 1972 to June 30, 1973; the stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 4%. For e
xports of bananas shipped during the period from July 1, 1973- June 30, 1974; th
e stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 2%. ISSUE: W/N Central bank acted wi
th grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it issued Mo
netary Board Resolution No. 1995. HELD: Central Bank acted with grave abuse of d
iscretion. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and the rule or regulati
on issued to implement the said law, the basic law prevails. The rule or regulat
ion cannot go beyond the terms of the basic law. LATIN MAXIM: 9c
12 China Banking Corp. v. CA

Case No. 59 G.R. No. 121158 (December 5, 1996) Chapter I, Page 19, Footnote No.8
4
Santos v. Honorable Estenzo
Case No. 140 G.R. No. L-14740 (September 26, 1960)
FACTS: Petitioner extended loans to Native West Corp. and its president, So Chin
g, in return for promissory notes to pay the loans. Two extra mortgages were add
itionally executed by So Ching and his wife on July and August 1989. The loans m
atured but So Ching was not able to repay the said loans. This caused Petitioner
to file for extra judicial foreclosures of the two mortgaged properties. The pr
operties were to be sold/auctioned on April 3, 1993. On April 28, 1989 the court
ruled on the side of So Ching. The issuance of the preliminary injunction was g
ranted; therefore the sale of the two mortgaged properties was stopped. Petition
er sought for reconsideration and elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The
y were appealing that Act No. 3135 was the governing rule in their case, instead
of Administrative Order No. 3 as So Ching was contending. ISSUE: 1. W/N Petitio
ner can extra-judicially foreclose the properties. 2. W/N Administrative Order N
o. 3 should govern the extra judicial foreclosure. HELD: 1. Petitioner can forec
lose the properties. 2. Act No. 3135 is the governing law. Administrative Order
No. 3 cannot prevail over Act 3135. It is an elementary principle that a stature
is superior to an administrative directive. Thus, the statute cannot be repeale
d or amended by the administrative directive. LATIN MAXIM: None
FACTS: The decedent is a driver for Peoples Land Transportation Company, of which
Petitioners are manager and proprietor. The Workmens Compensation Commission awa
rded the decedents widow the amount of P3,494.40, plus burial expenses not exceed
ing P200. After 5 years, Respondent, in a civil case filed by the mother of the
decedent, ordered Petitioners to pay the award plus P500 as attorneys fees for fa
ilure to comply. Petitioners pray that the decision be annulled or modified base
d on Section 1 Rule 11 the Rules of the Workmens Compensation Commission and pray
s further that the P500 in attys fees exceeded the allowed fees according to Sec.
6 Rule 26 of the said Rules. ISSUE: 1. W/N the Rules of the Workmens Compensation
Commission amended R.A. No. 772 and as a result deprived the court of its juris
diction over the case. 2. W/N the court committed a grave abuse of discretion in
awarding the P500 in attorneys fees. HELD: Petition was dismissed. 1. The Commis
sion, or any of its rules, cannot amend an act of Congress. Furthermore, the Rul
e was promulgated more than 2 years after the court had acquired jurisdiction ov
er the main case. 2. The court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in award
ing the P500 since the said rule only applies to the Commission and not the Cour
t. LATIN MAXIM: 30, 35, 46a
13 Grego v. Commission on Elections

Case No. 120 G.R. No. 125955 (June 19, 1997) Chapter I, Page 23, Footnote No.98
Santos v. Municipal of Caloocan
Case No. 141 G.R. No. L-15807 (April 22, 1963)
FACTS: One of the Respondents was elected for his 3 and final term as councilor
of the 2nd District of Manila. His qualifications are being questioned by herein
Petitioner, who is also asking for the suspension of his proclamation. Petition
er brings into consideration the fact that Respondent was removed from his posit
ion as Deputy Sheriff upon finding of serious misconduct in an administrative ca
se held on October 31, 1981. Petitioner argues that Respondent should be disqual
ified under Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code. Petitioner further argue
s that the Local Government Code should be applied retroactively. ISSUE: W/N or
not the Section 40 of the Local Government Code should be applied retroactively
due to its wording. HELD: Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code should not
be applied retroactively. It is understood that statutes are not to be construed
as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings, u
nless such intent is expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from
the language of the enactment. The fact that the provision of the Code in questi
on does not qualify the date of a candidates removal and that it is couched in th
e past tense should not deter the court from applying the law prospectively. The
term to be looked at in the issue is REINSTATEMENT, which has a technical meani
ng, referring only to an appointive position. Since Respondent was reelected, th
is does not fall under the scope of the term. LATIN MAXIM: 25a, 46c
rd
FACTS: Respondent issued Ordinance No. 24 charging slaughterhouses in the munici

pality certain fees including slaughterhouse fees, meat inspection fees, corral fees,
nd internal organ fees, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 655. Petitioners questio
ned the validity or said Ordinance. ISSUE: W/N Respondent, in the issuance of Or
dinance No. 24, exceeded the limits of its jurisdiction provided by Commonwealth
Act 655. HELD: Respondent exceeded its jurisdiction in the issuance of the said
ordinance. The Commonwealth Act only allowed Respondent to charge slaughterhous
e fees. When Respondent ordained the payment of other said fees, it overstepped
the limits of its statutory grant. The only other fees that would be acceptable
were veterinary or sanitary inspection fees since it was mentioned in the statut
e. Incidentally, the court ordered Respondent to refund the fees with the except
ion of slaughterhouse fees. One of the rules of statutory construction is that cert
ain sections or parts of sections of an ordinance may be held invalid without af
fecting the validity of what remains, if the parts are not so interblended and d
ependent that the vice of one necessarily vitiates the others. LATIN MAXIM: 15a,
37
14 National Housing Authority v. Reyes

Case No. 85 G.R. No. 49439 (June 29, 1983)
Francisco Lao Lim v. CA and Benito Villavicencio Dy
Case No. 73 G.R. No. 87047 (October 31, 1990)
FACTS: Private Respondents owned a parcel of land of 25,000 sq/rn, subject of an
expropriation proceedings granted by the court in favor NHA. Respondents claime
d they should be paid the assessed value of P6,600.00 pursuant to PD 42. Petitio
ner opposed the payment claiming that it was too excessive. He cited PD 464 whic
h provides just compensation not to exceed the market value declared by the owne
r in the amount of P1,400.00. Respondent Judge granted the payment of P6,600.00,
but Petitioner had opposed it pursuant to PD 1224 which states that the governm
ent shall choose between the value of real property as declared by the owner x x
x or the market value determined by the City or Provincial Assessor, whichever
is lower. ISSUE: W/N PD 464 as amended by PD 1224 determines the valuation on ju
st compensation. HELD: Courts accord the presumption of validity to executive ac
ts and legislative enactments, x x x because the legislature is presumed to abid
e by the Constitution x x x. The Respondent Judge should have followed just comp
ensation in expropriation cases, that the lower value made by the landowner shou
ld be the basis for fixing the price. The petition for Certiorari is granted. LA
TIN MAXIM: 37
FACTS: Private Respondent entered into a contract of lease with Petitioner for a
period of 3 years. After it expired, Private Respondent refused to vacate the p
remises, and hence, the filing of an ejectment suit against the Respondent. The
case was terminated by a compromise agreement, and the lease continued from 1979
to 1982, then from 1982 to 1985. The Petitioner filed another ejectment suit. T
he trial court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that (1) the lease contrac
t has not expired; and (2) the compromise agreement entered into constitutes res
judicata. Petitioner appealed to the RTC of Manila and then to the CA which als
o affirmed the decision of the trial court. ISSUE: 1. W/N the continuance of lea
se is made to depend upon the will of the lessee? 2. W/N the action for ejectmen
t is barred by compromise agreement on res judicata? HELD: This is untenable bec
ause the continuance of lease is not dependent upon the will of the lessee. On t
he compromise agreement, the lease is not for perpetual renewals unless the lang
uage employed indicates that it was the intention of the parties. On the second
issue, the compromise agreement does not apply because the present case requires
a different set of evidence. The compromise agreement does not foreclose any ca
use of action arising from a violation of the terms thereof, and hence, res judi
cata does not apply. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 11a, 26,
15 Hon. Alfredo S. Lim v. Felipe G. Pacquing;

Case No. 74 G.R. No. 115044 (January 27, 1995)
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union
Case No. 169 G.R. No. L-25246 (September 12, 1974)
FACTS: Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring the authority to regulate
JaiAlai from local governments to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB). The Cit
y of Manila passed an Ordinance No. 7065 authorizing the mayor to allow the Asso
ciated Development Corporation (ADC) to operate a JAI-ALAI. Then President Marco
s issued a PD 771 revoking all powers and authority of local governments to gran
t franchise, license or permit, to Jai-Alai and other forms of gambling. Then Pr
esident Aquino issued an E.O. No. 169 expressly repealing PD. No. 810 which revo
kes and cancels the franchise granted to the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement C
orporation. In 1998, ADC tried to operate a Jai-Alai, but the Games and Amusemen
t Board intervened and invoked P.D. 771 which expressly revoked all existing fra
nchises and permits to operate all forms of gambling issued by local governments
. ISSUE: 1. W/N the franchise granted by the City of Manila to ADC is valid in v
iew of E. 0. No. 392 which transferred from local governments to the GAB the pow
er to regulate Jai-Alai. 2. W/N the ADC is correct in assailing that P.D. 771 is
violative of equal protection and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution. H
ELD: R.A. 409 provides that Congress did not delegate to the City of Manila the
power to franchise the operation of Jai-Alai. And E.O. 392 removes the power of lo
cal governments to issue license and permit. All laws are presumed valid and con
stitutional. PD 771 was not repealed or amended by any subsequent law. It did no
t violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because the said decre
e had revoked all franchises issued by the local governments without exceptions.
LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 6c, 37, 44, 50
FACTS: Petitioner, an Iglesia ni Cristo, was a member of the Respondent Union whic
h had with their Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a closed s
hop provision allowed under R.A. 875: Membership in the Union shall be required a
s a condition of employment for all permanent employees workers covered by this
Agreement RA 3350 amended RA 875: but such agreement shall not cover members of a
ny religious sect which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor
organization. Petitioner resigned from Respondent Union, which wrote a formal let
ter to the Company asking to separate the Petitioner from service. ISSUE: 1. W/N
RA 3350 violates right to form or join association? 2. W/N RA 3350 is constitut
ional? 3. W/N the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when ruling th
at the Union should pay 500 and attorneys fee. HELD: The right to join associatio
ns includes the right not to join or to resign from a labor organization. Sectio
n 1 960 of Art III of the 1935 Constitution, as well as Section 7 of Art IV of t
he 1973 Constitution, provide that the right to form associations for purposes n
ot contrary to law shall not be abridged. Article 2208 of the Civil Code provide
s that attorneys fees and expenses of litigation may be awarded when the defendants
act has compelled the Plaintiff to incur expenses to protect his interest and in
any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorneys fees an
d expenses of litigation should be recovered. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 40b
16 Taada v. Tuvera
Case No. 287 G.R. No. L-63915 (December 29, 1986) Chapter I, Page 37, Footnote N
o.159
Gutierrez v. Carpio
Case No. 55 G.R. No. 31025 (August 15, 1929)
FACTS: Due process was invoked by the Petitioners in demanding the disclosure of
a number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as r
equired by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a
rule, it was not so when it was otherwise provided as when the decrees themselves
declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. ISS
UE: W/N the clause otherwise provided in Article 2 of Civil Code pertains to the n
ecessity of publication. HELD: No, the clause otherwise provided refers to the dat
e of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication per se, which cannot
in any event be omitted. Publication in full should be indispensable. Without su
ch notice or publication, there would be no basis for the application of the max
im ignorantia Legis non excusat. The court, therefore, declares that presidential
issuances of general application which have not been published shall have no for
ce and effect, and the court ordered that the unpublished decrees be published i
n the Official Gazette immediately. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a
FACTS: The Litigants here compromised a civil case on July 13, 1928, agreeing th
at if within a month from the date thereof the Plaintiffs failed to repurchase a
certain land, the ownership would vest in the Defendants. But when the Plaintif
fs duly tendered the amount, the Defendants appealed that by that time, August 1
3, 1928, the time when the Plaintiffs tendered it, the stipulated or fixed perio
d had already elapsed. ISSUE: W/N the stipulated period elapsed on the time of t
endering. HELD: No. The repurchase of the land was made within the stipulated pe
riod. The above issue depends upon the kind of month agreed upon by the parties,
and on the day from which it should be counted. Article 7 of the Civil Code had
been modified by Sec. 13 of the Administrative Code, according to which month now
means the civil month and not the regular-30-day month. In computing any fixed
period of time, with reference to the performance of an act required by law or c
ontract to be done within a certain limit of time, the day from which the time i
s reckoned is to be excluded and the date of performance included, unless otherw
ise provided. There is nothing in the agreement providing otherwise. LATIN MAXIM
: 2a, 39a
17 Guzman v. Lichauco
U.S. v. Paniaga
Case No. 161 G.R. No. 8223 (March 4, 1914)
FACTS: Plaintiff filed two actions of unlawful detainer to recover possession of
certain properties in Manila. The trial court decided in favor of the Plaintiff
. The unsuccessful Defendants having appealed in both cases on Dec. 9, 1920 to t
he Court of First Instance of Manila, it is their duty to conform with the provi
sions of Sec. 88 of the CCP, as amended by Act No. 2588, in case they desire to
avoid the immediate execution of the judgment pending the appeal, to pay the Pla
intiff, or to deposit in court, on or before the TENTH day of each Calendar month,
the sums of money fixed by the Justice of the Peace as the reasonable value of
the use and occupation of the property held by them. The Defendants made such di
latory payments however they failed to make such payments on or before the tenth
day of the month. As a result, the Plaintiff moved the court to execute the jud
gments. The court ordered the immediate execution of the judgment. ISSUE: W/N th
e payments were made on or before the Tenth day of each month.
FACTS: This is an appeal by the government from an order of the court, setting a
side the forfeiture of a bail bond. Judgment was rendered against the principal
on February 7, and the sureties were notified on the same day to produce the the
reof their principal. On Feb 28, the court ordered that the Defendants bond be fo
rfeited and the execution issued against the principal and the sureties for the
amount thereof, and that an alias warrant be issued for the arrest of the Defend
ant. By various orders of the court, the sale was postponed from time to time, a
nd finally occurred on July 8, 1912, with government as the purchaser. On July 1
0, 1912, the principal was arrested. On July 13, 1912, the court, on application
of the sureties, set aside the order of forfeiting the bond, and ordered the sh
eriff to annul the sale. ISSUE: W/N the execution sale occurred on the date dire
cted by the court. HELD: Sec. 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: unless o
therwise specially provided, the time within which an act is required by law to
be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last; if
the last be a Sunday or a legal holiday, it shall be excluded. This section is on
ly applicable if there is a computation needed to be done. However, in this case
, there is no necessity for such computation for the date is fixed for when the
act be performed. It is also directed that the sale should take place on a named
future date. The sale here of the property must stand. LATIN MAXIM: 6c
HELD: The payment made on August 11, 1921 was one day late. The term month must no
w be understood to refer to calendar month, inasmuch as Sec 13 of the Administra
tive Code has modified Art. 7 of the civil code in so far as the latter fixes th
e length of a month at thirty days. LATIN MAXIM: 25a, 25c
18 PNB v. CA
Case No. 238 G.R. No. 98382 (May 17, 1993) Chapter I, Page 47, Footnote No.195
Hidalgo v. Hidalgo
Case No. 124 G.R. No. L-25326 (May 29, 1970) and G.R. No. L-25327 (May 29, 1970)
Chapter II, Page 52, Footnote No.19
FACTS: To secure payments of his loans, Private Respondent mortgages two lots to
Petitioner bank. For failure to pay the obligation, Petitioner bank extrajudici
ally foreclosed the mortgaged property and won the highest bidder at the auction
sale. Then, a final deed of sale was registered in the Buacan Registry of Prope
rty in favor of the Petitioner bank and later sold the said lots to a third part
y. The notices of sale of Appellants foreclosed properties were published on Marc
h 28, April 11 and April 12, 1969 issues of the newspaper Daily Record. The date
March 28, 1969 falls on a Friday, while the dates April 11 and 12 fall on a Frid
ay and Saturday, respectively. Section 3 of Act No. 3135 requires that the notic
e of auction sale shall be published once a week for at least three consecutive w
eeks. ISSUE: W/N the Petitioner bank complied with the requirements of weekly pub
lication of notice of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages. HELD: It must be c
onceded that that Article 13 is completely silent as to the definition of what i
s week. In Concepcion v. Andueta, the term week was interpreted to mean as a period
of time consisting of seven consecutive days. The Defendant-Appellee bank failed
to comply with the legal requirement of publication. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 9a, 9b
FACTS: Petitioners pray to Agrarian Court to be entitled as share tenants to red
eem parcel of land they are working from the purchasers where no notice was prev
iously given to them by the vendor of the latters intention to sell the property
and where the vendor did not execute the affidavit required by Sec. 13 of the Ag
ricultural Land Reform Code before the registration of the deed of sale. Agraria
n Court dismissed petitions, stating that the right of redemption granted by Sec
. 12 of the same code is only for leasehold tenants and not for share tenants, c
laiming that share tenancy and leasehold tenancy are within the jurisdiction of
the code that the code expressly grants said right to leaseholders only and nobo
dy else. Moreover, the court held that if the intention of Congress was to exten
d the right of redemption to share tenants through judicial legislation, the sec
tion would have expressly said so. ISSUE: W/N not the right of redemption grante
d by Sec. 12 of the Agrarian Reform Code addresses only leaseholders and not sha
re tenants. HELD: Agrarian Court fell into several erroneous assumptions and pre
mises, reducing agricultural lessee to only leasehold tenants. The purpose of the Ag
ricultural Land Reform Code is the abolition of agricultural share tenancy. The
policy of the State is to establish owner cultivatorship. Adherence to the lette
r would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions and would defeat the p
lain and vital purpose of the statute. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 11a, 12a, 36a, 37, 4
0a Maxims invoked by lower court: 6c, 30b, 43
19 U.S. v. Navarro
Case No. 300 G.R. No. 6160 (March 21, 1911) Chapter II, Page 52, Footnote No.20
Litex Employees Association v. Eduvala
Case No. 149 G.R. No. L-41106 (September 22, 1977) Chapter II, Page 53, Footnote
No.22
FACTS: They made an oath before an election officer in the municipality of Piddi
g (in proceedings in connection with the general election held on Nov. 2, 1909)
that they owned real property with the value of P500. Evidence showed that the A
ppellants, except for Daniel Navarro and Genaro Calixtro, did not own property o
f the assessed value of P500. ISSUE: W/N the said statutes true test of property
qualification to vote is the actual/market value of the property owned or the as
sessed value thereof.
FACTS: Respondent, Officer-in-Charge of Bureau of Labor Relations, required refe
rendum election among Petitioners to ascertain their wishes as to their affiliat
ion with Federation of Free Workers. Petitioners contended that there was no sta
tutory authorization for the Respondent to require referendum election and that
Respondent and the Bureau were beyond jurisdiction. ISSUE: W/N there is a statut
e authorizing Respondents and giving them jurisdiction. HELD: Article 226 of the
Labor Code addresses this. Respondent and the Bureau were within jurisdiction.
Petition denied. Article 226 of Labor Code is very clear concerning executive de
partments original and exclusive authority to act. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 20a, 24a
HELD: It was the intention of the legislator as proved from an examination of th
e immediate context of provisions of the statute defining property qualifications
of a voter, and of the statute as a whole. In the statute, property qualificatio
n is an alternative to qualification based upon an annual payment. Both qualific
ations are under a single head, suggesting an intimate relation between the two
in the mind of the legislator. Another section of the statute disqualifies peopl
e who are delinquent in the payment of public taxes assessed since Aug. 13, 1898
, from voting. This provision was directed to the case of delinquency in the pay
ment of land taxes as well as all other taxes. The statute as a whole (as an ele
ction law) is intended to secure purity of the ballot box. If the property quali
fication is actual/market value, it would be highly improbable to enforce the st
atute within a reasonable time because it will be difficult to determine. LATIN
MAXIM: 10, 11a, 12a, 28, 36a, 37
20 Regalado v. Yulo
Case No. 255 G.R. No. L-42293 (February 13, 1935) Chapter II, Page 55, Footnote
No.25
B.E. San Diego Inc. v. CA
Case No. 26 G.R. No. 80223 (February 5, 1993) Chapter II, Page 56, Footnote No.
27
FACTS: Petitioner was Justice of Peace of Malinao, Albay. On November 16, 1931,
Act No. 3899 which provided for the age retirement among justices was approved.
A few years later, Petitioner became 65 years of age (age retirement as provided
by Sec. 203 of the Administrative Code, amended further by Act. No. 3899). Shor
tly thereafter, Esteban T. Villar was appointed as Justice of Peace to take the
place of Petitioner. On December 17, 1934, Villar assumed office. ISSUE: W/N und
er the provisions of Section 203 of the Administrative Code, as further amended
by Act No. 3899, the Justices of Peace and auxiliary justices appointed prior to
the approval of the Act shall cease to hold office upon reaching the age of 65.
HELD: Justices appointed prior to the approval of the Act will not be affected
by said amendment (Act No. 3899). LATIN MAXIM: 1, 46a
FACTS: On March 3, 1986, Petitioner instituted an action in the RTC of Valenzuel
a against Private Respondent De Jesus for recovery of possession of a parcel of
land in said area. In her defense, De Jesus argued that the land in question was
covered by PD 2016 (a complementary provision of PD 1517, which aims to protect
tenants from unjust eviction.) ISSUE: W/N PD 2016 is a valid defense of De Jesu
s in upholding her rights as a lessee. HELD: PD 2016 is a valid ground for De Je
sus in invoking her rights as a tenant. While it may depart from its source, PD
1517, said provision still aims to protect the tenants from unscrupulous landown
ers from demanding a steep price for the land, as well as unjust eviction. LATIN
MAXIM: 12a, 25a
21 Araneta v. Dinglasan
Case No. 84 G.R. No. L-2044 (August 26, 1949) Chapter II, Page 56, Footnote No.
29
Endencia and Jugo v. David
Case No. 98 G.R. No. L-6355-56 (August 31, 1953) Chapter II, Page 56, Footnote N
o.33
FACTS: Executive Orders, in pursuance of Commonwealth Act No. 671 (Emergency Pow
ers Act), were questioned for its validity until the National Assembly Conventio
n of 1942 ISSUE: W/N the proclamations are valid. HELD: These Executive Orders a
re valid because they have been enacted during the time of the inability of the
Congress to function. That when Congress convened again on Jan. 1, 1942, said pr
oclamations were also terminated. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 9a
FACTS: RA 590 declares that no salary received by a public officer shall be cons
idered exempt from income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a d
iminution of his compensation fixed by law. While Art. 8, Sec. 9 of the Constitu
tion states that judges shall receive compensation as fixed by law, which shall
not be diminished during their continuance in office. Petitioners question the l
egality of RA 590. ISSUE: W/N RA 590 unconstitutional. HELD: No. Saying that the
taxing of the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease in compensation is
a clear interpretation of Which shall not be diminished during their continuance
in office, by the Legislature. Through the separation of powers, such a task mus
t be done by the Judiciary. Judicial officers are exempt from taxes on his salar
y not for his own benefit but for the public, to secure and preserve his indepen
dence of judicial thought and action. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c, 7a, 24a
22 Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte

Case No. 84 G.R. No. L-34568 (March 28, 1988) Chapter II, Page 61, Footnote No.5
0
CIR v. Limpan Investment Corporation
Case No. 77 G.R. No. L-28571 and L-28644 (July 31, 1970) Chapter II, Page 62, Fo
otnote No.55
FACTS: Prior to this case, Petitioners contested the adoption of Quirino Bonilla
and Wilson Marcos by, Antero Agonoy and Amanda Agonoy, stating that under Art.
335 of the Civil Code, that those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged
natural children, or children by legal fiction, cannot adopt. Petitioners state
d that the Agonoys already had a daughter of the Estrella Agonoy, who is the dec
eased mother of the Petitioners, and that the Agonoys also have the Petitioners
as grandchildren. Furthermore, the Petitioners argued that the adopting would in
troduce a foreign element into the family unit, and would result in the reductio
n of their legitimes in terms of inheritance. The Respondent Court ruled in favo
r for Agonoy. ISSUE: W/N the Respondent Court erred in their decision. HELD: No,
the court was correct. In enumerating the persons who cannot adopt in Art. 335,
the children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and, do no
t include grandchildren. To add grandchildren in this article where no grandchil
d is included would violate the legal maxim that, what is expressly included wou
ld naturally exclude what is not included. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a, 30a
FACTS: In 1959 and 1960, Respondent Corporation filed income tax returns which l
ater were bases for deficiency due to disallowance by the BIR. Brought to the Co
urt of Tax Appeals, the deficiencies on both cases were decided upon at P26,137
and P7,240.48, resolved at September 20, 1967 (L-28571) and December 11, 1967 (L
-28644) respectively. ISSUE: W/N the CTA committed an error in its fixed date of
the payment of surcharges and interests. HELD: The CTAs decision on the date of
payment of surcharges and interests are in error. Section 51 of the NIRC provide
s the following- On Tax shown on the return, in failure to pay the required amou
nt on or before the date prescribed, interest upon such unpaid amount shall be c
ollected as part of the tax, at the rate of one per centum a month, from the dat
e prescribed for the payment until paid, provided that the maximum amount for th
e interest doesnt exceed the amount corresponding to a period of 3 years. The sam
e goes with deficiencies, except that the additional tax must be paid within 30
days of the notice, else the same interests apply. With regard to surcharge, if
the amount in the notice isnt paid within 30 days, a surcharge of 5 per centum of
the amount of tax unpaid. In L-28571, the interest shall be computed from Septe
mber 7, 1962 to September 6, 1965, at 1% for 3 years, plus the surcharge of 5% o
n failure to pay the deficiency tax. In L-28644, from April 4, 1963 to April 3,
1966, the interest shall be at 1% a month for 3 years, plus the 5% surcharge. LA
TIN MAXIM: 1, 6c, 7a, 24a, 26
23 Cebu Portland Cement v. Municipality of Naga, Cebu

Case No. 53 G.R. Nos. 24116-17 (August 22, 1968) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote N
o.56
Resins, Inc. v. Auditor General
Case No. 260 G.R. No. L-17888 (October 29, 1968) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote N
o.57
FACTS: Efforts of defendant Treasurer to collect from Plaintiff municipal licens
e tax from 1960, 1961, as well as penalties, amounting to a total sum of P204,30
0, have all been met with rebuff. Municipal tax imposed by Amended Ordinance No.
21. Finally on June 26, 1961, defendant Treasurer decides to avail of Civil rem
edies as provided for under Sec. 2304 of the Revised Administrative Code; he giv
es Plaintiff a period of ten (10) days within which to settle the account from r
eceipt thereof. On July 6, 1961, defendant Treasurer notified the Plant Manager
of the Plaintiff that he was distraining 100,000 bags of Apo Cement in satisfact
ion of Plaintiffs delinquency in municipal license tax; notice was received by Pl
ant Officer-in-Charge Vicente T. Garagay, who acknowledged the distraint. Said a
rticles (the cement bags) will be sold by public auction to the highest bidder o
n July 27, 1961, proceeds thereof will in part be utilized to settle the account
. Despite notice of sale, it did not take place on July 27, 1961 but on January
30, 1962 ISSUE: W/N the distraint and public auction were valid.
FACTS: Petitioner seeks a refund from Respondent Central Bank on the claim that
it was exempt from the margin fee under RA 2609 for the importation of UREA AND F
ORMALDEHYDE, as separate units used for the production of synthetic glue. The spe
cific language of the Act speaks of UREA FORMALDEHYDE, a finished product which is
distinct and different from UREA and FORMALDEHYDE. Petitioner argues his view, citi
ng the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during consideration of the b
ill before said House, by members thereof (referring to the Journal). Petitioner
would assail as devoid of support in law the action taken by the Respondent Aud
itor General in an endorsement to Central Bank causing it to overrule its previo
us resolution and to adopt the view in such endorsement to the effect that the i
mportation of urea and formaldehyde, as separate units, did not come within the
purview of the statutory language that granted such exemption. ISSUE: W/N Petiti
oners allegations are valid. HELD: The Act clearly states UREA FORMALDEHYDE as a fi
nished product and not UREA and FORMALDEHYDE as separate units. Individual statement
s made by Senators do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less
do they indicate the view of the House of Representatives. If there was any mist
ake in the printing of the bill, it should be corrected by legislation and not b
y judicial decree. The Auditor General was just doing his duty, following what w
as written in the statute. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43
HELD: Both actions are valid. According to the Revised Administrative Code: The r
emedy by distraint shall proceed as follows: Upon failure of the person owing an
y municipal tax or revenue to pay the same, at the time required, the municipal
treasurer may seize and distraint any personal property belonging to such person
or any property subject to the tax lien, in sufficient quantity to satisfy the
tax or charge in question, together with any increment thereto incident to delin
quency and the expenses of the distraint. The clear and explicit language of the
law leaves no room for doubt. Also, this being a direct appeal to the Supreme Co
urt, Plaintiff must be deemed to have accepted as conclusive the findings of the
lower court which upheld the validity of the auction. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43
24 Quijano v. Development Bank of the Philippines

Case No. 248 G.R. No. L-26419 (October 16, 1970) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote N
o.58
KMMRC Credit Union v. Manila Railroad Company
Case No. 66 G.R. No. L-25316 (February 28, 1979)
FACTS: Petitioners filed an application for an urban estate loan with the Rehabi
litation Finance Corporation (RFC), predecessor-in-intent of Respondent. They mo
rtgaged real estate properties to secure the loan; loan was approved on April 30
, 1953. Mortgage contract was executed by Petitioners in favor of DBP on March 2
3, 1954. As of July 31, 1965, outstanding obligation of the Petitioners with DBP
was P13, 983.59. Petitioner wrote Respondent offering to pay P14, 000 for his o
utstanding obligation out of his back pay pursuant to RA 897 (Back Pay Law). Res
pondent advised Petitioners of the non-acceptance of this offer on the ground th
at the loan was not incurred before or subsisting on June 20, 1953, when RA 897
was approved. Respondent filed on October 14, 1965 an application for the forecl
osure of real estate mortgage executed by the Petitioners; Respondent Sheriff sc
heduled the public auction after advising Petitioner of the application for fore
closure filed by DBP. ISSUE: W/N the obligation of the Petitioners was subsistin
g at the time of the approval of RA 897, the Amendatory Act of June 20, 1953, to
RA 304, the original Back Pay Law. W/N the trial court erred in declaring that
the loan of the Petitioners was not subsisting when RA 897 was enacted on June 2
0, 1953. HELD: RA 897 has clear provisions that expressly require that the oblig
ations for which back pay certificates may be accepted as payments must be subsi
sting at the time RA 897 was approved (June 20, 1953). While Petitioners loan was
approved on April 30, 1953, they only availed of it much later on March 23, 195
4. The obligation therefore attaches only on March 23, 1954. It cannot be said t
hat there was an obligation subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897. LA
TIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43
FACTS: The Petitioner filed a case for mandamus which the lower court has denied
. Petitioner seeks to overturn the ruling relying on a right that, according to
the Petitioner, RA 2023 grants to them. Paragraphs 1 & 2 of section 62 of RA 202
3 compels employers to deduct from the salaries or wages of members of credit un
ions the debts of the employees and pay it to said credit union. The lower court
has already granted there is no such right granting first priority to the loan
to credit unions in the payroll collection. ISSUE: W/N RA 2023 converts KMMRC cr
edit unions credit into a first priority credit. HELD: No. The Supreme Court affi
rmed the decision of the lower court. The RA Petitioner relies on clearly does n
ot state the loans shall be granted first priority in the salary collections. Ac
cording to Justice Recto in a subsequent opinion, it is well established that onl
y specific legal rights are enforceable by mandamus, that the right sought to be
enforced must be certain and clear, and the writ not issue in cases where the r
ight is doubtful. Justice Barrera adds: the writ never issues in doubtful cases. I
t neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise
a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed. LATIN MAXIM: 7a
25 Davao Light & Power Co. v. Commissioner of Customs

Case No. 29 G.R. No. L-28739 (March 29, 1972)
Alfredo Ramos v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 252 G.R. No. L-41295 (December 4, 1989) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote N
o.60
FACTS: Petitioner is the grantee of a legislative franchise to install, operate
and maintain an electric light, heat and power plant in the municipality of Dava
o. On two different occasions it imported materials and equipment for installati
on in its facilities. Petitioner is arguing that the taxes levied against its im
ports should be waived by the collector of customs in Cebu (the materials were d
elivered at the port of Cebu) pursuant to section 17 of (pre-commonwealth) Act 3
636 (Standard Electric Power and Light Franchise Law) which states that if any c
ompeting company should be granted franchise more favorable than the one previou
sly granted to another company, the latter shall enjoy the same advantages given
in the other franchise. ISSUE: W/N section 17 of act 3636 applies to the case o
f Petitioner. HELD: No. Firstly, the provision cited by Petitioner states that t
he franchise must be granted to a competing party. NPC, to which the contract with
tax exemptions was given, is not a competing party to Petitioner. Secondly, Pet
itioner cannot rely on RA 358 as amended by RA 987 to support its tax exemption.
Exemption from taxation is never presumed, it is always explicitly stated. LATI
N MAXIM: 6c
FACTS: The municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan sued Ramos et al for the recovery of
its 74 hectare fishpond. Atty. Angel Cruz, a private lawyer and head of the Cru
z, Durian and Academia law firm, volunteered himself and his firm to serve as co
unsel for the municipality. He stipulated in the complaint that the municipality
is obliged to pay them not less than 20% of the amount to be recovered. Petitio
ners move to disqualify said private law firm as counsel on the ground that it i
s illegal for the municipality to hire a private counsel. ISSUE: W/N it is legal
for the municipality to hire a private counsel in filing a case. HELD: No. Unde
r section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code, the provincial fiscal shall r
epresent the province and any municipality or municipal thereof in any court. Fu
rthermore, under section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act, the municipal attorney sha
ll act as legal counsel for the municipality and perform such duties and exercis
e such powers as may be assigned to them by the council. The municipalitys intere
st would be best protected if the municipal attorney handles its litigation. The
se laws are implemented as well so as not to burden the municipality with the ex
pense of hiring a private lawyer. LATIN MAXIM: 7a
26 Floresca v. Philex Mining Corporation

Case No. 47 G.R. No. L- 30642 (April 30, 1985)
Enrile v. Salazar
Case No. 40 G.R. No. 92163 (June 5, 1990)
FACTS: Petitioners are the surviving family of deceased employees of Respondent
Corporation who died as a result of a cave-in while working in underground minin
g operations. Petitioners, with the exception of Floresca, recovered damages und
er the Workmens Compensation Act. However, a later report on the accident showed
there was negligence on the part of Respondent Corporation. Thereafter, Petition
ers filed a civil suit to recover damages for Respondent Corporations reckless an
d wanton negligence. ISSUE: W/N Petitioners have the right to choose between ava
iling of the workers right under the Workmens Compensation Act or suing in the reg
ular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages. HELD: Petitioners may sue i
n the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages. However, in light
of the fact that they have already recovered damages from the Workmens Compensati
on Act, if they are awarded a greater amount in the regular courts, the amount r
eceived from this Act shall be deducted to prevent the instance of double recove
ry. An injured party cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously. In all
owing Petitioners to sue in regular courts, the Court stated that it did not leg
islate in this case but rather, applied and gave effect to the constitutional gu
arantees of social justice. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 17, 40a
FACTS: Petitioner was arrested and charged with the crime of rebellion with murd
er and multiple frustrated murders allegedly committed during a failed coup atte
mpt from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Petitioners contend that they are bei
ng charged for a criminal offense that does not exist in the statute books becau
se technically, the crime of rebellion cannot be complexed with other offenses c
ommitted on the occasion thereof. ISSUE: W/N case of Petitioners falls under the
Hernandez doctrine. HELD: The doctrine in the case People v. Hernandez remains
as the binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with a
ny other offense committed on the occasion thereof. The charges of murder and mu
ltiple frustrated murders are absorbed in the crime of simple rebellion. Therefo
re, charges against Petitioners in the information should be understood as that
of simple rebellion under the RPC. Furthermore, in a concurring opinion, Justice
Feliciano states that if the court ruled that the charges of murder could be pr
osecuted separately from rebellion, then the principle of non-retroactivity woul
d be violated. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 46a, 48
27 Manikad v. Tanodbayan
Case No. 162 G.R. No. 65097 (February 20, 1984) Chapter II, Page 63, Footnote No
.65
Senarillos v. Hermosisimo
Case No. 278 G.R. No. L-10662 (December 14, 1956) Chapter II, Page 67, Footnote
No.74
FACTS: Petitioners were members of the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) P
olice Force and were charged with crimes of smuggling, theft and violations of A
ntiGraft Law and Anti-Fencing Law before the Respondent. Petitioners argue that
the power to investigate complaints of this nature are lodged exclusively upon t
he EPZA and is not in the Respondents jurisdiction. Section 7 of P.D. 1716-A stat
es: The EPZA in the exercise of its sole police authority over the export process
ing zones shall have the power to receive and investigate complaints relative to
violation of penal laws committed inside the zones owned and administered by th
e Authority ISSUE: W/N Section 7 of P.D. 1716-A precludes the Respondent from inve
stigating complaints within the Export Processing Zone. HELD: No, the use of sole
in P.D. 1716-A refers to police authority. Although the EPZA Police Force is the
only police authority within the Zone, it is not the only authority that may in
vestigate complaints, especially those which fall under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 35
FACTS: Petitioner was appointed as Chief of Police in Sibonga, Cebu. Upon the ch
arges filed by Petitioner, Senarillos was suspended by Municipal Mayor of Sibong
a and investigated by a police committee composed of 3 councilors created by Resol
ution No.2 Series 1952 of the municipal council. The committee came up with an a
dverse decision subsequently signed by the members of the council. This was appe
aled to and affirmed by the Commissioner of Civil Service and by the Civil Servi
ce Board of Appeals. ISSUE: W/N Sibonga had jurisdiction to investigate the Chie
f of Police Senarillos. HELD: No. Under RA No.557 the investigation of police of
ficers must be conducted by council itself and not by a mere committee thereof.
Sibonga therefore had no jurisdiction to investigate the Chief of Police Senaril
los. RA No.557 has eliminated the provision authorizing investigation by a commi
ttee council. Hence, the decision against him was invalid, even if concurred in
by the rest of the councilors. The fact that the decision of the Municipal Counc
il was issued before the decision of the Supreme Court cannot validate the actio
n of the police committee. The initial proceeding was illegal ab initio and the
subsequent reaffirmation of the decision of the municipal council by the civil s
ervice authorities could not validate the proceeding. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 3a, 6b, 7a
28 People of the Philippines v. Moro Macarandang

Case No. 211 G.R. No. L-12088 (December 23, 1959) Chapter II, Page 69, Footnote
No.87
People of the Philippines v. Mapa
Case No. 213 G.R. No. L-22301 (August 30, 1967) Chapter II, Page 69, Footnote No
.89
FACTS: Defendant was accused and convicted of illegal possession of firearms in
Lanao. Defendant, admitting the ownership and possession of the firearm and ammu
nitions, invokes as his legal excuse the appointment issued to him by Governor D
imakuta as secret agent shown in the Governors letter which he presented as and e
vidence. He was granted this appointment for having shown good faith by previous
ly surrendering to the office of the Governor a firearm. He has then been appoin
ted as SECRET AGENT to assist on the maintenance of peace and order campaigns an
d is authorized to hold and carry in his possession 1 Riot shotgun. ISSUE: W/N a
Secret Agent tasked to assist in the maintenance of peace and order falls among
those authorized to possess firearms. HELD: Yes. It may be true that the Govern
or has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit but section 879 of th
e Revised Administrative Code provides the peace officers are exempted from the re
quirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. The appointm
ent sufficiently put him in the category of peace officer equivalent even to a Mun
icipal Police expressly covered by section 879. Wherefore the decision appealed
from is reversed and the Defendant acquitted. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 24a
FACTS: Defendant was accused of illegal possession of firearms. He invokes in hi
s defense that he was an appointed Secret Agent of the provincial Governor of Ba
tangas. He sought to be acquitted as the case of People v. Macarandang used the
same defense providing evidences of his appointment. ISSUE: W/N a Secret Agent f
alls among those authorized to possess firearms. HELD: No. The court held that t
he law cannot be any clearer. The law does not contain any exception for secret
agent therefore holding this position would not constitute a sufficient defense
to a prosecution for a crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions. W
herefore the conviction of the accused must stand. The Courts ruling overturned t
hat of People v. Macarandang. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c, 7a, 30a, 35, 46c
29 Co v. CA
Case No. 65 G.R. No. 100776 (October 28, 1993) Chapter II, Page 69, Footnote No.
91
Sy Kiong v. Sarmiento
Case No. 150 G.R. No. L-2934 (November 29, 1951)
FACTS: Petitioner delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check d
rawn against the Associated Citizens Bank, postdated November 30, 1983. The check
was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the tersely
-stated reason given by the bank being: CLOSED ACCOUNT. A criminal complaint for v
iolation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed by the salvage company against Pe
titioner. At the time of the issuance of the check, the delivery of a rubber or bou
ncing check as a guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable offe
nse, an official promulgation made in a Circular of the Ministry of Justice. ISS
UE: W/N Petitioner is criminally liable. HELD: No. According to them, Que v. Peo
ple should not be applied retroactively in accordance with the prospectivity pri
nciple of judicial rulings and the operative fact doctrine. The decision in Que
should not be given retroactive effect to the prejudice of Co and others similar
ly situated who relied on the opinion of the Secretary of Justice. LATIN MAXIM:
1, 2a, 46a
FACTS: Petitioner is the owner of a duly licensed grocery store located in the C
ity of Manila and an importer of flour who sells either to bakeries or to retail
dealers for purposes of retail. Sometime in September 1948, the Treasurer of th
e City of Manila assessed against him the sum of 566.50php which represents the
alleged deficiency municipal license tax due from him on his gross sales of flou
r to bakeries after deducting the sales made to retail dealers for purposes of r
esale. ISSUE: W/N the sales of flour made by the Petitioner to bakeries to be ma
nufactured into bread are retail or wholesale. HELD: The sale of flour to bakeri
es to be manufactured into bread and to be resold to the public, in the absence
of any express provision of law on the matter, should be treated as a sale at re
tail and should subject the vendor to the retail tax law. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 2
4a, 37, 43
30 Sumulong v. Commission on Elections

Central Capiz v. Ramirez
Case No. 56 G.R. No. L-16197 (March 12, 1920) Chapter III, Page 79, Footnote No.
8
FACTS: On September 15, 1941, Respondent granted the Popular Front Party of Abad
Santos the exclusive right to propose the minority election inspector in the fi
rst congressional district of Pampanga, and to the Popular Front Party of Petiti
oner, the minority inspector in the second congressional district of the said pr
ovince. Eleven days later, Respondent modified its ruling and awarded the minori
ty inspector to the Popular Front Party of Abad Santos. ISSUE: W/N Respondent co
mmitted grave abuse of discretion. HELD: Where the minimum number of votes requi
red by law was polled by a mere coalition or alliance of minority parties, the r
ight to minority representation in the board of election inspectors to which suc
h coalition is entitled, cannot be claimed by any of the component parties which
have thereafter separated. Respondent shall have the discretion to choose the m
inority inspector. LATIN MAXIM: 36a, 37, d
FACTS: Private Respondent contracted with Petitioner Corporation for a term of 3
0 years, a supply of all sugar cane produced on her plantation, which was to be
converted later into a right in rem and recorded in the Registry of Property as
an encumbrance upon the land, and binding to all future owners of the same. The
Respondent refuses to push through with the contract thinking it might violate A
ct No. 2874, An Act to amend and compile the laws relating to lands of public dom
ain, and for other purposes, since more than 61 percent of the capital stock of t
he corporation is held and owned by persons who are not citizens of the Philippi
ne Islands or of the United States. The land involved is a private agricultural
land. ISSUE: W/N said Act no. 2874 is applicable to agricultural lands, in the P
hilippine Islands which are privately owned. HELD: The limit and purpose of the
Legislature in adopting Act No. 2874 was and is to limit its application to land
s of public domain and that lands held in private ownership are not included the
rein and are not affected in any manner whatsoever thereby. Jones Law of 1916: Th
at no bill may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that
subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill. LATIN MAXIM: d
31 Eugenio v. Drilon
Case No. 104 G.R. No. 109404 (January 22, 1996) Chapter III, Page 81, Footnote N
o.20
People of the Philippines v. Purisima
Case No. 221 G.R. Nos. L-42050-66 (November 20, 1978) Chapter III, Page 76, Foot
note No.16
FACTS: Private Respondent purchased on installment basis from Petitioner, two lo
ts. Private respondent suspended payment of his amortizations because of nondeve
lopment on the property. Petitioner then sold one of the two lots to spouses Rel
evo and the title was registered under their name. Respondent prayed for annulme
nt of sale and reconveyance of the lot to him. Applying P.D. 957 The Subdivision
and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree, the Human Settlements Regulatory Commiss
ion ordered Petitioner to complete the development, reinstate Private Respondents
purchase contract over one lot and immediately refund him of the payment (inclu
ding interest) he made for the lot sold to the spouses. Petitioner claims that t
he Exec. Sec. erred in applying P.D. 957 saying it should have not been given re
troactive effect and that non-development does not justify the non-payment of th
e amortizations. ISSUE: W/N the Executive Secretary acted with grave abuse of di
scretion when he decided P.D. 957 will be given retroactive effect. HELD: No. Re
spondent Executive Secretary did not act with grave abuse of discretion and P.D.
957 is to given retroactive effect so as to cover even those contracts executed
prior to its enactment in 1976. P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroact
ivity in its entirety, but such can be plainly inferred from the unmistakable in
tent of the law. The intent of the statute is the law. LATIN MAXIM: 9a
FACTS: Twenty-six petitions for review were filed charging the respective Defend
ant with illegal possession of deadly weapon in violation of Presidential Decree N
o. 9. An order quashed the information because it did not allege facts which con
stitute the offense penalized by P.D. No. 9. It failed to state one essential el
ement of the crime, viz.: that the carrying outside of the residence of the accu
sed of a bladed, pointed, or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion o
f, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organize
d lawlessness or public disorder. Petitioners argued that a perusal of P.D. No.
9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities an
d that they are essentially malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public pol
icy. ISSUE: W/N P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to
subversive activities. HELD: The primary rule in the construction and interpret
ation of a legislative measure is to search for and determine the intent and spi
rit of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor. Because of the pro
blem of determining what acts fall under P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire
into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in
the preamble or whereas clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify
the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein. LATIN MAX
IM: 9a, b2
32 People of the Philippines v. Echaves

Case No. 207 G.R. Nos. L-47757-61 (January 28, 1980) Chapter III, Page 77, Footn
ote No.22
Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v. City of Cebu
Case No. 4 G.R. No. L-14526 (March 31, 1965) Chapter III, Page 82, Footnote No.2
3
FACTS: The issue is whether or not P.D. 772, which penalizes squatting and simil
ar acts applies to agricultural lands. The lower court denied the motion and rul
ed that agricultural land is not part of P.D. 772 on the basis of Ejusdem Generi
s (of the same kind or species) since its preamble does not mention the Secretar
y of Agriculture. The order of dismissal by Echaves was then appealed to the Sup
reme Court, thus bringing the case at hand. ISSUE: Whether or not P.D. 772 appli
es to agricultural lands HELD: The Supreme Court held the same ruling that the l
ower court did, declaring that P.D. 772 does not apply to pasture lands because
its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communitie
s or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-t
o-do individuals. But the Supreme Court disagreed to the lower courts usage of the
maxim Ejusdem Generis because the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It stat
ed that the rule of Ejusdem Generis is merely a tool for statutory construction w
hich is resorted to when the legislative is uncertain. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 36b
FACTS: The Petitioner contends that the ordinance implemented by Respondent shou
ld be declared null and void because the ordinance seeks to generate revenue by
collecting wharfage from vessels which dock at the public wharves of piers locat
ed in the said City but owned by the National Government. According to Responden
t, the legislature made no distinction between those owned by the City of Cebu a
nd the National Government and that consequently, both fall within the scope of
the power granted. Petitioners assail this construction erroneous in the light o
f the meaning of public wharf as it may have bearing on the right to charge wharfa
ge. ISSUE: W/N the City of Cebu, through its ordinance, has the right to charge
wharfages from docks which are owned by the National Government. HELD: The term p
ublic refers to the nature of use of the pier or wharves. Hence, the power to imp
ose wharfage rests on a different basis and that is ownership. The Court also re
ferred to the previous subsection of the questioned portion of the ordinance poi
nting out that it implies a distinction with regard to those docks that are owne
d by the City and those of the National Government. The Court states that only t
hose which are constructed by the City shall be considered as its property. LATI
N MAXIM: 9a, 25a, 36b
33 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX Sales, Inc.

Case No. 80 G.R. No. 83736 (January 15, 1992) Chapter III, Page 83, Footnote No.
25
Feliciano v. Aquino
Case No. 105 G.R. No. 10201 (September 23, 1957) Chapter III, Page 83, Footnote
No.28
FACTS: Respondent Company wants a refund to an erroneously collected tax as prov
ided in Sec. 292 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) which includes a t
wo-year prescription. The Petitioner claims that the prescriptive period provide
d in the law for refund of such tax is already expired since it is already more
than two years from the date the quarterly income tax was paid. The Respondent c
ontends, on the other hand, that the date of filing of the final payment (Final
Adjustment Return) is the one that should be considered with respect to the pres
criptive period and not the quarterly payment made. ISSUE: W/N the two-year pres
criptive period provided in Sec. 292 of the National Internal Revenue Code comme
nce to run from the date the quarterly income tax was paid or from the date of f
iling of the Final Adjustment Return (final payment). HELD: The date of filing o
f the final payment should be considered. The Supreme Court said that, Sec. 292 o
f the NIRC should be interpreted in relation to the other provisions of the Tax
Code in order to give effect the legislative intent and to avoid an application
of the law which may lead to inconvenience and absurdity. The intention of the l
egislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of t
he act is to be taken into view. LATIN MAXIM: 11a, 36b, 36d
FACTS: Respondent was proclaimed as elected Mayor of Concepcion, Tarlac. Four da
ys after the proclamation, defeated candidate Petitioner instituted quo warranto
proceedings, challenging Petitioners eligibility on the ground that Respondent w
as not yet 23 years old at the time of his election. Aquino claimed that age req
uirement refers only to the age at assumption of office. He appealed that the ex
istence of a semi-colon, converted into a comma in the 1951 Revised Administrati
ve Code, does not require him to possess the remaining qualifications at the tim
e of the election but rather at the time of the assumption of office, provided t
hat he had fulfilled the first two requirements. ISSUE: W/N the election of Aqui
no is unlawful and illegal. HELD: The primary rule of statutory construction is
that punctuation marks cannot be disregarded unless there is reason to do contra
ry. Punctuation marks are aids of low degree and can never control against the i
ntelligible meaning of written words. No reason is shown why, after plainly and
unequivocally requiring that the candidates of other elective offices should pos
sess the age qualification at the time of the election, the law should suddenly ch
ange the requirement for the case of municipal officers. No argument is needed t
o show that where the candidate is mentioned as eligible or ineligible in the sa
id section, taking part in the election is meant, not capacity to assume office.
Decision of the lower court is affirmed and the election of Respondent is decla
red unlawful and illegal. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9d, 11a, 11e, 36b
34 US. v. Hart
In re: Estate of Johnson
Case No. 131 G.R. No. 12767 (November 16, 1918) Chapter III, Page 86, Footnote N
o.38
FACTS: Respondent was caught in a gambling house and was penalized under Act No.
519 which punishes every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or g
ambling houses, or tramping or straying through the country without visible mean
s of support. The said portion of the law is divided into two parts, separated by
the comma, separating those caught in gambling houses and those straying throug
h the country without means of support. Though it was proven that Hart and the o
ther Defendants had visible means of support, it was under the first part of the p
ortion of law for which they were charged with. The prosecution persisted that t
he phrase without visible means of support was in connection to the second part of
the said portion of Act No. 519, therefore was not a viable defense. ISSUE: How
should the provision be interpreted? HELD: The construction of a statute should
be based upon something more substantial than mere punctuation. If the punctuat
ion gives it a meaning which is reasonable and is in apparent accord with legisl
ative will, it may be as an additional argument for adopting the literal meaning
of the words in the statute as thus punctuated. An argument based on punctuatio
ns alone is not conclusive and the court will not hesitate to change the punctua
tion when necessary to give the act the effect intended by the legislature, disr
egarding superfluous and incorrect punctuation marks, or inserting others when n
ecessary. Inasmuch as defendant had, visible means of support and that the absence
of such was necessary for the conviction for gambling and loitering in saloons
and gambling houses, defendants are acquitted. LATIN MAXIM: 11e, 33
FACTS: Petitioner was a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the United
States but died and left a will in Manila. Sec. 636 of the Code of the Civil Pr
ocedure states Will made here by an alienwill made within the Philippine Islands b
y a citizen or subject of another state or country, which is executed in accorda
nce with the law of the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject, an
d which might be proved, allowed by the law of his own state or country, may be
proved, allowed and recorded in the Philippine Islands and shall have the same e
ffect as if executed according to the laws of these Islands. The will of Johnson
was probated and allowed in the lower court, but Petitioner contends that Sec. 6
36 is applicable only to wills of aliens; and in this connection, attention is d
irected to the fact that the epigraph of this section speaks only of the will ma
de here by an alien and to further fact that the word state in the body of the sec
tion is not capitalized. ISSUE: W/N the will of Petitioner, a citizen of the U.S
and therefore an alien, is covered by Sec. 636. HELD: The fact that the words st
ate and country are not capitalized does not mean that the United States is exclude
d from the phrase another state or country. It is a rule of hermeneutics that punc
tuation and capitalization are aids of low degree in interpreting the language o
f a statute and can never control against the intelligible meaning of the writte
n words. The epigraph, or heading, of a section being nothing more than a conven
ient index to the contents of the provision, cannot have the effect of limiting
the operative words contained in the body of the text. Petitioner, being a US ci
tizen, thus an alien, is covered by Sec. 636. The will duly probated. LATIN MAXI
M: 24a, 25a, 26, 37, 42a, 48
35 People of the Philippines v. Yabut

No.43
People of the Philippines v. Mendoza
Case No.112 G.R. No. L-38076 (November 4, 1933)
FACTS: Defendant was convicted for homicide. While serving sentence, he killed a
nother prisoner. He was consequently charged for murder. After conviction, he wa
s punished with the maximum period for murder, in accordance with Art. 160 of th
e Revised Penal Code. ISSUE: W/N the lower court erred in applying Art. 160. HEL
D: No. Respondent relied on the word another appearing in the English translation
of the head note of Art. 160, and suggests that the law is applicable only when
the new crime committed by a person serving sentence is different from the crime
for which he is serving sentence. According to him, his conviction for murder i
s not different because it involved homicide. No such deduction is warranted fro
m the text itself, or from the Spanish caption. When the text of the law is clea
r and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to the preamble, heading, epigram
or head note of a section for interpretation of the text, which are mere catchwo
rds or reference aids, consulted to remove, not create doubts. LATIN MAXIM: 6c,
7a
FACTS: Respondents were accused for violation of Section 2654 of the Administrat
ive Code for allegedly depositing in the official ballot box 51 official ballots
which they prepared without the knowledge and consent of the voters. They were
tried and convicted. ISSUE: W/N the evidence is sufficient to convict. HELD: No.
What was presented and admitted was evidence in a previous election case which
has no probative value to establish the guilt of the defendants in the criminal
case. The English text of Section 2654 is defective as the head note clearly sho
ws that this section is only applicable when a person fraudulently deposits a bal
lot in the ballot box. The evidence presented was insufficient to convict that d
efendants fraudulently deposited the ballots in question. Judgment was reversed.
LATIN MAXIM: 50, d
36 People of the Philippines v. Manaba

U.S. v. Quintanar
FACTS: Defendant was charged for rape. The complaint was signed by the Chief of
Police. After trial, Defendant was convicted but the judgment was set aside and
the case dismissed on his motion that the court had no jurisdiction over his per
son or the subject matter, because the complaint was not signed by the offended
party. Subsequently, the offended party signed a complaint charging Defendant of
rape. Defendant asked for dismissal on the ground of double jeopardy, but it wa
s denied and he was convicted. ISSUE: W/N the Defendant was placed in double jeo
pardy. HELD: No. Whether or not Defendant was placed in double jeopardy depends
on whether or not he was tried on a valid complaint in the first case. Art. 334
of the Revised Penal Code requires the offended party to file the complaint. As
the first complaint was not signed by the offended party, it was not a valid com
plaint in accordance with law, and the judgment of the court was void for lack o
f jurisdiction over subject matter, and defendant was never in jeopardy. The Spa
nish equivalent of the word filed is not bound in the Spanish text which is contro
lling, because it was the Spanish text approved by the legislature. LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 36a
FACTS: Defendants, on the night of March 1, 1908 were caught in the act of smoki
ng opium, in violation of Sec. 32 of Act No. 1761, the Opium Law. On appeal, Defen
dants contend that they could not be legally convicted for they rely on the Span
ish translation of the Act which provides that it will take effect despues del pr
imero de Marzo. (after the first of March) ISSUE: W/N the Defendant should be pun
ished under Act No 1761 which takes effect despues del primero de Marzo. HELD: The
translation of the Defendant is not accurate. The English and original text say
s: on and after March 1, 1908. Where the Act was originally promulgated in English
, it shall prevail over its translation. LATIN MAXIM: 6c
37 Employees Club, Inc. v. China Banking Corporation

Case No. 39 G.R. No. 40188 (July 27, 1934)
McMicking v. Lichauco
Case No. 175 G.R. No. 7896 (March 30, 1914) Chapter III, Page 88, Footnote No.49
FACTS: Respondent Corporation contends that the order requires it to surrender t
he register of deeds of the City of Manila which is the duplicate of TCT No. 211
92 so that the contract lease might be noted and entered in the corresponding re
cords. They argue that the contract lease cannot be registered in the register o
f deeds because it is not a real right; and under the Civil Code and the Mortgag
e Law, only real rights can be registered. The only exceptions, which it does no
t harbor, are a term exceeding three years, rent to corresponding years paid in
advance, or an express covenant requiring the lease to be registered. ISSUE: W/N
contract lease under the Mortgage law is not a real right and not be registered
. HELD: The property in question is NOT under the Mortgage law but under Act No.
496, or the Torrens system, Sec. 51 and 52. This act expressly provides that al
l interests must be registered in order to affect third persons, which includes
the interest arising from the contract of lease in favor of the Respondent. The
Spanish text of the law was relied upon by the Petitioner the Mortgage Law. But
the English enacted by the Legislature, Act No. 496, should prevail. LATIN MAXIM
: 9c, 49
FACTS: This is an appeal on a judgment in favor of current Respondent against De
fendant Chu Chan Chac. However, there was another case pending in its duration:
an appeal in the judgment in favor of Antonio Flor Mata where judgment execution
is. And likewise, in the duration of Matas judgment, there was yet another pendi
ng appeal where Defendant Lichauco owed his Aunt Clara Lichauco P17,666.60. ISSU
E: With these two cases, who has preference over the funds owed by Lichauco. HEL
D: Preference should be secured to Mata notwithstanding the appeal. The preferen
ce on Mata was based on Art. 1924 of the new Code of Civil Procedure, which secu
res preference to sentencias firmes only (judgments which are final in the sense
that no appeal lies therefrom). Mata must have immediate recourse to the proper
ty of Lichauco based on the first judgment. However, until the allotment of time
for perfecting of a bill is not done yet and the appeal was not taken, the judg
ment, strictly, is not Sentencia Firme as used in Spanish legal terminology wher
e it would be explained that the right to share in the distribution of the debto
r (Lichauco) could not accrue the judgment creditor (Mata) until he has the righ
t to. One must take into account that classification and the incidents of judgme
nts, orders and decrees that were once under Spanish Terminology have been modif
ied under the new Code of Civil Procedure, drawn in part from American and Engli
sh precedents. One should look rather to the spirit than the letter of the law.
The lien of a judgment is not necessarily destroyed by the perfecting of an appe
al but simply suspended. Even if there was a new judgment, it is simply reversed
, not destroyed. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 49
38 Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court

Case No. 11 G.R. No. L-72873 (May 28, 1987) Chapter III, Page 89, Footnote No.54
Vda. De Macabenta v. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company
Case No. 156 G.R. No. L-27489 (April 30, 1970) Chapter III, Page 89, Footnote No
.57
FACTS: Five siblings inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land reg
istered in the name of their deceased parents. Two siblings sold their share to
the same vendee. By virtue of such agreements, the Petitioners occupied after th
e said sales, 2/5 of the lot, representing the portions bought. They subsequentl
y enclosed their portion with a fence and built a semi-concrete house. One of th
e sisters filed a complaint invoking the right to redeem the area sold. The tria
l court dismissed this complaint because the time had lapsed, not having been ex
ercised within 30 days from notice of the sales. ISSUE: 1. W/N there was a valid
notice. 2. W/N Art. 1088 of the Civil Code was interpreted correctly. HELD: Alt
hough there was no written notice, there was actual knowledge of the sales satis
fying the requirement of the law. It is unbelievable that the co-heirs were unaw
are of the sale, with the erection of a permanent semi-concrete structure. While
Art. 1088 of the Civil Code stresses the need for a written notice of sale; the
Petitioners claimed that because there was no written notice, despite their obv
ious knowledge of it, the 30-day period for redemption had not yet begun. The in
tent of the lawmakers was to ensure that the redemptioner was properly notified
of the sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of the
30-day period of redemption. The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed
of the sales although no notice in writing was given to them. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 8,
9a, 10, 11d, 11e, 12a, 17
FACTS: At the time the decedent met the vehicular accident on September 12, 1961
, which led to his death 16 days later, the claimant-widow was not yet married t
o the decedent although they had already been living together as husband and wif
e for the past 3 months. However, on the day following the accident, they were l
awfully wedded. The claimant widow gave birth on April 8, 1962, to the posthumou
s daughter of the deceased, Racquel. ISSUE: W/N the widow and posthumous child a
re considered dependents under the Workmens Compensation Act. HELD: Yes. Accordin
g to the Workmens Compensation Act, a widow living with the deceased or actually
dependent upon him totally or partly as well as her daughter, if under 18 years
of age or incapable of supporting herself, and unmarried, whether or not actuall
y dependent on the deceased are considered dependents. Although not his wife at
the time of the accident but at the time of his death, are still considered depe
ndents under the Act. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 9c, 12a, 37
39 Tinio, et al. v. Frances, et al.

Case No. 290 G.R. No. L-7747 (November 29, 1955) Chapter III, Page 90, Footnote
No.61
Home Insurance Company v. Eastern Shipping Lines
Case No. 125 G.R. No. 34382 (July 20, 1983) Chapter III, Page 91, Footnote No.64
FACTS: Sergio Nicolas applied for a parcel of land in Nueva Ecija and was approv
ed in 1917. In 1943, the final proof was approved by the Director of Lands who i
ssued a patent in his favor, but because Sergio Nicolas died, he was substituted
by his heirs, represented by his widow. In 1947, the heirs transferred their ri
ghts to the homestead to the Defendants, with approval by the Secretary of Agric
ulture and Commerce, and secured the issuance of a homestead patent in their fav
or. In 1953, heirs of the deceased Sergio Nicolas wanted to annul the sale of a
homestead and to recover the land, together with the fruits of the land as damag
es. ISSUE: W/N the sale or transfer of right of the heirs of Sergio Nicolas over
the parcel of land was valid. HELD: No. Conveyances made by the heirs of the ho
mesteader to the Defendants do not comply with the first requirement of Sec. 20
of the Public Lands Act that the Director of lands is satisfied from proofs subm
itted by the homesteader that he could not continue with his homestead through n
o fault of his own, and that the conveyance must be made with the prior or previ
ous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. Thus the conveyance m
ade by the heirs of Nicolas was null and void. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9b, 37, 38b, 48
FACTS: Plaintiff Company instituted two cases of recovery of damages against Def
endant Company. The Petitioner Company claimed for reimbursement with regard to
the amounts of insurance paid to the consignees due to losses suffered by the ca
rgoes and goods shipped. In this regard, the lower court dismissed the two cases
on the ground that the Plaintiff failed to provide its legal capacity to sue. I
SSUE: W/N the lower court is correct in holding that the Plaintiff lacks legal c
apacity to sue which resulted in the dismissal of the two cases. HELD: Yes. The
law on the matter is that a suing foreign company, such as Plaintiff Company, mu
st, in order to be capacitated to sue in the Philippine jurisdiction, prove lega
l capacity by establishing either that its transaction upon which the complaint
was based was an isolated one or that is was duly licensed or authorized by law
to transact in the Philippines. Otherwise, no cause of action accrues in favor o
f the Plaintiff as it has no legal right to seek relief from the court. In the c
ase at bar, the insurance contracts between the Plaintiff and the Defendant were
executed long before the Plaintiff secured its license to transact business in
the Philippines. Therefore, said insurance contracts were void from the beginnin
g as the purpose was contrary to public policy. LATIN MAXIM: 4, 8, 9c, 11a, 36a,
37
40 Luzon Stevedoring Company v. Trinidad

No.71
Go Chioco v. Martinez
Case No. 113 G.R. No. 19864 and 19685 (October 17, 1923) Chapter III, Page 93, F
ootnote No.93
FACTS: Plaintiff is a corporation duly organized under the laws of the Philippin
e Islands, doing business in the City of Manila. Engaging in a stevedoring busin
ess, consisting of loading and unloading of cargo from vessels in ports, at cert
ain rates of charge per unit of cargo, Plaintiff Company hopes to recover from D
efendant, the Internal Revenue Collector, the sum of P2,422.81, which had been p
aid under protest. Defendant alleged that during the first quarter of 1921, the
Plaintiff was engaged in business as a contractor, with its gross receipts from
the said business amounting to P242, 281.33. Under the provisions of Sec. 1462 o
f Act No. 2711, the percentage tax amount was levied and assessed toward the ste
vedoring business. ISSUE: W/N the Plaintiff is considered a "contractor" provide
d by Sec. 1462 of Act No. 2711. HELD: A contractor is defined as one who renders
service in the course of an independent occupation, representing the will of hi
s employer only as to the result of his work, and not as to the means by which i
t is accomplished. Plaintiff is not a "contractor" based on Sec. 1462 of Act No.
2711. Therefore, the tax paid by the Plaintiff was illegally collected and shou
ld be repaid. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 4, 5b, 9c, 11a, 28
FACTS: Petitioner made a loan of P40,000 to Respondent. They executed a promisso
ry note stipulating that Respondent Hermanos will pay back the loan within three
months. On the same day, Respondent Hermanos signed another promissory note and
sent a check of P1,800 to Petitioner, which was cashed. After three months, Res
pondent Hermanos was unable to pay the principal. He now executed a new promisso
ry note, again due within the next three months, and with this note, Respondent
Hermanos sent a check for P1,800. Again, he could not pay so they executed anoth
er promissory note and sent another check worth P1,800. This cycle was repeated
a total of 7 times, with the third cycle s promissory note bring due only a mont
h later and with a check for only P600. Then Respondent Hermanos paid P25,000 fo
r the principal and refused to pay for the remaining P15,000. Therefore, Petitio
ner filed a complaint. The trial court ruled that the interest rate of 18% was i
n violation of the Usury Law (Act 2655 as amended by Act No. 2992). Thus, he mus
t give back P11,850 from the interest and forfeits the remaining P15,000. ISSUE:
W/N the charging of a usurious interest of 18% forfeits the principal loaned to
gether with the interest. HELD: No, since only the interest is forfeited. Taking
into consideration the history of the Usury Law, the intent of the framers is c
lear. In a previous law RA 2073, the principal loan was forfeited together with
the interest. However, unlike the previous law, the current law RA 2655 provides
for stricter rules and alternative punishments for violations. The current law
also does not expressly mention that the principal is also forfeited. As a rule
of construction, when the intent of a law is ambiguous, one may consult the hist
ory of the law and its preamble to ascertain the framers intent. LATIN MAXIM: 9a
, 9c, 36a, 37
41 US v. De Guzman
Case No. 297 G.R. No. L-9144 (March 27, 1915) Chapter III, Page 94, Footnote No.
95
Basiana v. Luna
Case no. 31 G.R. Nos. L-34135-36 (February 24, 1981) Chapter III, Page 95, Footn
ote No.102
FACTS: Defendant, along with Pedro and Serapio Macarling, was convicted of asesi
nato (murder) and sentenced to life imprisonment. Defendant was discharged befor
e he pleaded on the condition that he promised to appear and testify as a witnes
s for the Government against his co-accused. Upon reaching the witness stand, De
fendant denied all knowledge of the murder. He denied ever saying anything that
implicated his co-accused and swore that statements made by him were made in fea
r of the police officers. The Solicitor-General asks for the discharge of the Re
spondent though it may result in a palpable miscarriage of justice, nevertheless
, the law provides for his dismissal and expressly bars a future prosecution. IS
SUE: W/N Defendant should be discharged. HELD: Sec. 19 and 20 are constitutional
. There is no provision for perjury should the Defendant fail to comply with the
agreement with the State. However, looking at the legislative history of the st
atute, it can be gleaned that faithful performance is necessary to avail of the
bar to criminal prosecution. Failure of the Defendant in the case at bar to fait
hfully and honestly carry out his undertaking to appear as witness and to tell t
he truth at the trial of his co-accused deprived him of the right to plead his f
ormal dismissal as a bar to his prosecution. Finally, discharge cannot be an acq
uittal since it was made prior to his trial. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 22a, b2
FACTS: Petitioner entered into a private agreement with Cipriano Luna to prospec
t with Luna getting 60% and Petitioner receiving the rest. Petitioner prospected
183 claims, 93 were recorded for him with the rest going to Luna, a clear disre
gard of their agreement. Realizing that there was something wrong with the decla
ration of location records, Luna amended the declarations with the intention of
clearing claim names and tie points; Petitioner however, disclaimed such consent
. Consequently, Luna cancelled the registration and created their own groups of
claims overlapping Petitioners claims. Petitioner alleges that his claims were va
lid, and were merely abandoned for failure to pay occupation fees. ISSUE: W/N Pe
titioners mining claims are valid. HELD: Sec. 47 par. 2 of the Mining Law (C.A. N
o. 137) provides: For the purpose of this section, a permanent and prominent obje
ct used as a tie point MAY be an intersection of known roads; a junction of know
n rivers or creeks, a known public or private structure; a corner of approved pu
blic, private or mineral land survey; a kilometer post of public road; or locati
on monument or triangulation station established by the Bureau of Lands, Bureau
of Mines, Army Corps of engineers, Bureau of Cost and Geodetic Survey, or other
government agencies. An initial post is not enumerated as a valid tie point. Peti
tioners contention that the word MAY suggests non-exclusivity is untenable since
it goes against the legislators intent to eliminate claim jumping and overlapping
claims. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 30a, 33, 36b
42 Baga v. PNB
Case No. 27 G.R. No. L-9695 (September 10, 1956) Chapter III, Page 95, Footnote
No.103
De Villa v. CA
Case No. 88 G.R. No. 87416 (April 8, 1991) Chapter III, Page 96, Footnote No.110
FACTS: Petitioner was the recipient of benefits with Respondent as the guardian
under RA 390 or the Uniform Veterans Guardianship Act which was passed with the
intention of being modeled after the US version. RA 390 provides that a guardian
ship can only be terminated upon reaching the age of majority. Petitioner allege
s that she has married and has become emancipated under Art. 399 of the New Civi
l Code thus terminating the guardianship. ISSUE: W/N Art. 399 of the Civil Code
shall prevail over RA 390. HELD: No. The Civil Code does not prevail. It was the
clear intent of the legislator to create a uniform law for material aid. Insert
ing provisions of the Civil Code would result in discordance with intent. RA 390
is a special law and thus must be taken to constitute an exception to the gener
al law which is the Civil Code. RA 390 Sec. 23 applies notwithstanding any other
provisions of law relating to judicial restoration and discharge of guardians.
LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 50, b2
FACTS: Petitioner was charged with a violation of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) fo
r issuing a worthless check. However, he contends that the check was drawn again
st a dollar account with a foreign bank, and is therefore, not covered by the sa
id law. ISSUE: W/N the Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the cas
e in question. HELD: The Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction. The deter
minative factor (in determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check
. The offense was committed in Makati and therefore, the same is controlling and
sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the Makati Regional Trial Court. The Court a
cquires jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the accused upon the f
iling of a complaint or information in court which initiates a criminal action.
With regard to Petitioners allegation that the check is not covered by BP 22, it
will be noted that the law does not distinguish the currency involved in the cas
e. Thus, the Court revealed that the records of Batasan, Vol. III unmistakably s
how that the intention of the lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever currency
may be the subject thereof. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 17, 24b, 26, 43, b2
43 National Police Commission v. De Guzman, Jr.

Case No. 185 G.R. No. 106724 (February 9, 1994) Chapter III, Page 96, Footnote N
o.110
China Banking Corporation v. Ortega
Case No. 21 G.R. No. L-34964 (January 31, 1973)
FACTS: RA 6975, otherwise known as An Act Establishing the PNP Under a Reorganize
d Dept. of the Interior and Local Government, laid down the compulsory retirement
age of PNP officers. Respondents argue that the age of retirement (56) of said
law cannot be applied to them since they are covered by Sec. 89 of the same law
(which temporarily extended the age of retirement). In other words, Respondents
wanted to be extended the same privileges as the local police. Hence, they conte
nd that the term INP includes both the former members of the Philippine Constabula
ry (PC) and the local police force who were earlier constituted as the Integrate
d National Police (INP). ISSUE: W/N the legislative intent was to classify the I
NP as applicable only to the local police force. HELD: The intent was to classif
y the INP in such manner that Sec. 89 of RA 6975 is applicable only to the local
police force. The use of the term INP is not synonymous with the PC. Had it bee
n otherwise, the statute could have just made a uniform reference to the members
of the whole PNP for retirement purposes and not just the INP. Indeed, the law
distinguishes INP from the PC and it cannot be construed that INP as used in Sec.
89 includes the members of the PC. The legislature did intend to exclude the mem
bers of the PC from the coverage of Sec. 89 insofar as the retirement age is con
cerned. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 11a, 12a, 27, b2
FACTS: A complaint was filed against B&B Forest Development Corporation for the
collection of a sum of money. The trial court declared the said corporation in d
efault. The Plaintiff sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of B&B Forest w
ith current Petitioner Bank. Thus, a notice of garnishment was issued by the Dep
uty Sheriff and served on Petitioner Bank through its cashier, Tan Kim Liong. He
refused to disclose the sought information, citing the provisions of RA 1405 wh
ich prohibits the disclosure of any information relative to bank deposits to any
person except upon written permission of the depositor. Furthermore, RA 1405 al
so imposes criminal liability on any official or employee of a banking instituti
on who breaks the confidential nature of this law. ISSUE: W/N a banking institut
ion may validly refuse to comply with a court process garnishing the bank deposi
t of a judgment debtor, by invoking RA 1405. HELD: No. It was not the intention
of the lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond the reach of execution to satisfy
a final judgment. The discussion of the conference committee report of the two
houses of Congress indicates that the prohibition against examination of or inqu
iry into a bank deposit under RA 1405 does not preclude its being garnished to i
nsure satisfaction of a judgment. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 11e, 12b, 30b, 35, 38b, 43, b
2
44 Mayon Motors v. Acting CIR

Case No. 173 G.R. No. 15000 (March 29, 1961) Chapter III, Page 96, Footnote No.1
11
Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato
Case No. 67 G.R. No. 118910 (November 16, 1995)
FACTS: Petitioner Company imported 17 Pontiac automobiles in three different shi
pments. Respondent assessed against Petitioner deficiency advance sales tax on t
he automobiles. Petitioner requested for reconsideration and, this request havin
g been denied, it recurred to the Court of Tax Appeals. After the hearing, said
court modified Respondents decision by requiring Petitioner to pay a sum more tha
n what the acting Commissioner on Internal Revenue assessed and denying its clai
m for a refund. Hence this appeal. Petitioner assails the procedure adopted by t
he tax court and insists the courts interpretation of the Tax Code erroneous invo
king a statement made by then Congressman Ferdinand Marcos during the deliberati
ons on the amendments for the Tax Code. ISSUE: W/N the opinion of a legislator i
n the deliberations of a law, controlling in the interpretation of the law. HELD
: No. Courts are not bound by a legislators opinion expressed in congressional de
bates regarding the interpretation of a particular legislation. It is deemed to
be a mere personal opinion of the legislator. LATIN MAXIM: b2
FACTS: Petitioners seek for reconsideration of Kilosbayan, et al. v. Guingona. T
he Court has determined that Petitioner has no standing to sue but did not dismi
ss the case. Petitioners insist that the PCSO cannot hold and conduct charity sw
eepstakes, lotteries and other similar activities in collaboration or joint vent
ure with any other party because of the clause except for the activities mentione
d in the preceding paragraph (A) in paragraph (B) of Sec. 1 of RA 1169 as amended
by BP 42. ISSUE: W/N under its charter (RA 1169, as amended) the Philippine Cha
rity Sweepstakes Office can enter in any form of association or collaboration wi
th any party in operating an on-line lottery. HELD: No. Petitioners interpretatio
n fails to take into account not only the location of the phrase in paragraph (B
), when it should be in paragraph (A) had that been the intention of the lawmaki
ng authority, but also the phrase by itself. What the PCSO is prohibited from doin
g is from investing in a business engaged in sweepstakes, races, lotteries and o
ther similar activities. It is prohibited from doing so whether in collaboration,
association or joint venture with others or by itself. LATIN MAXIM: 34, 36b
45 Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Luzon Marine Department Union

Case No. 77 G.R. No. 9265 (April 29, 1957)
Commissioner of Customs v. Court of Tax Appeals
Case No. 71 G.R. Nos. 48886-8 (July 21, 1993) Chapter III, Page 101, Footnote No
.133
FACTS: Petitioner files a case to review a resolution issued by the Court of Ind
ustrial Relations ruling that the 20 minutes rest given to employees after mealti
me should not be deducted from the four hours of overtime work. Employees of the
company are seamen working in tugboats from 6:00 am 6:00 pm (12 hours of work,
four hours overtime), given three free meals a day and 20 minutes rest after meal
time. ISSUE: 1. W/N the definition for "hours of work" as presently applied to d
ry land laborers equally applicable to seamen. 2. W/N a different criterion shou
ld be applied by virtue of the fact that the seamen s employment is completely d
ifferent in nature as well as in condition of work from that of a dry land labor
er. HELD: The definition of hours of work equally applies to seamen and no need fo
r a different criterion. Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 444, known as the Eight-Hour Labor L
aw, provides that when the work is not continuous, the time during which the labo
rer is not working and can leave his working place and can reset completely, sha
ll not be counted in the eight working hours. A laborer need not leave the premis
es of the factory, shop or boat in order that his period of rest shall not be co
unted, it being enough that he cease to work, and may rest completely. LATIN MAXIM
: 6c, 26
FACTS: Iligan Express Corporation maintains a berthing facility at Kiwalan, Ilig
an City. Respondent Company availed of such facilities and as thus assessed bert
hing fees by the Collector of Custom which were paid by the said shipping compan
y under protest. ISSUE: W/N a vessel berthing at a privately-owned wharf should
be charged berthing fees under Sec. 2901 of the Tariff and Custom Code, as amend
ed by P.D. 34. HELD: No. Liability does not attach if the port is privately-owne
d. Sec. 2901 of the Tariff and Custom Code, as amended by P.D. 34 speaks of the n
ational ports only. Sec. 2901 did not distinguish between national ports and priv
ate ports until it was amended by the presidential decree, and this amendment in
dicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from the ori
ginal. Since the said law limits the berthing taxes to national ports only, it i
s obvious that the private ports are not included. Kiwalan is not a national por
t in the Custom memorandum circular 33-73 or E.O. 72. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 25d, 30a
46 Buenaseda v. Secretary Flavier

No.141
Carolina Industries Inc. v. CMS Stock Brokerage Inc.
Case No. 47 G.R. No. L-46908 (May 17, 1980) Chapter III, Page 106, Footnote No.1
46
FACTS: The Private Respondents filed an administrative complaint with the Ombuds
man against the Petitioner for the violation of the Anti-graft and Corrupt Pract
ices Act. In response, the Ombudsman filed an order directing the preventive sus
pension of the Petitioners, who were employees of the national center for mental
health. The Respondent argue that the preventive suspension laid by the Ombudsm
an under Sec. 24 of RA 6770 is contemplated in by Sec. 13(8) of Art. 9 of the 19
87 Constitution, while the Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman can only recom
mend to the Heads of Departments and other agencies the preventive suspension of
officials and employees facing administrative investigation conducted by his of
fice. ISSUE: W/N the Ombudsman has the power to preventively suspend government
officials working in other offices other than that of the Ombudsman pending the
investigation of administrative complaints. HELD: Yes. The Ombudsman has the pow
er to suspend the employees of the said institution may it be in punitive or pre
ventive suspension. Sec. 13(3) of the Constitution refers to suspension in its pun
itive sense, as the same speaks of penalties in administrative cases, while Sec.
24 of RA 6770 grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend public off
icials and employees facing administrative charges. This statute is procedural a
nd may arise in order to facilitate a speedy and efficient investigation on case
s filed against the officers. A preventive measure is not in itself a punishment
but a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. LATIN MAXIM: 27, 28
FACTS: Petitioner opened a margin account with Respondent for purchasing, carryi
ng and selling stocks and securities listed in the Makati stock exchange. Within
three months, the Petitioners amount deposited was completely wiped out without
his permission. Respondent says there was consent but the evidence did not suffi
ce to prove such consent. Respondent now question the appellate courts ruling on
their violation of the SEC rules and securities Act, and how these statutes are
interpreted, the appellate court used foreign jurisprudence in coming up with th
is decision. ISSUE: W/N there is a violation of the rules and Regulations of sto
ck trading. HELD: If the law renders the customers as incapable of protecting hi
mself, it is the duty of the broker to do so. The courts use of a ruling in fore
ign case is only right because the prevailing laws are patterned after those of
the United States. LATIN MAXIM: 6d, 9
47 Zamora v. Collector of Internal Revenue

Case No. 176 G. R. No L-15290 (May 31, 1963)
Tamayo v. Gsell
Case No. 282 G. R. No 10765 (December 22, 1916) Chapter III, Page 106, Footnote
No.149
FACTS: Mariano Zamora, owner of the Bay View Hotel and Farmacia Zamora Manila, f
iled his income tax returns for the years 1951 and 1952. The Collector of Intern
al Revenue found that he failed to file his return of the capital gains derived
from the sale of certain real properties and claimed deductions which were not a
llowable. Mariano Zamora and his deceased sister Felicidad Zamora, bought a piec
e of land located in Manila on May 16, 1944, for P132,000.00 and sold it for P75
,000.00 on March 5, 1951. They also purchased a lot located in Q.C. for P68,959.
00 on January 19, 1944 which they sold for P94,000.00 on Feb. 9, 1951. The CTA o
rdered the estate of the late Felicidad Zamora, to pay the sum of P235.00, repre
senting alleged deficiency income tax and surcharge due from said estate. Espera
nza Zamora appealed and alleged that the CTA erred. ISSUE: W/N the CTA erred in
computing the taxes due for payment by Mariano Zamora. HELD: No. The appraisal i
s correct and the court found no plausible reason to disturb the same. LATIN MAX
IM: b2
FACTS: This is an action for damages against the Defendant for personal injuries
suffered by Braulio Tamayo, 11-year old son of the Plaintiff. The injury was at
tributed to the boys inexperience in the work which he had been assigned for the
first time and without prior instruction. ISSUE: W/N the plaintiff is entitled t
o recover damages under the Employers Liability Act. HELD: Yes. The Legislature i
ntended that the measure of damages in personal injury cases brought under the E
mployers Liability Act to be the same as that in the country from which the Act w
as taken, being of American origin. LATIN MAXIM: b2
48 Ossorio v. Posadas
Case No. 93 G.R. No. L-31088 (December 3, 1929)
Campos Rueda Corp. v. Sta. Cruz Timber Co. and Felix
FACTS: Plaintiff and appellant filed for the recovery from the Defendant Collect
or of Internal Revenue the sum of P56,246.72, which the Defendant, according to
the complaint, collected from the Plaintiff in excess of what he should have col
lected by way of income tax. ISSUE: W/N the paraphernal property of the Plaintif
fs wife constitutes her separate estate within the scope and meaning of this phrase
for the purposes of the additional income tax. HELD: Yes. It is ordered that th
e Defendant make two separate assessments of the additional income tax, one agai
nst the Plaintiff, and the other against his wife on her paraphernal property, r
eturning the sum of P56,203.59 to said plaintiff, without prejudice to his levyi
ng against and collecting from said Plaintiffs wife upon her own separate individ
ual declaration, in accordance with law, the additional income tax for the incom
e from her paraphernal property. LATIN MAXIM: b2
FACTS: The Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the case of Petitioner ag
ainst Respondent to recover the value of two promissory notes for the amounts of
P1,125 and P1,075, for lack of jurisdiction; holding that the two notes constit
ute two separate causes of action involving less than P2,000. The Municipal Cour
t likewise dismissed the case of Petitioner Corporation against Respondents for
collection of the same promissory notes object of the former action, on the grou
nd that the amount of two notes, which Petitioner now consolidated under a singl
e cause of action, was in excess of its jurisdiction. ISSUE: W/N the Municipal C
ourt of Manila has jurisdiction over the subject matter of appellants complaint.
HELD: No. The jurisdiction of a court depends, not upon the value or demand in e
ach single case of action contained in the complaint, but upon the totality of t
he demand in all the causes of action. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a
49 Ang Giok Chio vs. Springfield Fire & Marine Insurance Co.
Pando v. Kette and Sellner
FACTS: Petitioners warehouse was destroyed by fire while the policy taken out wit
h Respondent for the amount of P10,000 was in force. The Respondent Company has
appealed claiming that Petitioner violated a rider on the insurance contract. IS
SUE: W/N a rider as forming part of the contract of insurance is null and void b
ecause it does not comply with the Philippine Insurance Act. HELD: Yes. A rider
attached to the face of the insurance policy and referred to in the contract of
insurance, is valid and sufficient under Sec. 65 of the Philippine Insurance Act
as it was taken verbatim from Sec. 2605 of the Civil Code of California which s
tates, The section as it now reads is in harmony with the rule that a warranty ma
y be contained in another instrument than the policy when expressly referred to
in the policy as forming a part thereof. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, b2
FACTS: This is a foreclosure of mortgage. In pursuant thereof, the sheriff on Ja
nuary 30, 1929, posted notices of the sale of the land in said writ in 3 public
places, to wit, upon the land itself, at the market, and on the municipal buildi
ng of Pasay. Notice of the sale was sent to the newspaper La Opinion for publica
tion, and the editor certified that he published it once a week for 3 consecutiv
e weeks, more particularly on the 2nd, 9th, and 15th of February, 1929 and the s
ale took place on February 19, 1929. ISSUE: W/N the posted notices of the sale i
n 3 public places and publication in La Opinion once a week for 3 consecutive we
eks satisfied the requirements of the law regarding the notice of the sale in qu
estion. HELD: Yes. The Provision of our Code of Civil Procedure having been adop
ted from Sec. 692 of the California Code, the requirements of the law regarding
the notice of the sale in question have been substantially complied with. LATIN
MAXIM: b2
50 Reyes v. Wells
Phil. Educ. Co. v. Soriano
Case No. 235 G.R. No. L-22405 (June 30, 1971) Chapter III, Page 107, Footnote No
.156
FACTS: Defendants offered to sell to Plaintiffs an installed maguey stripping ma
chine and an International truck in a shed lot for P23,000. However, Plaintiff G
uerrero said that he could not do so for the lack of money to operate the machin
e. Respondent Rader promised to furnish said Plaintiff with the amount he would
need. Plaintiff would just have to make out two promissory notes in favour of th
e mortgage. Defendant Rader and Plaintiff Guerrero went to J. Northcott, and on
June 29, 1922, the former endorsed the mortgage deed. However, neither the said
amount nor any part thereof was delivered to Plaintiff Guerrero, or to any of hi
s co-Plaintiffs. Due to the failure of J. E. Rader and J. Northcott to pay said
amount of P12,000, the Plaintiff sustained damages for default in the payment of
the instalments due. ISSUE: W/N the promissory notes in question which have not
been paid, are not supported by the evidence in relation to the competence of t
he testimony of Guerrero. HELD: There was evidence on the part of the promissory
notes in question. These are also in line with Sec. 4604 of the Code of Iowa. T
he prohibition contained in said law against a witness testifying upon any transa
ction or communication between himself and a deceased person, is substantially t
he same as that contained in Sec. 383(7) of our Code of Civil Procedure, as amen
ded by Act No. 2252. Therefore, we believe that the construction placed upon it
by the court in the cases cited is applicable to the case at bar. LATIN MAXIM: 1
, b2
FACTS: Montinola sought to purchase money orders from Manila Post Office. He man
aged to leave the building without knowledge of the teller. Palomar received one
money order as part of their sales receipt and subsequently deposited it in the
Bank of America. Respondent, Chief of the Money Order Division of the Manila Po
st Office notified the Bank of irregularity, and deducted from the banks clearing
account the said amount, in the same way the bank of America debited Petitioners
account with the same amount. Petitioner requested to reconsider the action but
was denied. ISSUE: W/N the postal money order in question is a negotiable instr
ument. HELD: Postal statutes are patterned after similar statutes enforced in th
e US. These are generally constructed and construed in accordance with construct
ion of USs own postal statutes, in the absence of any special reason justifying d
eparture from the policy or practice. US held that postal money orders are not n
egotiable instruments. LATIN MAXIM: 2b, 9a, b2
51 Cruz v. Pahati
Republic v. Workmens Compensation Commission
Case No. 132 G.R. No. L-29019 (May 18, 1972)
FACTS: Defendant bought an automobile from Bulahan, for P4,900 which he paid in
check. He cancelled the sale and stopped the payment of the check upon impoundme
nt and as a result, he returned the automobile to Bulahan who in then surrendere
d the check for cancellation. He set up a counterclaim for attorney s fees. Bula
han claims that he bought the automobile from Belizo without having any knowledg
e of any defect in the title. It was found out that Belizo falsified a letter th
at enabled him to sell the car of Bulahan for profit. The court rendered judgmen
t declaring Defendant Bulahan entitled to the automobile in question and ordered
the Plaintiff to return it to said Defendant and, upon his failure to do so, to
pay him the sum of P4,900, with legal interest from the date of the decision. T
he claim for damages and attorney s fees of Bulahan was denied. Defendant Belizo
was however ordered to indemnify the Plaintiff in the amount of P4,900 and pay
the sum of P5,000 as moral damages. The counterclaim of Defendant was denied for
lack of evidence. ISSUE: Who has a better right of the two over the car. HELD:
Plaintiff has a better right to the car than Bulahan and therefore can recover t
he said car. It was clear that the Plaintiff was unlawfully deprived because of
the scheme of Belizo even if both the Plaintiff and Bulahan acted in good faith.
LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a
FACTS: Petitioners seek full compensation of P6,000.00 plus attorneys fee of P600
.00 under the WCC, without deducting the P3,000.00 as death benefit which they h
ad been previously paid by virtue of the provisions of RA 610. ISSUE: W/N the be
neficiaries of military personnel who have received the death gratuity under RA
610 should still be paid the death compensation under the WCC. HELD: The resolut
ion of the WCC is modified; the P3,000.00 received under RA 610 should be deduct
ed from the full grant received under the WCC. It is difficult to construe that
the legislature intended to double the compensations received, considering that
at the times said laws were approved the finances of the government could not ha
ve conceivably permitted the outlays needed for the purpose. Furthermore, Sec. 9
of RA 610 and Sec. 5 of WCC bar payment under other laws. It was also contended
that the phrase or any other law granting similar benefits to officers or employ
ees, generally, of the national, provincial or municipal government in Sec. 9 is
highly indicative of the legislative intent to prevent further recovery of compe
nsation benefits under other laws. LATIN MAXIM: 17, 19b, 29, 38b, 39, 40b
52 Garcia et al. v. Hipolito et al.

Case NO. 53 G.R. No. L-1449 (November 30, 1903)
ESSO Standard Eastern Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Case No. 41 G.R. No. 70037 (July 7, 1989)
FACTS: Judgment was rendered for the Defendants on May 1, 1903. The Plaintiffs w
ere notified thereof on May 21. Two days after, they excepted to the judgment an
d presented a motion for a new trial, which was denied on July 23. On July 28, t
he Plaintiffs presented their proposed bill of exceptions, which on August 5 was
allowed and signed by the court. The term of the court in which the case was tr
ied expired on May 30. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 143 of the Code of Civil Procedure allows
the parties to consent to or for the judge to order an extension of the 10-day
period. HELD: The period of 10 days and the subsequent period of 5 days have to
do with the mechanical part of the appealthe preparation of the papers for transm
ission to the Supreme Court. The right of the parties to the appeal was already
fixed by the notice of the intention to prepare a bill of exceptions entered of
record in the clerks office. If the period corresponds to the appeal or for suing
out a writ of error found in most other laws of American origin, it cannot be e
xtended. But that period is entirely different from the 10 days for allowing the
preparation of papers, after the right to remove the case has been secured. The
refore, it cannot be said that an extension of this time is an extension of the
time to appeal. Moreover, considering when the law was adopted, it seems impossi
ble that the Commission intended to deprive the court and the parties of the pow
er to extend the term, given the physical impossibility to comply with it in man
y cases. LATIN MAXIM: 11a, 19b, 27, 48
FACTS: The case is an appeal on the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals denying
the Petitioners claims for refund of the margin fees P102,246.00 for 1959 and P4
34,234.92 for 1960. ISSUE: W/N RA 2609, entitled An Act to Authorize the Central
Bank of the Philippines to Establish a Margin over Banks Selling Rates of Foreign
Exchange, is a police measure or a revenue measure. HELD: RA 2609 is a police me
asure as it is applied in order to strengthen our countrys international reserve.
Petitioner contended that margin fees are taxes and cited the background and th
e legislative history of the Margin Fee Law showing that RA 2609 was nothing les
s than a revival of the 17% excise tax on foreign exchange imposed by RA 601. Th
is was a revenue measure formally proposed by President Carlos P. Garcia to Cong
ress as part of, and in order to balance, the budget for 1959-1960. The CTA stat
ed that it is a well-settled jurisprudence that only in extremely doubtful matte
rs of interpretation does the legislative history of an act of Congress become i
mportant. As a matter of fact, there may be no resort to the legislative history
of the enactment of a statute, the language of which is plain and unambiguous,
since such legislative history may only be resorted to for the purpose of solvin
g doubt, not for the purpose of creating it. Moreover, at least two cases had be
en decided in which it was held that margin fee is not a tax. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 7a
53 Commissioner of Customs v. ESSO Standard Eastern Inc.

Pascual v. Director of Lands
FACTS: Petitioner contends that the special import tax under RA 1394 is separate
and distinct from the customs duty prescribed by the Tariff and Customs Code, a
nd that the exemption enjoyed by Respondent from the payment of customs duties u
nder the Petroleum net of 1949 does not include exemption from the payment of th
e special import tax provided in RA 1394. ISSUE: W/N the exemption enjoyed by Re
spondent from customs duties granted by RA 387 should include the special import
tax imposed by RA 1394, or the Special Import Tax Law. HELD: Petitioner took ex
ception to the finding of the CTA that "The language of RA 1394 seems to leave n
o room for doubt that the law intends that the phrase Special Import Tax is ta
ken to include customs duties". In order to determine the true intent of the leg
islature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken
as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must
be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. In fact every statute s
hould receive such construction as will make it harmonize with the pre-existing
body of laws. Antagonism between the Acts to be interpreted and existing or prev
ious laws is to be avoided, unless it was clearly the intention of the legislatu
re that such antagonism should arise and one amends or repeals the other, either
expressly or by implication. Another rule applied by this Court is that the cou
rts may take judicial notice of the origin and history of the statutes which the
y are called upon to construe and administer, and of facts which affect their de
rivation, validity and operation. The Court examined the six statuettes repealed
by RA 1394. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 36b, 38a, b2
FACTS: Petitioner filed with Respondents, pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 102
C.A. No. 141, a petition for the cancellation of the lease contract aforesaid o
n the ground that Ramos had failed to pay the rentals on the lands for seven yea
rs and the taxes thereon since 1947, and on the further ground that he and his s
uccessors-in-interest had not cultivated the property nor introduced improvement
s thereon, in violation of the terms and conditions of the lease. The policy in
the disposition and concession of public land is to give priority or preference
to the actual occupant. Thus, in cases of lease the law requires that no lease s
hall be permitted to interfere with any prior claim by settlement or by occupati
on, until the consent of the occupant or settler is first had, or until such cla
im shall be legally extinguished (Sec. 33, C.A. No. 141). If anyone should be gi
ven prior right of entry at all, it should be the actual occupants who have pres
ented several petitions for the subdivision or and sale of the land to them. ISS
UE: W/N the ruling of the trial court upholding Petitioners claim to a right of e
ntry was correct. HELD: No. It is well settled that the contemporaneous interpre
tation given by administrative officials to a law they are bound to enforce or i
mplement deserves great weight. In the present case, it appears that the trial c
ourt reversed not only the decision of Respondent and of the Secretary of Agricu
lture and Natural Resources but that of the Office of the President, without the
record disclosing in our opinion, that the same are clearly erroneous and unfou
nded. To the contrary, they appear to be in consonance with the purpose of the l
aw invoked by Petitioner, namely, to give priority or preference to the actual o
ccupant of public land which Petitioner is not. LATIN MAXIM: 2a
54 Orencia v. Enrile
m i k iPeople of the Philippines v. Hernandez
Case No. 107 G.R. Nos. L-39840 and L-39841 (December 23, 1933)
FACTS: Petitioner is alleging that he is the deputy clerk of court of the Clerks
of Court Division of the Land Registration Commission, and he has been performi
ng functions of Assistant Chief of said division and has been considered and rec
ognized as such until RA 4040, increasing the salaries of Assistant Chiefs of Di
visions, among others, was implemented where he was left out while co-assistant
chief of the nine other divisions of the Land Registration Commission were so re
cognized and extended increased compensation. Respondents filed their answer, an
d after usual admissions and denials, interposed a defense that Petitioner is un
qualified for the position of Assistant Chief, and being a new position created
under RA 4040, the same can only be filed by a qualified person; that Respondent
, being a lawyer, is more qualified than Petitioner, who is only a high school g
raduate with second grade civil service eligibility, and praying that the petiti
on be dismissed ISSUE: W/N the Petitioner should be recognized as the deputy cle
rk of court of the Clerks of Court Division of the Land Registration Commission.
HELD: For Respondent officials, the answer was not in doubt. Since there was a
new legal provision to be construed, one which admittedly, to follow the approac
h of counsel for Petitioner, has an ambiguous aspect, they chose to follow the p
rinciple that a public office is a public trust. Certainly, such a contemporaneo
us construction, one moreover dictated by the soundest constitutional postulate,
is entitled to the highest respect from the judiciary. LATIN MAXIM: 2a
FACTS: Respondent ran for governor in Camarines Norte and assumed office on Octo
ber 16, 1931. At this time, he was a delinquent in the payment of P2,000 for lan
d taxes to the government. Two or three days before Respondent assumed office, t
he municipal treasurer demanded him to pay said taxes but he failed to do so. Th
e Insular Auditor permitted Respondent to receive his salary as governor, on the
condition that it would be used to pay off the delinquent taxes. The Chief of E
xecutive Bureau and Attorney General agreed with Insular Auditor. By September,
1932, taxes had been paid for. However, in April 1932, he was charged for violat
ing Sec. 2659 of the Administrative code and was found guilty and was deprived t
he right to suffrage and public office. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 2659 can be applied to r
efrain Respondent from taking office as Governor in Camarines Norte. HELD: No. S
ec. 2659 refers to a person who assumes office to which he had been elected with
out possessing the necessary qualifications to hold public office as provided by
law. Delinquency of payment of taxes is no longer a disqualification for assumi
ng a public office. Hence, even though Respondent did not pay his land taxes, th
is does not incapacitate him from assuming office. Under these circumstances, we
should follow the doctrine laid down in the cases of Molina vs. Rafferty: long
continued administrative interpretation of a tax law, while not conclusive, shou
ld be followed unless clearly erroneous. And in this case, it was not. LATIN MAX
IM: 2a, 32, 42b
55 Sagun v. Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation

Case No. 266 G.R. No. 73603 (June 22, 1988) Chapter III, Page 112, Footnote No.1
80
Philippine Global Communications, Inc. v. Relova
Case No. 236 G.R. No. L-60548 (November 10, 1986) Chapter III, Page 112, Footnot
e No.181
FACTS: Respondent Corporation was created to provide decent, low cost housing fo
r those who are unable to provide themselves with this. In accordance with RA 32
08, the lots located in Block 330, LCH Project 3, Quezon City were meant to be u
sed for this purpose. However, the Petitioners first used the lots for store pur
poses, before converting these store units into their dwelling homes. In 1971, P
etitioners decided that they wanted to buy these lots from Respondent Corporatio
n but filed a petition for mandamus alleging that Respondent Corporation was sel
ling the lots at P50/sq m., which was in violation of RA 3802. ISSUE: W/N Respon
dent Corporation can be compelled by mandamus to sell these lots for not more th
an P10/sq m. to its registered tenants or their successors in interest, in refer
ence to Sec. 1 of RA 3802. HELD: No. For mandamus to lie, Petitioners rights shou
ld be well-defined, clear and certain. In the case at bar, there is no showing o
f a clear and certain right to compel Respondent Corporation to sell them the un
its for a price lower than what is being offered. The Petitioners first leased t
hese units for business purposes. Thus, the price of P50 is not excessive or unr
easonable considering that the market value for the lots is at least P120. The a
ction of Respondent Corporation neither conflicts with the law nor does it demon
strate any abuse of discretion to warrant its reversal. Moreover, there is no ob
ligation of Respondent Corporation, under RA 3802, aside from the fact that the
determination of the selling price requires exercise of discretion on their part
. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 9a
FACTS: In 1976, Petitioner filed with the Board of Communication, now NTC, an ap
plication for authority to establish a branch station in Cebu for the purpose of
rendering international telecommunication services from Cebu to any point outsi
de the Philippines where it is authorized to operate. In 1977, Manila was design
ated as the sole gateway for communications in the Philippines. In January 1979,
BOC gave Petitioners authority to establish a station in Cebu, subject to that
as soon as domestic carriers have upgraded their facilities, applicant shall cea
se its operations. Respondents filed a joint motion for reconsideration of said
decision, which ruled in favor of the Respondents claiming that Petitioner does
not have the authority to establish other stations aside from the station in Mak
ati. This is a petition seeking to set aside the ruling rendered. ISSUE: W/N Pet
itioner is authorized under RA 4617 to establish stations in places or points ou
tside Metro Manila? HELD: Yes. RA 4617 clearly authorizes Petitioner to construc
t, maintain, and operate, apart from its principal station in Makati, other stat
ions or branches within the Philippines for purposes of its international commun
ications operations. This can be seen in Sec. 3 and 4 wherein other stations may
be established as long as it is approved by the Secretary of Public Works and C
ommunications. The opinion of the Secretary and Undersecretary of Justice which
affirmed the authorization of other stations is material and must be considered
in favor of the Petitioners. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 36b
56 Asturias Sugar Central v. Commissioner of Customs

Case No. 24 No. L-19337 (September 30 1969) Chapter III, Page 112, Footnote No.1
83
Phil. Sugar Central Agency v. Collector of Customs
Case No. 241 No. 27761 (Dec. 6 1927) Chapter III, Page 113, Footnote No.186
FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition for review of the unfavorable decision of the
CTA which denied the recovery of the sum of P28,629.42 which the Petitioner pai
d under protest in the concept of customs duties and special import tax. Under t
he law in effect at that time, the Petitioner is entitled to recovery of taxes a
nd duties paid for importation of containers provided importer re-exports said c
ontainers within a 1year period. Also Asturias contends that they are entitled t
o an alternative recovery of the said amount minus 1% under Sec. 106(b) of the C
ustoms and Tariff Act. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is entitled to recovery of import t
axes and duties. HELD: No. The 1-year period mentioned in the Philippine Tariff
Act contains no express mention of any extension or of any grounds for it to be
extended. The provisions invoked by the Petitioner to sustain his claim for refu
nd, offer two options to an importer. The first gives him the privilege of impor
ting, free from import duties, the containers mentioned therein as long as he ex
ports them within one year from the date of acceptance of the import entry, it i
s non-extendible. The second contemplates a case where import duties are first p
aid subject to refund to the extent of 99% of the amount paid, provided the arti
cles mentioned are exported within three years from importation. LATIN MAXIM: 2a
, 4, 38b, 43
FACTS: Petitioner acts as agency and attorney-in-fact of Ma-ao Sugar Central Co.
Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. shipped 5,124,416 gross kilos of centrifugal sugar to U
nited States in a wharf on Pulapandan, Occidental Negros on steamship Hannover.
Wharf was built and maintained solely by the Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. Defendant c
ollected wharfage dues on petitioners wharf. ISSUE: W/N the Defendant can collect
wharfage dues on wharves not owned by government. HELD: Yes. The Government can
be allowed to collect because not to do so would overthrow and destroy the whole
system of the Government, in and by which millions of pesos have been levied an
d collected and expended in the construction of Government wharves, and it would
have defeated the construction of the Government wharf at Pulapandan. Dissenting
Opinion: Historically, wharves not owned nor operated by government cannot be t
axed or levied upon. LATIN MAXIM: 3a, 4, 37, 5b, 11d
57 Manila Jockey Club Inc. v. Games and Amusement Board

Case No. 164 No. L-12727 (February 29, 1960) Chapter III, Page 114, Footnote No.
190
Ramos v. CA
Case No. 253 G.R. No. L-22753 (December 18, 1967) Chapter III, Page 115, Footnot
e No.193
FACTS: The Petitioner states that they are entitled to certain Sundays unreserve
d for any event and that reducing the number of said days is an infringement of
their right. Petitioner relies on the strength of Sec. 4 of RA 309, as amended b
y RA 983, that the unreserved Sundays may be used by private individuals or grou
ps duly licensed by the Games and Amusement Board (GAB). RA 1502 increased the s
weepstakes draw and races to 12 but without specifying the days on which they ar
e to be run, the GAB reduced the number of racing days assigned to private indiv
iduals and entities by six. ISSUE: W/N the Petitioner has a right to the unreser
ved days. HELD: No. From the wording of the RA 309 and RA 983, it is clear that
the text is permissive and is not mandatory. The private individuals and entitie
s are not entitled to the use of such days. Petitioners claim that the intent of
the legislature was to allow the races and sweepstakes to be run on the same day
are untenable. The words of members of Congress are not representative of the e
ntire House of Representatives or Senate. Also, Petitioners claim that to allow t
he PCSO to use their equipment and property is deprivation of property is also u
ntenable because they have a rental agreement with the PCSO. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 6g
, 37, 38b
FACTS: The present case had its incipiency in a petition filed by the then Natio
nal Rice and Corn Corporation (NARIC) workers for an obligation created by agree
ment confirmed by the Court of Industrial Relations directing NARIC to pay 25% f
or additional compensation for overtime work, night work and work rendered on Su
ndays and legal holidays by its laborers and employees. Rice and Corn Administra
tion (RCA) claims that unlike NARIC, which was possessed with a distinct and sep
arate corporate existence, they are merely an office directly under the Presiden
t, a governmental machinery to carry out a declared government policy to stabili
ze the price of palay, rice, and corn, and not for profit. To carry out this fun
ction, by law of the Commonwealth Act otherwise known as the Budget Act, RCA dep
ends for its continuous operation on appropriation yearly set aside by the Gener
al Appropriations Act. There has been consistent administrative interpretation b
y the Office of the President as to what may, under law, be granted to RCA worke
rs and employees for overtime work and work on Sundays and holidays. Not a matte
r of right, such compensation was given upon authority of the Budgetary Act. ISS
UE: W/N RCA should be held answerable when NARIC ceased to exist and RCA was cre
ated for the said obligation. HELD: While executive construction is not necessar
ily binding upon courts, it is entitled to great weight and consideration. The r
eason for this is that such construction comes from the particular branch of gov
ernment called upon to implement the particular law involved. Thus, unless the P
resident specifically appropriates the 25% compensation, RCA is not liable to th
e abovementioned obligation. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 11a, 38b
58 Salaria v. Buenviaje
Case No. 267 G.R. No. L-45642 (February 28, 1978) Chapter III, Page 115, Footnot
e No.193
University of the Philippines v. CA
Case No. 305 G.R. No. L-28153 (January 28, 1971) Chapter III, Page 115, Footnote
No.195
FACTS: Petitioner has been staying on the land of Cailao when the latter sold th
e said land to Private Respondent Mendiola. A formal letter of demand to vacate
the premises was sent by Respondent Mendiola to Petitioner. A complaint for unla
wful detainer was filed by Mendiola against Petitioner Salaria. After the trial,
the City Court ordered Petitioner to vacate the leased premises. On appeal, the
CFI through Respondent Judge Buenviaje affirmed the decision of the inferior co
urt. Thus, a petition for review on Certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: W/N Respondent can eject Petitioner from the lot. HELD: No. Memorandum C
ircular No. 970 was issued by the President stating that except for the causes fo
r judicial ejectment of lessees bona fide tenants of dwelling places covered by
said decree are not subject to eviction, particularly if the only cause of actio
n thereon is personal use of the property by the owners or their families. Constr
uction by Executive Branch of Government of a particular law although not bindin
g upon courts must be given weight as the construction comes from that branch ca
lled upon to implement the law. The ground relied upon by the lessor in this cas
e, namely, personal use of property by the owner or lessors or their families is
not one of the causes for judicial ejectment of lessees. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 30a,
38b
FACTS: With the filing of Petition for injunction in the Court of First Instance
of Manila, Petitioners in the original case sought to restrain herein Responden
t from dismissing them and to declare as a matter of legal right that they shoul
d not be dismissed from the Philippine General Hospital by herein Respondent but
by the Civil Service Commissioner. ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of original Petitio
ners in the case by the Board of Regents is final, or requires further action by
the Civil Service Commission. HELD: The management of Philippine General hospit
al was initially under the Office of the President of the Philippines. Under RA
51 and E.O. 94, the President transferred them under herein Respondent. Thus, th
e Supreme Court ruled that the President and Board of Regents of the U.P. posses
s full and final authority in disciplining, suspension, and removal of the civil
service employees of the University, including those of the Philippine General
Hospital, independently of the Commissioner of the Civil Service and the Civil S
ervice Board of Appeals. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 6c, 9b, 20c, 38b
59 Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) v. Bureau of Labor Relati

ons
Everett v. Bautista
Case No. 43 G.R. No. 46505 (November 7, 1939)
FACTS: Petitioner lost to National Federation of Free Labor Unions (NAFLU) in th
e certification elections for the exclusive bargaining agent of the employees in
Philippine Blooming Mills, Company, Inc. Tallied votes are as follows: NAFLU 42
9 PAFLU 414 Spoiled Ballots 17 (not counted) Abstained 4 Total Ballots 864 (Note
: NAFLU didnt obtain the majority vote, which is 432.) Petitioner contends that t
he spoiled should be considered as in the ruling in a previous case. Respondent
answered that the ruling in the previous case was based on the Industrial Peace
Act, which has been superseded by the present Labor Code and as such cannot appl
y to the case at bar. ISSUE: W/N the Respondent acted with grave abuse of discre
tion by not allowing the spoiled ballots to be considered as in the previous cas
e of Allied Workers Association of the Philippines vs. CIR. HELD: There was no g
rave abuse of discretion made by Respondent since the basis of the ruling in the
Allied Workers case has been superseded by the present Labor Code. Also, the Ru
les and Regulations implementing the present Labor Code has been already been ma
de known to public and as such has the enforcing power in the case at bar. LATIN
MAXIM: 1, 2a, 39a
FACTS: Petitioner and Respondent were partners who owned and managed Queens Theat
er during the first Quarter of 1937. The partnership charged admission fees of P
0.40 per seat and at other times charged more than P0.40 but not more than P0.70
per seat. During the first Quarter of 1937, their receipts were P15, 881.41. At
that time, imposition tax is at 5% of the gross receipts of theaters, cinematog
raphs, etc. whose admission price exceeds P0.40 (Sec. 1&3 of C.A. No. 128). The
law does not say how tax should be imposed in cases where the daily receipts are
not made at the same rate. As such, the Collector of Internal Revenue issued Re
gulations No. 94, which states that the daily receipts of prices charged differe
ntly will be jointly taken into account for computation purposes. Sec. 1458 of t
he Administrative Code states that penalty for late payment will be at 25% of th
e tax imposed. The parties failed to pay the tax on time and therefore subject t
o Sec. 1458. They were asked to pay P992.50, which they refused to pay. ISSUE: 1
. W/N the collection to said tax is in accordance with law. 2. W/N Regulations N
o. 94 is in accordance with law. HELD: Yes to both. The interpretation given to
a law by an officer charged by reason of his office to carry out its provisions
should be respected. It has also been held that where there is ambiguity in the
language of the law, contemporaneous construction is given weight. LATIN MAXIM:
2a
60 Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees Union (IBAAEU) v. Inciong

Philippine Apparel Workers Union vs. NLRC
FACTS: Petitioner first filed a complaint to the lower Court against Insular Ban
k of Asia and America (IBAA) for not paying the holiday pay. The Petition was gr
anted and IBAA paid for the holiday wage. Later, IBAA stopped paying the holiday
wage in compliance to the issuance of Sec. 2 of the Rules and Regulations imple
menting the Labor Code and the Policy Instruction No. 9 issued by Respondent (th
en Secretary of DOLE). Petitioner filed for a motion for a writ of execution to
enforce the arbiters decision of paying the holiday wages and the motion was gran
ted. IBAA then appealed to NLRC and NLRC dismissed the appeal. At this point, IB
AA filed a motion for reconsideration to Respondent. Respondent granted IBAAs mot
ion for reconsideration. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari chargin
g Respondent of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. ISS
UE: 1. W/N the decision of the Labor Arbiter can be set aside by Respondent cons
idering that it has become final and had been partially executed. 2. W/N Sec. 2
of Implementing Rules and Policy Instruction No. 9 are valid. HELD: A judgment i
n a labor case that has become executory cannot be revoked after finality of jud
gment. In the case at bar, IBAA waived its right to appeal by paying the holiday
wage and is therefore deemed to have accepted the judgment as correct. Sec. 2 a
nd Policy Instruction No. 9 are both null and void since they amended the provis
ions of the Labor Code. It has been held that where the language of the law is c
lear and unequivocal the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. And als
o, if a contemporaneous construction is so erroneous, the same must be declared
null and void. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 17, 37, 40c
FACTS: A collective bargaining agreement was made between Petitioners and Manage
ment of Philippine Apparel Inc. (PAI) on April 2, 1977 and was signed on Septemb
er 7, 1977. CBA stipulated a P22.00 increase in monthly wage of workers that wil
l retroact from April 1, 1977. However, on May of the same year, P.D. 1123 grant
ed a P60.00 increase in living allowance which will take effect from January 1,
1977, provided that those who were granted an increase of less that P60.00 will
be given the difference. Management argues that since on April 2, there has been
an agreement to a P22.00 increase, PAI only had to pay the difference of P38.00
. Moreover, PAI was able to get the opinion of the Undersecretary of Labor suppo
rting the PAI Management. Labor contends that increase does not fall within the
exemption since the CBA was signed on September after P.D. 1123 has been passed.
ISSUE: W/N the case falls under the exception of P.D. 1123. HELD: No. There was
no formal agreement on April 2, 1977 regarding the increase. Moreover, the opin
ion of the Undersecretary of Labor was based on a wrong premise and misinterpret
ation by PAI Management. It was unlawful and beyond the scope of law. LATIN MAXI
M: 2a
61 United Christian Missionary Society vs. Social Security Commission

Case No. 293 G.R. No. L-26712-16 (December 27, 1969) Chapter III, Page 206, Foot
note No.206
Yra v. Abao
Case No. 316 G.R. No. 30187 (November 15, 1928) Chapter III, Page 118, Footnote
No.214
FACTS: Petitioner is a volunteer group that did not know that they had to pay ta
x for their operations. Nevertheless, upon knowledge thereof, they paid their pr
emium remittances but refused to pay the incredible penalty fees since they did
not know that they had to pay the aforementioned premium remittances, claiming t
hat the assessed penalties were inequitable. Respondent said that their organiza
tion is embraced in the Social Security Act; therefore the assessed penalties ar
e imposed on them. ISSUE: W/N Respondent erred in ruling that it has no authorit
y under the Social Security Act to condone, waive or relinquish the penalty pres
cribed by law for late payment of remittances. HELD: Respondent has no such auth
ority. Petition is dismissed on the ground that in the absence of an express pro
vision in the Social Security Act vesting Respondent the power to condone penalt
ies, it has no legal authority to condone, waive, or relinquish the penalty for
late premium remittances mandatorily imposed under the SS Act. The reason of the
law is to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system whic
h shall be suitable to the needs of the people to provide employees against the h
azards of disability, sickness, old age, and death. Good faith and bad faith are
irrelevant since the law makes no distinction. Where the language of the law is
clear and the intent of the legislature is equally plain, there is no room for i
nterpretation. LATIN MAXIM: 6a, 6b, 7a, 9a, 26
FACTS: Respondent was running for office in Bulacan, his hometown. However, he i
s a registered voter in Manila and to be a candidate, one of the qualifications
is that he/she who is running should be a duly qualified elector therein. ISSUE: W
/N Respondent is an eligible to run as a local official of Bulacan. HELD: Yes. H
e is qualified to run for local office. In a previous case contested in the Phil
ippine Assembly, Fernando Ma. Guerrero a candidate for representative to the Phi
l. Assembly was alleged to be unqualified for the position on the ground that he
was not registered in his electoral district. The conclusion to which was, quali
fied elector meant that he has all the qualifications provided by the law to be a
voter and need not be register. The same was the case and decision of the Execu
tive Bureau on the qualifications of Senator Jose P. Laurel. It is sufficient th
at he possess the qualifications stated in Sec. 431 and none of the disqualifica
tions stated in Sec. 432 of the Election Law. However, it is not least to disreg
ard the forcible argument advanced that when the law make use of the phrases, qua
lified electors and qualified voter the law means what it says. It would be an absu
rdity to hold one a qualified elector who was not eligible to vote in his own mu
nicipality. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 3a, 6c, 11a
62 Interprovincial Autobus Co., Inc. v. CIR

Case No. 134 G.R. No. L-6741 (January 31, 1956) Chapter III, Page 120-121, Footn
ote No.222 & 227
In re: McCulloch Dick
Case No. 129 G.R. No. L-13862 (April 15, 1918) Chapter III, Page 120, Footnote N
o.223
FACTS: Petitioner is engaged in transporting passengers and freight by means of
TPU buses in Misamis Occidental and Northern Zamboanga. The provincial revenue a
gent for Misamis Occidental examined the stubs of the freight receipts that had
been issued by Petitioner. The stubs and the daily reports of the conductor did
not state the value of the goods transported. Pursuant to Sec. 121 and 127 of th
e Revised Documentary Stamp Tax Regulations of the Department of Finance, the ag
ent assumed that the value of the goods was more than P5. Petitioner asked for a
refund and the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental rendered a judgmen
t in their favor but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision. ISSUE: 1. W/N t
he Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the case. 2. W/N the Court of Appeals d
ecision is erroneous. HELD: The Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction because acc
ording to both the Judiciary Act of 1948 and the Constitution the Supreme Court
has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases involving the legality o
f any tax, impost, assessment or tolls, or any penalty in relation thereto. The
decision of the Court of Appeals however was not erroneous: a. Sec. 121 falls wi
thin the scope of administrative power of the Secretary of Finance as authorized
in Sec. 79 of the Revised Administrative Code. b. The regulation (Sec. 121) is
valid also because of the principle of legislative approval be re-enactment. The
regulations were approved on September 16, 1924. When the National Internal Rev
enue Code was approved on February 18, 1939, the same provisions of stamp tax, b
ills of landing and receipts were re-enacted. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 4
FACTS: Petitioner, the editor and proprietor of the Philippines Free Press, file
d for a writ of habeas corpus so that he may be discharged from detention by the
acting chief of police of the city of Manila. He is being detained because the
Governor-General of the Philippines ordered his deportation. Before the Governor
-General gave his order, there was an investigation in the manner and form presc
ribed in Sec. 69 of the Administrative Code. ISSUE: W/N the Governor-General has
the power under Act No. 2113 and Sec. 69 of the Administrative Code to institut
e and maintain deportation proceedings. HELD: Yes, the Governor-General has the
power to institute and maintain deportation proceedings. When the provisions of A
ct No. 2113 were enacted and continued in force by the enactment of the Administra
tive Code and again continued in force by the enactment of the Jones Law the const
ruction theretofore placed upon it by this court became an integral part of thes
e statutes having the force and the effect of a legislative command. In the inter
pretation of reenacted statutes, the court will follow the construction which th
ey received when previously in force. The legislature will be presumed to know t
he effect which such statutes originally had, and by reenactment to intend that
they should again have the same effect. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 3a, 4, 9a
63 Howden & Co., Ltd. v. Collector of Internal Revenue

Case No. 9 G.R. No. L-19392 (April 14, 1965) Chapter III, Page 120, Footnote No.
222 and 224
Laxamana v. Baltazar
Case No. 144 G.R. No. L-5955 (September 19, 1952) Chapter III, Page 121, Footnot
e No.225
FACTS: Commonwealth Insurance Co. (CIC), a domestic corporation, entered into re
insurance contracts with 32 British companies not engaged in business in the Phi
lippines represented by herein Plaintiff. CIC remitted to Plaintiff reinsurance
premiums and, on behalf of Plaintiff, paid income tax on the premiums. Plaintiff
filed a claim for a refund of the paid tax, stating that it was exempted from w
ithholding tax reinsurance premiums received from domestic insurance companies b
y foreign insurance companies not authorized to do business in the Philippines.
Plaintiffs stated that since Sec. 53 and 54 were substantially re-enacted by RA 10
65, 1291 and 2343, said rulings should be given the force of law under the princ
iple of legislative approval by re-enactment. ISSUE: W/N the tax should be withh
eld. HELD: No. The principle of legislative enactment states that where a statut
e is susceptible of the meaning placed upon it by a ruling of the government age
ncy charged with its enforcement and the legislature thereafter re-enacts the pr
ovisions without substantial changes, such action is confirmatory to an extent t
hat the ruling carries out the legislative purpose. This principle is not applic
able for the aforementioned sections were never re-enacted. Only the tax rate wa
s amended. The administrative rulings invoked by the CIR were only contained in
unpublished letters. It cannot be assumed that the legislature knew of these rul
ings. Finally, the premiums remitted were to indemnify CIC against liability. Th
is took place within the Philippines, thus subject to income tax. LATIN MAXIM: 2
a, 4
FACTS: The Mayor of Pampanga was suspended. By virtue of Sec. 2195 of the Revise
d Administrative Code, Respondent Vice Mayor assumed the office. However, the Pr
ovincial Governor, by virtue of Sec. 21 of the Revised Election Code, appointed
herein Petitioner as the mayor. ISSUE: W/N Respondent is the right person to ass
ume office. HELD: Yes, Respondent should assume the vacated position. Sec. 21 of
the Revised Election Code, which was taken from Sec. 2180 of the Revised Admin
Code, applies to municipal officers in general while Sec. 2195 of the Revised Ad
ministrative Code applies to the office of mayor in particular. A special provis
ion overrides a general one. Also, the incorporation of Sec. 2180 in Sec. 21 doe
s not enlarge its scope but merely supplements it. It has also been consistently
held in case of suspension of the mayor, the vice-mayor shall assume office; th
e legislature is presumed to be acquainted with this contemporaneous interpretat
ion. Hence, upon re-enacting Sec. 2180, the interpretation is deemed to have bee
n adopted. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 4, 38b, 50
64 Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice

Case No. 32 G.R. No. L-42821 (January 18, 1936) Chapter III, Page 121, Footnote
No.226
NPC v. Province of Lanao del Sur
Case No. 187 G.R. No. 96700 (November 19, 1996) Chapter III, Page 122, Footnote
No.232
FACTS: Petitioner was appointed justice of the peace for Lingayen, Pangasinan. H
e relinquished his office after he had reached the age of 65 because of the prov
isions of Act No. 3899. Petitioner claimed that he was entitled to the benefits
under the vetoed Sec. 7 of the Retirement Gratuity Law which entitled justices o
f the peace to gratuities. Petitioner was contesting the validity of the veto of
the Governor-General by claiming that the Act was not an appropriation bill and
hence, was not subject to item-veto. ISSUE: W/N the veto of the Governor-Genera
l of Sec. 7 was valid. HELD: Yes. It is clear from reading Sec. 12 that the Legi
slature intended this Act to be an appropriation measure and that it anticipated
the possibility of a future veto by the Chief Executive. Hence, the Governor ca
n constitutionally veto certain items on this bill. Furthermore, the legislature
accepted the veto and made no attempt to override it. The executive department
sustained the validity of the veto as well. Contemporaneous construction is not
decisive for the courts, but when two co-equal branches of government have adopt
ed and accepted the construction of statutes, they must be given great respect.
Also, this practice of vetoing the separate items in a bill by the Chief Executi
ve has long been allowed and to rule against it would require a clear showing of
unconstitutionality. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 2b, 3a, 6c
FACTS: Petitioner Corporation was assessed real property taxes by Respondent sin
ce its tax exempt status was revoked by P.D. 1931. Because of the Petitioners fai
lure to pay, the properties were auctioned with the Respondent as the sole bidde
r. Petitioner contends that its status was never revoked but merely suspended. W
ith the Resolutions issued by the Fiscal Incentives Review Board (FIRB), the tax
exemption privileges of the Petitioners were restored. However, Respondent cont
ends that the Resolutions issued by the said Board was void relying on an earlie
r case between the Petitioner and the Province of Albay stating that FIRB does n
ot have power to restore tax exemptions and that the said Board can only recomme
nd to the President or the Minister of Finance which subsidiary of the Governmen
t can be given exemptions. Note however, that the Albay case was already superce
ded by the Maceda vs. Macaraig case stating that the FIRB Resolution is in accor
dance with the requirements of the law if it was properly approved by the Minist
er of Finance. In the present case, the FIRB Resolutions reinstating the status
were properly approved by the Minister of Finance. ISSUE: 1. W/N Respondent Prov
ince and provincial officials can validly and lawfully assess RPT against, and t
hereafter sell at public auction the subject properties of the Petitioner to eff
ect collection of alleged deficiencies in the payment of such taxes. 2. W/N Peti
tioner has ceased to enjoy its tax and duty exemption privileges, including its
exemption from payment of RPT. HELD: The Petitioner never lost its tax exempt st
atus, but its privileges were only suspended. Thus, the Respondent cannot assess
deficiency RPT against the Petitioner. Furthermore, since the Petitioner was ne
ver delinquent in paying RPT, the subsequent auction and sale of the Petitioners
assets is also considered void. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 5a, 5b, 9a, 20a, 37, 38a, 49
65 J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Mariano & Aquial & Cordova

J.M. Tuason v. Land Tenure Administration
Case No. 135 G.R. No. L-21064 (February 18, 1970) Chapter XI, Page 434, Footnote
No.7
FACTS: Plaintiffs Aquial (herein Respondents) claimed ownership of a parcel of l
and located in QC having an area of 383 hectares. They alleged that it had been
fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of
Rizal and that it was registered in the names of Defendants Tuason (herein Petit
ioners) pursuant to a decree issued on July 6, 1914 in Case No. 7681 of the Cour
t of Land Registration. Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles
derived therefrom be declared void due to certain irregularities in the land re
gistration proceeding. The Tuasons prayed that the petition be dismissed on the g
round that the court has no jurisdiction over the case, improper venue, prescrip
tion, laches and prior judgment. Respondents Cordova spouses were allowed to int
ervene in the case since they were able to purchase 11 hectares from the Aquials
. ISSUE: W/N OCT No. 735 is valid. HELD: OCT No. 735 is valid. The validity of O
CT No. 735 was already decided upon by the Supreme Court in the cases of Benin v
s. Tuason, Alcantara vs. Tuason and Pili vs. Tuason. The ruling in these cases w
as also applied in other cases involving the validity of OCT No. 735. LATIN MAXI
M: 5a, 5b
FACTS: Petitioner is the owner of a land called Tatalon Estate in Quezon City. T
hey seek to nullify RA 2616 which directs the expropriation of two lots inside t
he estate. Under Art. 8, Sec. 4 of the Constitution, The Congress may authorize,
upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be subdivided i
nto small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals Petitioner contends that said
law is unconstitutional because the provision in the Constitution refers to lands
not landed estates. ISSUE: W/N RA 2616 is unconstitutional. HELD: No. The questi
on is one of constitutional construction. The Constitution clearly states that la
nd not landed estates can be expropriated. It has a broader scope, allowing the leg
islature to expropriate more types of land. The law does not distinguish between
different types regardless of how big or small it may be, as long as there is a
need to address a growing social problem such as inequality. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9
c, 24a, 26, 37, 40c
66 Tolentino v. Commission on Elections

Aglipay v. Ruiz
FACTS: The 1971 Constitutional Convention seeks to amend Sec. 1 of Art. 5 of the
Constitution reducing the voting age from 21 to 18 years old. This proposal was
to be submitted to the people for ratification in a plebiscite coinciding with
the November 1971 elections relying on Sec. 1, Art. 15 of the Constitution: The C
ongress in a joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Memb
ers of the Senate and the House of Representatives voting separately may propose
amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for the purpose. Such amen
dments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority o
f the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the peo
ple for their ratification. ISSUE: W/N there is a limitation or condition in Sec.
1 of Art. 15 of the Constitution calling for a plebiscite on the sole amendment
contained in Organic Resolution No. 1. HELD: There was a violation. Because suc
h amendments regardless of how many are to be submitted to the people for their
ratification in an election, An election only means one. Also, no fixed frame of r
eference is given to the voter. No one knows what changes in the fundamental pri
nciples of the constitution would be modified. The amendments being proposed by
the convention in must be seen in relation to the whole. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a
FACTS: Respondent, who is the Director of Post, announced that he would order th
e issuance of postage stamps to commemorate the celebration of the 33rd Internat
ional Eucharistic Congress in accordance with Act No. 4052. Petitioner, who is t
he Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks prohibition of such
because it violates Sec. 13, Art. 6 of the Constitution. ISSUE: W/N the sale of
such stamps is in violation of the constitutional mandate of religious freedom.
HELD: Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the
Respondent is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special
postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government. In this case, the issua
nce of the postage stamps was not inspired by any sectarian feeling. Act. No. 40
52 grants the Respondent discretion to issue postage stamps with new designs "as
often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 36a, 37
67 U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho

Case No 295 G.R. No. 17122 (February 27, 1922) Chapter XI, Page 435, Footnote No
.12
Ordillo v. COMELEC
Case No. 192 G.R. No. 93054 (December 4, 1990) Chapter XI, Page 437, Footnote No
.24
FACTS: Respondent was charged for violating E.O. 53 (which fixes the ceiling pri
ce at which rice may be sold) when he sold rice at a price greater than that fix
ed by law. E.O. 53 follows Act No. 2868 which penalizes monopoly and hoarding of
products under extraordinary circumstances. Respondent contends that the Legisl
ature has not defined any basis for the order but has left it to the discretion
of the Governor General. Without leaving the discretion to say which extraordina
ry circumstances to the Governor General are, Defendant will not be charged. ISS
UE: W/N Act No. 2868 is unconstitutional for undue delegation of legislative pow
er. HELD: The act is unconstitutional. The Constitution is something solid, perm
anent and substantial. As known, no nation living under republican form of gover
nment can enact a law delegating the power to fix the price at which rice should
be sold. That power can never be delegated under a republican form of governmen
t. This power is exclusive to the legislative. In fixing the price, the law is d
ealing with private property and private rights, which are sacred under the Cons
titution. LATIN MAXIM: None
FACTS: A plebiscite was held pursuant to R.A. No. 6766 (Organic Act creating the
Cordillera Autonomous Region) with the votes of the people in the provinces of
Benguet, Mountain Province, Kalinga-Apayao, Ifugao, Abra and the city of Baguio.
Out of the provinces, only Ifugao managed to get a majority vote. Resolutions a
nd memorandum from the COMELEC and the Secretary of Justice states that only pro
vinces voting favorably in the plebiscite shall constitute the region. ISSUE: W/
N Ifugao being the only one which voted for the creation of CAR can alone, legal
ly and validly constitute a region. HELD: Art. X, Sec. 15 of the 1987 Constituti
on explicitly provides that there shall be created autonomous regions consisting o
f provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas From this, it can be de
rived that the term region used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces.
The provisions of R.A. No. 6766 also show that the Congress never intended that
a single province may constitute the Autonomous Region. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 11
g, 25a, 28
68 De los Santos vs. Mallare

Case No. 89 G.R. Nos. L-3045-6 (August 31, 1950) Chapter XI, Page 440 and 450, F
ootnote No.33 and 54
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary
Case No. 64 G.R. No. 83896 (February 22, 1991) Chapter XI, Pages 443, 450 and 45
4, Footnotes No. 41, 51 and 71
FACTS: This case questions the legality of the Petitioners removal from the same
office which would be the effect of Respondents appointment. Petitioner contends
that under the Constitution, he can not be removed against his will and without
cause, citing Sec. 4, Art. 12 of the Constitution which reads: No officer or empl
oyee of the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for a cause provi
ded by law. Respondent admits that the position of City Engineer belongs to the un
classified service. According to Lacson vs. Romero, all officers or employees in
the unclassified service are protected by the above provision; but notes that th
ere is a difference between this case and the Lacson case. Sec. 2545 of the Revi
sed Administration Code authorizes the President to remove at pleasure any of th
e officers enumerated therein, one of who is the city engineer. The two provisio
ns are repugnant and absolutely irreconcilable. ISSUE: W/N the position of City
Engineer is an unclassified service. HELD: No. Reading Art. 12, Sec. 1 of the Co
nstitution, it is clear that Sec. 4 protects those appointed into the service th
at do not fall as any of the following: policydetermining, primarily confidential
or highly technical in nature. The position of city engineer is neither of the a
bove-stated. This is confirmed by the enactment of C.A. No. 177. As a contempora
neous construction, this Act affords an index to the meaning of Civil Service as
conceived by the framers of the Constitution. Furthermore, the rules of constru
ction inform us that the words used in construction are to be given the sense th
ey have in common use. The Court therefore held that Petitioner De los Santos is
entitled to remain in office as the City Engineer of Baguio with all the emolum
ents, rights and privileges appurtenant thereto, until he resigns or is removed
for cause, and that Respondents appointment is ineffective in so far as it may ad
versely affect those emoluments, rights and privileges. LATIN MAXIM: 39
FACTS: Petitioners maintain that the Executive Order which, in effect, allows me
mbers of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold o
ther government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions. Thi
s runs counter to Art. 7, Sec. 13 of the Constitution which provides that the Pr
esident, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assi
stants shall not, unless otherwise provided by the Constitution, hold any other
office or employment during their tenure. ISSUE: W/N the prohibition in Art. 7,
Sec. 13 admits of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general
under Art. 9-B, Sec. 7, par. 2. HELD: No. A foolproof yardstick in constitutiona
l construction is the intention underlying the provision. The practice of holdin
g multiple offices or positions in the government would lead to abuses by unscru
pulous public officials who took the scheme for purposes of self-enrichment, par
ticularly during the Marcos era. The qualifying phrase unless otherwise provided
in this Constitution of Sec. 13, Art. 7 cannot possibly refer to the broad except
ions of Sec. 7, Art. 9-B of the 1987 Constitution. The former is meant to lay do
wn the general rule of holding multiple offices applicable to all elective publi
c officials and employees while the latter is meant for the exception of the Pre
sident, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. T
o construe otherwise would be to render nugatory and meaningless the manifest in
tent and purpose of the framers of the Constitution. E.O. 284 is therefore decla
red null and void. LATIN MAXIM: 6b, 9a, b2
69 People of the Philippines vs. Muoz

Case No. 217 G.R. No. L-38969 (February 9, 1989) Chapter XI, Page 446, Footnote
No.42
Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Case No. 190 G.R. No. 78780 (July 23, 1987) Chapter XI, Page 447, Footnote No.46
FACTS: The Defendant was convicted of three counts of murder. The penalty for mu
rder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code was reclusion temporal in its maxi
mum period to death but this was modified by Art. 3, Sec. 19(1) of the 1987 Cons
titution providing that any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to recl
usion temporal. ISSUE: W/N this Court would adhere to the Masangkay ruling that t
he abolition of the death penalty limited the penalty for murder to the remainin
g periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium. HELD: No. In the case at bar, the
Court found that the applicable sentence would be the medium period of penalty
prescribed in Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, which does not follow the Masa
ngkay ruling, and that would be reclusion perpetua. LATIN MAXIMS: 1, 6c, 20a
FACTS: Petitioners submit that any tax withheld from their emoluments and compen
sations as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salar
ies, contrary to the provision of Sec. 10, Art. 8 of the Constitution mandating
that during their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased, even
as it is anathema to the ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned by the Co
nstitution. ISSUE: W/N the salary of the members of the judiciary is subject to
the general income tax applied to all taxpayers. HELD: Yes. The salary of the me
mbers of the judiciary is subject to the general income tax. According to Perfec
to vs. Meer, income taxes are part of the diminution of judges salaries because th
e independence of judges is of far greater importance than any revenue that coul
d come from taxing their salaries. Endencia vs. David confirmed Perfecto vs. Meer
. However both decisions must be discarded because the framers of the fundamenta
l law (i.e. Fox, Concepcion, and Bernas), as the alter ego of the people, have e
xpressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning of Sec. 10 Art. 8 of the 19
87 Constitution; that is, to make the salaries of the members of the judiciary t
axable. LATIN MAXIM: 3, b1
70 Taada v. Cuenco, et al
Case No. 286 G.R. No. L-10016 (February 28, 1957) Chapter XI, Page No. 451, Foot
note No.55
Aratuc v. COMELEC
Case No. 19 G.R. No. L-49705-09 (February 8, 1979) Chapter XI, Page 452, Footnot
e No.62
FACTS: The Senate upon nomination of the Nacionalista Party chose Senator Laurel
, Lopez, and Primicias, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). Upon
nomination of the Citizens Party, Petitioner was next chosen by the Senate as me
mber of SET. Then, the Senate chose Respondents as members of the same SET. Peti
tioners maintain that after the nomination and election of Senator Laurel, Lopez
, and Primicias of the Nacionalista Party as members of the SET, the other Senat
ors must be nominated by the Citizens Party. Respondents alleged, however, that
six members of the Electoral Tribunal shall be members of the Senate or the House
of Representatives, is mandatory. The word shall is imperative in nature relative
to the number of members of the Electoral Tribunal and this is borne in the opin
ion of the Secretary of Justice. ISSUE: W/N the election of Respondents as membe
rs of the Electoral Tribunal was valid or lawful. HELD: No. The application of th
e doctrine of contemporaneous construction is more restricted except as to matte
rs committed by the Constitution itself to the discretion of some other departme
nt, contemporary or practical construction is not necessarily binding upon the c
ourts, even in a doubtful case. Hence, if the judgment of the court, such construc
tion is erroneous and its further application is not made imperative by any para
mount considerations of public policy, it may be rejected. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 6b, 9
b, 11a
FACTS: Two petitions were filed against the Respondent claiming that it failed t
o address irregularities in the Central Mindanao elections for the Interim Batas
ang Pambansa. ISSUE: W/N the Supreme Court has the power to review decisions mad
e by the Respondent in handling the pre-proclamation controversies cited by the
Petitioners. HELD: No. The Supreme Court may only review actions carried out wit
h grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Sup
reme Court cited differences in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions with regard to t
he Supreme Courts power over COMELEC decisions in 1935, the Supreme Court may rev
iew Respondents decisions on either review or certiorari; 1973, Respondents decis
ions may only be brought up on ground of certiorari alone. This highlights the 1
973 Constitutions intent to strengthen Respondents independence. Consequently, err
ors of judgment that were based on substantial evidence are not reviewable in ce
rtiorari. LATIN MAXIM: 6a, 9a, 25a
71 In Re: Appointment of Valenzuela and Vallarta

Case No. 59 A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC (November 9, 1998)
Magtoto v. Manguera
Case No. 159 G.R. Nos. L-37201-02 (March 3, 1975) Chapter XI, Page 457, Footnote
No.79
FACTS: Judges were appointed to the RTC by the President on May 12 1998, within
2 months before the election. There are two conflicting provisions in the 1987 C
onstitution, the former validating this action and the latter proscribing it. On
the one hand, Art. 8, Sec. 4 requires that all vacancies in the judiciary be fi
lled within 90 days of such vacancy. On the other hand, Art. 7, Sec. 15 prohibit
s the President from making any appointments two months before Presidential elec
tions, except for temporary appointments to executive positions when public inte
rest is at stake. ISSUE: W/N the appointments were valid. HELD: No, the appointm
ents were void. The general rule is that the President must fill in vacancies in
the Judiciary within 90 days, but this does not apply in the special circumstan
ce of Presidential elections, which occurs only once every six years. Temporary
appointments to executive positions are the only exception. The prohibition is f
or public policy purposes, to prevent midnight appointments which is more compelli
ng than temporary vacancies in the judiciary. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a, 35, 36b, 38a,
50, b
FACTS: The present cases involve the interpretation of Sec. 20 Art. 4 of the New
Constitution which took effect on Jan. 17, 1973. The provision reads: Any person
under investigationshall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to
be informed of such right. Any confession obtained in violation of this section s
hall be inadmissible. Petitioner was accused in two criminal cases of murder in t
wo informations both dated Feb. 23, 1973. During the trial, his extrajudicial co
nfession dated Nov. 15, 1972 was admitted in evidence over the objection that it
was taken while the accused was in the preventive custody of the PC without his
having been informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel. ISSUE: 1. W/
N the Petitioners extra-judicial confession dated on Nov. 15, 1972 is admissible
as evidence. 2. W/N Sec. 20, Art. 4 of the New Constitution can be applied retro
actively. HELD: 1. Yes. Petitioners confession is admissible. The court ruled tha
t a confession obtained from a person under investigation, who has not been info
rmed of his right to counsel, is admissible in evidence if the same had been obt
ained before the effectivity of the New Constitution, since no law gave the accu
sed the right to be so informed before that date. Conversely, such confession is
inadmissible if the same had been obtained after the effectivity of the New Con
stitution. 2. No. The constitutional guarantee of right to counsel only has pros
pective effect. Giving such provision a retroactive effect would invite unwarran
ted hardship on the part of the prosecutor. LATIN MAXIM: 12a, 46a
72 Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan
Case No. 106 G.R. No. 79543 (October 16, 1996) Chapter XI, Page 457, Footnote No
.80
Co v. Electoral Tribunal, House of Representatives
Case No. 66 G.R. Nos. 92191-92 and 92202-03 (July 30, 1991) Chapter XI, Page 457
, Footnote No.82
FACTS: Petitioners were held guilty by Respondent Court for the crime of robbery
of a postal delivery van. Upon the capture of his co-accused, he was pointed ou
t as the mastermind. When Petitioner was captured, he admitted involvement in th
e crime and pointed his other confederates. On May 30, 1982, Petitioner executed
sworn statements (confessing what had happened), without the presence of a coun
sel. The 1987 Constitution provides that the right to counsel of the accused can
not be waived except in writing and in the presence of a counsel. Petitioner cla
ims that such proscription against an uncounselled waiver is applicable to him r
etroactively, even though his custodial investigation took place in 1983. ISSUE:
1. W/N the Petitioners extra-judicial confession is admissible even without the
presence of a counsel. 2. W/N the said provisions of 1987 Constitution can be ap
plied retroactively. HELD: 1. Yes, it is admissible under the 1973 Constitution.
Accordingly, waivers of the right to counsel during custodial investigation wit
hout the benefit of counsel during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution shou
ld, by such argumentation, be admissible. 2. No. The specific provision of the 1
987 Constitution requiring that a waiver by an accused of his right to counsel d
uring custodial investigation must be made with the assistance of a counsel may
not be applied to him retroactively or in cases where the extrajudicial confessi
on was made prior to the effectivity of the said constitution. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 5
a, 46a
FACTS: Respondents declared Jose Ong Jr., elected representative of Northern Sam
ar, as a natural born Filipino citizen. Petitioners contend that based on the 19
87 Constitution, Jose Ong, Jr. who was born on June 19, 1948 (during which the 1
935 Constitution was operative), is not a natural born Filipino citizen having b
een born to a Chinese father, Jose Ong Chuan and a Filipina mother Agrifina Lao.
ISSUE: 1. W/N people who have elected Philippine citizenship under the 1935 Con
stitution are to be considered natural born Filipino citizens. 2. W/N this provi
sion should be applied retroactively. HELD: Yes. Under of Art. 4 Sec. 1 par. 3 o
f the Constitution, children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973 sh
all be accorded natural born status if they elect Philippine citizenship upon re
aching the age of majority. They need not perform any act of election granted that
his father was naturalized and declared a Filipino citizen by 1957, when he was
only 9 years old. The provision in question must be applied retroactively since
it seeks to remedy the inequitable situation under the 1935 Constitution wherei
n people born of Filipino fathers and alien mothers were considered natural born
while children born of Filipino mothers and alien fathers were not. LATIN MAXIM
: 8a, 9a, 42a
73 Sarmiento v. Mison
Case No. 277 G.R. Nos. 80519-21 (December 17, 1987) Chapter XI, Page 458, Footno
te No.84
Domingo v. Commission on Audit
FACTS: Petitioners question the validity of appointment of Respondent as Commiss
ioner of the Bureau of Customs on the ground that it was not confirmed by the Co
mmission on Appointments. The Court favored the Respondent based on express prov
isions of the 1987 Constitution. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 16, Art. 7 provides for officer
s other than the first group to be appointed with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments. HELD: No. Sec. 16 Art. 7 only provides for the appointment, by
the President of heads of executive departments, ambassadors, other public minist
ers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constit
ution with the requirement of CA approval. Deliberations of the Constitutional Co
mmission reveal that the framers of the 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded
the position heads of bureaus from CA confirmation with the intent of reconciling
the 1935 Constitution which turned the Commission into a venue for horse-trading,
and that of the 1973 Constitution which placed absolute power of appointment in
the President. The word also in the second sentence of Sec. 16 Art. 7 must not be
construed as to suppose that officers in the second sentence shall be appointed i
n a like manner as that of the first group. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 24b, 32, 39a, b
FACTS: Petitioner was endorsed with several government vehicles for the use of t
he personnel of the entire Region V of DSWD. Respondent sent a communication to
the Petitioner informing her that post-audit reports on the DSWD disbursement ac
counts showed that officials provided with government vehicles were still collec
ting transportation allowances when they should not be. Petitioner asserted that
even if she was assigned a government vehicle, she was entitled to transportati
on allowance on the days she did not use a government vehicle. ISSUE: W/N a comm
utable transportation allowance may still be claimed by a government official pr
ovided with a government vehicle, for the days the official did not actually use
the vehicle. HELD: The General Appropriations Act of 1988, 1990 and 1991 clearl
y provides that transportation allowance will not be granted to officials who ar
e assigned a government vehicles except as approved by the President. LATIN MAXI
M: 6c, 7a, 24a
74 Globe-Mackay v. NLRC and Salazar

Case No. 112 G.R. No. 82511 (March 3, 1992) Chapter IV, Page 124, Footnote No.3
Luzon Brokerage Co v. Public Service Commission
FACTS: Petitioner placed Respondent Salazar under preventive suspension because
it appeared that she had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of an air co
nditioner that Delfin Saldivar had stolen from the company but failed to inform
her employer. Respondent Salazar filed a complaint for illegal suspension and fo
r other damages. On appeal, the Respondent Court affirmed the decision of the La
bor Arbiter with respect to the reinstatement of Private Respondent but limited
back wages to 2 years and deleted award for moral damages. ISSUE: 1. W/N the Lab
or Tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the reinstatement of
Respondent Salazar. 2. W/N there existed independent legal grounds to hold Resp
ondent Salazar answerable as well and, thereby, justify her dismissal. HELD: The
Labor Code clearly provides that an employee who is unjustly dismissed from wor
k shall be entitled to reinstatement and to his full back wages. An exception to
this is when the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to strained relations be
tween the employer and the employee. The position of Private Respondent as syste
ms analyst is not one that may be characterized as such. Moreover, Petitioner me
rely insinuated that since Respondent Salazar had a special relationship with Sa
ldivar, she might have had direct knowledge of Saldivars questionable activities.
LATIN MAXIM: 6c
FACTS: Petitioner has been operating a fleet of trucks utilized exclusively for
the carriage of goods or cargo of its particular customers. On May 9, 1932, Resp
ondent required the Petitioner to file with the commission within a period of th
irty days an application for a certificate of public convenience for the operati
on of his trucks since they were said to be devoted to the transportation of car
go with compensation as provided in Sec. 13 of the Public Service Law. ISSUE: W/
N the amendments introduced into Sec. 13 of Act No. 3108 by Act No. 3316 conferr
ed jurisdiction on the Respondents over the Petitioners business, although it is
not a common carrier. HELD: The omission from Sec. 13 of the phrase for public us
e in the definition of a public service does not mean that the Legislature meant
to extend the jurisdiction of the PSC to private enterprises not devoted to publ
ic use. Public service is a service for public use. The insertion of the phrase f
or hire or compensation does not show the intent either. This is a stock phrase f
ound in most definitions of a common carrier and a public utility. Also, notwith
standing the changes in the wording of the definition of the term public service i
ntroduced by Act No. 3316, there were no alterations made in the basic provision
s of the other sections. Respondent has no jurisdiction over Petitioner. LATIN M
AXIM: 6c, 36b
75
ROUND 2
76 Aparri v. Court of Appeals

Case No. 15 G.R. No. L-30057 (January 31, 1984) Chapter IV, Page 124, Footnote N
o.4
People v. Quijada
Case No. G.R. Nos. 115008 (July 24, 1996)
FACTS: R.A. 1160 created the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administra
tion (NARRA). Said law also empowered its Board of Directors to appoint and fix
the term of office of the General Manager subject to approval of the President.
On January 15, 1960, the Board approved Resolution No. 13 appointing Petitioner
as General Manager of NARRA. On March 15, 1962, the Board approved Resolution No
. 24 wherein the President expressed his desire to fix the term of office of the
incumbent General Manager up to March 31, 1962. ISSUE: W/N Resolution No. 24 co
nstitutes removal of Petitioner without cause. HELD: No, Petitioners term of offi
ce is deemed expired. R.A. 1160 expressly gives the Board the power to appoint a
nd fix the term of office of the General Manager. The word term describes the peri
od that an office may hold office and upon expiration of such term, his rights,
duties, and authority must cease. In this case, the term of office is not fixed
by law, but by the Board. LATIN MAXIM: 6a, 6c
FACTS: Respondent killed Diosdado Iroy using an unlicensed firearm. He was convi
cted of 2 offenses, which were separately filed: 1) Murder under Art. 248 of the
RPC 2) Illegal possession of firearms in its aggravated form under PD 1866 Par
2 of Sec 1 of P.D. 1866 states that, If homicide or murder is committed with the
use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed. ISSUE: 1) W/
N the trial courts judgment should be sustained in conformity with the doctrine l
aid down in People v. Tac-an, People v. Tiozon, People v. Caling, etc. OR to mod
ify the judgment and convict the appellant only of illegal possession of firearm
in its aggravated form pursuant to People v. Barros. 2) W/N the 2nd par of Sec
1 of PD1866 integrated illegal possession of firearm and the resultant killing i
nto a single integrated offense. HELD: 1) The trial courts judgment is affirmed.
2) 2nd par of Sec 1 of P.D. 1866 does not support a conclusion that intended to
treat said two offenses as a single and integrated offense of illegal possession
with homicide or murder. It does not use the clause as a result or on the occasion o
f to evince an intention to create a single integrated crime, but rather it uses
the clause with the use of. LATIN MAXIM: 6c
77 Baranda v. Gustillo
Case No. 30 G.R. No. L-81163 (September 26, 1988) Chapter IV, Page 125, Footnote
No.5
Basbacio v. Office of the Secretary, Dept. of Justice
Case No. G.R. No. 109445 (November 7, 1994)
FACTS: Both parties claim that they own a parcel of land, Lot No. 4517. The Cour
t, after discovering that private respondents TCT was fraudulently acquired, orde
red a writ of possession against them and issued a resolution denying with final
ity a motion for reconsideration filed by Private Respondents. Another group fil
ed a separate civil case against Petitioners and applied for lis pendens on the
TCT of said lot, which the court found out to be privies of the Private Responde
nts tasked to delay the implementation of the final decisions of the Court. ISSU
E: 1. W/N the pendency of the appeal in subsequent civil case with the Court of
Appeals prevents the court from canceling the notice of lis pendens in the certi
ficate of titles of petitioners which were earlier declared valid and subsisting
by this Court. 2. What is the nature of the duty of the Register of Deeds to an
notate or annul the notice of lis pendens in a Torrens Certificate of Title? HEL
D: 1. Respondent Judge abused his discretion in sustaining the Acting Register o
f Deeds stand. He forgot the 1st par of Sec. 77 of P.D. 1529 which provides: Canc
ellation of lis pendens Before the final judgment, a notice of lis pendens may be
cancelled upon order of the Court after proper showing that it is necessary to
protect the rights of those who caused it to be registered. 2. Sec 10 of PD 1529
states that, It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately registe
r an instrument presented for registration . If the instrument cannot be register
ed, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presenter of suc
h denial in writing, stating the ground therefore, and advising him of his right
s to appeal by consulta. LATIN MAXIM: 6c
FACTS: RA 7309, among other things, provides for compensation of persons unjustl
y accused, convicted, and imprisoned. Petitioner and his son-in-law Balderrama w
ere charged with murder and frustrated murder for killing Boyon and wounding his
wife and son, due to a land dispute and thus imprisoned. However, on appeal to
the CA, Petitioner was acquitted on the ground that conspiracy between him and h
is son-inlaw was not proven. What was proven was that he was at the scene of the
crime with Petitioner when the shooting happened and left the place with his so
n-in-law. Petitioner claims he was unjustly accused and is entitled to compensat
ion. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is entitled to compensation pursuant to RA 7309. HELD
: No, he is not. For one to be unjustly accused one must be wrongly accused from t
he very beginning, unjustly convicted (when a judge knowingly and deliberately r
endered an unjust judgment, whimsical and capricious devoid of any basis for jud
gment) and imprisoned. In the case at bar, Petitioner was acquitted because the
prosecution was unable to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Petitioner was guil
ty. Thus, he does not fall under RA 7309. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 11a, 25a
78 Segovia v. Sandiganbayan
Case No. G.R. No. 124067 (March 27, 1998)
Tanada v. Yulo
Case No. 288 No. 43575 (May 31, 1935) Chapter IV, Page 127, Footnote No.11
FACTS: FACTS: Petitioners were designated as members of the Contracts Committee
for NPCs Mindanao project. The lowest bidder, Joint Venture was disqualified afte
r the PCAB verified that Joint Venture as well as the 2nd lowest bidder, Urban C
onsolidated Constructors, were downgraded thereby ineligible as bidders. Since all
other bids exceeded the allowable government estimate on the project, the commi
ttee declared a failure of bidding and directed a re-bidding. NPC Board approved
, but for reasons not on record. The project was eventually cancelled. Petitione
rs were charged under RA 3019 for in one way or the other, extending undue advant
age to Joint Venture through manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross in
excusable negligence. For this, petitioners were suspended from office. ISSUE: W/
N it is mandatory or discretionary for Sandiganbayan to place under preventive s
uspension public officers who stand accused before it. HELD: Yes, it is mandator
y. Under the act, one accused of any offense involving fraud upon government pub
lic funds or property whether the crime is simple or complex, regardless of stag
e of execution and mode of participation, shall be suspended from office. Jurisp
rudence is clear that upon determination of the validity of the information, a c
ourt must issue a suspension order as held in Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan, Luciano,
et al. v. Mariano, Socrates v. Sandiganbayan. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 5a, 7a Petitioner
is a Justice of Peace appointed by the Gov. Gen. with the consent by the Philip
pine Commission, assigned to Alabat, Tayabas. Later in his service, he was trans
ferred to Perez, Tayabas. He reached his 65 th birthday on October 35, 1934, sub
sequent to the approval of Act No. 3899 which makes mandatory the retirement of
all justices who have reached 65 years of age at the time said Act takes effect
on January 1, 1933. The judge of First instance, acting upon the directive of th
e Secretary of Respondent Justice, directed Petitioner to cease holding office p
ursuant to Act No. 3899. ISSUE: 1. W/N Petitioner should cease to hold office. 2
. W/N his transfer is considered a new transfer and requires confirmation by the P
hilippine Commission. HELD: No, Petitioner should not cease to hold office as Ac
t No. 3899 clearly states that those who will cease to hold office are those 65
yrs of age at the time the Act takes effect, not thereafter. Therefore, Petition
er shall be a Justice of Peace for life as long as he stays in good behavior or
does not become incapacitated. No, his transfer is not a new appointment. Hence,
no confirmation is required as it is just an enlargement of the jurisdiction gr
ounded on original appointment. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a
79 Eliseo Silva v. Belen Cabrera

Case No. 146
Radio Communications of the Philippines v. National Telecom. Com.
Case No. 129 G.R. No. L-68729 (May 29, 1987)
G.R. No. L-3629 (March 19, 1951) FACTS: Respondent filed an application with the
Public Service Commission for a certificate of public convenience, to be able t
o operate an ice plant in the City of Lipa. Petitioner, owner of another ice pla
nt already in the same area, opposed Respondents application, claiming that publi
c convenience did not need another ice plant. Atty. Aspillera was delegated by t
he Commissioner to receive testimony and conduct hearing of the contest; thereaf
ter the Commission en banc rendered a decision that Respondent was allowed to op
erate the ice plant. After which, Petitioner claimed that under the law, no one
except the Commissioner may hear contested cases. ISSUE: W/N delegation to Atty.
Aspillera to hear the case is lawful. HELD: No, the delegation is unlawful. Alt
hough Sec. 32 of Public Service Act allows the Commission to delegate to any of
their attorneys the right to receive evidence or take testimony, Sec. 3 of the s
ame act provides that in (1) all contested cases and (2) cases involving fixing
of rates, the reception of evidence may only be delegated to one of the Commissi
oners. Thus, though the law makes it inconvenient or cumbersome for the Commissi
on to handle contested cases, where the law is clear, the Commission nor the Cou
rt may not disregard, circumvent, or interpret the law any other way. Plus, you
have to look at the entire Act, and not just specific provisions, in applying th
e law. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 8a, 36b
FACTS: Petitioner was awarded legislative franchise in 1957 by RA 2036 to operat
e a radio communications system, recognized by the Public Service Commission (PS
C). Petitioner then established services in Sorsogon, Mindoro, and Samar. In 198
0, the Respondent, which replaced the PSC, authorized Kayumanggi to set up radio
systems in Mindoro and Samar too. Respondent, after conducting a hearing upon a
complaint by Kayumanggi, ordered Petitioner to stop operating, because it didnt
have a certificate of public convenience, which is necessary under EO 546 for an
y public service to operate. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner still needs a certificate of
candidacy before it can validly operate. HELD: Yes, they need such certificates
to validly operate. Petitioner was created under RA 2036, governed by the Public
Service Commission. Under it, radio companies did not need a certificate of pub
lic convenience to operate. However, P.D. 1 abolished the Public Service Commiss
ion and EO 546 created the Respondent Commission. Under EO 546, Respondent must
issue a certificate of public convenience for the operation of radio communicati
ons systems. Petitioner did not avail of it when they should have. LATIN MAXIM:
2a, 6c, 30, 46a, 49
80 National Federation of Labor v. Hon. Eisma

Pascual v. Pascual-Bautista
6
FACTS: Zambowood Union went on strike because of the illegal termination of thei
r union leader and underpayment of their monthly allowance. In the process, they
blocked the roads and prevented customers and suppliers from entering the premi
ses. Thereafter, Respondent filed in court for damages for obstruction of privat
e property. Petitioners contended that jurisdiction over this case belongs to La
bor Arbiter and not for courts to decide. ISSUE: W/N courts may be labor arbiter
s that can pass on a suit for damages filed by an employer or is it the Labor Ar
biter of the NLRC? HELD: Yes, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction. In the Labor C
ode, Sec. 217 vested Labor Arbiters with original jurisdiction. However, P.D. 13
67 amended Sec. 217, vesting courts of first instance with original jurisdiction
to award damages for illegal dismissal. But again P.D. 1691 amended Sec. 217 to
return the jurisdiction to Labor Arbiters. Additionally, BP 130 amended the sam
e section, but without changing original jurisdiction of LA over money claims ar
ising from employer-employee relations. Thus the law is clear, respondent Judge
has no jurisdiction to act on the case. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c, 7a
FACTS: Petitioners are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pasc
ual, the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual,
who died intestate without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted
or spurious children. ISSUE: W/N Art. 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
which states that An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato fro
m the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such
children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child, can
be interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of t
he deceased. HELD: In Diaz v. IAC, this Court ruled that Art. 992 of the Civil Co
de provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a successi
on ab intestate between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and r
elatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natur
al tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992.
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate childr
en. Petitioners herein cannot represent their father in the succession of the la
tter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother
of their father. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 7b, 36b
81 People v. Amigo
Case No. 201 G.R. No. 116719 (January 18, 1996) Chapter IV, Page 127, Footnote N
o.16
People v. Santayana
Case No. 115 No. L-22291 (November 15, 1976)
FACTS: The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision finding the Accused guilty b
eyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, and sentenced to the penalty of r
eclusion perpetua. Accused-Appellant argues that error was committed by the tria
l court in imposing or meting out the penalty of reclusion perpetua against him
despite the fact that Sec. 19 (1), Art. 3 of the 1987 Constitution was already i
n effect when the offense was committed. Accused-Appellant contends that under t
he 1987 Constitution and prior to the promulgation of RA 7659, the death penalty
had been abolished and hence, the penalty that should have been imposed for the
crime of murder committed by Accused-Appellant should be reclusion temporal in
its medium period to 20 years of reclusion temporal. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 19 (1), Art
icle 3 of the 1987 Constitution means to require a corresponding modification in
the other periods as a result of the prohibition against the death penalty. HEL
D: In People vs. Muoz, the Court held that A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article
III will readily show that there is really nothing therein which expressly decla
res the abolition of the death penalty. LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 7b
FACTS: Accused was found guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearms a
nd sentenced to an indeterminate penalty from one year and one day to two years,
and to pay the costs. ISSUE: W/N the appointment of the Appellant as a special
agent of the CIS, which apparently authorizes him to carry and possess firearms,
exempts him from securing a license or permit corresponding thereto. HELD: Yes.
At the time of appellants apprehension, the doctrine then prevailing was enuncia
ted in the case of People vs. Macarandang wherein it was held that the appointme
nt of a civilian as secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order
campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the category of a
peace officer equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly cover
ed by Section 879. LATIN MAXIM: 46a
82 National Marketing Corp. (NAMARCO) v. Miguel D. Tecson

Case No. 184 G.R. No. L-29131 (August 27, 1969) Chapter 4, Page 127, Footnote No
.18
Santiago v. Commission on Elections, et al.
6
FACTS: On 14 November 1955, defendants were ordered by the Court of First Instan
ce of Manila to pay PRATRA, the sum of P7,200 plus 7% interest until the amount
was fully paid until May 25, 1960. On 21 December 1965, Plaintiff filed a compla
int against the same defendants for the revival of the judgment rendered in the
initial case. Defendants moved to dismiss the said complaint, on the ground of l
ack of jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof and prescription of action.
The complaint was dismissed as having prescribed. ISSUE: W/N the date on which t
en years from December 21, 1955 expired was considered to be December 21, 1965.
HELD: NO. "When the laws speak of years ... it shall be understood that years ar
e of three hundred sixty-five days each" according to Art. 13 of our Civil Code.
1960 and 1964 being leap years, the month of February in both had 29 days, so t
hat ten (10) years of 365 days each, or an aggregate of 3,650 days, from Decembe
r 21, 1955, expired on December 19, 1965. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7b
FACTS: On December 6, 1996, Private Respondents filed with Respondent Commission
a petition to amend the Constitution through a system of initiative Sec. 2, Art
. 17 of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners filed a special civil action for proh
ibition based on the argument that the constitutional provision on peoples initia
tive can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress and no such law has
been passed. RA 6735 provides for three systems of initiative: initiative on th
e Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to pro
vide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes o
f initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle II
I. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people s initiative to
amend the Constitution was left to some future law. ISSUE: W/N RA 6735 is an ade
quate statute to implement Section 2, Article 17 of the 1987 Constitution. HELD:
NO. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Su
btitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle i
s provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to th
e latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referend
um on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provi
de for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, i
t could have provided for a subtitle therefore, considering that in the order of
things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the peopl
e to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than
the initiative on national and local laws. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 43
83 Villanueva v. COMELEC
Case No. 170 No. L 54718 (December 4, 1986)
Mario R. Melchor v. Commission on Audit
Case No. 177 G.R. No. 95398 (August 16, 1991) Chapter IV. Page 133, Footnote No.
35
FACTS: On January 25, 1980, Petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy for Vice
Mayor of Dolores for the January 30 elections in substitution for his companion
Mendoza who withdrew candidacy without oath upon filing on January 4. Petitione
r won in the election but Respondent Board disregarded all his votes and proclai
med Respondent Candidate as the winner on the presumption that Petitioners candid
acy was not duly approved by Respondent. Petitioner filed a petition for the ann
ulment of the proclamation but was dismissed by Respondent Commission on the gro
unds that Mendozas unsworn withdrawal had no legal effect, and that assuming it w
as effective, Petitioners candidacy was not valid since Mendoza did not withdraw
after January 4. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner should be disqualified on the ground of f
ormal or technical defects. HELD: No. The fact that Mendozas withdrawal was not s
worn is a technicality, which should not be used to frustrate the peoples will in
favor of Petitioner as the substitute candidate. Also, his withdrawal right on
the very same day that he filed his candidacy should be considered as having bee
n made substantially and in truth after the last day, even going by the literal
reading of the provision by Respondent Commission. The spirit of the law rather
than its literal reading should have guided Respondent Commission in resolving t
he issue of last-minute withdrawal and substitution of other persons as candidat
es. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 9a, 39c
FACTS: On July 15, 1983, Petitioner, as school administrator of Alangalang AgroIndustrial School of Leyte, entered into a contract with Cebu Diamond Constructi
on for the construction of one of the school buildings. The school accountant is
sued a certificate of availability of funds to cover the construction cost but f
ailed to sign as a witness to the contract, which was approved by the Minister o
f Education. During construction, the contractor sought additional charges due t
o labor cost increase, but eventually gave up the project to save itself from lo
sses. Consequently, the matter was referred to Respondent Commission who disallo
wed the payment in postaudit on the ground that the contract was null and void f
or lack of signature of the chief accountant of the school as witness to it. For
this reason the petitioner was made personally liable for the amount paid to th
e contractor. ISSUE: 1. W/N the contract was null and void. 2. W/N the petitione
r should be held personally liable for the amount paid to the contractor. HELD:
No. The chief accountants issuance of a certificate of fund availability served a
s substantial compliance with the requirements of LOI 968 in the execution of th
e contract. The contract was also valid and enforceable because it already bore
the approval of the Minister of Education. Also, it was highly inequitable for t
he Court to compel the Petitioner, who had substantially complied with the manda
te of LOI 968, to shoulder the construction cost of the building, which was bein
g utilized by the school when he was not reaping benefits from it. LATIN MAXIM:
8a, 9a, 12a
84 Mateo Casela v. Court of Appeals, and Exequiel Magsaysay

Case No. 50 G.R. No. L 26754 (October 16, 1970) Chapter IV, Page 134, Footnote N
o.38
De Jesus v. City of Manila
Case No. 86 G.R. No. L-9337 (December 24, 1914) Chapter IV, Page 134, Footnote N
o.41
FACTS: Petitioner was ordered, on Oct. 26, 1956, to vacate the premises and remo
ve his house. Petitioner refused to comply. Thus, the Court issued two more writ
s on May 6, 1958 and April 14, 1959. Instead of obeying the writs, the Petitione
r filed a case before the Court of First Instance of Zambales, asking Private Re
spondent to pay him the value of his house in addition to damages. He also filed
a motion for suspension of the implementation of the writ of execution. The Cou
rt granted the motion for suspension but the civil case was dismissed when it re
ached Respondent Court. For this reason, Magsaysay filed a motion for execution
of the writ dated Dec. 6, 1963 and another on Feb. 11, 1964. CAR denied the moti
on holding that its decision dated Oct. 26, 1956 could no longer be executed on
mere motion for the reason that a period of five years has already elapsed from
the said date. ISSUE: W/N the motion for execution which was filed beyond the re
glementary period was time-barred.
FACTS: In 1907, Petitioner bought from an original owner a piece of land in Mani
la which was under the Torrens system. Apparently, the original owner incorrectl
y declared the size of the land. So, from 1901 1907, the original owner was payi
ng lesser taxes than he should have and same for Petitioner from 1907 1910. Upon
finding out that he was not paying the correct amount of taxes, Petitioner paid
the taxes, fees, and interest of P2, 096.49 for the unpaid balance of the years
1901-1910. Soon after, he protested and filed an action to recover the same amo
unt. Petitioner was awarded P1, 649.82. Petitioner contends that the supposed ta
xes from before 1910 were not actually taxes because they had not yet been asses
sed. Taxes may not be due and payable until they are assessed. ISSUE: W/N Petiti
oner should still pay the taxes which were not assessed before. HELD: Petitioner
should only pay the taxes when he was the owner of the property. LATIN MAXIM: 6
, 9a, 38b, 43, 50
HELD: No. From Dec. 17, 1956 when the decision in question became final and exec
utory, to Dec. 11, 1963, the date when Private Respondents motion for execution w
as filed, a period of 6 years, 11 months and 24 days elapsed. From this period,
the time during which the writs of execution could not be served, or a period of
3 years, 9 months and 25 days must be subtracted. Consequently, only 3 years, 1
month and 29 days can be charged against the reglementary period. Hence Private
Respondents motion for execution was not time-barred. LATIN MAXIM: 8a, 9c, 11a,
11d, 11e
85 Federation of Free Workers v. Inciong

Case No. 45 G.R. No. L-48848 (May 11, 1988)
Morales v. Paredes
FACTS: In April 1977, PD 1123 was promulgated requiring all employers in the pri
vate sector to pay their employees an extra P60/month as emergency allowance. Th
e increase was set at May 1, 1977, as well as the rules issued on the same day.
Sec. 6 stated that Employers may apply for exemption with the Secretary of Labor
within 30 days from the effectivity of these rules. On September 27, 1977, the
company filed with the Wage Commission its application for exemption from paying
the increase. Respondent approved both applications granting exemptions for the
company. Petitioners argue that Respondent committed grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to loss of jurisdiction by approving both applications. ISSUE: 1. W/N
the first application was filed beyond the 30-day reglementary period. 2. W/N t
he petitioners were in a financial position to pay the additional emergency allo
wance. HELD: No, the application was not a strict rule. The purpose of the PD is
to protect wages and income. The law takes into consideration that there is a p
ossibility that some employers are not financially capable to pay such wages and
such incapability may happen anytime within the year. No, only the Department o
f Labor and Wage Commission can decide if the petitioner was in a financial posi
tion to pay. The Department is in a better position to assess the matter. In abs
ence of any grave abuse of discretion, their recommendations will be respected b
y the courts. Moreover, the company was able prove their financial situation by
giving financial statements. LATIN MAXIM: 8, 9a, 42
FACTS: Petitioner claimed to own a parcel of land in Pangasinan wherein two othe
r people have already registered such land as their own. Respondent Judge grante
d the registration of the land to the two claimants. Petitioner filed a motion f
or reconsideration in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. While the Motio
n was still pending, Petitioner brought the present action to the Supreme Court
praying that the decision of Respondent Judge be set aside and a new trial shoul
d be granted in accordance with Sec. 513 if the Code of Civil Procedure. ISSUE:
W/N a new trial should be granted in accordance with Sec. 513 of the Code of Civ
il Procedure. HELD: Supreme Court cannot open a new trial. The Supreme Court doe
s not have jurisdiction to reopen judgments under Sec. 513 if there are other ad
equate remedies available. Petitioner still has a pending Motion for Reconsidera
tion case with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, therefore, that action
should be finished first. LATIN MAXIM: 9c
86 Prasnik v. Republic of the Philippines

De Guia v. COMELEC
Case No. 30 G.R. No. 104712 (May 6, 1992)
FACTS: Petitioner seeks to adopt four children which he claims to be his and Paz
Vasquez children without the benefit of marriage. The Solicitor General opposed
this stating that Art. 338 of the Civil Code allows a natural child to be adopte
d by his father refers only to a child who has not been acknowledged as natural
child. It maintains that in order that a natural child may be adopted by his nat
ural father or mother there should not be an acknowledgment of the status of the
natural child for it will go against Art. 335. ISSUE: W/N the Civil Code allows
for the adoption of acknowledged natural children of the father or mother. HELD
: The law intends to allow adoption whether the child be recognized or not. If t
he intention were to allow adoption only to unrecognized children, Article 338 w
ould be of no useful purpose. The rights of an acknowledged natural child are mu
ch less than those of a legitimated child. Contending that this is unnecessary w
ould deny the illegitimate children the chance to acquire these rights. The tren
d when it comes to adoption of children tends to go toward the liberal. The law
does not prohibit the adoption of an acknowledged natural child which when compa
red to a natural child is equitable. An acknowledged natural child is a natural
child also and following the words of the law, they should be allowed adoption.
LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 8a, 9, 12, 26, 36a, 37, 39b
FACTS: Petitioner contends that under Par (d) of Sec. 3 of RA 7166, members of t
he Sangguniang Panlulungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large. ISS
UE: W/N par (d) Sec. 3 of RA 7166 should be interpreted to mean that elective of
ficials of the Sangguniang Panlulungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected a
t large. HELD: No. Par (d) Sec.3 of the RA refers only to elective officials of
the Sangguniang Panlulungsod of single district cities and elective officials of
the Sangguniang Bayan for municipalities outside Metro Manila. The law specific
ally stated that provinces with only one legislative district should be divided
into two and therefore should necessarily be elected by districts. Par (d) shoul
d be interpreted in line with the rest of the statute and to follow the interpre
tation of the petitioner there would have been no reason for the RA to single ou
t the single district provinces. The court realized that the language of the law
in this case seems abstruse and the key to determine what legislature intended
is the purpose or reason which induced it to enact the statute. The explanatory
note in the proposed bill provided that the reason for the division into two leg
islative districts is to reduce the number of candidates to be voted for in the
1992 elections. LATIN MAXIM: 2, 9c, 11a, 36b, 37, b2
87 Salenillas v. Court of Appeals

Case No. 68 G.R. No. 78687 (January 31, 1989) Chapter IV, Page 135, Footnote No.
47
Sarcos v. Castillo
Case No. 276 G.R. No. L-29755 (January 31, l969) Chapter IV, Page 136, Footnote
No. 48
FACTS: On December 4, 1973, the property of Petitioners was mortgaged to Philipp
ine National Bank as security for a loan of P2,500. For failure to pay their loa
n, the property was foreclosed by PNB and was bought at a public auction by Priv
ate Respondent. Petitioner maintains that they have a right to repurchase the pr
operty under Sec.119 of the Public Land Act. Respondent states that the sale of
the property disqualified Petitioners from being legal heirs vis--vis the said pr
operty. Respondent also maintains that the period for repurchase has already pre
scribed based on Monge et al. vs. Angeles. ISSUE: 1. W/N petitioners have the ri
ght to repurchase the property under the said Act. 2. W/N the prescription perio
d had already prescribed. Held: The provision makes no distinction between the l
egal heirs. The distinction made by Respondent contravenes the very purpose of t
he Act. Petitioners contention would be more in keeping with the spirit of the la
w. With regard to prescription, the Monge case involved a pacto de retro sale an
d not a foreclosure sale and so the rules under the transaction would be differe
nt. For foreclosure sales, the prescription period starts on the day after the e
xpiration of the period of redemption when the deed of absolute sale was execute
d. LATIN MAXIM: 9b, 26, 27, 9b, 42a
FACTS: Petitioner, the elected Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, was charged wit
h misconduct and dishonesty in office by Respondent, the Provincial Governor of
Surigao del Sur. The act, constituting the alleged dishonesty and misconduct in
office consisted in the alleged connivance of Petitioner with certain private in
dividuals in the cutting and selling of timber or logs for their own use and ben
efit, to the damage and prejudice of the public and of the government. And on th
e basis of such administrative complaint, Petitioner was placed under preventive
suspension by Respondent pursuant to Sec. 5, of RA No. 5185, otherwise known as
the Decentralization Act of l967. ISSUE: W/N Respondent is vested with power to o
rder such preventive suspension under the Decentralization Act of l967. HELD: Th
e new law explicitly stated that the power of suspension was vested on the Provi
ncial Board. The purpose of this was to prevent partisan considerations by vesti
ng the power on a board where no one person may have monopoly over the power of
suspension. The Provincial Governor may no longer have the power of preventive s
uspension over a Municipal Mayor. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c, 6d, 7a, 9a, 36b, 49
88 Ala Mode Garments, Inc. v. NLRC

Case No. 7 G. R. No. 122165 (February 17, l997) Chapter IV, Page 138, Footnote N
o. 53
Jose Comendador v. Renato S. De Villa
Case No. 69 G.R. No. 93177 (August 2, 1991) Chapter IV, Page 142, Footnote No. 6
1
FACTS: Respondents were both employees of Petitioner and holding position as lin
e leaders, tasked to supervise 36 sewers each. On May 5 and 6, l993, all the lin
e leaders did not report for work. On May 6, l993, Private Respondents were not
allowed to enter the premises of the Petitioner, and then required to submit wri
tten explanations as to their absence. On May 10, l993, Private Respondents tend
ered their explanation letters. Despite their explanation, they were not allowed
to resume their work and were advised to await the decision of the management w
hether or not the real reason for their absence was intended to sabotage the ope
rations of Petitioner. But other line leaders were allowed to resume their work
despite their absence on May 5 and 6, l993. ISSUE: 1. W/N the failure of Petitio
ner to allow Private Respondents from resuming their work constitutes dismissal
from the service? 2. W/N the Labor Arbiter erred in limiting the award of backwa
ges for only a period not exceeding three 3 years? HELD: Under the old doctrine,
the backwages that can be awarded to illegally dismissed employees was not to e
xceed a period of three years. However, a new doctrine allowed the awarding of fu
ll backwages and also prevented the company from deducting the earnings of the il
legally dismissed employees elsewhere during the pendency of their case. The Lab
or Arbiter was wrong in awarding backwages for a period of not exceeding three y
ears. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 5a, 6a, 6c, 7a, 49
FACTS: The petitioners are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facin
g prosecution for their participation in the failed coup detat on December l to 9
, l989. In connection with their prosecution, a Pre-Investigation Panel and a Co
urt Martial was formed. During their trial, petitioners invoked their right to p
eremptory challenge. The same was denied by the Court Martial on the ground that
the right was discontinued when martial law was declared under a Presidential D
ecree. ISSUE: 1. W/N there was substantial compliance in the conduct of pre-tria
l investigation. 2. W/N there was a legal basis for the GCM No. 14 to deny the r
ight of petitioners to invoke a peremptory challenge. 3. W/N there was a legal b
asis for the Regional Trial Courts to grant bail and order for the release of pe
titioners. HELD: The right to peremptory challenge was suspended when Martial La
w was declared. But when the same was lifted, the right to peremptory challenge
was effectively revived. The reason being, the right was suspended due to the cr
eation of military tribunals to try cases of military personnel and other cases
that may be referred to them, so when martial law was lifted and the tribunals w
ere abolished, the right to peremptory challenge was revived. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 9
a, 10
89 Matabuena v. Cervantes
Case No. 172 G.R. No. L-28771 (March 31, 1971) Chapter IV, Page 143, Footnote No
.69
Lopez & Sons, Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals
Case No. 151 G.R. No. L-9274 (February 1, 1957) Chapter IV, Page 144, Footnote N
o.76
FACTS: Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Respondent. During this period, Felix Ma
tabuena donated to Respondent a parcel of land. Later the two were married. Afte
r the death of Felix Matabuena, his sister, Petitioner, sought the nullification
of the donation citing Art.133 of the Civil Code Every donation between the spou
ses during the marriage shall be void. The trial court ruled that this case was n
ot covered by the prohibition because the donation was made at the time the dece
ased and Respondent were not yet married and were simply cohabitating. ISSUE: W/
N the prohibition applies to donations between live-in partners. HELD: Yes. It i
s a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within the spir
it of the law is as much a part of the law as what is written. Since the reason
for the ban on donations between spouses during the marriage is to prevent the p
ossibility of undue influence and improper pressure being exerted by one spouse
on the other, there is no reason why this prohibition shall not apply also to co
mmon-law relationships. The court, however, said that the lack of the donation m
ade by the deceased to Respondent does not necessarily mean that the Petitioner
will have exclusive rights to the disputed property because the relationship bet
ween Felix and Respondent were legitimated by marriage. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a, 9c
FACTS: Petitioner imported wire nettings from Germany. The Manila Customs Collec
tor assessed the customs duties on the basis of the suppliers invoice. The dutie
s were paid and the shipment released. Thereafter, the Manila Customs Collector
reassessed the duties due on the basis of the dollar value of the importation an
d imposed additional duties. Petitioner appealed directly to Respondent Court bu
t they dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction citing Sec. 7 of RA 1125 creating s
aid Tax Court. Provision says that the Court has jurisdiction to review decisions
of Commissioner of Customs. However, under Sec. 11 of same Act, the Court has j
urisdiction to review rulings of the Collector of Customs when brought by person
s affected thereby. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Court has jurisdiction to review the d
ecisions of the Collector of Customs. HELD: Yes, there is indeed a disparity bet
ween Sec. 7 and 11 of same RA. The Supreme Court concurred with the positions of
the Solicitor General that a clerical error was committed in Sec. 11 and the wo
rd Collector should read Commissioner. To support this, the Supreme Court cited
that under the Customs Law as found under Sec. 1137 to 1410 of the Revised Admin
istrative Code, the Collectors of Customs are mere Subordinates of the Commission
er of Customs over whom he has supervision and control. In this ruling, the cour
t did not engage in judicial legislation. It merely rectified an apparent cleric
al error in the wordings of the statute to carry out the conspicuous intention o
f the Legislature. Under the rule of statutory construction, it is not the lette
r, but the spirit of the law and the intent of the legislature that is important
. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 16a, 16c, 36a
90 Lamb v. Phipps
Case No. 143 G.R. No. L-7806 (July 12, 1912) Chapter 4, Page 144, Footnote No.78
Com. of Internal Revenue v. ESSO
Case No. 27 G.R. No. L-28502-03 (April 18, 1989)
FACTS: Petitioner contends that he had rendered a proper account of all the fund
s of the government which came to his possession as a superintendent of the Iwah
ig Penal Colony and that all of his accounts are balanced. Petitioner thus filed
an action for mandamus to compel the acting auditor of the Philippines to issue
a clearance. However, it was contended that the action for mandamus cannot pros
per since there is no showing that, as provided by law, there is no plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary courts of law. ISSUE: W/N the legislature in
tended to limit the jurisdiction to cases where there is no other adequate and s
peedy remedy in the ordinary courts of law. HELD: There appears to be a typographi
cal error in the wording of Sec. 222 of Act No. 190 which reads in part: When the
complaint in an action in a court of First Instance alleges that any inferior t
ribunal, it may if there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the or
dinary courts of law. The phrase courts of law should read as course of law. Copied ve
batim from the Code of Civil Procedure of California, the said section in the Ca
lifornia Code reads course of law instead of courts of law. Spanish translation of s
aid Sec. 222 more clearly indicates what the legislature intended. In Spanish, t
he other remedy is not limited to the ordinary courts of law. On its face, this ev
ident typographical error, which, if uncorrected, would render the law nonsensic
al. It is therefore the duty of the court to give the statute a sensible constru
ction, such as will effectuate the legislative intent and to avoid injustice or
an absurd conclusion. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 9d, 11a, 11d, 12a, 36a, 36b, 36d, 36f, 37
FACTS: Respondent overpaid its 1959 income tax. It was accordingly granted a tax
credit by Petitioner on August 5, 1964. However, Respondents payment for 1960 wa
s found to be short. Thus, Petitioner demanded payment of the deficiency tax tog
ether with interest for the period of April 18, 1961 to April 18, 1964. On Augus
t 10, 1964, Respondent paid under protest the amount alleged to be due. It prote
sted the computation of interest, arguing that it was more than what was properl
y due, claiming that it should only be required to pay interest for the amount o
f the difference between the deficiency tax and Respondents overpayment. ISSUE: 1
. W/N Respondent shall pay the deficiency tax of P367, 994 with interest. 2. W/N
Respondent is entitled to a refund. HELD: The government already had in its han
ds the sum of P221, 033 representing the excess payment of Respondent. Having be
en paid and received by mistake, the sum belonged to Respondent and the governme
nt had the obligation to return such amount, which arises from the moment that p
ayment is made, and not from the time that the payee admits the obligation to re
imburse. Since the amount of P221, 033 was already in the hands of the governmen
t as of July, 1960, whatever obligation Respondent might subsequently incur in f
avor of the government would have to be reduced by that sum, in respect of which
no interest could be charged. It is well established that to interpret words of
the statute in such a manner as to subvert these truisms simply cannot and shou
ld not be countenanced. Nothing is better settled than the rule that courts are
not to give words a meaning which would lead to absurd and unreasonable conseque
nces. Moreover, a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust
or lead to absurd results. Statutes should receive a sensible construction, suc
h as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust
or absurd conclusion. LATIN MAXIM: 8a, 8b, 11a, 11d, 11e, 12a, 12b
91 People v. Villanueva
Case No. 116 G. R. L-15014 (April 29, 1961)
People v. Duque
Case No. 106
G. R. 100285 (August 13, 1992)
Chapter IV, Page 149, Footnote No.97
FACTS: Defendant was accused of crime of serious and less serious physical injur
ies with damage to property in amount of P2,362 through reckless imprudence in t
he Justice of the Peace Court of Batangas. The case was considered beyond the co
urts jurisdiction because of the fine imposable upon the accused. The case was fo
rwarded to the Court of First Instance, which also declared itself without juris
diction because the penalty for the more serious offense of physical injuries th
rough reckless imprudence is only arresto mayor in its minimum and medium period
s, and even applied to its maximum degree. It should remain within the jurisdict
ion of the Justice of Peace. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of First Instance h
as jurisdiction.
FACTS: Accused was charged with illegal recruitment because he was not licensed
nor authorized by the proper government agency, POEA. The Labor Code provides th
at the offense shall prescribe in 3 years but does not contain any provision of
how to compute it. Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that prescription shall begin
to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the sa
me be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and institution of judic
ial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. According to Accused, a lit
eral reading suggests that the prescriptive period would never begin to run. ISS
UE: What is the prescription of the criminal offense of the Accused? HELD: Presc
ription began from the time the activities of the Accused were ascertained by th
e complainants and by the POEA to have been carried out without any license or a
uthority from the government. There is absurdity in Sec. 2 but Accused does not
benefit from a literal reading. It must be construed in such a way as to give ef
fect to the intention and avoid absurd results. Institution of judicial proceedin
gs for its investigation and punishment may be either disregarded as surplusage o
r should be deemed preceded by the word until. LATIN MAXIM: 9, 11a, 11d, 12, 15, 3
8
HELD: Yes. Angeles et al vs. Jose, a similar case, held that jurisdiction was wi
th the Court of First Instance and not the municipal court. Also, since the Cour
t of First Instance would have jurisdiction if the only offense were the damage
of property, it would be absurd to say that the graver offense of serious and le
ss serious physical injuries combined with damage to property through reckless i
mprudence is in jurisdiction of the Justice of Peace. Moreover, there is the pos
sibility that the prosecution will fail to prove the physical injuries aspect of
the case and establish only the damage to property. The Justice of Peace, if gi
ven jurisdiction, would find itself without jurisdiction to impose the P2,636 fi
ne for the damage to property committed, since such fine cannot be less than the
amount of the damage. LATIN MAXIM: 5, 11
92 Bello v. Court of Appeals

Case No. 15 G. R. L-38161 (March 29, 1974)
Cesario Ursua v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 306 G.R. No. 112170 (April 10, 1996) Chapter 4, Page 152, Footnote No.1
12
FACTS: Petitioners falsely appealed a case to the Court of First Instance, which
should have been taken directly to Respondent Court. The Prosecutor filed a pet
ition to dismiss appeal. Petitioners invoked an analogous provision (Rule 50, Se
c. 3) directing the Court of Appeals in cases erroneously brought to it to certi
fy the case to the proper court. The Court of First Instance still ordered the d
ismissal of the appeal. Petitioners then filed their petition for prohibition an
d mandamus to prohibit the execution of judgment and elevate the appeal to Respo
ndent Court. They dismissed the petition. Although Respondent Court recognized t
hat the Court of First Instance may have exercised its inherent powers to direct
appeal to Respondent Court, it held that Petitioners did not implead the Court
of First Instance as principal party respondent and thus it could not grant any rel
ief at all even on the assumption that Petitioners can be said to deserve some e
quities. ISSUE: W/N the case should be elevated to Respondent Court despite final
ity of judicial decision. HELD: Yes. The Court of First Instance acted with grav
e abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court cautions against narrowly interpreting
a statute, defeating its purpose and stressed that it is the essence of judicial
duty to construe statutes as to avoid such a deplorable result of injustice or a
bsurdity. The provision should also be taken within the context and spirit of Rul
e 50, Sec. 3 as an analogous provision. The Supreme Court finds no reason as to
why the court cannot act in all fairness and justice to be bound by the same rul
e. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 9d, 9e, 11a, 11g, 11h, 12, 36, 8b
FACTS: Petitioner was charged before the Office of the Ombudsman. He was request
ed by his lawyer to personally procure the complaint from the Ombudsman because
the law firms messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend some personal matters. At the
Office of the Ombudsman, he wrote his name at the logbook as Oscar Perez. Petitio
ners real identity was eventually discovered by the employees of the Ombudsman. H
e was charged and convicted for violation of C.A. No. 142. ISSUE: W/N the acts c
ommitted by the petitioner were among the evils sought to be remedied by C.A. No
. 142 HELD: Petitioner was acquitted. Statutes are to be construed in the light
of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. The court ma
y consider the spirit of the statute where the literal meaning would lead to inj
ustice and absurdity. Likewise, C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute that should be c
onstrued strictly against the state, and in favor of the accused. LATIN MAXIM: 9
a, 11a, 12a, 41a
93 Paat v. Court of Appeals

Pritchard v. Republic
Case No. 245 G.R. No. L-1715 (July 17, 1948) Chapter 4.16, Footnote No.114, page
156
FACTS: Petitioner questioned the legality of the forfeiture of the truck used in
illegal logging operations. He insists that only the Court can do so, citing Se
ction 68 of PD 705 as amended by EO 277 which reads The court shall further the o
rder of confiscation in favor of the Governmentas well as the machinery, equipmen
t which are illegally used ISSUE: W/N the petition should be granted in light of Se
c. 68 of P.D. 705. HELD: No. The above-quoted provision should be read together
with Sec. 68a. Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be ach
ieved and the evil to be suppressed, and they should be given such construction
as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits inten
ded. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 36a
FACTS: The Solicitor General opposed the claim of the Petitioner for exemption f
rom filing a declaration of intention on the ground that under the requirement f
or exemption, it is imperative that Petitioners children should be enrolled durin
g the entire period of residence, and that the Petitioner having failed to enrol
l all of his children in school, he failed to comply with one of the conditions
required to entitle him to exemption from filing a declaration of intention. Iss
ue: W/N the Petitioner should be allowed to avail of the exemption by invoking t
he aforementioned provision. HELD: The provision of law invoked by appellant mus
t be interpreted in the sense that the enrollment required by law must be made a
t any time during the entire period of the residence of the applicant. The draft
ers of the law could not have intended to create an absurd or impossible situati
on. LATIN MAXIM: 11a, 19a
94 Salvacion v. Central Bank of the Philippines

Case No. 245 G.R. No. 94723 (August, 21, 1997) Chapter 4.16, Footnote No.114, pa
ge 156
Demafiles v. Comelec
Case No. 91 G.R. No. L-28396 (December 29, 1967) Chapter 4.18, Footnote 126, pag
e 159
FACTS: An American tourist raped 12 year old girl. In order to pay for moral dam
ages, the Deputy Sheriff of Makati sent a notice of garnishment to China Bank in
order to draw from the Americans bank account to pay the fees. China Bank respon
ded by invoking Sec. 113 of Circular 960 of Central Bank, which states that forei
gn currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment or any other p
rocess of any court. Respondent Bank states that though the law is harsh, such i
s the law and stood firm on the policy. ISSUES: W/N Section 13 of Central Bank C
ircular 960 and Section 8 of RA 6427, as amended by PD 1246 should be made appli
cable to a foreigner. HELD: Central Bank contends that the reason for the exempt
ion is to encourage the deposit of foreign currency. RA 6424 was enacted during
a period of economic crisis, where foreign investments were minimal. As, some ti
me has already passed since the crisis that enacted RA 6424, the economy has now
somewhat recovered from the financial drought. Hence, the Court ruled that it i
s unthinkable that the guilty would be acquitted at the expense of the innocent,
stating that if Circular 960 is to be followed, justice would be undermined, st
ating Art. 10 of the Civil Code, in case of doubt as to the interpretation or ap
plication of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and jus
tice to prevail. LATIN MAXIM: 2, 14, 39
FACTS: Respondent Galido won over Petitioner due to the Provincial Board voting
to reject returns. Petitioner challenged the right of 2 board members to sit, co
nsidering that they were reelectionists. Respondent Commission ruled in favor of
Petitioner. Galido then asked for reconsideration, stating that the 2 board mem
bers in question were disqualified only when the board was acting as a provincia
l but not as municipal. In light of this, Respondent Commission reversed its pre
vious decision. ISSUES: 1. W/N this case is moot and the board had the authority
to reject the returns from Precinct 7. 2. W/N the board members who were candid
ates for reelection were disqualified from sitting in the board in its capacity
as a municipal board of canvassers. 3. W/N Respondent Commission can order the b
oard of canvassers to count a return. HELD: RA 4970 reads the first mayor, vice-m
ayor and councilors of the municipality of Sebaste shall be elected in the next
general elections for local officials and shall have qualified. The Supreme Court
ruled that and shall have qualified is devoid of meaning. The term of office of m
unicipals shall begin in the 1 st day of January following their election, despi
te the fact that Sebaste was a newly created municipality. No, a canvassing boar
d may not reject any returns due to whatever cause. However, since there is a po
ssibility of fraud, the canvass made and proclamation should be annulled. The la
w states any member of a provincial board or of municipal council who is a candid
ate for office in any election, shall be incompetent to act on the said body. Sin
ce Respondent Commission has the power to annul and illegal canvass and proclama
tion, there is no reason as to why it cannot order canvassing bodies to count al
l returns which are otherwise regular. LATIN MAXIM: 15, 35, 43, 26
95 National Housing Corporation v. Juco

People v. Mejia
Case No. 111 G.R. Nos. 118940-41 and G.R. No. 119407 (July 7, 1997)
FACTS: For being declared guilty of stealing scrap iron owned by Petitioner, Pri
vate Respondent was terminated. He filed a complaint with Respondent Court and P
etitioner replied stating that the Respondent Court is without jurisdiction as P
etitioner Corporation is a government owned corporation and the grounds for dism
issal were for valid reasons. Respondent Court however, despite past decisions,
decided in favor of the Private Respondent. ISSUE: W/N employees of Petitioner a
re covered by the Labor Code or by the laws and regulations governing the civil
service. HELD: Petitioner is government owned as it never had any private stockh
olders. The 1935 constitutions section 1 article 12 states that A civil service em
bracing all branches and subdivisions of the government shall be provided by law
. While the amendments in section 1 article 12b of the 1973 constitution states t
hat The civil service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision and instrumental
ity of the government, including every government owned or controlled corporatio
n. Clearly, the inclusion of government owned or controlled corporation carries o
ut a message that the coverage is broad and all-embracing. Furthermore, P.D. 807
Sec. 56 implements the said provision. In addition to this, the Labor Code stat
es that the mentioned corporations shall be governed by the Civil Service Law. L
ATIN MAXIM: 6, 7, 24, 26, 38b
FACTS: Sec. 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act reads: Sec. 14. Any person who is found
guilty of carnapping shall, irrespective of the value of the motor vehicle take
n, be punished by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months
and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of vi
olence or in intimidation of persons or force upon things; and the penalty of re
clusion perpetua to death, when the owner, driver, or occupant is killed or rape
d in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. I
SSUE: 1. W/N the phrase is killed covers both homicide and murder. 2. If the crime
was frustrated murder, would the penalty be life imprisonment or reclusion perp
etua to death? 3. W/N frustrated homicide would be treated as a separate offense
. HELD: The words is killed make no distinction between homicide and murder. Wheth
er it is one or the other which is committed in the course of carnapping or on th
e occasion thereof makes no difference in so far as the penalty is concerned. The
killing, whether it is homicide or murder, cannot be treated as a separate offe
nse and only serves to qualify the carnapping. The phrase is killed refers only to
consummated murder, and not frustrated murder. Frustrated homicide (or murder)
is not treated as a separate offense as it is deemed to fall under the clause of
Sec. 14 by means of violence or in intimidation of persons. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a,
26, 38a, 43, 48
96 City of Manila v. Judge Gomez and Esso Philippines

Case No. 23 G. R. No. L-37251 (August 31, 1981)
Chua v. Civil Service Commission
Case No. 60 G.R. No. 88979 (February 7, 1992) Chapter IV, Page 164, Footnote No.
146
FACTS: The Revised Charter of Manila took effect on June 18, 1949. It fixes the
annual realty tax at one and one-half percent. The Special Education Fund Law (R
A 5447), which took effect on Jan. 1, 1969, imposed an annual additional one per
cent tax and fixes the total realty tax at three percent. With the three percent
maximum limit set by RA 5447, the municipal board of Manila enacted Ordinance N
o. 7125, effective beginning the third quarter of 1972, imposing an additional o
ne-half percent realty tax. Respondent Corporation paid the tax, but protested t
he Ordinance; the Court of First Instance of Manila ruled that the tax ordinance
is void as it is not authorized by the city charter or by any law, and that the
city of Manila should reimburse Respondent Corporation said tax. ISSUE: W/N the
tax ordinance is valid. HELD: The Court holds that the doctrine of implications
in Statutory Construction sustains the City of Manilas contention that the addit
ional one-half percent realty tax is sanctioned by the provision of the Special
Education Fund Law that the total real property tax shall not exceed a maximum of
three per centum. While the 1949 Revised Charter of Manila fixed the realty tax
at one and one-half percent, the 1969 Special Education Fund Law fixed three per
cent as the maximum real property tax. The obvious implication is that an additi
onal one-half percent tax could be imposed by municipal corporations. Inferentia
lly, that law fixed at two percent the realty tax that would accrue to the city
or municipality. The fact that the 1974 Real Property Tax Code specially fixes t
he real property tax at two percent confirms the prior intention of the lawmaker
to impose two percent as the realty tax proper. That was also the avowed intent
of the questioned ordinance. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 20a, 38b, 43, 49
FACTS: RA 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation a
s well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Section 2 covers tho
se who are qualified: Sec. 2. Coverage. This Act shall cover all appointive offi
cials and employees of the National Government. The benefits authorized under th
is Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, re
gardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years
of government service as of the date of separation Petitioner Lydia Chua, believi
ng that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an appli
cation on January 30, 1989 with Respondent Administration, which, however, denie
d the same. Recourse by the petitioner to Respondent Commission yielded the same
result. ISSUE: W/N Petitioners status as a co-terminus employee is excluded from
the benefits of RA 6683 (Early Retirement Law). HELD: The petition is granted.
The Early Retirement Law would violate the equal protection clause of the consti
tution if the Supreme Court were to sustain Respondents submission that the benef
its of said law are to be denied a class of government employees who are similar
ly situated as those covered by the said law. The court applied the doctrine of
necessary implication in deciding this case. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 11e, 12a, 20a, 20b
, 37
97 Solid Homes Inc. v. Teresita Payawal

Case No. 280 G.R. No. 84811 (Aug. 29, 1989) Chapter IV, Page 169, Footnote No.16
4
Richard Gordon v. Regino Veridiano II
Case No. 116 G.R. No. L-55230 (Nov. 8, 1988) Chapter IV, Page 170, Footnote No.1
71
FACTS: The Court of Appeals sustained that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon Ci
ty has jurisdiction over the case filed by the Respondent against Petitioner for
failure to deliver a land title after payment of the agreed amount. Petitioner
contends that the case should have been heard by the Housing and Land Use Regula
tory Board and not the RTC. ISSUE: 1. W/N the RTC has jurisdiction over the case
. 2. W/N the applicable law is the general law (BP 129) or the special law (PD 1
344) HELD: The RTC has no jurisdiction over the case since the respondents argume
nt relies on the general statute where in fact it is the special statute that sh
ould prevail. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 20c, 50
FACTS: Respondent Yambao owns a San Sebastian Drugstore and an Olongapo City Dru
gstore. A test buy operation at San Sebastian Drugstore, wherein agents were sold
200 tablets of Valium without a doctors prescription, gave rise to the closure or
dered by the FDA. Before such order was promulgated, the Mayor revoked the Mayors
Permits issued to San Sebastian Drugstore and subsequently, a signboard was pos
ted by the Vice-Mayor at the drugstore announcing its permanent closure. On May
7, 1980, FDA approved Respondents request to exchange the locations of the two dr
ugstores (which were 5m apart and in the same building). Upon knowledge of this,
Petitioner then revoked the Mayors Permit issued to Olongapo City Drugstore. ISS
UE: The conflict between the FDAs and the mayors power to grant and revoke license
s for the operation of drugstores. RULING: The FDA had the authority to order th
e closure of San Sebastian Drugstore, the Mayor however did not. In the case of
Olongapo City Drugstore however, the authority rested on the Mayor (local jurisd
iction). LATIN MAXIM: 20c, 38b
98 Eufronio Llanto v. Mohamad Ali Dimaporo

Case No. 155 G.R. No. L-21905 (Mar, 31, 1966) Chapter IV, Page 171, Footnote No.
178
People v. Concepcion
Case No. 205 G.R. No. 19190 (November 29, 1922) Chapter IV, Page 176, Footnote N
o.202
FACTS: The Provincial Board of Lanao del Norte reverted the 60-61 salary appropria
tion for the position of Assistant Provincial Assessor to the general fund. The
position, then held by the Petitioner, was abolished. Petitioner came to the cou
rt on mandamus, wherein the Respondents motion to dismiss was granted hence the c
urrent action. ISSUE: 1. Was the dismissal order issued without hearing on the m
otion to dismiss? 2. Is it void? RULING: There is no need for a hearing and no,
it is not void. The motion to dismiss is grounded on lack of cause of action, wh
ich can be determined by reference to the facts in the averred pleading. The que
stion raised is purely one of law. The legal issue was fully discussed in the mo
tion and opposition thereto. Oral arguments are then reduced to unnecessary cere
monies. Further, petitioner contends that the stamp of approval of the Secretary
of Finance is needed in abolishing his position. Such action was, however, done
away with by the Local Autonomy Act (Sec. 3a of RA2264). LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 20a,
32, 37, 49
FACTS: Defendant authorized an extension of credit in favor of Puno Y Concepcion
, S. en C, a co-partnership. Defendants wife was a director of this co-partnershi
p. Defendant was found guilty of violating Sec. 35 of Act No. 2747 which says th
at The National Bank shall not, directly or indirectly, grant loans to any of the
members of the Board of Directors of the bank nor to agents of the branch banks
. This Section was in effect in 1919 but was repealed in Act No. 2938 approved on
January 30, 1921. ISSUE: W/N Defendant can be convicted of violating Sections o
f Act No. 2747, which were repealed by Act No. 2938. HELD: In the interpretation
and construction, the primary rule is to ascertain and give effect to the inten
tion of the Legislature. Section 49 in relation to Sec. 25 of Act No. 2747 provi
des a punishment for any person who shall violate any provisions of the Act. Def
endant contends that the repeal of these Sections by Act No. 2938 has served to
take away basis for criminal prosecution. The Court holds that where an act of t
he Legislature which penalizes an offense repeals a former act which penalized t
he same offense, such repeal does not have the effect of thereafter depriving th
e Courts of jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence offenders charged with vio
lations of the old law. LATIN MAXIM: 6a, 6b, 9a, 37, 38b
99 Tantuico, Jr. v. Domingo

Case No. 285 G. R. No. 96422 (February 28, 1994) Chapter IV, Page 176, Footnote
No.205
Alpha Investigation and Security Agency, Inc. v. NLRC
Case No. 12 G.R. No. 111722 (May 27, 1997) Chapter V, Page 177, Footnote No.2
FACTS: The petition questions the withholding of one-half of Petitioners retireme
nt benefits. Petitioner was Chairman of the COA from 1976 to 1986. On December 1
985, he applied for and obtained clearance, which covered the period from 1976 t
o 1985, from all money, property, and other accountabilities in preparation for
his retirement. After the EDSA Revolution, he submitted his resignation and soug
ht a second clearance for the period from January 1, 1986 to March 9, 1986. Resp
ondent, who took over as Chairman, created an inventory/audit of all equipment a
cquired during the tenure of his 2 predecessors. After the committee recommended
Petitioners clearance from accountability and after another special audit, Respo
ndent approved Petitioners application for retirement but added that of the money
value of benefits due would be withheld subject to the findings of the audit. I
SSUE: W/N Respondent can authorize that half of Petitioners retirement benefits m
ay be withheld. HELD: No. Under Section 4 of RA 1568 providing for life pension
to the Auditor General and members of COMELEC, the benefits granted shall not be
subject to garnishment, levy or execution. Likewise, under Section 33 of P.D. 1
146 (Revised Government Service Insurance Act), the benefits granted shall not be
subject, among others, to attachment, garnishment, levy or other processes. With
holding Petitioners benefits is not allowed in this case. Well-settled is the rul
e that retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because
the intention is to provide for the retirees well-being. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9b, 9d
, 11f, 11g, 11h, 11i, 38b, 42a
FACTS: Petitioner provides security services. One of its clients is Don Mariano
Marcos State University (DMMSU). Security guards working in DMMSU filed before t
he Regional Office of the DOLE a complaint against Petitioner for noncompliance
with the current minimum wage order. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision holdi
ng Petitioner and DMMSU solidarily liable for the salary differential owed to th
e security guards. Petitioner alleges that payment of the wage increase should b
e borne by DMMSU. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner may be held jointly and severally liable
with DMMSU for nonpayment of minimum wage. HELD: Yes, Petitioner is jointly and
severally liable with DMMSU for the payment of wage increases. Section 6 of RA
6727 (Wage Rationalization Act) provides that in case of wage increases resultin
g in a salary differential, the liability of the principal and contractor shall
be joint and several. The same liability attaches under Articles 106, 107 and 10
9 of the Labor Code. Petitioner contends that the matter involved in the case at
bar hinges on wage differentials and wage increases, as prescribed in Section 6
of RA 6727, and not wages in general as provided by the Labor Code. This interp
retation is not acceptable. It is a cardinal rule in statutory construction that
in interpreting the meaning and scope of a term used, a careful review of the w
hole law, as well as the intendment of the law, must be made. Legislative intent
must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole and not of a
n isolated part or a particular provision alone. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 25a, 36a, 36c,
38b
100 Alfon v. Republic Espino v. Cleofe

Case No. 102 G.R. No. L-33410 (July 13, 1973) Chapter V, Page 182, Footnote No.2
5
Case No. 6 G.R. No. L-51201 (May 29, 1980)
FACTS: Petitioner files a petition to have her named changed from Maria Estrella
Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon. The reasons she gave on why she w
as petitioning to have her name changed are the following: 1. She has been using
the name Estrella Alfon from infancy. 2. She has been enrolled from Grade schoo
l to College in the same name. 3. All acquaintances know her as Estrella Alfon.
4. She exercised her right to suffrage under the same name. ISSUE: W/N legitimat
e and legitimated children are required to use the surname of their father. HELD
: No. The word "principally" as used in Article 364 is not equivalent to "exclus
ively" so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child s
hould choose to use the surname of its mother to which he or she is equally enti
tled. Petitioner is therefore allowed to change her name from Maria Estrella Ver
onica Primitiva Alfon Duterte to Estrella Alfon LATIN MAXIM: 1, 17, 42a
FACTS: Petitioners appeal a decision involving a petition for declaratory relief
filed by 18 Respondents for a judicial declaration of their rights under RA 186
2 as amended by RA 4902 in the matter of conversion lump sum gratuity to annual
retirement pension. ISSUE: W/N the provision applies to military personnel who r
etire even after its June 17, 1967. HELD: No. Looking at the legislative intent
through the explanatory note the persons referred to are those who had retired a
nd received the gratuity in lump sum after June 22, 1957 but prior to the approv
al of the act on June 17, 1967. A contrary interpretation which would allow or a
uthorize retired military personnel present or future to convert lump sum gratui
ty to annual pension would virtually abolish the essential distinction between t
he two types of retirement benefits and render the option under the law meaningles
s and nugatory. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 9a, 25a
101 Republic Flour Mills, Inc v. Commissioner of Customs

Case No: 258 G. R. No. L-28463 (May 31, 1971) Chapter V, Page 184, Footnote No.3
9
Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue
Case No. 10 G.R. No. 12687 (August 27, 1918) Chapter V, Page 187, Footnote No.47
FACTS: This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals
in which they found in Sec. 2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Petitioner was
assessed wharfage dues for the exportation of bran (ipa) and pollard (darak) un
der Sec. 2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code which states: There shall be levied
collected and paid on products of the Philippines exported from the Philippines,
a charge of 2 pesos per gross metric ton as a fee for wharfage ISSUE: W/N the wor
ds products of the Philippines excludes bran and pollard on the ground that they a
re from wheat grain, which is imported into the Philippines. HELD: No. Even with
out undue scrutiny it does appear quite obvious that as long as the goods are pr
oduced in the country, they fall within the terms of the above section. The law
is clear; it must be obeyed. The Term product of the Philippines should be taken i
n its usual signification to mean any product produced in the country; hence, br
an(ipa) and pollard(darak) produced from wheat imported into the country are prod
ucts of the Philippines. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 6d, 7a, 24a, 24b
FACTS: The Defendant, under threat of penalty, compelled the Plaintiff to pay th
e Internal Revenue Tax provided for under Sec. 17 of Act No. 2432 upon all such
oils which the plaintiff had on hand on the 1st day of January, 1915. The tax wa
s paid under protest. The Plaintiff contends that the tax collected was illegal.
Sec. 17 Par 72a of Act No. 2432 provides that no tax (imposed by this law) shall
be collected on such articles which, before the taking effect of this Act, shal
l have been disposed of to consumers or persons other than manufacturers or whol
esale dealers. Said Act took effect upon the 1st day of January, 1915. ISSUE: W/N
a dealer is required to pay the Internal Revenue Tax, provided for under Sec. 1
7 Par 72a of Act No. 2432, upon mineral oils, composed of kerosene and gasoline
which had been sold, but not delivered, prior to the 1st day of January 1915. HE
LD: No. The Legislature evidently intended, by said phrase, to mean that merchan
dise dispose of had been sold. The Legislature, by Act No. 2445, fully recognized
that the phrase disposed of meant nothing more or less than a contract whereby the
vendor was bound to furnish an article, because in said Act it provided that th
e purchaser, and not the vendor, was subject to pay such tax in the absence of s
tipulations to the contrary. The phrase disposed of as used in Sec. 17 of Act No.
2432, should be given its commercial sense and not a technical interpretation. L
ATIN MAXIM: 3, 6c, 25a, 43
102 Wil Wilhemsen, Inc v. Baluyut

Case No. 173 G.R. Nos. L-27350-51 (May 11, 1978)
Calder & Co v. The United States
Case No. 44 G.R. No. 2839 (August 15, 1907) Chapter V, Page 187, Footnote No.46
FACTS: Empty cargo vans were used by Plaintiffs to facilitate the carriage and s
ale storage of merchandise loaded on their vessels for delivery from foreign por
ts of Manila among others. After the merchandise had arrived at the port and the
cargo vans had been emptied of their contents, they were left along Muelle de S
an Francisco Stalag. The Defendant applied to the Surveyor of Port for the trans
fer of these empty sea vans. The request was based on the Memorandum Order No. 1
9 and the Memorandum Order dated April 20, 1964. The trial court held that the t
ransfer of Appellants empty cargo vans to the warehouse of Appellee was done by a
uthority of Customs Memorandum of April 20, 1964 and Customs Administrative Orde
r No. 22-64, and that the said objects were lawfully detained by Appellee in his
warehouse pending the payment of storage charges. ISSUE: W/N the decision of th
e trial court is legally valid. HELD: Yes. As plainly worded in the administrati
ve order, it becomes necessary for all empty sea vans to be removed from the pie
r premises by their owners or shipping agents within ten days after the vans hav
e been completely emptied of all their contents. This is in order to make availa
ble at all times adequate space in all ports for the loading and unloading of ca
rgoes. In addition, the administrative order has no requirement similar to that
found in Memorandum Order No. 130-63 whereby the owners of the impounded vans sh
ould be notified in writing. The two customs regulations under consideration are
in pari materia so far as both operate under the flexible cargo system. LATIN M
AXIM: 9a, 25a, 32, 35, 38a, 50
FACTS: The following were imported into the Philippines "One steam turbine, cond
ensing machinery, hot well and pumps, complete with parts and accessories" the s
team turbine was classified under Par 257b as other machinery and detached parts
not otherwise provided for". The trial court reversed the classification made b
y customs authorities and classified it under Par 250 as "Dynamos, generators, e
xciters, and all other machinery for the generation of power." ISSUE: W/N the ma
chinery in question should be classified under Par 257b or Par 250. HELD: A turb
ine engine and generator, although intended for use as a powergenerating device,
does not constitute a complete power generation machine. Component parts must s
till be added for that purpose to be achieved it should be classified as "other
machinery" under Par 257b. LATIN MAXIM: 6b, 9c, 25a, 43
103 Manila Herald Publishing Co v. Ramos

Case No. 163
Malanyaon v. Lising et. al
Case No. 160 GR No. L-56028 (July 30,1981) Chapter V, Page 188, Footnote No.52
G. R. No. L-4268 (January 18, 1951)
Chapter V, Page 188, Footnote No.51
FACTS: Respondent filed a libel suit, docketed as Civil Case No. 11531, against
Aproniano G. Borres, Pedro Padilla and Loreto Pastor, editor, managing editor an
d reporter, respectively, of the Daily Record, a daily newspaper, asking damages
aggregating P90,000. With the filing of this suit, the Plaintiff secured a writ
of preliminary attachment upon putting up a P50,000 bond. The Sheriff of the Ci
ty of Manila levied an attachment upon certain office and printing equipment fou
nd in the premises of the Daily Record. Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc. and P
rinters, Inc. commenced a joint suit against the sheriff, Respondent Quirino and
Respondent Corporation, in which the former sought (1) to enjoin the defendants
from proceeding with the attachment of the properties above mentioned and (2) P
45,000 damages. This suit was docketed as Civil Case No. 12263. Respondent Judge
declared that the suit, in case No. 12263, was "unnecessary, superfluous and il
legal" and so dismissed the same. He held that what Manila Herald Publishing Co.
, Inc., and Printers, Inc., should do was intervene in Case No. 11531. ISSUE: W/
N Respondent Judge has authority to dismiss Case No. 12263 at the stage when it
was thrown out of court. HELD: Yes, the right to intervene, unlike the right to
bring a new action, is not absolute but left to the sound discretion of the cour
t to allow. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 25a, 30, 36a, 36b
FACTS: A Municipal Mayor was charged with violation of RA 3019 (Anti Graft and C
orrupt Practices Act). He was suspended from office but he died during his incum
bency, and while the case was pending. The case was dismissed due to his death.
Petitioner sought payment of his salary during his period of suspension pursuant
to Sec 13 of RA 3019 which provides, Should he be convicted by final judgment he
shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acqu
itted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits w/
c he failed to receive during suspension. ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of the case du
e to death of the accused constitutes acquittal. HELD: No. It is obvious that wh
en the statute speaks of the suspended officer being "acquitted" it means that a
fter due hearing and consideration of the evidence against him the court found t
hat his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Dismissal of the case
is not equal to acquittal of the accused. In People vs. Salico (84 Phil. 722),
" Acquittal is always based on the merits but dismissal does not decide the case
on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 25a
104 Rura v. Lopena

Case No. 139
Krivenko v. Register of Deeds
Case No. 139 G.R. No. L-360 (November 15, 1947) Chapter 5, Page 190, Footnote No
.60
G. R. No. L-69810-14 (June 19, 1985)
Chapter 5, Page 189, Footnote No.53
FACTS: Petitioner was accused, tried and convicted of five (5) counts of estafa
committed on different dates. The counts were consolidated and tried jointly. On
ly a single decision was rendered. The Petitioner then applied for probation but
was denied by the fiscal on the ground that he had been previously convicted by
final judgment of an offense. The fiscal invoked Sec. 9 of the Probation Law, w
hich disqualifies persons who have previously been convicted by final judgment f
rom applying for probation. The trial court denied his application on the belief
that since the crimes were committed on different dates, he was guilty on each
of those dates. Petitioner however contends that since there is only one decisio
n, he has not yet been previously convicted. ISSUE: How should the word previousl
y be construed? HELD: The word previously refers to the date of the conviction and
not to the dates of the crimes involved. Although he was guilty of five counts o
f estafa, they were tried jointly and only one decision was handed down. Hence,
when Petitioner applied for Probation he had not yet had a final judgment of con
viction on his record. He is eligible for probation under such circumstances. LA
TIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 48
FACTS: Petitioner, an alien, bought a residential lot but its registration was i
nterrupted by the war. In 1945, he sought to accomplish the registration but was
denied by the register of deeds of Manila on the ground that he cannot acquire
land in this jurisdiction. Petitioner brought the case to the Court of First Ins
tance of Manila which ruled in favor of sustaining the refusal of the register o
f deeds. ISSUE: W/N residential land falls under the phrase agricultural lands as st
ated in Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution. HELD: Under the Constitution, ali
ens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands, which includes residen
tial lands. It may safely be presumed that what the members of the Constitutiona
l Convention had in mind when they drafted the Constitution was this well-known
classification and its technical meaning then prevailing. Soon after, the Nation
al Assembly revised the Public Land Law and passed C.A. No. 141 which permits th
e sale of residential lots to Filipino citizens or to corporations controlled by
such citizens. Such revision is equivalent to a declaration that residential lo
ts are considered as agricultural lands, for under the Constitution, only agricu
ltural lands may be alienated. In addition, the interpretation given by the Secr
etary of Justice (1939) also supports the claim that residential land is part of pu
blic agricultural lands. It is clear that the three branches of the Government ha
ve always maintained that residential lots are included in agricultural lands. If th
e term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including lands no
t strictly agricultural, the result would not be in line with the conservative s
pirit of the Constitution. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 2a, 5a, 9a, 25a, 30a, b
105 Chang Yung Fa, et al. v. Gianzon, etc. and De la Cruz, etc.
Garcia v. COMELEC
Case No. 109 G.R. No. 111511 (October 5, 1993) Chapter V, Footnote No.67, Page N
o. 192
FACTS: Petitioners were admitted to the Philippines on pre-arranged employment a
s immigrants under C.A. No. 613 with the express condition that their stay shall
be limited to two years. An amendatory law was then passed which changes the cl
assification of pre-arranged employees from immigrants to non-immigrants. Petiti
oners contend that having been classified as non-quota immigrants, they should hav
e been admitted for permanent residence in this country because the word immigran
t is defined to be a person who comes into a country for a permanent residence. I
SSUE: W/N the word immigrant only refers to a person who comes into a country for
a permanent residence. HELD: The only definition given by our law to the term "i
mmigrant" is: "any alien departing from any place outside the Philippines destin
ed for the Philippines, other than a nonimmigrant." The law gives no definition
to the term "nonimmigrant" from which we may imply that the term "immigrant" is
merely intended to include any alien coming to this country for permanent reside
nce as now contended by appellants. A review of the whole law would disclose no
such intention which denotes that the purpose of the law is to give broad power
to the Commissioner of Immigration on matters pertaining to the admission of imm
igrants into the Philippines. LATIN MAXIM: 6b, 9a, 36b
FACTS: In its Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan ng
Morong, Bataan agreed to the inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of
the Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with Republic Act No. 7227. Responden
t Commission issued two resolutions denying the petition for initiative and refe
rendum on the ground that its subject is merely a resolution and not an ordinanc
e. It contends through the Office of the Solicitor General that under the Local
Government Code of 1991, a resolution cannot be the subject of a local initiativ
e. The same is being asserted by the respondent Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong. ISS
UE: W/N a local resolution of a municipal council can be the subject of an initi
ative and referendum.
HELD: The petition to review and set aside the issued COMELEC resolutions is gra
nted because resolutions are appropriate subjects for initiative and referendum
(Sec. 32 of Art. VI of the Constitution). Also, RA 6735, the law providing for a
system on initiative and referendum, includes resolutions as among the subjects
of initiative. Although the Local Government Code does not include the word res
olution in its definition, the court holds that the definition does not limit th
e coverage of local initiatives to ordinances alone. Resolutions are still prope
r subjects of an initiative according to the Constitution and RA 6735. LATIN MAX
IM: 6a, 9c, 11a, 50
106
Motoomull v. dela Paz Case No. 180 G.R. No. L-45302 (July 24, 1990) Chapter V, F
ootnote No.73, Page No. 195
People v. Nazario
Case No. 218 G.R. No. L-44143 (August 31, 1988) Chapter V, Footnote No.81, Page
No. 197
FACTS: The Petitioners and the Respondents were the initial directors of the Sar
kara Trading Corporation. The Corporation issued a resolution authorizing the is
suance of unissued stocks on a one is to one basis to its stockholders. The reso
lution was then amended authorizing the issuance of unissued shares of stock on
a two is to one basis to its stockholders payable on Aug. 31, 1974. Petitioner s
ought issuance of a preliminary injunction by the Court of Appeals to stop the e
nforcement of the SEC decision pending resolution of the appeal. The Court howev
er held that it had no jurisdiction according to RA 5434 which reads: Appeal sha
ll not stay the award, order, ruling, decision or judgment unless the officer or
body rendering the same or the court, on motion, after hearing, and on such ter
ms as it may deem just, should provide otherwise. The propriety of a stay grante
d by the officer or body rendering the award, order, ruling, decision or judgmen
t may be raised only by motion in the main case. ISSUE: 1. W/N the word court refe
rs to a trial court and not the Court of Appeals 2. W/N the Court of Appeals can
grant a stay in the execution of the decision. HELD: Yes, the word court refers
to the trial court. The law unequivocally stated its declared objection that app
eal shall not stay the appealed decision, award, order. The exception is given wh
ere the officer or body rendering the same, or the court on motion, after hearin
g should provide otherwise. The law provides further that the propriety of a sta
y granted by the officer or body rendering the award, order, decision or ruling
may be raised only by motion in the main case. More importantly where a particul
ar word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various me
anings, its obscurity or doubt may be reviewed by reference to associate words.
Accordingly, an interpretation which leads to patent inconsistency must be rejec
ted as not in accordance with the legislative intent. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 12a, 36a
FACTS: Accused was charged with violating a municipal ordinance requiring him to
pay municipal taxes worth P362.52 as a fishpond operator in spite of repeated d
emands. Sec. 1 Ordinance No. 4 Series of 1995 provides: Any owner or manager of f
ishponds in places within the territorial limits of Pagbilao, Quezon, shall pay
a municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per hectare of fishpond on part thereof p
er annum. He admits to the non-payment of the taxes but contends that the ordinan
ce is unconstitutional, or assuming its constitutionality that it does not apply
to him as he is a lessee not an owner or manager. ISSUE: 1. W/N the ordinance i
s null and void because it is ambiguous and uncertain. 2. W/N the ordinance appl
ies to Accused. HELD: No, the ordinance is constitutional. In no way may the ord
inance at bar be said to be tainted with vagueness. It is unmistakable from the
above provision that the Accused falls within the coverage. As the actual operat
or of the fishponds, he comes within the term manager. While it appears that the N
ational Government is the owner of the fishpond, the Government never shared in
the profits they generated. It is therefore, logical that Accused alone shoulder
s the burden of the taxes under the ordinance. And obviously, the word owner can
not be construed to include the Government because of the ancient principle that
the government is immune from taxes. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 6c, 37
107 People v. Evangelista

Case No. 106 G.R. No. 84332-33 (May 8, 1996)
Banco de Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Equitable Banking Corporation
FACTS: Private Respondent was charged and convicted of frustrated homicide. Priv
ate Respondent filed a petition for probation. However, Chief Probation and Paro
le Officer recommended denial of Private respondents application for probation on
the ground that by appealing the sentence of the trial, he had already waived h
is right to make his application for probation. The RTC set aside the Probation
Officers recommendation and granted Private Respondents application on April 23, 1
993. ISSUE: W/N the Respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion by gr
anting private respondents application for probation. HELD: Yes. Private Responde
nt filed his application for probation on December 28, 1992, after PD 1990 had t
aken effect. It is thus covered by the prohibition that no application for probat
ion shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal fr
om the judgment of conviction and that the filing of the application shall be deem
ed a waiver of the right to appeal. Having appealed from the judgment of the tria
l court and applied for probation only after the Court of Appeals had affirmed h
is conviction, Private Respondent was clearly precluded from the benefits of pro
bation. LATIN MAXIM: 6, 26, 49
FACTS: Respondent Bank filed a case against Petitioner Bank for reimbursement of
P45,982.23 as a consequence of six crossed Managers checks which turned out to h
ave forged and/or unauthorized endorsements appearing at the back of each check.
Philippine Clearing House Corp. (PCHC) ordered Petitioner Bank to pay the said
amount. Petitioner Bank appealed saying that PCHC had no jurisdiction because th
e checks involved were non-negotiable checks. ISSUE: W/N PCHC had jurisdiction o
ver checks which are non-negotiable. HELD: Yes. As provided in the articles of i
ncorporation of PCHC, its operation extends to clearing checks and other clearing
items. Clearly, the term checks refer to checks in general use in commercial and b
usiness activities, including nonnegotiable checks. No doubt non-negotiable chec
ks are within the ambit of PCHCs jurisdiction. There should be no distinction in
the application of a statute where none is indicated for courts are not authoriz
ed to distinguish where the law makes no distinction. They should instead admini
ster the law not as they think it ought to be but as they find it and without re
gard to consequences. LATIN MAXIM: 24a, 24b, 25a, 25b, 26
108 Robles v. Zambales Chromite Mining Co., et. al.

Case No. 261 G.R. No. L-12560 (September 30, 1958) Chapter V, Page 199, Footnote
No.90
Velasco v. Lopez
Case No. 308 G.R. No. 905 (February 12, 1903)
FACTS: Petitioner and Respondent Company entered into a contract by virtue of wh
ich the latter delivered the possession of certain mining properties over which
it had control to Petitioner who was to extract, mine and sell ores from said pr
operties upon payment of certain royalties. Upon violation of the terms of agree
ment, the company filed a complaint for unlawful detainer. Petitioner filed a mo
tion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Justice of Peace was withou
t jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the case for unlawful detainer involving
mineral land. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court includes any kind
of land, including mineral lands. HELD: Yes. Any land spoken of in this provisi
on obviously includes all kinds of land, whether agricultural, residential or mi
neral. It is a well known maxim in statutory construction that where the law doe
s not distinguish, we should not distinguish. LATIN MAXIM: 24a, 26
FACTS: Santiago Velasco died in Namacpacan, La Union on December 4, 1895, leavin
g a last will and testament. The Plaintiff seeks to declare such will void on se
veral grounds, most importantly that the hour is not stated. ISSUE: W/N the will
of Santiago Velasco is void because the hour of its execution is not stated. HE
LD: Yes. Book III, Title II, Chapter I, Article 695 and 687 of the civil Code ex
plicitly states that said wills without necessary formalities will be void: The t
estator shall express his last will to the notary and to the witnesses. After th
e testament has been drafted in accordance with the same, stating the place, yea
r, month, day and hour of its execution its shall be read aloud, (art 695) Any wil
l, in the execution of which the formalities respectively established in this ch
apter have not been observed, shall be void. (art 687) The law explicitly defines
what shall consist in open wills (art 695) and what the sanctions shall be if s
uch formalities arent met. (art 687) It was stated that if the decision would be
in favor of the Defendant (overlooking the absence of the hour) the Court may di
sregard one formality after another until eventually they had to repeal the enti
re system established by the code. LATIN MAXIM: 6d, 7a
109 Colgate-Palmolive Phil, Inc v. Gimenez

Case No. 67 G.R. No. L-14787 (January 28, 1961) Chapter V, Page 199, Footnote No
.95
Oliva v. Lamadrid
Case No. 191 G.R. No. L-23196 (October 31, 1969) Chapter V, Page 200, Footnote N
o.96
FACTS: Petitioner Corporation engages in manufacturing toilet preparations and h
ousehold remedies. Importation of materials including stabilizers and flavors is a
mong those Petitioner imports. For every importation, Petitioner pays the Centra
l Bank of the Philippines 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used fo
r the payment of the cost, transportation and other charges pursuant to RA 601,
the Exchange Tax Law. Under such law, it was also provided that: Foreign exchange
d used for the payment of cost, transportation and/or other charges incident to
the importation into the Philippines of stabilizer and flavors shall be refunded
to any importer making application therefore. The petitioner therefore seeks a r
efund of the 17% special excise tax ISSUE: W/N the imports of dental cream stabil
izers and flavors are subject to a 17% transportation tax exemption under the Exc
hange Tax Law. HELD: No. The refusal to deny refund was based on the following a
rgument: All the items enumerated for the tax exemption fall under one specific
class, namely: food products, books supplies/ materials and medical supplies. Th
e stabilizers and flavors the petitions refer to are items which must fall under t
he category of food products. Because such items will be used for toothpaste, it
is not a food product and therefore not subject to exemption Petitioners argumen
ts effected the grant of the refund: RA 601 does not categorize the exceptions a
s stated above. Though stabilizers and flavors are preceded by items that might fa
ll under food products, the following which were included are hardly such: ferti
lizer, poultry feed, vitamin concentrate, cattle, and industrial starch. Therefo
re, the law must be seen in its entire context, not the parts and categorization
s posited by the respondent. LATIN MAXIM: 26, 29, 36
FACTS: Plaintiff was the owner of a parcel of land which he mortgaged as securit
y for the payment of a loan. Having defaulted in the payment of the loan, the pr
operty was foreclosed and sold to Respondent. However, under RA 720, the land co
uld be redeemed two (2) years after the sale, Feb. 4 1963. No redemption was mad
e within that time. On May 31 1963, Plaintiff offered to repurchase, claiming th
at under C.A. No. 141, he was entitled to repurchase the land, not two (2), but
five (5) years after the title was sold because he was a holder of a free patent
and torrens title. ISSUE: W/N the period of redemption is governed by Sec. 119
of C.A. No. 141 of Sec. 5 of RA 720. HELD: No. Petitioner, as a former owner of
land with a homestead patent and a torrens title, is not included in those enume
rated in RA 601 and therefore not subject to the two (2) year allotment for rede
mption. In July 30, 1951, the Court had already decided that Sec. 119 of C.A. No
. 141 is applicable to foreclosure sales of lands covered by a homestead or a fr
ee patent; therefore, the plaintiff may use its provision of five (5) years. Whe
re the general law is the Commonwealth Act and the specific law is the Republic
Act, they should be unified, and should abide by the conditions of the times. LA
TIN MAXIM: 1, 30a, 38a, 39a, 50, b, b2
110 Escosura v. San Miguel Brewery, Inc.

Case No. 100 G.R. No. L-16696 & L-16702 (January 31, 1962) Chapter V, Page 200,
Footnote No.97
Philippine British Assurance v. Intermediate Appelate Court
Case No. 234 G.R. No. L-72005 (May 29, 1987) Chapter 5, Page 200, Footnote No.99
FACTS: Petitioners are employees of San Respondent Corporation who at various ti
mes during employment, fell ill. They were given sick leave pay pursuant to its
Health, Welfare and Retirement Plan. Despite receipt of the sick leave pay from
Respondent Corporation, the employees claimed for sickness benefit allowances un
der the Social Security Act contending that their receipt of sick leave pay of l
ess than the full wage does not preclude them from claiming for the allowances p
rovided in the law. Respondent Corporation countered that having already receive
d sick leave pay, they cannot claim benefits under the Social Security Act as th
ese are exclusive to those not receiving any leave privileges at all from the em
ployer. ISSUE: W/N Petitioners were entitled to additional sickness benefit allo
wance under the Social Security Act. HELD: To uphold the theory that as long as
the employee receives any amount as sick leave pay by a private benefit plan, th
e employee cannot avail of the privileges under the Social Security Act, would b
e to enable the employer to defeat the purpose of the law. The Social Security A
ct, having been enacted for the welfare of the employees, cannot be given an int
erpretation that would defeat such purpose. LATIN MAXIM: 26, 2b, 3a, 38b
FACTS: Sycwin Coating& Wires Inc, filed a complaint for a collection of money ag
ainst Varian Industrial Corporation. During the pendency, Respondent attached so
me of the properties of Varian Industrial Corp upon the posting of a supersedes
bond. The latter in turn posted a counter bond through Petitioner so the attache
d properties were released. Sycwin filed a petition for execution pending appeal
against the properties of Varian, which was granted. However, the writ of execu
tion was returned unsatisfied as Varian failed to deliver the previously attache
d personal properties upon demand. Sycwin prayed that Petitioner Corporation be
ordered to pay the value of its bond which was granted. ISSUE: W/N the counter b
ond issued was valid. HELD: The counter bond was issued in accordance with Sec.
5, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. Neither the rules nor provisions of the counte
r bond limited its application to a final and executory judgment. It appllies to
the payment of any judgment that may be recovered by Plaintiff. The only logica
l conclusion is that an execution of any judgment including one pending appeal i
f returned unsatisfied may be charged against such counter bond. The rule theref
ore, is that the counter bond to life attachment shall be charged with the payme
nt of any judgment that is returned unsatisfied. It covers not only a final and
executory judgment but also the execution of a judgment of pending appeal. LATIN
MAXIM: 24a, 26, 36a
111 Ramirez v. Court of Appeals

Case No. 251 G.R. No. L-16696 & L-16702 (January 31, 1962) Chapter 5, Page 201 ,
Footnote No.100
Pilar v. Commission on Elections
Case No. 242 G. R. No. 115245 (July 11, 1995) Chapter 5, Page 201, Footnote No.1
00
FACTS: A civil case was filed by Petitioner alleging that Private Respondent, in
a confrontation in the latters office allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated h
im. Petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event to support her claim.
The act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal. Thus, respondent and
filed a criminal case. ISSUE: W/N the facts charged against him constituted an o
ffense. HELD: The law makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the
parties in any private communication to secretly record such communication by m
eans of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party so
ught to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different
from those involved in the private communication. The statute s intent to penali
ze all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of
the qualifier "any". Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distingui
sh. LATIN MAXIM: 6a, 7a, 9a, 11a, 24a, B2
FACTS: On March 22, 1992, Petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. T
hree days later, he withdrew his certificate of candidacy. As a result, Responde
nt Commission imposed a fine of P10,000 pesos for failure to file his statement
of contributions and expenditures. Petitioner contends that it is clear from the
law that the candidate must have entered the political contest, and should have
either won or lost. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner can be held liable for failure to fil
e a statement of contributions and expenditures since he was a non-candidate, havi
ng withdrawn his certificate of candidacy three days after its filing. HELD: Yes
. Sec. 14 of RA 7166 states that every candidate has the obligation to file his st
atement of contributions and expenditures. As the law makes no distinction or qu
alification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the sa
me, the term every candidate must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who p
ursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy. Sec. 13 of Reso
lution No. 2348 categorically refers to all candidates who filed their certificat
e of candidacy. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 26, 37, b2
112 Sanciangco v. Roo

Case No. 273 G. R. No. 68709 (July 19, 1985) Chapter 5, Page 203 , Footnote No.1
06
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 38 G. R. No. 116356 (June 29, 1998)
FACTS: Petitioner was elected as Barangay Captain. Later, he was elected Preside
nt of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) of Ozamiz City by the Board of
Directors of the said Association. Petitioner then Petitioner then filed his Cer
tificate of Candidacy for the May 14, 1984 elections for Misamis Occidental unde
r the banner of the Mindanao alliance. He was not successful in the said electio
ns. ISSUE: W/N an appointive member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod, who ran for
the position of Mambabatas Pambansa in the elections of May 14, 1984, should be
considered as resigned or on forced leave of absence upon filing of his certific
ate of candidacy. HELD: The legislative intent of Sec. 13(2) of BP 697 is clear
that even appointive Barangay officials are deemed also covered by the said prov
ision. Since he is unquestionably an appointive member, he is deemed to have ips
o facto ceased to be such member when he filed his certificate of candidacy for
the May 1984 Batasan elections. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 9c, 28, 36b
FACTS: Davao Pilots Association elevated a complaint against Petitioner for a su
m of money and attorneys fees alleging that DPA had rendered the pilotage service
s to Petitioner between January 14, 1987 to July 22, 1989 with total unpaid fees
of P703,290.18. Despite repeated demands, Petitioner failed to pay and prays th
at the latter be directed to pay the amount with legal rate of interest from the
filing of the complaint; attorneys fees equivalent to 25% of the principal oblig
ation. ISSUE: W/N EO 1088 is unconstitutional. HELD: No. In Philippine Interisla
nd Shipping Association of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the court upheld
the validity of EO 1088 and it shall not depart from this ruling. The Courts hol
ding clearly debunks Petitioners insistence on paying the pilotage fees based on
the memorandum circulars issued by the PPA. Administrative or Executive Acts, Or
ders and Regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws
or the Constitution. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 5a, 9a, 37 49
113 Castillo-Co v. Barbers

Case No. G.R. No. 129952 (June 16, 1998)
People v. Martin
Case No. 214 G.R. No. L-33487 (May 31, 1971) Chapter 5, Page 204, Footnote No.11
0
FACTS: Congressman Junie Cua filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsma
n against Governor Castillo-Co and Provincial Engineer Virgilio Ringor alleging
irregularities in the purchase of heavy equipment by the Governor and Provincial
Engineer. The items purchased were reconditioned instead of brand new and include
d other irregularities. Emilio A. Gonzales III, Director, and Jesus Guerrero, De
puty Ombudsman for Luzon, placed the Petitioners under preventive suspension for
6 months. Petitioners contest that the Deputy Ombudsman has no power to sign th
e order of preventive suspension. ISSUE: W/N the deputy Ombudsman possessed the
authority to sign the order for preventive suspension. HELD: Yes. The deputy Omb
udsman possessed the authority to preventively suspend the Petitioners. There is
nothing in RA 7975 which may suggest that the Ombudsman and only the Ombudsman
may sign an order preventively suspending officials occupying positions classifi
ed as grade 27 or above. The word or is clearly disjunctive in this case signifyin
g dissociation from one thing from the other. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a
FACTS: Respondents were charged with violating Sec. 46 of C.A. No. 613 or the Ph
ilippine Immigration Act by the Court of First Instance of La Union, specificall
y in the act of bringing in and landing. The Court dismissed the charges on the
ground of it being a continuous offense with Criminal Case 6258-M filed in Bulac
an against other Respondents who were concealing and harboring the same Chinese
Immigrants who were brought in therefore they had no jurisdiction. ISSUE: W/N th
e act of bringing in and landing constitute a continuous offense with concealing
and harboring. HELD: No. They are two separate offenses. C.A. No. 613 clearly p
rovides that the four acts are in fact four separate acts. Each act possesses it
s own distinctive, different, and disparate meaning. The word OR in C.A. No. 613
cannot be given a non-disjunctive meaning signifying the separation of one act
from the other. The words in the information suggesting conspiracy are considere
d a mere surplusage. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 37, 15b
114 GMCR v. Bell Telecommunications Inc.

Case No. 49 G.R. No. 126496 (April 30, 1997)
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc.
Case No. 158 G.R. No. 111097 (July 20, 1994) Chapter V, Page 208, Footnote No. 1
30
FACTS: NTC Commissioner Kintanar denied the request of Bell Telecommunications f
or a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity for the installation of tel
ecommunications equipment pursuant to its congressional franchise to operate. Th
e denial was promulgated despite the approval of the CCAD of its feasibility and
the endorsement of Deputy Commissioners Fidelo Q. Dumlao and Consuelo Perez. IS
SUE: Whether the NTC is a collegial body or under the direct and sole control of
Commissioner Kintanar. HELD: The NTC is a collegial body and its decisions shou
ld be reached by a majority vote. Executive Order 146 creating the NTC clearly s
hows that the NTC shall be composed of a head commissioner and 2 deputy commissi
oners suggesting its collegial nature. Therefore the acts of Chairman Kintanar a
re void ab initio for being unabashedly contrary to law. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 15
a, 24a
FACTS: PAGCOR, created by P.D. 1896, leased a building belonging to Pryce in ord
er to prepare to open a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Various civic organizatio
ns, religious elements, womens and youth groups, and even the local officials ang
rily denounced the project. The Sangguniang Panlungsod swiftly enacted two ordin
ances disallowing the building of the planned casino. Petitioners argue that by
virtue of the Local Government Code (LGC), the Sangguniang Panlungsod may prohib
it the operation of casinos by passing ordinances to protect the general welfare
of their citizens from the harmful effects of gambling. ISSUE: W/N the two ordi
nances as enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro are valid. HEL
D: The two local ordinances are not valid. In Basco v. Phil. Amusements and Gami
ng Corp., this Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree. Under the LG
C, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress gambling and othe
r prohibited games of chance. Since the world gambling should be read as referring
to only illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited games of chance, must
be prevented or suppressed. On the assumption of a conflict between P.D. 1869 an
d the LGC, the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to giv
e effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. Casino gambling is authorized
by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or
nullified by a mere ordinance. LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 9c, 11e, 28, 37, 38, 50
115 Commissioner of Customs v. Philippine Acetylene Company

Case No. 72 G.R. No. L-22443 (May 29, 1971) Chapter V, Page 210, Footnote No. 13
5
People v. Santiago
Case No. 224 G.R. No. L-17663 (May 30, 1962) Chapter V, Page 136, Footnote No. 2
11
FACTS: Charles Butler, manager of Respondent Company, imported a custom-built LP
G tank which is used to contain LPG from the refinery in Batangas and to transpo
rt it to the companys plant in Manila. RA 1394 provides a tax exemption for the i
mportation of machinery and/or raw materials to be used by new and necessary ind
ustries as determined in accordance with RA 901. The Tax Court held that the ter
m industry should be understood in its ordinary and general definition, which is
any enterprise employing relatively large amounts of capital and/or labor. ISSU
E: W/N the Philippine Acetylene Co., Inc. may be considered engaged in an indust
ry as contemplated in Sec. 6 of RA 1394 and therefore exempt from the payment of
the special import tax with respect to the gas tank in question. HELD: Philippi
ne Acetylene is not exempt from the special import tax. Tax exemptions are held
strictly against the taxpayer. The obvious legislative intent is to confine the
meaning of the term industries to activities that tend to produce or create or man
ufacture, and not to all ventures and trades falling under the ordinary and gene
ral definition. In granting the exemption, it would have been illogical for Cong
ress to specify importations needed by new and necessary industries as the term
is defined by law and in the same breath allowed a similar exemption to all othe
r industries in general. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 11a, 11d, 28, 43
FACTS: The information alleges that Santiago has committed the crime of "libel."
The accused delivered false, malicious, and highly defamatory statements agains
t Mayor Lacson through an amplifier system before a crowd of around a hundred pe
rsons. Defendant moved to quash this information upon the ground that the crime
charged therein is not libel but oral defamation. ISSUE: Whether the crime charg
ed in the information is oral defamation, under Art. 358 of the Revised Penal Co
de, or libel, under Art. 355, in relation to Art. 353, of the same Code. HELD: T
he facts alleged in the information constitute the crime of oral defamation. The
word "radio" should be considered in relation to the terms with which it is ass
ociated, all of which have a common characteristic, namely, their permanent natu
re as a means of publication, and this explains the graver penalty for libel tha
n that prescribed for oral defamation. Radio as a means of publication is the tr
ansmission and reception of electromagnetic waves without conducting wires inter
vening between transmitter and receiver, while transmission of words by means of
an amplifier system is not thru "electromagnetic waves" but thru the use of "co
nducting wires" intervening between the transmitter and the receiver. It has als
o been held in the United States that slanderous statements forming part of a ma
nuscript read by a speaker over the radio constitute libel. LATIN MAXIM: 11h, 25
a, 28, b2
116 Caltex (Phil.), Inc. v. Palomar

Case No. 45 G.R. No. 19650 (September 29, 1966) Chapter V, Page 137, Footnote No
. 211
San Miguel Corp. v. NLRC
Case No. 272 G.R. No. 80774 (May 31, 1988) Chapter V, Page 211, Footnote No. 138
FACTS: Petitioner conceived the Caltex Hooded Pump Contest where participants have
to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump can dispense during a
specific period of time. There was no fee or consideration required to be paid,
nor any purchase of any Caltex products to be made in order to join the contest
. Foreseeing the extensive use of mail for advertising and communications, Calte
x requested clearance for Respondent Postmaster General but was denied citing sa
id contest is a gift enterprise deemed as a non-mailable matter under the anti-lot
tery provisions of the Postal Law. Hence, Petitioner filed a petition for declar
atory relief. ISSUE: W/N the Caltex Hooded Pump Contest falls under the term gift e
nterprise which is banned by the Postal Law. HELD: No, said contest is not a gift
enterprise. The word lottery is defined as a game of chance where the elements of
which are (1) consideration, (2) chance, and (3) prize. The term gift enterprise
and scheme in the provision of the Postal Law making unmailable any lottery, gift,
enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money or any real or personal prop
erty by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind means such enterprise as will require
consideration as an element. The intent of the prohibition is to suppress the t
endency to inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt public morals. There being
no element of consideration in said contest, the spirit of the law is preserved
. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 28
FACTS: Petitioner Corporation sponsored an Innovation Program which rewarded cas
h to SMC employees who will submit ideas and suggestions beneficial to the corpo
ration. Rustico Vega submitted his proposal entitled Modified Grande Pasteurizati
on Process and claimed entitlement to the cash award. SMC denied utilizing such p
roposal but Vega alleged otherwise and filed a complaint with the NLRC which arb
itrated against the Petitioner. ISSUE: W/N the money claim of Vega falls within
the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the NLRC. HELD: No, said money claim f
alls outside the jurisdiction of said agencies. The jurisdiction of the NLRC is
outlined in Art. 217 of the Labor Code which includes in par. 3 all money claims
of workers, including those based on nonpayment or underpayment of wages, overti
me compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriat
e agreement While par. 3 refers to all money claims of workers, it is not necessary
to suppose that the entire universe of money claims has been absorbed into the j
urisdiction of the NLRC. Par. 3 should not be read in isolation with the context
formed by par. 1 (unfair labor practices), par. 2 (terms and conditions of empl
oyment), par. 4 (household services), par. 5 (prohibited activities). The unifyi
ng element of pars. 1-5 is that they refer to cases or disputes arising out of o
r in connection with an employer-employee relationship. The scope of par. 3 is c
larified by its associated paragraphs wherein money claims falling within the or
iginal and exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC are those which have some reasonab
le causal connection with the employer-employee relationship. LATIN MAXIM: 28, 3
6b, 36e
117 Gotiaco v. Union Ins. Soc. Of Camilon

. 141
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Oil Industry Commission
FACTS: The Gotiaco Brothers transported a cargo of rice from Saigon to Cebu. The
rice was damaged due to the inflow of seawater into the ship during the voyage
because of a defect in one of its drain pipes. Plaintiffs sought recovery from D
efendant under maritime insurance that purports to insure the cargo from: Perils o
f the seas, men of war, fire, enemies, pirates, rovers, thieves, jettisons, barra
try of the master and mariners, and of all other perils, losses, and misfortunes T
he trial court ruled that the ship was unseaworthy and Defendant is not liable.
Plaintiffs appealed hence this action. ISSUE: W/N the insurer is liable for the
loss. HELD: No, the owners of the damaged rice must look to the shipowner for re
dress and not to the insurer. The words all other perils, losses, and misfortunes
are to be interpreted as covering risks which are of like kind with the particul
ar risks which are enumerated in the preceding part of the clause in the contrac
t. A loss which, in the ordinary course of events, results from the natural and
inevitable action of the sea, from the ordinary wear and tear of the ship, or fr
om the negligent failure of the ships owner to provide the vessel with proper equ
ipment to convey the cargo under the ordinary condition is not a peril of the sea
. The insurer undertakes to insure against perils of the sea and similar perils,
not against perils of the ship. It was found that the cargo was improperly stowe
d and that the owners of the ship were chargeable with negligence for failure to
protect the pipe by putting a case over it. It was appropriately held that the
ship was not seaworthy. LATIN MAXIM: 29
FACTS: Petitioner Corporation was contending that Respondent Commission had no j
urisdiction over the contractual disputes between them and a gasoline dealer in
the name of Manuel Yap. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Commission had jurisdiction over t
he contractual disputes. HELD: The contention of the Petitioner is well founded.
A detailed reading of the entire OIC Act will say that there has not been an ex
press provision providing for disputes involving the gasoline dealer and the oil
company. Sec 6 of R.A. 6173 restricts the extent and scope the OIC prerogative
of jurisdiction in sub paragraph a to f. What the law intend here is to be all e
mbracing to the jurisdictional power of Respondent Commission so anything not me
ntioned are not or cannot be presumed or indicated. Thus, the jurisdictional pow
er should be restricted to mere regulatory and supervisory power and not judicia
l. The phrase, to set the conditions means the right to prescribe rules and conduc
t. It only pertains to rule making power and not adjudication. Such limitation i
s included in the provision in Sec. 7(4d) LATIN MAXIM: 25, 30, 31, 36
118 Cagayan Valley Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

Case No. 43 G.R. No. 123248 (October 16, 1997) Chapter V, Page 217, Footnote No.
158
Rep. of the Philippines vs. Hon. Migrinio and Tecson
Case No. 257
FACTS: La Tondea registered with the Philippine Patent Office, pursuant to RA 623
1, the 350 c.c. white flint bottles it has been using for its gin popularly know
n as Ginebra San Miguel. Thereafter, a case was initiated against Petitioner for u
sing the 350 c.c., white flint bottles with the mark La Tondea, Inc. and Ginebra San
Miguel stamped or blown-in therein by filling the same with Petitioners liquor pr
oduct bearing the label Sonny Boy for commercial sale and distribution, without La
Tondeas written consent, and in violation of Sec. 2 of RA 623 as amended by RA 57
00. ISSUE: W/N La Tondea was part of the protected beverages of RA 623 amended by
RA 5700. HELD: The words other lawful beverages is used in its general sense, ref
erring to all beverages not prohibited by law. Beverage is defined as a liquor o
r liquid for drinking. Hard liquor, although regulated, is not prohibited by law
; hence, it is within the purview and coverage of RA 623, as amended. To limit t
he coverage of the law only to those enumerated or of the same kind or class as
those specifically mentioned will defeat the very purpose of the law. LATIN MAXI
M: 9a, 26, 29
FACTS: Acting on information received, which indicated the acquisition of wealth
beyond his lawful income, the Philippine Anti-Graft Board required Private Resp
ondent to submit his explanation or comment, together with his supporting eviden
ce. Private Respondent, a retired lt. colonel, was unable to produce his support
ing evidence, despite several postponements, because they were allegedly in the
custody of his bookkeeper who had gone abroad. The anti-graft Board was created
by the PCGG to investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP pe
rsonnel, both retired and in active service. ISSUE: W/N Private Respondent may be
investigated and prosecuted by the Board, an agency of the PCGG, for violation
of RA 3019 and 1379. HELD: No. Applying the rule in statutory construction, the
term subordinate as used in EO 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys a close assoc
iation or relation with former President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the
immediate family member, relative, and close associate in EO 1 and the close rel
ative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in EO 2. LATIN MAXIM: 28, 30
, 36b, 38
119 Commissioner of Customs vs. Court of Tax Appeals

Case No. 71 G.R. Nos. 48886-88 (July 21, 1993) Chapter III, Page 101, Footnote N
o.133
United States vs. Sto. Nino
Case No. 302 Chapter V, Page 220, Footnote No.172
FACTS: Petitioner contends that the importation of the foodstuffs in question is
prohibited and the articles thus imported may be subject to forfeiture under Se
c. 2530 (f) and 102 (k) of the Tariff and Customs Code. The foodstuffs in questi
on being articles of prohibited importation cannot be released under bond. ISSUE
: W/N the imported foodstuffs in question are not contraband, and are not as sta
ted by Respondent Court, among the prohibited importations enumerated in Sec. 10
2 of the Tariff and Customs Code therefore these foodstuffs may be released unde
r bond as provided in Sec. 2301 of the same code. HELD: Yes. The imported foodst
uffs are considered prohibited importation under Sec. 102 (k) of the Tariff and
Customs Code. LATIN MAXIM: 29
FACTS: Respondent was caught possessing a deadly weapon. He was prosecuted under
Act No. 1780, which stated that it shall be unlawful for any person to carry con
cealed upon his person any bowie knife, dirk dagger, kris or other deadly weapon
s, provide that this prohibition shall not apply to firearms in the possession o
f persons who have secured a license therefore or who are entitled to carry the
same under the provision of this Act. The trial court ruled that, using the prin
ciple of ejusdem generis, the law will only apply to bladed weapons ISSUE: W/N t
he trial court was correct in applying ejusdem generis. HELD: No. The trial cour
t erred in applying ejusdem generis because the latter is only resorted to in de
termining the legislative intent, such that if the intent is clear, the rule mus
t give way. In this case, the proviso provides that unlicensed revolvers were co
vered by the law and as such the law is not limited to bladed weapons. LATIN MAX
IM: 6c, 29
120 Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Social Security Commission

Case No. 263 G.R. No. L-15045 (January 20, 1961) Chapter V, Page 221, Footnote N
o.175 Rep. v. Estenzo Case No. G.R. No. L 35376 (September 11, 1980)
FACTS: Petitioner filed with Respondent Commission a request that Catholic Charit
ies, and all religious and charitable institutions and/or organizations, which a
re directly or indirectly, wholly or partially, operated by the Roman Archbishop
of Manila be exempted from compulsory coverage of RA 1161, otherwise known as th
e Social Security Law of 1954. Petitioner contends that the term employer as defin
ed in the law should following the principle of ejusdem generis--- be limited to
those who carry on undertakings or activities which have the element of profit or
gain, or which are pursued for profit or gain, because the phrase activity of any
kind in the definition is preceded by the words any trade, business, industry, un
dertaking. ISSUE: W/N the rule of ejusdem generis can be applied in this case. H
ELD: No. The rule of ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty. It
is not controlling where the plain purpose and intent of the Legislature would
thereby be hindered and defeated. The definition of the term employer is sufficien
tly comprehensive as to include religious and charitable institutions or entitie
s not organized for profit. This is made more evident by the fact that it contai
ns an exception in which said institutions or entities are not included. LATIN M
AXIM: 9a, 29
FACTS: Private Respondents filed a petition to reopen a decision by the Cadastra
l Court to declare Lot No. 4273 of the Ormoc Cadastre as public land. Petitioner
s filed an instant petition alleging that the trial court erred in assuming juri
sdiction over the petition for reopening the cadastral proceedings. ISSUE: W/N R
A 6236 applies to the reopening of cadastral proceedings on certain lands which
were declared public lands. HELD: No. RA 6236 does not apply to the reopening of
cadastral proceedings on certain lands which were declared public lands. The Re
spondent judge was wrong in interpreting that RA 6236 is applicable; the job of
the judiciary is to apply laws, not interpret it. LATIN MAXIM: 6d, 7a, 30, 32
121 In re estate of Enriquez and Reyes

Case No. 130 G.R. No. 9351 (January 6, 1915) Chapter V, Page 223, Footnote No. 1
80
Empire Insurance Co. v. Rufino
Case No. 97 G.R. No. L 38268 (May 31, 1979) Chapter V, Page 223, Footnote No. 18
1
FACTS: Francisca Reyes died intestate and was survived by his 2 legitimate daugh
ters, Petra and Pascuala. Petra had 2 legitimate children, Rafael and Josefa. Pa
scuala had 1 legitimate child, Aurea, and had begotten a natural child by a prie
st, Vicente. Petra, Pascuala, and Aurea have since died. The lower court held th
at Vicente was the owner of all the separate property of Aurea and half of the e
state of Francisca. ISSUE: W/N Vicente was an acknowledged natural child. HELD:
Yes. G. E. 68, which was promulgated on December. 18, 1899, repealed the law tha
t priesthood was a ground for declaring a marriage void. Since Vicente was born
in 1905 after the said law was enacted, he is considered an acknowledged natural
child. LATIN MAXIM: 30a, 35, 49
FACTS: Vicente A. Rufino died intestate and was survived by his widow and 7 chil
dren. They then executed a Partition Agreement agreeing to pay for all liabiliti
es or obligations of the decedent. Almost 1 year later, Petitioner filed a Civil
Case claiming liabilities and obligations from the Rufino estate. The trial cou
rt dismissed this claim stating the Petitioner did not file within the time limi
ted in the notice to creditors in the intestate proceedings. A Petition for Revi
ew on Certiorari was filed by the Petitioner on the decision of the trial court
claiming that what was previously filed was not a money claim against the estate
of the decedent, but a claim on the estates of the Respondents. ISSUE: W/N the
petition has merit. HELD: The petition is dismissed for lack of merit. The liabi
lities claimed by Petitioner were not listed in the obligations acknowledged by
the Partition Agreement. LATIN MAXIM: 29, 30a, 45a
122 Ching Leng v. Galang

Case No. G. R. No. L-11931 (October 27, 1958)
Acosta v. Flor
Case No. 5 G. R. No. 2122 (September 13, 1905) Chapter V, Page 224, Footnote No.
187
FACTS: Petitioner obtained judgment granting his petition for naturalization. He
and his wife later petitioned to the Court of First Instance in Rizal for the a
doption of his five children who were all minors and Chinese nationals. The peti
tion was later granted. Petitioner then requested the Commissioner of Immigratio
n to cancel the alien certificate of registration of their children based on the
following grounds: (1) by virtue of their naturalization, the children are now
considered as Filipino citizens, (2) adoption gave the adopted children the same
rights and duties as if they were the legitimate children of the adopter, (3) s
ince a legitimate child follows the nationality of the adopter, the children are
considered Filipino Citizens. ISSUE: W/N citizenship can be acquired by a child
through adoption. HELD: Citizenship is not a right but a mere privilege. Art. 2
54 of the Civil Code enumerates the rights of the legitimate child and acquisiti
on is not a part of the said enumeration. Furthermore, Art. 341 of the Civil Cod
e does not include acquisition of citizenship. Also, Art. 49 of a special law th
at provides the character of naturalization enumerates the means of acquiring ci
tizenship and adoption is not part of it. LATIN MAXIM: 30a
FACTS: The Plaintiff and the Defendant were candidates for the Office of the Mun
icipal President of Laoag, Ilocos Norte. Plaintiff alleged that he was duly elec
ted to said office and that the Defendant had usurped and unlawfully held the sa
me. However, not a single witness presented by Plaintiff confirmed the latters al
legations that he had obtained a majority of 100 votes at the said election. Nor
can it be inferred from the evidence introduced by the Plaintiff that he, as a
result of said election, or for any other reason, was entitled to the office of
Municipal President of Laoag, now held by Defendant. ISSUE: Can the Plaintiff ma
intain an action for the purpose of excluding the Defendant from the exercise of
said office? HELD: No. Art. 199, 200, and 201 of the Code of Civil Procedure ha
s reserved to the Attorney-General and to the provincial fiscals, as the case ma
y be, the right to bring such action. If the legislative had intended to give al
l citizens alike the right to maintain an action for usurpation of public office
, it would have plainly said so in the law in order to avoid doubt on a subject
of such far-reaching importance. LATIN MAXIM: 30a
123 Lerum v. Cruz

Case No. 146 G. R. No. L-2783 (November 29, 1950) Chapter V, Page 225, Footnote
No. 192
Central Barrio v. City Treasurer of Davao
Case No. 55 G.R. No. L-25811 (April 3, 1968) Chapter V, Page 225, Footnote No. 1
93
FACTS: This is an appeal for a petition for declaratory relief. Attys. Lerum and
Fernando filed for this petition in order to test the sufficiency and probative
value of a testimony in a bigamy case by (former) Judge Cruz regarding the issu
ance of a divorce decree. ISSUE: Can the attorneys file a petition for declarato
ry relief regarding the sufficiency and probative value of (former) Judge Cruzs t
estimony? HELD: No, the petition for declaratory relief cannot be granted. Under
Sec 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, declaratory relief may only be granted to
a person whose rights are affected by a statute or ordinance, or who is interes
ted under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument. The sufficiency and
probative value of a testimony, which is the subject matter for declaratory reli
ef in the instant case, is not included in the enumeration. Thus, the assailed o
rder is affirmed. LATIN MAXIM: 30a
FACTS: On August 29, 1962, the City of Davao passed Resolution No. 732, pursuant
to RA 2370, declaring as officially and legally existing several barrios of the
city. Among these were barrios Agdao, Bucana and Poblacion. Subsequently, barri
o Poblacion, also called barrio Central, asked for its alleged 10% share in taxe
s collected on real property located within the barrio, as provided in Sec. 3 of
RA 3590. Respondent refused to release the share on the ground that the amount
pertaining to the said barrio, in relation to barrios Agdao and Bucana, cannot b
e determined because the respective boundaries of said barrios were not yet fixe
d as required by law. The Petitioner thus filed a case against Davao Citys Treasu
rer, Council, Auditor and Mayor with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Davao,
which dismissed the case on the ground that the issue had been rendered academi
c by the passage of RA 4354, amending the charter of Davao City. ISSUE: W/N the
dismissal order was correct. HELD: The dismissal was affirmed. Sec. 2 of RA 4354
enumerated the barrios comprising the City of Davao, which did not include the
Petitioner. Thus, there prima facie arises the conclusion that said law abolishe
d Barrio Central as part of Davao City. A non-existent barrio or a barrio not si
tuated in Davao City cannot present a claim against it or its officials for a sh
are in taxes under RA 3590. LATIN MAXIM: 30
124 Vera v. Fernandez

Case No. 55 G.R. No.L-31364 (March 30, 1979) Chapter V, Page 225, Footnote No. 1
93
Villanueva v. City of Iloilo
Case No. 312 G.R. No. L-26521 (December 28, 1968) Chapter V, Page 226, Footnote
No. 197
FACTS: This case is an appeal with regard to two orders promulgated by the CFI o
f Negros Occidental, Branch V in relation to the intestate estate of Luis D. Ton
goy. The cases were for the claim and payment of deficiency income taxes in the
total sum of P3,254.80 with 5% surcharge and 1% monthly interest, as provided in
the Tax Code. The Petitioners were denied the said claim and payment as they we
re barred under Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE: W/N the statute of
non-claims under Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the New Rules of Court bars claim of the go
vernment for unpaid taxes. HELD: The order appealed from is reversed. A perusal
of the aforequoted provision shows that it makes no mention of claims for moneta
ry obligations of the decedent created by law, such as taxes which is entirely d
ifferent from the claims enumerated therein. Par. 315 of the Tax Code states tha
t payment of income tax shall be a lien in favor of the government from the time
the assessment was made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue until paid with
interests, penalties, etc. Thus, before the inheritance has been passed to the
heirs, the unpaid taxes due the decedent may be collected, even without its havi
ng been presented under Sec. 2 of Rule 36 of the Rules of Court. LATIN MAXIM: 27
, 30, 44
FACTS: The case is an appeal questioning the lower courts judgment declaring Ordi
nance No. 11 as illegal. The Petitioners, Eusebio and Remedios Villanueva, are o
wners of 5 tenement houses containing 43 apartments. By virtue of the ordinance,
the city was able to collect P5,824 from the spouses for the years 1960-1964. I
SSUE: 1. Is Ordinace 11 illegal because it imposes double taxation? 2. Is the Ci
ty of Iloilo empowered by the Local Autonomy Act to impose tenement taxes? 3. Is
it oppressive and unreasonable because it carries a penal clause? 4. Does it vi
olate the uniformity of taxation? HELD: The judgment is reversed; the ordinance
is valid. 1. No. The same tax may be imposed by the national government as well
as by the local government. 2. Yes. RA 2264 confers on local governments broad ta
xing authority. It is clear that the intention of the ordinance is to impose a t
enement or apartment tax, which is not among the exceptions listed in Sec. 2 of
the Local Autonomy Act. 3. No. The lower court had in mind the constitutional pr
ovision that no person shall be imprisoned for a debt or non-payment of a poll ta
x, which should not apply; the tax in question is neither a debt nor a poll tax.
4. No. Taxes are uniform and equal when imposed upon all property of the same cl
ass or character within the taxing authority. LATIN MAXIM: 7a, 20c, 30, 35, 42
125 Santo To v. Cruz-Pao

Case No. 275 G.R. No. L-55130 (January 17, 1983) Chapter V, Page 226, Footnote N
o. 199
Samson v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 270 G.R. No. L-43182 (November 25, 1986) Chapter V, Page 226, Footnote
No. 200
FACTS: Petitioner Santo To was convicted of estafa for a bouncing check and was
sentenced with a penalty of prision mayor. He appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which reduced his sentence to the penalty of prision correctional. He then filed
a petition for probation but was denied by the Respondent judge, Hon. Cruz-Pao,
despite the favorable recommendation of the Probation Office, on the ground that
granting it would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, and that Santo To
was not a penitent offender. In a motion for reconsideration, the Solicitor Gene
ral recommended the grant because the Petitioner was not among the offenders dis
qualified to avail probation, as enumerated in the probation law (P.D. 968) Sec.
9. ISSUE: Can Petitioner To avail himself of probation? HELD: Yes. The law give
s more importance to the offender than the crime. He is a first-time offender an
d his offense has relative lightness. In addition, the Respondent judge cannot a
ssume that To had not shown repentance. Besides, where the Probation Law express
ly enumerates the persons disqualified to avail of its benefits, the clear inten
t is to allow the benefits of probation to those not included in the enumeration
. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 36b
FACTS: Petitioner Samson, the mayor of Caloocan, terminated the services of Resp
ondent, Mr. Talens, as Assistant Secretary, through Administrative Order No. 3,
because of lack and loss of confidence, and appointed Mr. Liwag, co-Petitioner,
to said position. RA 2260 (Civil Service Act of 1959) Sec 5(f) declares that the
position of secretaries to city mayors as non-competitive. Talens asserts his p
osition was not covered by the said act and, being permanently appointed, he can
only be removed for a cause and after due process. The Court of First Instance
ruled in favor of Talens, declaring the order null and void. The Court of Appeal
s also affirmed said decision. ISSUE: Was the termination of Talens illegal? HEL
D: Yes, Talens termination was illegal; his position is not among those expressly
declared by law as highly confidential. The nature of functions attached to a p
osition determines whether such position is highly confidential. Where the law p
rovides that positions in the government belong to the competitive service, exce
pt those declared by law to be in the noncompetitive service and those which are
policydetermining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature, the le
gislature is presumed to have intended to exclude those not enumerated, for othe
rwise, it would have included them in the enumeration. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 30
126 Finman General Assurance Corp. vs. Court of Appeals

Case No. 107 G.R. No 100970 (September 2, 1992) Chapter V, Page 228, Footnote No
. 202
Centano v. Villalon-Pornillos
. 203
FACTS: Carlie Surposa was insured with the Petitioner and had several relatives
as his beneficiaries. On October 18, 1988, Carlie Surposa died of a stab wound.
After a written notice of claim by the beneficiaries to the insurance company, t
he latter denied the claim, saying that murder and assault are not within the sc
ope of the coverage of the insurance policy. The insurance company was found lia
ble by the Insurance Commission to pay P15,000, and this decision was affirmed b
y the appellate court. Petitioner contends that the CA was wrong in using express
io unius exclusio alterius in a personal accident insurance policy since death re
sulting from murder and/or assault are impliedly excluded therefrom. ISSUE: Did
the CA make a mistake in using the said principle? HELD: No. The fact remains th
at the death of Surposa was pure accident on the part of the victim. Furthermore
, the personal accident insurance policy specifically enumerated only 10 circums
tances where no liability attaches to the insurance company. Failure to include
death through murder or assault meant it had not been intended to be exempt from
liabilities resulting from such. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 30
FACTS: In 1985, the officers of Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a
fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay in Bulacan.
Martin Centeno, chairman of the group, approached Judge Angeles, President of Ti
kay, and the latter solicited P 1,500. However, this solicitation was made witho
ut a permit from the DSWD and as a result, it was contended that Centeno violate
d P.D. 1564, which states Any person to solicit or receive contributions for char
itable or public welfare purposes shall secure a permit from the regional Office
of the Department of Social services and Development. ISSUE: W/N the phrase chari
table purposes in P.D. 1564 is meant to include religious purposes. HELD: No. Whe
re a statute is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretat
ion or construction, be extended to others. The 1987 Constitution treats the wor
ds charitable and religious separately and independently from each other. Since P.D.
1564 merely states that charitable or public welfare purposes need a permit fro
m DSWD, this means that the framers of the law never intended to include solicit
ations for religious purposes within its coverage. The term charitable should be s
trictly construed to exclude solicitations for religious purposes. Moreover, since
this is a criminal case, penal law must be construed strictly against the State
and liberally in favor of the accused. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 11g, 11i, 25, 27, 30, 4
8
127 Escribano v. Avila

Case No. 101 G.R. No. L-30375 (September 12, 1978) Chapter V, Page 229, Footnote
No. 205
Manabat v. De Aquino
Case No. 161 G.R. No. L-5558 (April 29, 1953) Chapter V, Page 229, Footnote No.
208
FACTS: Congressman Salipada Pendatun of Cotobato, filed a complaint for libel ag
ainst Mayor Jose Escribano of Tacurong before the Court of First Instance (now t
he RTC) to Judge David Avila. Escribano questioned Judge Avilas authority to cond
uct the preliminary investigation of the offense. He contended that the city fis
cal of Cotobato is the only one empowered to conduct the preliminary investigati
on, pursuant of RA 4363 and Art. 360 of the RPC which does not empower the Court
of First Issuance to conduct preliminary investigations of written defamations
due to an amendment made for Art 360. ISSUE: Whether the Court of First Issuance
is invested with the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the
crime of libel or whether that power is lodged exclusively in the city attorney
of that city. HELD: Yes. The Court of First Issuance may conduct preliminary inv
estigations because this power is not lodged exclusively in the city attorney. T
he enumeration in the law of the public officers and the courts that may conduct
preliminary investigations was designed to divest the ordinary municipal court
of that power but not to deprive the Court of First Instance of that same power.
The power of the CFT to conduct a preliminary investigation is derived from the
constitutional grant of power for a judge to hold a preliminary examination and
to issue warrants of arrest and search warrants. What is important to remember
is that preliminary investigations by the CFT is the exception to the rule and n
ot the general rule. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 11e, 12, 37
FACTS: Petitioners were ordered to pay P 1,261.74 plus interest for usury, where
in the couple failed to appear in court and present evidence in the hearing. Not
ified of the decision on September 7, 1951, they filed for an appeal by register
ed mail on September 22 of that same year. However, the papers were actually rec
eived by the court on September 24. Thus, the Judge of First Instance declared t
hat the appeal was late and dismissed it. ISSUE: 1. Whether the appeal was deeme
d filed on September 22, when they were deposited by registered mail, or Sept 24
, when they were actually received by the court. 2. W/N the appeal has been perf
ected within 15 days. HELD: Yes. The appeal was perfected within 15 days. Rule 2
7 Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court must be applied which will result to the date of
deposit in the post office by registered mail of court papers as the date of fil
ing. Uniformity of rules is to be desired to simplify procedure. Thus, Petitione
rs filed their appeal just in time. LATIN MAXIM: 3a, 9c, 11d, 12a
128 Gomez v. Ventura and Board of Medical Examiners

Case No. 115 No. 32441. March 29, 1930 Chapter V, Page 229, Footnote No.209
Primero v. CA
Case No. 126 G.R. Nos. 48468-69. November 22, 1989
FACTS: FACTS: Plaintiff had his license revoked on unprofessional conduct due to
the administration of opium. Petitioner claims that his administration of opium
to patients was not a grounds for unprofessional conduct because it has been re
pealed by subsequent Opium Laws. ISSUE: W/N Plaintiff should have his license re
stored. HELD: No, Plaintiff should not have his license restored. The subsequent
Opium Laws cannot be held to have impliedly repealed prior ones as these did no
t conflict or remove said prior laws. The Opium Laws are in fact in force and th
e ill-defined term of unprofessional conduct can include improper administration
of opium to patients. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 38b Petitioner carried a bladed weapon o
utside of his residence while PD 9, the prohibition against fan knives, balisong o
r clubs was in effect which thereafter resulted in his arrest. Petitioner answer
s in his defense that a bayonet, the bladed weapon he was carrying, was neither
a blunt nor bladed weapon enumerated in PD 9 and therefore he was not guilty of
violating the law against bladed or blunt weapons. ISSUE: W/N a bayonet is not a
bladed or blunt weapon that falls under the purview of PD 9. HELD: No, the bayo
net is a bladed weapon that falls under PD 9. Petitioners defense of expressio u
nius est exclusio alterius is weak and incomplete. It would make no sense if pos
session of a fan knife, which is less lethal than a bayonet, would be punishable
while possession of a bayonet would not. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 30a
129 SEC Legal Opinion re BIR Employees Association Inc.

Case No. 142 Oct. 23, 1987
Roldan v Villaroman
Case No. 262 G.R. No. 46825 (October 18, 1939) Chapter V, Page 234, Footnote No.
229
FACTS: Petitioners inquired as to whether or not past presidents can run as boar
d members or are merely ex-officio board members. ISSUE: W/N past presidents of
the association can run again as members of the board or are automatically ex of
ficio members. HELD: Past Presidents may run again for positions in the board. T
here is nothing in the rules and regulations of the association or the BIR that
past presidents of the association may not run again for board membership even a
s they are automatically made ex officio members of the board. LATN MAXIM: 9a
FACTS: Respondents were charged of murder. During the trial, Respondent Cuevas b
ecame ill and had to be confined to a hospital. Judge Roldan, the Petitioner, de
nied the Respondents for postponement of the trial on the ground of illness of C
uevas. The court also compelled the counsel of the accused to present evidence a
nd their witnesses and ordered to arrest the accused. Respondents then institute
d a certiorari proceeding in the Court of Appeals against the Petitioner, impugn
ing the decision of the judge for proceeding with the case in the absence of Cue
vas. The CA then issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering Judge Roldan f
rom continuing with the trial. ISSUE: W/N the CA has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: No. The CA resolutions denying the motions of the Solicitor-General rely
principally upon the decision rendered in the case of Mujer vs. CFI of Laguna, w
hich held that the phrase in aid of its appellate jurisdiction only refers to its
proximate antecedent and to all other auxiliary writs and process. This ruling is
in conjunction with the rule of interpretation that a qualifying phrase should b
e understood as referring to the nearest antecedent. Moreover, the rule in the i
nterpretation applied is in fact the general rule in the interpretation of quali
fying or conditional phrases found in a law, but this rule is subject to the exc
eption that where the intention of the law is to apply the phrase to all the ant
ecedents embraced in the provision, the same should be made extensive to the who
le. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6d, 9c, 33, 36b, b2
130 Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons

Case No. 122 G.R. No. L-278 (July 18, 1946) Chapter V, Page 234, Footnote No. 23
0
Jose Antonio Mapa v. Hon. Joker Arroyo and Labrador Development Corporation
Case No. 170 G.R. No. 78585 (July 5, 1989) Chapter V, Page 234, Footnote No. 231
FACTS: Petitioner was apprehended by the US Counter Intelligence Corps Detachmen
t under Security Commitment Order No. 286 wherein she was specifically charged w
ith (a) active collaboration with the Japanese, and (b) previous association with t
he enemy. When she, along with her co-detainees and coPetitioners in that case, w
as delivered by the US Army to the Commonwealth Government pursuant to the procl
amation of General Douglas MacArthur of December 29, 1944, she was detained by s
aid Government under that charge. And under the same charge during all the time
referred to, she has remained in custody of the Commonwealth Government. ISSUE:
W/N Petitioner is constitutionally entitled bail. HELD: Yes. The constitutional
mandate laid down the rule that all persons shall before conviction be bailable,
except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. Si
nce the Peoples Court Act and the Constitution and other statutes in this jurisdi
ction should be read as one law, and since the language used in this court in co
nstruing the Constitution and other statutes on the matter of bail is substantia
lly the same as the language used by the Peoples Court Act on the same subject, t
he most natural and logical conclusion to follow in cases of capital offenses be
fore conviction is that discretion refers only to the determination of whether o
r not the evidence of guilt is strong. To hold that the Peoples Court has uncontr
olled discretion in such cases and to deny bail even where the evidence of guilt
is not strong or there is absolutely no evidence at all, is to make the Act off
ensive not only to the letter but also to the spirit of the Constitution, which
is contrary to the most elementary rules of statutory construction. LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 6d, 11g, 12a, 26, 35, 37, 38b, 42a
FACTS: Mapa bought lots from Labrador Development Corporation which are payable
in ten years. Mapa defaulted to pay the installment dues and continued to do so
despite constant reminders by Labrador. The latter informed Mapa that the contra
cts to sell the lots were cancelled, but Mapa invoked Clause 20 of the four cont
racts. Said clause obligates Labrador to complete the development of the lots, e
xcept those requiring the services of a public utility company or the government
, within 3 years from the date of the contract. Petitioner contends that P.D. 95
7 requires Labrador to provide the facilities, improvements, and infrastructures
for the lots, and other forms of development if offered and indicated in the appr
oved subdivision plans. ISSUE: W/N Clause 20 of the said contracts include and i
ncorporate P.D. 957 through the doctrine of last antecedent, making the cancella
tion of the contracts of sale incorrect. HELD: No. Labrador has every right to c
ancel the contracts of sale, pursuant to Clause 7 of the said contract for the r
eason of the lapse of five years of default payment from Mapa. P.D. 957 does not
apply because it was enacted long after the execution of the contracts involved
, and, other than those provided in Clause 20, no further written commitment was
made by the developer. The words which are offered and indicated in the subdivis
ion or condominium plans refer not only to other forms of development but also to fa
cilities, improvements, and infrastructures. The word and is not meant to separate
words, but is a conjunction used to denote a joinder or a union. LATIN MAXIM: 6d
, 7a, 33
131 People of the Philippines v. Teodoro Tamani

Case No. 227 G.R. No. L-22160 and G.R. No. L-22161 (January 21, 1974) Chapter V,
Page 234, Footnote No. 232
Andres Borromeo v. Fermin Mariano
Case No. 38 G.R. No. L-16808 (January 3, 1921) Chapter V, Page 236, Footnote No.
240
FACTS: Tamani was convicted of murder and attempted murder by the lower court on
February 14, 1963. Upon receipt of a copy of this order, his counsel subsequent
ly filed a motion for reconsideration on March 1, 1963, which was denied. The lo
wer court sent a copy of the order of denial to the counsel by registered mail o
n July 13, 1963 through the counsels wife. Counsel filed his appeal only on Septe
mber 10, 1963, forty-eight days from July 24th, which is the reglementary fiftee
n-day period for appeal. Appellees contend that the case should be dismissed on
the ground that the appeal was forty-eight days late. They invoked Sec. 6, Rule
122 of the Rules of Court which states that an appeal must be taken within fifte
en (15) days from the promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed f
rom. ISSUE: W/N the fifteen-day period should commence from the date of promulga
tion of the decision. HELD: Yes. Using the rule of reddendo singula singulis, th
e word promulgation should be construed as referring to judgment, while notice should
be construed as referring to order. Tamanis appeal is therefore 58 days late, not 4
7, as Appellees contend; he only had a day left from the receipt of his wife of
the notice on July 13. Nonetheless, the court decided to act upon the appeal at
hand to obviate any possible miscarriage of justice. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 8a 11g,
34
FACTS: Andres Borromeo was appointed and commissioned as Judge of the Twentyfour
th Judicial District, effective July 1, 1914. On February, 25, 1920, he was appo
inted Judge of the Twenty-first Judicial District, and Fermin Mariano was appoin
ted Judge of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District. Judge Borromeo has since the l
atter date consistently refused to accept appointment to the Twenty-first Judici
al District. The Attorney-General assails the validity of the later appointment
by arguing on the basis of Sec. 155 of the Administrative Code, which states tha
t nothing herein shall be construed to prevent a judge of first instance of one d
istrict from being appointed to be judge of another district. ISSUE: W/N Borromeo
has the right to sit as the Judge of the 24th Judicial District. HELD: Yes. The
concluding part of Sec. 155 of the Administrative Code used by the Attorney-Gen
eral should be construed as a proviso, although it did not start with the usual
introductory word, provided. The word appointed in the proviso should be given its m
eaning in the ordinary sense, and thus, should mean the nomination or designation
of an individual. The provisions of the Judiciary Law are plain and unambiguous.
Judges of First Instance are appointed Judges of the Courts of First Instance o
f the respective judicial districts of the Philippine Islands. They hold these p
ositions of Judges of First Instance of definite districts until they resign, re
tire or are removed through impeachment proceedings. The power to appoint lies o
n the appointing officer, but the power to accept lies solely on the appointee.
Hence, appointees consent is needed and he has power to refuse an appointment. In
upholding the independence of the judiciary and the states separation of powers,
the only way to remove Borromeo from power is by impeachment. LATIN MAXIM: 6c,
7a, 9a, 9c, 12a, 24a, 37
132 ALU-TUCP v. NLRC

Case No. 2 G.R. No. 109328 (August 16, 1994) Chapter V, Page 240, Footnote No. 2
50
Arenas v. City of San Carlos, Pangasinan
Case No. 20 G.R. No. L-34024 (April 5, 1978) Chapter V, Page 240, Footnote No. 2
51
FACTS: Petitioners were employed by the National Steel Corporation for their fiv
e year expansion program. The workers contend that they should be considered reg
ular workers as opposed to project workers, as the NSC and NLRC ruled. ALU-TUCP
claims that they have been working in NSC for more than 6 years and that their w
ork is necessary for the business, and that would have been more than enough to
consider them as regular employees. Petitioners contentions stemmed from Art. 280
of the Labor Code. ISSUE: W/N Petitioners should be considered regular employee
s. HELD: No. The provision calls for casual employees. Since Petitioners were co
nsidered project employees, this provision does not apply to them. Moreover, the
fact that they have been working in NSC for more than a year does not mean they
are automatically converted into regular employees. (They were hired as project
employees for the 5-year expansion program. Once that project is done, their serv
ices will no longer be needed.) In Mercado, Sr. vs. NLRC, the proviso in par. 2
of Art.280 relates only to casual employees and is not applicable to those who d
o not qualify under the definition of such workers in par. 1. The proviso is to
be construed with reference to the immediately preceding part of the provision t
o which it is attached, and not to other sections thereof. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6, 33
FACTS: RA 5967 provides that second and third class judges would receive an annu
al salary of P18,000. Arenas was receiving a monthly salary of P1000.00, P350 of
which was from the national government and the remaining P650 comes from the ci
ty government. Petitioner had repeatedly requested the city to enact the said RA
but the Respondent City refused. ISSUE: W/N Judge Arenas should be granted the
increase in his salary from P12,000 to P18,000. HELD: Looking at the Senate deli
berations, the intention in enacting the RA was that the salary of a city judge
should not be higher than the salary of the city mayor. Moreover, exceptions, as
a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only s
o far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in fa
vor of the general provisions rather than the exception. In case there is repugn
ancy between the proviso and the main provision, the latter provision, whether a
proviso or not, is given preference because it is the latest expression of the
intent of the legislation, but more so because provisos are negatively written a
nd gives off a more mandatory tone. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 33, 43,48, b2
133 Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance

Case No. 292 G.R. No. 115852 (August 25, 1994) Chapter V, Page 243, Footnote No.
266
ALDECOA v. Hongkong and Shanghai Bank
Case No. 126 30 Phil. 228, (March 23, 1915) Chapter V, Page 245, Footnote No. 27
2
FACTS: Petitioner assail the constitutionality of RA 7716 saying that S. No. 163
0 did not pass three reading on separate days as required in the Constitution be
cause the second and the third readings were done on the same day. The President
had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent and the presidential certification dispense
d with the requirement not only of the printing but also that of reading the bil
l on three separate days. ISSUE: W/N RA 7716, an act that seeks to widen the tax
base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the
National Internal Revenue Code, has been constitutionally passed. HELD: There is
no merit in the contention that presidential certification dispenses only with
the requirement for the printing of the bill and its distribution three days bef
ore its passage but not with the requirement of three readings on separate days.
The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immedia
te enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Sec 26(2) qualifies the two stated conditions be
fore a bill can become a law: (i) the bill has passed three readings on separate
days and (ii) it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days
before it is finally approved. In other words, the "unless" clause must be read
in relation to the "except" clause, because the two are really coordinate clause
s of the same sentence. To construe the "except" clause as simply dispensing wit
h the second requirement in the "unless" clause (i.e., printing and distribution
three days before final approval) would not only violate the rules of grammar b
ut it would also negate the very premise of the "except" clause: the necessity o
f securing the immediate enactment of a bill which is certified in order to meet
a public calamity or emergency. LATIN MAXIM: 33
FACTS: The mother of the Plaintiffs, Isabel Palet, was a general partner in the
firm, Aldecoa & Company. The said firm, however, was heavily indebted to the Def
endant corporation. Isabels remedy for this was to furnish certain securities and
obligations to the Defendant Corporation, and to mortgage certain real properti
es of her sons. In order to mortgage these properties, she emancipated her sons
and mortgaged their properties with her consent. The Petitioners now seek to can
cel the instruments of mortgage executed by them. ISSUE: W/N Isabel Palet can le
gally emancipate the Plaintiffs under the law in force in this country in 1903,
and in so doing, confer upon them the capacity to execute a valid mortgage on th
eir real property with her consent. HELD: We must look at the provisions of the
Code of Civil Procedure (American) relating to guardianship and upon certain pro
visions of the Civil Code (Spanish) relating to the control of the parents over
the person and property of their minor children. The Code of Civil Procedure imp
liedly repealed some parts of the old Spanish code. According to the Code of Civ
il Procedure, there is no longer a need to be formally emancipated by the parent
s after attaining the age of majority. At the time of the furnishing of the mort
gage emancipation documents, Joaqin was already of legal age and so his mortgage
remained valid, while Zoilos mortgage was not valid even if he signed it with hi
s mother because he was a minor when he executed the mortgage. LATIN MAXIM: 49
134 Ocampo v. Buenaventura

Aisporna v. Court of Appeals and People
Case No. 6 G.R. No. L-39419 (April 12, 1982) Chapter VI, Page 248, Footnote No.
8
FACTS: On September 11, 1966 the Cebu Police Department arrested and detained Ed
gardo Ocampo and other minors for an alleged violation of Ordinance No. 228 whic
h fixed curfew hours. The minors were then convicted for violation of said ordin
ance. On appeal, the minors were acquitted since the reason they violated the or
dinance was to attend a birthday, which is considered as a wholesome assemblage,
and therefore falls under the exception to the curfew rule. Roberto Ocampo file
d a complaint against the Respondents for serious misconduct, grave abuse of aut
hority, and commission of a felony. The Mayor issued an ordinance exonerating th
e policemen. On March 17, 1969 a complaint was lodged with the Police Commission
for the same grounds. ISSUE: W/N the Mayor can decide or investigate on adminis
trative cases involving police service and personnel. HELD: The Respondents argum
ent is devoid of merit. The power of local officials to investigate and decide a
dministrative cases involving police service and personnel has been transferred
to the POLCOM under RA 4864. According to Commission v. Hon. Bello, Sec. 26 of t
he Police Act is a mere saving clause and refers only to administrative cases in
volving police personnel and service pending at the time of the effectivity of t
he Act (September 8, 1969). Sec. 26 may not be interpreted to mean that the Boar
d of Investigators and Police Commission could not legally function to carry int
o effect the purpose of the Act until after the lapse of the 100 days. LATIN MAX
IM: 1, 6c, 6d
FACTS: Petitioner Mrs. Aisporna was charged with violation of Sec. 189 of the In
surance Act for allegedly acting as an insurance agent without first securing a
certificate of authority to act as such from the office of the Insurance Commiss
ioner. Mrs. Aisporna, however, maintained that she was not liable because she on
ly assisted her husband, and that she did not receive any compensation. ISSUE: W
/N the receipt of compensation is an essential element for violation of Sec. 189
. HELD: Receipt of compensation is essential to be considered an insurance agent
. Every part of a statute must be considered together with the other parts, a ke
pt subservient to the general intent of the enactment, and not separately and in
dependently. The term agent used in par. 1 of Sec. 189 is defined in par. 2 of the
same section. Applying the definition of an insurance agent in par. 2 to the ag
ent in par. 1 would give harmony to the aforementioned 3 paragraphs of Sec. 189.
A statute must be construed so as to harmonize and give effect to all its provi
sions wherever possible. Every part of the statute must be considered together w
ith the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enac
tment. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9c, 28, 36b, 36c, 36d, 37
135 Gaanan v. Indeterminate Appellate Court

Case No. 108 G.R. No. L-69809 (October 16, 1986) Chapter VI, Page 249, Footnote
No. 11
Radiola-Toshiba Phils. Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate
Case No. 249 G.R. No. 75222 (July 18, 1991) Chapter VI, Page 252, Footnote No. 2
0
FACTS: Atty. Pintor called Leonardo Laconico to discuss the terms of the withdra
wal of his complaint for direct assault against Laconico in the City Fiscal of C
ebu. That same day, Laconico called the Appellant, Atty. Edgardo Gaanan to come
to his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case. When
complainant Pintor called up, Laconico requested Appellant Gaanan to secretly li
sten to the telephone call through the extension phone. ISSUE: W/N an extension
telephone is one of the prohibited devices covered by Sec. 1 of RA 4200. HELD: T
elephone party lines were intentionally deleted from the provisions of the Act.
There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate
installation of a device. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same c
ategory as the devices enumerated in Sec. 1 RA 4200. In order to determine the t
rue intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute
should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and eve
ry part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. In
the case of Empire Insurance Company v. Rufino, held that the phrase device or a
rrangement in Sec. 1 of RA 4200, although not exclusive to that enumerated therei
n, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same nature, that is, in
struments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a tel
ephone. Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed
strictly in favor of the accused. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 11g, 29, 30a, 36c, 36d, 48, b
2
FACTS: The levy on attachment against the subject properties of spouses Carlos a
nd Teresita Gatmaytan was issued on March 4, 1980 by the Court of First Instance
of Pasig. However, the insolvency proceeding in the Court of First Instance of
Angeles City was commenced more than four months after the issuance of the said
attachment. Under the circumstances, Petitioner Radiola-Toshiba Phils. contended
that its lien on the subject properties overrode the insolvency proceeding and
was not dissolved thereby. ISSUE: W/N the levy on attachment dissolved the insol
vency proceedings against Respondent spouses even though it commenced four month
s after said attachment. HELD: No. Sec. 32 of the Insolvency Law is clear that t
here is a cut off period one month in attachment cases and thirty days in judgme
nts entered in actions commenced prior to the insolvency proceedings. Also, ther
e is no conflict between Sec. 32 and Sec. 79. Where a statute is susceptible to
more than one interpretation, the court should adopt such reasonable and benefic
ial construction as will render the provision thereof operative and effective an
d harmonious with each other. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 36a, 37
136 Lopez v. El Hogar Filipino

Case No. 152 G.R. No. L-22678 (January 12, 1925) Chapter VI, Page 251, Footnote
No. 16
JMM Promotions v. NLRC
Case No. 136 G.R. No. 109835 (November 22, 1993) Chapter VI, Page 251, Footnote
No. 21
FACTS: Pursuant to a contract of loan and mortgage, El Hogar Filipino caused the
mortgaged properties to be sold publicly in an extra-judicial sale. Lopez and J
avelona, in whose favor the loan was made, sought to have the contract of loan a
nd mortgage annulled on the ground that the agreement was usurious. They contend
ed that the court erred in holding that the word void, as used in the Usury Law, w
as intended to make the entire transaction a nullity. ISSUE: W/N the meaning of
the word void, as used in the Usury Law, was intended to make the entire transacti
on a nullity. HELD: No. From the very context of the law, the legislature, in us
ing the word void, did not intend that the transaction should be a complete nullit
y. It was only with respect to the usurious interest. The intention of the legis
lature must be ascertained, not from the consideration of a single word or a par
ticular phrase of the law, but from the context of the whole law or from a porti
on thereof, as compared with the whole. Every part of the act should be read wit
h the purpose of discovering the mind of the legislature. LATIN MAXIM: 9b, 25a,
37
FACTS: JMM Promotions paid license fee amounting to P30, 000 and posted a cash b
ond of P100, 000 and a surety bond of P50,000, as required by the POEA Rules. Wh
en JMM Promotions appealed to NLRC regarding a decision rendered by POEA, the NL
RC dismissed the petition for failure to post the required appeal bond as requir
ed by Art. 223 of the Labor Code. ISSUE: Is JMM Promotions still required to pos
t the required appeal bond, as required by Art. 223 of the Labor Code, consideri
ng it has already posted a cash bond and surety bond, as required by the POEA? H
ELD: Yes. The POEA Rules regarding monetary appeals are clear. A reading of the
POEA Rules shows that, in addition to the cash and surety bonds and the escrow m
oney, an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award is required t
o perfect an appeal from a decision of the POEA. LATIN MAXIM: 6b, 6d, 7a, 12a, 3
6a, 37
137 Araneta v. Concepcion

Case No. 17 G.R. No. L-9667, (July 31, 1956) Chapter VI, Page 252, Footnote No.
24
Lichauco vs. Apostol
Case No. 147 G.R. No. L-19628 (December 4, 1922) Chapter VI, Page 252, Footnote
No. 23
FACTS: The husband filed a case for legal separation against his wife on the gro
und of adultery. After the issues were joined, Defendant therein filed an omnibu
s petition to secure the custody of their three minor children, a monthly suppor
t of P5,000 for herself and said children, and the return of her passport; to en
join Plaintiff from ordering his hirelings from harassing and molesting her; and
to have Plaintiff therein pay for the fees of her attorney in the action. The j
udge rendered his decision regarding the omnibus petition and granted the custod
y of the children to Defendant, a monthly allowance of P2,300 for support for he
r and the children, P300 for a house, and P2,000 as attorneys fees. The judge ref
used to reconsider the order. ISSUE: W/N the parties are required to submit evid
ence before deciding the omnibus petition. HELD: No. If the parties are allowed
to present evidences regarding the omnibus petition, it would violate the intent
of the law regarding the 6-month cooling period contained in Art. 103 of the Ci
vil Code. A recital of grievances in court may fan their grievances against one
another; the legislatures intent is to give them opportunity for dispassionate re
flection. Note, however, that the case was filed after 6 months of the filing of
the legal separation case. As such, the determination of the custody and alimon
y must have been given force and effect, provided it did not go to the extent of
violating the policy of the cooling off period. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 27, 36a, 36c,
36d, 37
FACTS: Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the business of importing carabao
and other draft animals. It now desires to import from Pnom-Pehn a shipment of d
raft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum. However, the Directo
r of Agriculture refuses to admit said cattle, except upon the condition stated
in Administrative Order No. 21 of the Bureau of Agriculture that said cattle sha
ll have been immunized from rinderpest before embarkation at Pnom-Pehn. Legislat
ions involved in the case: Sec. 1762 of the Administrative Code prohibition agai
nst bringing of animals from infected foreign country Sec. 1770 of the Administr
ative Code Bringing of diseased animal into islands forbidden Sec. 1762 of the A
dministrative Code as amended by Act No. 3052 Bringing of animals imported from
foreign countries into the Philippine Islands ISSUE: W/N Sec. 1762 of the Admini
strative Code, as amended by Act No. 3052, has been repealed by the implication
in Sec. 1770. HELD: No. Sec. 1762, as amended, is of a general nature, while Sec
. 1770 deals with a particular contingency not made the subject of legislation i
n Sec. 1762. Sec. 1770 therefore is not considered as inconsistent with Sec. 176
2 and it must be considered as a special qualification of Sec. 1762. Sec. 1770 o
f the Administrative Code remains in full force and effect, being a special law
having special contingency not dealt within Sec. 1762, which extends merely to t
he importation of draft animals for purposes of manufacturing serum. LATIN MAXIM
: 2a, 36a, 38b, 50
138 Cassion v. Banco Filipino

Case No. 51 G.R. No. L- 3540 (July 30, 1951) Chapter VI, Page 256, Footnote No.
31
People v. Palmon
Case No. 220 G.R. No. L-2860 (May 11, 1950) Chapter VI, Page 257, Footnote No. 3
5
FACTS: Plaintiffs mortgaged two parcels of land to PNB for P600. Plaintiffs defa
ulted and PNB extra judicially foreclosed the mortgage and sold it to Cabatigan.
After 1 year but before the expiration of 5 years, Plaintiffs offered to repurc
hase the land but PNB turned down the offer. PNB relied on RA 2938 and RA 3135,
which created the PNB and authorizes it to have extra judicial foreclosure of mo
rtgage respectively, while Plaintiffs relied on RA 2874, known as the Public Lan
d act, which provided that every conveyance of land acquired under free patent o
r homestead provisions shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant for a per
iod of 5 years from date of conveyance ISSUE: Which of the conflicting statues s
hould prevail? HELD: When two or more conflicting statues exist, as when general
and special provisions are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former
and a particular intent will control a general one that is inconsistent with it
regardless of to the respective dates of passage. RA 2874 specially relates to s
pecific property, thus it is an exception to the coverage of RA 2938 and 3135. L
ATIN MAXIM: 9, 38a, 38b, 40b, 50
FACTS: Palmon was charged with serious physical injuries (prision correctional i
n med and max period 2 yrs, 4 mos. 1 day 6 yrs) before the CFI of Capiz. Before
the arraignment of the accused, the judge motu proprio dismissed the case on the
ground that under Sec. 87 of RA 296, the crime falls under the jurisdiction of
the justice of the peace. However, the solicitor general contended that CFI has
jurisdiction. ISSUE: Which court has jurisdiction to try the case? HELD: Sec 44(
f) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 confers original jurisdiction on the CFI over al
l criminal case in which the penalty provided is imprisonment for more than 6 mo
nths. Sec. 87 of the same act also confers original jurisdiction on the justice
of the peace and the judges of municipal courts over all criminal cases relating
to assaults where the intent to kill is not charged upon the trial. Hence, the
CFI and justice of the peace courts have concurrent original jurisdiction over t
he case. LATIN MAXIM: 36c, 36d, 37
139 Chartered Bank v. Imperial and National Bank

Case No. 57 G.R. No. 17222 (March 15, 1921) Chapter VI, Page 257, Footnote No. 3
5
Montenegro v. Castaeda and Balao
Case No. 179 G.R. No. L-4221 (August 30, 1952) Chapter VI, Page 258, Footnote No
. 39
FACTS: Umberto de Poli was declared to be in a state of insolvency at the instan
ce of Plaintiff, and the sheriff was ordered to take possession of all property
of said Defendant. In an earlier case, the PNB had obtained a writ by virtue of
which the sheriff also seized certain goods owned by the insolvent. Plaintiff as
serted that since the insolvent had been declared as such, all civil proceedings
against him should have been suspended according to the last portion of Sec. 60
of the insolvency law. ISSUE: Which provision is controlling upon the case? HEL
D: To ascertain the meaning of the various provisions of the insolvency law, eve
ry section, provision and clause of a statue must be expounded in reference to e
very other. Thus, Sec. 60 should be understood in reference with the other provi
sions of the same law, and as such the PNB falls under the exception to Sec. 60
as stated in the other provision of the same law. LATIN MAXIM: 9, 36c, 36d, 36e,
37, b2
FACTS: Maximino Montenegro was arrested in Manila by agents of the Military Inte
lligence Service of the AFP for complicity with a communistic organization in th
e commission of acts of rebellion, insurrection or sedition. Maximinos father the
n submitted an application for writ seeking the release of his son. Three days a
fter, Pres. Quirino issued Proclamation No. 210 suspending the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus. ISSUE: 1. W/N Proclamation No. 210 is erroneous since it
included sedition, which is not under the Constitution. 2. W/N the Bill of Right
s prohibited the suspension of the privilege of the writ. HELD: There is no doub
t that it was erroneous to include sedition. Art. 7 only provides invasion, insurr
ection, rebellion or imminent danger as grounds for suspension. Sedition should be
deemed as a mistake or surplusage that does not taint the decree as a whole. Al
so, as posed by Prof. Aruego, the Bill of Rights impliedly denied suspension in
case of imminent danger, while Art. 7 expressly authorized the President to susp
end when there is imminent danger. Moreover, during the Constitutional Conventio
n, the debates voted down an amendment to add another cause, which is imminent da
nger of invasion, insurrection or rebellion. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 15a, 20b, 36f, b2
140 Arabay Inc. v. CFI of Zamboanga

Case No. 16 G.R. No. L-37684 (September 10, 1975) Chapter VI Page 259, Footnote
No. 43
Paras v. COMELEC
Case No. 196 G.R. No. 123169 (November 4, 1996) Chapter VI, Page 259, Footnote N
o. 50
FACTS: The Municipality of Dipolog enacted Ordinance No. 19 that charged tax for
the selling and distribution of gasoline, lubricating oils, diesel fuel oils, a
nd petroleumbased products. Arabay Inc., distributor of gas, oil and other petro
leum products, contested the validity of such on the ground that the tax is beyo
nd the power of a municipality to levy under Sec. 2 of RA No. 2264, which provid
es that municipalities may not impose tax on articles subject to specific tax ex
cept gasoline. ISSUE: W/N Arabay Inc. is entitled to a refund. HELD: The ordinan
ce levied a sales tax not only because of the character of the ordinance as a sa
les tax ordinance, but also because the phraseology of the provision reveals in
clear terms the intention to impose a tax on sale. It is evident from the terms
that the amount of the tax that may be collected is directly dependent upon to t
he volume of sales. Since Sec. 2 of the Local Autonomy Act prohibits the municip
ality from imposing sales and specific tax, with the exception of gasoline, ther
e subsists the right of Arabay Inc. to a refund. The reasonable and practical in
terpretation of the terms of the proviso in question resulted in the conclusion
that Congress, in excluding gasoline, deliberately and intentionally meant to pu
t it within the power of such local governments to impose whatever type or form
of taxes. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 11e, 12a, 14, 20a
FACTS: A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent Punon
g Barangay. The recall election was deferred due to Petitioners opposition that u
nder Sec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no recall shall take place within one year from the
date of the officials assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a r
egular local election. Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set on t
he first Monday of May 2006, no recall may be instituted. ISSUE: W/N the SK elec
tion is a local election. HELD: No. Every part of the statute must be interprete
d with reference to its context, and it must be considered together and kept sub
servient to its general intent. The evident intent of Sec. 74 is to subject an e
lective local official to recall once during his term, as provided in par. (a) a
nd par. (b). The spirit, rather than the letter of a law, determines its constru
ction. Thus, interpreting the phrase regular local election to include SK election
will unduly circumscribe the Code for there will never be a recall election ren
dering inutile the provision. In interpreting a statute, the Court assumed that
the legislature intended to enact an effective law. An interpretation should be
avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, meaningl
ess, inoperative or nugatory. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 11d, 25b, 27, 36b, 37, 38
141 Javellana v. Kintanar

Case No. 138 G.R. No. L-33169 July 30, 1982 Chapter VI, Page 262, Footnote No.55
Niere v. CFI of Negros Occidental, Branch II
Case No. 188 G.R. No. L-30324 November 29, 1973 Chapter VI, Page 262, Footnote N
o.60
FACTS: Petitioner is the owner of a market (building and lot) in Crossing Bago,
Bago City, which consists of store spaces and of permanent and movable stalls le
ased to vendors. Said market has served the general population of the City of Ba
go for more than twenty (20) years already when it was denied the payment of Pet
itioner for a municipal license for the 3rd quarter of 1968 on the ground that O
rdinance No. 150 had been enacted prohibiting the establishment, maintenance or
operation of a public market in the City of Bago by any person, entity, or corpo
ration other than the local government. Appellant claims that a public market is
one that is not owned privately; whereas the appellees say that is one that ser
ves the general public. ISSUE: W/N the marketplace owned by Petitioner is a publ
ic market. HELD: The test of a public market is its dedication to the service of
the general public and not its ownership. A scrutiny of the charter provision w
ill readily show that by public market, it is meant one that is intended to serv
e the general public. The Petitioner himself so declared when he testified that
his market is engaged in servicing the public, not only in Bago City, but also t
hose coming from other municipalities. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 2a, 6d, 40c
FACTS: Petitioner is a Civil Service eligible and was appointed city engineer of
La Carlota City by the City Mayor pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 21 of RA 4
858 (the City Charter). After the enactment of the Decentralization Act, Private
Respondent was appointed by the President of the Philippines as city engineer o
f La Carlota City. Petitioner refused to turn over office and claimed that he wa
s the one legally appointed as city engineer under RA 4858. House Bill No. 9711,
which became RA 4585, originally expressly included city engineer as one of tho
se whom the city mayor can appoint under Sec. 21 of said RA, but during the peri
od of amendment in the Senate, the position of said engineer was deleted in the
final draft of Sec. 21. ISSUE: 1. W/N deletion of the position of city engineer
in Sec. 21 of RA 4585 an amendment purely of form only or not. 2. W/N appointing
authority for the post of city engineer belongs to the city Mayor or not. HELD:
1. NO, it is a substantial amendment. Nothing could be more substantial than th
e vesting of a power to appoint such an important city official as the city engi
neer. If Congress wanted to authorize the city mayor to appoint all heads and em
ployees of city department, it could have easily re-phrased Sec. 21 of the City
Charter to that effect. Such section expressly limits the appointing authority o
f the mayor. 2. NO. Since the city mayor under Sec. 21 is without authority to a
ppoint the city engineer, this prerogative can only be exercised by the Presiden
t of the Philippines, who, under Sec. 10(3) of Article VII of the 1935 Constitut
ion, shall nominate with the consent of the Commission on Appointments all other
officers of the government whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided
for LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 29, 30a, 32, 38b, b2
142 Uytengsu vs. Republic of the Philippines

Case No. 307 G.R. No. L-6379 (September 29, 1954) Chapter VI, Page 263, Footnote
No.61
Manila Lodge No. 176 v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 165 G.R. No.L-41001 and G.R. No.L-41012 (September 30, 1976) Chapter VI
, Page 264, Footnote No. 63
FACTS: Petitioner-appellee was born, of Chinese parents in Dumaguete, Negros Ori
ental n October 6, 1927. After finishing primary and secondary education here in
the Philippines, he went to the United States to further his studies from the y
ear 1947-1950. In April of the same year he returned to the Philippines for four
(4) months vacation. On July 15, 1950, he filed for naturalization. Forthwith,
he returned to the United States and took a post-graduate degree which he finish
ed in July 1951l but he did not return to the Philippines until October 13, 1951
. Hence, the original date of hearing the case, originally scheduled to take pla
ce on July 12, 1951, had to be postponed. ISSUE: 1. W/N the application for natu
ralization may be granted, notwithstanding the fact that petitioner left the Phi
lippines immediately after the filing of his petition and did not return until s
everal months after the first date set for the hearing thereof. 2. W/N domicile
and residence are synonymous. HELD: 1. No. Section 7 of C.A. No. 473 requires ap
plicant for naturalization to reside continuously in the Philippines from the dat
e of the filing of the petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine ci
tizenship. 2. No. Although the words residence and domicile are often used interchan
geably, each has, in strict legal parlance, a meaning distinct and different fro
m that of the other. Actual and substantial residence within the Philippines, no
t legal residence or domicile, is required. Residence indicates permanency of oc
cupation, distinct from lodging or boarding, or temporary occupation. Domicile i
s residence with intention to stay. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7, 11a, 25a, 37
FACTS: The Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1306 which authorized the City
of Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay. The reclaimed area was to form par
t of the Luneta extension. The act provided that the reclaimed area shall be the
property of the City of Manila, and the city is authorized to set aside a tract
of the reclaimed land for a hotel site and to lease or to sell the same. Later,
the City of Manila conveyed a portion of the reclaimed area to Petitioner. Then
Petitioner sold the land, together with all the improvements, to the Tarlac Dev
elopment Corporation (TDC). ISSUE: W/N the subject property was patrimonial prop
erty of the City of Manila. HELD: The petitions were denied for lack of merit. T
he court found it necessary to analyze all the provisions of Act No. 1360, as am
ended, in order to unravel the legislative intent. The grant made by Act No. 136
0 of the reclaimed land to the City of Manila is a grant of a public nature. Such
grants have always been strictly construed against the grantee because it is a g
ratuitous donation of public money or resources, which resulted in an unfair adv
antage to the grantee. In the case at bar, the area reclaimed would be filled at
the expense of the Insular Government and without cost to the City of Manila. H
ence, the letter of the statute should be narrowed to exclude matters which, if
included, would defeat the policy of legislation. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 6c, 9a, 36b,
37, 43
143 Almeda v. Florentino

Case No. 10 G.R. No.L-23800 (December 21, 1965) Chapter VI, Page 265, Footnote N
o. 67
Abellana v. Marave
Case No. 3 G.R. No.L-27760 (May 29, 1974) Chapter VI, Page 266, Footnote No. 71
FACTS: RA183, the charter of Pasay City (enacted June 21, 1947), provides in its
Sec. 14 that the Board shall have a secretary who shall be appointed by it to se
rve during the term of office of the members thereof On June 18, 1960, RA 2709 ame
nded Sec. 12 of RA 183. On the strength of Par. 2 of Sec. 12 of the Pasay City C
harter, as amended, the Vice-Mayor of Pasay City appointed Petitioner Almeda as
secretary of the Municipal Board of said City. The very next day, the Board refu
sed to recognize Petitioner as its secretary and, in turn, appointed Respondent
Florentino to the position, purportedly under Sec. 14 of the City Charter. ISSUE
: Which law applies on the matter of the appointment of the Secretary of the Mun
icipal Board of Pasay City? HELD: The petition was dismissed. There is nothing i
n RA 2709 that indicates any intention on the part of the Legislature to repeal,
alter, or modify in any way the provisions of Sec. 14 of R.A 183. Repeals by im
plication are not favored, unless it is manifested that the legislature so inten
ded. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 37, 49, 50
FACTS: Petitioner was prosecuted of the crime of physical injuries through reckl
ess imprudence. The criminal case was filed with the city court of Ozamis City,
which found Petitioner guilty as charged. Petitioner appealed such decision to t
he CFI. At this stage, the Private Respondents as the offended parties filed wit
h another branch of the CFI of Misamis Occidental presided by Respondent Judge,
a separate and independent civil action for damages. Petitioner sought for the d
ismissal of such action principally on the ground that there was no reservation
for the filing thereof in the City Court of Ozamis Respondent Judge was not pers
uaded and issued the order to deny Petitioners motion to dismiss. ISSUE: W/N the
order was issued with grave abuse of discretion. HELD: Petition for certiorari i
s dismissed. Petitioners literal reading of the Sec. 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules o
f Court ignores the de novo aspect of appealed cases from city courts as provide
d in Sec. 7 of Rule 123. Such interpretation, does likewise, give rise to a cons
titutional question that may trench on a substantive right in accordance to Art.
33 of the Civil Code.2 As stated in Art. X, Sec. 5, par.5 of the 1973 Constitut
ion, the grant of power to this Court does not extend to any diminution, increas
e or modification of substantive rights. Thus, it is a well-settled doctrine tha
t a court is to avoid construing a statute or legal norm in such a manner as wou
ld give rise to a constitutional doubt. Lastly, in the case at bar, literal cons
truction of the law is not favored. The law as an instrument of social control w
ill fail in its function if through an ingenious construction sought to be faste
ned on a legal norm, particularly a procedural rule, there is placed an impedime
nt to a litigant being given an opportunity of vindicating an alleged right. LAT
IN MAXIM: 6c, 12a, 37
144 Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad

Case No. 317 G.R. No. L-20479 (February 6, 1925) Chapter VI, Page 267, Footnote
No. 78
City of Naga v. Agna
Case No. 63 G.R. No. L-36049 (May 31, 1976) Chapter VI, Page 268, Footnote No. 8
3
FACTS: Act 2972 prohibited record books of Merchants from being written in a lan
guage other than English, Spanish, or a local dialect. Yu Cong Eng, a Chinese me
rchant, was penalized for keeping books written in Chinese. He and other Chinese
merchants challenged the constitutionality of the law.
FACTS: The City of Naga changed its tax system from graduated tax to percentage
tax. Respondent taxpayers insisted on paying the new taxes the following year, p
ursuant to the Revised Administrative Code (Sec. 2309). It stated that tax enact
ments changing the current system prior to December 15 should take effect the fo
llowing year. The Naga City government, on the other hand, claimed that under th
e Local Autonomy Act (RA 2264), tax ordinances take effect 15 days after publica
tion; this allegedly impliedly repealed Sec. 2309 of the Admin Code. ISSUE: Did
RA 2264 repeal Sec. 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code? HELD: No, it did no
t. There is a presumption against implied repeal; a subsequent provision only re
peals a prior provision clearly contradictory to it. If two laws can be harmoniz
ed, then the Courts shall do so. Sec. 2309 of the Revised Admin Code applies in
this case because the new tax changed a prior tax system. RA 2264 only applies f
or entirely new tax provisions. LATIN MAXIM: 37, 38a, 38b
ISSUE: Is Act 2972 constitutional? HELD: It is constitutional. The purpose of th
e Act is to prevent fraud in book keeping and evasion of taxes for the protectio
n of the public good. This decision is consistent with the ruling in Kwong Sing
v. City of Manila, where laundrymen were prohibited from issuing receipts writte
n in Chinese. Class legislation is thus allowed if it is for the public good. In
stead of interpreting the Act as a blanket prohibition against keeping books in
Chinese, it may be interpreted as a directory measure that records pertaining to
taxes must be written or annotated in English, Spanish, or a local dialect, or
have a duplicate in any of these languages. This liberal interpretation is reaso
nable and it upholds constitutionality. LATIN MAXIM: 1a, 6d, 9c, 11e, 37
145 Tan v. COMELEC

Philippine Government v. Municipality of Binangonan
Case No. 118 G.R. No. L-10202 (March 29, 1916) Chapter VI, Page 268, Footnote No
. 84
FACTS: BP 885 is an act creating the new province of Negros del Norte. The plebi
scite for the approval of the act was only conducted in the municipalities prosp
ectively composing the new province. The parent provinces, which will get also a
ffected, were not included in the plebiscite. ISSUE: Is BP 885 unconstitutional?
HELD: It is unconstitutional. The Constitution provides that a plebiscite must
be held in all units affected, including the parent province, and not just the n
ew areas. The draft bill provided that the plebiscite be conducted in all units,
and not just the areas constituting the new province, but the final bill only l
imited it to the latter. LATIN MAXIM: 12a
FACTS: Petitioner Municipality of Cardona challenged the constitutionality of EO
66 by the Governor-General granting Binangonan municipal authority over 7 addit
ional barrios. Petitioner claimed that the Governor-General has no legislative a
uthority and that this legislation was not for the public good. ISSUE: Is EO 66
constitutional? HELD: It is constitutional. Every act of legislation is presumed
to be constitutional and for the public good; facts need not be stated to prove
it. LATIN MAXIM: 12a, 37
146 People v. Del Rosario

Case No. 105 G.R. No. L-7234 (May 21, 1955)
Salvatierra v. Court of Appeals
Case No. G.R. No. 107797 (August 26, 1996)
FACTS: On July 27, 1953, information was filed in the Municipal Court of Pasay c
harging Paz M. del Rosario with slight physical injuries committed on May 28, 19
53. The accused presented a motion to quash the information on the ground that t
he offense charged had already prescribed in accordance with Art. 90 and Art. 91
of the RPC. The municipal court sustained the motion and dismissed the case. He
nce, an appeal against the dismissal is made to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: 1. Whe
ther the prescriptive period should commence from the very day on which the crim
e was committed, or from the day following that in which it was committed; 2. W/
N the term month in the RPC should be understood to be a month of 30 days, instead
of the civil/calendar month. HELD: 1. In computation of the period of time with
in which an act is to be done, the law has always directed that the first be exc
luded and the last included (Art. 13, Civil Code). Art. 18 of the CC directs tha
t any deficiency in any special law must be supplied by its provisions. As the R
PC is deficient in that it does not explicitly define how the period is to be co
mputed, resort must be had to Art. 13 of the CC. 2. By express provision of Arti
cle 13 on the new Civil Code, a month is to be considered as the regular 30-day
month. In accordance therewith, the term month used in Art. 90 of the RPC should
be understood to mean the regular 30-day month and not the solar or civil month
. Hence, the Court held that the offense charged had not yet prescribed because
July is the 60th day from May 29. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 38b, 46a
FACTS: Enrique Salvatierra died intestate and was survived by his legitimate bro
thers, Tomas, Bartolome, Venancio, and Macario, and a sister, Marcela. His estat
e consisted of 3 parcels of land (Lots 25, 26, & 27). Macario sold the 405 sq. m
ts. out of the 749 sq. mts. total area of Lot 26 to his son, Anselmo. Eventually
, an extrajudicial partition with confirmation of sale was executed by and among t
he surviving legal heirs of Enrique, which consisted of the aforementioned lots.
Thereafter, Venancio sold Lot No. 7 (which belonged to him by virtue of the sai
d partition), and a 149-sq. m. portion of Lot 26 to spouses Longalongs. It turne
d out, however, that Anselmo already obtained an OCT covering the whole of Lot N
o. 26. The complaints for reconveyance were filed 5 years after the issuance of
such OCT to Anselmo. ISSUE: 1. Which prescriptive period for actions for annulme
nt should prevail, Art. 1391 of the new CC or Art. 1144 of the same Code? 2. W/N
there was a double sale. HELD: 1. Art. 1144 of the CC prevails. The prescriptiv
e period for such actions is 10 years, as held in previous cases. Hence, the act
ion for reconveyance had not yet prescribed. There is no ambiguity in the terms
and stipulations of the extrajudicial partition. Thus, the literal and plain mea
ning thereof should be observed. What Anselmo bought from his father was only 40
5 sq. m of Lot 26. The registration of the whole Lot 26 in the name of Anselmo w
as, therefore, done with evident bad faith. 2. There was no double sale. Both pa
rties did not dispute the contents of the extrajudicial partition. LATIN MAXIM:
5a, 6c, 7a
147 Pasno v. Ravina and Ravina

Case No. 199 G.R. No. 31581 (February 3, 1930) Chapter VI, Page 273, Footnote No
. 104
C & C Commercial v. NAWASA
Case No. 42 G.R. No. L-27275 (November 18, 1967) Chapter VI, Page 274, Footnote
No. 107
FACTS: Labitoria, during her lifetime, mortgaged 3 parcels of land to the PNB. W
hen Labitoria died, a petition was presented for the probate of her last will an
d testament. During the pendency of the case, a special administrator of the est
ate of the deceased was appointed by the court. The special administrator failed
to comply with the conditions of the mortgage, and the PNB asked the sheriff to
proceed with the sale of the parcels of land. The CFI ruled in favor of the spe
cial administrator requiring the sheriff to abstain from selling the said lands.
ISSUE: 1. W/N the will is valid 2. W/N the PNB had the right to foreclose in it
s favor the mortgage which was executed by Labitoria now that the mortgaged prop
erty is in custodia legis. HELD: 1. The law does not require that the will shall
be dated. Accordingly, an erroneous date will not defeat a will. 2. Yes. The PN
B had the right to foreclose the said mortgaged property. The mortgagee should f
oreclose the mortgage in accordance with Sec. 708 of the Code of Civil Procedure
. Since Act 3135 fails to make provision regarding the sale of the mortgaged pro
perty which is in custodia legis, it would be logical to suppose Sec. 708 of the
Code of Civil Procedure would govern latter contingency. Act 3115 must be presu
med to have been acquainted with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.
LATIN MAXIM: 38a, 38b
FACTS: NAWASA conducted three separate bids for the three different waterworks p
rojects in Manila, Davao and Iloilo. However, C & C Commercial Corporation, one
of those who participated in the bidding but eventually lost, filed three corres
ponding supplemental complaints on each of the aforesaid waterworks projects con
tending that NAWASA violated Sec. 1 of RA 912, which should give preference to l
ocal materials that are available, practicable and usable. The said law also pro
vides that this nationalistic policy of preferring for locally produced material
s is in relation to the construction or repair work undertaken by the Government.
NAWASA alleged that it should not be included within the meaning of the term Gove
rnment as used in the said law. ISSUE: W/N NAWASA falls under the term government u
nder RA 912. HELD: Yes. The NAWASA should be deemed embraced within the term gove
rnment found in RA 312, and in the construction of their works or purchase of mat
erials thereof, local material should be given preference whenever available, pr
acticable and usable. Government-owned or controlled corporations are not exempt
ed from RA 912. Two laws are being considered in this case: C.A. No. 138 and RA
912. Both relate to the same subject matter and have the same nationalistic purp
ose or object which is to give preference to locally produced materials in purch
ases, works or projects of the Government (referring to Filipino-First policy).
LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 35, 36, 37, 38a, 38b
148 Butuan Sawmill, Inc. v. City of Butuan

Case No. 41 G.R. No. L-21516 (April 29, 1966) Chapter VI, Page 277, Footnote No.
119
Manila Railroad Co. v. Rafferty
Case No. 168 G.R. No. 14205 (September 30, 1919) Chapter VI, Page 279, Footnote
No. 124
FACTS: The Petitioner was granted a legislative franchise under RA 399 for an el
ectric light, heat, and power system in Butuan and Cabadbaran, Agusan, together
with the issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity by the Pu
blic Service Commission. However, the City of Butuan issued Ordinances numbered
11, 131 and 148 imposing a 2% tax on the gross sales or receipts of any business
operated in the city. Butuan Sawmill, Inc. questioned the validity of the taxin
g ordinance which is deemed to have impaired the obligation of contract thereby
depriving the Petitioner of property without due process of law. On the other ha
nd, Respondent maintained that it was vested with the power to provide for the le
vy and collection of taxes for general and special purposes as stipulated in its
charter which was granted in 1950. ISSUE: W/N the inclusion of the franchise bus
iness of Petitioners falls within the coverage of the taxing ordinances pursuant
to the citys power of taxation. HELD: No. the inclusion of the franchise busines
s of the Butuan Sawmill, Inc. by the City of Butuan is beyond the broad power of
taxation of the city under its charter. Neither could the latters power therein
granted be taken as an authority delegated to the city to amend or alter the fra
nchise, considering the absence of an express or specific grant of power to do s
o. Where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the latter general and
the terms of the general are broad enough to include the matter provided for in
the special the fact that one is special and the other is general creates a pres
umption that the special is to be considered as a remaining exception to the gen
eral as a general law of the land, while the other as the law of a particular ca
se. LATIN MAXIM: 25, 50, d
FACTS: The Defendant assessed and collected against Manila Railroad internal rev
enue taxes upon oil and coal materials imported into the Philippine by virtue of
an act of Congress in 1913. The latter contended that the taxes had been illega
lly collected pursuant to a private charter granted by the legislature in 1906.
On the other hand, Rafferty asserts that the 1913 Act of Congress repealed the 1
906 private charter. ISSUE: W/N the 1913 Act of Congress repealed the 1906 priva
te charter. HELD: No. A special law (including private charters) having the char
acter of a private contract, supposes that the legislators intended to attend to
the special facts and circumstances, the consideration of such being embodied i
n the special law. A general law subsequently enacted by the legislature cannot
be taken to have modified or altered the charter, unless the intent to modify or
alter is manifest. Where the general act is later, the special statute will be
construed as remaining an exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly or b
y necessary implication. LATIN MAXIM: 37, 50
149 De Jesus v. People of the Philippines

Case No. 87 G. R. No. L-61998 (February 22, 1983) Chapter VI, Page 277, Footnote
No. 117
US v. Almond
Case No. 157 G.R. No. 2517 (June 2, 1906)
FACTS: The Petitioner, COMELEC registrar of Casiguran, was charged by the Tanodb
ayan before the Sandiganbayan with the violation of the 1978 Election Code. He f
iled a motion to quash the information on the ground that the jurisdiction to in
vestigate, prosecute and try the offense charged against him is lodged with the
COMELEC, and, coincidentally, the Court of First Instance (now RTC). ISSUE: W/N
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over election offenses with respect to public
officers. HELD: No. Sec. 2 of Art. XII [C] of the 1973 Constitution granted COM
ELEC the power to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elec
tions, while Sec 182 of the 1978 Election Code vested the Commission with authori
ty to conduct preliminary investigation and subsequently prosecute all election
offenses punishable under the same Code. The legislative intent in granting COME
LEC the said power is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of election
s. To divest the COMELEC of its authority would seriously impair its effectivene
ss in achieving the aforementioned constitutional mandate. At the same time, Sec
184 of the Election Code, which deals specifically with election offenses, must
be favored over provisions of P.D. 1606 which speaks generally of other crimes
or offenses committed by public officers in relation to their office. The former
cannot be construed as impliedly repealed by the latter thereby continuing to b
e an exception granted the more specific legislative intent it evinces. LATIN MA
XIM: 6, 9, 37, 38, 50
FACTS: The complaint alleges that R.W. Almond, master and in charge of the steam
ship Rubi brought Tawas Tahan, is an alien of East India who is afflicted with t
rachoma. He permitted Tawas Tahan to land in the Philippine Islands from the ste
amship at a place and time other than that designated by the immigration officer
s. The evidence showed that Defendant adopted due precautions to prevent the lan
ding of Tawas Tahan, and that if the landing was made, it was made without the D
efendants knowledge or consent. ISSUE: W/N a conviction can be sustained when it
appears that there was no consent, either tacit or express, to the landing of th
e alien. HELD: Sec. 18 imposes upon one who has brought immigrant aliens into a
United States port the duty of adopting due precautions to prevent the landing o
f any such alien at any time or place other than that designated by the immigrat
ion officers and fixes a penalty for permitting an alien so to land. The word per
mit implies that the landing of the alien must be with the express or tacit conse
nt of the owner, officer, agent or person in charge of the vessel. LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 11e, 41a, 48
150 US v. Estapia
Case No. 298 G.R. No. 12891 (October 19, 1917) Chapter VII, Page 289, Footnote N
o. 23
U.S. v. Abad Santos
Case No. 294 G.R. No. 12262 (February 10, 1917) Chapter VII, Page 290, Footnote
No. 28
FACTS: A case was filed against Defendants for having engaged in cockfighting, i
n violation of Sec. 1 of Act. No. 480. The Defendants held a cockfight on a clea
ring near a grove of buri palms. The prosecution argued that the term cockpit shou
ld be construed to mean any place in which a cockfight takes place. ISSUE: W/N t
he clearing where the cockfight was held by the Defendants is a cockpit within t
he contemplation of the law. HELD: The term cockpit as used in the statute has a l
imited meaning so it cannot be construed to mean or include a clearing such as h
ad been used by the Defendants. Penal provisions of a statute are to be construe
d strictly and particular words used in the law should be construed in relation
to the context. LATIN MAXIM: 25, 37, 48
FACTS: The Appellant was accused of violating the provisions of the Internal Rev
enue Law by failing to make an entry for the January 5, 1915 indicating whether
any business was done on that day or not. He had employed a bookkeeper with the
expectation that the latter would perform all the duties pertaining to his posit
ion, including the entries required to be made by the Collector of Internal Reve
nue. ISSUE: W/N the Appellant is guilty of violating the Internal Revenue Law. H
ELD: The Appellant must be acquitted since it is undisputed that he took no part
in the keeping of the book in question and that he never personally made an ent
ry in it as he left everything to his bookkeeper. Courts will not hold one perso
n criminally responsible for acts of another done without his knowledge or conse
nt, unless the law clearly so provides. LATIN MAXIM: 41a, 48
151
ROUND 3
152 People v. Atop

Case No. 202 G.R. Nos. 124303-05 (February 10, 1998) Chapter VII, Page 290, Foot
note No. 29
People v. Padilla
Case No. 113 G.R. No. 47027 (February 4, 1941) Chapter VII, Page 291, Footnote N
o. 30
FACTS: Appellant was found guilty of 3 counts of rape. The trial court sentenced
him to 2 terms of reclusion perpetua for the first two counts, and to death for
the third, holding that his common-law relationship with the victims grandmother
aggravated the penalty. Private complainant Regina Guafin, 12 years old, is the
granddaughter of Trinidad Mejos, the common-law wife of the Appellant. ISSUE: 1
. W/N the trial court erred in appreciating the nighttime and relationship as ag
gravating the penalty imposable for the rape allegedly committed. 2. W/N the tri
al court erred in finding Appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
charged. HELD: 1. The trial court erred. Nocturnity must have been deliberately
sought by the Appellant to facilitate the crime or prevent its discovery or eva
de his capture or facilitate his escape. Neither can we appreciate relationship
as aggravating. The scope of the relationship under Art. 15 of the RPC encompass
es only the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted brother
or sister, and relative by affinity in the same degrees. Outside these enumerati
ons and consistent with the doctrine that criminal laws must be liberally constr
ued in favor of the accused, no other relationship between the offender and the
victim may aggravate the imposable penalty for the crime committed. 2. The Appel
lant was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The offended partys straightforwar
d and unequivocal statements show indelible badges of truth. LATIN MAXIM: 30a
FACTS: Appellants Padilla, a Filipino citizen, and Von Arend, a German citizen,
acting jointly and conniving with each other, voluntarily, illegally, and crimin
ally evaded the provisions of Art. 4 of C.A. No. 138, which requires Philippine
or U.S. citizenship before the exercise or enjoyment of the privilege establishe
d in said article. It is contended, however, that notwithstanding the infringeme
nt of Sec. 4. of Act No. 138, the Appellants cannot be punished therefore since
the said Act imposes no penal sanction whatsoever. ISSUE: W/N a violation of C.A
. No. 138 may be prosecuted under C.A. No. 108, entitled An Act to punish acts of
evasion of the laws on the nationalization or certain rights, franchises or pri
vileges. HELD: Yes. Any citizen of the Philippines or of the United States who kn
owingly allows his name or citizenship to be used so that a person not so qualif
ied may enjoy the privilege granted to domestic entities by C.A. No. 138, as wel
l as any alien profiting thereby, is guilty of violation of C.A. No. 108. The ve
ry title of Act No. 108 gives unmistakable notice of the legislative intent and
purpose of punishing all acts of evasion of the laws of the nationalization of c
ertain rights, franchise or privileges. Sec. 1 of the same Act applies punishmen
t provided therein to all cases in which any constitutional or legal provision re
quires Philippine or United States citizenship as a requirement for the exercise
or enjoyment of a right, franchise or privilege. Under Act No. 108, any legal pr
ovision, whenever existing at the time of the passage of said Act or promulgated
thereafter, would fall within its scope. One of such legal provision is Art. 4
of Act No. 138. LATIN MAXIM: 6a, 6c, 9a
153 People v. Salazar

Case No. 223 G.R. No. L-13371 (September 24, 1959) Chapter VII, Page 292, Footno
te No. 36
People v. Garcia
Case No. 209 No. L-2873 (February 28, 1950) Chapter VII, Page 293, Footnote No.
41
FACTS: The Appellant was charged with the crime of malversation of public funds.
The Appellant being the then Deputy Provincial and Municipal Treasurer, and as
such, accountable for the funds collected and received by him, did willfully, fe
loniously and with grave abuse of confidence, misappropriate, and convert to his
own personal use and benefit, from said funds, the sum of P13,897.77. Upon arra
ignment, the Appellant pleaded not guilty, which he later withdrew and changed t
o guilty. He was sentenced to be imprisoned, to suffer the penalty of perpetual
special disqualification, to pay a fine, to indemnify the Government without sub
sidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The Appellant
contends that the lower court committed an error in sentencing him to suffer the
aforementioned penalty on the ground of lack of malice in the commission of the
crime, in that, he did not apply the missing funds to his personal use and bene
fit but lost the same while he was drunk. ISSUE: W/N the penalties imposed by th
e lower court were excessive given the contention of Appellant. HELD: No. There
is nothing in the record that supports the claim that missing funds were lost wh
ile the Appellant was drunk. When he entered the plea of guilty, he thereby admi
tted, not only his guilt, but also all the material facts alleged in the informa
tion, namely, that he willfully, feloniously and with grave abuse of confidence,
misappropriate, misapply, embezzle, and convert to his own personal use and bene
fit, from said funds, the sum of P13,897.77, thus clearly indicating malice or ev
il intent on his part. His plea of guilt carried with it the acknowledgement or
admission that the willful acts charged were done with malice. LATIN MAXIM: 7b,
11e, 41a, 43
FACTS: The lower court, ignoring the Appellants minority, sentenced him to an ind
eterminate penalty of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional to 8 y
ears of prision mayor for the crime of robbery. RA 47 which amended Art. 80 of t
he RPC by reducing from 18 to 16 the age below which the Appellant has to be comm
itted to the custody or care of a public or private, benevolent or charitable in
stitution, instead of being convicted and sentenced to prison, has given rise to
the controversy. The Solicitor General believes that the amendment by implicatio
n has also amended par. 2 of Art. 68 of the RPC, which provides that when the of
fender is over 15 and under 18 years of age, the penalty next lower than that pre
scribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. ISSUE: W/N the
Appellant, being 17 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime, was
entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of Art. 68, par. 2 of the RP
C. HELD: Yes. We find no irreconcilable conflict between Art. 68, par. 2, as it
now stands and Art. 80 as amended. There is no incompatibility between granting
Appellant of the ages of 15 to 18 a privileged mitigating circumstance and fixin
g at 16 the maximum age of persons who are to be placed in a reformatory institu
tion. All parts of a statute are to be harmonized and reconciled so that effect
may be given to each and every part thereof, and that conflicting interest in th
e same statute are never to be supposed or so regarded, unless forced upon the c
ourt by an unambiguous language. LATIN MAXIM: 37, 38b
154 People v. Terrada, et. al.

Case No. 229 G.R. No. L-23625 (November 25, 1983) Chapter VII, Page 293, Footnot
e No. 42
US v. Toribo
Case No. 304 G.R. No. 5060 (January 26, 1910) Chapter VII, Page 295, Footnote No
. 48
FACTS: On November 1951 and May 1952, Appellees Obo, Gundran, and Terrado applie
d for and were issued free patents for contiguous parcels of land situated in Ca
marines Sur. These parcels of land were forest land and as such are not disposab
le. On March 1962, three separate informations for falsification of public docum
ent were filed against the Appellees for having conspired with one another throu
gh false and fraudulent misrepresentations alleging that they had all the qualif
ications and had complied with all legal requirements of the law to entitle them
to a free patent. Appellees claim that the crime has already prescribed accordi
ng to the RPC, but the State argues that the crime has not prescribed under Act
No. 3585 where the crime of perjury prescribes in 8 years. ISSUE: W/N the prescr
iptive period to be applied should be 10 years under the RPC or 8 years under Ac
t No. 3585. HELD: The 8 year prescriptive period should be applied. Penal statut
es must be strictly applied. Where a crime is punishable by both a special law a
nd the RPC but with different prescriptive periods, the one favorable to the acc
used or the shorter prescriptive period should be applied. LATIN MAXIM: 43, 48
FACTS: Evidence suggests that Appellant slaughtered the carabao for human consum
ption, which is in violation of Act No. 1147, An Act Regulating the Registration,
Branding, Slaughter of Large Cattle. It appears that in the town of Carmen in Bo
hol, there arent any slaughterhouses. Appellant suggests that under such circumst
ances, the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not penalize slaughter of large cattle
without permit. Appellant also alleges that it is an infringement on his right o
ver his property (carabao). ISSUE: W/N Act No. 1147 applies only when there is a
municipal slaughterhouse, and the slaughter of a carabao is made therein. HELD:
No. As long as the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption is done with
out a permit secured first from the municipal treasurer, the penalty under the A
ct applies. The Act primarily seeks to protect the large cattle of the Philippin
e Islands, against theft and to make recovery and return of the same easy. More
importantly, it is to protect the very life and existence of the inhabitants of
the Philippines, imperiled by the continued destruction of large cattle by disea
se, making it reasonable for the legislative to prohibit and penalize a perfectl
y legal act utilizing personal properties of citizens (cattle) if not for the ex
traordinary conditions/threat present. Well settled is the doctrine of the States
legitimate exercise of the right of eminent domain laid down in jurisprudence.
Where the language of the statute is fairly susceptible of many interpretations,
that which stays true with the intent of the law must be observed. LATIN MAXIM:
5a, 9a, 37
155 US v. Go Chico
Case No. 299 G.R. No. 4963 (September 15, 1909) Chapter VII, Page 295, Footnote
No. 49
Arriete v. Director of Public Works
Case no. 22 G.R. No. 37125 (September 30, 1933) Chapter VII, Page 296, Footnote
No. 52
FACTS: Appellant is charged with the violation of Sec. 1 of Act No. 1696 or the
Flag Law, displaying in his store a number of medallions, in the form of a small
button, upon the faces of which were imprinted in miniature the picture of Emil
io Aguinaldo, and the flag or banner or device used during the late armed insurr
ection in the Philippine Islands against the U.S. Appellant claims that he is ig
norant of the law and consequently, had no corrupt intention to violate the law.
He claims acquittal on the ground that his guilt must be proven beyond reasonab
le doubt and that the law was referring to identical banners, emblem, flag, etc. I
SSUE: 1. W/N to be in violation of the Flag Law, Appellant must have acted with
criminal intent. 2. W/N the wording of the law exempts the articles displayed by
the Defendant. HELD: 1. No, criminal intent isnt necessary for violation of the
Flag Law. 2. The medallions, though not exactly identical, comes within the purv
iew of the class of articles referred to by the law. Jurisprudence has held that
in crimes made by statutory requirement, criminal intent is not necessary. Inte
ntion of the perpetrator is entirely immaterial because to hold otherwise would
render the statute substantially worthless, and its execution impossible. The st
atute did not include intent as an element of a crime, and it is clear so no int
erpretation is required. Clearly therefore, ignorance of the law is not a valid
defense for violation thereof. The description in the law refers not to a partic
ular flag, but to a type of flag. LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 7a, 9a, 9c, 11a, 43, a
FACTS: Appellant Arriete, as legal guardian on behalf of minor Carmen Jagunap, s
ought to recover the title and possession of three lots which were sold by the s
heriff in a public auction to Appellee Ledesma (and thereafter sold to Fermin Ca
ram) to satisfy the judgment of a lien for nonpayment of taxes, under the Irriga
tion Act No. 2152. However, it was found that the delinquent taxpayer was not th
e owner of said lots, but Carmen Jagunap was. ISSUE: W/N Appellee Ledesma has an
y rights over the lots acquired in good faith under the final deed of sale of th
e provincial sheriff. HELD: No, she acquired no right at all. Act No. 2152 provi
ded that regarding expropriation of land, the list of lands filed by the Directo
r of Public Lands must be published, and notice should be given to the owners to
file answer or appear in the civil case. No such publication or notice was evid
ent in this case. It is not sufficient that they had actual knowledge. Statutes in
the derogation of rights are construed strictly. This is because people in a re
publican state like ours enjoy inherent rights guaranteed by the Constitution or
protected by law, like the right against undue deprivation of property. Thus, w
henever there are statutes authorizing the expropriation of private land or prop
erty, these statutes are construed strictly. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43
156 Provincial Chapter of Laguna v. COMELEC

Case No. 246 G.R. No. L-53460 (May 27, 1983) Chapter VII, Page 297, Footnote No.
57
Genaro B. Reyes Construction Inc. v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 51 G.R. No. 108718 (July 14, 1994) Chapter VII, Page 297, Footnote No.
57
FACTS: Nacionalista Party (NP) filed a petition against Respondent San Luis of t
he Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) for turncoatism. When Respondent San Luis ran a
s Governor of Laguna under Liberal Party (LP) in 1972, he won. The normal expiry
for the term was 1975, but it was extended lawfully by the President. Now (1980
) he is running for Governor again under KBL. Under the law, No elective public o
fficer may change his political party affiliation during his term of officeor wit
hin six months immediately preceding or following an election. ISSUE: W/N COMELEC
was correct in dismissing petition which contended that Respondent San Luis sho
uld be disqualified from running due to turncoatism. HELD: No, he cannot be disq
ualified. He did not change affiliations during his term. He was expelled from t
he LP in 1978 and this cant be construed as a willful change of affiliation. At t
hat time, no one even knew when the next elections were, so Respondent could not
have changed affiliations simply to anticipate the next election. The constitut
ional prohibition cannot be applied to the period beyond the frame-up (1971-1975
) term to which public officials were elected in 1971 because this would unduly
impinge on freedom of association guaranteed to all. Between two constructions,
one of which would diminish or restrict fundamental right of people and the othe
r of which would not do so, the latter construction must be adopted. LATIN MAXIM
: 11a, 37, 48
FACTS: Petitioners filed petition to stop Respondent DPWH from implementing the
notice of pre-termination in their contract for construction of the flood contro
l facilities and land improvement works in Butuan City. Petitioners won in a pub
lic bidding held for this purpose. Respondents claimed that with a 9.86% negativ
e slippage (delay in the infrastructure project), the government was either auth
orized to take over the project or let another contractor finish it. Petitioners
however claimed that not only were the delays caused significantly by DPWH, but
also termination of contract is only appropriate if the negative slippage reach
es 15%. ISSUE: W/N termination of contract with Petitioners is valid. HELD: No,
Respondents may not terminate contract with Petitioners and award the contract t
o other bidders. The discretion of Respondent DPWH to terminate or rescind the c
ontract comes into play only in the event the contractor shall have incurred a n
egative slippage of 15% or more, according to P.D. 1870 and DPWH Circular No. 10
2. The intent of the law in allowing the government to take over delayed constru
ction projects with negative slippage of 15% or more is primarily to save money a
nd to avoid dislocation of the financial projections and/or cash flow of the gov
ernment. Terminating the contract and awarding it to Hanil, a previously disquali
fied bidder, would actually result in a financial loss to the government. LATIN
MAXIM: 6c, 9a, 12a
157 Tenorio v. Manila Railroad Co.

Case No. 289 G.R. No. L-6690 (March 29, 1912) Chapter VII, Page 297, Footnote No
. 62
City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, et al.
Case No. 61 G.R. No. L-14355 (October 31, 1919) Chapter VII, Page 297, Footnote
No. 64
FACTS: Defendant company took possession of and occupied a small parcel of land
without the express consent of Plaintiff and without having made payment therefo
re, alleging that the land is a part of certain lands described in condemnation
proceedings. ISSUE: W/N Plaintiff has the right to maintain this separate action
for damages for trespass on his land on the ground that it was his duty to seek
redress in the condemnation proceedings instituted by Defendant company. HELD:
As a general rule, the steps prescribed by the statute must be followed or the p
roceedings will be void. Since these statutes are in derogation of general right
and of common-law modes of procedure, they must be strictly construed in favor
of the landowner, and must be at least substantially or fully and fairly complied
with. In the absence of proof of a substantial compliance with the provisions of
law touching such proceedings, the Plaintiff was clearly entitled to institute
any appropriate action to recover the damages which she may have suffered as a r
esult of an unauthorized and unlawful seizure and occupation of her property. Th
e theory on which the trial judge correctly proceeded was that Defendant company
having unlawfully taken possession of a part of the tract of land in question,
and by its operations thereon rendered the whole tract worthless to the Plaintif
f. Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to abandon the entire tract, and recover damages
for its full value. LATIN MAXIM: 21a, 43
FACTS: Appellant presented a petition in the CFI of Manila praying that certain
lands, be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement the
extension of Rizal Avenue. Appellee denied that it was either necessary or exped
ient that the parcels of land be expropriated for street purposes. ISSUE: W/N in
expropriation proceedings by the Appellant, the courts may inquire into, and he
ar proof upon, the necessity of the expropriation. HELD: In our opinion, when th
e legislature conferred upon the courts of the Philippine Islands the right to a
scertain upon trial whether the right exists for the exercise of eminent domain,
it intended that the courts should inquire into, and hear proof upon, those que
stions (of necessity). It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in quest
ion may be used by the general community of Chinese, which fact, in the general
acceptation of the definition of a public cemetery, would make the cemetery in q
uestion public property. If that is true, the petition of the Plaintiff must be
denied, for the reason that the Plaintiff has no authority or right under the la
w to expropriate public property. Even granting that a necessity exists for the
opening of the street in question, the record contains no proof of the necessity
of opening the same through the cemetery. The record shows that adjoining and a
djacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge, which will answer ev
ery purpose of the Plaintiff. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 24a, 43
158 Velasco v. Republic of the Philippines

76
Lee Cho v. Republic of the Philippines
Case No. 72 G.R. No. L-12408 (December 28, 1959) Chapter VII, Page 299, Footnote
No. 76
FACTS: Petition for naturalization of Petitioner was denied for failure to meet
the requirements of the law. ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in denying the pet
ition for naturalization. HELD: No. Considering that naturalization laws should b
e rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against
the applicant, we are constrained to hold that the trial court did not err in de
nying the petition for naturalization. LATIN MAXIM: 43
FACTS: Before an applicant may apply for Philippine citizenship, the law require
s that he file a declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen one year
prior to the filing of application unless he is exempt from complying with said
requirement. The law exempts one from filing a declaration of intention in two c
ases: (a) if he is born in the Philippines and has received primary and secondar
y education in any school recognized by the government; and (b) if he has contin
uously resided in the Philippines for a period of 30 years or more provided that
he has given primary and secondary education to all his children either in a pu
blic school or private schools recognized by the government. In the instant case
, Petitioner has not filed any declaration of intention to become a Filipino cit
izen because, as he claims, he has resided continuously in the Philippines for a
period of more than 30 years and has given primary and secondary education to a
ll his children in private schools recognized by the government. ISSUE: W/N the
Petitioner has complied with the requirement of the law regarding his duty to af
ford primary and secondary education to all his children. HELD: No. The governme
nt disputes that Petitioner has failed to give such education to his daughters A
ngelita and Lourdes. The reason that Angelita was not able to complete her studi
es because she got married is not only unsatisfactory but betrays the sincerity
of Petitioner in embracing our citizenship. It was further shown that in spite o
f Lourdess alleged sickness, she continued her studies in a Chinese school which
strictly employed a Chinese curriculum. Considering that the provisions of the N
aturalization Law should be strictly construed in order that its laudable and na
tionalistic purpose may be fully fulfilled, the Supreme Court concluded that Pet
itioner has failed to qualify to become a Filipino citizen and so his petition s
hould be denied. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7b, 43
159 Co v. Republic of the Philippines

76
Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos
Case No. 157 G.R. No. L-120082 (September 11, 1996) Chapter VII, Page 301, Footn
ote No. 85
FACTS: Petitioner filed his petition for naturalization in the trial court. The
court ordered that a certificate of naturalization be issued to Petitioner after
the lapse of two years from the date the decision became final and all the requ
isites provided for in RA 503 were met. The government appealed the decision con
tending that from the evidence itself introduced by Petitioner it would appear t
hat he failed to comply with some of the requirements prescribed by law in order
to qualify him to become a Filipino citizen. Thus, it is claimed, he has not st
ated that he believes in the principles underlying the constitution, but rather
stated that he believes in democracy upon cross-examination. It is contended tha
t such belief is not sufficient to comply with the requirement of the law that o
ne must believe in the principles underlying our constitution. ISSUE: W/N the tr
ial court erred in finding that Petitioner had all the qualifications for natura
lization and none of the disqualifications mentioned in the law. HELD: Yes. In s
o stating that he believes merely in our laws, Petitioner did not necessarily re
fer to those principles embodied in our constitution which are referred to in th
e law. He has also failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable mann
er in his relation with our government as evidenced by his failure to register h
is family with the Bureau of Immigration and to file his income tax return. Cons
idering that "naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly constr
ued in favor of the government and against the applicant," the Supreme Court hel
d that the trial court erred in granting the petition for naturalization. LATIN
MAXIM: 6c, 7b, 43
FACTS: Respondent Cesa, OIC, Office of the Treasurer of the City of Cebu, demand
ed payment for realty taxes on several parcels of land belonging to the Petition
er, who objected to such demand claiming in its favor Sec. 14 of RA 6958 which e
xempt it from payment of realty taxes. Respondent City of Cebu alleges that as a
n LGU and a political subdivision, it has the power to impose, levy, assess, and
collect taxes within its jurisdiction. Such power is guaranteed by the Constitu
tion and enhanced further by the LGC. While it may be true that under its Charte
r the Petitioner was exempt from the payment of realty taxes, this exemption was
withdrawn by Sec. 234 of the LGC. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is a taxable person. HELD
: Yes. Petitioner cannot claim that it was never a taxable person under its Charte
r. It was only exempted from the payment of real property taxes. The grant of th
e privilege only in respect of this tax is conclusive proof of the legislative i
ntent to make it a taxable person subject to all taxes, except real property tax
. Even if the Petitioner was originally not a taxable person for purposes of rea
l property tax, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, it had already become,
a taxable person for such purpose in view of the withdrawal in the last paragrap
h of Sec. 234 of exemptions from the payment of real property taxes. Since taxes
are what we pay for civilized society, or are the lifeblood of the nation, the
law frowns against exemptions from taxation and statutes granting tax exemptions
are thus construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayers and liberally in fa
vor of the taxing authority. Else wise stated, taxation is the rule, exemption t
herefore is the exception. LATIN MAXIM: 43
160 The Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the Philippines v. A. W. Hastings, As

sessor and Collector of the City of Manila, and the City of Manila
Case No. 136 G.R. No. 1974 (March 15, 1906) Chapter VII, Page 300, Footnote No.
79
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court Of Appeals, Court of Tax Appeals and A
teneo de Manila University
Case No. 74 G.R. No. 115349 (April 18, 1997) Chapter VII, Page 300, Footnote No.
81
FACTS: In 1901, Appellant imposed a tax upon the residence of the Roman Catholic
archbishop of Manila, overruling the claim that it was exempt from taxation as
provided by Sec. 48 of Act No. 183 of the Philippine Commission. The Appellant c
ontended that the said property was not a parsonage and not adjacent to the cath
edral, being 80 to 100 meters distant from the church, and that the exemption pr
ivilege was already exhausted by its allowance to the parsonage of the adjoining
chapel. ISSUE: W/N the house of the archbishop of Manila should be exempted fro
m tax. HELD: In enacting its exemption laws, the Commission had in view not only
the conditions peculiar to and inherent in Roman Catholic parishes in the Islan
ds, but their intent was to extend the exemption to the parsonages appurtenant t
o all churches. And it is a general rule that statutes exempting charitable and
religious property from taxation should be construed fairly and not unnaturally
though strictly and in such manner as to give effect to the main intent of the l
egislators. Although separated from the cathedral by an intervening block, and a
lthough a parsonage within the area was already exempt, the residence of the arc
hbishop should still be exempted from taxation as a parsonage adjacent to the ca
thedral. LATIN MAXIM: 8a, 9b, 43
FACTS: Private Respondent is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution wit
h auxiliary units and branches all over the Philippines, one of which is the Ins
titute of Philippine Culture (IPC), which is engaged in social sciences studies
of Philippine society and culture. In 1983, Petitioner issued a demand letter re
garding the institutions tax liabilities. Petitioner contended that private Respo
ndent was an independent contractor within the purview of Sec. 205 of the Tax Code
, and was conducting studies for a fee, and therefore subject to 3% contractors t
ax. ISSUE: W/N Private Respondent, through its auxiliary unit or branch, the IPC
, performing the work of an independent contractor and, thus subject to 3% contr
actors tax levied by Sec. 205 of the National Internal Revenue Code. HELD: No. Th
e research activity of the IPC was done in pursuance of maintaining private Resp
ondents university status and not in the course of an independent business of sel
ling such research with profit in mind. There was no evidence that the IPC ever
sold its services for a fee to anyone or was ever engaged in business apart from
the academic purposes of the university. Petitioner erred in applying the princ
iples of tax exemption without first applying a strict interpretation of the tax
laws. LATIN MAXIM: 43
161 Manila Railroad Company v. Insular Collector of Customs

84
Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court
Case No. 256 G.R. No. L-69344 (April 26, 1991) Chapter VII, Page 301, Footnote N
o. 84
FACTS: Appellee Manila Railroad Company used dust shields made of wool on all of
its railway wagons to cover the axle box which protects from dust the oil depos
ited therein which serves as lubricant of the bearings of the wheel. Under par.
141 of Sec. 8 of the Tariff Law of 1909, manufactures of wool, not otherwise pro
vided for are subject to 40% ad valorem. On the other hand, under par. 197 of sa
me law, vehicles for use on railways and tramways, and detached parts thereof ar
e subject to 10% ad valorem. Appellant Insular Collector of Customs classified d
ust shields as manufactures of wool, not otherwise provided for. Upon appeal, howe
ver, the CFI overruled the decision and classified dust shields as detached parts
of vehicles for use on railways. ISSUE: Whether dust shields should be classifie
d as manufactures of wool or as detached parts of vehicles for use on railways.
HELD: Dust shields are classified for the purposes of tariff as detached parts o
f vehicles under par. 197. It is a general rule in the interpretation of statute
s levying taxes not to extend their provisions beyond the clear import of the la
nguage used. In case of doubt, they should be construed strictly against the gov
ernment and in favor of the citizen. And when there is in the same statute a par
ticular enactment and a general one which in its comprehensive sense would inclu
de what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, a
nd the general one must be taken to affect only such cases within its general la
nguage as are not within the provisions of the particular enactment. LATIN MAXIM
: 38a, 43, 50
FACTS: Respondent spouses Antonio and Clara Pastor owed the Government P1,283, 6
21.63 for taxes from the years 1955-1959. A reinvestigation of their debt was ma
de and the amount was changed to P17,117.08. They applied for tax amnesty under
P.D. 23, 213 and 370. Due to this, their debt even decreased to about P12,000. T
hey paid such debt to the Government and had receipts as proofs of such. The Gov
ernment contended that the spouses could not avail of the tax amnesty under P.D.
213 because of Revenue Regulation No. 8-72 which stated that amnesty is not all
owed for those who had pending assessments with the BIR. Respondent spouses then
contended that Revenue Regulation No. 8-72 was null because P.D. 213 did not co
ntain any exemption wherein one should not be allowed to amnesty. ISSUE: W/N Res
pondent spouses were properly given tax amnesty. HELD: Yes, because Revenue Regu
lation No. 8-72 was null and void. If Revenue Regulation No. 8-72 provided an ex
ception to the coverage of P.D. 213, then such provision is null and void for be
ing contrary to the Presidential Decree. Revenue regulations shall not prevail o
ver provisions of a Presidential Decree. LATIN MAXIM: 8, 26
162 Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. v. Department of Finance

Secretary
Case No. 82 G.R. No. 108524 (November 10, 1994) Chapter VII, Page 301, Footnote
No. 85
Acting Commissioner of Customs v. Manila Electric Company
Case No. 3 G.R. No. L-23623 (June 30, 1977) Chapter VII, Page 301, Footnote No.
85
FACTS: FACTS: Petitioner is a corporation whose members are engaged in buying an
d selling copra. Prior to Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) 47-91, copra was cla
ssified as a food product under Sec. 103(b) of the National Internal Revenue Cod
e and therefore exempt from tax in all stages, including distribution. Under Sec
. 103(a), the sale of agricultural NON-food products in their original state is
exempt from VAT only if the seller is the primary producer and the owner of the
land which the same is produced. Under Sec. 103(b), the sale of agricultural foo
d products in their original state is exempt from VAT in all stages. RMC 47-91 t
hen reclassified copra as a non-food product. ISSUE: W/N copra is an agricultura
l food product which is exempt from VAT and thus not under the purview of RMC 47
-91. HELD: No, it is not an agricultural food product, thus it is not exempt fro
m VAT. The Commissioner of Internal Revenues interpretation is entitled to great
respect because it is the government agency charged with the interpretation and
implementation of tax laws. In fact, although copra is from coconut, and 80% of
the coconut plant is edible, copra per se is not intended for human consumption.
LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 42a, b RA 1394 exempted payment of special import tax for spar
e parts used for industries and also insulators from all taxes of whatever natur
e. Respondent contends that their insulating oils are exempt from taxes. ISSUE:
W/N insulating oil is an insulator making Respondent exempt from paying its taxe
s. HELD: No, insulating oil is different from insulators. The Supreme Court look
ed into the definition of insulating oils under Materials Handbook by George J. Br
ady, 8th Edition. The court found out that insulating oils are used for cooling
as well as insulating. And there is no question that the insulating oil that Res
pondent is importing is used for cooling instead of insulating. The law frowns o
n exemption from taxation; hence an exempting provision must be construed sticti
ssimi juris. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 43, b
163 Collector of Internal Revenue v. Manila Jockey Club Inc.

Case No. 68 G.R. No. L-8755 (March 23, 1956) Chapter VII, Page 304, Footnote No.
97
People v. Castaeda Jr.
Case No. 104 G.R. No. L-46881 (September 15, 1988) Chapter VII, Page 306, Footno
te No. 102
FACTS: Respondents Manila Jockey Club Inc. and Philippine Racing Club Inc. are c
orporations organized primarily for holding horse races. Petitioner is contendin
g that payments for renting several parts of the property that Respondents rent
and lease are subject to the 20% amusement tax in the National Internal Revenue
Code. ISSUE: W/N rentals received by the Respondents from private horse owners o
r trainers, the PCSO, the White Cross, the Philippine Anti-Tuberculosis Society
are subject to the 20% amusement tax. HELD: The law refers to gross receipts and n
ot gross income. This clause is plain demonstration that the gross receipts refer to
the collections on days when the race track is open to the general public and a
dmission fees are or are not charged. This necessarily excludes income of the Re
spondents received on days when they do not legally and actually hold horse race
s. The lease by the Respondents of the land clearly has nothing to do with horse
racing. It is to be remembered that the law makes the proprietor, lessee, or op
erator, of the amusement place liable for the amusement tax, the three tax payer
s being connected by the disjunctive conjunction or, thereby positively implying t
hat the tax should be paid by either the proprietor, the lessee, or the operator
, as the case may be, singly and not all at one and the same time. LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 7a, 27
FACTS: Respondents were charged of 8 criminal cases for violating the National I
nternal Revenue Code for manufacturing alcoholic products subject to specific ta
x without having paid the annual privilege tax therefore. Respondents argued tha
t they are exempt from taxes because they are entitled to the benefits available
under P.D. 370 which declares tax amnesty. ISSUE: W/N Respondent is entitled to
the benefits of tax amnesty under the P.D. HELD: To be entitled to the extincti
on of liability provided by P.D. 370, the claimant must have voluntarily disclos
ed his previously untaxed income or wealth and paid the required 15% tax on such
previously untaxed income or wealth. Where the disclosure was not voluntary, th
e claimant is not entitled to the benefits expressly excluded from the coverage
of P.D. 370. In the instant case, the violations with which the Respondents were
charged had already been discovered by the BIR when P.D. 370 took effect. It is
necessary to note that the "valid information under RA 2338" referred to in Sec
. 1(a)(4) of P.D. 370 refers not to a criminal information filed in court by a f
iscal or special prosecutor, but rather to the sworn information or complaint fi
led by an informer with the BIR under RA 2338 in the hope of earning an informer
s reward. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 25a, 43
164 Zamora v. City of Manila

Case No. 175 G.R. No. 3433 (March 2, 1907) Chapter VII, Page 306, Footnote No. 1
02
Republic Flour Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Case No. 259 G.R. No. L- 25602 31 (February 18, 1970) Chapter VII, Page 306, Foo
tnote No. 103
FACTS: Act No. 975 is a remedial statute which provides for relief of persons wh
o have paid an excessive assessment on taxes prior to the creation of the Board
of Tax revision. Petitioner prays that the word land in the title and body of the
statute be interpreted to mean land including buildings and improvements thereon.
ISSUE: W/N the word land should be interpreted liberally to mean land with the bui
ldings and improvements thereon. HELD: While the distinction does not appear to
have been consciously made in Act No. 123, it is disregarded in Act Nos. 82 and
551. The rule of strict construction of statutes granting exemptions from taxati
on is not applicable in this case. This rule is not without its exceptions and l
imitations, and the plain principles of justice suggest that the act under consi
deration should be construed with some liberality. It is a remedial statute, pro
viding for a refund of taxes which have been collected unjustly and upon an unfa
ir and inequitable valuation of land. While some of the Acts of the Commission h
ave consciously sought to give to the word land and real estate a special signif
ication, nevertheless such use has not been uniform and the deviations therefrom
have been so frequent that it affords no safe rule from interpretation. LATIN M
AXIM: 9a, 9d, 9f, 27, b2
FACTS: In 1957, Petitioner was granted tax-exemption privileges pursuant to RA 9
01. In 1958, Petitioner imported a quantity of wheat grains, part of which was n
ot used in the business that year. The surplus of wheat grains were finally util
ized into flour and sold in 1959. Petitioner paid sales tax of P37,275.55, but t
he cost of wheat left over was treated as deductible item from gross sales in 19
59. Respondent Commissioner finally assessed the Petitioner of deficiency tax of
P23,170.17 because materials purchased from tax-exempt industries were not acqu
ired from one enjoying taxexemption privilege under our laws. ISSUE: W/N Respond
ent Commissioner is correct in imposing the deficiency sales tax. HELD: No. Sec.
186-A of Internal Revenue provides that whenever a tax-free product is utilized
in the manufacture or production of any article, in the determination of the va
lue of such finished article, the value of such tax-free product shall be deduct
ed. While It is true that tax exemptions (and deductions) are not favored in the
law, and are construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer, it is equally a
recognized principle that where the provision of the law is clear and unambiguo
us, so that there is no occasion for the courts seeking the legislative intent, t
he law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction. LATIN
MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43
165 Ajero v. Court of Appeals

Case No. 5
In re: Testate Estate of Tampoy
Case No. 61 G.R. No. L-14322 (February 25, 1960) Chapter VII, Page 309, Footnote
No. 117
G.R. No. 106720 (September 15, 1994)
Chapter VII, Page 309, Footnote No. 117
FACTS: Petitioners filed a petition for probate of holographic will left by the
late Annie Sand. They alleged that the decedent was of sound and disposing mind,
and was capacitated to dispose of her estate by will. Private Respondent oppose
d the petition claiming the will or testament was not of the decedent and the sa
me was procured through improper pressure. It was also opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero
claiming that the decedent was not the sole owner of the property. The trial co
urt granted and/or admitted the decedents holographic will to probate. On appeal,
said Decision was reversed by the CA for its failure to comply with Art. 813 an
d 814 of the New Civil Code. ISSUE: W/N the CA is correct that the will did not
comply with the law. HELD: No. Failure to strictly observe other formalities wil
l not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionably ha
ndwritten by the testator. Art. 813 of the New Civil Code affects only the valid
ity of the dispositions in the will, but not its probate. A holographic will can
still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding noncompliance with Art. 814. In c
ase of alterations, cancellations or insertions, the lack of authentication will
only result in disallowance of such changes, but not its entirety. The CA, howe
ver, correctly held that Annie Sand could not dispose the other property includi
ng the house and lot, which she shares with her fathers other heirs. LATIN MAXIM:
1, 6c, 7a, 9a
FACTS: In the matter of Petition for Probate Proceedings before the CFI of Cebu,
the will consists of two pages and the last page had been duly signed by the te
statrix and the three testimonial witnesses who also signed the first page but t
he testatrix failed to sign the left margin of the first page. The lower court d
enied the petition because the will was not executed in accordance with law, cit
ing Sec. 618 of Act No. 190, as amended. ISSUE: W/N the probate court (CFI) is c
orrect in denying the petition for the allowance of the will. HELD: Yes. Sec. 61
8 of Act No. 190, as amended, requires that the testator sign the will and each
and every page thereof in the presence of the witnesses, and that the latter sig
n the will and each and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and o
f each other, which requirement should be expressed in the attestation clause. T
his requirement is mandatory, for failure to comply with it is fatal to the vali
dity of the will. Thus, it has been held that Statutes prescribing the formalitie
s to be observed in the execution of wills are very strictly construed. A will m
ust be executed in accordance with the statutory requirements; otherwise it is e
ntirely void. All these requirements stand as of equal importance and must be ob
served, and courts cannot supply the defective execution of the will. Accordingly
, we cannot escape the conclusion that the same fails to comply with the law and
therefore, cannot be admitted to probate. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a
166 A.L. Ammen Transportation Company, Inc. v. Borja

Case No. 1 G.R. No. L-17750 (August 31, 1962) Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No
. 123
Lazo v. Employees Compensation Commission
Case No. 70 G.R. No. 78617 (June 18, 1990) Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 1
23
FACTS: Respondent filed an action against Petitioners in the CFI of Albay to rec
over compensation for overtime work rendered, and damages. Pending this, Respond
ent filed the present proceedings on the Court of Industrial Relations. ISSUE: 1
. W/N the scope of the term action falls under RA 1994. 2. W/N the Court of Indust
rial Relations has jurisdiction. HELD: 1. The Petitioner contends that the phras
e action already commenced employed in the statute should be construed as meaning
only actions filed in a regular court of justice. With this limited and narrow i
nterpretation, we cannot agree. The statute under consideration is undoubtedly a
labor statute and as such must be liberally construed in favor of the laborer c
oncerned. 2. The allegation in the complaint filed by the Respondent employee th
at he was separated automatically from the said employment with Defendants, and n
otwithstanding pleas for reinstatement, Defendants refused and still refuse to r
einstate Plaintiff, and his prayer for specific reliefs and other reliefs justify
the conclusion that said Respondent ought reinstatement aside from overtime wag
es. This was within the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations. LATIN
MAXIM: 9a
FACTS: Petitioner is a security guard of the Central Bank of the Philippines ass
igned to its main office. His regular tour of duty is from 2pm to 10pm. On June
18, 1986, the Petitioner rendered full duty. But, as the security guard who was
to relieve him failed to arrive, the Petitioner rendered overtime duty up to 5am
the next day. On his way home, he met an accident and as a result, he sustained
injuries. For injuries sustained, he claimed for disability benefits under P.D.
626 but was denied by the GSIS. ISSUE: W/N the denial of compensation under P.D
. 626 was valid. HELD: No. In the case at bar, it can be seen that Petitioner le
ft his station at the Central Bank several hours after his regular time off, bec
ause the reliever did not come on time. There is no evidence on the record that
Petitioner deviated from his usual, regular homeward route. While presumption of
compensability and theory of aggravation under the Workmens Compensation Act may
have been abandoned under the New Labor Code, it is significant that the libera
lity of the law in general favor of the workingman still subsists. LATIN MAXIM:
9a
167 Villavert v. Employees Compensation Commission

Case No. 313 G.R. No. L-48605 (December 14, 1981) Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnot
e No. 124
Abella v. National Labor Relations Commission
Case No. 2 G.R. No. 71813 (July 20, 1987) Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 12
4
FACTS: The Petitioner is the mother of the late Marcelino Villavert, who died of
acute hemorrhagic pancreatic, employed as a code verifier in the Philippine Con
stabulary. She filed a claim for income benefits for the death of her son under
P.D. 626, as amended, with the GSIS. The said claim was denied by the GSIS on th
e ground that acute hemorrhagic pancreatic is not an occupational disease and th
at Petitioner had failed to show that there was a causal connection between the
fatal ailment of Marcelino and the nature of his employment. The Petitioner appe
aled to the ECC which affirmed the denial. ISSUE: W/N the ECC committed grave ab
use of discretion in denying the claim of the Petitioner. HELD: From the foregoi
ng facts of record, it is clear that Marcelino died of acute hemorrhagic pancrea
tic which was directly caused or at least aggravated by the duties he performed
as coder verifier, computer operator and clerk typist of the Philippine Constabu
lary. There is no evidence at all that Marcelino had a bout of alcoholic intoxica
tion shortly before he died. Neither is there a showing that he used drugs. All d
oubts in the implementation and interpretation of this Code, including its imple
menting rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of the labor. LATIN MAX
IM: 9a
FACTS: Petitioner leased a farm land, Hacienda DanaoRamona, in Negros Occidental
for a period of ten years. It is renewable at her instance, which she opted to d
o, for another ten years. During the existence of the lease she employed the pri
vate Respondents. Upon expiration of the leasehold rights, Petitioner dismissed
the two Respondents. ISSUE: W/N the Respondents are entitled to separation pays.
HELD: Yes. The applicable law on the case is Art. 284 of the Labor Code. Notwit
hstanding the contention of the Petitioner that the aforementioned provision vio
lates the constitutional guarantee against impairment of obligations and contrac
ts, because when she leased the farm land, neither she nor the lessor contemplat
ed the creation of the obligation to pay separation pay to the workers upon the
expiration of the lease. The court held such contention untenable as the issue h
ad already been adjudicated in the case of Anucension v. NLRC. It was stated in
the said case that the prohibition to impair the obligation of contracts is not a
bsolute and unqualified. The prohibition is general. The court further stated tha
t the purpose of Art. 284 is for the protection of the workers whose employment
is terminated because of the closure of establishment. Without such law, employe
es like the Respondents will lose the benefits to which they are entitled. Moreo
ver, it is well settled that in the implementation and interpretation of the pro
visions of the Labor Code, the workers welfare should be the primordial and param
ount consideration, and that all doubts shall be resolved in favor of labor. LAT
IN MAXIM: 5a, 9a, 9d
168 Del Rosario & Sons v. National Labor Relations Commission

Case No. 36 No. L-64204 (May 31, 1985) Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 124
Manahan v. Employees Compensation Commission
Case No. 79 G.R. No. L-44899 (April 22, 1981) Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No
. 124
FACTS: Petitioner, a logging company, entered into a contract of services with C
almar Security Agency to supply the Petitioner with security guards. The securit
y guards, herein Respondents, filed a complaint for underpayment of salary again
st the Petitioner and the security agency. The Labor Arbiter found the security
agency to be liable for the underpayment and dismissed the case against the logg
ing company. The security agency appealed the case to the NLRC. The latter allow
ed the appeal even though there were formal defects in the procedure by which th
e appeal was made. It was not under oath and the appeal fee was paid late. ISSUE
: W/N the formal defects of the appeal of the security agency should invalidate
the appeal. HELD: No. According to Art. 221 of the Labor Code, in any proceeding
before the Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevai
ling in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit an
d intention of the Code that the Commission and the Arbiters shall use every and
all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case and proceed all in the
interest of justice. The lack of verification could have easily been corrected b
y making an oath and even though the payment was late, it was still paid. LATIN
MAXIM: 9a, 9d, 40b
FACTS: Nazario Manahan, Jr., died of Enteric Fever while he was employed as a te
acher in the Las Pias Municipal High School. The claimant, the widow of the decea
sed, filed a claim in the GSIS for she contends that the death of her husband wa
s due to his occupation. However, GSIS denied such claim. Claimant filed for a M
otion for Reconsideration alleging that the deceased was in perfect health prior
to his employment and that the ailment of the deceased is attributable to his e
mployment. Again she was denied by the GSIS. She then appealed her case to the E
mployees Compensation Commission which also denied her claim. ISSUE: W/N the wid
ow of the deceased is entitled to claim benefits. HELD: Yes. The findings of the
commission indicated that the deceased was in perfect health prior to his emplo
yment as a teacher and that in the course of his employment, he was treated for
Epigastric pain- and ulcer-like symptoms. This was supported by his medical reco
rds and a medical certificate issued by Dr. Bernabe. Epigastric pain is a sympto
m of Ulcer and Ulcer is a common complication of Enteric Fever. Pursuant to the
doctrine of Corales v. ECC, the provisions of the Workmens Compensation Act shall
be applied, thus the presumption of compensability should be in favor of the cl
aimant. Moreover, it is well settled that in case of doubt, the case should be r
esolved in favor of the worker and that Labor laws should be liberally construed
to give relief to the worker and his dependents. LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 9a, 9d, 40b
169 Liwanag v. Workmens Compensation Commission

Case No. 75 G.R. No. L-12164 (May 2, 1959) Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 1
24
Sibulo v. Altar
Case No. 279 G.R. No. L-1916 (April 30, 1949) Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No
. 125
FACTS: Appellants Benito Liwanag and Maria Liwanag Reyes are co-owners of Liwana
g Auto Suppy. They hired Roque Balderama as a security guard, who was killed in
the line of duty by criminals. His widow and children filed a claim for compensa
tion with the Workmens Compensation Commission, which was granted in an award tha
t ordered the Appellants to pay jointly and severally the amount of P3,494.40 to
the claimant in lump sum. Appellants did not question the right of Appellees to
compensation nor the amount awarded. However, they claim that because the Workm
ens Compensation Act did not give an express provision declaring solidary obligat
ions of business partners, the compensation should be divisible. ISSUE: W/N the
Commission erred in ordering the Appellants to pay jointly and severally. HELD:
No. Although the WCA does not contain any provision expressly declaring that the
obligation arising from compensation is solidary, other provisions of law show
how their liability is solidary. Art. 1711 and 1712 of the New Civil Code and Se
c. 2 of the WCA reasonably indicate that in compensation cases, the liability of
business partners should be solidary. If the responsibility were to be merely j
ointly, and one of them happens to be insolvent, the award would only be partial
ly satisfied, which is evidently contrary to the intent of the law to give full
protection to employees. The WCA should be construed fairly, reasonably and libe
rally for the employee and dependents. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 9d, 36, 38, 40
FACTS: Petitioner, owner of first class agricultural land, entered into a contra
ct of tenancy with Respondent. Petitioner was to furnish the work animals and fa
rm implements and Respondent was to defray all expenses of planting and cultivat
ion. The net produce was to be divided equally. The contract was disapproved by
the Tenancy Law Enforcement Division of the Department of Justice because the di
vision contravenes with a provision of the Tenancy Law. It was taken to the Cour
t of Industrial Relations, which declared the contract illegal as against public
policy as contemplated in Sec. 7 of the Tenancy Law, for the reason that instea
d of receiving 60% of his total share, the tenant shall receive 50% only. Petiti
oner claimed that the contract is not among those expressly declared to be again
st public policy in Sec. 7 of the Tenancy Law, which he argues to be an exhausti
ve list. ISSUE: W/N the contract is against public policy as contemplated in Sec
. 7 of the Tenancy Law. HELD: No. In declaring certain stipulations to be agains
t public policy, the legislature could not have meant to sanction other stipulat
ions which, though not specified, are similar to those expressly mentioned. The
purpose of the law might easily be defeated otherwise. The Tenancy Act is a reme
dial legislation intended to better the lot of the share-cropper by giving him a
more equitable participation in the produce of the land which he cultivates. Be
ing a remedial statute, it should be construed to further its purpose in accorda
nce with its general intent. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 12a, 36, 40
170 Guerrero v. Court of Appeals

Case No. 54
Vicente v. Employees Compensation Commission
Case No. 168 G.R. No. 85024 (January 23, 1991) Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote N
o. 127
G.R. No. L-44570 (May 30,1986)
Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 126
FACTS: Apolonio Benitez was hired by the Petitioners to work in their plantation
. He was allowed for that purpose to put up a hut within the plantation. He shar
ed 1/3 of the proceeds with his coconut-related responsibilities. Afterwards, th
e Petitioners and Benitez executed an agreement allowing Benitez to continue wor
king as tenant; the Agricultural Tenancy Act would govern their relationship. La
ter the Petitioners ordered Benitez out. Benitez sued in the Court of Agrarian R
elations, which ordered his reinstatement. The Petitioners appealed to the CA, w
hich affirmed the Court of Agrarian Reforms decision. The Petitioners then appeal
ed to the Supreme Court. Pending appeal, the Code of Agrarian Reforms was passed
repealing the Agricultural Tenancy Act. The Petitioners then claimed that since
the basis of the suit was a share tenancy agreement, the decisions lost their v
alidity. ISSUE: W/N share tenancy ended. HELD: No. An agreement is not abrogated
by the subsequent repeal of the law. The phasing out of share tenancy was never
intended to mean a reversion of tenants into farmhands or hired laborers with n
o rights. The Agricultural Tenancy Act and Agricultural Land Reform Code have no
t been entirely repealed by the Code of Agrarian Reform. But assuming that they
were, the rule that the repeal of a statute defeats all actions pending under th
e repealed statute has the exception when vested rights are affected and obligat
ions of contract are impaired. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 12, 32, 38
FACTS: Petitioner was an employed nursing attendant. At the course of his employ
ment, he had several physical complications which forced him to retire. So at th
e age of forty-five, he availed an optional retirement to entitle him to income b
enefits under the GSIS retirement program. The application was supported by a phy
sicians certification that Petitioner was classified as under permanent total disa
bility. The significance of such classification was whether or not Petitioner cou
ld avail of the full income benefits. GSIS contended that Petitioner was only per
manent partial disability. The ECC affirmed the GSIS decision. ISSUE: Whether Pet
itioner was under permanent total disability or permanent partial disability. HE
LD: Petitioner was under permanent total disability. The test of whether or not
an employee suffers from permanent total disability is a showing of the capacity
of the employee to continue performing his work notwithstanding the disability
he incurred. The Court takes this occasion to stress once more its abiding conce
rn for the welfare of government workers, especially the humble rank and file. I
t is for this reason that the sympathy of the law on social security is toward i
ts beneficiaries and requires a construction of utmost liberality in their favor
. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 11b, 12a
171 Tamayo, et al. v. Manila Hotel Company

128
Corporal v. Employees Compensation Commission
Case No. 83 G.R. No. 86020 (August 5, 1994) Chapter VII, Page 311, Footnote No.
131
FACTS: 265 employees of Appellee Manila Hotel Co., who had to be dismissed and p
aid the value of their accumulated leave under Sec. 266 of the Administrative Co
de, as amended by RA 611, when the hotel was leased to a private concern on June
30, 1954, brought the present action to recover from the Appellee Manila Hotel
Co. an additional amount for accrued leave alleged to be due them under the same
section of the Administrative Code, as later amended by RA 1081, approved on Ju
ne 15, 1954, that is to say, 15 days before they were separated from the company
. ISSUE: W/N Petitioners could avail of the alleged accrued benefits. HELD: No.
Art. 4 of the New Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect
unless the contrary is provided. As RA 1081 does not provide that it is to have
a retroactive effect, it can only be given effect from the date of its approval
. LATIN MAXIM: 46a
FACTS: Norma Corporal was an employed public school teacher. During the course o
f her work, she had several pregnancies. On her 4th pregnancy, she suffered comp
lete abortion. On her 5th pregnancy, she gave birth to a baby boy with the help
of a hilot. An hour later, she was rushed to the hospital due to profuse vaginal b
leeding. She underwent hysterectomy but she died afterwards. Her husband, herein
Petitioner, filed a claim for compensation benefit with GSIS. But said agency d
enied. The matter was elevated to ECC but the petition was also dismissed becaus
e the cause of his wifes death was non-work-related. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner could
avail the compensation benefit. HELD: No. The determination of whether the prola
pse of Normas uterus developed before or after her 5th pregnancy is immaterial si
nce this illness is the result of her physiological structure and changes in the
body. While as a rule that labor and social welfare legislation should be liber
ally construed in favor of the applicant, there is also a rule that such liberal
construction cannot be applied if the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code ar
e clear. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 43
172 People v. Moran

Case No. 216 G.R. No. 17905 (January 27, 1923) Chapter VII, Page 320, Footnote N
o. 167 People v. Reyes Case No. 222 G.R. Nos. 74226-227 (July 27, 1989) Chapter
VII, Page 320, Footnote No. 168
FACTS: Appellant was punished for violating the Election Law. When the decision
was published, it was increased to 6 months. Defendant alleges that the crime ha
s already prescribed, pursuant to Sec. 71 of Act No. 3030, which was enacted by
the Legislature on March 9, 1922. ISSUE: W/N Act No. 3030 is meant to apply to t
he Administrative Code and whether the said act should be retroactive with respe
ct to Art. 22 and 7 of the RPC. HELD: Act No. 3030 is intended to be amendatory
to several sections of the Administrative Code. Furthermore, Art. 22 of the RPC
can only be invoked with reference to some other penal law. Hence with regard to
Art. 7, the SC contends that Art. 22 should still apply to special laws. Also,
the prescription of the crime is intimately connected with that of the penalty.
A statute declaring prescription of a crime has no other purpose than to annul p
rosecution of the offender. When the statute makes no distinction, it makes no e
xception. Statutes are not construed to have retrospective operation as to destr
oy or impair rights unless such was clearly the intention. The new law shortenin
g the time of prescription indicates that the sovereign acknowledges that the pr
evious one was unjust and enforcing the latter would be contradictory. LATIN MAX
IM: 26, 37, 46a, 48
FACTS: On June 1983, the complainants allegedly discovered that the property of
their deceased parents was falsely transferred to Mizaph Reyes through falsified
signatures and untruthful statements in the deed of registration. However as th
e deed was registered on May 26, 1961, the lower courts held that the period of
prescription has long passed. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower courts erred in di
smissing the case due to the passing of the prescriptive period. HELD: The SC ru
led affirmed the decision of the lower court, as the registration of land acts a
s a notice to the whole world. Under this, it is also presumed that the purchase
r has examined the instruments of the record. The court will not hesitate to app
ly rules of construction in civil cases to that of criminal ones, should the cir
cumstances warrant. Rights should not be left on a precarious balance, always su
sceptible possible challenges. This should also apply to criminal cases. Further
more, as stated in People v. Moran, in the interpretation of the law and that of
the prescription of crimes, a liberal reading that is most favorable to the acc
used is the one to be adopted. LATIN MAXIM: 48
173 Board of Administrators of the PVA v. Bautista

Case No. 37 G.R. No. L-37867 (February 22, 1982) Chapter VII, Page 321, Footnote
No. 170
Legaspi v. Executive Secretary and Agrarian Reforms
Case No. 145 No. L-36153 (November 28, 1975) Chapter VII, Page 322, Footnote No.
173
FACTS: Respondent Gasilao, a veteran, failed to present all the necessary papers
to receive his pension. After finally complying with all the necessities, he wa
s awarded with the full benefits of RA 65, Sec. 9 and RA 1920, for P100 a month
and an additional P10 per minor. Later, on June 22, 1969, RA 5753 was approved.
However, due to the lack of funds, Respondent Gasilao only received a 25% increa
se and only after January 15, 1971. The lower court granted Respondent Gasilao h
is pension, starting from December 18, 1955 at the rate of P50, and then P100 pl
us P10 per minor, from June 22, 1957 up to August 7, 1968. To pay the difference
of P100 plus P30 per month and P20 per month for each minor from June 22, 1969
up to January 15, 1971, the difference of P75 plus P22.50 per month for his wife
, and P20 per minor from January 16, 1971 up to December 31, 1971. ISSUE: W/N th
e lower court erred in the retroactivity of Respondent Gasilaos pension. HELD: Re
spondent Gasilao is a veteran of good standing and has complied with the prescri
ptive period for filing for his pension. The laws on veteran pension must be lib
erally construed as to grant our veterans the proper recognition. Granting such
pensions the earliest possible time is more in tune with the spirit of RA 65. Bu
t, as the government has yet to provide the necessary funds, the judgment of the
lower courts is modified as, effective December 18, 1955 at P50 plus P10 per mo
nth for each minor, increased to P100 from June 22, 1957 to August 7, 1968. The
difference from June 22, 1969 to January 14, 1972 is subject to the release of f
unds by the government. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 40b
FACTS: Petitioner, an employee of the Department of Agrarian Reforms, sent a let
ter to the Respondent Secretary of the Department, Conrado Estrella. Petitioner
expressed his desire to be laid-off under the provisions of RA 3844, as amended
by RA 6389, on the condition that he would also be paid the gratuity benefits to
which he might be entitled under C.A. No. 186, as amended by RA 1616. GSIS appr
oved his retirement gratuity under C.A. No. 186, as amended by RA 1616 but denie
d his claim for gratuity under RA 3844, as amended by RA 6389. ISSUE: W/N Petiti
oner is entitled to both gratuity benefits under C.A. No. 186, as amended by RA
1616, and RA 3844, as amended by RA 6389. HELD: No. There is nothing in RA 3844,
as amended by RA 6389, that would suggest that an employee who is laid-off or p
refers to be laid-off can receive two pension benefits, one under its provisions
and another pursuant to C.A. No. 186. This interpretation is more in line with
the policy of the law embodied in C.A. No. 186 prohibiting an employer from payi
ng double retirement benefits to an employee. Being the law governing the retire
ment of government employees, all other laws extending retirement benefits to go
vernment employees should, in case of ambiguity, be construed in relation to C.A
. No. 186 and in the light of its provisions. It is a rule of statutory construc
tion that when the legislature enacts a provision, it is understood that it is a
ware of previous statutes relating to the same subject matter, and that in the a
bsence of an express repeal or amendment therein, the new provision should be de
emed enacted pursuant to the legislative policy embodied in prior statutes, whic
h should all be construed together. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 38b
174 Re: Monthly Pension of Judges and Justices

Case No. 60 A.M. No. 09-9-019-SC (October 4, 1990) Chapter VII, Page 322, Footno
te No. 174
Re: Application For Retirement Under R.A. No. 910 of Associate Justice Ramon B.
Britanico of the IAC
Case No. 128 A.M. No. 6484-Ret. (May 15, 1989) Chapter VII, Page 323, Footnote N
o. 177
FACTS: This matter was brought about due to two separate publications in the Off
icial Gazette of the same amendment to RA 910 (Special Retirement Law of Judges
and Justices). P.D. 1438 was published in Vol. 74 of the Official Gazette, No. 3
0, which did not provide how to compute the monthly pension starting from the si
xth year of retirement. However, in Vol. 74 of the Official Gazette, No. 41 prov
ided that the monthly pension starting from the sixth year of retirement is equi
valent to the monthly salary he was receiving on the date of his retirement. Sin
ce 1978 however, GSIS computed the monthly pension as follows: 1) highest salary
, plus 2) highest representation and transportation allowances (RATA), plus 3) l
ongevity pay (which was considered part of the salary starting in 1983 pursuant
to Sec. 42, BP 129). The basis was the copy of P.D. 1438 which was published in
Vol. 74 of the Official Gazette, No. 30. ISSUE: Which version of P.D. 1438 must
be followed. HELD: The Court directed GSIS to continue implementing RA 910, as a
mended by P.D. 1438, in the same manner as it has done since 1978. This is defin
itely more in keeping with and gives substance to the elementary rule of statuto
ry construction that, being remedial in character, retirement laws should be lib
erally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefit
ed and all doubts as to the intent of the law should be resolved in favor of the
retiree to achieve its humanitarian purposes. Retirement laws are intended to e
ntice competent men and women to enter the government service and to permit them
to retire therefrom with relative security, not only for those who have retaine
d their vigor but, more so, for those who have been incapacitated by illness or
accident. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 40b FACTS: Justice Britanico requested that he be gra
nted retirement benefits under RA 910 in addition to or in lieu of benefits he r
eceived under RA 1616 upon termination of his service in the Judiciary by the ac
ceptance of his courtesy resignation by President Aquino, pursuant to Proclamati
on No. 1 dated February 25, 1986, requiring all appointive public officials to s
ubmit their courtesy resignations beginning with the members of the Supreme Cour
t. Justice Britanico served the government for 36.23 years, of which 10 years, 2
months, and 27 days were served in the Judiciary. As provided in Sec. 1 of RA 9
10, the judges or justices who may enjoy retirement benefits with their lifetime
annuity, should have rendered at least 20 years service in the judiciary or in a
ny other branch of the government or both. They fall into three categories: XXX 2
. those who resign by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of their offi
ce and had rendered at least 20 years service in the judiciary or in any other b
ranch of the government or both XXX ISSUE: Which category Justice Britanico belo
ngs to. HELD: He belongs to the second category of Sec. 1. The acceptance of his
courtesy resignation, not being a voluntary resignation (as held in Ortiz v. CO
MELEC), resulted in his incapacity to discharge the duties of his office, which
he could have very well held until he reaches the mandatory retirement age of 70
years. Retirement laws should be liberally construed to and applied in favor of
the persons intended to be benefited thereby. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 40b, 43c
175 Re: Gregorio G. Pineda

Case No. 132 A.M. No. 6789-RET (Jul 13, 1990) Chapter VII, Page 323, Footnote No
. 178
Ramirez v. Arrieta
Case No. 130 G.R. No. L-19183 (Nov. 29, 1962) Chapter VII, Page 325, Footnote No
. 181
FACTS: These are petitions or motions for reconsideration filed by six retired j
udges, namely Pineda, Montesclaros, de Lara, Montecillo, Paredes and Gerochi, as
king that they be granted gratuity and/or retirement benefits under RA 910, as a
mended, in addition to or in lieu of the benefits under RA 1616 or P.D. 1146. Th
ey want to take advantage of the Plana and Britanico ruling. ISSUE: W/N they sho
uld be granted benefits under RA 910 pursuant to the Plana or Britanico ruling.
HELD: No. A close scrutiny into the service records as well as the conduct of th
e judges is necessary to determine their qualification to receive benefits under
RA 910. The rule is that retirement laws are construed liberally in favor of th
e retiring employee. When the court allows exemptions to fix rules for certain j
udges, there are ample reasons behind each grant. The crediting of leaves is not
done indiscriminately. The court only allows the use of the Plana or Britanico
ruling if the career of the judge was marked by competence, integrity and dedica
tion to the public service. Most of the judges however retired bowing to policy
considerations, id est courtesy resignations. The De La Llana ruling is an essen
tial factor in determining whether or not the judges should be granted the benef
its they ask for. It stated that if a judge was not recommended for reappointmen
t following their courtesy resignations then the relevant factors were considere
d and they were found wanting. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 9e, 37, 42a
FACTS: Petitioner filed an action against Apolinar Serina seeking the annulment
of a transfer certificate of title over a parcel of land alleging misrepresentat
ion. The CFI dismissed the complaint. The Plaintiff filed a notice of intent to
appeal. The end of the 30 day period fell on a Sunday hence it was moved to the
following Monday but one of the two bondsmen was unable to sign the appeal bond.
The clerk of court suggested that the document first be completed by the Plaint
iff before filing it. Petitioner followed the suggestion and filed the complete
document the next day. Defendant filed an opposition to the approval of the appe
al bond since it was filed one day after the end of the reglementary period. The
judge disapproved the bond and rendered the judgment final and executory. Plain
tiff interposed a petition for mandamus to the SC saying that the CFI committed
a grave abuse of discretion. ISSUE: W/N the CFI committed grave abuse of discret
ion in disallowing the appeal bond. HELD: Yes, it did. The action of the CFI is
harsh and improvident according to the SC. The bond would have been filed on tim
e if it had not been for the defect. According to the Rules of Court, a personal
appeal bond need not necessarily be subscribed by 2 sureties, it would suffice
that the court approves such. Furthermore, the Rules of Court also state that th
e appeal needs only one surety. So long as the surety is solvent and acceptable
to the court, it should suffice. Moreover, the defect in the appeal bond, even i
f indeed 2 sureties were needed, the court would not have been deprived of juris
diction since it was filed within the reglementary period. Rules of procedure sh
ould be liberally construed in order to promote their object and assist the part
ies in obtaining a just determination of their cases. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9d, 9e, 1
1b
176 International Corporate Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court

Case No. 63 G.R. No. L-6970 (Jan. 30, 1988) Chapter VII, Page 326, Footnote No.
181
Del Rosario v. Hamoy
Case No. 35 No. L-77154 (June 30, 1987) Chapter VII, Page 326, Footnote No. 181
FACTS: Private Respondent secured a loan from Petitioners predecessor in interest
by mortgaging her properties. The amount approved for release was used to pay f
or her other obligations to Petitioner. Thus, private Respondent claimed that sh
e never received anything from the approved loan. Private Respondent made a mone
y market placement. Meanwhile, she allegedly failed to pay her mortgage so the b
ank refused to pay the interest earned by the placement, applying the amount ins
tead to the deficiency in the mortgage. The mortgaged properties were auctioned.
Private Respondent filed a petition to release in her favor the amount earned i
n the money market investment which was subsequently granted by the court. The c
ourt issued a writ of execution against Petitioners property. Private Respondent
filed an ex parte motion praying that five branches of the bank pay her the tota
l amount of the money market interest, which was granted. Petitioner failed to c
omply with all the said orders. The supplemental petition of the Private Respond
ent was marred by erasures, alterations, and/or additions. Such bond was therefo
re rendered without force and effect. Private Respondent contends that the alter
ations were all made by the insurance company itself since there were no ready-m
ade forms available. ISSUE: W/N there can be legal compensation in the case at b
ar. HELD: Compensation is not proper where the claim of the person asserting the
setoff against the other is neither clear nor liquidated. Compensation cannot e
xtend to unliquidated disputed claim arising from breach of contract. Petitioner
is indebted to private Respondent in the amount of the money market interest. T
he debt of P6.81M of private Respondent to Petitioner is however in doubt. This
prevents legal compensation from taking place under Art. 1290 of the Civil Code.
The filing of insufficient or defective bond does not dissolve absolutely and u
nconditionally the injunction issued. The decision of the CA is affirmed. LATIN
MAXIM: 9c, 9d, 11b
FACTS: For want of a one-peso documentary stamp in a special power of attorney f
or pre-trial purposes, in lieu of the personal appearance of Plaintiff, the Resp
ondent Judge declared him non-suited and dismissed the complaint for failure of t
he Plaintiff to appear for pre-trial conference. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Judge erre
d in dismissing the case because the document did not have the required one-peso
documentary stamp. HELD: Yes. Had Respondent Judge been less technical and more
sensible, the present proceedings and the consequent waste of time of this Cour
t would have been avoided. By such rigidity, Respondent denied the Petitioner su
bstantial justice. He could have easily required counsel for Plaintiff to buy th
e documentary stamp and affix it to the special power of attorney and it would n
ot have taken ten minutes. The Respondent Judge lost sight of the fact that even
the Rules of Court themselves, fortified by jurisprudence, mandate a liberal co
nstruction of the rules and pleadings in order to effect substantial justice. LA
TIN MAXIM: 8c, 9d, 18a, 18b
177 Lacsamana v. Intermediate Appellate Court

Case No. 69 No. L-73146-53 (August 26, 1986) Chapter VII, Page 326, Footnote No.
181
Gimenez v. Securities and Exchange Commission
Case No. 52 No. L-68568 (December 26, 1984) Chapter VII, Page 326, Footnote No.
181
FACTS: A decision was rendered against Petitioner by the RTC, thus counsel for P
etitioner filed a motion with Respondent court for 15 days extension to file a p
etition for review. However, a decision was promulgated by the Respondent court
ruling that the period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration
cannot be extended and declared the case terminated. The Respondent court cited
a Supreme Court decision where the issue was regarding an extension to file a mo
tion for reconsideration of a final order or ruling and not the question of gran
ting a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review. ISSUE: W/N Re
spondent court erred in terminating the case. HELD: Yes. The Court rules, for th
e guidance of Bench and Bar, that a motion for extension of time to file a petit
ion for review under Sec. 22 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act and Sec. 22(b)
of the Interim Rules, may properly be filed with and granted by the IAC (now the
Court of Appeals). The Court further restates and clarifies the modes and perio
ds as follows: (6) Period of extension of time to file petition for review: Begi
nning one month after the promulgation of this Decision, an extension of only 15
days for filing a petition for review may be granted by the CA, save in excepti
onally meritorious cases. The motion for extension of time must be filed and the
corresponding docket fee paid within the reglementary period of appeal. LATIN M
AXIM: 2a, 5b, 27
FACTS: Gimenez Stockbrokerage filed a motion for reconsideration before the Comm
issioners of the SEC 27 days after receiving their decision. The SEC denied thei
r motion for reconsideration for being filed out of time. The SEC ruled that the
30-day period provided for in Sec. 6 of P.D. 902-A was modified by Sec. 39 of t
he Judiciary Revamp Law (BP 129) which provides for a period of 15 days for appe
aling from final order, resolutions, awards of decisions of any court. ISSUE: W/
N Sec. 39 of BP 129 applies to the SEC. HELD: No. Sec. 39 of BP 129 expressly re
fers to courts. The SEC is not a court. It is an administrative agency. Repeals by
implication are not favored. The 30-day period fixed by P.D. 902-A, the organic
law of the SEC, is still in force. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 24a, 37, 38b
178 Blanco v. Bernabe and Lawyers Cooperatuve Publishing Co.

Case No. 36 G.R. No. L-44970 (March 31, 1936) Chapter VII, Page 326, Footnote No
. 183
Case and Nantz v. Jugo
Case No. 49 G.R. No. L-832 (October 14, 1946) Chapter VII, Page 327, Footnote No
. 187
FACTS: To comply with the requirements to file an appeal the Petitioners filed t
he notice along with a money order for the sum of P16 to the Collector of Intern
al Revenue. However the Collector returned the said money order to sender for th
e reason that he had no authority to be its depositary. With such, the appeal wa
s not deemed filed for failure to comply with the requirements. ISSUE: W/N the r
equisites were complied with and W/N the court should grant the remedy prayed fo
r by the Petitioners. HELD: Under Sec. 76 of Act No. 190 on how appeals are perf
ected, The bond to be given shall be filed with the justice of peace . In lieu of
such bond the Appellant may file with the justice a certificate of the proper of
ficial that the Appellant has deposited P25 with the municipal treasurer (In Man
ila with the Collector of Internal Revenue). The Petitioners therefore have comp
lied with said requirements. The non-presentation of this certificate was not du
e to the Petitioners failure or omission but to the refusal of the Collector of I
nternal Revenue to receive the deposit tendered by the Petitioner. The fact that
the corresponding receipt therefore has not been issued or the failure to prese
nt the same in due time should not affect the remedy. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 6d, 7a
FACTS: Herein Defendants were to pay a counterbond to which they had complied wi
th. They furnished the Sheriff with a copy of the said counterbond to comply wit
h the requirement. The Sheriff is then tasked to furnish the Plaintiff with a co
py. On the occasion when the Sheriff received the copy of such, the counsel of t
he Plaintiff was present in his office. He asked the latter if there were object
ions to the said counterbond and the counsel replied none. Due to unfortunate ci
rcumstances the Sheriff failed to deliver a copy of such counterbond to the coun
sel to formalize the act of furnishing a copy. ISSUE: W/N the Defendants complie
d with the requirement of filing a counterbond and W/N the Plaintiff was furnish
ed a copy of such. HELD: Yes to both issues. Negligence or unavoidable circumsta
nces should not adversely affect the Defendant under the circumstance of this ca
se. The sole purpose of the counterbond is to enable the Plaintiff to see that t
he bond is in the prescribed form and for the right amount. There was substantia
l compliance with this when their attorney was shown in the Sheriffs office the D
efendants counterbond. LATIN MAXIM 6d, 9a, 9d
179 C. Viuda de Ordoveza v. Raymundo

Case No. 91 G.R. No. L-45155 (July 31, 1936) Chapter VII, Page 327, Footnote No.
189
Javellana v. Mirasol and Nuez
Case No. 65 G.R. No. 14881 (February 5, 1920) Chapter VII, Page 328, Footnote No
. 192
FACTS: Petitioner is the Respondent in another case and she contends that the op
posing party failed to file her brief within the 15-day period which makes her a
ppeal ipso facto dismissed and the CA had no authority to grant additional 5 day
s to file her brief. ISSUE: W/N the CA had authority to reinstate the appeal and
to grant the Appellant an additional 3 days with which to file her brief. HELD:
Yes. Under the Rules of Court the court may, on motion to the Appellee and notic
e the Appellant or on its own motion dismiss the bill of exceptions or the appea
l. The word may implies that the matter of dismissing the appeal or not rests withi
n the sound discretion of the court. LATIN MAXIM: 9d
FACTS: A redemption of property from an execution sale, which had been effected
in behalf of a brother of the execution debtor (Julio Javellana), was attacked i
n this case as void because of a supposed collusive agreement between the redemp
tioner (Luis Mirasol) and sheriff (Geronimo Nuez) whereby the latter agreed to wi
thhold the redemption money from the creditor and to return it to the redemption
er if the latter should finally succeed in establishing his title to the same pr
operty in other litigation. ISSUE: W/N the redemption has been effected in good
faith and in accordance with the requirements of law. HELD: A liberal constructi
on will be given to statutes governing the redemption of property, to the end th
at the property of the debtor may be made to satisfy as many liabilities as poss
ible. Redemption of property sold under execution is not rendered invalid by rea
son of the fact that the payment to the sheriff for the purpose of redemption is
effected by means of a check for the amount due. Any ordinary creditor, or assi
gnee as such, having a judgment subsequent to that under which the property was
sold may exercise the right of redemption. The act of the redemptioner in redeem
ing the property pending the decision of those appeals was not an officious act
in any sense. It was on the contrary necessary to the reasonable protection of h
is right as a subsequent judgment-creditor of Maximino Mirasol. LATIN MAXIM: 38b
, 41
180 Del Rosario v. Equitable Ins. and Casualty Co., Inc.

192
De la Cruz v. Capital Ins. & Surety Co.
o. 192
FACTS: Defendant company issued Personal Accident Policy No. 7136 on the life of
Francisco del Rosario, binding itself to pay the sum of P1,000 to P3,000, as in
demnity for the death of the insured. Petitioner, father of the insured, filed a
claim for payment with Defendant company when his son died of drowning after be
ing forced to jump off the motor launch ISLAMA on account of fire. Defendant compa
ny refused to pay more than P1,000 since they alleged that their liability was o
nly said amount pursuant to Sec. 1, Part I of the provisions of the policy. ISSU
E: How much the Defendant company should pay in indemnity for the death of Franc
isco del Rosario. HELD: The policy does not positively state any definite amount
that may be recovered in case of death by drowning. There is an ambiguity in th
is respect in the policy, which ambiguity must be interpreted in favor of the in
sured and strictly against the insurer so as to allow a greater indemnity. Petit
ioner is entitled to recover P3,000. The insurance company has already paid the
amount of P1,000 to Petitioner so that there still remains a balance of P2,000 o
f the amount to which he is entitled to recover. LATIN MAXIM: 11a, 38
FACTS: Eduardo de la Cruz was the holder of an accident insurance policy underwr
itten by the Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. In a boxing contest participat
ed into by the insured, Eduardo slipped and was hit by his opponent on the left
part of the back of the head, causing Eduardo to fall, with his head hitting the
rope of the ring. The cause of death was reported as hemorrhage, intracranial,
left. Simon de la Cruz, the father of the insured, filed a claim with the insura
nce company for payment of the indemnity under the insurance policy. Defendant c
ompany set up the defense that the death of the insured, caused by his participa
tion in a boxing contest, was not accidental and, therefore, not covered by insu
rance. ISSUE: W/N Eduardos death falls under the definition of the policy against
death or disability caused by accidental means. HELD: The terms accident and acciden
tal, as used in insurance contracts, have not acquired any technical meaning, and
are construed by the courts in their ordinary and common acceptation. There is
no accident when a deliberate act is performed unless some additional, unexpecte
d, independent and unforeseen happening occurs which produces or brings about th
e result of injury or death. The failure of the Defendant company to include dea
th resulting from a boxing match or other sports among the prohibitive risks lea
ds to the conclusion that it did not intend to limit or exempt itself from the l
iability for such death. LATIN MAXIM: 3, 25a, 30a
181 Ty Vs. First National Surety & Assurance Co., Inc.

o. 192
Capati v. Ocampo
Case No. 46 G.R. No. L-28742 (April 30, 1982) Chapter VIII, Page 330, Footnote N
o. 8
FACTS: Plaintiff Diosdado C. Ty insured himself in 18 local insurance companies,
among which being the eight above named Defendants, which issued to him persona
l accident policies. On December 24, 1953, a fire broke out which totally destro
yed the Broadway Cotton Factory. Fighting his way out of the factory, Plaintiff
was injured on the left hand by a heavy object which caused temporary total disa
bility of his left hand. Plaintiff filed the corresponding notice of accident an
d notice of claim with all of the Defendants to recover indemnity under Part II
of the policy but the Defendants rejected plaintiff s claim for indemnity for th
e reason that there being no severance of amputation of the left hand, the disab
ility suffered by him was not covered by his policy. ISSUE: W/N it is necessary
that there should be an amputation of the left hand of the Plaintiff before he c
an recover on the insurance policies. HELD: The clear and express conditions of
the insurance policies define partial disability as loss of either hand by amput
ation through the bones of the wrist. There was no such amputation in the case a
t bar. All that was found by the trial court, which is not disputed on appeal, w
as that the physical injuries "caused temporary total disability of plaintiff s
left hand." In addition, the agreement contained in the insurance policies is th
e law between the parties. As the terms of the policies are clear, express and s
pecific that only amputation of the left hand should be considered as a loss the
reof, an interpretation that would include the mere fracture or other temporary
disability not covered by the policies would certainly be unwarranted. LATIN MAX
IM: 6b, 7a, 9c
FACTS: Plaintiff, a resident of Pampanga, entered into a sub-contract with the D
efendant, a resident of Naga City. The Defendant completed a construction job fo
r the Plaintiff. However, the construction was completed on a date later than wh
at was agreed in their contract. Hence, Plaintiff filed in the CFI of Pampanga a
n action for recovery of consequential damages due to the delay. Defendant filed
a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue of action was improp
erly laid. The CFI of Pampanga dismissed the Plaintiff s complaint on ground of
improper venue. ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of impro
per venue was correct. HELD: No. The rule on venue of personal actions cognizabl
e by the CFI is found in Sec. 2(b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, which provides
that such "actions may be commenced and tried where the Defendant or any of the
Defendants resides or may be found, or where the Plaintiff or any of the Plaint
iffs resides, at the election of the Plaintiff." The word "may" is merely permis
sive and operates to confer discretion upon a party. Under ordinary circumstance
s, the term "may be" connotes possibility; it does not connote certainty. "May"
is an auxillary verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission or possibility.
LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 25a, b
182 Chartered Bank v. National Government Auditing Office

Case No. 58 G.R. No. L-38513 (March 31, 1987) Chapter VIII, Page 331, Footnote N
o. 10
Guiao v. Figueroa
Case No. 121 G.R. No. L-6481 (May 17, 1954) Chapter VIII, Page 333, Footnote No.
17
FACTS: Iloilo city branch of Petitioner bank was accepting postal money order fr
om the general public since 1946. These orders were presented to the Iloilo city
office for payment and if said office could not pay in full, they would issue r
eceipts for their remaining balance. On 1968, the Bureau of Posts issued an unnu
mbered circular: "Memorandum of Understanding Covering Cashing and Clearing of M
oney Orders," effective October 1, 1968, involving the installation of a new pos
tal money order system which requires that all commercial banks, regardless of l
ocation, must clear all postal money orders they have received and paid with the
Central Bank at Manila. Petitioner bank continued its transactions with the pos
t office under the old practice through the latter s Acting Cashier beyond Octob
er 1, 1968. The post office said that the arrangements made by the acting cashie
r and the Petitioner bank were private, unauthorized arrangements and any claim
for settlement of any unpaid money orders should be directed against the said ca
shier. ISSUE: W/N the unnumbered circular and the understanding are directory an
d permissive in nature. HELD: Respondents are correct by saying that the purpose
s of the new postal money order system negate the contention that said circular
and memorandum are not mandatory in nature and that they are for the convenience
of commercial banks operating in the Manila area only. LATIN MAXIM: 7a, 9a, 36a
, 36b undated memorandum of
FACTS: In the trial of People v. Gopez, the provincial fiscal introduced Porfiri
o Dizon and Emiliano Manalo as witnesses for the State. After the reinvestigatio
n, an amended information was filed, and two new accused were included, namely,
Jesus Guiao and Eulogio Serrano. But Dizon and Manalo were not included. In view
of the failure of the provincial fiscal to include these two persons, the actio
n for mandamus was filed by Jesus Guiao to compel the fiscal to include Dizon an
d Manalo as accused in his information. ISSUE: W/N a fiscal may be compelled by
mandamus to include in an information persons who appear to be responsible for t
he crime charged therein. HELD: Yes. Sec. 1 of Rule 106 of the Rules of Court ta
ken from Act No. 2709 states that, Every prosecution for a crime shall be in the
name of the United States against all persons who appear to be responsible there
for, except in the cases determined in Sec. 2 of this Act. A perusal of Act No. 2
709 discloses the legislative intent to require that all persons who appear to b
e responsible for an offense should be included in the information. The use of t
he word "shall" and of the phrase "except in cases determined" shows Sec. 1 is m
andatory, not merely directory. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a, 25a
183 Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 153 G.R. No. 117188 (August 7, 1997) Chapter VIII, Page 334, Footnote N
o. 22
Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 95 G.R. No. 102858 (July 28, 1997) Chapter VIII, Page 334, Footnote No.
23
FACTS: The Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association Inc. (LGVHAI) was register
ed with Respondent Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) as the sole ho
meowners organization in the said subdivision but it did not file its corporate b
ylaws. Later, it was discovered that there were two other organizations within t
he subdivision: the North and South Associations. Respondent HIGC then informed
the president of LGVHAI that the latter has been automatically dissolved because
of non-submission of its by-laws as required by the Corporation Code. This resu
lted in the registration of Petitioner association. LGVHAI complained and got a
favorable result from Respondent HIGC declaring the registration of Petitioner a
ssociation cancelled and Respondent CA subsequently affirmed the said decision.
Hence, Petitioner association filed a petition for certiorari. ISSUE: W/N the fa
ilure of a corporation to file its by-laws within one month from the date of its
incorporation results in its automatic dissolution. HELD: No. The legislatures i
ntent is not to automatically dissolve a corporation for its failure to pass its
by-laws. The word must in a statute is not always imperative but it may be consis
tent with an exercise of discretion. The language of the statute should be consi
dered as a whole while ascertaining the intent of the legislature in using the w
ord must or shall. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 25a, 36a, 38b, b
FACTS: Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registr
ation of a land title. During the pendency of the said petition, he died and his
heirs were represented by Josefa Abistado as a guardian ad litem in order to co
ntinue the petition. The trial court dismissed the petition for want of jurisdict
ion. However, it was found that the applicant had been in open, continuous and ex
clusive possession of the subject land since 1938. The reason for the dismissal
is that the applicant failed to publish the notice of Initial Hearing in a newsp
aper of general circulation pursuant to a law. The CA set aside the decision of
the trial court. Thus, Petitioner brought the case to the Supreme Court. ISSUE:
Whether the newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an origina
l land registration case is mandatory or directory. HELD: It is mandatory. The l
aw used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner
of Land Registration upon the latter s receipt of the court order setting the ti
me for initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and thus indicates t
he mandatory character of a statute. While such literal mandate is not an absolu
te rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its con
text in the entire provision, it is held that in the present case the term must
be understood in its normal mandatory meaning in order to uphold the norms of du
e process. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a
184 Bersabal v. Salvador

Case No. 34 G.R. No. L-35910 (July 21, 1978) Chapter VIII, Page 335, Footnote No
. 25
Republic Planers Bank v. Agana Sr.
Case No. 133 G. R. No. 51765 (March 3, 1997)
FACTS: Private Respondents filed an ejectment suit against the Petitioner. The s
ubsequent decision was appealed by the Petitioner and during its pendency, the c
ourt issued an order stating that counsels for both parties are given 30 days from
receipt of this order within which to file their memoranda in order for this ca
se to be submitted for decision by the court. After receipt, Petitioner filed a m
otion ex parte to submit memorandum within 30 days from receipt of notice of sub
mission of the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing of the
case which was granted by the court. But the Respondent judge issued an order di
smissing the case for failure to prosecute Petitioners appeal. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration citing the submitted ex parte motion but the court d
enied it. ISSUE: W/N the mere failure of an Appellant to submit the mentioned me
morandum would empower the CFI to dismiss the appeal on the ground of failure to
prosecute. HELD: The court is not empowered by law to dismiss the appeal on the
mere failure of an Appellant to submit his memorandum. The law provides that Cou
rts shall decide cases on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from t
he city courts: Provided parties may submit memoranda if so requested It cannot be in
terpreted otherwise than that the submission of memoranda is optional. LATIN MAX
IM: 6c
FACTS: Private Respondents filed in court a quo, an action for specific performa
nce to compel petitioner to redeem 800 preferred shares of stock with a face val
ue of P8,000.00 and to pay 1% quarterly interest thereon as quarterly dividend o
wing them under the terms and conditions of the certificates of stock. The court
a quo rendered judgment in favor of Private Respondents. ISSUE: W/N Respondent
Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdi
ction in compelling Petitioner bank to redeem Private Respondents preferred share
s HELD: Yes. Respondent Judge, in ruling that Petitioner must redeem the shares
in question, stated that, On the question of the redemption by the Defendant of s
aid preferred shares of stock, the very wordings of the terms and conditions in
said stock certificates clearly allows the same. What Respondent Judge failed to
recognize was that while the stock certificate does allow redemption, the option
to do so was clearly vested in the Petitioner Bank. The redemption therefore is
clearly the type known as "optional". Furthermore, the terms and conditions set
forth therein use the word "may". It is a settled doctrine in statutory constru
ction that the word "may" denotes discretion, and cannot be construed as having
a mandatory effect. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 6b, 7a, 30b, 36a
185 Phil. Consumers Foundation , Inc. v. Natl Telecommunications Commission

Phil. Consumers Foundation, Inc. v. NTC and PLDT (Resolution)
FACTS: Respondent Commission approved a revised schedule for Subscriber Investme
nt Plan (SIP) filed by Private Respondent. Petitioner states that SIP schedule p
resented by the Private Respondent is pre-mature and, therefore, illegal and bas
eless, because the Respondent Commission has not yet promulgated the required ru
les and regulations implementing Sec. 2 of P.D. 217 which provides, The Departmen
t of Public Works, Transportation and Communications through its Board of Commun
ications and/or appropriate agency shall see to it that the herein declared poli
cies for the telephone industry are immediately implemented and for this purpose
pertinent rules and regulations may be promulgated ... ISSUE: W/N Respondent Com
mission acted with grave abuse of discretion. HELD: Yes. P.D. 217 deals with mat
ters so alien, innovative and untested such that existing substantive and proced
ural laws would not be applicable. Thus, the SIP was so set up precisely to ensu
re the financial viability of public telecommunications companies which in turn
assures the enjoyment of the population at minimum cost the benefits of a teleph
one facility. Without promulgation of rules and regulation there would be confus
ion among the rights of Private Respondent, the consumers and the government its
elf. The plan to expand the company program and/or improve its service is laudab
le, but the expenses should not be shouldered by the telephone subscribers. Cons
idering the multi-million profits of the company, the cost of expansion and/or i
mprovement should come from part of its huge profits. LATIN MAXIM: 8b, 9d, 11b,
12a
FACTS: Respondent Commission filed a manifestation that it is joining Private Re
spondent in its second motion for reconsideration and adopting it as its own. Th
e decision promulgated interprets the rule-making authority delegated in Section
2 of P.D. 217 to the then Department of Public Works, Transportation and Commun
ications as mandatory, which construction is not supported by the actual phraseo
logy of said Section 2. ISSUE: W/N the previous decision rendered making it mand
atory to set rules and regulations implementing P.D. 217 should be reconsidered.
HELD: Yes. The basic canon of statutory interpretation is that the word used in
the law must be given its ordinary meaning, unless a contrary intent is manifes
t from the law itself. Hence, the phrase "may be promulgated" should not be cons
trued to mean "shall" or "must". LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 6d, 9f, 30b, 24, 36, 39c
186 Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation

Case No. 93 G.R. No. L-4712 (July 11, 1952) Chapter VIII, Page 336, Footnote No.
32
Berces v. Guingona, et. al.
Case No. 33 G.R. No. 112099 (February 21, 1995) Chapter VIII, Page 337, Footnote
No. 34
FACTS: Petitioner, the holder of a back pay certificate of indebtedness issued u
nder RA 304, sought to compel Respondent company to accept his back pay certific
ate as payment of his loan from the latter. His basis was Sec. 2 of RA 304, whic
h provides that investment funds or banks or other financial institutions owned o
r controlled by the government shall subject to availability of loanable funds a
ccept or discount at not more than two per centum per annum for ten years such c
ertificate for certain specified purposes. Respondent company contended however t
hat the word shall used in this particular section of the law is merely directory.
The lower court sustained Respondent company. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner can use his
back pay certificate to pay for his loan to Respondent company.
FACTS: Petitioner filed two administrative cases against Respondent mayor of Tiw
i, Albay for 1) abuse of authority; and 2) dishonesty, with the Sangguiniang Pan
lalawigan. Respondent mayor was convicted, and accordingly, suspended in both ca
ses. Respondent mayor appealed to the Office of the President and prayed for sta
y of execution under Sec. 67(b) of the LGC. The Office of the President stayed e
xecution, citing Sec. 68 of RA 7160 and Sec. 6 of A.O. No. 18. According to Peti
tioner, the governing law is RA 7160, which contains a mandatory provision that
an appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final and executory. Petiti
oner further contends that A.O. No. 18 was repealed by RA 7160. ISSUE: W/N R.A.
7160 repealed A.O. No. 18. HELD: No. Sec. 530(f), RA 7160 did not expressly repe
al Sec. 6, A.O. No. 18 because it failed to identify or designate the laws on ex
ecutive orders that are intended to be repealed. If there was any repeal, it was
by implication which is not favored. In the absence of an express repeal, a sub
sequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcilabl
e inconsistency and repugnancy exists between the two. There is none in this cas
e. The first sentence of Sec. 68 provides that an appeal shall not prevent a deci
sion from becoming final or executory. It gives discretion to reviewing appeals t
o stay execution. The term shall may be read mandatory or directory, depending upo
n consideration of the entire provision where it is found. LATIN MAXIM: 25a, 26,
50
HELD: No. It is true that in its ordinary signification, the word shall is imperat
ive. However, the rule is not absolute; it may be construed as may when required b
y the context or by the intention of the statute. The modifier, at not more than
two per centum per annum for ten years., the interest to be charged, that the ver
bphrase is mandatory because not only the law uses at not more but the legislative
purpose and intent, to conserve the value of the back pay certificate for the b
enefit of the holders, for whose benefit the same have been issued, can be carri
ed out by fixing a maximum limit for discounts. But as to when the discounting o
r acceptance shall be made, the context and the sense demand a contrary interpre
tation. If the acceptance or discount of the certificate is to be subject to the c
ondition of the availability of loanable funds, it is evident the legislature in
tended that the acceptance shall be allowed on the condition that there are avail
able loanable funds. In other words, acceptance or discount is to be permitted on
ly if there are loanable funds. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 25a, 26
187 Mers Shoes Manufacturing, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al

.
No. 35
Fule v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 48 G.R. No. L-79094 (June 22, 1988) Chapter VIII, Page 337, Footnote No
. 37
FACTS: Petitioner hired Respondent workers as piece rate workers. Alleging serio
us business decline, Petitioner barred its workers from entering the company to
work. The workers challenged the legality of Petitioners stoppage of operations.
The Labor Arbiter found the shutdown with cause but without the required notice,
and ordered Petitioner to pay indemnity and separation pay. Petitioner appealed
to Respondent NLRC but sought a reduction of the cash or surety bond. Despite t
he reduction granted, Petitioner still failed to post bond within 10 days, resul
ting to the dismissal of appeal for failure to perfect it. ISSUE: W/N Respondent
NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion. HELD: No. Under Art. 223 of the Labor
Code, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon posting of cash or s
urety bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award. Perfection of appeal i
s jurisdictional and non-compliance with such legal requirements is fatal. The w
ord only makes it perfectly clear that the posting of bond is to be the exclusive
means by which an employers appeal may be perfected. LATIN MAXIM: 25a, 26
FACTS: Petitioner, an agent of the Towers Assurance Corporation, issued and made
out check No. 26741 in favor of Roy Nadera. Said check was dishonored for the r
eason that the said checking account was already closed, thus in violation of BP
22, the Bouncing Checks Law. Upon the hearing, prosecution presented its eviden
ce and the Petitioner waived his right. Instead, he submitted a memorandum confi
rming the Stipulation of Facts. He was convicted by the trial court, and on appe
al, the Appellate Court. ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in affirming the decision of th
e RTC based on the Stipulation of Facts that was not signed by the Petitioner no
r his counsel. HELD: The CA erred. Case is re-opened to receive evidence of Peti
tioner. Sec. 4 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides, No agreement or admis
sion made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence a
gainst the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel. B
ecause of the word shall, in its language, the rule is mandatory. Negative words a
nd phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are me
rely directory. Therefore, the signature of the Petitioner and the counsel is ma
ndatory. Also, penal statues are to be liberally construed in favor of the accus
ed. LATIN MAXIM: 9d
188 McGee v. Republic

Case No. 174 G.R. No. L-5387 (April 29, 1954) Chapter VIII, Page 337, Footnote N
o. 37
Penid v. Virata
Case No. 101 G.R. No. L-44004 (March 25, 1983) Chapter VIII, Page 338, Footnote
No. 40
FACTS: Petitioner, an American citizen married to Leonarda Crisostomo, wants to
adopt her children by her first husband. However, he is barred from doing so und
er Art. 335 of the old Civil Code which states that those who have legitimate, le
gitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction ca
nnot adopt. Petitioner and Leonarda have one legitimate child. Despite Art. 335,
the trial court ruled in favor of the adoption, invoking Art. 338 which states
that a step-child, by the step-father or step-mother can be adopted. ISSUE: W/N a
husband having a legitimate child may adopt a step-child. HELD: No. One strong a
rgument presented by the trial court in upholding the adoption is that to hold o
therwise would render Art. 338 meaningless and a surplusage. However, it must be
noted that Art. 335 and Art. 338 should be considered in relation to each other
. That a parent can adopt a step-child is limited by Art. 335 that said parent c
annot have a legitimate child in order to qualify as an adopter. One principle b
ehind this is to protect the successional rights of the legitimate child. In add
ition, under the laws of statutory construction, negative words and phrases are
to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory.
Art. 335 is phrased in a negative manner: cannot adopt. While Art. 338 is posit
ive: the following may be adopted. LATIN MAXIM: 15a
FACTS: Confidential Information No. 28 of the BIR was filed by the Petitioners.
It is a sworn statement that listed the shipping companies and agents who had be
en falsely declaring their gross earnings on the basis of a parity rate of P2.00
to US $1.00 defrauding the Philippine Government of millions of pesos in taxes.
Further, Petitioners divulged other cases of erroneous conversion not listed in
the Confidential Information. One of these was Pan Fil Co. Inc. Now the Petitio
ners seek their 25% reward taken from the total revenue collected from shipping
companies in payment for their deficiencies as provided by RA 2338. ISSUE: W/N t
he Petitioners could claim reward from Pan Fil Co. Inc, a company which is not i
ncluded in the Confidential Information. HELD: Yes. According to Sec. 4 of RA 23
38, In order to entitle an informer to a reward, the information given by him mus
t lead to or be instrumental in the discovery of the fraud or violation and resu
lts in the recovery of collection of revenues . Not only did the BIR rely on the C
onfidential Information submitted by the Petitioners for their investigation, bu
t also on the categorical statement that other shipping companies falsely declar
ed their gross earnings, which led to further investigations and, consequently,
recovery of collection. Therefore, this information was instrumental in the disc
overy of the fraud or violation. In jurisprudence, statues offering rewards must
be liberally construed in favor of informers and with regard to the purpose for
which they are intended. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9d
189 Pahilan v. Tabalba, et al.

No. 63
Pimentel v. Festejo
Case No. 124 G.R. No. L-2327 (January 11, 1949) Chapter VIII, Page 342, Footnote
No. 64
FACTS: Petitioner and Respondent were candidates for Mayor of Guinsiliban, Camig
uin. Respondent Tabalba was proclaimed Mayor. Petitioner Pahilan filed an electi
on protest although the docket fees he paid were insufficient. The trial court d
ismissed the election protest for non-payment on time of the required fees for f
iling an initiatory pleading. Within the 5-day period to appeal, Petitioner file
d a verified appeal brief. But the Clerk of Court said that his office did not rec
eive any notice of appeal from Petitioner. Petitioners appeal was then dismissed fo
r failure to appeal within the prescribed period. ISSUE: 1. W/N the verified appe
al was validly dismissed. 2. W/N the trial judge validly dismissed the petition o
f protest of Petitioner for non-payment on time of the required fees. HELD: 1. N
o. The notice of appeal can be validly substituted by an appeal brief. The filin
g and approval of the record on appeal necessarily involves the filing of the no
tice of appeal. The RTC was sent copies by registered mail within the prescribed
period, and is assumed to be received in the regular course of the mail, filed
as of the date of mailing. 2. No. The docket fee was paid although insufficient.
Statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed that the
will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere
technical objections. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 9d, 40b
FACTS: Festejo was proclaimed Mayor of Santa Lucia with Appellant protesting. Ap
pellant contends that the lower court erred in not crediting to him the 59 ballo
ts which would have made him win. Appellants name in the 59 ballots were written
on different lines such as those corresponding to vice-mayor, member of the prov
incial board or councilor. Appellant claimed that his name was only misplaced bu
t the intention to elect him as mayor was apparent. ISSUE: W/N Appellant can cla
im as votes in his favor ballots with his name which does not appear written in
the space reserved for mayor. HELD: No. For any ballot to be counted for a candi
date for mayor, it is indispensable that his name be written by the voter in the
ballot and cannot be mistaken by a person who, as provided by the Constitution,
is able to read. A name can be counted for any office only when it is written w
ithin the space indicated upon the ballot for the vote for such office. It is im
possible to count a ballot as vote for a candidate for mayor, when his name is c
learly written in the space reserved for another office. Considering that in 59
ballots claimed by Appellant in this appeal his name does not appear written in
the space reserved for mayor, he cannot claim them as votes in his favor as cand
idate for mayor. LATIN MAXIM: 6d, 7b, 43
190 Roxas v. Rafferty

Case No. 264 G.R. No. L-12182 (March 27, 1918) Chapter VIII, Page 345, Footnote
No. 75
Serfino v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 145 G.R. No. 40858 (September 15, 1987) Chapter VIII, Page 345, Footnot
e No. 75
FACTS: Plaintiffs owned a parcel of land. In the latter part of 1913, the constr
uction of a reinforced concrete building was begun. It was finished in all respe
cts on February 15, 1915. The city assessor and collector of Manila, under the d
ate of December 1, 1914, sent Plaintiffs notice, received by them on December 25
, 1914, requiring them to declare the new improvements for assessments for the y
ear 1915. Plaintiffs paid the amount of the taxes, which amounted to P3,000, und
er protest. Suit was begun in the CFI of Manila to recover this sum with interes
t at the legal rate from the date of payment. ISSUE: W/N the assessment was lega
l. HELD: No. The assessor cannot make a valid assessment unless he has given pro
per notice. The law requires that the assessor should have notified the Plaintif
fs during November. His attempted notification on December 25, 1914, was not giv
en during the time fixed by statute, thus there was no legal assessment of the R
oxas Building for the year 1915. Furthermore, the city assessor and collector we
re under the obligation to add any completed improvements to the assessment list
. The city assessor and collector could not prematurely perform this duty on imp
rovements not yet completed. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 19
FACTS: A parcel of land, consisting of 21.1676 hectares situated in Sagay, Negro
s Occidental, was patented in the name of Pacifico Casamayor, under Homestead Pa
tent No. 44139. Upon registration of said patent, OCT No. 1839 was issued by sai
d office in the name of Pacifico Casamayor. In 1945, Casamayor sold the land in
favor of Nemesia Baltazar. Apparently, OCT No. 1839 was lost during the war and
upon the petition of Baltazar, the CFI of Negros ordered its reconstitution in t
he name of Casamayor. On the same day, TCT No. 57-N was issued in the name of Ne
mesia Baltazar but after the cancellation of OCT No. 14-R. In 1951, Baltazar sol
d the property to Respondent Lopez Sugar Central, which did not present the docu
ments for registration until December 1964 to the Office of Registry of Deeds. S
aid office refused registration upon its discovery that the same property was co
vered by another certificate of title, TCT No. 28985, in the name of Petitioner.
ISSUE: W/N the purchase by Respondent Lopez Sugar Central of the lot in questio
n was null and void from the beginning. HELD: No, applying Sec. 118 of C.A. No.
141, which prohibits the alienation of homestead lots to private individuals wit
hin 5 years from the date of the issuance of the patent, and not Sec. 121 which
governs sale to corporations. Since the grant was more than 5 years before, the
transfer to Nemesia Baltazar was valid and legal. LATIN MAXIM: 37b, 43
191 Quijano v. Development Bank of the Philippines

Case No. G. R. No. 26419 (October 16, 1970)
Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections
Case No. 137 G.R. No. 119976 (September 18, 1995) Chapter VIII, Page 347, Footno
te No.84
FACTS: Petitioner filed an urban estate loan with respondent which was approved.
The loan was to be released in installments. The outstanding obligation of the
petitioners with respondent, including interests, amounted to P13,983.59. Petiti
oner wrote the respondent offering to pay in the amount of P14,000 for his outst
anding obligation, out of the proceeds of his back pay pursuant to RA No. 897 (R
A 897). Respondent advised petitioners of the non-acceptance of the offer on the
ground that the loan was not incurred before or subsisting on June 20, 1953 whe
n RA 897 was approved. ISSUE: W/N petitioners obligation is subsisting at the tim
e of the approval of RA 897. HELD: No. The provision expressly provides that the
obligations must be subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897. Hence, wh
en such backpay certificates are offered in payment to a government-owned corpor
ation of obligation thereto which was not subsisting at the time of the enactmen
t of said Act on June 20, 1953, such corporation may not legally be compelled to
accept the certificates. The Court cannot see any room for interpretation or co
nstruction in the clear and unambiguous language of the provision of law. LATIN
MAXIM: 28, 7a, 6c, 1
FACTS: Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Represe
ntative of the First District of Leyte. Private respondent Montejo, the incumben
t Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same pos
ition, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification with respondent COME
LEC alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for res
idency. ISSUE: W/N petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the Firs
t District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the 1995 elections.
HELD: Yes. Residency qualification pertains to domicile. As a minor, petitioner
followed the domicile of her parents in Tacloban, Leyte. As domicile, once acqui
red, it is retained until a new one is gained. In spite of the being born in Man
ila, Tacloban was her domicile of origin by operation of law. Parenthetically, w
hen she married then Congressman Marcos, petitioner was obliged, by virtue of Ar
t. 110 of the Civil Code, to follow her husbands actual place of residence fixed
by him. Although Mr. Marcos has different places of residence, and even if he ha
d designated one, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. The
refore, she did not lose her domicile of origin. LATIN MAXIM: 25a, 37, 39a
192 Portillo v. Salvani

Case No. 243 G.R. No. L-32181 (March 10, 1930) Chapter III, Page 101, Footnote N
o. 130
Querubin v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 247 G.R. No. L-2581 (December 2, 1948) Chapter VIII, Page 332, Footnote
No. 14
FACTS: Appellant Salvani won the elections in 1928 for the office of provincial
governor of Antique. Appellee Portillo, his nearest opponent, filed an election
protest on July 9, 1928. Decision was rendered on August 15, 1929 declaring appe
llee Portillo the winner. ISSUE: W/N the decision by the trial judge declaring a
ppellee Portillo is valid. HELD: The decision is void for want of jurisdiction.
The Election Law provides that all proceedings in an electoral contest shall be
terminated within one year. Legislative history of the said legislation reveals
that the shift of the tenor of the statute from silence to mild admonition to st
ronger suggestion and finally to an emphatic and explicit provision suggests the
legislative intent to make the provision mandatory. One year having already ela
psed, the proceeding is deemed terminated and the court loses jurisdiction rende
ring any subsequent decision void for want of jurisdiction. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a,
7b, 9a, 43, 45, b2
FACTS: Petitioner defeated Felipe Mamuri in the election for the mayoralty of Il
agan. Mamuri filed an election protest in the court, lost and filed an appeal th
ereafter. The appeal was not acted upon for three months hence the petition to d
ismiss the case for the court had lost jurisdiction. ISSUE: W/N the CA had lost
their jurisdiction to decide the appeal. HELD: No. Sec. 178 of the Election Code
provides that appeals from decisions in election contests should be decided wit
hin three months after filing. However, this provision is directory in nature si
nce to apply a mandatory character would defeat the purpose of due process of th
e law. The dismissal in such a case will constitute a miscarriage of justice. Th
e doctrine in Portillo v. Salvani should be abandoned. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 2, 5b, 18
b, 39b
193 Nilo v. Court of Appeals

Case No. 189 G.R. No. L-34586 (April 2, 1984) Chapter III, Page 89, Footnote No.
59
Salcedo and Ignacio v. Carpio and Carreon
Case No. 138 G.R. No. L-4495 (June 6, 1951)
FACTS: Private respondent Gatchalian is the owner of a parcel of Riceland at Bul
acan with an area of 2 hectares. Petitioner elected to use the leasehold system.
Private respondent then filed for ejection citing personal cultivation on March 7
, 1968. Private respondent won the case and petitioner filed an appeal citing th
at RA 3844 was amended on September 10, 1971 removing personal cultivation from th
e grounds for ejectment. ISSUE: W/N the amendment of RA 6389 has retroactive eff
ect. HELD: No. Art. 4 of the New Civil Code provides that laws shall have no ret
roactive effect unless it is explicitly provided. The legislation involves socia
l justice, however the landowners being holders of only small parcels of land sh
ould also be entitled to social justice. Furthermore, to rule against the small
landowners would be thwarting legislative intent of creating independent and sel
f-reliant farmers. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 46a, 46b
FACTS: Petitioners were appointed members of the Board of Dental Examiners. RA 5
46 was approved and Sec. 1 thereof amended Sec. 10 of the Reorganization Act No.
4007. By virtue of this law, a Board of Dental Examiners was appointed by the P
resident, whose terms directly overlapped and conflicted with that of the petiti
oners. ISSUE: W/N it was the intention of Congress, in enacting RA 546, to aboli
sh all the pre-existing Boards of Examiners existing after the time of the enact
ment thereof. HELD: Appointment of the respondents is valid. It is obvious that
it is the intention of Congress to do so, because the provisions of said Act are
inconsistent with those of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Act No
. 4007. In the case of Camacho vs. Court of Industrial Relations it was held tha
t it is a well established rule recognized by all authorities without exception,
that a retrospective or retroactive law is that which creates a new obligation,
imposes a new duty or attaches a new disability in respect to a transaction alr
eady past; but that status is not made retrospective because it draws on anteced
ent facts for its operation, or in other words part of the requirements for its
action and application is drawn from a time antedating its passage. LATIN MAXIM:
5a, 9c, 46, 49
194 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co., Inc.
Case No. 78 G.R. No. L-23771 (August 4, 1988) Chapter IX, Page 355, Footnote No.
14
Gallardo v. Borromeo
Case No. 50 G.R. No. L-36007 (May 25, 1988)
FACTS: The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) assessed and demanded from responden
t deficiency franchise taxes and surcharges applying the franchise tax rate of 5
% as prescribed in Sec. 259 of the National Internal Revenue Code, instead of th
e lower rates as provided in the municipal franchises. Pending the case, RA 3843
was passed, granting to the respondent a legislative franchise for the operatio
n of light, heat, and power. This law lowered the franchise tax rate to 2%. ISSU
E: W/N RA 3843 is unconstitutional for being violative of the uniformity and equa
lity of taxation clause of the Constitution. HELD: It is valid. Sec. 259 of the T
ax Code was never intended to have a universal application. RA 3843 did not only
fix and specify a franchise tax of 2% on its gross receipts, but made it in lieu
of any and all taxes, all laws to the contrary notwithstanding, thus leaving no
room for doubt regarding the legislative intent. Charters or special laws grante
d and enacted by the Legislature are in the nature of private contracts. They do
not constitute a part of the machinery of the general government. The Legislatu
re considers and makes provision for all the circumstances of a particular case.
RA 3843 specifically provided for the retroactive effect of the law. LATIN MAXI
M: 6c, 9c, 46, 49
FACTS: Petitioner filed to terminate the leasehold of the respondent tenant so h
e (plaintiff) may cultivate it himself as he had retired from his government job
as a letter carrier. Upon appeal, the CA applying Sec. 7 of RA 6389, held that
the landowners desire to cultivate the land himself is not a valid ground for dis
possessing the tenant. ISSUE: W/N the CA correctly gave retroactive application
to Sec. 7 of RA 6389. HELD: No. The applicable law when petitioner filed his com
plaint was RA 3844 which provided a ground for the ejectment of the tenant shoul
d the landowner have a desire to personally cultivate the landholding. The newer
law, R.A. 6389 eliminated this ground. In applying Art. 4 of the New Civil Code
, RA 6389 cannot be given retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory provi
sion for retroactivity or a clear implication of the law to that effect. Since C
ongress failed to express an intention to make said RA retroactive, it may not a
pply to ejectment cases then already pending adjudication by the courts. LATIN M
AXIM: 6c, 46e
195 Cebu Portland Cement v. CIR

Case No. 52 G.R. No. 20563 (October 29, 1968) Chapter IX, Page 355, Footnote No.
15
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Filipinas Compaia de Seguros
Case No. 76 G.R. No. 14880 (April 29, 1960) Chapter IV, Page 134, Footnote No. 4
1
FACTS: The case involves petitioners claim for refund of sales tax paid from Nove
mber 1954 to March 1955, and ad valorem tax paid from April 1955 to September 19
56 from the sale of APO Portland cement produced by petitioner. Since 1952, howe
ver, petitioner had been protesting the imposition of the sales tax on its APO P
ortland cement, and on January 1953, it also protested the payment of the ad val
orem taxes. Petitioner claimed for refund and brought its case to the Court of T
ax Appeals. Petitioner contends that the percentage taxes collected by responden
t are refundable since under RA 1229 (effective June 1955), producers of cement
are exempt from the payment of said tax. The Court of Tax Appeals ruled otherwis
e. ISSUE: Whether RA 1229 applies prospectively or retroactively. HELD: A statut
e operates prospectively only and never retroactively, unless the legislative in
tent to the contrary is made manifest either by the express terms of the statute
or by necessary implication. In every case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved
against the retrospective effect. While the purpose of the amendment, as mentio
ned in the explanatory note to the bill, was not only to accelerate the collectio
n of mining royalties and ad valorem taxes but also clarify the doubt of the tax
-paying public on the interpretative scope of the two terms, it certainly could n
ot have been the intention of the lawmakers to unsettle previously consummated t
ransactions between the taxpayer and the Government. LATIN MAXIM: 46a, 46c, 46e
FACTS: Respondent, an insurance company, was engaged in business as a real estat
e dealer. RA 1612 amended the National Internal Revenue Code and provided for a
scale of graduated rates; this took effect on August of 1956. Petitioner assesse
d against the respondent taxes (to which the insurance company has already paid
in full on January 1956) for the year 1956 based on RA 1612. Respondent appealed
to the Court of Tax Appeals the erroneous assessment of the petitioner and was
granted a decision in favor of it. ISSUE: W/N RA 1612 should be applied retroact
ively. HELD: No. As a rule, laws have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary
is provided. The rule applies with greater force to the case at bar, considerin
g that RA 1612, which imposes the new and higher taxes, expressly provides that
said Act shall take effect upon its approval. LATIN MAXIM: 46a, 46c, 46e
196 Laceste v. Santos

Case No. 140 G.R. No. 36886 (February 1, 1932) Chapter IX, Page 351, Footnote No
. 1
Balatbat v. Court of Appeals and Passion
Case No. 29 G.R. No. L-36378 (January 27, 1992) Chapter IX, Page 363, Footnote N
o. 73
FACTS: Petitioner committed rape along with Nicolas Lachica. The crime took effe
ct before the effectivity of the RPC. However, Lachica married the victim, Magda
lena de Ocampo, and was accordingly relieved from criminal prosecution. The peti
tioner continued to serve his sentence but now prays for the Court to set him at
liberty through the writ of habeas corpus, pleading that there is no sufficient
legal ground for continuing his imprisonment any longer based on the last sente
nce of Art. 344 of the RPC. ISSUE: W/N the last paragraph of Art. 344 of the RPC
has retroactive effect. HELD: Yes. The petition for habeas corpus was granted.
The principle granting to the accused in certain cases an exception to the gener
al rule that laws shall not be retroactive when the law in question favors the a
ccused applies. Conscience and good law justify this exception. LATIN MAXIM: 48
FACTS: Petitioner has an agricultural land in Sta. Ana, Pampanga containing 18,4
90 square meters of land owned by Garcia. Garcia sold the land to private respon
dent Pasion and had declared it for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No.
126. Private respondent Pasion claims that he will cultivate the land pursuant t
o Sec. 36(1) of RA 3844. However, petitioner maintains that the case should have
been decided in light of Sec. 7 of RA 6389 since, in view of the appeal the res
pondent still does not have the vested right to acquire the land. ISSUE: W/N Sec
. 7 of RA 6389 should be given retroactive effect. HELD: No. Art. 4 of the Civil
Code provides that there should be no retroactive effect unless otherwise provi
ded by law. In order for a law to have a retroactive effect it should have a pro
vision stating its retroactivity, otherwise nothing should be understood which i
s not embodied in the law. Furthermore the law is a rule established to guide ou
r action with no binding effect until it is enacted, thus laws have no effect in
past times but laws look forward in the future. LATIN MAXIM: 20, 46b, 46e
197 People v. Zeta

No. 72
San Jose v. Rehabilitation Finance Corp.
Case No. 271 G.R. No. L-7766 (November 29, 1955) Chapter IX, Page 369, Footnote
No. 104
FACTS: Appellant was found guilty of violating RA 145 for having collected fees
in excess of 5% of the amount received by the claimant as compensation for servi
ces rendered. At the time the agreement was made the law in force was C.A. No. 6
75 which allowed a person to charge not more than 5% of any amount that the clai
mant would collect. The trial court in convicting appellant held that the agreem
ent for the payment of a 5% fee on the amount collected was void and illegal. IS
SUE: W/N RA 145 has a retroactive effect. HELD: No. It does not appear in the la
nguage of RA 145 that it should be given retroactive effect. There is a need of
a law to tell the retroactivity of RA 145 for it to act on cases under the old l
aw. Laws cannot be given retroactive effect unless it is specifically stated in
the provision. Furthermore, strict construction on the law was made so as not to
prejudice the constitutional right of the constructor and for the law not to ha
ve any retroactive effect. LATIN MAXIM: 11b, 20, 46e
FACTS: Plaintiff presented this petition to recover the interest she supposedly
has in her pre-war loan with defendant. The basis of the suit was RA 671 amendin
g RA 401, the former law condoning the pre-war loans and the interest correspond
ing from January 1, 1946 to March 14, 1951. The lower court decided for defendan
t to return the interest to the plaintiff. ISSUE: W/N the lower court was correc
t in imposing the return of interest to plaintiff by the defendant. HELD: Yes. R
A 671 is made to condone only the unpaid interest. It did not include within its
term completed payment and paid interest. Where a statute was amended and reena
cted, the amendment should be construed as if it had been included in the origin
al act; but it could afford no retroactive effect unless plainly made so by the
terms of the amendment. LATIN MAXIM: 20, 46e
198 People v. Sumilang

Case No. 226 G.R. No. L-49187 (December 18, 1946) Chapter IX, Page 371, Footnote
No. 111
Palomo Building Tenants Association v. Intermediate Appellate Court Case No. 97
G.R. No. L-68043 (October 31, 1984) FACTS: Petitioner filed an action for Declar
ation of Nullity of Sale and Damages with Preliminary Injunction before the then
Court of First Instance of Manila against respondents Government Service Insura
nce System (GSIS) and Capitol Hills, as principal defendants, and the five (5) j
udges of the then City Court of Manila in the injunction aspect of the case. Res
pondent GSIS and Capitol Hills filed separate motions to dismiss on the grounds
that the complaint states no cause of action and that there are other actions pe
nding between the same parties for the same cause. Respondent judge granted priv
ate respondents motion to dismiss. ISSUE: W/N the Intermediate Appellate Court
(IAC) erred in sustaining the order of respondent, denying petitioner s motion f
or approval of the record on appeal due to failure to amend the record on appeal
within the period granted them. HELD: Yes. Petitioners invoke Section 39 of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (BP 129) which dispensed with the record o
n appeal and claim that herein respondent IAC erred in not applying retrospectiv
ely the said law. Ruled in Alday vs. Camilon, "[t]he reorganization having been
declared to have been completed, BP Big. 129 is now in full force and effect. A
Record on Appeal is no longer necessary for taking an appeal. The same proviso a
ppears in Section 18 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines issued by this Court on
January 11, 1983. Being procedural in nature, those provision s may be applied
retroactively for the benefit of petitioners, as appellants. Statutes regulatin
g the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending
and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospectiv
e in that sense and to that extent (People vs. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 764 [19461.]
" LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 46e
FACTS: The petitioner was convicted of the crime of arson and sentenced to the i
ndeterminate penalty from 5 years and 4 months and 21 days of prision correction
al to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor. On appeal, both the CA and the SC aff
irmed the sentence of the lower court. Based on the records, a copy of the resol
ution of the Court denying the motion for reconsideration was mailed to the peti
tioners attorney. However, the attorney alleges in his petition that he did not r
eceive the notice because then he was already hiding in the mountains of Laguna
as a guerilla officer of the Markings guerilla. The attorney prays that the read
ing of the sentence be suspended and that petitioner be allowed to file whatever
pleading that may be allowed by this Honorable Tribunal necessary for the prote
ction of the rights of the petitioner. ISSUE: W/N the petition to suspend readin
g of sentence and to file pleading or motion should be granted. HELD: No. It is
a well established rule of statutory construction that statutes regulating the p
rocedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and un
determined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in th
at sense and to that extent. LATIN MAXIM: 46e
199 MRCA, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

Ocampo v. Court of Appeals
FACTS: The petitioner prays to set aside the decision of the CA affirming the or
der of the RTC dismissing the complaint for non-payment of the proper filing fee
s as the prayer of the complaint failed to specify the amounts of moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses sought to be recovered
by it from the defendants but left them to the discretion of the Honorable Cour
t. ISSUE: W/N the petition has merit. HELD: Yes. It is a well established rule o
f statutory construction that statutes regulating the procedure of the courts wi
ll be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of
their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that exte
nt. LATIN MAXIM: 46e
FACTS: Petitioner began construction of his house without permit from the owner,
while being informed of P.D. 772. Petitioner never showed title to the land he
claimed to have purchased. Sec. 1 of P.D. 772, otherwise known as the Anti Squatt
ing Law has three elements: (a) accused is not the owner of the land; (b) he suc
ceeded in occupying or possessing the property through force, intimidation, or t
hreat or by taking such advantage of the absence or tolerance of the owner; (c)
such occupation of the property is without the consent or against the will of th
e owner. Sec. 15, Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that after p
rosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss the case on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. ISSUE: 1. W/N petitioner is guilty of the crime of squ
atting. 2. W/N a motion to dismiss bars a petitioner from presenting his evidenc
e. HELD: Yes on both counts. By moving to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence, petitioner waives his right to present evidence to substantiate hi
s defense and in effect submits the case for judgment on the basis of the eviden
ce for the prosecution. LATIN MAXIM: 45a, 46b
200 Yakult Philippines v. Court of Appeals

Case No. 315 G.R. No. 91856 (October 5, 1990) Chapter IX, Page 372, Footnote No.
117
Aris (Phil.) Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission
Case No. 21 G.R. No. 90501 (August 5, 1991) Chapter IX, Page 372, Footnote No. 1
19
FACTS: Petitioner argues that the civil action for damages for injuries arising
from alleged criminal negligence, being without malice, cannot be filed independ
ently of the criminal action under Art. 33 of the Civil Code. ISSUE: W/N a civil
action instituted after the criminal action was filed may prosper even if there
was no reservation to file a separate civil action. HELD: Yes. Under the 1985 R
ules of Criminal Procedure, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
is impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waiv
es the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action. LATIN MAXIM: 38b, 46e
FACTS: Petitioner assails the constitutionality of Sec. 12 of RA 6716 to Art. 22
3 of the Labor Code, and Transitory Provisions of the said Interim Rules on the
basis of being in violation of due process and non retroactivity of laws, respec
tively. ISSUE: W/N amendments introduced by Sec. 12 of RA 6715 to Art. 223 of th
e Labor Code, and Transitory Provisions of the said Interim Rules are constituti
onal. HELD: Yes on both counts. The provision concerning the mandatory and autom
atic reinstatement of an employee whose dismissal is found unjustified by the la
bor arbiter is a valid exercise of the police power of the state, and the contes
ted provision is then a police legislation. The questioned Interim Rules can be gi
ven retroactive effect for they are procedural or remedial in character. LATIN M
AXIM: 8a, 46e
201 Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Co. v. Court of Appeals

Case No. 25 G.R. No. L-54305 (February 14, 1990) Chapter IX, Page 373, Footnote
No. 124
Government of the Philippine Islands v. Municipality of Binalonan
Case No. 117 G.R. No. L-8243 (December 24, 1915) Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No
. 44
FACTS: Petitioner entered into an operating agreement with CUENCO-VELEZ whereby
the said petitioner was granted the right to operate 12 mining claims belonging
to the latter located at Toledo City, Cebu. Petitioner also entered into a simil
ar agreement with BIGA COPPER; subject of this Operating Agreement are 31 mining
claims of BIGA-COPPER likewise located at Toledo City, Cebu. However, of the to
tal mining claims "leased" by petitioner from both CUENCO-VELEZ and BIGA COPPER,
9 mining claims overlap. These 9 overlapping mining claims became the subject o
f administrative cases where CUENCO-VELEZ won. During the pendency of this appea
l, CUENCO-VELEZ and BIGA COPPER, entered into a compromise agreement. This compr
omise agreement enabled BIGA-COPPER to eventually lay claim over the 9 overlappi
ng mining claims. Due to the promulgation of P.D. 1281, a number of the defendan
ts filed a supplemental motion to dismiss. They alleged that the operating agree
ment which BIGA COPPER signed with petitioner had already been revoked by a lett
er and that by reason of this rescission, the trial court is deemed to have lost
jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. 7(a)(c) and Sec. 12 of P.D. 1281. ISSUE: W/N P.D.
1281 prevails. HELD: P.D. 1281 prevails for special laws prevail over statutes
or laws of general application. LATIN MAXIM: 50
FACTS: This is a registration proceedings instituted by the Director of Lands un
der Sec. 61 of Act No. 926, seeking to compel the registration of all private pr
operty within a prescribed area in the municipality of Binalonan, Pangasinan on
two parcels of land. Act No. 926 is not applicable to any other than public land
s, or, at most, lands claimed by the Government. The Act does not touch upon the
compulsory registration of private titles. Cadastral Act (No. 2259) authorizes
the Director of Lands to institute compulsory registration proceedings against a
ll owners and claimants of property within any area which has been regularly sur
veyed and platted under the procedure prescribed in the Act. Sec. 61 of Act No.
926 does not permit of similar proceedings. The title of the Public Land Act con
tains no mention of compulsory registration proceedings. No reference is made in
Act No. 2259 to the repeal or amendment of Sec. 61 of Act No. 926. ISSUE: Wheth
er Sec. 61 of Act No. 926 authorizes the institution of compulsory registration
proceedings against private owners or whether it is not confined exclusively to
public lands. HELD: Act No. 2259 was enacted to remedy the shortcomings of exist
ing legislation on the same subject. The fact that the new Act does not expressl
y state that it amends or repeals Sec. 61 of Act No. 926 does not necessarily re
but this conclusion. LATIN MAXIM: 46e
202 Development Bank of the Phil. v. Court of Appeals

Case No. 92 G.R. No. L-28774 (February 28, 1980) Chapter IV, Page 175, Footnote
No. 199
Briad Agro Development Corp. v. Hon. dela Serna, and dela Cruz, et al.
Case No. 39 G.R. No. 83225 (June 29, 1989) Chapter IX, Page 376, Footnote No. 13
6
FACTS: The Board of Governors appropriated money to purchase land for a housing
project for its employees who shall pay for them in monthly installments for 20
years. However, the area sold was then part of a bigger parcel of land and becau
se the subdivision plan for the area was still pending approval by the Bureau of
Lands, the sales agreement between the DBP and the PHHC was not presented immed
iately for registration by the DBP. DBP expressed its doubts as to whether it co
uld acquire the property in question for the intended purpose of a housing proje
ct in the light of the then Sec. 13 of RA 85. However, without the knowledge of
the DBP, a portion of the property including the 159 lots sold to the DBP, were
segregated and a separate certificate of title was issued for the segregated por
tion in the name of PHHC wherein there was no annotation whatsoever to the title
. Then, RA 3147 was enacted, amending certain provisions of the DBP Charter (RA
85), among which was Sec. 13. ISSUE: W/N there is retroactivity of the amendment
of Sec. 13 of RA 85, by RA 3147. HELD: Yes. One of the purposes of Congress whe
n it enacted RA 3147, by amending Sec. 13 of RA 85, was to erase any doubts rega
rding the legality of the acquisition by the DBP of the 159 lots from the PHHC f
or the housing project which it intended to establish for its employees who did
not yet have houses of their own. It is, therefore, a curative statute to render
valid the acquisition by the DBP of the 159 lots from the PHHC. LATIN MAXIM: 46
e
FACTS: The case arose out of a complaint filed by Trade Union of the Philippines
and Allied Services WFTU Local Chapter No. ROI-005 against respondent agricultu
ral firm for alleged underpayment/non-payment of minimum wage, ECOLA, overtime p
ay, legal holiday pay, night shift differential pay, 13 th month pay and service
incentive leave pay. Respondent failed to submit controverting evidence despite
due notice; Director Balbin thus ruled in favor of the employees and ordered re
spondent to pay P5,369,909.30. In its appeal to the NLRC, Briad Agro questioned
the Regional Directors authority to entertain the pecuniary claim of workers, whi
ch NLRC dismissed on the strength of E.O. 111 amending Art. 128(b) of the Labor
Code, which granted to Regional Directors jurisdiction over monetary claims. ISS
UE: W/N the jurisdiction over money claims is exclusive to the Labor Arbiters, b
y force of Art. 217 of the Labor Code. HELD: The Court held that E.O. 111 has th
e character of a curative law to remedy a defect that attached to the provision
subject of the amendment. This was clear from the proviso: The provisions of Art.
217 of this Code notwithstanding The intended effect was clearly to make the Secr
etary of Labor and the various Regional Directors have concurrent jurisdiction.
E.O. 111 therefore has retroactive effect. LATIN MAXIM: 6a, 9, 30b, 38b, 46e
203 Erectors, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, Hon. Andres, Jr. and
Burgos
Case No. 99 G.R. No. 104215 (May 8, 1996) Chapter IX, Page 377, Footnote No. 140
Santos v. Duata and the Court of Appeals
Case No. 274 G.R. No. L-20901 (August 31, 1965) Chapter IX, Page 376, Footnote N
o. 134
FACTS: Private respondent was recruited to work in Saudi Arabia as a service con
tract driver. Months after, another contract was executed which changed his posi
tion into that of a helper/laborer. When private respondent returned to the Phil
ippines, he invoked his first contract and demanded that petitioner pay the diff
erence between his salary and allowance as indicated in the said contract and th
e amount actually paid to him, plus his contractual bonus. Private respondent fi
led the complaint with the Labor Arbiter but E.O. No. 797 was passed, creating t
he Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), vested with the origina
l and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims between employers and employees a
broad. The Labor Arbiter still proceeded with the case and rendered a Decision i
n favor of private respondent. ISSUE: W/N E.O. 797 should be given retroactive e
ffect and thus divest the Labor Arbiter of jurisdiction. HELD: No. E.O. 797 is n
ot a curative statute and is therefore not included in the exception to the rule
on prospectivity. Laws should only be applied prospectively unless the legislat
ive intent to give them retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessita
ted. Furthermore, the jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the
law in force at the time of the commencement of the action; in this case, these
were P.D. 1691 and 1391. LATIN MAXIM: 35, 46a, 46c, 46e
FACTS: Duata and Aguilar bought a parcel of land which subsequently became a qua
rter part of Lot No. 37. The lot was purchased by Santos, Gaanan and Aguilar. Fo
r convenience, the title was issued in Santoss name. On August 3, 1955, private r
espondent Duata, the daughter of the Duata spouses, instituted an action for rec
onveyance of of Lot No. 37. Santos denied the spouses ownership, claiming that th
e land had been sold to her by Aguilar in a private document. The trial court pr
onounced the document as a pacto de retro sale and ruled in favor of Santos. Upo
n appeal, the CA ruled that the transaction was actually an equitable mortgage u
nder Art. 1602 of the New Civil Code and set aside the decision of the trial cou
rt. ISSUE: Whether Santos and Aguilar, in executing the said private document, i
ntended a mortgage or sale with pacto de retro. HELD: It is a mortgage. Art. 160
2 was designed primarily to curtail the evils brought about by contracts of sale
with right of repurchase; it envisioned contracts of sale with right to repurch
ase where the real intention of the parties is that the pretended purchase price
is money loaned, and in order to secure the payment of the loan, a contract pur
porting to be a pacto de retro sale is drawn up. Said article is remedial in nat
ure and can thus be applied retroactively to cases arising prior to the effectiv
ity of the New Civil Code. LATIN MAXIM: 8c, 17, 21, 46e
204 Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr.

Case No. 182 G.R. No. 103702 (December 6, 1994) Chapter IX, Page 381, Footnote N
o. 150
Ortigas & Co. v. Feati Bank & Trust
Case No. 193 G.R. No. L-24670 (December 14, 1979) Chapter VIII, Page 312, Footno
te No. 133
FACTS: President C. Garcia, issued E.O. 353 creating the municipal district of S
an Andres, Quezon. Then by virtue of E.O. 174, issued by President D. Macapagal,
the municipal district of San Andres was later officially recognized to have ga
ined the status of a fifth class municipality by operation of Sec. 2 of RA 1515.
It was then attacked of its validity. While petitioners would grant that the en
actment of RA 7160 may have converted the Municipality of San Andres into a de f
acto municipality, they contend that since the petition for quo warranto had bee
n filed prior to the passage of said law, petitioner municipality had acquired a
vested right to seek the nullification of E.O. 353, and any attempt to apply Se
c. 442 of RA 7160 to the petition would perforce be violative of the equal prote
ction clause of the Constitution. ISSUE: W/N the E.O. creating the municipality
of San Andres was cured by Sec. 442(d) of RA 7160. HELD: Yes. The de jure status
of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon must be conceded. S
ec. 442(d) of the LGC of 1991, which provides that municipal districts organized
pursuant to presidential issuances or executives orders and which have their re
spective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the
effectivity of the code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities
, is also curative statute, as it validates the creation of municipalities by ex
ecutive orders which had been held to be an invalid usurpation of legislative po
wer. LATIN MAXIM: 46e, 6c
FACTS: Appellee began laying the foundation and commenced the construction of a
building on Lots Nos. 5 and 6, to be devoted to banking purposes. Appellant dema
nded that appellee stop the construction of the commercial building on the said
lots. The latter refused to comply, contending that the building was being const
ructed in accordance with the zoning regulations, defendant having filed buildin
g and planning permit applications with the Municipality of Mandaluyong. ISSUE:
W/N the resolution of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong declaring Lots Nos. 5
and 6, among others, as part of the commercial and industrial zone of the munic
ipality, prevailed over the building restrictions imposed by plaintiff-appellant
on the lots in question and if Resolution No. 27 s-1960 is a valid exercise of
police power. HELD: The trial court held that the subject restrictions were subo
rdinate to Municipal Resolution No. 27. It upheld the classification by the Muni
cipal Council of the area along EDSA Avenue as a commercial and industrial zone,
and held that the same rendered "ineffective and unenforceable" the restriction
s in question as against defendant. Resolution No. 27 was passed in the valid ex
ercise of police power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good o
rder and general welfare of the people in the locality. Even if the subject buil
ding restrictions were assumed by the defendant as vendee of Lots Nos. 5 and 6,
in the deeds of sale and in the TCTs the contractual obligations so assumed cann
ot prevail over Municipal Resolution No. 27. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 46e
205 Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations

Case No. 35 G.R. No. L-17566 (July 30, 1965) Chapter IX, Page 372, Footnote No.
119
Philippine National Bank v. Asuncion
Case No. 237 G.R. No. L-46095 (November 23, 1977) Chapter X, Page 387, Footnote
No. 3
FACTS: Petitioners were allegedly employees of Luzon Stevedoring Corporation, wh
ich required them to work 18 hours a day without giving them additional compensa
tion. There was an amicable settlement but petitioners disclaimed having knowled
ge stating they did not authorize the filing. Respondent contends that petitione
rs are barred due to prescription under Sec. 7-A of C.A. No. 144, as amended by
RA 1993. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 7-A of C.A. No. 144, as amended by RA 1993 to the effec
t that any action to enforce any cause under this Act shall be commenced within
three years after such cause of action accrued; otherwise it shall be barred for
ever. HELD: It would have applied, provided that actions already commenced befor
e the effective date of this act shall not be affected by the period prescribed.
As the statute shortened the period of action accrued, it was contended that to
give it retroactive effect would impair vested rights since it would operate to
preclude the six years from their accrual. The court ruled that a statute of li
mitations is procedural in nature and no vested right can attach thereto nor ari
se therefrom. Because the statute shortened the period within which to bring an
action and in order not to violate the constitutional mandate concerning due pro
cess, claimants whose claims were injuriously affected thereby should have a rea
sonable period of one year from the time the new statute took effect within whic
h to sue on such claims. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 46e
FACTS: On January 1963, Philippine National Bank (PNB) granted Fabar Incorporate
d a loan secured by joint signatures of Jose Barredo, Carmen and Tomas Borromeo
and Manuel Barredo. By May, 1977 the outstanding balance was over P8 million. PN
B filed a case against all 4 signatories. However, before the case was decided,
Manuel Barredo passed away. The case was dismissed pursuant to Sec. 6, Rule 86 o
f the Rules of Court that the claim of PNB should be filed with the estate proce
edings of M. Barredo and cannot be brought against other surviving debtors. ISSU
E: W/N the Courts interpretation of Sec. 6, Rule 86 prevents a creditor from pro
ceeding against the surviving solidary debtors is accurate. HELD: No. Art. 1216
of the New Civil Code gives the creditor the right to proceed against anyone of t
he solidary debtors, or some, or all. Thus, the choice is left up to PNB to decid
e. Sec. 6 of Rule 86 simply provides the procedure if in case the creditor desir
es to go against the deceased debtor. To require PNB to go against the estate wo
uld deprive PNB of his substantive rights provided by Art. 1216. In this case, t
he Rules of Court may not prevail over Art. 1216 because substantive law cannot
be amended by a procedural rule. Moreover, the 1987 Constitution states that rul
es promulgated by the Supreme Court should not diminish, increase of modify subs
tantive rights. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c
206 Ongsiako v. Gamboa

Amandy v. People
Case No. 7 G.R. No. 79010 (May 23, 1988)
FACTS: In 1946, Ongsiako (landowner) and Gamboa (tenant) entered into a contract
pursuant of Sec. 8 of Act 4054. This act provided that the palay would be divid
ed equally by the 2 parties. However, later that same year, Act 4054 was amended
by RA 34. During liquidation, Gamboa sought application of the amendatory law w
hich provided for crop division on a 55-45 basis in favor of the tenants. Ongsia
ko insists that RA 34 is not remedial in nature and therefore cannot be given re
troactive effect. Because of this, the original contract starting an equal shari
ng of profits should be followed. ISSUE: W/N RA 34 is remedial in nature and sho
uld be given retroactive effect. HELD: Yes. In the past, laws concerning this is
sue have been amended with the intent of being remedial and therefore, producing
retroactive effect. Moreover, it is clearly shown in the recommendation of the
President concerning RA 34 that this bill seeks to amend the Rice Share Tenancy A
ct in such a way to make the division of the crops more equitable to the tenants
The principal feature of this bill is to increase the participation of the tenan
ts in the production of the land he is cultivating. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 6b, 9a, 49
FACTS: Petitioner was arrested and tried for possession of 1.6 grams of marijuan
a. Because he pleaded guilty in his trial, he was given a sentence of six years
and 1 day (the minimum time for his offense). Petitioner then filed for probatio
n alleging P.D. 968. However, the petition was denied because P.D. 1990 had repe
aled P.D. 968, no longer permitting petitioner to fall under those eligible for
probation. ISSUE: W/N the lower court erred in disapproving Amandys petition for
probation. HELD: No. The law clearly declares who are entitled to probation and
who arent. Petitioner does not fall under those entitled because those who have b
een sentenced to serve a maximum term of more than six years are excluded from the
benefits of the Probation Law. Because P.D. 1990 was promulgated after P.D. 968
, the former prevails. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken
as it is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 7b, 2
2a, 25a, 36a, 43, 49
207 Parras v. Land Registration Commission

Case No. 197 G.R. No. L-16011 (July 26, 1960) Chapter X, Page 390, Footnote No.
16
Diu v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 96 G.R. No. 115213 (December 19, 1995) Chapter X, Page 391, Footnote No
. 28
FACTS: Petitioner was required by the Land Registration Commissioner (LRC) to re
mit to the Commissioner s office, pursuant to Special Provisions of RA 2300, oth
erwise known as the Appropriations Act for the current fiscal year, the sum of P
57.00 as estimated cost of publication in the Official Gazette of the initial no
tice of the hearing of the case. Petitioner refused to pay the said amount stati
ng that such insertion is unconstitutional being as it is revenue-raising. He pr
ays that he be exempt from such a deposit and that the LRC and the Director of P
rinting be ordered to publish the notice in the Official Gazette. ISSUE: 1. W/N
petitioner can be exempted. 2. W/N the law states that persons will be made to p
ay for the publication. HELD: Petitioner was made to pay. The law that petitione
r relies on was Sec. 114 of Act 496. The reenactment of the same law as RA 117 d
id not include the said provision of Act 496. LATIN MAXIM: 11, 32, 38b
FACTS: On several occasions, private respondent Pagba purchased on credit variou
s articles of merchandise from petitioners store all valued at P7,862.55. Priva
te respondents failed to pay despite repeated demands. Petitioners brought the m
atter before the Barangay Chairman and the latter set the case for hearing, but
private respondents failed to appear. When the parties met, they failed to reach
an amicable settlement. Private respondents in their Answer, while admitting in
debtedness, interposed two counterclaims: (1) for P6,227.00 as alleged expenses
for maintenance and repair of the boat belonging to petitioners, and (2) another
for P12,0000.00 representing the cost of the two tires which petitioners allege
dly misappropriated. ISSUE: W/N parties did not meet in presence of a Pangkat as
required by law. HELD: Petition was granted without prejudice to the re-filing
of the case by petitioners after due compliance with the provisions of P.D. 1508
, otherwise known as the "Katarungang Pambarangay Law". It must be noted that P.
D. 1508 has been repealed by codification in the LGC of 1991. The basic complain
t was filed by petitioners before the trial court before the effectivity of the
LGC. Nevertheless, Sec. 4 and 6 of the former law have been substantially reprod
uced in Sec. 410(b) and 412 respectively, of the latter law. LATIN MAXIM: 4, 5b,
9a, 36b
208 Government v. Springer

Case No. 119 G.R. No. L-26979 (April 1, 1927) Chapter I, Page 38, Footnote No. 1
66
Mecano v. Commission on Audit
Case No. 176 G.R. No. 103982 (December 11, 1992) Chapter X, Page 395, Footnote N
o. 45
FACTS: The National Coal Company elected its board of directors via vote in acco
rdance with its by-laws. However, the respondents are stated as usurping and ill
egally occupying said positions since they were not elected by the proper shareh
olders. The National Coal Company was formed by the Philippine Government. The G
overnment intended to retain a majority stake in the said company; however, it e
nded up occupying almost 90% of the stock. During the election of directors, thr
ee members of the government appeared, two from the legislative and one from the
executive. ISSUE: W/N the executive is the sole administrator of the Philippine
Government. HELD: Yes. Sec. 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by Sec. 2 of Act No.
2822, as purports to vest the voting power of the government-owned stock in the
National Coal Company in the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the Hous
e of Representatives, is unconstitutional and void. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a, 30a, 38
b
FACTS: Petitioner seeks to nullify the decision of the Commission on Audit (COA)
embodied in its Endorsement denying his claim for reimbursement under Sec. 699
of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC), as amended. Petitioner is a Director I
I of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). He was hospitalized for cholecy
stitis from March 26 to April 7, 1990, on account of which he incurred medical a
nd hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which he is claiming from the C
OA. However, the reimbursement process was stalled because of the issue that the
RAC Sec. 699 was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987. ISSUE: 1. W/N pet
itioner can claim from the COA. 2. W/N Sec. 699 of RAC was repealed by the Admin
istrative Code of 1987. HELD: Petition was granted. The question of whether or n
ot petitioner can claim from COA is rooted on whether or not Sec. 699 of the RAC
has been repealed. The Court finds that that section although not included in t
he reenactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 is merely under implied repeal
, and the Court considers such implied repeal as not favorable. Also the Court f
inds that laws must be in accord with each other. The second sentence of Art. 17
3 of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 1921, expressly provides that "the payme
nt of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as pr
ovided for in Sec. 699 of the RAC whose benefits are administered by the system
(SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies of the government. LATIN MAXIM: 30a, 32, 37, 3
8b, 49
209 Chin Ah Foo and Yee Shee v. Concepcion and Lee Voo
Ynchausti & Co v. Stanley
Case No. 174 G.R. No 12330 (January 25, 1917)
FACTS: The accused, one Chan Sam, was acquitted of murder but was ordered to be
committed to an asylum. The court permitted accused to leave the hospital two ye
ars later on the strength of doctors reports. In issuing the order of release the
respondent judge relied upon Art. 8, par. 4, of the Penal Code. On the other ha
nd, Sec. 1048 of the Administrative Code confers on the Director of Health the a
uthority to say when a patient may be discharged from an insane asylum. ISSUE: W
/N the court which ordered the confinement of an insane person in an asylum poss
esses the power to permit said insane person subsequently to leave the asylum wi
thout the approval of the Director of Health. HELD: It is a well-known rule of s
tatutory construction that when there is no express repeal, none is presumed to
be intended. Likewise, when two portions of the law can be construed so that bot
h can stand together, this should be done. Art. 8 of the Penal Code has not been
impliedly repealed by Sec. 1048 of the Administrative Code. The powers of the c
ourts and the Director of Health are complementary with each other. Thus, any pe
rson confined in any asylum by order of the court in accordance with Art. 8 of t
he Penal Code cannot be discharged from custody without the acquiescence of the
Director of Health. The converse proposition equally holds true. LATIN MAXIM: 38
b, 49
FACTS: The petitioner, a company engaged in the coastwise shipping business, sou
ght to prohibit the Insular Collector of Customs from enforcing the requirement,
which states that coastwise vessels shall carry third mate as one of the office
rs on each vessel. The petitioner relied upon the ground that Act No. 2614 was n
ot and could not have been repealed by the Administrative Code; Act No. 2614 bei
ng specific with regard to the management of Philippine vessels. ISSUE: W/N ther
e is a conflict between Act No. 2614 and paragraph (e) of Sec. 1312 of the Admin
istrative Code. HELD: There is no express repeal of Act No. 2614. It is apparent
that there was no specific intention to repeal the statute. The Philippine Legi
slature could not have intended to repeal said Act within less than three weeks
after its passage and substitute in its place absolutely nothing except the unco
ntrolled judgment of the Insular Collector of Customs. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 49,
50
210 U.S. v. Tantoco

Fabros, et al. v. Laya
Case No. 44 G. R. No. 70832 (December 18, 1987)
FACTS: The defendant was charged with having illegally in his possession and und
er his control a certain amount of opium. The trial court dismissed the complain
t on the theory that Act No. 2381 and all other laws had been repealed by the Ac
t of the United States Congress. The Government appealed. ISSUE: What the effect
of said Act was upon local legislation dealing with the subject of opium. HELD:
That the United States Congress did not intend to repeal any of the local laws
dealing with the subject of opium appears from the law itself. Whether or not an
Act is impliedly repealed is a question of legislative intent to be ascertained
by an examination of both statutes, and in the light of the reason, purpose, an
d object of both. The United States Congress never intended to relax the stringe
nt provisions relating to the smoking of opium or to its use in any of its forms
whatever. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 49
FACTS: This is a consolidated case involving the allocation of the incremental p
roceeds of authorized tuition fee increases of private schools provided for in S
ec. 3(a) of P.D. 451, and thereafter, under the Education Act of 1982 (BP 232).
Then Minister of Education Jaime C. Laya promulgated the disputed MECS Order No.
25, entitled Rules and Regulations to Implement the Provisions of BP 232, The E
ducation Act of 1982, relative to Student Fees for School Year 1985-1986. Petiti
oners prayed for temporary restraining order on the Rules and Regulations, which
was granted to them. However, four schools prayed for the lifting of the TRO on
the ground that their tuition fee increase has already been approved pursuant t
o P.D. 451, which the Court thereby lifted. ISSUE: W/N BP 232 has repealed P.D.
451 which thereby makes MECS Order No. 25 valid. HELD: Yes. Under P.D. 451, the
authority to regulate the imposition of tuition and other school fees or charges
by private schools is lodged with the Secretary of Education and Culture, where
Sec. 42 of BP 232 liberalized the procedure by empowering each private school t
o determine its rate of tuition and other school fees or charges. P.D. 451 provi
des that 60% of the incremental proceeds of tuition fee increases shall be appli
ed or used to augment the salaries and wages of members of the faculty and other
employees of the school; while BP 232 provides that the increment shall be appl
ied or used in accordance with the regulations promulgated by the MECS. Hence, t
here was a repeal. LATIN MAXIM: 4, 39b
211 Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. v. Feliciano

Case No. 127 G.R. No. L-24022 (March 3, 1965) Chapter X, Page 399, Footnote No.
61
Brias de Coya v. Tan Lua, et al.
Case No. 16 G.R. No. 30756 (September 22, 1931)
FACTS: Private respondent Feliciano, the Chairman and General Manager of the Ric
e and Corn Administration, wrote the President of the Philippines urging the imm
ediate importation of rice, thru a government agency which the President may des
ignate, pursuant to the recommendation of the National Economic Council as embod
ied in its Resolution No. 70, series of 1964. It was approved. The President des
ignated the Rice and Corn Administration as the government agency authorized to
undertake the importation pursuant to which Chairman Feliciano announced an invi
tation to bid for said importation and set the bidding date. Petitioners contend
that the importation is contrary to RA 3452 which prohibits the government from
importing rice and that there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same
. ISSUE: W/N RA 2207 was repealed by RA 3452. HELD: The importation may be illeg
al on the ground that such importation belong exclusively to private parties, th
ereby prohibiting any government agency from doing so. RA 2207 provides that sho
uld there be an existing or imminent shortage in the local supply of rice of suc
h gravity as to constitute a national emergency, and this is certified by the Na
tional Economic Council, the President may authorize such importation thru any g
overnment agency that he may designate. The two laws, although with a common obj
ective, refer to different methods applicable to different circumstances. The tw
o laws can therefore be construed as harmonious parts of the legislative express
ion of its policy to promote a rice and corn program. In order to effect a repea
l by implication, the latter statute must be irreconcilably inconsistent and rep
ugnant to the prior existing law, hence there was no repeal. LATIN MAXIM: 38b, 3
9a
FACTS: Defendant-appellant Tan Lua was declared an insolvent in the Philippines
while she was in China. At this, she appointed her son to manage, sell and encum
ber her properties situated in the Philippines. A certain Vicente Nepomuceno was
appointed assignee of the involuntary insolvency. Defendant-appellant executed
a mortgage deed of a parcel of land to petitioner so as to secure a loan. The as
signee filed his appointment for the purpose of transferring the property to him
. ISSUE: W/N the mortgage given by respondent to petitioner was valid and legal
considering the fact that the assignee recorded his appointment after the transf
er has been made. HELD: The Insolvency Law and the Land Registration Act complim
ent each other and are both intended to protect the rights and interests of cred
itors, according the latter a means for securing their insolvent debtor s proper
ty, against which they may enforce their credits. Construing the Insolvency Law
together with the Land Registration Act, we reach the conclusion that in order t
hat the assignment of the insolvent debtor s real property made by the clerk of
the proper court to the assignee may operate to vest in said assignee all of sai
d estate from the commencement of the insolvency proceedings, both such proceedi
ngs and the assignment must have been recorded in the registry of deeds, the for
mer from their commencement. Petitioner is a mortgagee in good faith and therefo
re the mortgage upon the land given to him by the latter, which was registered w
ith a Torrens title, is legal and valid. LATIN MAXIM: 38b, 39a
212 Villegas vs. Subido

Case No. 314 G.R. No. L-31711, (September 30, 1971) Chapter X, Page 411, Footnot
e No.96
Jalandoni vs. Endaya
Case No. 137 G.R. No. L-23894, (January 24, 1974) Chapter X, Footnote No. 62
FACTS: The Secretary of Finance authorized Jose R. Gloria of the Office of the C
ity Treasurer of Manila to assume the duties of Assistant City Treasurer. In an
Administrative Order, series of 1968, Petitioner, Mayor of the City of Manila, d
irected Gloria to desist and refrain from exercising the duties and functions of
the Assistant City Treasurer, saying that Romualdez is not empowered to make su
ch designation. Petitioner, appointed Manuel D. Lapid as Assistant City Treasure
r. Respondent, disapproved the appointment, basing his action, on an opinion of
the Secretary of Justice, to the effect that the appointment of Assistant Provin
cial Treasurers is still governed by Sec. 2088a of the Revised Administrative Co
de, and not by Sec. 4 of the Decentralization Law, RA 5185. ISSUE: W/N the Decen
tralization Law should govern. HELD: No. It has been the constant holding of thi
s court that repeals by implication are not favored and will not be so declared
unless it be manifest that the legislature so intended. Such a doctrine goes as
far back as United States v. Reyes, a 1908 decision. It is necessary then before
such a repeal is deemed to exist that it be shown that the statutes or statutor
y provisions deal with the same subject matter and that the latter be inconsiste
nt with the former. A subsequent statute, general in character as to its terms a
nd application, is not to be construed as repealing a special or specific enactm
ent, unless the legislative purpose to do so is manifest. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 9, 50
FACTS: Petitioner instituted a criminal complaint for libel against a Serafin Cr
uz in the Municipal Court of Batangas presided over by the Respondent Judge. Dur
ing the hearing of the libel case Cruz, through counsel manifested in open court
that under Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code, (the court of first instance of
the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published o
r where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commissi
on of the offense), Respondent Judge was devoid of jurisdiction to do so. There
was, as noted, a negative response. Respondent still tried the case. ISSUE: W/N
Municipal Court of Batangas has jurisdiction over case at hand. HELD: No. As is
clear from his well-written memorandum, he did base his action on what for him w
as the consequence of the Judiciary Act as amended by RA 3828, Sec. 87 of which
would confer concurrent jurisdiction on municipal judges in the capital of provi
nces with court of first instance where the penalty provided for by law does not
exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine
not exceeding six thousand pesos or both. Libel is one of those offenses includ
ed in such category. He would thus conclude that as the amendatory act came into
effect on June 22, 1963, the provisions of Art. 360 as last amended by RA 1289
conferring exclusive jurisdiction on courts of first instance, was thus repealed
by implication. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 9, 49
213 CIR vs. Rio Tuba Nickel Mining Corporation.

Case No. 79 G.R. Nos. 83583-84 September 30, 1991 Chapter X, Page 400, Footnote
No.64
Valdez v. Tuazon
Case No. 111 G.R. No. L-14957 (March 16, 1920) Chapter X, Page 388, Footnote No.
9
FACTS: Respondent Corporation filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue tw
o separate written claims for refund in the amounts of P974,978.50 and P424,303.
33, respectively, representing 25% of the specific taxes collected on the refine
d and manufactured mineral oils, motor fuel and diesel fuel oils that it had uti
lized in its operations as a mining concessionaire, using RA 1435 as basis. The
Court of Tax Appeals decided that Respondent Corporation can no longer claim thi
s due to P.D. 231, 436 and 711. ISSUE: W/N Republic Act No. 1435 (An Act To Prov
ide Means of Increasing the Highway Special Fund) or certain provisions thereof
have been repealed by subsequent statutes. HELD: Yes. We find that the disputed
proviso found in Sec. 5 of RA 1435 was drafted to favor a particular group of ta
xpayers-the miners and the lumbermen-because it was "unfair" to subject them to
the increased rates and in effect make them subsidize the construction of highwa
ys from which they did not directly benefit. Given the present concept of the ge
neral fund and its wide application, then the proviso in Sec. 5 of RA 1435 has t
ruly become an anachronism. It is inevitable that, sooner or later, the miners w
ill stand to benefit from any of the government endeavors and it will no longer
be correct to asseverate that the imposition of the increased rates in specific
taxes to augment the general fund for government undertakings is "unfair" to the
miners because they are not directly convenienced. While we generally do not fa
vor repeal by implication, it cannot be denied that situations can and do arise
wherein we are left with no other alternative but to concede the point that an e
arlier law has been impliedly repealed or revoked by a later law because of an o
bvious inconsistency. LATIN MAXIM: 49
FACTS: This is a petition for divorce filed by petitioner against his respondent
wife. Act No. 2710 states that a petition of divorce due to adultery or concubi
nage cannot be granted except upon conviction. The respondent has never been con
victed of the offense of adultery. Petitioner contends that he is entitled to di
vorce based on prevailing laws before the enactment of Act No. 2710. ISSUE: W/N
Act No. 2710 should be applied in the case. HELD: Act No. 2710 should be applied
. Even if the said Act has no repealing clause, when there is a plain and unavoi
dable repugnancy between two laws, the later must be given effect. Negative stat
utes are mandatory, and must be presumed to have been intended as a repeal of al
l conflicting provisions. The situation in this case does not require the applic
ation of any of the artificial canons of interpretation, for the language of the
statute is so plain that its meaning is unmistakable. LATIN MAXIM: 7a, 49
214 Estate of Mota v. Concepcion

Torrente v. Grove
FACTS: In 1919, Lazaro Mota and Salvador Serra entered into a partnership to con
struct several kilometers of railroad in Occidental Negros. In 1920, Serra trans
ferred his half interest to Concepcion and Whitaker. In December of the same yea
r, Mota also sold his half to the same purchaser. On the last sale, only part of
the price was paid, so Concepcion and Whitaker mortgaged to Mota the railroad.
Mota registered the contract as an unregistered real property. ISSUE: 1. W/N a m
ortgage over an unregistered property is valid. 2. W/N enforcement of mortgage i
s fatal to right of rescission. HELD: 1. According to Standard Oil Co. vs. Castr
o, Sec. 194 of the Administrative Code clearly recognizes the validity of such a
contract between the contracting parties. 2. The election to enforce the contra
ct of mortgage is fatal to the right of rescission. Serra foreclosed the mortgag
e given to him to secure the unpaid portion of the selling price of the railway.
LATIN MAXIM: 1
FACTS: This case is an appeal from a habeas corpus proceeding, discharging the p
etitioner from detention. It is alleged that the order of arrest is illegal on i
ts face in that the Justice of the Peace had no jurisdiction to issue the order
directing the making of an arrest outside the Province of Cebu. It is contended
that the arrest and detention of petitioner, were illegal and void. ISSUE: W/N t
he Justice of the Peace can issue an order of arrest wherever he may be in the P
hilippines. HELD: Under the provision of Sec. 13 of G.O. No. 58, a justice of th
e peace is vested with authority to issue a lawful order of arrest, wherever he
may be in the Philippines. Due to contrary provisions, the general order has imp
liedly repealed the Spanish law. The contention of the petitioner that Act No. 5
9 is a proof that the Civil Commission deemed it necessary to make an express gr
ant of such authority and that they were of opinion that prior to the publicatio
n of the said law the processes of the justices of the peace did not run through
out the province, much less the archipelago. The court however said that the opi
nion of the law making authority as to the meaning and effect of the law does no
t determine what the law actually is, it is entitled to respectful consideration
, but it is not conclusive on the courts. LATIN MAXIM: 4, 49
215 Pamil v. Teleron

Case No. 195 G.R. No. L-34854 (November 20, 1978) Chapter I, Page 33, Footnote N
o. 148
People v. Almuete
Case No. 200 G.R. No. L-26551 (February 27, 1976) Chapter IV, Page 142, Footnote
No. 61
FACTS: Respondent Fr. Gonzaga was elected and proclaimed municipal mayor of Albu
querque, Bohol. The petitioner, himself an aspirant for the office, filed for Go
nzagas disqualification based on Sec. 2175 of the Administrative Code which state
d that in no case can ecclesiastics be elected to a municipal office. ISSUE: W/N
an ecclesiastic is eligible to be elected. HELD: The vote was indecisive. Seven
believed Sec. 2175 was no longer operative. Five believed that the prohibition
was not tainted with any constitutional infirmity. Though the five were a minori
ty, the votes of the seven were insufficient to render the provision ineffective
, hence it was presumed valid. Gonzaga was ordered to vacate the mayoralty. Diss
enting Seven: The challenged provision was superseded by the 1935 Constitution,
the supreme law, which mandated that no religious test shall be required for the
exercise of political rights. Sec. 2175 was also repealed by the Election Code
for ecclesiastics are no longer included in the enumeration of ineligible person
s. Also, legislation that intends to repeal all former laws upon the subject sho
ws the legislative intent to repeal the former statutory law. Minor Five: For a
later provision to repeal a prior one there must be such absolute repugnance bet
ween the two. No such repugnance is discernible. Sec. 2175 has neither been repe
aled nor superseded. The section also admitted no exception, therefore there can
be none. The Court cannot rewrite the law under the guise of interpretation. LA
TIN MAXIM: Dissenting Seven: 9a, 30a, 32, 49 Minor Five: 6c, 7a, 7c, 37, 43
FACTS: Almuete, et. al. were charged with the violation of Sec. 39 of the Agricu
ltural Tenancy Law (ATL). The accused, tenants of Fernando, allegedly pre-thresh
ed a portion of their respective harvests without notifying her or obtaining her
consent. The accused filed a motion to quash alleging that at the time of the s
upposed offense, there was no longer any law punishing the act. ISSUE: W/N pre-t
hreshing was still a crime at the time the act was committed. HELD: Sec. 39 was
impliedly repealed by the Agricultural Land Reform Code which was already in for
ce at the time of the act. The ALRC suspended the ATL. It instituted the leaseho
ld system and abolished the rice share tenancy system. The prohibition against p
re-threshing is premised on the existence of the rice share tenancy system and i
s the basis for penalizing clandestine pre-threshing. The evident purpose is to
prevent the tenant and the landholder from defrauding each other in the division
of the harvests. The legislative intent not to punish anymore the tenants act of
prethreshing is evident by not re-enacting Sec. 39 of the ATL. A subsequent sta
tute, revising the whole subject matter of a former statute operates to repeal t
he former statute. The repeal of a penal law deprives the courts of jurisdiction
to punish persons charged with a violation of the old penal law prior to its re
peal. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 10, 47, 49
216 Smith Bell & Co. v. Municipality of Zamboanga

Lechoco v. Civil Aeronautics Board
Case No. 71 G.R. No. L-32979-81 (February 29, 1972)
FACTS: Municipality of Zamboanga imposed upon the plaintiff a license fee for it
s machine for the baling of hemp in accordance with Ordinance No. 226. Plaintiff
paid the license fee under protest and contended that defendant had no authorit
y to impose such tax and that the ordinance in question is null and void. The de
fendant argues that the latter has no power to levy the tax in question under Se
c. 2625(d) of the Administrative Code but it does have such power under a subseq
uent enactment of Act No. 3422. ISSUE: W/N Act No. 3422 repealed Sec. 2625(d) th
e Administrative Code. HELD: Repeals by implication are not favored. If the legi
slature intended its repeal, it would have made specific reference in the repeal
ing clause as it did in expressly repealing Sec. 2407 of the Administrative Code
. A general affirmative act will not be construed to repeal a special or local s
tatute unless the intention is manifest. LATIN MAXIM: 37, 50
FACTS: Petitioner contends that by the enactment of RA 2677 amending Sec. 13(a)
and 14 of C.A. No. 146, jurisdiction to control rates of airships was taken away
from the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and re-vested in the Public Service Comm
ission (PSC) since RA 2677 impliedly repealed RA 776 which conferred to the CAB
the power of control over air rates and fares. On the other hand, respondents ar
gue that jurisdiction over air fares and rates were, under both statutes, exerci
sable concurrently by the CAB and the PSC. ISSUE: Whether the authority to fix a
ir carriers rates is vested in the CAB or in the PSC. HELD: Authority to fix air
carriers rates is vested in both the CAB and the PSC. Under RA 776, the CAB can f
ix and determine reasonable individual, joint or special rates charges or fares
for air carriers but is subject to the maximum rates on freights and passengers
that may be set by the PSC under RA 2677. Furthermore, implied repeal of statute
s is not favored. LATIN MAXIM: 37, 38b
217 Villegas v. Enrile

Villegas v. Subido
Case No. 172 G.R. No. L-24012 & L- 24040 (August 9, 1965)
FACTS: It is the contention of the petitioner that if Sec. 4 of the Decentraliza
tion Act be given effect, then the authority to appoint a City Fiscal is not lod
ged in respondent Secretary of Justice but in him as Mayor of the City of Manila
. The defense of the respondents on the other hand is the continuing effectivity
of the provision of the Charter of the City of Manila, which negates the assump
tion of authority on the part of the petitioner. ISSUE: W/N the Decentralization
Act impliedly repealed the provision of the Charter of the City of Manila. HELD
: No. The issue in this case was already decided in previous jurisprudence in th
e case of Villegas v. Subido. Furthermore, petitioner ignored the provision that
the City Fiscal is not included in the enumeration made in the Decentralization
Act. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 5a, 37
FACTS: The Commissioner of Civil Service claims that RA 2260 impliedly repealed
RA 557and 409 providing for the removal and suspension of policemen. The City Ma
yor was ordered to cease from deciding administrative cases of officers and empl
oyees in Manila and submit to the Commissioner of Civil Service all pending disc
iplinary cases. ISSUE W/N RA 2260 impliedly repeal RA 557 and Sec. 22 of RA 409
so as to vest in the Commissioner of Civil Service the exclusive and original ju
risdiction to remove, suspend and separate policemen and employees of the City o
f Manila in the competitive service. HELD: No. RA 2260 states that the removal a
nd suspension by the City Mayor can be passed upon or reviewed by the Commission
er of Civil Service. It does not state that the power of removal is conferred to
the other body. RA 557 and 409 are special laws covering specific situations of
policemen and employees of the City of Manila, RA 557 and 409 subsists side-byside with RA 2260 and are not impliedly repealed by the latter which is a genera
l law. RA 2260 contemplates appeal from the decision of the City Mayor to the Co
mmissioner of Civil Service, instead of to the President. Repeal by implication
is not favored and if two laws can be reconciled, the construction will be again
st such repeal. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 38b, 50
218 U.S. v. Palacio

Case No. 301 G.R. No. 11002 (January 17, 1916) Chapter X, Page 406, Footnote No.
77
Marin v. Nacianceno
Case No. 171 G.R. No. 5939 (March 29, 1911) Chapter X, Page 411, Footnote No. 10
0
FACTS: Respondent was accused of violating Sec. 87 of Act No. 82 when he willful
ly omitted from the tax lists real property which he knows to be lawfully taxabl
e. He posits that Act No. 2238 repeals by implication Act No. 82 because of the
clause in Sec. 18 that states all acts or parts of Acts in conflict therewith are
repealed. ISSUE: W/N Act No. 2238 had repealed the penal effect of Act No. 82. H
ELD: No. Act No. 2238 had done nothing but to change the method and procedure pr
ovided in Act No. 82. Repeals by implication are not favored, unless it is manif
est that such is the intention of the legislature. Act No. 2238 provides no pena
lty thus, Sec. 87 of Act No. 82 continues in force. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 38b
FACTS: Felisa Hernandez died before the testatrix, but the testatrix did not alt
er her will in respect to this legacy after the death of the legatee. The petiti
oners are the surviving heirs of the devisee who relies upon Sec. 758 of the Cod
e of Civil Procedure which provides that When a devise or a legacy is made to a c
hild and the devisee or legatee dies before the testator, leaving issues such issu
e shall take the estate so given as the devisee or legatee would have done unless
a different disposition is required by law. The executor of the will opposes the
payment upon the ground that such legatee had no interest therein, having died
before the testator so as to pass to the heirs. ISSUE: W/N the heirs of Felisa H
ernandez become the heir to her legacy after her death even if the testator did
not alter her will. HELD: Yes. The construction by the respondent would repeal o
r annul the section absolutely. It is tantamount to saying that the legislature
enacted a law and repealed it at the same time. If petitioners are not entitled
to the payment of this legacy, then Sec. 758 would have no value and might as we
ll have never been written which is an absurd interpretation. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 1
1
219 Velunta v. Chief, Philippine Constabulary

Case No. 309 G.R. No. L-71855 (January 20, 1988) Chapter X, Page 412, Footnote N
o. 102
Pacis v. Averia
Case No. 194 G.R. No. L-22526 (November 29, 1966) Chapter X, Page 413, Footnote
No. 105
FACTS: Petitioner as patrolman and member of the Integrated National police (INP
) apprehended a motorcycle driver for violation of traffic rules. An altercation
occurred which resulted in the shooting and death of the driver Lozano. Anacori
ta, the widow of Lozano then filed for a criminal case where it was found that t
here exists a prima facie evidence that petitioner, with deliberate intent and wi
th intent to kill, shot Lozano during the performance of duty. Petitioner contend
s that General Court Martial has no jurisdiction since P.D. 1850 was repealed by
E.O. 1040 & 1012. ISSUE: W/N the Court Martial has jurisdiction. HELD: Yes. It
is specifically stated under E.O. 1012 that it is only the operational supervisio
n and direction over all units of the INP that was transferred from the Constabul
ary to the city/municipal government. Under E.O. 1040, it is the exercise of admi
nistrative control and supervision over units of the INP that was transferred to
the President. The allegation that P.D. 1850 has been expressly repealed by clea
r and precise provision of E.O. 1040 is inaccurate. Repeals by implication are n
ot favored and will not be so declared unless the intent of the legislators in m
anifested. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 20c, 27, 37
FACTS: Petitioner, the Acting Collector of Customs, commenced a seizure and forf
eiture proceedings pursuant to the Tariff and Customs Code referring to the inci
dent wherein sailors were wounded in a chase for boat loaded with untaxed cigare
ttes. On the same day, Marges, the alleged boat owner, filed a Civil Case for re
plevin alleging that the boat was stolen. The fishing boat therein was transferr
ed to the Provincial Sheriff, and later on to Marges as commanded by respondent
Hon. Averia. ISSUE: 3. 4. HELD: 1. No. The jurisdiction of the Collector of Cust
oms is provided for in RA 1937 which took effect much later than the Judiciary A
ct. It is axiomatic that the later law prevails over the prior statute. 2. Yes.
The writ was received by respondent Sheriff. It has also caught the Supreme Cour
ts notice that respondent sheriff has practically taken the cudgels for the boat
owner. He went beyond his official acts and proceeded to espouse the cause of th
e boat owner giving impression that his interest in the subject is more than jus
t the interest of a public official. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 20c, 49 W/N Marges could r
ecover the fishing boat. W/N Provincial Sheriff may be held in contempt for fail
ure to comply with the writ.
220 Herman v. Radio Corporation of the Philippines

Case No. 123 G.R. No. 26802 (July 15, 1927) Chapter X, Page 414, Footnote No. 10
7
Philippine National Bank v. Cruz, et al.
Case No. 239 G.R. No. 80593 (December 18, 1989) Chapter X, Page 414, Footnote No
. 108
FACTS: Two Philippine corporation attempting to develop the commercial radio bus
iness (Far Eastern Radio Inc. and Radio Corp.) agreed to merge. The petitioner h
erein has been largely interested in the respondent corporation, and in consider
ation of the cancelled contract for his services to the respondent, it was agree
d in the contract of merger that he should be offered the post of manager of the
traffic department. ISSUE: W/N Hermans claim for salary has been expressly waive
d in the final agreement. HELD: Yes. In Sec. 333 of the Code of Civil Procedures
, it mentions that whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act or omission
, intentionally or deliberately led another to believe a particular thing is tru
e and to act upon such belief, he cannot be permitted to falsify it. Sec. 1815 o
f the Civil Code also does not apply since the transaction was more than a compr
omise. The Code of Civil Procedures must prevail because it is a later expressio
n of legislative will than Art. 1815 of the Civil Code. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 49
FACTS: Aggregate Mining Exponents (AMEX) suffered huge financial losses and was
unable to pay its remaining employees. Two years after, AMEX entered into an ope
ration contract agreement with T.M. San Andres Development Corporation, thus ena
bling the latter to acquire on lease the equipment of AMEX. The unpaid workers f
iled for monetary compensation before the Labor Arbiter. The said Arbiter awarde
d backwages and separation pay. AMEX did not appeal but PNB, as mortgage-credito
r, appealed and alleged that the workers should be given their unpaid wages only
and not the termination pay. The NLRC denied the appeal of PNB. Hence, this ins
tant petition by the PNB on the grounds that Article 110 of the Labor Code does
not create lien in favor of the workers for unpaid wages upon the properties of
the employer. ISSUE: W/N Art. 110 of the Labor Code is to be construed as not fa
voring the unpaid workers because of the order of preference provided in Art. 22
41 to 2245 of the Civil Code. HELD: No. Art. 110 of the Labor Code provides for w
orker preference in case of bankruptcy. It specifically states that In the event o
f bankruptcy of an employers business, his workers shall enjoy FIRST preference as
regards to their unpaid wages, any provision of law to the contrary not withsta
nding such unpaid wages shall be paid in FULL before claims of the government and
other creditors may be paid. LATIN MAXIM: 6a, 49
221 David v. Commission on Elections

Case No. 85 G.R. No. 127116 (April 8, 1997) Chapter X, Page 413, Footnote No. 10
5
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals
81
FACTS: Barangay Chairman Alex David raised the question of when the barangay ele
ctions should be held and questions the COMELECs schedule of holding such electio
ns on the 2nd Monday of May 1997. The COMELECs basis is R.A. 7160 or the Local Go
vernment Code which mandates barangay elections every 3 years. Petitioner David
contends that an earlier law, R.A. 6679, should be the one followed. R.A. 6679 p
rovides that barangay elections should be held every 5 years. He also contends t
hat there is a violation of Art. 10, Sec. 8 of the Constitution. ISSUE: 1. What
the term of office of barangay officials is. 2. W/N there was a violation of Art
. 10, Sec. 8 of the Constitution. HELD: 1. It is basic in cases of irreconcilabl
e conflict between two laws that the later legislative enactment prevails. Furth
ermore, the Supreme Court in Paras v. COMELEC had the opportunity to mention whe
n the next barangay election should be when it stated that the next regular elect
ion involving the barangay office is barely 7 months away, the same having been
scheduled in May 1997. 2. No. Art. 10, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that, T
he term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years It is not to be construed as proh
ibiting a 3-year term of office for barangay officials. LATIN MAXIM:
1, 9a, 20a, 49
FACTS: This is a petition to reverse the Decision ordering the refund of the GCL
Retirement Plan representing the withholding tax on income. RA 4917 exempted th
e GCL Retirement Plan, including all the retirement benefits given to officials
and employees of private firms, from income tax. Soon after, P.D. 1959 was promu
lgated abolishing the exemption from withholding tax of interest on bank deposit
s previously given by P.D. 1739 if the recipient of the interest is exempt from
income taxation. The GCL Plan is one of those exempted from income tax under RA
4917. Petitioner contends that P.D. 1959 impliedly repealed the provisions of RA
4917 and RA 1983, and that GCL Plan is subject to the final withholding tax. IS
SUE: W/N GCL Retirement Plan retains its tax exemption after the promulgation of
P.D. 1959. HELD: Yes. The deletion in P.D. 1959 of the provisions regarding tax
exemption under the old law cant be deemed to be applicable to the employees trus
ts. P.D. 1959 is a general law, hence, it cant repeal a specific provision implie
dly. It is known in statutory construction that a subsequent statute that is gen
eral in character cant be construed as repealing a special or specific enactment
unless there is a legislative manifestation of such effect. Also in Villegas v.
Subido, such rule is upheld even if the provisions of the latter legislation are
sufficiently comprehensive to include what was set forth in the special act. LA
TIN MAXIM: 1, 5a, 43, 50
222 People v. Leachon, Jr.

Case No. 108 G.R. No. 108725-26 (September 25, 1998)
Philippine Airlines Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission
Case No. 118 G.R. No. 114307 (July 8, 1998)
FACTS: The Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro filed two separate inform
ation for violation of P.D. 772, also known as Anti-Squatting Law before the RTC
presided over by respondent judge. After presenting the evidence, the prosecuti
on rested the cases. Almost a year after the prosecution has rested, respondent
judge issued an order dismissing the case motu proporio on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. Thereafter, the CA ordered the continuation of trial of the subje
ct case. A month after, the respondent judge dismissed the case again, opining t
hat P.D. 772 is obsolete and deemed repealed by Sec. 9 and 10 of Art. 13 of the
1987 Constitution, which provide that, urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be
evicted nor their dwellings demolished except in accordance with law and in a ju
st and humane manner. ISSUE: W/N responded judge acted in grave abuse of discreti
on in dismissing the subject criminal case. HELD: Yes. The Anti-Squatting law en
joys the presumption of constitutionality. Unless otherwise repealed by a subseq
uent law or adjudged unconstitutional by this court, a law will always be presum
ed valid. At the time the order was issued by respondent judge, P.D. 772 was sti
ll effective. Neither has this court declared its unconstitutionality, notwithst
anding the social justice provision of the Constitution. LATIN MAXIM: 37, 50
FACTS: Private respondent Edilberto Castro was hired as manifesting clerk by pet
itioner PAL. Respondent was apprehended by government authorities while about to
board a flight en route to Hongkong in violation of Central Bank (CB) Circular
265, as amended by CB Circular 383, in relation to Sec. 34 of RA 265, as amended
. PAL placed Castro on preventive suspension for grave misconduct. Three years a
nd six months after his suspension, PAL issued a resolution finding respondent g
uilty of the offense charged but nonetheless reinstated the latter. The said res
olution likewise required respondent to affix his signature therein to signify h
is full conformity to the action taken by PAL. Upon his reinstatement, responden
t filed a claim against PAL for backwages and salary increases granted under the
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) covering the period of his suspension. IS
SUE: W/N Castro is entitled to backwages and salary increases granted under the
CBA during his period of suspension. HELD: Yes. The rules clearly provide that a
preventive suspension shall not exceed a maximum period of 30 days, after which
period, the employee must be reinstated to his former position. If the suspensi
on is otherwise extended, the employee shall be entitled to his salaries and oth
er benefits that may accrue to him during the period of such suspension. LATIN M
AXIM: 7a, 13b
223 Province of Misamis Oriental v. Cagayan Electric Power and Light Company, In
c.
De Joya v. Lantin
FACTS: Respondent CEPALCO was granted a franchise under RA 3247, 3570, and 6020
to install, operate and maintain an electric light, heat and power system in Cag
ayan de Oro City and its suburbs including the municipalities of Tagoloan, Opol,
Villanueva, and Jasaan. The franchise of CEPALCO expressly exempts it from paym
ent of all taxes of whatever authority except 3% tax on its gross earnings. The Pr
ovincial treasurer of Misamis Oriental, however, demanded payment of the provinc
ial franchise tax from CEPALCO in accordance with the Local Tax Code (P.D. 231)
and pursuant thereto, the Provincial Revenue Ordinance No. 19. ISSUE: W/N CEPALC
O is exempt from paying the provincial franchise tax. HELD: No. No provision in
P.D. 231 expressly or impliedly amends or repeals RA 3247, 3570 and 6020. A spec
ial and local statute applicable to a particular case is not repealed by a later
statute which is general in its terms, provisions and application even if the t
erms of the general act are broad enough to include cases in the special law unl
ess there is manifest intent to repeal or alter the special law. Also, the Secre
tary of Finance made it clear that the franchise tax provided in the Local Tax C
ode may only be imposed on companies with franchise that do not contain exemptin
g clause. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 50
FACTS: Respondent Francindy Commercial purchased bales of textile from Cebu Comp
any Ernerose Commercial. However, the Bureau of Customs discovered that the good
s to be delivered by Ernerose were different from those declared. Customs took c
ustody of the shipment. Francindy Commercial filed a petition in the Court of Fi
rst Instance for Customs to release the goods. Francindy insisted that the CFI h
ad jurisdiction on the basis of the Judiciary Act and not the Bureau of Customs.
RA 1937 and 1125, on the other hand, vest exclusive jurisdiction over seizure a
nd forfeiture proceedings to the Bureau of Customs. ISSUE: Who has jurisdiction
over the shipment. HELD: The Bureau of Customs does. RA 1937 and 1125 are specia
l laws, whereas the Judiciary Act is a general law. In case of conflict, special
laws prevail over general ones. LATIN MAXIM: 50
224 Arayata v. Joya

Sitchon, et al. v. Aquino
FACTS: Cecilio Joya was leasing six friar lots, and he started paying the Govern
ment for such. Because the number of lands he can hold is limited, he conveyed s
ome of the lots to respondent F. Joya as administrator. Cecilio died before full
y paying the Government for the lands. His widow, herein petitioner, was ruled t
o own only one-half of the lot based on the Civil Code provision on conjugal pro
perty. The court then sought to deliver the property to Florentino for liquidati
on and distribution. Petitioner claimed that under Act 1120, Sec. 16, the widow
receives all deeds of her deceased spouse upon compliance with requirements of t
he law. ISSUE: Whether the Civil Code provision on conjugal property prevails or
Act 1120s full conveyance of the property to the widow. HELD: Act 1120 prevails.
It lays down provisions regarding acquisition, disposition, and transmission of
friar lands, which are contrary to the Civil Code. The Civil Code is a general
law, while Act 1120 is a special law. The special law must prevail. LATIN MAXIM:
50
FACTS: Respondent Aquino, the City Engineer of Manila, demolished the houses of
the six petitioners in this class suit, because their houses were public nuisance
s built on public streets and river beds. Petitioners contend that under the Civi
l Code, Art. 701 and 702, it is the district health officer who should remove pu
blic nuisances. Respondent, on the other hand, argues that RA 409, the Revised C
harter of the City of Manila, grants the power to remove public nuisances to the
City Engineer. ISSUE: Whose job it is to determine and demolish public nuisance
s, the health officer under the Civil Code or the city engineer under RA 409. HE
LD: The City Engineer, under RA 409, has jurisdiction. The Civil Code is a gener
al law applicable throughout the Philippines, whereas RA 409 is a special law th
at pertains solely to the City of Manila. When a general and a special law are i
n conflict, the latter prevails. LATIN MAXIM: 50
225 Bellis v. Bellis

Case No. 14 G.R. No. L-23678 (June 6, 1967)
Philippine Trust Co. v. Macuan
FACTS: Amos Bellis, a citizen of Texas USA, died. He had 7 legitimate and 3 ille
gimate children, all surnamed Bellis. After the execution of the decedents will,
which was executed in the Philippines where the properties involved were situate
d, the executor divided the residuary estate into 7 equal portions for the benef
it of the testators 7 legitimate children. Herein appellants filed their respecti
ve oppositions on the ground that the partition deprived of their legitimes as i
llegitimate children. Relying on Art. 16 of the New Civil Code which provides th
at the national law of the decedent should apply (Texas Law), which did not prov
ide for legitimes, the CFI of Manila denied such oppositions. ISSUE: Whether Tex
as Law or the Philippine Law must apply in intestate and testamentary succession
. HELD: Texas Law should apply. Art. 16, par 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code
render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary
successions. It must have been the purpose of the Congress to make Art. 16, par
. 2 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestat
e succession. As further indication of this intent, Art. 1039 provides that the
capacity to succeed is governed by the national of the decedent. It is thus evid
ent that Congress has not intended to extend our system of legitimes to the succ
ession of foreign nationals. LATIN MAXIM: 6b, 9c
FACTS: Defendant Macuan married F. Tormo, who became mentally incapacitated. Def
endant filed a petition to the Court asking that he be appointed guardian of the
person and estate of his wife, the latter consisting in undivided half in a cer
tain land with improvements, which is claimed to be conjugal property. Subsequen
tly, M. Tormo, et. al., filed a motion, which was later granted by the Court, pr
aying that the guardian be instructed to file a complete inventory of all the pr
operty belonging to his ward. A special guardian, Philippine Trust Co., was appo
inted for the recovery of the ownership and possession of the property herein in
volved. ISSUE: 1. W/N a married woman judicially declared mentally incapacitated
is entitled to include in the inventory of her property that which is conjugal.
2. W/N the defendant may be compelled to include in the inventory of his mental
ly incapacitated wifes property, her undivided half of the conjugal property. HEL
D: 1. No. She is not entitled to include half of the legal conjugal partnership,
which still subsists, in the inventory of her property. 2. The defendant, being
the guardian, cannot be compelled to include in the inventory of the same, said
half of the conjugal property. The Court relied on 1) the Code of Civil Procedu
re, which is general in character; and 2) the Civil Code, which is more specific
, referring to the management of the property of a demented ward who is married.
Thus, Civil Code takes precedence over the Code of Civil Procedure. LATIN MAXIM
: 50
226 Tan Liao v. American President Lines, Ltd.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeal
Case No. 75 G.R. No. 44007 (March 20, 1991) Chapter X, Page 415, Footnote No. 11
5
FACTS: This is an action filed by plaintiff-appellant Tan Liao for the recovery
of P92,755.00, with interest from the damages allegedly suffered by plaintiff du
e to the wrongful and unauthorized delay and careless handling in the transporta
tion of a cargo of eggs undertaken by defendant for plaintiff from the port of N
ew York, USA to the port of Manila. The suit was brought more than a year from t
he receipt of the goods, and thereby, claimed by the defendant to have already p
rescribed in accordance with the prescription given by the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act. ISSUE: W/N the action for damages had already prescribed, and thus, bar
red the appellant to receive compensation for damages. HELD: Yes, it has already
prescribed. The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act provides that loss or damage suit
must be brought within one year after the delivery of the goods. Relying on the
ruling in previous cases, the Court held that the prescriptive period of 1 year
established by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act modified pro tanto the provision
s of Act No. 190 as to goods transported in foreign trade, the former being a sp
ecial act while the latter is a law of general application. LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 50
FACTS: Private respondent, a British-owned foreign corporation was granted a leg
islative franchise, pursuant to RA 808, which included a tax exemption from the
payment of all taxes except a franchise tax of 5% on the gross earnings and tax
on its real property. The CIR assessed the corporation in the amount of 7M pesos
representing deficiency income tax maintaining that the franchise was inoperati
ve for failure to comply with Sec. 8, Art. 14 of the 1935 Constitution which lim
its the grant of franchise to Filipino-owned corporations. The Court of Tax Appe
als rendered the franchise unconstitutional while declaring petitioners assessmen
t without effect having been made beyond the prescribed period stipulated in the
Tax Code. ISSUE: W/N the provision in the franchise requiring the payment of on
ly 5% of the gross receipts in lieu of any and all taxes is unenforceable and wi
thout legal effect, for failure of the respondent corporation to comply with the
1935 Constitution, the Corporation Law and the Public Service Act. HELD: No. Th
e legislative franchise was valid. As a charter is in the nature of a private co
ntract, the imposition of another franchise tax on the corporation by the local
authority would constitute an impairment of the contract between the government
and the corporation. RA 808 as a special statute must be deemed an exemption to
the general laws as it was meant to meet particular sets of conditions and circu
mstances. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 50
227 NPVC v. Presiding Judge RTC Br. XXV

Lopez, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission
Case No. 150 G.R. No. 87119 (April 16, 1991) Chapter X, Page 415, Footnote No. 1
16
FACTS: The Province of Misamis Oriental filed a complaint with the Regional Tria
l Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch XXV against NAPOCOR for the collection of
real property tax covering the period 1978 to 1984. Petitioner contends that th
e court has no jurisdiction over the suit and that it is not the proper forum fo
r the adjudication of the case pursuant to P.D. 242 which provides that disputes
between agencies of the government including GOCCs shall be administratively set
tled or adjudicated by the Secretary of Justice. On the other hand respondent in
vokes P.D. 464 which governs the appraisal and assessment of real property for p
urposes of taxation by provinces, cities and municipalities thereby justifying i
ts position in favor of the concerned municipal corporations. ISSUE: W/N the res
pondent court has jurisdiction over the civil action. HELD: Yes. P.D. 242 must y
ield to P.D. 464 on the matter of which tribunal or agency has jurisdiction over
the enforcement and collection of real property taxes. granted that the latter
is a special law dealing specifically with real property taxes whereas P.D. 242
is a general law that deals with a broad coverage concerning administrative sett
lement of disputes, claims and controversies between or among government agencie
s and instrumentalities. Special laws ought to be upheld and construed as except
ions to the general law in the absence of special circumstances calling for a co
ntrary conclusion LATIN MAXIM: 50
FACTS: The Vice-mayor of Manila submitted to the Civil Service Commission the ap
pointment of 19 officers in the Executive Staff of the Office of the Presiding O
fficer pursuant to the provisions of RA 409. However, the City Budget of Manila
questioned whether the payroll of the newly appointed employees may be paid out
of city funds on the basis of the appointments signed by the Vice Mayor. The Cit
y Legal Officer then rendered an opinion that the proper appointing officer is t
he City Mayor and not the City Council. ISSUE: W/N the Charter of the City of Ma
nila has been repealed by RA 5185 giving mayors the power to appoint all officia
ls entirely paid out by city funds and BP 337 empowering local executives to app
oint all officers and employees of the city. HELD: No. Regardless of their date
of passage, a special law (RA 409) providing specifically for the organization o
f the Government of the City of Manila prevails over a general law. RA 5185 and
BP 337 as general laws were not meant to deprive the City Council of Manila of i
ts appointing power. Also, since repeals by implication are not favored, conflic
t between the statutes should be very clear to favor the assumption that the lat
ter in time repeals the other. LATIN MAXIM: 37, 38b, 50
228 Manzano v. Valera Garcia v. Pascual, et al.

No. 118
Case No. 80 G.R. No. 122068 (July 8, 1998)
FACTS: A criminal complaint for libel was filed in the sala of herein petitioner
, who initially recognized that the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over t
he case thereafter forwarding the records to the Office of the Provincial Prosec
utor. However, the latter opined that the MTC should take cognizance of the case
based on Republic Act 7691 which expanded the jurisdiction of Metropolitan, Mun
icipal Trial, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts to hear and decide criminal cas
es where the penalty does not exceed 6 years. Petitioner thus filed a motion to
dismiss upon the respondents acceptance of the case for the MTCs lack of jurisdict
ion over the offense charged. ISSUE: W/N the MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over
complaints for libel. HELD: No. The applicable law is still Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code which categorically provides that jurisdiction over libel cas
es are lodged with the Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts). Alt
hough RA 7691 was enacted to decongest the clogged dockets of the Regional Trial
Courts by expanding the jurisdiction of first level courts, the said law is of
general character and does not alter the provisions of Article 360 of the RPC, w
hich is a law of special nature. Granted that there seems to be no manifest inte
nt to repeal or alter the jurisdiction in libel cases from the provisions of R.A
. 7691it must be maintained that a special law cannot be repealed, amended or al
tered by a subsequent general law by mere implication. LATIN MAXIM: 37, 38, 50 H
ELD: The judge ruled that said RA 1551 did not expressly repeal Sec. 75 of the J
udiciary Act and that the two laws may be reconciled following the principle of
law that a prior specific statute is not repealed by a subsequent general law. A
lso, there being no specific grant of authority in favor of the mayor to appoint
the clerk of court, the power to appoint should not be considered lodged in the
said mayor. Lastly, the intent of the law in placing the appointment of the cle
rks in the justice of the peace is to prevent the importunities and pressure of
prejudicial politics. LATIN MAXIM: 6b, 9a, 32, 36d, 50, b2 ISSUE: W/N Sec. 75 of
RA 926 has been repealed by RA 1551. FACTS: Petitioner, a junior typist civil s
ervice eligible, was appointed by the Justice of Peace as clerk of the municipal
ity of San Jose, Nueva Ecija. When vouchers were submitted to the mayor, he did
not want to approve them. His reason was RA 1551 has repealed Sec. 75 of RA 926,
otherwise known as the Judiciary Act. Sec. 75 of the Judiciary Act provides tha
t justices of peace may have clerks of court at the expense of the municipalitie
s and shall be appointed by respective justices. RA 1551 however, which is claim
ed to have repealed Sec. 75 of RA 296 provides that all employees whose salaries
are paid out of the general funds of the municipalities shall be appointed by t
he mayor.
229 Lagman v. City of Manila, et al.

Case No. 141 G.R. No. L-23305 (June 30, 1966) Chapter X, Page 420, Footnote No.
126
Bagatsing v. Ramirez
No. 83
FACTS: Petitioner operates 15 auto trucks with fixed routes and regular terminal
for the transportation of passengers and freight. The Municipal of Manila repea
led RA 409 and enacted Ordinance No. 4986, entitled An Ordinance Rerouting Traffi
c on Roads and Streets within the City of Manila, and For Other Purposes. ISSUE:
W/N the enactment and enforcement unconstitutional, illegal, ultra vires, and nu
ll and void. HELD: No. RA 409 is a special law and of later enactment than C.A.
No. 548 and the Public Service Law, so that even if conflict exists between the
provisions of the former act and the latter acts, RA 409 should prevail over bot
h Commonwealth Acts. Moreover, the powers conferred by law upon the Public Servi
ce Commission were not designed to deny or supersede the regulatory power of loc
al governments over motor traffic. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 11a, 49, 50 of Ordinance No.
4986 is
FACTS: The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7522, An Ordinance Reg
ulating the Operation of Public Markets and Prescribing Fees for the Rentals of
Stalls and Providing Penalties for Violation thereof and for other Purposes. Resp
ondent were seeking the declaration of nullity of the Ordinance for the reason t
hat a) the publication requirement under the Revised Charter of the City of Mani
la has not been complied with, b) the Market Committee was not given any partici
pation in the enactment, c) Sec. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Ac
t has been violated, and d) the ordinance would violate P.D. 7 prescribing the c
ollection of fees and charges on livestock and animal products. ISSUE: What law
shall govern the publication of tax ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of
Manila, the Revised City Charter or the Local Tax Code. HELD: The fact that one
is a special law and the other a general law creates the presumption that the sp
ecial law is to be considered an exception to the general. The Revised Charter o
f Manila speaks of ordinance in general whereas the Local Tax Code relates to ordin
ances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges in particular. In regard t
herefore, the Local Tax Code controls. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 11a, 17, 40b, 49, 50
230
Latin Maxims
Chapter II CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION B. POWER TO CONSTRUE 1. Legis interpr
etation legis vim obtinet. Judicial construction and interpretation of a statute
acquires the force of law. Chapter III AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION C. CONTEMPORARY CON
STRUCTION 2. Contemporanea exposition est optima et fortissimo in lege. Contempo
rary construction is strongest in law. Optima est legum interpres consuetudo. Cu
stom is the best interpreter of a statute. Regula pro lege, si deficit lex. In d
efault of the law, the maxim rules. 3. Optimus interpres rerum usus. The best in
terpreter of the law is usage. Communis error facit jus. Common error sometimes
passes as current law. Quod ab initio non valet in tractu temporis non convalesc
it. That which was originally void, does not by lapse of time become valid. 4. R
atihabitio mandato aequiparatur. Legislative ratification is equivalent to a man
date. 5. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Follow past precedents and do not d
isturb what has been settled. Interest republicae ut sit finis litium. The inter
est of the state demands that there be an end to litigation. Chapter IV ADHERENC
E TO, OR DEPARTURE FROM, LANGUAGE OF STATUTE LITERAL INTERPRETATION 6. Index ani
mi sermo est. Speech is the index of intention. Animus hominis est anima scripti
. The intention of the party is the soul. Verba legis non est recedendum. From t
he words of the statute there should be no departure. Maledicta et exposition qu
ae corrumpit textum. It is bad construction which corrupts the text. Littera scr
ipta manet. The written word endures. Clausula rebus sic stantibus. Things thus
standing. 7. Absoluta sentential expositore non indigent. When the language of t
he law is clear, no explanation is required. Dura lex sed lex. The law may be ha
rsh but it is the law. Hoc quidem perquam durum est, sed ita lex scripta est. It
is exceedingly hard, but so the law is written. B. DEPARTURE FROM LITERAL INTER
PRETATION 8. Aequitas nunquam contravenit legis. Equity never acts in contravent
ion of the law. Aequum et bonum est lex legume. What is good and equal is the la
w of laws. Jus ars boni et aequi. Law is the art of equity. 9. Ratio legis est a
nima legis. The reason of the law is the soul of the law.
231 Littera necat spiritus vivificate. The letter kills but the spirit gives lif
e. Verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservice. Words ought to be more subs
ervient to the intent, and not the intent to the words. Benignus leges interpret
andae sunt, quod voluntas eraum conservetur. Laws are to be construed liberally,
so that their spirit and reason be preserved. Qui haret in littera haret in cor
tice. He who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes but skin deep int
o its meaning. Quando verba statute sunt speciali, ratio autem generalia, statum
generaliter est intelligendum. When the words used in a statute are special, bu
t the purpose of the law is general, it should be read as the general expression
. 10. Cessante rationi legis, cessat et ipsa lex. When the reason of the law cea
ses, the law itself ceases. 11. Interpretatio talis in ambiguis simper fienda es
t ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, the interpreta
tion of such that will avoid inconveniences and absurdity is to be adopted. Legi
s construction non facit injuriam. The construction of the law will not be such
as to work injury or injustice. Argumentum ab inconvenient plurimum valet in leg
e. An argument drawn from inconvenience is forcible in law. Verba nihil operari
melius est quam absurde. It is better that words should have no operation at all
than that they should operate absurdly. Lex simper intendit quod convenit ratio
ni. The law always intends that which is in accordance with reason. Ubi eadem ra
tio ibi idem jus. Like reason doth make like law. Argumentum a simili valet in l
ege. An argument drawn from a similar case, or analogy, prevails in law. De simi
libus idem est judicium. Concerning similars, the judgment is the same.
Ubi eadem est ratio, ibi est eadem legis disposition. Where there is the same re
ason, there is the same law 12. Ea est accipienda interpretation quae vitio care
t. That interpretation is to be adopted which is free from evil or injustice. Le
x injusta non est lex. An unjust law is not a law. 13. Fiat justitia, ruat coelu
m . Let right be done, though the heavens fall. Nemo est supra legis. Nobody is
above the law. Nulla potential supra legis esse debet. No power must be above th
e law. 14. Jurae naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria f
ieri locupletiorem. It is certainly not agreeable to natural justice that a stra
nger should reap the pecuniary produce of another mans work. 15. Surplusagium non
nocet. Surplusage does not vitiate a statute. Utile per inutile non vitiatur. T
he useful is not vitiated by the non-useful. ) 16. Falsa demostratio non nocet,
cum de corpore constat. False description does not preclude construction nor vit
iate the meaning of the statute. Nil facit error nominis cum de corpora vel pers
ona constat. Error in name does not make an instrument inoperative when the desc
ription is sufficiently clear. Certum est quod certum reddi potest. That is suff
iciently certain which can be made certain. 17. Ibi quid generaliter conceditur,
inest haec exception, si non aliquid sit contras jus basque. Where anything is
granted generally, exemption from rigid application of law is implied; that noth
ing shall be contrary to law and right.
232 18. Summum jus, summa injuria. The rigor of the law would be the highest inj
ustice. Jus summum saepe, summa est militia. Extreme law is often extreme wrong.
19. Nemo tenetur ad impossibilia. The law obliges no one to perform an impossib
ility. Impossibilum nulla obigatio est. There is no obligation to do an impossib
le thing. Lex non cogit ad impossibilia. The law does not require an impossibili
ty. Lex non intendit aliquid impossible. The law does not intend the impossible.
C. IMPLICATIONS 20. Ex necessitate legis. By the necessary implication of law.
In eo quod plus sit, simper inest et minus. The greater includes the lesser. Cui
jurisdiction data est, ea quoque concessa esse videntur sine quibus jurisdictio
n explicari non potuit. When jurisdiction is given, all powers and means essenti
al to its exercise are also given. 21. Ubi jus, ibi remedium. Where there is a r
ight, there is a remedy for violation thereof. Ubi jus incertum, ibi jus nullum.
Where the law is uncertain, there is no right. 22. Ex dolo malo non oritur acti
on. An action does not arise from fraud. Nullius commodum capere potest de injur
ia sua propria. No one may derive advantage from his own unlawful act. In pari d
elicto potior est condition defendentis. Where the parties are equally at fault,
the position of the defending party is the better one.
23. Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum. What canno
t, by law, be done directly cannot be done indirectly. Chapter V INTERPRETATION
OF WORDS AND PHRASES A. IN GENERAL 24. Generalia verba sunt generaliter intellig
enda. General words should be understood in their general sense. Generis dictum
generaliter est interpretandum. A general statement is understood in its general
sense. 25. Verba accipienda sunt secundum subjectam materiam. A word is to be u
nderstood in the context in which it is used. Verba mere aequivoca, si per commu
nem usum loquendi in intellectu certo sumuntur, talis intellectus preferendus es
t. Equivocal words or those with double meaning are to be understood according t
o their common and ordinary sense. Verba artis ex arte. Words of art should be e
xplained from their usage in the art to which they belong. Verba generalia restr
inguntur ad habilitatem rei vel personam. General words should be confined accor
ding to the subject-matter or persons to which they relate. 26. Ubi lex non dist
inguit necnon distinguere debemus. Where the law does not distinguish, the court
s should not distinguish. 27. Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio. Of things dissimi
lar, the rule is dissimilar. B. ASSOCIATED WORDS 28. Noscitur a sociis. A thing
is known by its associates. 29. Ejesdem generis. Of the same kind or specie.
233 30. Expressio unius est exclusion alterius. The express mention of one perso
n, thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. Expressum facit ces
sare tacitum. What is expressed puts an end to that which is implied. 31. Argume
ntum a contrario. Negative-Opposite Doctrine: what is expressed puts an end to t
hat which is implied. 32. Cassus omissus pro omisso habendus est. A person, obje
ct or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intent
ionally. 33. Ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sentential. A q
ualifying word or phrase should be understood as referring to the nearest antece
dent. 34. Reddendo singular singulis. Referring each to each, or referring each
phrase or expression to its appropriate object, or let each be put in its proper
place. C. PROVISOS, EXCEPTIONS AND SAVING CLAUSES 35. Exceptio firmat regulam i
n casibus non exceptis. A thing not being expected must be regarded as coming wi
thin the purview of the general rule. Chapter VI STATUTE CONSIDERED AS A WHOLE I
N RELATION TO OTHER STATUTES A. STATUTE CONSTRUED AS A WHOLE 36. Optima statute
interpretatrix est ipsum statutum. The best interpreter of the statute is the st
atute itself. Ex tota materia emergat resolution. The exposition of a statute sh
ould be made from all its parts put together.
Injustum est, nisi tota lege inspecta, de una aliqua ejus particula proposita in
dicare vel respondere. It is unjust to decide or to respond as to any particular
part of a law without examining the whole of the law. Nemo enim aliquam partem
recte intelligere possit antequam totum interum atque interim perlegit. The sens
e and meaning of the law is collected by viewing all the parts together as one w
hole and not of one part only by itself. Ex antecendentibus et consequentibus fi
t optima interpretation. A passage will be best interpreted by reference to that
which precedes and follows it. Verba posterima propter certitudinem addita ad p
riora quae certitudine indigent sunt referenda. Reference should be made to a su
bsequent section in order to explain a previous clause of which the meaning is d
oubtful. 37. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. A law sho
uld be interpreted with a view of upholding rather than destroying it. B. STATUT
E CONSTRUED IN RELATION TO CONSTITUTION AND OTHER STATUTES 38. Pari materia. Of
the same matter. Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpreta
ndi modus. Every statute myst be so construed and harmonized with other statutes
as to form a uniform system of law. 39. Distingue tempora et concordabis jura.
Distinguish times and you will harmonize law. - Tempora mutantur et leges mutant
ur in illis. - Times have changed and laws have changed with them. Mutatis mutan
dis. With the necessary changes.
234 Chapter VII STRICT OR LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION A. IN GENERAL 40. Salus populi es
t suprema lex. The voice of the people is the supreme law. Statuta pro publico c
ommodo late interpretantur. Statutes enacted for the publc good are to be constr
ued liberally. Privatum incommodum publico bono pensatur. The private interests
of the individual must give way to the accommodation of the public. B. STATUTES
STRICTLY CONSTRUED 41. Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. The act does not
make a person guilty unless the mind is also guilty. Actus me invito facturs non
est meus actus. An act done by me against my will is not my act. 42. Privilegia
recipiunt largam interpretationem voluntate consonem concedentis. Privileges ar
e to be interpreted in accordance with the will of him who grants them. Renuncia
tio non praesumitur. Renunciation cannot be presumed. 43. Strictissimi juris. Fo
llow the law strictly. 44. Nullum tempus occurit regi. There can be no legal rig
ht as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.
Chapter VIII MANDATORY AND DIRECTIONAL STATUTES A. MANDATORY STATUTES 45. Vigila
ntibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt. The law aids the vigilant, not those
who slumber on their rights. Potior est in tempore, potior est in jure. He who
is first in time is preferred in right. Chapter IX PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE S
TATUTES A. IN GENERAL 46. Lex prospicit, non respicit. The law looks forward, no
t backward. Lex de futuro, judex de praeterito. The law provides for the future,
the judge for the past. - Nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non pr
aeteritis. - A new statute should affect the future, not the past. Leges quae re
trospciunt, et magna cum cautione sunt adhibendae neque enim janus locatur in le
gibus. Laws which are retrospective are rarely and cautiously received, for Janu
s has really no place in the laws. Leges et constitutiones futuris certum est da
re formam negotiis, non ad facta praeterita revocari, nisi nominatim et de praet
erito tempore et adhuc pendentibus negotiis cautum sit. Laws should be construed
as prospective, not retrospective, unless they are expressly made applicable to
past transactions and to such as are still pending. B. STATUTES GIVEN PROSPECTI
VE EFFECT 47. Nullum crimen sine poena, nulla poena sine lege. There is no crime
without a penalty, there is no penalty without a law. 48. Favorabilia sunt ampl
ianda, odiosa restringenda. Penal laws which are favorable to the accused are gi
ven retroactive effect.
235 Chapter X AMENDMENT, REVISION, CODIFICATION AND REPEAL A. REPEAL 49. Leges p
osteriores priores contrarias abrogant. Later statutes repeal prior ones which a
re repugnant thereto. 50. Generalia specialibus non derogant. A general law does
not nullify a specific or special law.
TITLE OF THE ACT (INTRINSIC AID) D. Nigrum Nunquam Excedere Debet Rubrum. The bl
ack (body of the act printed in black) should never go beyond the red (title or
rubric of the statute printed in red).
BINDING FORCE OF RULES OF INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION A. Ignorantia legis ne
minem excusat. Ignorance of the law excuses no one. LANGUAGE OF STATUTE WHEN AMB
IGUOUS B. In obscuris inspici solere quod versimilius est, aut quod plerumque fi
eri solet. When matters are obscure, it is customary to take what appears to be
more likely or what usually often happens. Ambiguitas verborum patens nulla veri
ficatione excluditur. A patent ambiguity cannot be cleared up by extrinsic evide
nce. PRESUMPTION AGAINST INJUSTICE AND HARDSHIP C. Ad ea quae frequentibus accid
unt jura adaptatur. Laws are understood to be adapted to those cases which most
frequently occur. Jus constitui oportet in his quae ut plurimum accidunt non qua
e ex inordinato. Laws ought to be made with a view to those cases which happen m
ost frequently, and not to those which are of rare or accidental occurrence. Quo
d semel aut bis existit praetereunt legislatores. Legislators pass over what hap
pens only once or twice. De minimis non curat lex. The law does not concern itse
lf with trifling matters.

Statutory Construction Case Brief on People of the Philippines v. Buenviaje

Enviado por

Dados do documento

Título original

Direitos autorais

Formatos disponíveis

Compartilhar este documento

Compartilhar ou incorporar documento

Opções de compartilhamento

Você considera este documento útil?

Este conteúdo é inapropriado?

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

Statutory Construction Case Brief on People of the Philippines v. Buenviaje

Enviado por

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

1

3 Casco Philippine Chemical Co. Inc., v. Hon. Pedro Gimenez

4 Ichong, etc., et al. v. Hernandez, etc., and Sarmiento

5 People of the Philippines v. Buenviaje

6 Cordero v. Hon. Cabatuando

7 Ayson and Ignacio v. Provincial Board of Rizal

8 Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Reyes

9 Del Rosario v. Carbonell, et al.

10 People of the Philippines v. Apolonio Carlos

11 KMU Labor Center v. Garcia Jr.

12 China Banking Corp. v. CA

13 Grego v. Commission on Elections

FACTS: Respondent issued Ordinance No. 24 charging slaughterhouses in the munici

14 National Housing Authority v. Reyes

15 Hon. Alfredo S. Lim v. Felipe G. Pacquing;

22 Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte

23 Cebu Portland Cement v. Municipality of Naga, Cebu

24 Quijano v. Development Bank of the Philippines

25 Davao Light & Power Co. v. Commissioner of Customs

26 Floresca v. Philex Mining Corporation

28 People of the Philippines v. Moro Macarandang

30 Sumulong v. Commission on Elections

32 People of the Philippines v. Echaves

33 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX Sales, Inc.

35 People of the Philippines v. Yabut

36 People of the Philippines v. Manaba

37 Employees Club, Inc. v. China Banking Corporation

38 Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court

39 Tinio, et al. v. Frances, et al.

40 Luzon Stevedoring Company v. Trinidad

43 National Police Commission v. De Guzman, Jr.

44 Mayon Motors v. Acting CIR

45 Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Luzon Marine Department Union

46 Buenaseda v. Secretary Flavier

47 Zamora v. Collector of Internal Revenue

52 Garcia et al. v. Hipolito et al.

53 Commissioner of Customs v. ESSO Standard Eastern Inc.

55 Sagun v. Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation

56 Asturias Sugar Central v. Commissioner of Customs

57 Manila Jockey Club Inc. v. Games and Amusement Board

59 Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) v. Bureau of Labor Relati

60 Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees Union (IBAAEU) v. Inciong

61 United Christian Missionary Society vs. Social Security Commission

62 Interprovincial Autobus Co., Inc. v. CIR

63 Howden & Co., Ltd. v. Collector of Internal Revenue

64 Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice

65 J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Mariano & Aquial & Cordova

66 Tolentino v. Commission on Elections

67 U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho

68 De los Santos vs. Mallare

69 People of the Philippines vs. Muoz

71 In Re: Appointment of Valenzuela and Vallarta

74 Globe-Mackay v. NLRC and Salazar

76 Aparri v. Court of Appeals

79 Eliseo Silva v. Belen Cabrera

80 National Federation of Labor v. Hon. Eisma

82 National Marketing Corp. (NAMARCO) v. Miguel D. Tecson

84 Mateo Casela v. Court of Appeals, and Exequiel Magsaysay

85 Federation of Free Workers v. Inciong

86 Prasnik v. Republic of the Philippines

87 Salenillas v. Court of Appeals

88 Ala Mode Garments, Inc. v. NLRC

92 Bello v. Court of Appeals