Joya, et al. vs.

PCGG
GR No. 96541. August 24, 1993
FACTS:
Mateo Caparas, then Chairman of the PCGG, through the authority granted by then
Pres. Aquino, signed a Consignment Agreement allowing Christies of New York to
auction off Old Masters Paintings and the 18 th and 19th century silverware alleged to be
part of the ill-gotten wealth of Pres. Marcos, his relatives, and cronies, for and in behalf
of RP. 35 petitioners in this Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus with
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order sought to enjoin PCGG from
proceeding with the auction sale which nevertheless proceeded on schedule.
Petitioners claim that, as Filipino citizens, taxpayers, and artists deeply concerned with
the preservation and protection of the countrys artistic wealth and that the paintings and
silverware are public properties collectively owned by them and the people in general to
view and enjoy as great works of art alleging that they have been deprived of their right
to public property without due process of law, they have the legal personality to restrain
the respondents who are acting contrary to their public duty to conserve the artistic
creations as mandated by Sec. 14-18 of Art. XIV of the Constitution and RA 4846.
ISSUE:
Whether the petition complies with the legal requisites for the Court to exercise its
power of judicial review over this case.
HELD:
NO. Petitioners failed to show that they have the legal standing, i.e. a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that they have sustained or would sustain direct
injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged, because they are not
the legal owners of the artworks/silverwares or that the valued pieces have become
publicly owned since such artworks are in fact owned by the Metropolitan Museum of
Manila Foundation, a non-profit, non-stock corporation established to promote nonPhilippine arts and the silverwares were in fact gifts to the Marcos couple on their silver
wedding anniversary. The mandamus suit cannot prosper because what the petitioners
seek is the enjoining of an official act because it is constitutionally infirmed not because
they are after the fulfilment of a positive duty required of the respondent public officials
which is the only ground for a writ of mandamus to be issued. The taxpayers suit
cannot prosper as well since the items in question were acquired from private sources
and not with public money.
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual controversy
one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims
susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on

extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. A case

becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become stale, such as this case.
Since the purpose of this petition for prohibition is to enjoin the respondents from
holding the auction sale of the artworks on a particular date which had long past, the
issues raised have become moot and academic. Nevertheless, the Court has the
discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of an
actual case or legal standing when paramount public interest is involved. However,
there is no such justification in this petition.

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS vs Torres Case Digest

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. petitioner, vs. HON.
RUBEN D. TORRES, as Secretary of the Department of Labor & Employment, and
JOSE N. SARMIENTO, as Administrator of the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, respondents.
[G.R. No. 101279. August 6, 1992.]
FACTS: DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16 Series of
1991 temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of
Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. As a result of the department order
DOLE, through the POEA took over the business of deploying Hong Kong bound
workers.
The petitioner, PASEI, the largest organization of private employment and recruitment
agencies duly licensed and authorized by the POEA to engage in the business of
obtaining overseas employment for Filipino land-based workers filed a petition for
prohibition to annul the aforementioned order and to prohibit implementation.
ISSUES:
1. whether or not respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess
of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars;
2. whether or not the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the
Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and
3. whether or not the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the
National Administrative Register were not complied with.
RULING:
1. The respondents acted well within in their authority and did not commit grave
abuse of discretion. This is because Article 36 (LC) clearly grants the Labor
Secretary to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities, to wit:

Art. 36. Regulatory Power. The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to
restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies
within the coverage of this title [Regulation of Recruitment and Placement
Activities] and is hereby authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and
regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of this title.
2. The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative
bodies is constitutional. It is necessitated by the growing complexities of the
modern society.
3. The orders and circulars issued are however, invalid and unenforceable. The
reason is the lack of proper publication and filing in the Office of the National
Administrative Registrar as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code to wit:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazatte, unless it is otherwise provided;
Article 5 of the Labor Code to wit:
Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. The Department of Labor and other
government agencies charged with the administration and enforcement of
this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary implementing
rules and regulations. Such rules and regulations shall become effective
fifteen (15) days after announcement of their adoption in newspapers of
general circulation;
and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987
which provide:
Sec. 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the
Philippines Law Center, three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it.
Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within
three (3) months shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any
party or persons. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.)
Sec. 4. Effectivity. In addition to other rule-making requirements provided
by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective
fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different
date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to
public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed
in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate
measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected
by them. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987).

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP

VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY,
Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY,
ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 205728

January 21, 2015

FACTS:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private
compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was
approximately six feet (6) by ten feet (10) in size. They were posted on the front walls
of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message IBASURA
RH Law referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354.
The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the
heading Conscience Vote and lists candidates as either (Anti-RH) Team Buhay with
a check mark, or (Pro-RH) Team Patay with an X mark. The electoral candidates
were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354,
otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were
classified by petitioners as comprising Team Patay, while those who voted against it
form Team Buhay.
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for
by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names
ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of
the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a
political question, hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Courts power of
review.
2. Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies as the case was not brought first before the COMELEC
En Banc or any if its divisions.
3. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.

4. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin
violated petitioners fundamental right to freedom of expression.
5. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or contentneutral regulation.
6. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners right to property.
7. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.

RULING:
FIRST ISSUE: No.
The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of
prudence or modesty. There is no political question. It can be acted upon by this court
through the expanded jurisdiction granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of
the Constitution..
The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the
act of a constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right.
Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the
manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the
fundamental right to expression.
Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an
issue involves a truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the
question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine
whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such
limits.
A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.
Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official
actions of the body to the scrutiny and review of this court.
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free
speech. Any instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does
not fall squarely into any doubt that a political question brings.
SECOND ISSUE: No.

The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is

not proper in this case.
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that
the controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the prerequisite that
something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch or in this
case, organ of government before a court may come into the picture.
Petitioners exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their
medium, had understandable relevance especially during the elections. COMELECs
letter threatening the filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an
actionable infringement of this right. The impending threat of criminal litigation is enough
to curtail petitioners speech.
In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as
COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of
speech.
THIRD ISSUE: No.
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their
position that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that
all of these provisions pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not
candidates. Neither do they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have the
authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression
exercised by a non-candidate in this case.
FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that every citizens expression with political consequences
enjoys a high degree of protection.
Moreover, the respondents argument that the tarpaulin is election
propaganda, being petitioners way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH
Law and rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water.
The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of
the named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election
propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted in return for consideration by
any candidate, political party, or party-list group.
By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included,
while sponsored messages are covered.
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech

Political speech refers to speech both intended and received as a contribution to public
deliberation about some issue, fostering informed and civic minded deliberation. On
the other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does no more
than propose a commercial transaction. The expression resulting from the content of
the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.
FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.
Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions based on the
subject matter of the utterance or speech. In contrast, content-neutral regulation
includes controls merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner
of the speech.
The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The
tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the size of its medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this
court has used the clear and present danger rule as measure.
Under this rule, the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be
substantive, extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high. Only
when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass
constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of overcoming the
presumed unconstitutionality.
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the
regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the
posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression.
There is no reason for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to
post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect
anyone elses constitutional rights.
SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public,
the tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to use their property
is likewise protected by the Constitution.
Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of
private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property
rights is void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process
and equal protection of the laws.
The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals
and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizens

private property. Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which
provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.
SEVENTH ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not
binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as
regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a
tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on
the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political
consequences and not religious speech.
Doctrine of benevolent neutrality
With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent
neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances.
Accommodations are government policies that take religion specifically into account not
to promote the governments favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and
groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to
remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a persons or institutions religion.
As Justice Brennan explained, the government may take religion into account
. . . to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation
individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed,
or to create without state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious
exercise may flourish.
Lemon test
A regulation is constitutional when:
1. It has a secular legislative purpose;
2. It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
3. It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.