Philosophical Papers

ISSN: 0556-8641 (Print) 1996-8523 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rppa20

Technology of the Dead: Objects of Loving

Remembrance or Replaceable Resources?
Adam Buben
To cite this article: Adam Buben (2015) Technology of the Dead: Objects of Loving
Remembrance or Replaceable Resources?, Philosophical Papers, 44:1, 15-37, DOI:
10.1080/05568641.2015.1014538
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2015.1014538

Published online: 24 Feb 2015.

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Date: 29 August 2016, At: 18:10

Philosophical Papers
Vol. 44, No. 1 (March 2015): 15-37

Technology of the Dead: Objects of Loving

Remembrance or Replaceable Resources?
Adam Buben

Abstract: This paper addresses ethical questions surrounding death given imagined but
not unlikely technological advancements in the near future. For example, how will highly
detailed interactive simulations of deceased personalities affect the way we deal with dying
and interact with the dead? Most cultures have at least a vague sense of duties to the dead,
and many of these duties are related to the memorial preservation of decedents. I worry
that our advances might be paralleled by a deteriorating grasp of what proper preservation
is all about. With the phenomenological assistance of the 19th and 20th century
philosophers Sren Kierkegaard, Martin Heidegger, and Jean-Paul Sartre, we can get a
sense of some potential problems for what we ordinarily call progress.
I dont want to achieve immortality through my work; I want to achieve immortality
through not dying. I dont want to live on in the hearts of my countrymen; I want to
live on in my apartment.
Woody Allen1

Humans have a long history of trying to overcome death. Everything

from holding religious beliefs about the afterlife to the planning of a
family might fall into this category. The idea is that even though my
body will one-day collapse, some part of me might carry on, be it my soul
or my genes. We even build structures and create works of art and
literature in the hope that our legacies will last well after we are gone.
These days we have innumerable means of passing on pieces of ourselves
to posterity: digital images and video, websites of every imaginable
variety, and cryogenic preservation complete with dreams of profound

1 This oft-quoted passage is usually attributed to The Illustrated Woody Allen Reader
(Sunshine 1993: 250), or to On Being Funny (Lax 1975: 232). Oddly, these books only
include the first sentence of the passage, while there is no clear source for the second
sentence.
ISSN 0556-8641 print/ISSN 1996-8523 online
2015 The Editorial Board, Philosophical Papers
DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2015.1014538
http://www.tandfonline.com

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Adam Buben

future medical advances.2 Unsatisfied with existing technological

trajectories, the wealthiest and most desperate among us seek ever more
unlikely and hazily defined innovationse.g. the transfer of the mind
into an artificial brain or computer program.3
Just as death separates people into two classes (the living and the
dead), there seem to be two perspectives from which to approach this mass
of death-defying strategies. There is the perspective of the one dying
(bracketing the possibility of an afterlife, surely the dead have no
perspective), and there is the point of view of the one who is, or will be,
left behind.4 Speaking purely about survival, I would suggest that such
strategies are always somehow dubious from the former perspective, while
they seem to be increasingly effective from the latter. What I mean is that,
on a grand enough scale, it remains hard to see how any emerging
technologies could change the finite human condition, but we are
becoming better and better at leaving our survivors with less to miss.
However, even if technology cannot provide for every sort of survival, its
successesin terms of preserving more of the dead for the livinghave a
significant impact upon both perspectives, and this impact raises a variety
of interesting questions. On the one hand, how might expanding
posthumous legacy quality and durability affect the way we feel about
dying? Does ones own approaching demise become even more isolating
and painful as we eliminate certain reasons for others to be upset about
the loss? Or would it provide people with some consolation to know that
their loved ones will not have such a sizeable void to fill when they are
gone? On the other hand, before we address these fascinating questions
2 Some scientists even hope to find answers in studying the so-called immortal jellyfish
(Rich 2012).
3 Consider, for example, the 2045 Initiative, sponsored by a Russian real estate mogul,
which has established the rather ambitious goal of making this sort of transfer a reality on
the way to ultimately freeing humans from material bodies in the next three decades
(Danigelis 2012). Also see Goldstein 2012. On some of the conceptual problems related to
the computer program scenario, see e.g., Zimmerman 2013: 101.
4 Insofar as we are all on our way to death, and we have all been left behind by someone
who beat us to it, I recognize that in some sense we always occupy both perspectives
simultaneously.

Technology of the Dead

17

about how preserving more of the dead changes how we face death, we
should first address questions related to the changing preservation itself,
and then consider the effect that some of our advances might have on
long-held beliefs about our moral duties to the dead. Perhaps a few of our
attitudes and beliefs are incoherent or simply in need of revision, but it
may also be the case that certain kinds of progress leave us in danger of
losing valuable aspects of what makes us good survivors, descendants, or
bearers of legaciesespecially if we are not paying attention.
What Gets Left Behind
The first thing to do is clarify exactly what it means to say that we are
getting better at leaving our survivors with less to miss. What I want to
emphasize is how much easier it has become to keep memories alive and
stay connected to those long gone. Despite the rise of family tree
research websites, most people with less notable lineages would have a
very difficult time finding much information about their family history
beyond four or five generations back. This is unlikely to be the case for
our descendants. Whereas the dead used to fade fairly quickly from the
collective memory of the living, they will have an increasingly longer and
more robust afterlife as we come up with new ways to keep them
around. Before raising concerns about any of these developments, the
range of benefits they offer must be acknowledged.
Consider the situation of a person living in the most technologically
advanced of societies two hundred years ago. Suppose this person
recently lost a loved one, their mother. What does this person have left
of consolation and reminder of their departed parent? In addition to
ever-fading memories, perhaps a family shrine or a small tombstone in a
graveyard nearby, some letters, and other personal effects, which must
take on great meaning for this surviving child. If the mother had been
wealthy, famous, or particularly talented, perhaps there would be
portraits, works written by or about her, and the esteem (or contempt) of
a large number of other survivors (and maybe the likelihood of some of
this would be diminished in the case of a mother given the state of

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Adam Buben

gender equality in this period). But the bereaved will never again hear
the mothers voice, see her mannerisms, or engage her in any reciprocal
interaction.
Things have changed rather rapidly in the last two hundred years.
Both the rich and famous and the poor and common alike have access to
vast quantities of technological gadgetry that helps to preserve the
memory of the dead. When my mother dies, I will have no trouble finding
pictures and video recordings that prevent my forgetting what she
sounded like, looked like, and thought (this is still of course not true of
everyone, but I am hardly an exceptional case). I can even have her
physical remains preserved in the form of a vinyl record or diamond
necklace, if that helps me to keep her close (Spitznagel 2012; Biehl 2005).
While I leave the question about the value of making ones mother into
a decorative ornament open for now, most of these developments sound
like steps in a very a positive direction. Who would not want more ways to
commemorate and stay close to their deceased loved ones? In addition to
the potential comfort offered by things like video recordings of the
deceased, such resources also make it easier to pass along practical advice,
create a record of personal stories, and connect with members of nonoverlapping generations. I would find it fascinating to hear my greatgrandfather tell the story of his experience traveling to America in the
early twentieth century. What is made possible along these lines by
relatively recent technological achievement is truly remarkable if one
pauses to think about what we previously had to do without, and this is
before taking into account what is now available to us when it comes to the
movers and shakers of bygone eras. It is a wonderful thing to be able to
watch Martin Luther Kings I Have a Dream speech, for instance, during
a quick visit to YouTube, and it would be similarly wonderful to have this
sort of access to Abraham Lincoln delivering his Gettysburg Address.
Given all of the benefits provided, on what grounds would anyone criticize
the array of ever-emerging technological strategies for the preservation of
the dead? Perhaps it is necessary to reach forward a bit in order to offer an
example that will make the potential dangers stand out.

Technology of the Dead

19

An Imagined but Not So Far-Fetched Scenario

Without looking too far beyond our current cutting-edge methods of
sustaining significant aspects of the dead, I think something even more
impressive is on the way. Voice recognition software, for example, is
beginning to come into its own, and when this is combined with existing
high-end digital audio and video recording devices and the always
improving motion-capture technology used in big-budget films, I believe
that we are on the road toward Interactive Personality Constructs (IPCs).
I am not suggesting some highly advanced science fiction scenario of
artificial intelligence, but rather something like a smartphone app (say,
for the iPhone 25) that, admittedly, still outstrips our capabilities.5
Imagine this: while your mother is still flourishing and lucid, she makes
arrangements to have her appearance, mannerisms, voice, memories,
and thoughts on a wide array of topics collected and synthesized through
advanced recording and motion-capture techniques. With the addition
of sophisticated voice recognition, you would be able, in a way that is
similar to playing a video game, to access her moving, speaking image
and engage it in conversation (one might eventually consider
holographic projection of the image for a more embodied feel6). The
quality of interactive conversation is of course the issue in need of the
most progress, but rudimentary question and answer is already possible
with an IPC that many people have in their pockets.7
The applications and implications of such a development are legion,
but on the topic of preserving more of the dead, I am curious about its
impact on the way we relate to the deaths of others. Like the technology
that is currently available, the appearance of IPCs looks like a wonderful
5 Consider the similar ideas that are currently under development in connection with
Twitter (Cangeloso 2013) and the website http://www.virtualeternity.com/. Patrick Stokes
also takes up these possibilities in discussing the latter (2012: 370).
6 This is another area that is in need of further development, but we have recently flirted
with the possible implications of such things (Manning 2012).
7 Interestingly, the first episode of the second season of the British television show Black
Mirror deals with a scenario that is very similar, if somewhat more fanciful, to the one
discussed in this paragraph. I am grateful to Ward Jones for bringing this to my attention.

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Adam Buben

innovation that would provide the living with access to more of the dead.
In this case, however, it seems possible to preserve (at least some of)
their personality and camaraderie, which would be lost if it were
necessary to rely only upon existing technology. Among the various
benefits of such a resource, it might feel less demoralizing to lose a loved
one if it were not necessary to go entirely without their company (in
more advanced versions, it would be a bit like having a video-chat with
someone who lives too far away to visit easily (cf. Stokes 2012: 370)).
Clearly, there is nothing about this scenario that would remedy the loss
of a good old-fashioned motherly hug, but one could in theory have a
conversation with an IPC that possesses a great many of her traits just
after attending her funeral. Would the funeral then be less significant;
would we still feel the need to bring flowers to the cemetery? Would
there still be discussion of psychological practices such as saying
goodbye and letting go; would there not be less to let go of? What new
death-rituals would arise?8
Surely, any advancing technology alters social practices and the
morality/etiquette that goes along with them. For example, with the rise
of email, texting, and social media comes the rise in expectations of an
almost immediate response to messages; a delayed response could give
the impression of a lack of interest or enthusiasm and lead to hurt
feelings. Perhaps this growing impatience and sensitivity is a minor
nuisance easily dismissed when compared with the wonders of instant
mass communication, but maybe it is worth noticing anyway, and maybe
other advances generate more serious worries. It might be the case that
there is something especially troublesome about the alteration of
practices and values portended by IPCs. Consider the difference between
the following means of preservation after a loss: recollection and
replacement. The former aims to keep us aware of what has been taken
8 In addition to these questions, I wonder if the prospect of a suicide would be as
unsettling if more aspects of the supposedly unique and valuable individual about to take
their own life had already been preserved. Although suicide is not a focus of this paper, I
will later discuss an interesting example involving these issues.

Technology of the Dead

21

from usit is thus in part an attempt at preservation of an irremediable

void; but the latter seeks to overcome, ignore, or at least mitigate the fact
that anything has been lost at allit is an attempt at preservation of the
status quo.9 While IPCs are simply a plausible extension of the trend of
technological preservation that can be traced back for quite some time,
they seem to possess an intensified aspect of longing for replacement
that has perhaps always been present to a lesser degree in earlier
technological strategies mostly aimed at reminder. Focusing on one very
recent, yet (relative to IPCs) still earlier, case, Elaine Kasket provides
several examples of memorialized Facebook pages filling in for the dead.
Speaking of a deceased friend, one of her interviewees says, when Im
communicating with him on Facebook, there isnt that immediate
reminder that hes gone (Kasket 2012: 254; cf. Stokes 2012: 367).10 As
our recollection aids become more about replacement, we might be
concerned about an increasing insensitivity toward the meaning of losing
someone significant and the value of the simple recollection that
maintains feelings of loss. I suppose the level of concern here has at least
something to do with what sorts of responsibilities one thinks the living
have with respect to the deada topic that must now be considered.
Duties to the Dead
Some might argue that we can have no obligations to the nonexistent.
This argument usually has its roots in the Epicurean position that since
death begins nonexistence and is not a part of life, it is not a state that
allows for either benefit or harm; in fact, it is not a state at all (Epicurus

9 Perhaps it is unfair to offer an example of replacement that involves pets instead of

people, but I often think about the way we sometimes fill the emptiness felt at the loss of an
old dog with a new puppy.
10 An interesting/disturbing corollary here is that we might go on interacting with many
of the Facebook friends that we dont physically see on a regular basis for days or weeks
after the individual behind the profile has died, until someone informs us of the death. In
fact, if some devious loved one with the appropriate passwords wanted to impersonate the
dead by taking over their Facebook profile, some people might never realize that their
friend is gone.

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Adam Buben

1994: 29).11 The idea is that with no possibility of harm or benefit, it

makes no sense to think that the living can do right or wrong by the
dead. There is surely something compelling about this line of reasoning,
but despite any appeal, it does not fit in well with our everyday intuitions
and practices related to the dead. J. Jeremy Wisnewski points to serious
contemporary worries about the morality surrounding archaeological
digs, access to private materials (e.g. email accounts), and the execution
of wills (cf. Stokes 2012: 368), arguing (by reductio ad absurdum based on
the nature of promise-making) that there may indeed be a rational
grounding for our common sensibilities (2009: 54-70). While the present
paper cannot delve fully into these issues, it will nonetheless proceed
with something like Wisnewskis view that our sensibilities are not
entirely misguided, and thus, that there are indeed legitimate moral
norms pertaining to what we owe the dead.
One familiar norm suggests a perhaps nebulous period of mourning
during which certain activities are frowned upon.12 For example,
although remarriage after the death of a spouse is now commonplace in
many parts of the world, it is still often considered distasteful to reenter
the dating pool too soon after the death. Whether or not one agrees that
the allegedly premature dating is a genuinely moral matter, there is a
common rejection in such a situation of what appears to be an eagerness
to replace, and a corresponding undervaluing of, the deceased. If one is
willing to consider the possibility that there is an obligation to hold out,
at least for a little while, for the sake of the nonexistent in scenarios like
this, then perhaps there are other sorts of more durable holding out on
11 The Epicurean view has received a great deal of attention in the last four-plus decades
beginning with Thomas Nagels critical Death, which is reprinted in The Metaphysics of
Death (1993: 61-9). In fact, many of the key articles from the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s,
representing both defenders and critics of Epicurus, are contained in this same edited
volume. The discussion has raged on since with responses coming in even greater
frequency up to the present.
12 Though perhaps not as prevalent today, some traditions have recommended quite
specific mourning restrictions. Consider the Confucian claim that a person who for three
years refrains from reforming the ways of his late father can be called a filial son (Ames
and Rosemont 1998, 74).

Technology of the Dead

23

behalf of the dead that might also be obligatory.

In Works of Love, Sren Kierkegaard includes a short discourse titled
The Work of Love in Recollecting One Who Is Dead. While he means to
describe the proper way of relating to the dead, in the end, the discourse
is less concerned about actual practices, such as burial, visiting the
cemetery, and speaking of loved ones long gone, than it is about using
love for the dead to teach oneself how to love the living properly.
Kierkegaard declares,
the work of love in recollecting one who is dead is thus a work of the most
unselfish, the freest, the most faithful love. Therefore go out and practice it;
recollect the one who is dead and just in this way learn to love the living
unselfishly, freely, faithfully. In the relationship to one who is dead, you have
the criterion by which you can test yourself (1995: 358/2004: 351).13

The main idea here is that loving the dead in the right way helps people
identify and do away with their selfish love for others who are still alive.
This selfish sort of love, Kierkegaard explains, is the preferential love of
certain individuals, such as friends and family members, over the rest of
humanity; it is contrary to the Christian love he advocates, which is
meant for every member of humankind, even ones enemies (1995:
19/2004: 27). Because the dead can do absolutely nothing for the living,
and in some sense, have entirely ceased to be (as Kierkegaard reiterates
throughout the discourse), there is nothing about the dead that one can
prefer. Thus, loving the dead is practice for loving non-preferentially, or
unselfishly.
Before there can be any discussion of this application of love for the
dead,14 however, one must acknowledge all that Kierkegaard has to say
about the recollection itself that manifests such love. His major concern
is that one who is dead merely crumbles away more and more into
certain ruin (Kierkegaard 1995: 350/2004: 344). The fact that the dead
13 It has become common practice to include reference to the new Danish fourth edition
of Kierkegaards works because the complete English edition only provides a concordance
with older Danish editions.
14 Much has been written on this topic in the secondary literature on Works of Love. See
e.g., Ferreira 2001: esp. 211-13; Keeley 1999: esp. 241; and Sltoft 1998: esp. 125.

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Adam Buben

cannot do anything to compel the living to prefer or even take notice of

them makes it easy to forget about them. Kierkegaard points out that
the untrustworthiness of human feelings left to their own devices
perhaps never manifests itself more than in this very relationship (1995:
348/2004: 342). While the recently dead are lavished with tears and all
sorts of promises and oaths, social pressures and maybe the human
psyche itself are structured in such a way as to encourage individuals to
overcome their immediate passionate response to loss over time. There
are surely good reasons not to wallow in sorrow for too long, but
mourning is not solely about the feelings of the survivor, according to
Kierkegaard.
In death, something valuable and unique has been lost; if what is lost
is to have any continued meaning and significance then it depends upon
the living, for whom such things are possible.15 Patrick Stokes claims, in
the absence of their object, our feelings of loss eventually dissipate,
leaving the value of what actuated those feelingsthe specific other who
has diedseemingly unattested to (2011: 265). A conscientious,
sustained, and patient commitment to the one that is now missing is
necessary if this value is to be maintained once the turbulent period just
after a death subsides. Kierkegaard explains:
the loving recollection of the dead has to protect itself against the actuality
around one, lest through ever-new impressions it acquire full power to wipe
out the recollection, and it has to protect itself against timein short, it has
to guard its freedom in recollection against that which wants to compel one
to forget (1995: 354/2004: 347).

He is not all that interested in offering comfort to the living here, and
not interested at all in filling the void left behind with new stimuli.
Rather, Kierkegaard suggests that one must preserve instead of cover
over the painful emptinesssomething special is gone, never to return.
In doing so, what was special is allowed to remain, in some sense as what
it was, by way of its notable absence. As Stokes puts it, in recollecting the
15 Kierkegaard does not focus on the possibility of an afterlife in his Works of Love account
of the proper relationship with the dead. For more on this issue, see Allen 2011.

Technology of the Dead

25

dead we simultaneously testify to the distinctive individuals that they

were and in so doing constitute their continued being in the world (2011:
268). What I (and perhaps Stokes as well) have in mind here relies on
something like the phenomenology of absence that Jean-Paul Sartre
offers in Being and Nothingness.
Sartre describes the situation of looking to no avail for a friend he
expected to meet in a caf: my expectation has caused the absence of
Pierre to happen as a real event concerning this caf (1992: 42). In other
words, his disappointed expectation has the effect of constituting Pierre
as the sort of thing that is-not-there, which is quite different from the
rather unremarkable absence of Sartres dentist, for example, whom he
was not even thinking about meeting in the caf. I believe that there is a
strong analogy between the creative/constitutional force of Sartres
expectation in this case and Kierkegaards recollection of the dead. Such
recollection also allows an absence a genuine place of prominence in the
foreground of an otherwise busy and crowded sceneeveryday life. Even
though the technological trajectory under consideration initially seems
to help us meet (what is according to Kierkegaard, at least) our
responsibility for what we might call continued postmortem
constitution, it should be possible by now to see that the relevant
developments can also push us away from our obligation and into
something else.
Inhuman Resources
Insofar as the trajectory that leads to IPCs seeks more and more to
overcome and mitigate the absence of those who die, it may actually
work against the sense of preservation found in the sort of continued
postmortem constitution that Kierkegaard is after. Overcoming an
absence in this way is what I earlier called replacement, and it has little
to do with the dead themselves. It is more about filling a role in
someones life, which has been vacated due to a death, with something
else capable of playing the part. As it shows up in the case of IPCs,
replacement is concerned with taking what can be extracted from the

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Adam Buben

dying before they are gone and using this material as just such a
gap/role-filling resource once the dying is finished. To be sure, this
technology could also have less sinister applications, but if there is a
genuine duty to engage in (perhaps painful) Kierkegaardian
recollection, then the danger of something like IPCs lies in the
possibility of confusing the preservation of (aspects of) the dead as
resources with the preservation of the absence of the dead.16 These
specific worries related to treating the dead as resources find compelling
support in a certain, more general, critique of modern technology.
Martin Heideggers The Question Concerning Technology considers the
essence of technology and the path it has traveled from its ancient
conception to the way it dominates the twentieth century. Heidegger
begins his account by examining the original Greek notion of techn,
which he carefully connects with other key concepts, most importantly
poisisa being responsible for letting something come forth or show up.
He states, techn belongs to bringing-forth, to poisis; it is something
poietic techn is [also] linked with epistm. Both words are names for
knowing in the widest sense. They mean to be entirely at home in
something such knowing provides an opening up it is a revealing
(Heidegger 1977: 13). Ancient technology, on this view, is thus a knowhow that opens up the possibility of events happening in such a way, as
Heidegger continues on to point out, that human ends are met. For
example, consider the understanding of when and where to plant and
harvest; with this sort of knowledge, humans can allow the world to
present them with dependable sustenance.
Modern technology, on the other hand, seems to have little interest
in the openness of the Greek sense, in simply providing the opportunity
for things to come into being as they do; it seeks instead to master,
16 Stokes also addresses the duty of preservation of the dead in the course of discussing
the implications of memorialized Facebook pages, but he does not distinguish between the
two senses of preservation that I focus on here, or consider the danger of overlooking
something significant if preservation as replacement becomes too prominent (2012: 375).
He, thus, seems to be a bit more optimistic about the prospects of technological
preservation (of persons, if not selves, in his technical sense) than I am.

Technology of the Dead

27

exploit, and extract all that is useful or profitable. The field is no longer
a place to care for, where growth and life happen, but a natural resource
that must be yoked and employed for all it is worth (Heidegger 1977:
14-15). On Heideggers view, the modern technological tendency is one
that challenges the world to put out what it wants, when it wants, and as
much as it wants. In his words, everywhere everything is ordered to
stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just so that it
may be on call for a further ordering. We call it the standing-reserve
(1977: 17). This is not to say that the ancient world never coldly
stockpiled resources, or that the ordering of standing-reserve has no hint
of poisis, but Heideggers concern is that the essence of modern
technology is an all-encompassing, yet very narrow and closed-off, type
of revealing. Things are no longer allowed to be what they arethey are
only what they are available to do for us.17
The worst part for Heidegger is that we turn this ordering on
ourselveswe make a standing reserve of human resources, and we
hardly notice or care.18 Humans get caught up in enframing and
become the resource that orders and stockpiles resources for use. For
Heidegger, enframing means the gathering together of that settingupon which sets upon man, i.e., challenges him forth, to reveal the real,
in the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve (1977: 20). We even come
to know ourselves primarily by the particular narrow approach to
ordering that we are caught up ini.e., our occupation. Just as it does
with the natural world, the modern technological tendency forecloses
human freedom and forces us to appear to ourselves and others as only
what we are good for. But this is a mistake, according to Heidegger,
17 There is an underlying anti-humanism to The Question Concerning Technology,
characteristic of many of Heideggers later writings, but it should be remembered that he is
not so much critical of specific technologies, as he is concerned about the essence and
direction of technology in general. Surely, modern farming techniques provide benefits to
countless people, but perhaps it is worth asking about what might be lost in exchange when
we view the world in a way that makes such techniques possible.
18 On the Nazi death camp as a particularly egregious example of the modern
technological impulse making humans into resources, see Thomson 2005: 83.

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Adam Buben

because a human, no less (and probably more) than a field, need not be
so narrowly interpreted. Furthermore, as the entity that does the
interpreting (or the more sinister ordering), human interpretation of
other entities and events need not be so constrained (e.g. a butcher need
not see animals only as meat). While we can be both the agents and the
victims of a rigid and comprehensive enframing, we can also be the free
and open space that allows things simply to come forth however they
are. A human becomes truly free only insofar as he becomes one who
listens and hears, and not one who is simply constrained to obey
(Heidegger 1977: 25).
Although Heidegger does not consider how we might turn our own
dead into standing-reserve to be on hand when needed and set aside
when we are otherwise occupied, there is much in his discussion of the
essence of technology that may be fruitfully applied to this topic. In a
world dominated by enframing, the dead, if not forgotten outright, exist
only insofar as they can play pre-ordered roles in our lives (e.g. the role
of one who would have been proud of my accomplishments or
disappointed in my behavior). Whereas the living, even on Heideggers
fairly bleak view of things, still have some hope of extracting themselves
from the realm of human resources (cf. 1977: 28-35), the dead,
according to Kierkegaard, depend entirely upon the living for their
continued meaning and value. If such meaning and value has any hope
of staying true to the person who has been lost, then it must be
constituted by a survivor who remains open to all that is now missing
(however painful that might be), not simply to what suits the survivors
own purposes. This sort of Heideggerian openness is what is intended by
Kierkegaards notion of recollection, which allows the dead to show up in
some sense as they were. The trend of replacement in our current
technological dealings with the dead, however, covers over and distracts,
making it easy to lose sight of the fact that a unique and valuable person
is now gone (cf. Kasket 2012: 254).

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29

Facing Death
Having addressed different senses of preserving the dead (neither of
which involve formaldehyde), associated moral responsibilities, and
technological developments that impact both, it is now possible to
consider how new ways of encountering and dealing with the dead might
affect the experience of the dying. Given that IPCs, or similar
innovations, do not solve (or even attempt to solve) the problem of
subjective finitude, any more than the aforementioned strategies of
writing books, having children, or taking pictures,19 it still seems likely
that one might feel acute anxiety over their own impending demise.
However, it is also conceivable that some would find comfort (or maybe a
depressing sense of insignificance) in the idea that their loved ones could
be looked after somehow by this new sort of living-will. While the
groundwork has been laid for an array of fascinating inquiries, it will
only be possible to discuss a few key issues here. As was the case in
exploring our relationship with the dead, such inquiries may well suggest
some downsides to the relevant technological gains when it comes to our
relationship with dying.
Perhaps a recent example involving an analogous scenario of
technological preservation will help to shed some light on both these
gains, and their potential drawbacks. On sportswriter Martin Manleys
sixtieth birthday (15 August 2013), he did two notable things: he
launched a new website and he shot himself in the head. The website is a
complex and detailed testament to the life of a man who apparently
enjoyed his existence, but didnt want to see a day when this was no
longer true. Although Manley apologizes to those who may be hurt by
his actions, he provides a rational defense of his decision and anticipates
the arguments of naysayers who will claim that he was sick or selfish.
Here is a key passage from his explanation:
I know the question you are asking. Why did you want to die? or Why

19 And clearly, Kierkegaardian continued postmortem constitution is no more effective in

this direction.

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Adam Buben

didnt you want to live? Here is the answer. I didnt want to die. If I could
have waved a magic wand and lived for 200 years, I would have.
Unfortunately, thats not an option. Therefore, since death is inevitable, the
better question is do I want to live as long as humanly possible OR do I
want to control the time and manner and circumstances of my death? That
was my choice (and yours). I chose what was most appealing to me. Let me
ask you a question. After you die, you can be remembered by a few-line
obituary for one day in a newspaper when youre too old to matter to anyone
anyway OR you can be remembered for years by a site such as this. That
was my choice and I chose the obvious (Manley 2013).

This record of his decision making process is more digital diary than
IPC, but it possesses a similar potential to comfort someone facing death
given a similar, albeit less detailed and interactive, potential for a certain
kind of preservation.
Manley is hardly the first person to leave behind a digital record
related to their suicidethere have even been some cases of livestreaming suicides (Gross 2013)but he does offer a reflective account
that makes a couple of interesting claims about the value he finds in
what he preserves. First, even though Manley is thrilled to death that
[he] left this website (2013) it is worth noting that there is nothing about
leaving behind a website that changes Manleys desire to go on living
indefinitely, if only that were possible.20 He is well aware that the
technological afterlife he achieves is a consolation prize; it is simply
something that he can feel good about passing on to posterity given that
his own first-personal perspective must be snuffed out eventually (cf.
20 Although consideration of the appropriateness of such a desire would take the present
discussion too far afield, it must be mentioned that this is also a topic that has received a
great deal of attention in the last four decades beginning with Bernard Williams critical
The Makropoulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality, (also reprinted in The
Metaphysics of Death (1993: 73-92)). Much like Nagels paper, Williams reflections have
spawned a cottage industry of defenders and critics of immortality. On the one hand are
thinkers such as Jay F. Rosenberg (1983, 201-4), Timothy Chappell (2007), and John
Martin Fischer (2009; 2013), who believe that an indefinitely extended life could be at least
as fulfilling as our current finite lives; and on the other hand are the Williams-esque
Immortality Curmudgeons (as Fischer often calls them) who, like A. W. Moore, conclude
that immortality would nullify the very resources needed to overcome the sense of lifes
meaninglessness (2006: 328).

Technology of the Dead

31

Stokes 2012: 372). Second, he feels confident that the digital/online

realm provides a more accessible and durable medium, particularly for
the sorts of ruminations and characterization that he wants to convey,
than traditional ways of publicly summing up a life. Manley believes that
there is a new resource available, and he embraces the opportunity to
put it to work for him. Just after saying, the thought that my memory or
legacy would come to an abrupt end was unacceptable to me, he laments
the fact that most legacies do end so abruptly, especially considering
existing technology has enabled us to store everything ever said, done or
thought by every person on earth (Manley, 2013).
My present goal is not to heap doubt and scorn upon something that
obviously meant a great deal to this man, but insofar as I think Manleys
views and actions are representative of a growing trend, I do feel that
there are some important caveats to acknowledge when it comes to the
comfort one can justifiably take from such beliefs and behavior. In
connection with Heideggers views on the dangers of making oneself into
a resource, for instance, we might be nervous about overvaluing the
record we make. It might be very difficult to open the flood gates and
consider all that will be lost when my unique perspective is snuffed out,
but as in the case of Kierkegaardian recollection of the dead, perhaps
doing so offers a more genuine testament to the person that I am.
Websites or IPCs are great ways to preserve aspects of myself, but
focusing too much on these aspectswhat Stokes calls the thinner me
(2012: 377)could be a distraction that prevents me from appreciating
all that I am. With a little caution, and likely a few tears, maybe it is
possible to avoid being distracted like this and have it both ways.
A more pressing concern has to do with the future of the thin me that
survives my death via IPC or Internet. Kaskets research participants
talked about on one hand seeing this representation as incredibly
durableforever, eternaland on the other hand being aware of its
non-durability, that it could disappear into nothing at the act of a
Facebook employee, at the behest of a bereaved family member (2012:
256). Despite Manleys belief that he had left something behind

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Adam Buben

potentially lasting forever, Yahoothe company that he paid to host

the websitetook it down due to its supposedly disturbing and
controversial content (Gross 2013). While his website lives on, now
hosted by more open-minded and less mainstream parties, the fear of
Kaskets research participants seems warranted in light of Manleys
treatment. However, such fear should not be limited only to existential
issues, but should also stem from the possibility of continued existence
under degenerate, or otherwise unpleasant, circumstances. Here we have
an interesting parallel with certain worries about medically prolonged
impaired or vegetative conditions. Manley accepts the idea that anyone
can do with [his website] whatever they wish (2013), but he surely did
not intend for it to be taken down immediately by the people he paid to
host it, and it is unclear what he would think if it, say, became the
founding text for a massive suicide cult. The point is that the prospect of
some possible futures of the bits of ourselves that we choose to preserve
may not be so comforting, and once we are gone we have no further
influence over which future comes to fruition.
As I have held throughout this discussion of the death-related
implications of emerging technologies, there is nothing entirely new
about the kind of problem described here, even if there are some novel
aspects to it.21 Unable to explore the significance of the digital realm,
Sartre still managed to recognize the potentially bleak situation of the
nonphysical remains of the dead (Chairman Mao, Jeremy Bentham, and
some Egyptian pharaohs aside, I think we all recognize the generally
bleak situation of the physical remains). His World War II-era magnum
opus argues that to be dead is to be a prey for the living (1992: 695),
and what he means is that the aspects of a person that last beyond
deaththe stories, the reputation, the projects and interestsare in the
hands of the survivors. Sartre, echoing Kierkegaard, explains that to die
is to exist only through the Other, and to owe to him ones meaning
(1992: 696). However, in the antagonistic interplay between oneself and
21 I think this is a point that Kasket does not fully acknowledge.

Technology of the Dead

33

others that Sartre details, it is not only possible, but also likely, that a
persons legacy will not end up as they had hoped, even if they followed
a carefully crafted plan until the end. My death is the final victory of the
other over my way of seeing myself.
This somewhat ominous account can easily be applied to IPCs,
memorialized Facebook pages, and Manleys website. The versions of
our personalities that we intentionally create for posterity can easily be
suppressed, co-opted, or interpreted in unflattering ways once we are no
longer around to fight on their behalf, and we have not yet even
considered the things we accidentally leave behind and hope that no one
ever discovers. Although predicting such things can be difficult, it might
turn out in some cases that the less we leave behind, the better. Having
said all of this, it must also be mentioned that I need not become
embroiled at this point in disputes about the possibility of posthumous
harms that arise with Aristotle (1908: 1100a10-1101b9) and Epicurus,
and continue to the present day. For the sake of my argument, it does
not matter if the deceased Manley was somehow wronged by Yahoo.
What is at stake is whether the living Manley was justified in taking
comfort in producing something that is supposed to be more
dependable than his deteriorating body, but is in reality fraught with
peril. When dealing with the fairly low bar of what people find
comforting, maybe it is enough simply to have left something that is
likely to last awhile and unlikely to be grossly misappropriated, even if it
does not work out that way in the end. Still, I think there might be a hint
of self-deception, or perhaps just a less than thorough self-reflection, if
one does not at least consider the more disturbing possible repercussions
of what one is eager to find comforting.
The Dead End
Despite the exciting recent developments and near-future possibilities
that have the potential to enrich and extend the legacies of the
deceased, it would appear that this ever more robust afterlife is not free
of worries. In addition to perennial problems related to attempts at

34

Adam Buben

keeping more of the dead around, new technological strategies also

seem likely to generate new concerns, or at least exacerbate the old ones.
If we are to avoid overlooking important aspects of our traditional ways
of relating to the dead and facing death ourselves, special caution must
be exercised as we incorporate emerging technologies into our deathrituals and preparation for dying. Furthermore, if honesty, even when it
makes us uncomfortable, is something that we value, then we must be
careful to acknowledge the limitations of what we can hope to achieve
through these technologies. For the genuinely thoughtful, it would
appear that death cannot be conquered from any perspective.22
Leiden University
a.j.buben@luc.leidenuniv.nl
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